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How do states collapse? Towards a model of causal mechanisms

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How do states collapse? Towards a model of causal

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Eva Johais , Markus Bayer & Daniel Lambach

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GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2020.1780204

How do states collapse? Towards a model of causal

mechanisms
Eva Johaisa, Markus Bayerb and Daniel Lambach c

a
Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany;
b
Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany; cCluster Normative Orders,
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Frankfurt, Germany

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

State collapse is a highly consequential event. But we know very Received 26 November 2019
little about the reasons why and how states lose their capacities Accepted 4 June 2020
of violence control, rule-making and taxation. In order to explore
KEYWORDS
the underlying causal mechanisms, we use a nested analysis State collapse; fragile states;
combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis and comparative failed states; QCA;
process-tracing. While the mobilisation of armed opposition process-tracing; mobilisation
groups is a necessary condition for state collapse, it only works in
concurrence with other conditions, namely political transitions,
repression, factionalism, intra-elite rivalry and external
interventions. Thus, the article presents a causal model that shows
the alternative pathways leading to state collapse.

Introduction
Over the last decade, the world has been witness to severe political turmoil in multiple
countries. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS carved out its own para-state territory and exerted
control over significant segments of the population while Kurdish Peshmerga took
control over northern Iraq and northeast Syria, plunging both states into protracted civil
war. In Libya, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 led to the emergence of multiple
rival governments, a situation that is still unresolved today. In Yemen, a complex civil
war has raged since 2015 which at one point forced the government into exile. Civil
conflict in South Sudan has paralysed the state and created a serious humanitarian emer-
gency. Similar stories could be told about Mali and the Central African Republic at certain
points since 2012. These contemporary cases echo historical instances of state collapse,
such as Somalia throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo after the fall of the Mobutu regime, or Lebanon during its long-running civil war.
These examples illustrate that state collapse might be a rare phenomenon, but one that
invariably leads to tremendous human suffering with hundreds of thousands of deaths,
millions of displaced people and severe damage to national economies. Yet we know
very little about what makes some states collapse while other fragile states avoid such
a fate.

CONTACT Daniel Lambach lambach@normativeorders.net Cluster Normative Orders, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt,

60629 Frankfurt, Germany @daniellambach
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2020.1780204
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

There are several reasons for this. First, prior causal research has favoured struc-
tural explanations over dynamic factors. This is a problem because structural factors
are often also present in non-collapsed, fragile states, and by omitting
dynamic explanations, we might be overlooking an influential set of factors.
Second, except for unsystematic evidence scattered across the many existing
single-case studies of collapsed states, we know next to nothing about the mechan-
isms linking causal factors to the outcome. Clearly, a comparative perspective would
help us identify recurring causal patterns across these cases. Third and most impor-
tantly, the majority of the literature is not about state collapse in the narrow sense.
Instead, there is a debate about fragile states more broadly that lacks conceptual
clarity, deals with a wider range of phenomena, and accordingly offers a diversity
of causal explanations.
This paper focuses on the extreme end of the continuum of statehood, its collapse.
We define the condition of ‘state collapse’ as a stalemated power struggle between
multiple rival actors that exposes or causes a lack of meaningful state capacities in
the three core dimensions of statehood, control of violence, rule-making and taxation,
for a period of at least six consecutive months.1 We use a ‘nested analysis’2 approach
that combines a test of existing hypotheses via the Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA) of 15 cases3 with comparative process-tracing to develop a causal model of
state collapse.
We find that, with the sole exception of Congo in 1960, all cases of state collapse
feature an increasing mobilisation of armed opposition, often accompanied by large-
scale violence.4 However, armed mobilisation needs to happen in conjunction with
other causal factors to result in state collapse. Political transition is one such factor
because it disrupts the internal balance of power and creates uncertainty, thereby
increasing the likelihood that power struggles escalate. These power struggles are
further characterised by certain patterns of politics, specifically repression, factionalism
and intra-elite rivalries. Lastly, external intervention in support of conflict parties can
help bring about state collapse when it balances the military capabilities of government
and opposition. These findings challenge prevalent theories about the causes of col-
lapse and fragility and provide a first step towards a better understanding of the mech-
anisms of state collapse.
The paper first discusses our conceptualisation of state collapse and then reviews the
literature on its potential causes. After that, we outline our nested analysis research
design by summarising findings from the first round of QCA comparisons and outlining
how these inform our process-tracing case studies. We then present results from the com-
parison of case studies and discuss how they form the basis for our causal model of state
collapse that is presented in the final section.

1
Daniel Lambach, Eva Johais and Markus Bayer, ‘Conceptualising State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach’, Third World
Quarterly 36, no. 7 (2015): 1299–315.
2
Evan S. Lieberman, ‘Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research’, American Political Science
Review 99, no. 3, (2015): 435–52.
3
Eva Johais, Markus Bayer and Daniel Lambach, ‘Militarization, Factionalism and Political Transitions: An Inquiry into the
Causes of State Collapse’, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, forthcoming (2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12286-020-00450-9, summarised in the Online Appendix (see Supplemental data).
4
Sources for our case studies can be found in the Online Appendix (see Supplemental data).
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 3

Conceptualising state collapse

We agree with Call’s critique that concepts of state fragility and state failure are too broad
and too vague.5 This conceptual overstretch creates two problems: first, the line between
failed/fragile and non-failed/non-fragile states is impossible to define, and second, cases
within the group of failed/fragile states are too different from each other.6 We therefore
focus on state collapse as a condition at the extreme end of the continuum of stateness.
This term goes back to Zartman7 who uses state collapse to refer to ‘a situation where the
structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart’.8
Our concept of state collapse is firmly anchored in a Weberian institutionalist tradition.9
Weber famously defined the state as follows: ‘A compulsory political organisation with
continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a “state” insofar as its
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use
of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.10 Weber’s definition provides a good con-
ceptual basis for a comparative analysis because his ideal type of the modern state persists
as the ‘most powerful idea of political order’11 today. However, we exclude the aspect of
legitimacy because (a) its inclusion creates a high threshold for statehood and (b) legiti-
macy is very difficult to operationalise. Thus, we define the state as an institution that is
characterised by the monopolies of rule-making, violence and taxation within a
bounded territory and over the population living therein. Accordingly, state collapse is a
stalemated power struggle between multiple rival actors that exposes or causes a lack
of meaningful state capacities in the three core dimensions of statehood, control of vio-
lence, rule-making and taxation for a period of at least six consecutive months.
Thus, our definion excludes cases where civil war only briefly brings state institutions
to a standstill. We consider state collapse and civil war to be two different phenomena
that require different explanatory theories12: For one thing, there are many cases of
severe civil war that did not lead to state collapse (e.g. in Colombia, Guatemala, or Sri
Lanka). For another, the situation of state collapse is characterised by a stalemate
between competing forces which is a very specific conflict constellation. Furthermore,
our concept of state collapse goes beyond situations of mere institutional dysfunction.
What distinguishes collapsed states from cases with weak institutions or ‘fragile states’ is
the centrality of protracted conflict between rival political forces and its effect on the
institutional capacity of the state. In this perspective, state collapse is an essentially

