State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 at
page 378

The Supreme Court has held in Bhajan Lal case that the High Court can quash the FIR to protect the
accused from malicious prosecution. This landmark case dealt with some important aspects of
section 482 and inherent powers of the High Court. Inevitably the suit underwent the question of
legitimacy that led to the appearance of the same before the Supreme Court. The case holds
importance as it significantly points out the powers and limitations of various authorities at different
points of time throughout the trial of the matter. It re-emphasized the power of investigation that
police holds and in what nature of cases, the necessity of filing an FIR, and the extent to which High
Courts should use their special power of quashing criminal proceedings. The court in this case
quashed the criminal proceeding against the Bhajan Lal, the then Chief Minister of Haryana and
issued seven guidelines which should be followed by the Court in the exercise of its inherent power
vested by section 482 crpc.

Section 482
Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Relevant extract taken from the Judgment

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of

the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court

in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under

Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have

extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by

way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,

though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials,

if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the

Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and

the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence

but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted

by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated

under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of

the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or

where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or

where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.

The Supreme Court further said that the High Court should quash the criminal proceeding in
the rarest of the rare cases. Section 482 crpc does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction of the High
Court and it cannot act according to its whim and caprice.

the High Court has inherent power to quash any criminal proceeding which is an abuse of
process of the court. Filing false FIR or complaint thereby rope the accused in a false
allegation is an abuse of process of the court. A false and frivolous criminal proceeding
adversely affects the criminal justice system. 

Power under section 482 crpc is very vast and unfettered. The landmark judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Bhajan Lal case is an attempt to draw a boundary within which
the High Court should exercise its inherent power. Bhajan Lal case is known for its “Seven
golden rules” to be considered in quashing a criminal proceeding.

Allegations don’t constitute any offence

The High Court can quash the criminal proceeding if it finds that after taking all the
allegations made in FIR or Complaint at their face value, it don’t prima facie constitute any
offence. Prima facie means “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless
disproved or rebutted.”

If allegations do not suggest commission of an offence then the court will quash that
proceeding. In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1, the
Supreme Court reiterated the first golden rule of Bhajan Lal’s case. 

FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence

The High Court can quash the FIR if it does not disclose the commission of a cognisable
offence. FIR relates with commission of a cognisable offence only. Officer in charge of the
police station cannot record any information (FIR) pertaining to the non cognisable offence
under  Section 154 of the CrPC. Cognisable offences are serious offences. If FIR does not
disclose cognisable offence, the investigation on such an FIR will impede the rights of
accused.
After recording the FIR the investigating officer can arrest the accused without warrant or
order of the Magistrate. The accused will languish in police custody for some time. Such an
illegal police custody will result in physical and mental harassment of the accused. Therefore,
the High Court will quash the FIR which does not disclose cognisable offence. 

Uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

The baseless allegation in FIR is a ground of quashing. There must be some evidence in
support of commission of any offence. In devoid of evidence, the prosecution cannot prove
that the accused has committed an offence. A criminal proceeding without evidence will not
only frustrate the criminal justice system but also invade the fundamental right of accuse.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has held in Bhajan Lal’s case that a criminal proceeding shall
be quashed if uncontroverted allegations have been made in FIR.

Allegation in FIR constitutes non cognisable offence

A police officer cannot investigate a non-cognisable offence without permission of the
Magistrate. Non cognisable offences are less serious offences. It does not harm our society as
much as compared to cognisable offences. Therefore, the CrPC embodies some restrictions
on the police power towards investigation of non-cognisable offences. 

Carrying out Investigation in non-cognisable offence without permission of Magistrate

frustrates the founding principle of the code of criminal procedure. It is an abuse of the
process of the court. Hence, the High Court will quash such FIR under section 482 CrPC.

Allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd

The High Court can quash the FIR when allegations are absurd and lacking firm ground to
investigate that offence. Allegations in the FIR must be solid and capable of giving a reason
for initiating  investigation against the accused. CrPC does not permit launching an
investigation upon an absurd FIR. Because a police officer can harass the accused in
connivance with the informant. Therefore, an absurd allegation in FIR constitutes a ground
for quashing the FIR. 

When there is an express legal bar in continuance of

criminal proceeding
The High Court can quash the criminal proceeding which is carried on in breach of pre legal
requirement. Section 195, 196, 197, 198 & 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure put some
pre-conditions for launching a criminal proceeding against the accused. Breach of such a pre
condition will nullify the investigation. Thus such breach will give a ground to quash that
criminal proceeding. 

Criminal proceeding with mala-fide intention

When an accused has been falsely implicated by manipulation of facts then it is said to be a
mala-fide criminal proceeding. Such a mala fide intention constitutes a ground to quash the
proceeding. Filing false FIR is a very easy task in India. Section 482 CrPC provides a
protection to the accused from such a mala-fide proceeding. The High Court can quash the
proceeding if finds that information has manipulated the fact and launched a criminal case
with bad intention. 
Dissented
State of Bihar and Ors. Vs. P.P. Sharma and Ors

In this case R.K. Singh, IAS office sent a written report to the Station House Officer on the basis of
which a case under Sections 409, 420, 468, 469, 471, 120B I.P.C. and 7 of the Essential Commodities
Act was registered against eight persons including Tapeshwar Singh, P.P. Sharma and G.D. Mishra.

Tapeshwar Singh and P.P. Sharma accused persons filed Writ Petition before the Patna High Court
with a prayer that the First Information Report be quashed.

The High Court heard the arguments in writ and quashed the FIR and the criminal proceedings
against the accused-petitioners. Then appeal was made against the decision before the Supreme
Court questioning the Jurisdiction and powers of thew High Court.

Relevant Paragraphs:

22

The question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution
is initiated on extraneous considerations and for an unauthorised purpose. There is no material
whatsoever is this case to show that on the date when the FIR was lodged by R.K. Singh he was
activated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. The dominant purpose of registering the case
against the respondents was to have an investigation done into the allegations contained in the FIR
and in the event of there being sufficient material in support of the allegations to present the
charge- sheet before the court. There is no material to show that the dominant object of registering
the case was the character assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate them. This
Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. J.T. 1990 (4) S.C. 655 permitted the
State Government to hold investigation afresh against Ch. Bhajan Lal inspite of the fact that
prosecution was lodged at the instance of Dharam Pal who was economical towards Bhajan Lal.

60

It may be honest and bonafide exercise of power. There are no grounds made out or shown to us
that the first information was not lodged in good faith. State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal J.T. (1991) 4 SC
655 is an authority for the proposition that existence of deep seated political vendetta is not a
ground to quash the F.I.R. Therein despite the attempt by the respondent to prove by affidavit
evidence corroborated by documents of the mala fides and even on facts as alleged no offence was
committed, this Court declined to go into those allegations and relegated the dispute for
investigation. Unresistingly I hold that the findings of the High Court that F.I.R. gets vitiated by the
mala fides of the Administrator and the chargesheets are the results of the mala fides of the
informant or investigator, to say the least, is fantastic and obvious gross error of law
I am constrained to hold that the learned Judges have committed gravest errors of law in quashing
the F.I.R. and Charge-sheets. Since the proceedings are yet to start I decline to go into the merits of
the respective contentions, though vehemently argued by Shri R.K. Jain, on merits, and Kapil Sibal in
rebuttal since expressing any view either way would gravely prejudice the case of the accused or the
prosecution. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs
State of Maharashtra Vs. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed

This appeal was made against the decision of the Bombay High Court quashing the proceedings
under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 against respondent Abdul Hamid
Haji Mohammed on the ground that the provisions of TADA Act are not attracted to the allegations
against him.

Filed for quashing by ram jeth manali

The lust question is: Whether the High Court was empowered in the present case to invoke its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the correctness of the view taken by the
Designated Court and to quash the prosecution of the respondent under the TADA Act

Shri Jethmalani contended, placing reliance on the decisions in R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab and
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Ors. that in the facts of this case, the High Court had such
a jurisdiction since there is no accusation against the respondent in the chargesheet filed in the
Designated Court which, if believed, must result in his conviction for an offence punishable under
TADA Act We are not impressed by this argument of Shri Jethmalani. It is no doubt true that in an
extreme case if the only accusation against the respondent prosecuted in the Designated Court in
accordance with the provisions of TADA Act is such that ex facie it cannot constitute an offence
punishable under TADA Act, then the High Court may be justified in invoking the power under Article
226 of the Constitution on the ground that the detention of the accused is not under the provisions
of TADA Act. We may hasten to add that this can happen only in extreme cases which would be rare
and that power of the High Court is not exercisable in cases like the present where it may be
debatable whether the direct accusation made in conjunction with the attendant circumstances, if
proved to be true, is likely to result in conviction for an offence under TADA Act. The moment there
is a debatable area in the case, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution and the gamut of the procedure prescribed under TADA Act must be
followed, namely raising the objection before the Designated Court and, if necessary, challenging the
order of the Designated Court by appeal in the Supreme Court as provided in Section 19 of TADA
Act. In view of the express provision of appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment, sentence
or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Designated Court, there is no occasion for the High
Court to examine merits of the order made by the Designated Court that the Act applies. We have
no doubt that in the present case wherein the High Court had to perform the laboured exercise of
scrutinising the material containing the accusation made against the respondent and the merits of
the findings recorded by the Designated Court holding that the provisions of TADA Act were
attracted, there was sufficient indication that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution was not available. The ratio of the decisions of this Court in R.P. Kapur and
Bhajan Lal on which reliance is placed by Shri Jethmalani, has no application to the facts of the
present case. There was thus no justification for the High Court in the present case to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for examining the merits of the controversy much
less for quashing the prosecution of respondent Abdul Hamid in the Designated Court for offences
punishable under TADA Act.