5
Charles T. Call, ‘The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’’, Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1491–507; Charles T. Call, ‘Beyond
the “Failed State”: Toward Conceptual Alternatives’, European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 2 (2011): 303–26.
See also the review by Ines A. Ferreira, ‘Measuring State Fragility: A Review of the Theoretical Groundings of Existing
Approaches’, Third World Quarterly, 38, no. 6 (2016): 1291–309.
6
See for empirical confirmation Jörn Grävingholt, Sebastian Ziaja and Merle Kreibaum, ‘Disaggregating State Fragility: A
Method to Establish a Multidimensional Empirical Typology’, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 7 (2015): 1281–98; Peter Tikui-
sis et al., ‘Typology of State Types: Persistence and Transition’. International Interactions 41, no. 3 (2015): 565–82.
7
I. William Zartman, ‘Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse’, in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restor-
ation of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1995), 1–11.
8
Zartman, ‘Introduction’, 1.
9
For a more detailed discussion of our conceptualisation, see Lambach, Johais and Bayer, ‘Conceptualising State Collapse’.
10
Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 54.
11
Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat, ‘Introduction: States of Imagination’, in States of Imagination: Ethnographic
Explorations of the Postcolonial State, eds. Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Durham: Duke University Press,
2001), 1–38, 10.
12
Huseyn Aliyev, ‘Precipitating State Failure: Do Civil Wars and Violent Non-State Actors Create Failed States?’, Third World
Quarterly 38, no. 9 (2017): 1973–89.
4 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

political phenomenon: If institutions were functioning, such conflicts could be more

easily managed or avoided.

Causal theories of state fragility and collapse

While the concept of state collapse allows for a more focused analytical approach, there is
very little work that attempts a causal explanation of this specific phenomenon. Large-N
work is hampered by lack of usable data and can only make general correlational infer-
ences while the results of small-N comparisons are of limited generalisability. Based on
the case studies in his edited volume, Zartman locates the causes of collapse mostly in
bad governance, corruption, repression, and exit by societal groups.13 These claims are
broadly echoed in other contributions but are not based on a systematic and rigorous
assessment of the evidence.14 This is why we also draw on literatures on fragile and
failed states more broadly.15
DiJohn offers a critical review of the dominant theories that are supposed to explain the
failure of states: the resource curse hypothesis, functionalist arguments and ‘new war’
explanations.16 The resource curse approach argues that a dependence on primary com-
modity extraction creates politically fragile rentier states, mainly due to the volatility of
rents and the ease with which they can be captured by rentiers. However, if a sudden
decline in government revenues dries up opportunities for personal gain, actors will be
motivated to break with the ruling coalition.17 The functionalist argument is that the
failure of the state serves the interests of a neopatrimonial elite whose power rests on
predatory and clientelist politics. For instance, Englehart argues that weak regimes may
undermine security forces and the bureaucracy to prevent the formation of alternative
power centres within the state.18 Embattled rulers may also create unofficial militias
outside the formal security apparatus, operating under their personal control.19 ‘New
war’ explanations argue that changes in global capitalism have spurred a depoliticisation
of warfare which leads to the breakdown of state institutions in conflict-affected states.
This is also related to ‘social contract’ approaches which propose that the inability of
state security institutions to deter or punish the private use or threat of force

13
Zartman, ‘Introduction’.
14
Chris Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy 26, no 81 (1999):
367–84; Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002) ‘State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts,
Lessons and Strategies’, Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 753–74.
15
The empirical research in these fields is plagued with inconsistencies. Large-N approaches use different specifications of
the dependent variable, cover different sets of cases and use different independent variables with different operationa-
lisations, leading to sometimes contradictory results. See, e.g. Robert H. Bates, ‘State Failure’, Annual Review of Political
Science 11 (2008): 1–12; Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni, ‘Growth, history, or institutions: What explains state
fragility in sub-Saharan Africa?’, Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 6 (2012): 769–83; David Carment, Yiagadeesen Samy
and Stewart Prest, ‘State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis’, Conflict Management and
Peace Science 25, no. 4 (2008): 349–73; Zaryab Iqbal and Harvey Starr, State Failure in the Modern World (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2016).
16
Jonathan DiJohn, ‘The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature and Agenda
for Research with Specific Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa’, European Journal of Development Research 22, no. 1 (2010):
10–30.
17
Allen, ‘Warfare’.
18
Neil A. Englehart, ‘Governments against States: The Logic of Self-Destructive Despotism’, International Political Science
Review 28, no. 2 (2007): 133–53.
19
Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell and Will Lowe, ‘States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database
on Pro-Government Militias’, Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 2 (2013): 249–58.
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 5

undermines the central legitimising claim of the state and may lead to an internal security
dilemma.20
Beyond these main strands, other contributions focus on power dynamics and political
structures. Goldstone et al. highlight the risks of factionalism, a style of politics that is primarily
concerned with parochial interests which erodes shared societal institutions.21 There are also
claims that repressive rule by ethnic minorities will lead to state failure.22 This parallels macro-
historical arguments on inclusive versus exclusive/extractive institutions, although these often
focus more on economic rather than political outcomes.23 Bates further points out that
demands for democratisation threaten autocratic incumbents who turn to predatory and
repressive tactics to disrupt the opposition, pushing protesters towards violent rebellion.24
Other approaches highlight historical trajectories of state-society relations and state for-
mation. For instance, Tusalem finds that pre-colonial stateness reduces the likelihood of
post-colonial state fragility.25 In contrast, Migdal and Boone argue that strong societal auth-
orities impede post-colonial state formation.26 The degree of spatial congruence between
precolonial polities and post-colonial states may be a crucial mediating factor. Research
by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou shows a strong positive association between African
pre-colonial polities and contemporary levels of local economic development.27
Most of these works offer theoretical conjectures but no empirically sound causal expla-
nations. One of the rare exceptions is Englehart’s model of ‘self-destructive despotism’ that
shows how governments in Somalia and Afghanistan deliberately destroyed state insti-
tutions to remove checks and balances on their exercise of power and prevent rivals
from harnessing alternative sources of power.28 In addition, Allen’s model of ‘terminal
spoils’ describes how struggles between rent-seeking elites over declining rents wear
down state institutions.29 Yet these explanations often only cover a small number of
cases and build on monocausal explanations of collapse, e.g. the rent-seeking approach
underlying both Englehart’s and Allen’s work. This overlooks the interplay between politi-
cal, economic, social and international factors.