The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the High Court was not

empowered in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution to quash a prosecution launched for punishment of offences under the

TADA Act and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside for this reason

alone. He further submitted that even on merits the order of the Designated Court

refusing bail to the respondent is not open to interference and if the matter is examined

afresh, the nature of accusation against the respondent and the material on which it is

based clearly attracts the provisions of TADA Act justifying refusal of bail to the

respondent

Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 18.1.1994 of

the Bombay High Court is set aside resulting in dismissal of Writ Petition (Criminal) No.

902 of 1993 filed by the respondent in the High Court. The result is that the prosecution

of respondent Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed in the Designated Court shall continue in

accordance with the provisions of TADA Act and cancellation of his bail is confirmed.

Inte.

The Respondent-complainant is a private limited company engaged in the manufacturing and

marketing of scientific devices and equipments. The Respondent filed complaint against Appellant-
International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI) and its
officers Appellant No. 2 and 3, seeking prosecution of the Appellants for the offences punishable
Under Sections 405, 415, 418, 420 Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 34 and 120B Indian
Penal Code, 1860. After investigation, the investigating officer submitted final report stating that
the dispute is purely of civil nature and that no offence was made out against the Appellants and
the case be treated as closed. On protest petition filed by the Respondent, the Magistrate took
cognizance of the case for offences Under Sections 419 and 420 read with Section 34 Indian Penal
Code 1860. Aggrieved by the summoning order issued by the II Metropolitan Magistrate,

Cyberabad, the Appellants filed petition Under Section 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure before the High Court to quash the proceedings in CC No. 840 of

2008 and the same was dismissed, which is under challenge in this appeal.

The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is, as to whether uncontroverted allegations as made
in the complaint establish the offence. The High Court being superior court of the State should
refrain from analyzing the materials which are yet to be adduced and seen in their true
perspective. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal
Procedure should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Power Under Section 482
Code of Criminal Procedure is to be used sparingly only in rare cases. In a catena of cases, this
Court reiterated that the powers of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very
sparingly and quashing a complaint in criminal proceedings would depend upon facts and
circumstances of each case. Vide State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. ; State of T.N. v.
Thirukkural Perumal and Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Anr.

The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 482

Code of Criminal Procedure should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate

prosecution. Power Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is to be

used sparingly only in rare cases. In a catena of cases, this Court reiterated

that the powers of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very

sparingly and quashing a complaint in criminal proceedings would depend

upon facts and circumstances of each cas

The decisions discussed reiterate the well-settled principles that while

exercising inherent jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure, it is not for the High Court to appreciate the evidence and its

truthfulness or sufficiency inasmuch as it is the function of the trial court.

High Court's inherent powers, be it, civil or criminal matters, is designed to

achieve a salutary public purpose and that a court proceeding ought not to be
24-07-2022 (Page 3 of 12) www.manupatra.com Nirma University

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. If the

averments in the complaint do not constitute an offence, the court would be

justified in quashing the proceedings in the interest of justice.[23]

Mohanty

Facts:

In the present case allegations were made with respect to allotment of 10

plots which were required to be allotted under the discretionary quota. At the

relevant time, the Respondents - Accused were connected with the

Department concerned with regard to allotment of the plots directly or

indirectly. The accused were alleged of misusing their official position and

thereby causing loss to public exchequer.

Held, while allowing the Appea

At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order the
High Court in exercise of its powers Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure has

quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and Section 420 read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code.