Research design
Previous steps in a nested analysis
This paper reports results from the second stage of a mixed-methods project using a
‘nested analysis’ approach which combines the ‘analysis of a large sample with in-depth
20
Abdirashid A. Ismail, ‘The Political Economy of State Failure: A Social Contract Approach’, Journal of Intervention and Sta-
tebuilding 10, no. 4 (2016): 513–29; Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, in Ethnic Conflict and Inter-
national Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103–24.
21
Jack A. Goldstone et al., ‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability’, American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1
(2010): 190–208.
22
Bates, ‘State Failure’, 6–8.
23
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile
Books, 2012).
24
Bates, ‘State Failure’, 8–9.
25
Rollin F. Tusalem, ‘The Colonial Foundations of State Fragility and Failure’, Polity 48, no. 4 (2016): 445–95.
26
Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Catherine Boone, ‘Decentralization as Political Strategy in West Africa’, Comparative
Political Studies 36, no. 4 (2003): 355–80.
27
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development
(Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18224, 2012).
28
Englehart, ‘Governments against States’.
29
Allen, ‘Warfare’.
6 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

investigation of one or more of these cases’.30 In a first step, we had used crisp-set Qualitat-
ive Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify sets of causal conditions associated with state col-
lapse. We investigated all cases of state collapse between 1960 and 2007 except for
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.31 We conducted a synchronic comparison (i.e. with
other fragile, but non-collapsed states) to identify structural differences between collapse
cases and fragile states and a diachronic comparison (i.e. with other periods of political
crisis within the same countries) to highlight more dynamic drivers of collapse. All 15 col-
lapse cases and their synchronic and diachronic control cases are reported in Table 1, criteria
for selecting control cases are reported in the online appendix (see Supplemental data).
In total, the QCA reveals that different configurations of eight factors lead to state collapse
(see Table 2).32 In line with csQCA practice, all conditions are reduced to binary values to facili-
tate comparison although this incurs a loss of information about individual cases.
Results from the two QCAs are discussed in detail elsewhere and are also summarised in
the online appendix (see Supplemental data).33 Data was coded from country-specific lit-
erature and cross-national datasets (see Table V in the Online Appendix (see Supplemental
data) for more details). In brief, the parsimonious solutions of both QCA comparisons (see
Table 3) indicate that there are no necessary conditions for state collapse but that different
combinations of conditions are jointly sufficient. Individual solution terms only cover small
numbers of cases without suggesting a clear taxonomy of cases. Cases that are covered by
one solution term in the synchronic comparison are covered by different terms in the dia-
chronic comparison. Thus, the QCA does not reveal a neat taxonomy of cases but it does
offer some indications about potential causal factors. Therefore, we use the QCA solution
terms as a starting point for process-tracing.

Comparative process-tracing
In contrast to QCA, process-tracing allows us to analyse how the conditions that the QCA sol-
utions suggest occur as parts of a mechanism leading to state collapse. In line with QCA best
practice,34 such case-oriented work also allows us to understand cases in all their empirical
richness and is a much-needed supplement to the reductionist dichotomisation of conditions
in QCA. The selection of all cases for process-tracing is similar to the strategy used by Haggard
and Kaufman who argue that for rare events, researchers should ‘select all of the cases in the
corresponding cross-panel model for closer, qualitative scrutiny’.35
Our approach for the case studies builds on the ‘X-Y-centric theory-building’ approach
to process-tracing where the causal factor and the outcome are known and the aim is to
30
Lieberman, ‘Nested Analysis’, 435–36.
31
Detailed criteria in Lambach, Johais and Bayer, ‘Conceptualising State Collapse’. We excluded Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq
2003 because state collapse there was clearly precipitated by external invasion, thus having a completely different causal
structure. Including these cases would have required adding further conditions to our QCA and made results more
complex and less useful.
32
For details about sources see Table V in the Online Appendix (see Supplemental data). Several other conditions were also
tested but produced less specific results, as reported in the ‘Alternative Conditions’ section of the Online Appendix (see
Supplemental data).
33
Lambach, Johais and Bayer, ‘Militarization, Factionalism and Political Transitions’.
34
Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. A Guide to Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy Sets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
305–12.
35
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites and Regime Change (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, 2016), 23.
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 7

Table 1. Cases of state collapse and control cases.

Collapse case Collapse year Synchronic control case Year Diachronic control case Year
Afghanistan 1979 Sri Lanka 1983 Afghanistan 1973
Angola 1992 Mali 1991 Angola 1975
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 Croatia 1995 - -
Chad 1979 Ethiopia 1974 Chad 1965
Congo-Kinshasa 1960 Nigeria 1967 Zaire 1977
Zaire 1996 Sudan 1992 - -
Georgia 1991 Moldova 1992 Georgia 2003
Guinea-Bissau 1998 Lesotho 1998 Guinea-Bissau 1980
Laos 1960 Cambodia 1967 Laos 1989
Lebanon 1975 Iran 1979 Lebanon 2005
Liberia 1990 Burundi 1993 Liberia 1979
Sierra Leone 1998 Guinea 1996 Sierra Leone 1967
Somalia 1991 Niger 1990 Somalia 1978
Tadjikistan 1992 Uzbekistan 1999 Tajikistan 2010
Uganda 1985 Burkina Faso 1987 Uganda 1971

uncover the mechanism connecting the two (see Figure 1).36 However, our research
diverges from this strategy by going beyond the characteristic focus on within-case infer-
ences.37 Instead, our aim is to test the variety of potential causes of state collapse and to
develop hypotheses about mechanisms that link different factors.
Therefore, we begin our case studies from the QCA results (see Table 3) which indicate
empirically relevant combinations of dynamic and structural conditions and give us start-
ing points for the analyis of causal mechanisms for each case. The practical implication is
that our case studies were not limited to exploring the effect of one ‘X’, but of several:
Every case was associated with at least two terms – one from the solution formula of
the diachronic comparison and one from the synchronic comparison, each of which
usually involved more than one X. Moreover, each case study involved a different set of
factors.
In line with the logic of process-tracing, we trace causal processes within cases to inves-
tigate which ‘configurations of causal conditions’38 explain specific cases. In addition, we
adopt a comparative perspective using a heuristic based on a typology of causality by
Jackson that treats causal analysis as a procedure of counterfactual thinking on whether
putative causal factors are (1) systematically causal, (2) idiosyncratically causal, or (3) not
causal.39 Systematically causal factors have an ideal-typical causal effect, i.e. they are
present in multiple cases and usually have causal effects that contribute to state collapse.
Idiosyncratically causal factors are those factors that have a causal effect but only in
specific cases or under very specific circumstances. Not causal factors are those where
we expect that the outcome occurs whether this factor is present or not. With this com-
parative perspective on a set of within-case analyses, we identify systematic factors and
formulate hypotheses about their causal effects and linkages which we combine in our
causal model.

36
Derek Beach and Rasmus B. Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2013), 154.
37
Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods, 75.
38
Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research (Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 24.
39
Patrick T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study
of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), 150.
8 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

Table 2. Initial list of conditions.

Condition Values Definition and coding rules
AID 0= constant or rising international aid Trend in external ODA and military aid (hardware,
1= cut back of international aid is training) to state over the last five years prior to
announced or carried out collapse.
FACTIONAL 0= no factionalism Factionalism is a ‘polarized politics of exclusive
1= factionalism identities’,a i.e. a pattern of politics conducted along
identity group lines. Coding based on variable
PARCOMP from Polity IV dataset.
0= PARCOMP 0, 1, 2, 4, or 5
1= PARCOMP 3
GOV_REV 0= rising or constant state revenues Total government revenue of the year preceding the
1= decline of state revenues collapse (a) divided by total revenues three years
before the collapse (b). Revenues are measured as
percentage of GDP in local currency.
0= total revenues (year a)/total revenues (year b) ≥ 100%
1= total revenues (year a)/total revenues (year b) < 100%
INCOME 0= Income ≤ 5% of the global average INCOME measures whether a country is very poor relative
1= Income > 5% of global average to global averages. It is calculated as follows: GDP per
Capita divided by global average GDP per Capita. Both
values measured in constant US-$.
LOCAL_POLITY 0= other Local polities are hierarchical political organisations with
1= local precolonial/preimperial polity a degree of institutionalisation and persistence that
or polities cover a significant part of current state territory but are
not congruent with current state territory.
MOBIL 0= no mobilisation of armed opposition This means either (a) the formation of new armed groups
1= mobilisation of armed opposition with oppositional objectives, or (b) the politicisation of
already existing armed groups or (c) an increase in an
armed opposition group’s level of mobilisation in
quantitative and/or qualitative terms. We understand
mobilisation in terms of military capability, i.e.
requiring motivation, logistics, and internal structures
of communication, command and control,b not in the
broader sense used in sociological approaches.c
REPRESSION 0= no or low level of repression Repression is the use of force by the government against
1= intermediate to high level of repression political dissidents. Coded as the average of Political
Terror Scale (PTS) data (both State Department and
Amnesty International scores) for the three-year period
prior to collapse 0 = PTS score 1–2 (no repression) 1=
PTS 3–5
TRANSITION 0= Collapse does not follow a transition Transitions are substantial changes in regime type where
period basic rules about access to power are renegotiated. A
1= Collapse follows directly after a transition is coded if the Polity Score of the year
transition-period. preceding state collapse is either coded as −88 or has
changed by at least 3 points compared to the previous
year.
a
Jack A. Goldstone et al., ‘A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability’, American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1
(2010), 198.
b
Anthony Vinci, ‘The “Problems of Mobilization” and the Analysis of Armed Groups’ Parameters 36, no. 1 (2006): 49–62.
c
E.g. Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001).

Results: the causal dynamics of state collapse

Process-tracing turned out to be a useful complement to the QCA analysis and altered the
latter’s initial findings as summarised in Table 4: Column (1) lists the number of cases that
were covered by a specific condition in the diachronic or synchronic QCA solution terms. In
other words: this column presents the causal factors that the QCA solutions suggested.
Column (2) shows the results of our process-tracing case studies. For example, we
found the mobilisation of armed opposition to have a causal effect on state collapse in
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 9

Figure 1. The logic of process-tracing. Source: Based on Beach and Pedersen.

Note: Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods, 34.

Table 3. Parsimonious solutions for synchronic and diachronic QCA.

Synchronic comparison
Term Cases covered
MOBIL(1) * INCOME Sierra Leone 1998+Uganda
(0) + 1985+Somalia 1991,Chad 1979
+Liberia 1990+Laos 1960
MOBIL(1) * GOV_REV Sierra Leone 1998+Somalia 1991,
(1) + Chad 1979+Tajikistan 1992,Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1992,Georgia 1991
+Afghanistan 1979+Angola 1992
INCOME(0) * Sierra Leone 1998+Uganda 1985
LOCAL_POLITY(1) + +Somalia 1991,Chad 1979+Zaire
1996+Guinea-Bissau 1998
FACTIONAL(1) * Sierra Leone 1998+Uganda 1985
MOBIL(1) * +Congo-Kinshasa 1960,Lebanon
LOCAL_POLITY(1) 1975
Note: Cases that are unique to a particular term are highlighted in italics.
Diachronic comparison
Term Cases covered
TRANSITION (1) Afghanistan 1979,Chad
+ 1979+Angola 1992+Congo-
Kinshasa 1960+Laos 1960+Sierra
Leone 1998,Tajikistan 1992
FACTIONAL(1) * Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992,Georgia
MOBIL(1) + 1991,Lebanon 1975+Congo-
Kinshasa 1960+Laos 1960+Sierra
Leone 1998,Tajikistan 1992
+Uganda 1985
REPRESSION(1) Angola 1992+Zaire 1996+Guinea-
* AID(1) Bissau 1998+Liberia 1990,Somalia
1991+Sierra Leone 1998,Tajikistan
1992

12 of the 13 cases indicated by column (1) whereas in one case it had no meaningful
impact. In addition, we found that conditions also had causal effects in cases that were
not covered in column (1); this number of additional cases is given in column (3). The
number in column (4) is an addition of columns (2) and (3) and shows the revised total
number of cases where a particular condition had a causal effect on the collapse of the
state.
The comparison of our case studies shows that mobilisation, factionalism, repression
and transition had a systematic causal effect but government revenue, per capita
income and international aid did not.40 In addition, two further causal conditions also
emerged as systematically causal (intra-elite rivalry, external intervention). These two
factors had not featured prominently in the prior literature on state collapse and had
therefore been left out of the QCA. Of course, each case had idiosyncratic causes that
could not be observed in other instances. One condition, mobilisation, stood out in that
it was causally relevant in all cases but one (Congo 1960, see Fn. 41), making it almost a
necessary condition. However, mobilisation by itself is not a sufficient condition, in that
it needs to occur jointly with other conditions to lead to state collapse. Interestingly, we
are unable to confirm that specific combinations of conditions as they appeared in the

We also found little evidence that ‘local polity’ had a systematic causal effect. However, this condition had significant
40

conceptual overlaps with factionalism so we combined the two conditions into one (see the discussion below). We
also expanded the concept of transition to include both regime change and national independence.
10 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

Table 4. Overview of results from the case studies.