From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the

High Court has entered into the merits of the allegations and has conducted the mini-

trial by weighing the evidence in detail which, as such, as observed and held by this

Court in a catena of decisions is wholly impermissible. As held by this Court in the case

of State of Haryana And Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors. MANU/SC/0115/1992 : AIR

1992 SC 604, the powers Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure could be

exercised either to prevent an abuse of process of any court and/or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice. In the said decision this Court had carved out the exceptions to the

general Rule that normally in exercise of powers Under Section 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be quashed. Exceptions to the above

general Rule are carved out in para 102 in Bhajan Lal (supra) which reads as unde

Looking to the allegations in the present case against the Respondents - Accused

and considering the fact that charge-sheet has been filed by the Vigilance Cell after a

thorough investigation, it cannot be said that the case falls within any of the exceptions

as carved out by this Court in para 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). It cannot be

said that the criminal proceedings initiated against the Respondents - Accused are an

abuse of process of any court. On the contrary, the allegations are an instance of abuse

of the powers with a mala fide intention and allotment of the plots to the family

members by hatching a criminal conspiracy and to allot the plots to the family members

at throw away price causing loss to the B.D.A. and the public exchequer.

It is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with

circumspection and in rare cases. Normally the criminal proceedings should

not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been

filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application Under

Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure the courts are not required to go into

the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the

mini-trial.[6.2]

t is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with

circumspection and in rare cases. As per settled proposition of law while examining an

FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry

as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing

of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the

criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers Under Section 482

Code of Criminal Procedure when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has

been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application Under Section

482 Code of Criminal Procedure the courts are not required to go into the merits of the

allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the mini-trial. As held by this Court

the powers Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is very wide, but conferment

of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more

diligent duty on the Court.

Manoj kumar

Facts:

Manoj Kumar Sharma-Appellant-accused, who was serving in the Indian Air

Force at the relevant time, got married to one Nandini on 27.04.1999. On

20.09.1999, Nandini Sharma (since deceased) committed suicide at her

matrimonial home. The information with regard to the same was lodged by

the Security Officer of the Indian Air Force at Police Station Mulana, District

Ambala. On 22.09.1999, post mortem was conducted on the body of the

deceased and the body was handed over to the relatives for performing last

rites.

On 22.09.1999, the officer in-charge of the investigation, P.S. Mulana

submitted a report stating that there was no sign of foul play in the

occurrence. On the basis of the investigation, on 24.01.2000, a Final Report

was submitted before the sub-Divisional Magistrate which got accepted on

19.02.2000. Simultaneously, a Court of Inquiry (CoI) was also convened to

investigate into the alleged role of the Appellant-accused but after completion

of the Inquiry the case was finally closed on 25.07.2000.

After five years of the closing of the above case, a fresh First Information

Report (FIR), was registered by Respondent No. 2 herein-brother of the

deceased against Manoj Sharma-Appellant No. 1 herein, Heera Lal Sharma,

Mahaveer Prasad Sharma and Smt. Hem Lata Sharma-the father, uncle and

mother of the Appellant No. 1 herein respectively at P.S. Bhillai Nagar,

District Durg Under Sections 304B, 498A and Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (the Indian Penal Code).

Being aggrieved by the filing of the FIR, the Appellants herein filed a Writ

Petition before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court directed

for the continuance of the investigation of the alleged offence.

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The said writ petition was withdrawn with the leave of the court and the

Appellants herein filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition before the High Court

Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code) for

quashing of the FIR. Learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the

proceedings to continue with a direction to the police to hold fair and proper

investigation to ensure logical conclusion of the same without unnecessary

delay.

An application for modification being Criminal Misc. Petition was filed for

modification of the order of learned Single Judge in earlier Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition on the ground that during the pendency of the

judgment in the matter, the chargesheet came to be filed by the police before

the court which was allowed vide the said earlier order.

Further, the Appellants herein filed Criminal Misc. Petition being No. 765 of

2011 Under Section 482 read with Section 397 of the Code before the High

Court for quashing of charge sheet and cognizance taken thereof by the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg dated 03.09.2011 and 13.10.2011

respectively in Criminal Proceeding arising out of Crime No. 194 of 2005

registered at P.S. Bhilai Nagar, District Durg. Learned single Judge of the High

Court, vide order dated 27.09.2012 dismissed the petition filed by the

Appellants herein.

Aggrieved by the abovesaid order, the Appellants have preferred this appeal

by way of special leave before this Court.

Held, while allowing the appeal

In the above backdrop, it is also imperative to discuss the scope of inherent power

of the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code. The Appellants before us filed a

petition Under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR on the ground that the

FIR was filed after a delay of 5 (five) years and is barred by territorial jurisdiction. The

High Court, on the other hand, after taking note of the fact that the investigation is in

the final stage in the matter and a charge sheet is ready to be filed before the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, ordered for its continuance without taking into consideration that

it is barred by law. The court at Durg did not take notice of the fact that there is a legal

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bar engrafted in the matter for its continuance and the proceedings have been

maliciously instituted after a delay of five years with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the Appellants. This point has been more clarified in State of Haryana

and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. MANU/SC/0115/1992 : (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335,

wherein this Court also stated that though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power Under

Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR should be exercised, there are

circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction. These

are, where the FIR does not prima facie constitute any offence, does not disclose a

cognizable offence justifying investigation by the police; where the allegations are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused; where there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

Code; and where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or

where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge. Despite stating these grounds, the Court unambiguously uttered a note of

caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be

exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in the rarest of rare

cases; the Court also warned that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon

an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in

the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an

arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. In para 102

of the judgment, it was held as und

This point has been more

clarified in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., wherein this

Court also stated that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,

clearly defined, sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power

Under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR should be exercised,

there are circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such

jurisdiction.[20]

n view of the above discussion, the Court was of the considered opinion that

the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any

offence and make out a case against the Appellants herein. Further, to invoke

inherent jurisdiction Under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court must be

fully satisfied that the material produced on record is based on sound,

justifiable and reasonable facts. In the case on hand, malicious prosecution

was instituted by the brother of the deceased after a period of five years that

too on the basis of anonymous letters. There was no accusation against the

Appellants before filing of the FIR. The allegations are vague and do not

warrant continuation of criminal proceedings against the Appellants. Also, the

court at Durg has no territorial jurisdiction because cause of action, if any,

has arisen in Ambala.[22]

The High Court did not apply its

mind judiciously and on an incorrect appreciation of record, ordered for

continuance of the investigation on a petition Under Section 482 of the Code.

This power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as

any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable

results.[22]

Arnab

Facts:

The Appellant, Editor-in-Chief of an English television news channel, Republic

TV was arrested on 4 November 2020 in connection with FIR registered

 under Sections  306  and  34  of the Indian Penal Code.The genesis of

the FIR could be traced back to December 2016, when a company by the
name of ARG Outlier Media Private Limited (ARG) awarded a contract for civil

and interior work to another company, Concorde Design Private Limited

(CDPL) which was owned substantially by one AnvayNaik (the deceased).

Spouse of the deceased alleged to have committed  suicide. The contents of

the FIR included Appellant for abating death of deceased and his spouse due

to non-payment of their legitimate dues. Appellant claimed arrest to have

been vitiated by  malice  in fact.Appellant submitted that his arrest is

rooted in malice which is evident from the manner in which he was targeted

for his news broadcasts criticizing the Maharashtra government and the

Maharashtra police. It was further claimed that following the acceptance of

police report and reinvestigation ordered at the behest of the Home Minister

of the State of Maharashtra as ultra vires and in the absence of the specific

permission of the CJM, it was not open to the State to conduct a

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reinvestigation; It was further contended that FIR in question did not

establish an offence under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code.

Held, while disposing the Appeals:

High Court in the present case misdirected itself in declining to enquire prima

facie on a petition for quashing whether the parameters in the exercise of

that jurisdiction have been duly established and if so whether a case for the

grant of interim bail has been made out. The settled principles which have

been consistently reiterated since the judgment of this Court in the case of

State of Haryana v. BhajanLal  include a situation where the allegations

made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value

and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the Accused. [44

The above decision thus arose in a situation where the High Court had declined to

entertain a petition for quashing an FIR Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure However, it nonetheless directed the investigating agency not to arrest the

Accused during the pendency of the investigation. This was held to be impermissible by

this Court. On the other hand, this Court clarified that the High Court if it thinks fit,

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having regard to the parameters for quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, has

the jurisdiction to quash the investigation "and may pass appropriate interim orders as

thought apposite in law". Clearly therefore, the High Court in the present case has

misdirected itself in declining to enquire prima facie on a petition for quashing whether

the parameters in the exercise of that jurisdiction have been duly established and if so

whether a case for the grant of interim bail has been made out. The settled principles

which have been consistently reiterated since the judgment of this Court in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335 ("Bhajan Lal")

include a situation where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute

any offence or make out a case against the Accused. This legal position was recently

reiterated in a decision by a two-judge Bench of this Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar

v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0180/2019 : (2019) 14 SCC 350.

I Prima Facie evaluation of the FIR and the grant of bail

Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an

act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby

facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.

47. The first segment of Section 107 defines abetment as the instigation of a person to

do a particular thing. The second segment defines it with reference to engaging in a

conspiracy with one or more other persons for the doing of a thing, and an act or illegal

omission in pursuance of the conspiracy. Under the third segment, abetment is founded

on intentionally aiding the doing of a thing either by an act or omission. These

provisions have been construed specifically in the context of Section 306 to which a
reference is necessary in order to furnish the legal foundation for assessing the contents

of the FIR. These provisions have been construed in the earlier judgments of this Court

in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal MANU/SC/0321/1994 : (1994) 1 SCC 73,

Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0881/2004 : (2004) 13 SCC 129, Kishori Lal

v. State of M.P. MANU/SC/7815/2007 : (2007) 10 SCC 797 ("Kishori Lal") and

Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0096/2009 : (2009) 4 SCC

52. In Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal MANU/SC/1808/2009 : (2010) 1 SCC 707,

Justice Mukundakam Sharma, speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court and having

adverted to the earlier decisions, observed:

12...It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide

there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of

suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive

action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the Accused which led

or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306

Indian Penal Code is not sustainable.

The Court noted that before a person may be said to have abetted the commission of

suicide, they "must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing

certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide". Instigation, as this Court held in

Kishori Lal (supra), "literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by

persuasion to do anything". In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan

MANU/SC/0585/2010 : (2010) 12 SCC 190, a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking

through Justice Dalveer Bhandari, observed:

25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally

aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the

Accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be

sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by

this Court is clear that in order to convict a person Under Section 306 Indian

Penal Code there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also

requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide

seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased

into such a position that he committed suicide.

48. Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0611/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 628

was specifically a case which arose in the context of a petition Under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure where the High Court had dismissed the petition for

quashing an FIR registered for offences Under Sections 306 and 294(B) of the Indian

Penal Code. In that case, the FIR was registered on a complaint of the spouse of the

deceased who was working as a driver with the Accused. The driver had been rebuked

by the employer and was later found to be dead on having committed suicide. A suicide

note was relied upon in the FIR, the contents of which indicated that the driver had not

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been given a fixed vehicle unlike other drivers besides which he had other complaints

including the deduction of 15 days' wages from his salary. The suicide note named the

Accused-Appellant. In the decision of a two judge Bench of this Court, delivered by

Justice V.S. Sirpurkar, the test laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra) was applied and the

Court held

The High Court recited the legal position that the jurisdiction to  quash

 under Section  482  has to be exercised sparingly. These words, however,

are not meaningless incantations, but have to be assessed with  reference

 to the contents of the particular FIR before the High Court. If the High Court

were to carry out a prima facie evaluation, it would have been impossible for

it not to notice the disconnect between the FIR and the  provisions  of

Section  306  of the Indian Penal Code. The failure of the High Court  to

do so  has led it to adopting a position where it left the Appellant to pursue

his remedies for regular bail under Section  439. The High Court was clearly

in error in failing to perform a duty which is entrusted to it while evaluating a

petition under Section  482  albeit at the interim stage.[55

The petition before the High Court was instituted Under Article  226  of the

Constitution and Section  482  of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While

dealing with the petition under Section  482  for quashing the FIR, the

High Court has not considered whether prima facie the ingredients of the

offence have been made out in the FIR. If the High Court were to have carried

out this exercise, it would have been apparent that the ingredients of the

offence have not prima facie been established. As a consequence of its failure

to perform its function under Section  482, the High Court has disabled itself

from exercising its jurisdiction under Article  226  to consider the

Appellant's application for bail. In considering such an application under

Article  226, the High Court must be circumspect in exercising its powers on

the basis of the facts of each case. Â However, the High Court should not

foreclose itself from the exercise of the power when a citizen has been

arbitrarily deprived of their personal liberty in an excess of state power.[56]

Pepsi

MANU/SC/1090/1998

Equivalent Citation: AIR1998SC 128, 1998 (36) AC C 20, 1998(1)BLJR6, IV(1997)C C R108(SC ),
[1998]28C LA4(SC ), (2001)3C ompLJ340(SC ),

1998C riLJ1, 1997(4)C rimes212(SC ), JT1997(8)SC 705, 1998-1-LW(C rl)72, 1998(1)MhLJ599(SC ),

1998(1)MPLJ494, 1997(4)RC R(C riminal)761,

RLW1998(1)SC 18, 1997(6)SC ALE610, (1998)5SC C 749, [1997]Supp5SC R13

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1019 of 1997

Decided On: 04.11.1997

Appellants: Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Ors.

Vs.

Respondent: Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Manohar and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.

Counsels:

For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K.K. Venugopal, Senior Adv., R.K. Virmani, Rizvi and P.

Verma, Advs

For Respondents/Defendant:Party in Person, Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Adv. and A.S.

Pundir, Adv.

Case Note:

Criminal - adulteration - Section 7 and 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration

Act, 1954 - appeal against conviction of accused under Sections 7 and 16 -

allegations merely show that appellants have given their brand name to A for

bottling beverage - complaint failed to show role of appellants in manufacture

of beverage which is said to be adulterated - allegation against appellants do

not make out any case for offence under Section 7 - no basis for complainant

to make such allegations - no averment as to how complainant can say that

appellants were manufacturers of bottle - preliminary evidence failed to show

how appellants were manufacturers of either bottle or beverage or both -

appeal allowed.
HELD See paras 29, 30 and 31.