(2) # of cases where (3) # of additional cases not (4) Revised total #
(1) # of cases covered process-tracing covered by solution terms of cases where
(unique + non-unique) confirms causal effect where process-tracing process-tracing
by QCA solution terms of condition on state indicates causal effect of indicates causal
Condition containing condition collapse condition effect
Mobilisation 13 12 2 14
Factionalism 8 6 0 6
Repression 7 4 1 5
Transition 7 4 1 5
Government 8 0 0 0
revenue
Income 8 0 0 0
Aid 7 0 0 0
Local polity 8 n/a 0 n/a
Note: This table summarises results reported in more detail in Table X in the Online Appendix (see Supplemental data).

QCA solution terms have clear causal effects for the cases covered by particular terms.
Instead, the causal process involves different combinations of conditions for each individ-
ual case.
On a general note, we observe that the dynamics of collapse depended on the degree
of institutionalisation of state authority. In those states that were relatively strong (e.g.
Lebanon), large-scale eruptions of violence weakened the state’s monopoly of violence
to the extent that it also decreased institutional capacities for taxation and rule-making.
In more fragile states (e.g. Zaire), there was very little institutional capacity to extract
taxes and make binding rules in the first place. There, controlling the means of violence
was often the only thing that the state was able to do. But once the security apparatus
faced a military challenge that was too strong to cope with, state collapse came swiftly.41

Discussion: causal mechanisms of state collapse

We wish to reiterate that no single condition produces the outcome in the cases we
studied, but a conjunction of causes. Based on the comparison of our case studies, we
develop the following model of the causal mechanisms of state collapse (see Figure 2).
The arrows in the model indicate causal relations between factors that are discussed in
more detail in the remainder of this section. The model is not to be read sequentially,
i.e. that the process of state collapse happens from left to right. Instead, factors are organ-
ised by their causal proximity to the outcome. By causal proximity we mean that some
factors have more immediate effects on the outcome of state collapse while others con-
tribute in a more indirect fashion. Causally distant conditions have a more enabling func-
tion – they provide the circumstances under which the deleterious effects of more
proximate factors can unfold.42

41
This relationship also explains our ‘outlier’ case, the only one where mobilisation did not play a causal role: In Congo, state
institutions were virtually non-existent after the administrative and military structures of the former colonial power
Belgium had been dismantled in 1960. Thus, it did not even require a military escalation of the power struggle
between the central government and secessionist forces for the state to collapse, since the government simply lacked
the capacity to transport loyal troops to regain control of the secessionist Katanga region.
42
Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, ‘Reducing Complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote
and Proximate Factors and the Consolidation of Democracy’, European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 5 (2006): 751–
86.
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 11

Figure 2. A model of causal relations.

As the furthest removed set of factors, political transitions are contextual variables who
‘set the stage’ for state collapse but have little immediate impact on the outcome. Regime
change and decolonisation constitute moments of change that provide opportunities and
risks for the institutionalisation of authority. These situations are critical junctures during
which established rules become contested and new rules are institutionalised. The ‘pat-
terns of politics’ conditions are more proximate to the outcome. They are affected by tran-
sitions and are more closely connected to the dynamics of power struggles on the national
level. Particular kinds of repression trigger feelings of powerlessness amongst the general
public (or large parts thereof) against excessive and disproportionate measures of the
ruling regime. Factionalism has deleterious effects both as a structural feature of politics
and as a mobilising strategy. Intra-elite rivalries emerge in situations of unpredictability,
as mistrust among regime insiders increases.
When the mobilisation of armed opposition happens under these conditions, state col-
lapse becomes an acute risk. For instance, a transitional context makes the mobilisation
against a repressive government more likely and more effective, both by opening new
spaces for counter-hegemonic forces and by weakening the government’s hold over
society. Mobilisation can also intensify if actors draw on factionalist loyalties to recruit sup-
porters for or against the regime. Finally, intra-elite rivalries will be played up during tran-
sition processes: If marginalised elites defect from the regime coalition while the regime is
under threat from oppositional forces, the erosion of state control over society intensifies.
External intervention can contribute to state collapse by either supporting the mobilisation
of the opposition or the incumbent regime when this evens out military imbalances and
drags armed conflict into a stalemate.43

Transition: regime change/national independence

Process-tracing reveals that the destabilising effect of transition emerges from the state of
uncertainty that changing modes of governance creates for political actors. We

In addition to the factors mentioned above, we find some instances where states have decided to relinquish parts of their
43

sovereignty. For instance, the Lebanese state tolerated the armed presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation
(PLO) on Lebanese territory in the 1969 Cairo Agreement. In Zaire, Mobutu, in his policy of ‘Debrouillez-vous’ (literally,
‘fend for yourselves’), exhorted his subjects to survive without public services and enrich themselves in order to secure his
patrimonial rule. These policies that more or less voluntarily surrender existing levels of state authority, once initiated, are
hard to reverse. However, we cannot say whether this mechanism represents a more general pattern across cases
because we only found isolated and anecdotal evidence across cases.
12 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

differentiate between transitions on two levels: regime change and national indepen-
dence. Understanding the regime as the formal and informal organisation of the political
power centre and its relation to society more broadly, regime change can be an alteration
of the rules for access to power, its mode of exercise, claims to power or the power struc-
ture itself. In our cases the consequences of regime change had a greater impact on the
relations between elites than on relations between the governing elite and the population
more broadly. Only the case of Afghanistan (1979) featured a destabilising shift in the
relationship between elites and population when the communist regime tried to trans-
form Afghan society according to its modernist vision, thereby provoking heavy resistance
from traditional rural authorities.
As a more profound form of transition, national independence alters the sovereignty
status of a state by liberating it from colonial rule or from incorporation into an empire
or federation. It necessarily implies a reorganisation of internal power relations and a re-
legitimisation of power itself. This amplifies the problems of institutional and normative
uncertainty as struggles over the constitutional framework, citizenship, recognition, the
scope of the demos and territorial status erupt. A case in point is the newly independent
Congo (1960) where Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba’s idea of a centralised socialist
Republic was challenged territorially by the secession of Katanga and politically by
strong anti-socialist forces preventing Lumumba’s government from consolidating the
new state. In some newly independent countries, we found that the state was lacking
instruments to enforce the monopoly of violence because no formal security apparatus
existed at independence (as in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Georgia and Tajikistan) or decolonisa-
tion destroyed the organisational structures of the security forces (Congo-Kinshasa 1960).
This is particularly dangerous when armed militias had risen to prominence during the
struggle for independence who cannot be transformed into formal national security
forces after independence because they only represent particular identity groups and/
or rely on personal loyalties.
Both types of political transition contribute to state collapse by disrupting the
power structure of the elite, increasing the risk of escalating power struggles (see
intra-elite rivalry). Whereas regime change concerns the extent of representation
and access to power of individuals and groups within a given state order, national
independence exposes all aspects of a political order to political contestation. In
either case elites often fall back on identity-based networks to mobilise supporters
in their struggle for power (see factionalism), especially if such processes occur unex-
pectedly or rapidly.

Repression
We found that repression was a causal factor if it either (a) was employed against large
sections of the population, or (b) manifested as a single symbolic event of publicly
visible repression with extraordinary violence against the population. Targeted, selective
repression against individual dissidents did not seem to have a causal effect on state
collapse.
We hypothesise that the causal effect of repression lies in its effect on the mobilisation
of dissent, especially its scale. When state repression is indiscriminately applied or targets
large groups irrespective of their political activism, everybody is at risk of becoming a
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 13

victim. An example of this dynamic is Somalia in the 1980s where the government of Siad
Barre was ‘at war with its own population’,44 driving its victims into the hands of the oppo-
sition. In such cases, repression helps unite disparate opposition groups around the
common goal of overthrowing the regime, even if dissidents agree on little else. This
hypothesis is consistent with the literature on repression and communal mobilisation in
civil war.45 A single event of excessively harsh repression can have a similar effect by
serving as a symbolic reference point for opposition movements to mobilise against the
regime. For instance, the Georgian nationalist movement radicalised after Soviet troops
crushed demonstrations by the moderate democratic opposition in the Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic, killing at least 20 people in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. This sowed the
seeds for Georgian independence but also the later split between Georgian, Abkhazian
and South Ossetian nationalists.
Both of these repressive strategies – widespread, indiscriminate oppression and visible
extraordinary violence – disrupt the relationship between rulers and populace. Feelings of
fear and insecurity lead citizens to mobilise against the regime to ensure their security
(Chad, Georgia, and Tajikistan). In other cases like Liberia, Somalia and Afghanistan,
severe repression limited political opportunities for peaceful political change until activists
saw no alternative to violent struggle. Furthermore, we found repression to have an
immediate effect on factionalism if repression is directed against particular identity
groups. In those cases, targeted groups will mobilise along identity lines at the sub-
national level. In times of danger the retreat into identity-group solidarity offers the
best option for the organisation of social order and safety (as in Somalia, Liberia, and
Chad). Also, the combination of repression and armed mobilisation, i.e. mobilisation as
a reaction to repression, is particularly dangerous. Repression produces negative coalitions
which agree on few policy issues beyond the removal of the regime.46 Once this uniting
goal is achieved, these movements quickly disintegrate and end up in protracted power
struggles which descend into state collapse, as the cases of Georgia and Somalia attest.

Factionalism
We understand factionalism as a form of politics emphasising difference that draws on
pre-existing groups or constructs exclusive group identities which provide a comparatively
stable form of identification. It unfolds its destructive properties in conjuction with contex-
tual conditions such as political transition that make factionalist identities politically
salient. This echoes insights from the literature on ethnicity and nation-building about
the risks of identity politics.47
Factionalism can contribute to state collapse in two ways. First, political elites may stra-
tegically use exclusive identities by instrumentalising inter-group differences to mobilise
followers. The resulting processes of ‘ingrouping’ and ‘outgrouping’ promote conflict-esca-
lating behaviour through stereotyping and the dominance of radical positions within
44
Africa Watch, ‘Somalia a Government at War with its Own People. Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the
North, 1990’, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/01/31/government-war-its-own-people (accessed November 18, 2014).
45
E.g. Gregory D. Saxton, ‘Repression, Grievances, Mobilization, and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr’s Model of Ethnopolitical
Rebellion’, International Interactions 31, no. 1 (2005): 87–116.
46
E.g. Mark R. Beissinger, ‘The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution’, American
Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013): 574–92.
47
E.g. Andreas Wimmer, Kultur als Prozess. Zur Dynamik des Aushandelns von Bedeutungen (Wiesbaden: VS, 2005), 133–4.
14 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

groups. An example of this strategy is Uganda where the anti-Amin coalition fractured
after 1979. Drawing on a political practice introduced by the British colonial adminis-
tration, political rivals competed to stack the armed forces with their ethnic kin. Thus, mili-
tary factions served as a power base for elites, and the internally fragmented military
proved unable to fend off an armed opposition. Drawing on military units loyal to
them, Brigadier Bazilio Olara-Okello and General Tito Okello overthrew the ruling Obote
regime in July 1985 but were unable to establish control over the entire country,
paving the way to the collapse of the state.
Second, factionalism may constitute a structural principle of politics. In times of political
crisis or change, particular identity groups may feel insecure or the idea of a common
(national) identity may be called into question. In such cases, mobilisation follows the
pre-existing factionalist pattern of politics. Lebanon in 1975 is a case in point where the
political system distributed power along sectarian lines. While this system was fairly
stable for several decades, the armed presence of the PLO on Lebanese territory from
the late 1960s onwards upset the fragile political balance. Initially, factional leaders
wanted to uphold national unity with the Lebanese army as its guarantor. However,
when the army proved incapable of coping with the armed Palestinian groups and pro-
tecting Lebanese territorial integrity against Israeli air raids, factionally organised political
groups started to arm themselves. This factionalist mobilisation spiralled into civil war and
paralysed state institutions.
Of course, separating factionalism as political strategy from factionalism as a struc-
tural principle of politics is difficult. The distinction is nonetheless theoretically impor-
tant because these modes represent different mechanisms leading to state collapse.
Whereas factionalism as strategy relates more to the mobilisation of armed groups, fac-
tionalism as structural principle serves as an organisational resource by increasing pol-
itical polarisation. Thus, factionalism only has a causal effect on state collapse in
conjunction with the mobilisation of armed groups and, in some cases, a political
transition.
As for the prior existence of local polities, process-tracing did not suggest that an
institutionalised polity prior to the colonisation or integration into an empire or federa-
tion was a distinct causal factor of state collapse. Nonetheless, in the spirit of Hobs-
bawm’s concept of ‘invented traditions’48 we found several instances where this
factor had an impact on contemporary politics in the form of historically-derived
ideas of identity and coexistence among social groups. Therefore, we treat ‘local pre-
colonial polities’ as a special form of factionalism that can have two effects: The more
likely phenomenon is that historical experiences like conflict, exploitation or discrimi-
nation between groups (Chad), the hegemony of particular groups (Congo-Kinshasa,
Uganda) or the circumstances of state formation (Lebanon) are used as narrative
tropes in a polarising discourse. It is also theoretically plausible that pre-colonial polities
leave behind political structures or traditions that offer organisational advantages to des-
cendants, but we were only able to observe this in a single case, namely the Bakongo in
the case of Congo 1960.49

48
Eric J. Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’, in The Invention of tradition, eds. Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence
O. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14.
49
Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1961), 50–1.
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 15

Intra-elite rivalry
Process-tracing highlighted the potentially destructive impact of intra-elite rivalry. A politi-
cal elite is usually defined as the group of individuals that hold positions of authority in a
political system.50 We take a broader approach and look beyond decision-
making positions in formal institutions to account for the manifold sources of authority
in society. This includes ‘non-state’ or ‘hybrid’ authorities who exercise some degree of
regularised power over particular groups in society. Due to their ability to mobilise fol-
lowers, keeping these elites invested in the political system is a crucial prerequisite for
stability.51
Intra-elite rivalry means a competition over positions of power in the state that goes
beyond institutionalised rules governing internal power relations. Rivalries may manifest
themselves in power struggles that contravene formal rules, e.g. coup attempts or assas-
sinations. Office-holders may also utilise formal rules such as cabinet reshuffles or judicial
prosecutions but the mere occurrence of such practices does not automatically indicate
internecine struggles behind the scenes and thus have to be interpreted in conjunction
with other causal factors. In the cases we studied, formal rules of elite relations were
only weakly institutionalised and ambiguous. We hypothesise that the lack of institutiona-
lisation accounts for the dangerous effects of intra-elite rivalries by creating uncertainty
about how positions of power can be attained and secured. This is of great importance
during political transitions when the existing power structure is questioned. Furthermore,
rivalries can also result from repressive governmental policies that result in a climate of
fear and mistrust among elites.
This mechanism can best be illustrated with state collapse in Georgia. While also
notably driven by the factionalist polarisation between South Ossetian, Abkhaz and Geor-
gian nationalisms, collapse might have been avoided without the internal divisions within
the Georgian nationalist movement. Shortly after the declaration of independence in April
1991, the newly elected President Zviad Gamsakhurdia ordered the suppression of the
Mkhedrioni, the leading Georgian paramilitary group, in an attempt to establish political
supremacy within the Georgian nationalist movement. In addition, Gamsakhurdia set up
a National Guard under the leadership of Tengiz Kitovani. However, when Gamsakhurdia
tried to subordinate this force to the Interior Ministry, his personal rivalry with Kitovani
came to a head. The National Guard joined forces with the Mkhedrioni and orchestrated
a coup d’état that deposed Gamsakhurdia. Fighting between Gamsakhurdia’s supporters
and the forces allied with the ruling military council forestalled the institutionalisation of
state authority until about 1994.

Mobilisation of armed opposition

In our understanding, the mobilisation of armed opposition is predicated on political objec-
tives to change the status quo: Armed groups mobilise to take power for themselves and/
or to topple the ruling regime. The adoption of an oppositional stance is a crucial element

John Higley and Michael G. Burton, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological
50

Review 54, no. 1 (1989): 17–32.

David Brown, ‘The Search for Élite Cohesion’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 15, no. 1 (1993): 111–30; James Putzel and
51

Jonathan DiJohn, Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States: Crisis States Research Centre Report (London: Crisis States
Research Centre, 2012).
16 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

here because mobilisation of armed groups covers cases where groups were already
armed and organised. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau in June 1998 a group inside the mili-
tary led by the former chief of general staff Ansumané Mané turned against president João
Bernardo Vieira. This move set off a violent struggle that neither side was able to win which
eventually led to the collapse of the state. Obviously, in this case the level of mobilisation
in terms of organisation or armament did not increase, but a group that was already sys-
tematically armed went into opposition.
By conceptualising the mobilisation of armed opposition as a dynamic process, we
assume that an increase in mobilisation can cause state collapse by testing the incum-
bent regime’s ability to control the means of violence. If the regime is militarily weak,
an armed insurgency does not have to lead to state collapse – if the insurgents score a
quick and decisive victory, they can take over and reconsolidate state institutions, as is
typical during coups d’état. In such a scenario, maintaining internal cohesion within the
alliance of former oppositional forces now in power becomes crucial. For example, in
Somalia a lack of cohesion prevented the re-consolidation of state authority: the insur-
gents were able to depose the regime of Siad Barre but the alliance between the
various rebel groups fell apart soon after this common goal was achieved. Mobilisation
of armed opposition causes state collapse when it leads to a drawn-out conflict or sta-
lemate between the regime and the opposition that prevents both sides from effec-
tively governing the country.
We regard an increased mobilisation of armed groups as a necessary condition of state
collapse since we observed it in all of our cases except for Congo 1960 (see Fn. 41). The
mobilisation of armed oppositional groups does not just affect the government’s
control over the means of violence but also limits its ability to make rules and collect
taxes in its national territory. Due to the empirical significance of mobilisation across
our cases, this causal factor takes up a central position in our model (see Figure 2). It is,
however, not a sufficient condition for state collapse because there are many instances
(e.g. civil wars) where the mobilisation of violent opposition does not lead to this
outcome. Other factors that weaken state institutions and contribute to a stalemated
power struggle also need to be in place. The ones mentioned above – transition, repres-
sion, factionalism, intra-elite rivalry – undercut the capacity of state institutions to repress
or deter militant opposition to the incumbents and to resolve social grievances in a non-
violent manner.

External intervention
Our initial expectation was that foreign influences like a decline in military or financial aid to
the government would increase the risk of collapse. Instead we find that external intervention
had a causal effect in at least seven of the cases in our process-tracing. External intervention
refers to situations where external actors take sides in an intrastate conflict and support
those actors that (seem to) serve their objectives through material aid or outright deploy-
ment of troops. While external intervention can theoretically act to forestall state collapse,
within our case set we suggest that external intervention was linked to state collapse
when it evened out the military balance of power between government and opposition.
This prevents both sides from scoring a decisive victory and re-establishing the monopolies
of violence, rule-making and taxation. This assumption is supported by Lockyer who argues
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 17

that external assistance affects belligerents’ military capabilities and the form of warfare by
changing the military balance between opposing sides.52 Cunningham also shows that
external interventions prolong the duration of intrastate conflict when interveners pursue
an independent agenda.53 We would like to highlight that our case studies suggest that sup-
porting armed groups seems to have limited effectiveness for external sponsors to achieve
their intended goals. This is in line with other research that casts doubt on the ability of
outside actors to use militant groups in other states as political leverage.54
External intervention can lead to state collapse in two ways: The first is an external inter-
vention in support of a weakened regime which prevents the fall of the regime but triggers
state collapse by stretching the period of a contested monopoly of violence beyond our
six-month threshold. State collapse in Guinea-Bissau is a case in point. In June 1998, Briga-
dier-General Ansumané Mané had started an armed insurgency against the regime of pre-
sident Vieira, rallied about 90% of the army behind him, attacked the capital and brought
large parts of the country under his control. Without Senegalese and Guinean troops prop-
ping up Vieira, the coup leaders likely would have taken power quickly and re-established
state authority. Instead, it took eleven months until negotiations led to the withdrawal of
the foreign troops, after which the few remaining forces loyal to Vieira quickly surrendered.
The second mechanism linking external intervention to state collapse is when external
parties support a secessionist or oppositional group, making it more competitive. One
option is to enhance the group’s level of mobilisation, e.g. through the provision of
weapons and equipment, training, funding, or through the deployment of military advi-
sors or troops. Another option for external actors is to support the mobilisation of the
opposition or the politicisation of existing groups. US financial and military assistance to
anti-communist forces within the Laotian military from 1958 onwards strengthened politi-
cal forces that otherwise would have lacked the means to compete with the entrenched
political elite pursuing a conciliatory policy towards the ‘leftist’ Pathet Lao insurgents. Led
by General Phoumi Nosavan the ‘right-wing’ opposition formed a revolutionary committee
in south-central Laos and seized the capital Vientiane in December 1960. However, the
new regime was unable to assert its authority throughout large parts of the country
that were controlled by the Pathet Lao or Kong Le’s ‘neutralists’.

Conclusion
State collapse is a prolonged power struggle leading to or revealing a lack of capacity of
state institutions. These institutions have the crucial function to maintain public order
through the monopolisation of the means of violence, rule-making and taxation. Further-
more, institutions create certainty about the rules in a polity, both between the rulers and
the ruled and also amongst the elite. The modern state is not the only model that can fulfil
this function, but it is the contemporary global standard. Thus, policies of institution-build-
ing could be an adequate strategy to foster peace and development, at least in theory.
52
Adam Lockyer, ‘Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars’, Review of International Studies 37, no. 5 (2011): 2337–64.
53
David E. Cunningham, ‘Blocking Resolution: How External States can Prolong Civil Wars’, Journal of Peace Research 47, no.
2 (2010): 115–27.
54
Navin A. Bapat, ‘Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent’, Journal of Peace Research 48,
no. 3 (2011): 303–18; Idean Salehyan, Kristian S. Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support for
Insurgent Groups’, International Organization 65, no. 4 (2011): 709–44.
18 E. JOHAIS ET AL.

However, state-building has often failed as a policy in international interventions due to a

lack of attention to the political dynamics underlying the creation and maintenance of
institutions. Reducing institution-building to its technical aspects misses the point:
State-building is as political as state collapse.
So how do states collapse? Our model shows the different factors that play a role in the
causal dynamics in 15 cases of state collapse. First, state collapse occurs if power struggles
are militarised by both government and opposition becoming systematically armed. Situ-
ations of political change, such as decolonisation and regime change, increase the risk for
state collapse because they call existing power structures into question. Certain pattern of
politics contribute to the prolongation of power struggles because they hamper insti-
tutional capacities of conflict management. Repression, either as widespread terror or in
highly symbolic events, disrupts the relationship between rulers and ruled by creating
the perception that everyone is at risk of becoming a victim. Factionalist politics obstruct
state-building policies that depend on the monopolisation of the means of violence, rule-
making and taxation. Further, this monopolisation is threatened when the cohesion of the
ruling elite erodes. Finally, external intervention, whether in support of the incumbent
regime or to insurgents, can have a deleterious effect by creating military stalemates
that prolong power struggles.
This model advances the understanding of causes of state collapse, especially as it
complements prevalent structuralist explanations with findings on dynamic factors. It is
a first attempt to provide a more complex and fine-grained theorisation of the mechan-
isms of state collapse. However, further research is needed to learn more about how par-
ticular causal factors are linked to the outcome of state collapse. Therefore, we suggest
that further research should tap into various bodies of literature that have hitherto
been neglected in previous writings on state collapse.
First, the mobilisation of armed opposition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
state collapse. Although we focus on military mobilisation, a broader understanding of
mobilisation dynamics would be very valuable for further research on state collapse.
With state collapse usually being an unintended consequence of political power struggles,
a mobilisation perspective could produce new insights on when and how anti-regime
groups mobilise, how they interact with each other, and which coalitions of anti-regime
forces are particularly likely to break apart after toppling the government.
The concept of political settlements has developed in the research on state fragility to go
beyond the problematic focus on formal state institutions. Political settlements are the
accomodations, compromises and systems that actors develop to generate political stab-
ility, and that embody the distribution of power among those actors.55 Instead of looking
at politics in terms of regime type and transition processes, such an approach foregrounds
elite bargains and the wider system of state-society relations. In line with our findings, this
refocuses attention on actors and the constant renegotiation of their relationships. Think-
ing of political elites in terms of political settlements also brings out the ambivalent effect
of informal practices (e.g. clientelism, neopatrimonialism) which undermine formal state
institutions while stabilising elite relations.
Moreover, we suggest that the rich literature on repression that we identified as a causal
factor should be used to improve the understanding of its effects on the stability of states.

55
Putzel and DiJohn, Meeting the Challenges, 1.
 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 19

External aid turned out to have the opposite effect than we initially assumed – support
from external patrons did not actually help stabilise the regime. Instead, military aid con-
tributed to state collapse in several cases. Finally, we still know very little about the impact
of factionalism on processes of conflict escalation and state collapse. We propose that fac-
tionalism has a twofold effect: as a principle of political organisation and as a deliberate
strategy by political elites. This suggests that the literature on identity politics could
enrich the research on state collapse by providing an understanding of the dynamics of
factionalist politics.
We believe that exploring these literatures would be a fruitful way to test, refine and
expand on our results. This would go some way towards a more dynamic explanation
of the causes of state collapse. Where previous research mostly offered structuralist expla-
nations and paid little attention to the underlying causal mechanisms, our approach offers
an opportunity for a more systematic exploration of these causal processes.

Acknowledgements
This research was made possible by the generous funding of the German Research Foundation
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, grant LA 1847/8-1). Christian Tischmeyer, Laura Blomenkemper,
Simon von Dahlen and Jörg Langerwisch have provided research assistance. We thank the editors
and reviewers for their helpful comments. We are also indebted to Felix S. Bethke, Jörg Faust,
Jörn Grävingholt, Kai Koddenbrock, Sabine Kurtenbach, Julia Leininger, Thomas Richter and
Henning Schmidtke for their comments on earlier versions of the paper and to Carlo Diehl for edi-
torial assistance.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft: [Grant Number LA 1847/8-1].

Notes on contributors
Eva Johais is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict
(IFHV) at the Ruhr University Bochum. Her research interests include interventions, development and
the state.
Markus Bayer is a researcher at the University of Duisburg-Essen and member of the Institute for
Social Movement Studies (Berlin). His work focuses on peace and conflict studies, democracy and
civil activism.
Daniel Lambach is a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Univer-
sity Frankfurt and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace at the Uni-
versity of Duisburg-Essen. His research focuses on the state and resistance movements.

ORCID
Daniel Lambach http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4670-4188

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