Case Category:

CRIMINAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL MATTERS RELATING TO FOOD ADULTERATION

JUDGMENT

D.P. Wadhwa, J.

1. Leave granted.

2 . The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated September 23, 1996 of the

Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench)

dismissing their writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The

appellants sought quashing of the complaint filed against them under Section 7 read

with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short 'the Act').

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The prayers in the writ petition were worded as under :

"(a) issue a writ of prohibition or a writ, order or direction in the nature of

prohibition, prohibiting the Opposite Party Number-1 to proceed with case No.

699 of 1994 (Anurag Narain v. Nitin Sachdeva and Ors.)',

(b) issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of

certiorari quashing the proceedings in Case No. 699 of 1994 together with the

consequential order dated 9.5.1994 and the complaint dated 6.5.1993 in so far

as it pertains to the petitioners;

(c) issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of

mandamus commanding the opposite Party Number-1 not to proceed with the

Case No, 699 of 1994 during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition;

(d) issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court

may deem just and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be

passed: and

(e) to allow the writ petition with costs.

3 . There are two appellants, second appellant is the Managing Director of first

appellant. The respondents are three. First respondent is the court where the appellants

alongwith others have been summoned for having committed offences under Sections

7/16 of the Act. The second respondent is the complainant and the third respondent is
the State of Uttar Pradesh.

4 . The allegation in the complaint is that complainant was sold a bottle of beverage

under the brand "Lehar Pepsi" which was adulterated. The bottle was purchased by the

complainant on September 13, 1993. He filed the complaint on May 6. 1994. After

recording preliminary evidence the Magistrate passed orders summoning the appellants

and others on May 9, 1994. It appears that when the summons reached the appellants

they immediately approached the High Court seeking aforesaid reliefs. The High Court,

however, refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellants should

approach the 1st respondent for their discharge under Section 245 of the CrPC (for

short 'the Code'), if the complaint did not disclose commission of any offence by the

appellants and the Court considered the charge to be groundless. The High Court did

not approve of the appellants approaching it under writ jurisdiction when sufficient

remedy was available under the Code. The High Court was also of the opinion that it

could not be said at that stage that the allegations in the complaint were so absurd and

inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just

conclusion that there existed no sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused.

On the plea of the appellants that the provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act read with

Rule 9-A of the Rules framed under the Act were violated and on that account the

inquiry or trial stood vitiated the High Court said that the appellants could well

approach the court for that purpose and that it was no stage for the High Court to

record its finding. Yet another plea of the appellants that provisions of Section 203 and

245(2) of the Code did not provide an adequate remedy for a person charged on flimsy

grounds and that in view of the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Chaudhry

Bhajan Lal and Ors., MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992CriL J527 the court should interfere

also did not find favour with the High Court. It was of the opinion that Chaudhry Bhajan

Lal's case pertained to a cognizable offence where police had taken cognizance of the

matter and in a complaint case the Magistrate was empowered to discharge the accused

at any stage of the trial if it was found that the charge was groundless.
21. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal

matters. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. MANU/SC/0115/1992 :

1992CriL J527 , this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the

Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said

could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court

or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where

the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these

guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts.

Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case

but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the

first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court

is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers

vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior

courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure.

The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care

and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers

could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to

invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down

principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Article 226 and 227 may

be referred to

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the
High Court and quash
the complaint and proceeding against the appellants

It is no comfortable thought for the appellants to be told that they could appear
before the court which is at a far off place in the Ghazipur in the State of Uttar Pradesh,

seek their release on bail and then to either move an application under Section 245(2)

of the Code or to face trial when the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded

makes out no case against them. It is certainly one of those cases where there is an

abuse of the process of the law and the courts and the High Court should not have shied

away in exercising its jurisdiction. Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In

our view High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has

led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but

this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it

Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not

debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless

there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the

present one the court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under

Article 226, the court can certainly treat the petition one under Article 227 or Section

482 of the Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the Code

of revision and appeal but sometime for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or

Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be

committed by the subordinate courts. The present petition though filed in the High

Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the

Constitution
Nikhil Merchant
Vs.
Respondent:Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors

Ratio Decidendi:

even though the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

would not apply to such offences, which are not compoundable it did not limit

or affect the powers under Section 482 and the powers conferred on the High

Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution

of India.

Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as "CBI") filed a charge sheet

against five accused persons under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 467, 468,
471A Indian Penal Code read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. In the said charge sheet, the appellant herein was made accused
No. 3 and the Company, in respect of which he was the former Managing Director, M/s.
Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai, was made the accused No. 4. The other three
accused are officials of the Andhra Ban

Apart from the said decision, reliance was also placed on another decision of this

Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr.

MANU/SC/0230/2003 : 2003CriL J2028 wherein while dealing with the proceedings

under Sections 498A and 406 Indian Penal Code involving matrimonial disputes and

offences, this Court held that even though the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure would not apply to such offences, which are not compoundable it

did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 and the powers conferred on the

High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of
India. Referring to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992CriL J527 this Court observed that the categories indicated

in the said case which warranted exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC were only

illustrative and not exhaustive. This Court ultimately held that the High Court in exercise

of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or a FIR or complaint and Section

320 CrPC does not limit or affect the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the

Code.

We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court dismissing the

petitioner's revision application No. 49 of 2003 in Special Case No. 80 of 1998 and

quash the proceedings against the appellant. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Babu Venkatesh and Ors.

Vs.
Respondent: State of Karnataka and Ors
Facts:

The Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 on one hand and Respondent No. 2 on the other

hand, entered into various Agreements for Sale with respect to properties

situated at Bangalore. It is the case of the Appellants that, after receipt of the

payments, the Respondent No. 2 was avoiding to get the Sale-deed

registered. As such, the Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 on 24th November, 2017 had

filed four different suits, for specific performance of contract. The Respondent

No. 2, thereafter filed a complaint against the Appellants, thereby making

allegations of cheating. Thereafter, following a gap of almost one year, the

Respondent No. 2 filed Private Complaint. The Complainant has filed the

present private complaint under Section 200 of CrPC, against the Accused

Nos. 1 to 3 for the alleged offences punishable under Section 420, 465, 468,

464 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). In the complaint, the

complainant has made serious allegations against the Accused persons.

Therefore, it appears this Court that, it is just and proper to refer the matter

to the jurisdiction police for investigate and submit report. Accordingly, the

matter is referred to PSI of Jayanagar Police Station under Section 156(3) of

CrPC, for investigation and submit report. On the basis of the same, First

Information Report came to be registered for the offences punishable under

Sections 120-B, 420, 471, 468, 465, of the IPC. Three similar FIRs came to

registered against the Appellants on different dates in December 2019. The

Appellants thereafter filed petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC before the

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High Court. The main contention of the Appellants in the criminal petitions

was that, the order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC was passed in a

mechanical manner. The Single Judge of the High Court vide four identical

impugned orders dismissed the petitions on the ground that, serious

allegations of cheating and forgery were shown in the complaint and as such

no case was made out for quashing the FIRs.

Held, while allowing the appeal

It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of

State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp (1)

SCC 335 which read thus.

We find that in the present case, though civil suits have been filed with regard to

the same transactions and though they are contested by the Respondent No. 2 by filing

written statement, he has chosen to file complaint Under Section 156(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure after a period of one and half years from the date of filing of written

statement with an ulterior motive of harassing the Appellants. We find that, the present

case fits in the category of No. 7, as mentioned in the case of State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal (supra)

We are, therefore, of the considered view that, continuation of the present

proceedings would amount to nothing but an abuse of process of law.

31. We therefore, allow these appeals and set-aside the judgments and orders of the

High Court dated 22nd January 2021, passed in Criminal Petition Nos. 6719/2020,

6729/2020, 6733/2020 and 6737/2020. Consequently, the FIR Nos. 255/2019,

256/2019 filed on 16th December, 2019, FIR No. 257/2019 filed on 17th December,

2019 and FIR No. 258/2019 filed on 18th December, 2019 registered with Jayanagar

Police Station, Bengaluru City are quashed and set aside. Pending application(s), if any,

shall stand disposed of

Preeti

The main question which falls for consideration in this case is whether the High

Court was justified in not exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure in the facts and circumstances of this case?

. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito

justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it

exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section

482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice

17. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very

wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The

court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on

sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate

prosecution but court's failing to use the power for advancement of justice can also lead

to grave injustice. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie

decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the

evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved,

whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true

perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid

down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary

jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage

One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding

initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction.

The present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in

accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the

revisional power of the High Court is impermissible

When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background of

legal principles set out in preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair to compel the

appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial. In the interest of justice, we

deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the appellants. As a result, the

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Consequently, this appeal is allowed

22. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992

Supp. (1) SCC 335 this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) under Chapter XIV and

of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the

exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the

inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by

way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the

process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it

clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised