CCU Journal 1

WSIF-01707; No of Pages 13
Women's Studies International Forum xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Women's Studies International Forum

j ournal homepage: www . elsevier . com/locate/wsi f
The glass ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors on the boards
of listed firms in China and India
Alice de Jonge
Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Australia
article info synopsis
Available online xxxx This study uses quantitative analysis to build as complete a picture as possible of the
gendered-nature of boardrooms in major listed firms in China and India. Data were collected
and analysed to understand where women hold boardroom positions across the range of
company sizes and types in both countries. In particular, data were analysed to establish the
extent to which board size, company size (market capitalisation), workforce size, industry
sector and/or firm ownership type are related to the presence of women on the board of a
company. It was discovered that women do better than average in firms from within the
financial services sector, and in firms with a larger work-force size. State-owned firms do
comparatively better in India than in China, possibly reflecting the fact that women's political
empowerment in India is more advanced than in China, and much more advanced than
women's economic participation in India.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.201
4.01.008
Introduction confirm that rapid growth,
marketisation and
There is increasing concern in many Western nations that despite a westernisation in the economies
variety of measures which have been introduced both voluntarily in the of China and India have not
private sector and at the level of public regulation, the glass ceiling for been ac-companied by similar
women in corporate leadership remains firmly in place. Only in Norway trends towards improved levels
and a small number of other countries (including Denmark, Finland, of gender equity in corporate
Iceland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, South Africa and Israel) where leadership. Western countries
quotas have been put into place has the proportion of women directors are now demonstrating an
on the boards of publicly-listed firms risen above 25% (Gender Equality awareness of the need for policy
Project, 2012). While the debate over ‘glass ceilings’ and whether quotas interventions aimed at
or targets are an appropriate way to ensure more equitable catalysing growth in
representation of women in corporate leadership continues in the west, opportunities for women at
in many developing countries women still struggle for basic social and leadership level. As part of the
economic rights. This paper presents preliminary findings from the first special issue, this paper
half of a larger study examining attitudes towards different policy suggests that rethinking gender
options aimed at improving gender diversity on corporate boards in and social policy in China and
China and India. This first half of the larger study provides an overview India requires an understanding
of where women are missing from corporate boards in China and India, that gender balance is an
and in so doing highlights the need for greater social policy important part of good corporate
interventions. Preliminary findings governance, which in turn
remains a linchpin of healthy
economic development.
0277-5395/$ – see front matter © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
economic participation in nation those published by the ILO and
building and economic the World Economic Forum
development ( Boserup, Su, & (WEF) provide a basis for
Review of existing literature Toulmin, 2007; The World comparing the gender story of
Bank, 2012). Regular development in India on the one
International development organisations and development scholars benchmarking studies such as hand, and China on the other.
have focussed upon the role of women's political empowerment and
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass

ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors
on the boards of listed firms in China and India,
Women's Studies International Forum (2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.01.008
2 A. de Jonge / Women's Studies International Forum xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
yet poor enforcement and
Given the economic power-house status of the fact that the legislation falling more on the
both countries, and the fact that the mostly fails to reach feminine side of the
combined population of China and Indiawomen working in the spectrum will have a
accounts for nearly 18% of the world'sinformal economy remain higher proportion of
total female population, understandingmajor obstacles to the female board directors
these stories is important for womenrealisation of equity in than countries falling on
every-where. China and India arepractice ( Hirway & Jose, the masculine side of the
developing countries which both had2011; Pellissery & Jalan, spectrum. Hofstede et al.
strong elements of state control until the 2011). (2010), however, find that
early 1990s when a process of economic worldwide ‘there is no
liberalisation and opening up to foreign relation-ship between the
investment was instituted. Corporate masculinity or femininity
governance reforms were an important part of a society's culture and
of this process in both China and India. Yet National culture has the distribution of
China and India have followed verybeen shown to play an employment over men and
different pathways towards marketisationimportant role in women’, and also find that
of the economy, and they have veryperceptions of gender and only amongst wealthier
different political systems and verythe determination of countries does cultural
different cultures. India is a very vigorousgender roles ( Parboteeah, femininity correlate to a
democracy, and one which performs betterHoegl, & Cullen, 2008; higher proportion of
than average when it comes to women'sWEF, 2012). The most women in higher-level
political participation – thanks largely towidely recognised technical and professional
Constitutionally-protected levels of femaleframework for jobs. Moreover, China and
participation in local politics. Politicalcategorising national India are very similar
participation has failed, however, tocultures was developed by when it comes to the
translate into economic participation, andDutch social psychologist masculinity/femininity
Indian women remain woefully under-and management scholar dimension of national
represented in the economy, particularly atGeert Hofstede culture, with China
senior levels (WEF, 2012). China, on the(Ghemawat & Reiche, scoring 56 and India 44 on
other hand, is a country where politics is 2011). In 1980, Hofstede a scale where zero
dominated by a single party — theidentified systematic represents the most
Communist Party of China, and wheredifferences between feminine culture and 100
women appear to do equally well incultures across four the most masculine.
political and economic participa-tiondimensions: power Likewise, when it comes
(WEF, 2012). Thus, the WEF's 2012distance; individualism/ to the power distance
Gender Gap Report ranks China as number collectivism, uncertainty dimension of national
58 (out of 135 countries) in its Politicalavoidance and mas- culture, China (80) scores
Empowerment Index, and number 58 alsoculinity/femininity only marginally higher
in its Economic Participation and(Hofstede, 1980). This than India (77), with both
Opportunity Index. India, on the otherframework has since been countries on the higher
hand, performs highly on the Politicalupdated to include two side of the index
Empowerment Index, coming in at numberextra dimensions: long- spectrum, revealing more
17, but very poorly when it comes to term orientation (Chinese hierarchical and less
women's Economic Participation andvalue system) and egalitarian cultures in both
Opportunity, where India is ranked atindulgence versus countries (Hofstede et al.,
number 123 on the Index. This is despiterestraint (Hofstede, 2010). It is unlikely,
the fact that both China and India have put Hofstede, & Minkov, therefore that differ-ences
into place a legislative framework aimed at2010). So far as the in either of these
promoting and protecting gender equity inmasculinity/femininity dimensions is useful for
the workplace. In China, the Law on the dimension of national exploring differences in
Protection of Women's Rights and Interestsculture is concerned, gender equity in corporate
(1992) and the more recent 2007Grosvold (2011) leadership between these
Employment Protection Law providehypothesises that two countries.
theoretical protection for workplace equity,countries
including equal pay. However, women
remain concentrated in the more poorly
paid sectors of the workforce, and China and India are
enforcement is not always possible for most different when it
women whose rights have been denied ( comes to the
Chen, 2008; Zhou, 2013). In India, the individualism/
1976 Equal Remuneration Act and the collectivism dimension of
National Rural Employment Guarantee national culture is
Act 2005 have both served to provide and considered, with China
protect employment benefits for women, much more collectivist
(20) than India (49) (where 100 representsPricewaterhouseCoopers tend to disappear from the
the most individualist of societies.Genesis Park Program, promotion ladder at an
Grosvold (2011) hypothesises that more2007) suggest that women earlier stage in the career
liberal cultures, which tend to be moreare more likely to play a trajectory, between junior
individualist, will tend to have a higher greater role in corporate and middle level positions
representation of women on corporateleadership in China than ( Community Business
boards. This study does not support such a in India — a hypothesis Limited, 2009, 2011 — a
hypothesis. Rather, my findings here pointborne out by the findings survey of Hang-Seng
to alternative hypothesis based essential-ly of a 2011 Gender Index firms). While
on the idea that collectivist cultures mayDiversity Benchmark for Chinese companies
place greater importance on distributingAsia Report (Community employed significantly
job burdens and social roles in a mannerBusiness Limited, 2011). more women at all levels
most conducive to creating anThat report revealed a than did their Indian
‘harmonious’ collec-tive whole. To the ‘leaky pipeline’ effect for counterparts, the
extent that gender diversity in leadership is women in the companies difference was particularly
seen as part of this pattern, more women surveyed, from six key noticeable at senior level.
will be encouraged to enter leadership Asian economies, The average number of
positions. This hypothesis will be furtherincluding China, and also women employed by
explored in the second part of the larger found that while the surveyed companies at
study of which this paper forms a part. greatest leak (i.e. the senior level positions in
greatest percentage China was 20.72%, while
decrease of women) takes for India the figure was
The WEF Global Gender Gap Reportplace between middle and 9.32% ( Community
and other similar studies (eg. ILO, 2010;senior level positions in Business Limited, 2009,
China; in India women 2011).
Please cite this article as:

de Jonge, A., The glass
ceiling that refuses to
break: Women directors on
the boards of listed firms in
China and India, Women's
Studies International
Forum (2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
wsif.2014.01.008
A. de Jonge / Women's Studies International Forum xxx (2014) xxx–xxx 3
proportion of women on the

Methods of China's major export markets board.
over the preceding 12 months.
This first part of the larger study uses quantitative instruments to In order to ensure the inclusion
Relationship between
build as complete a picture as possible of the gendered nature of of Chinese data reflecting more
organisation size and the
publicly-listed company boardrooms in China and India. Data were normal economic conditions,
proportion of women directors
collected and analysed to under-stand where women hold boardroom and thus more comparable to
on the board
positions across the range of company sizes and types in both countries. the Indian data, another sample
In particular, data were analysed to establish the extent to which board was taken at end 2011, by which
Past research on the
size, company size (market capitalisation), workforce size, industry time fiscal stimulus measures
relationship between
sector or firm ownership type ap-pear to be related to the presence of and cyclic recovery had taken
organisation size and
women on the board. This analysis was conducted in order to test a effect (Yu, 2010). All data were
opportunities for women has
number of hypotheses which were designed after reviewing the rele- collected from company annual
reached conflicting results.
vant literature. reports filed for the standard
Early research found that
Chinese reporting year which
women encounter in-creased
ends on 31 December. There
opportunities in smaller
In India, the S&P CNX 500 represents the country's first broad were 150H-share firms listed on
based benchmark of the Indian capital market. The S&P CNX 500 the HKEx as at 31 December companies, partly due to a lower
comprises a list of 500 companies listed on the National Stock 2008. By 31 December 2011 likelihood of women being
Exchange of India (NSE), and represents over 95% of total free-market this number had grown to 168. related to secondary jobs in
capitalisation of stock traded, and around 94% of total turnover on the smaller organisations. For
NSE (NSE website). The S&P CNX 500 index is also designed example, one study of highly-
specifically to reflect the market industry composition as closely as paid executives in the USA
possible, and can thus be considered representative of India's best Relationship between the found that the organisations that
1 proportion of women directors executive women worked for
performing firms from all industry groups. Data were collected for all
were 35–45% smaller than the
Indian firms included in the S&P CNX 500 index on the census date, 31 and the size of the company
organisations that executive
March 2010. Where data for a particular firm was not available for 31 board
men worked for, regardless of
March 2010, data available for the closest date to the census date was
Network analysis literature whether size was measured by
used (for example where a firm's annual report contained figures current
has revealed that networks and sales, total assets, or number of
as at 30 June, 30 September or other reporting date for 2010).
relationships are undoubtedly employees (Bertrand & Hallock,
Within the Chinese market, firms with shares listed on the Hong important for women aspiring to 2001).
Kong stock exchange (HKEx) are exposed to reporting standards board membership
Conversely, two studies
comparable in terms of accessibility, accuracy and transparency to (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman,
specifically looking at women
international best practice standards. Com-panies incorporated and 1994). Burke (1997) found that
board members found a positive
based in China, and operating under Chinese law, but having shares the most common ways in
listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange are known as H-share firms. which CEOs found qualified relationship between
Because these firms have shares listed on the HKEx, they are subject to women directors were through organisation size and the
Hong Kong reporting requirements, which in turn are comparable to another board member and by presence of women on the board
Indian and international reporting standards for corpora-tions (de Jonge,the CEO personally knowing ( Burke, 2000; Harrigan, 1981).
2008), as well as being readily available in English. There are practical the woman candidate. Every Moreover, recent efforts at
difficulties in accessing accurate and up-to-date data from an alternative board member has his or her improving diversity have been
group of mainland-China based firms, including those listed on the own set of relationships or embraced primarily by large
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. The group of publicly-listed network. A larger number of companies worldwide. A 2010
Chinese firms chosen for this study was therefore that group comprising board members implies access poll conducted by the Society
all mainland-Chinese firms with shares listed on the HKEx. As well as to a broader range of for Human Resource
being exposed to international reporting standards, H-share firms arerelationship networks. It can Management found that larger
also more likely than their domestically-listed mainland counterparts to therefore be argued that the organi-sations and multinational
be exposed to ideas of corporate governance and management theory larger the existing membership organisations were more likely
from western markets (de Jonge, 2008), including western ideas ofof a board, the more likely it is than their smaller and more
diversity management. that qualified women will be local peers to address workplace
amongst those included in the diversity (Society for Human
pool of potential candidates for Resource Management, 2010).
Because the group of all H-share firms is relatively small, it was nomination to board In addition, research comparing
both possible and desirable to survey this sample population twice, atmembership. This study thus the largest 500 companies in the
two different points in time — 31 December 2008 and 31 Decemberproposes that: Fortune 1000 with their smaller
2011, thereby allowing for an analysis of change over time. The year counterparts in the next largest
2008 was when the Global Financial Crisis had its most devastating group found that America's
Hypothesis 1. The size of a largest companies were
impact on the Chinese economy, mostly via its impact on the economies
company's board will be significantly more likely to have
positively correlated with the at least one woman board
Women's Studies 1016/j.wsif.2014.01.
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass International Forum 008
ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors (2014),
on the boards of listed firms in China and India, http://dx.doi.org/10.
Hypothesis 3. The size
director than those in the Fortune 501–of a company's workforce recent Forbes study found
1000 group (Catalyst, 2001). (number of employees) that the best performing
will be positively industry sectors in terms
In both India and China, it alsocorrelated with the of gender diversity at
remains true that larger companies areproportion of women on senior levels were
more likely to have western-trainedthe board. healthcare, education and
manage-rial staff aware of the concept that financial and other
greater diversity is correlated withRelationship between business services, with
improved managerial decision making.industry sector and construction, utilities and
Larger firms in China and India are alsoproportion of women mining scoring the lowest
operating in markets where managerialdirectors (Forbes Insights, 2012). A
skills are in short supply ( Futurestep, report released in
2012; Gregory, Nollen, & Tenev, 2009; As suggested above, September 2010 by the
Ooi, 2009). It can be hypothesised thatthe industry in which an US Government
they are therefore more likely to beorganisation operates may Accountability Office
focussed upon merit-based selection foralso affect opportunities found that in 2007 the
their top staff, and less likely to exclude for women to advance to industry sectors with the
qualified candidates (consciously ortop level positions. Some largest proportion of
unconsciously) on the basis of gender (industries, such as women at managerial
Cooke & Saini, 2010; Gregory et al.,construction and level were healthcare and
2009). In light of this reasoning and inmanufacturing, have been social assistance,
light of past studies showing that womentraditionally dominated by educational services,
directors are more prevalent in larger men, while women are financial activities and
companies, this study tests the hypothesismore likely to be leisure and hospitality.
that: employed in the services Across all 13 industry
and trade sectors (Brewer, sectors surveyed, female
2001). Harrigan's, 1981 managers earned, on
study examined firms average, 81 cents for
Hypothesis 2. The size of a company
from eight different every dollar earned by
(measured by market capitalisation) will
industry sectors and found male managers in 2007
be positively correlated with the (USGAO, 2010).
the strongest effect of
proportion of women on the board.
industry sector on the
presence of women
Relationship between the size of adirectors was for firms in In Australia, a Reibey
company's workforce and the proportion ofthe process technology, Institute (2011) study of
women directors on the board of thatservice and financial Women Leaders in ASX
company services sectors. 500 firms found that the
three sectors with the
It has been argued that women are Several other studies highest representation of
better at ‘relationship management’ andhave examined women's women directors were
‘people management’ than are men (advance-ment to senior finan-cials (14.1%),
Pounder & Coleman, 2002; Woodd, 2000).level by industry sector. healthcare (13%) and
This proposition has been supported by consumer discretionary
For example, one
some previous studies showing that (12.4%). The lowest
women are more likely to be prevalent at representation was in
senior level in service industries that place materials (5.6%) and
value on customer relations than in other energy (6%).
industry sectors ( Gardiner & Tiggemann, Interestingly, the utilities
1999; Hakim, 2006). Other studies have industry had the highest
found that women are psychologically proportional increase in
more suited to developing skills in human female representation over
relations (Melamed, 1995). Still other the 12 months between 30
studies have found that senior HR June 2010 (5% women
personnel are also more likely to be directors) and 30 June
women than non-HR senior executive 2011 (9.3% women
officers (Blum, Fields, & Goodman, directors). This possibly
1994). All of this suggests that companies reflects the tendency for
with a larger number of employees are increasingly privatised
more likely to value the presence of utilities sector firms in
women on the board of directors. This Australia to become more
leads to the proposition that: oriented towards
consumer-service
delivery.
Directors International non-banking financial-
A number of reports have(CWDI) also found that service companies in the
benchmarked a higher propor-tion ofChinese bank were Fortune Global 200. The
women directors on the boards of banksleading the way, with the Report confirmed that
and other financial institutions comparedfour Chinese Banks finance sector firms
to firms in other industry sectors.included in the Fortune perform better than the
According to the 2012 Catalyst Census ofGlobal 200 having an average for all Fortune
Fortune 500 companies, for example,average women's Global 200 companies
women made up 19% of all directors in representation of 19% on (15.6% directors being
finance and insurance industry firms, a the board, compared to an women, compared to
proportion higher than that found in anyaverage of 15.6% 13.8%). It also found that
other NAICS Industry sector except for the women's representation the 12 finance industry
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing sector, for all 31 banks (from all firms which came from
where women also occupied 19% of all countries) included in the China averaged only
board seats (Appendix 8 — Women's2010 Fortune Global 200. 12.3% of women
Representation by NAICS Industry, 2012A later 2012 Report draws directors, compared to an
Catalyst Census: Fortune 500). a different picture of average of 15.6% for their
China's position in Global 200 finance-sector
The Catalyst Census findings areregards to women peers (CWDI, 2012).
supported by a number of CWDI studiesdirectors in financial
since 2004, which have consistently foundsector firms. The 2012
that banks within the Fortune Global 200CWDI report on Women Overall, however, the
have a higher average percentage of Board Directors of financial services sector
women directors than their non-bankingLargest Banks and clearly leads the way in
Fortune Global 200 peers (CWDI, 2010).Financial Services facilitating women's rise
The 2010 report by Corporate WomenCompanies Globally to the boardroom
looked at 93 banking and

Forum (2014),
wsif.2014.01.008
sector exhibited a culture that

in both China and India. A 2009 survey by EMA Partners International A number of studies have was hierarchical, less flexible
found that among the top 240 Indian compa-nies, only 11% are headed confirmed that women's and more con-cerned with
by women, but over half of those, 54%, were in the financial sector employment is largely preserving existing company
(EMA Partners International, 2011). In China also, the Women onconcentrated in the service values. In light of Bilimoria and
Boards: Hang Seng Index 2012 study found that the financial sector sector industries, especially Piderit's (1994) finding that
performed above average in terms of gender equality in corporate healthcare and consumer firms perceived a risk associated
leadership. Amongst the top 20 firms listed in the Women on Boards services (staples and with hiring female board
League Table: HIS 2012 as having the highest proportion of womendiscretionary) ( Forbes Insights, directors, industries with a
leaders, seven came from the financial services sector (five banks and 2012; United States lower aversion to risk, and a
two insurance firms) (Community Business Limited, 2012). FactorsGovernment Accountability more innovative culture are
which have been pointed to as explaining the above-average presence ofOffice, 2010). While studies likely to have more women
women in finance sector leadership positions include the desk-based and carried out in Western nations board directors. In China and
stable nature of banking careers, the greater use of flexible workplace do not necessarily translate into India, the rapid rise of a
practices by finance sector firms, the high social status offered by a an Asian context, the tendency consumer middle class has
banking career for women, the greater opportunities for advancement in Western economies for ensured vibrant competition in
open to women in the finance sector, the customer-oriented nature of a women's employment to be the consumer products sectors
banking career and the need for senior employees in finance-sector concentrated in some service (both staples and discretionary),
firms to be highly detail oriented ( Catalyst, 2012, 2013; CWDI, 2010).sector industries, notably which in turn has ensured that
In both Hong Kong and India, the ready availability of affordable child- education and healthcare, also innovative, risk-taking
care and home help has also been pointed to as a factor in allowing seems to hold for China and enterprises have survived. Rapid
women at senior executive level to devote more time to their careers India ( Centre for Social growth, innovation and risk-
(WEF, 2012). Research, 2009; ILO(b), 2010). taking also characterise the IT
It is difficult to obtain an sector, the financial services
accurate picture of women's sector and the healthcare sector
Another important factor in India may be the entrance exam foremployment in China and India in these countries (China data
probationary officer recruitment. In 2011 a new Common Written because of the large numbers of online, 2011).
Examination (CWE) conducted by the Institute of Banking Personnelwomen working in the informal
Selection was introduced to consolidate recruitment selection for 20sector, and in part-time and
public sector Indian banks. The CWE, like the individual bank examsinsecure work ( Chen, 2008; Past studies which have
conducted before it, is conducted in gender-blind conditions, and thus Ying Zhou, 2013). Moreover, a explored the question of which
enables women to seek entry officer-level positions on an equal basis higher percentage of women in industries offer the best
with their male peers. Yet individual banks still retain control over other the workforce does not opportunities for senior women
pre-selection conditions and processes, such as age limits and individual necessarily translate into more in corporate governance have
interviews, and these are not free of gender bias. In 2009, for example, opportunities for women at the characterised and classified
the government-controlled State Bank of India was accused of barring top — a phenomenon most industries in different way
pregnant women from being hired during a recruit-ment drive that drew noticeable in the hospitality (Catalyst, 2013). For the
11,000 applicants (David & Alexander, 2011). Possibly more importantindustries but also in the purposes of this study, the
that the recruitment exam process, are the innovative HR policies andeducation sector, where women Global Industry Classification
practices by major Indian banks such as ICICI whose CEO Chanda form a majority at the bottom of Standard (GICS) was adopted.
Kochhar was the only female delegate amongst 76 global banking the hierarchy, but remain absent The GICS is an industry
executives at the 2009 IMF Conference in Kyoto, Japan. India is also from the top ( Centre for Social taxonomy developed by MSCI
notable the introduction of a world-first women-focussed bank, Research, 2009; China data and Standard & Poor's for use
Bharatiya Mahila Bank, announced by Finance Minister P online, 2011). by the global financial
Chindambaram in his 2013 budget speech, to be funded and owned by community. The GICS structure
the Government of India and headed by Usha Ananthasubramanian, consists of 10 industry sectors,
executive director of Punjab National Bank ( Saha, 2013; Sidhartha, Grosvold (2011) therefore 24 industry groups, 68
2013). suggests a cultural approach to industries and 154 sub-
examining gender in different industries. The GICS structure
industry sectors, explaining that is universal in that it applies to
There is no similar specialised entrance-exam for those seeking over time, ‘industries develop companies globally and has
entry to a banking career China, where banks and financial sector firms distinct cultural and cognitive been accepted as an industry
also lead the way in facilitating women's rise to the top. This may characteristics that may analysis framework for
suggest that university qualifications act as an equally effective gender- influence a number of firm investment and other types of
blind entry barrier to the first (interview) stage of recruitment. Major behaviours’. Gordon (1985) research. The GICS industry
Chinese banks have also, like their Indian counterparts, adopted a range analysed differences in industry sector taxonomy is also used by
of flexible HR policies and practices which have allowed more women culture between firms in the China Securities Regulatory
to pursue career advancement for longer. dynamic industries, such as Commission (CSRC) in its
technology industries and firms Annual Report and other
in more stable sectors such as reporting documents.
utilities. A culture of risk-
taking, innovation and action For the purposes of this
characterised firms in the R&D- study, each company was
intensive technology industry, allocated into one of the ten
whereas firms in the utility GICS industry sectors. The ten
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass
ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors
on the boards of listed firms in China and India,
Women's Studies International Forum (2014),
case in developing
GICS industry sectors are: Energy; countries, where the 2008 Wenchuan
Materials; Industrials (capital goods, state is both the earthquake disaster in
commercial and professional services, regulator and a main Sichuan Province was less
trans-portation); Consumer Discretionary employer. Also, public than that of donations by
(automobiles and com-ponents, consumer sector firms in these private firms. In India,
durables and apparel, consumer services, countries retain strong Cooke and Saini (2010)
media, retailing); Consumer Staples (food bureaucratic and found that locally-based
and staples retailing, food, beverage & monopoly features Indian public-sector and
tobacco, household & personal products); despite an increasing private firms tend to lag
Health Care (health care equipment & level of market forces. behind MNCs (either
services, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology In contrast, managers foreign or Indian
& life sciences); Financials (banks, in private firms may controlled) in their
diversified financials, insurance, real have more autonomy diversity management
estate); Informa-tion Technology (software and competence in policies and practices.
& services, technology hardware & making strategic Compared to their
equipment, semiconductors & business decisions. globally-connected peers,
semiconductor equipment); They may also take locally-based firms
Telecommunication Services and Utilities. more risks in pursuing operating in India tended
profit and therefore be to adopt a legal
In light of previous studies which have more receptive to compliance to diversity
revealed a higher than average proportion HRM practices will management or have no
of women directors and women senior enhance the firm's policy at all. This finding
executives in the banking and financial competitive makes intuitive sense
services sector, and in other industry advantage. given that firms which are
sectors characterised by innovation and part of an MNC network
risk-taking, it is proposed that: structure are more likely
The impact of
to be exposed to
Hypothesis 4. The proportion of boardownership form on HR international best practice
seats filled by women will be higher in the practices has been
in diversity management
financial services sector than in otherobserved in studies of and gender equality than
industry sectors. Firms in other service-HRM in both China (eg are firms which lack such
oriented sectors, such as health care,Cooke, 2009; Wei & Lau, connections.
consumer goods and consumer services2005); and India ( Amba-
(including telecommunications andRao, Petrick, Gupta, & Family-controlled
Information Technology), are also likely toVon der Embse, 2000; firms are much more
have a higher than average percentage ofBudhwar & Khartri, common in India than in
women directors. 2001). Privately-owned China. The presence and
firms are different from influence of family
state-owned firms in the relation-ships in the
way they interact with management of family-
Relationship between proportion ofgovernment and society.
controlled firms makes it
women directors and firm ownership type Zhang, Rezaee, and Zhu
more likely that women
(2010), for example, will play a part in such
A 2010 study by Cooke and Saini found that the extent of
management. Particularly
explored differences in diversitycorporate donations by
where there are not
management strategies amongst 24 firmsstate-owned firms sufficient men in the
in North-west India. The study included afollowing the 12 May
family network willing
comparison of diversity management
and able to fill the desired
strategies amongst firms with different
number of managerial
owner-ship forms. The authors noted that:
positions, family-
… a comparative study of several connected women are
ownership forms … is helpful in more likely to be
illustrating various operating nominated/appointed to
environments and hence firms' HR fill managerial, executive
strategies. This is because firms in and/or board positions. A
different ownership forms are subject number of studies support
to different busi-ness environments and the proposition that
may interact with institutional family-controlled firms
environments in different ways ( will tend to have a higher
Boisot & Child, 1996; Brewster, proportion of women on
Wood, & Brookes, 2008; Peng, Tang, the board of directors than
& Tong, 2004; Shenkar & Von state-owned or widely-
Glinow, 1994). This is particularly the held firms ( Bettinelli,
2011; Gibb Dyer & Whetten, 2006;hundred and thirty-nine of board had nineteen
Zainol, 2013). these companies had directors, and the most
shares (H-shares) listed common board size was
Based upon comparative studieson the mainboard of the nine directors (35
described in the litera-ture, companies inHKEx, while 29 had companies or 23.3%).
each of the sample groups were allocatedshares listed on the These findings are
into one of the following four ownership-Growth Enterprise Market summarised in Table 1.
type categories: State-controlled firm,(GEM) board of the Firms with the largest
Family-controlled firm, Widely-held firmHKEx. By 31 December boards appeared to be
or Foreign-controlled MNC. 2011, there were 168 clustered within the
The following hypothesis, drawn from mainland-incorporated financial services sector,
an examination of the existing literature firms with equities listed and so an independent t-
was explored: on the HKEx, of which test was conducted, using
139 had H-shares listed board size as the
Hypothesis 5. Family-controlled firmson the mainboard of the dependent variable and
will have, on aver-age, a higher proportion Exchange, while 29 were industry sector (financial
of women directors on the board thanlisted on the GEM. services) as the
either state-controlled or widely-held independent (dummy)
firms. In 2008, the average variable. Levene's test for
(mean) board size of equality of variances was
Data Analysis: China 2008 and 2011China mainland Chinese firms non-significant (p N .05),
2008 and 2011 listed on the HKEx was so the assumption of
just over ten directors (x = homogeneity of variances
There were 150 Chinese mainland10.54, SD = 2.60). The (between firms within and
companies with securi-ties listed on the smallest board size was those
HKEx on 31 December 2008. Onesix directors, the largest

Forum (2014),
wsif.2014.01.008
boards of HKEx-listed mainland

Table 1 Table 3 Chinese firms had increased
Profile of firms sampled: China 2008 and 2011. Proportion of women directors by only slightly. There were a total
industry sector: China 2008 and 2011.
of 1,776 directors on the boards
x (mean) S/D Range Mode
Sector N of all 168H-share firms
2008 (n = 150) surveyed for that year, of which
Board size 10.54 2.60 6–19 9 2008
Consumer staples 2 168 or 9.46% of the total were
Women on board 0.88 0.95 0–5 0
Total supervisors 4.69 1.84 1–11 3 Utilities 6 women. The average (mean)
Women supervisors 0.99 1.03 0–5 0 Financials 9 number of women of H-share
Board committees 3.04 1.1 1–6 2 Consumer discretionary 16 firms listed as at 31 December
Women committee chair 0.29 0.5 0–2 0 Healthcare 10
2011 was one (x = 1.00, SD =
No of employees 33,276 75,228 45–477,780 Information Technology 18
% public shareholding 39.33 13.96 10.8–100 Industrials 57 1.003). As was the case in 2008,
Telecommunications 3 over one-third of all companies
2011 (n = 168) Materials 21 surveyed (61 companies or
Board size 10.57 2.52 6–18 9 Energy 8 36.3%) had no female director
Women on board 1.00 1.00 0–5 1 Total 150
Total supervisors 4.59 1.78 2–13 3 on the board. A further thirty-
Women supervisors 0.88 0.95 0–5 0 2011 two companies (19%) had two
Board committees 3.47 1.08 1–7 3 Consumer staples 7 women directors on the board,
Women committee chair 0.33 0.56 0–2 0 Telecommunications 1
while eight companies (4.8%)
No of employees 40,604 86,109 18–552,810 Financials 16
% public shareholding 40.35 14.19 13.65–100 Healthcare 13 had three women sitting at the
Utilities 8 board table. Only three
Consumer discretionary 11 companies (Bank of China Ltd,
Information technology 21 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd
not within the financial services sector) was sustained (see Table 3). The Industrials 56
and Tianjin Capital
test revealed that on average, firms from within the financial services Materials 23
Energy 12 Environmental Protection
sector had larger boards (x = 15.22, SE = .94) than did firms outside of
Total 168 Group Co Ltd) had as many as
that sector (x = 10.24, SE = .193). This difference was significant:
2008 Levene's test F (9, 140) = 4.141, p four women directors, while one
t(148) = 6.242, p b .00.
b .00. Levene's test significant. Robust company (Weiqiao Textile Co
tests of equality of means could not be Ltd) had five women directors
By December 2011 these statistics had not changed very much at all. performed for proportion of women
(four of whom came from the
The average board size was still just over ten (x = 10.57, SD = 2.52), the because at least one group has 0
same two families).
smallest board size remained at six while the largest board table seated variance.
eighteen directors. Nine directors was still the most popular board size 2011: Levene's test not significant: F(8,
158) = 1.353, p N .10 at .22.
(50 firms or 29.8%). These findings are summarised in Table 1.
Women were more likely to
Financial sector firms still retained, on average, larger boards (x =
be supervisors than directors of
14.69, SE = .64) than firms from other industry sectors (x = 10.14, SE
= .17); a difference which was statistically significant: t(166) = 8.09, p bonly one woman on the board. A H-share firms. The average size
.00 (see Table 3). further thirty companies (20%) of H-share firm supervisory
had two women directors on the
The average (mean) number of women directors on the boards of H- board, while three companies
share firms in 2008 was less than one (x = 0.88, SE = .95). Over forty (Bank of China Ltd, China
percent of all H-share firms listed at the end of 2008 (62 companies or Merchants Bank Ltd and Great
41.63%) had no female director on the board. Another third (53 Wall Motor Co Ltd) had three
companies or 35.3%) had women on the board of
directors. Only two companies
(China Construction Bank
Corporation and Weiqiao
Table 2
Textile Co Ltd) had more than
Profile of firms sampled: India 2010.
three women directors on the
x (mean) S/D Range Mode board. In the case of Weiqiao
(n = 500) Textile, director Ms Zhang
Board size 9.51 2.70 3–19 8 Hongxia held the combined
Women on board 0.43 0.67 0–4 0 positions of board Chair and
Board committees 4.22 2.09 1–15 3 General Manager. There were a
Women committee 0.11 0.44 0–4 0
chair
total of 1,581 directors on the
No of independent 4.86 1.64 0–10 4 boards of all 150 companies
directors surveyed as at 31 December
No of nominee 0.41 0.96 0–6 0 2008. Of these, 132 were
directors
women, comprising 8.35% of
No of employees 8,012 SE = 17,653 26–200,299
(n = 429) the total.
% public 39.33 13.96 10.8–100
shareholding By 31 December 2011 the
No of shareholders 129,291 2,965–4,877,760 proportion of women on the
on the boards of Studies http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.01.008
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass listed firms in China International Forum
ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors and India, Women's (2014),
shareholder or
committees was between four and fiveshareholder group (see Table 4
supervisors (2008: x = 4.69, SD = 1.84; further Table 5). There Proportion of women directors
by industry sector: India 2010.
2011: x = 4.59, SD = 1.84). The mostwere no foreign-
common supervisory committee size wascontrolled MNCs in either Sector N Percent x (mean) S/D
three supervisors (59 companies in 2008;2008 or 2011. (n = 500)
68 companies in 2011). The average Consumer discretionary 63 12.6 .054 .088
(mean) number of women on the Telecommunications 9 1.8 .053 .080
supervisory committee was just under one Hypothesis 1. The size Healthcare 40 8.0 .050 .079
of a company's board will Financials 59 11.8 .048 .070
(2008: x = .99, SD = 1.033; 2011: x =
Information Technology 35 7.0 .046 .066
0.88, SD = .949). It was most common for be positively correlated Materials 74 14.8 .044 .063
the supervisory com-mittee to bewith the proportion of Consumer staples 33 6.6 .042 .054
comprised entirely of men (58 firms orwomen on the board Utilities 2 0.4 .041 .059
Energy 40 8.0 .039 .072
38.7% in 2008; 70 companies or 41.7% in
Industrials 145 29.0 .034 .065
2011). The 150 firms surveyed for 2008 Total 500 100 .043 .070
had a total of 703 supervisors, of which A matrix was
Levene's test not significant (Sig
148 or 21.05% were women. Three years generated using SPSS N .05 at .06).
later, the 168 firms surveyed for 2011 had(Version 20) to show the
a total of 771 supervisors, of which 147 orcorrelation between the
19.06% were women. size of a company's board
and the proportion of
of a company (measured
It was rare for board committeeswomen on the board.
(committees directly under the board) orHypothesis one is not a by market capitalisation)
the supervisory committee to be chaired bydirectional hypothesis, so will be positively
a woman. The average number of board a two-tailed Pearson's correlated with the
committees (including the obligatory auditcorrelation test was run. proportion of women on
committee and remuneration committeeThe results of the test run the board
required by HKEx Listing Rules) wasfor both 2008 and 2011
between three and four. In 2008 it was data showed a positive, A two-tailed Pearson's
most common for H-share firms to havebut correlation test was run,
not significant,
three board committees (42 firms or 28%). correlation, between the again using data entered
By 2011 it was more common for H-sharesize of a company's board into an SPSS (Version 20)
firms to have four board committees (61and the proportion of matrix, to show the
firms or 36.3%). In both 2008 and 2011, it women on that company's correlation between
was most common for both theboard (2008: Pearson's company size (market
supervisory committee and all boardcorrela-tion coefficient r = capitalisation) and the
committees to be chaired by men. Seventy-.034, significance value p proportion of women on
four percent (111 firms) of H-share b .676; 2011: Pearson's company boards. The
companies listed at the end of 2008, and correlation coefficient r results of the test showed
seventy-two percent (121 companies) of= .083, significance value that the proportion of
H-share companies three years later inp b .285). Hypothesis one women on the board of a
2011 had no female committee chair.was company was positively
therefore not
Thirty-five H-share companies (23.3%) insupported by data from correlated with company
2008 had one committee (either the2008 or 2011. size. This remained true
supervisory committee or a board for both 2008 data
committee) chaired by a woman. A similar (Pearson's correlation
number of firms (39 companies or 23.2%) coefficient r = .204) and
had a single female committee chair in 2011 data (Pearson's
2011. correlation coefficient r
= .113). The correlation
was found to be statisti-
The most common ownership type for cally significant on the
H-share companies was the state-owned basis of 2008 data
firm, both locally based (78 companies in (significance value p
2008, 76 companies in 2011) and those b .012) but not
with multinational operations (34 statistically significant on
companies in 2008, 47 companies by the basis of 2011 data
(significance value p
2011). Family-controlled firms were the
b .145). In other words,
next most common, and tended to be
while Hypothesis 2 was
locally based (30 companies in 2008, 28 in
supportable in 2008, by
2011), rather than multinational (5
2011 the relationship
companies in 2008, 7 firms in 2011) in
between company size
their operations. Only a small number of
and proportion of women
H-share firms (7 in 2008, 8 in 20011) were
directors had weakened.
widely-held, with no controlling
TOTAL 150 100
2011 (n = 168)
The question of a possible relationshipTable 5 State controlled 125 74.4 .084 .083
between the size of a company's board and Proportion of women directors Family controlled 35 20.8 .130 .113
the market capitalisation of that companyby firm ownership type: China Widely held 8 4.8 .064 .071
Total 168 100 90
was also explored. Do H-share companies2008 and 2011.
with greater market capitalisation tend to 2008: Levene's test not
significant: F(2, 147) =
have larger boards? In both 2008 and 2011 n
2.35, p N .05 at .099.
the answer was yes. A statistically 2011: Levene's test not
2008 (n = 150)
significant positive correlation was State controlled 108 significant F(2, 165) =
discovered between the size of a company Family controlled 35 2.92, p N .05 at .057.
(market capitalisation) and the size of a Widely-held 7

Forum (2014),
wsif.2014.01.008
widely-held firms
company's board with a Pearson's correlation coefficient of r = .275, homogeneity of variances was
significant at p b .01 in 2008, and a Pearson's correlation coefficient of r sustained. The results of the An ANOVA test was
= .309, also significant at p b .01 in 2011. independent t-test revealed that conducted to compare
firms from within the financial differences in the mean
services sector had, on average, proportion of women directors
Hypothesis 3. The size of a company's workforce (number of a higher proportion of women between firms of different
employees) will be positively correlated with the proportion of women on the board (x = .133, SE ownership types. The results of
on the board = .03) compared to firms from the analysis are summarised in
outside that industry sector (s Table 5. Levene's test for
A two-tailed Pearson's test was run to explore the cor-relation = .08, SE = .007). This differ- homogeneity of variances was
between the size of a company's workforce and the proportion of ence was not significant two- satisfied for both 2008 and 2011
women on the board of that company. When the test was run on data tailed (t(148) = 1.8, p = .073), data. It was revealed that family
from 2008, a statistically significant positive correlation between however the one-tailed controlled firms had a higher
company workforce size and the presence of women directors on the probability was .073/2 = .037 average proportion of women
board was discov-ered, with a Pearson's correlation coefficient of r which is significant, p b .05. directors on the board than did
= .336, significant at p b .01. A statistically significant between state-controlled or widely-held
company size (market capitalisation) and company work-force numbers A second ANOVA test was companies. This remained true
was also discovered (r = .534, significant at p b .01). In other words,run using 2011 data to compare for both 2008 and 2011 data.
companies larger in terms of market capitalisation tended to employ difference GICS industry State-controlled firms appear to
more workers. sectors (proportion of women have had a higher proportion of
on the board of directors). women directors than widely-
The relationship between company size (market capi-talisation) and Levene's test was non- held firms, but the small number
company workforce numbers remained firmly in place when a Pearson's significant, so the assumption of of widely-held firms in the
correlation test was run using 2011 data (r = .534, significant at p b 01).homogeneity of variances was sample casts doubt upon this
However, the relation-ship between workforce size and the proportion sustained for the different finding.
of women on a company's board was revealed as no longer present. industry sectors. As Table 3
When a Pearson's correlation test was run using 2011 data for employee indicates, firms in the consumer
numbers and proportion of women directors, a negative correlation staples, telecommunications, Data analysis: India 2010
coefficient was discovered (r = −.023), in contrast to the positivefinancial ser-vices and
correlation found for 2008 data. This negative correlation was, however, healthcare sectors had a higher The average (mean) board
not a statistically significant one, with a significance value of p b .769average (mean) proportion of size of companies included in
(two-tailed). In other words, while Hypothesis 3 was supported by the women directors on the board the S&P CNX500 index on 31
data from 2008, it was not supported by the data from 2011. than did firms from within other March 2010 was between nine
industry sectors. These findings and ten directors (x = 9.51, SD
tend to support Hypothesis 4. = 2.696). It was most common
for CNX500 companies to have
Hypothesis 4. The proportion of board seats filled by women will be Data from 2011 was further either an eight-person board (77
higher in the financial services sector than in other industry sectors. explored using an indepen-dent companies) or a ten person
Firms in other service-oriented sectors, such as health care, consumer t-test using dummy variables to board (75 companies) (Table 2).
goods and consumer services (including telecommunications and compare firms from within and The average (mean) number of
utilities), are also likely to have a higher than average percentage of without the financial services women on the board was less
women directors sector. Firms from within the than one-half (x = .43, SD
financial services sector had, on = .674). Just over two-thirds of
In order to test this hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA test was run average, a higher proportion of CNX500 firms (334 companies)
(again using SPSS Version 20) to explore differences in the mean women directors on the board (x had no woman at all on the
proportion of women directors between the ten different GICS industry= .13, SE = .02) than did firms board of directors, while nearly
sectors. The results of the test are summarised in Table 3. Levene's test from all other sectors combined one-quarter of CNX500 firms
was significant for data from 2008, so the assumption of equality of (x = .09, SE = .01). The (121 companies or 24.2%) had
variances was not sustained. Keeping this in mind, the ANOVA test difference was not significant one woman on the board. On
indicated that, on average, companies within the consumer staples, two tailed (t(166) = 1.69, p company (JSW Steel Ltd) had
utilities, financial services, consumer discretionary and healthcare = .093), however the one-tailed three women on the board, and
sectors had a higher mean proportion of women directors than firms probability was .093/2 = .047, one company (Apollo
from other industry sectors. The findings for 2008 appear to support which is significant. Hospitals) had four women
Hypothesis 4. directors. There were a total of
4,752 directors on the 500
In order to explore Hypothesis 4 more deeply, an in-dependent t-test Hypothesis 5. Family-
company boards surveyed,
was conducted, using dummy variables to compare firms from withincontrolled firms will have, on
the financial services sector with firms from outside of that sector (all aver-age, a higher proportion of
other firms). Levene's test was non-significant (p b .05), so thewomen directors on the board
assumption of than either state-controlled or
Women's Studies 1016/j.wsif.2014.01.
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass International Forum 008
ceiling that refuses to break: Women directors (2014),
on the boards of listed firms in China and India, http://dx.doi.org/10.
the average (mean)
of which two hundred and fourteen or workforce size was just Table 6
4.5% were women. A summary of theseover 8,000, ranging from Proportion of women directors
by firm ownership type: India
findings can be found in Table 2. 26 employees in the 2010.
The Indian Listing Rules (Clause 49,smallest workforce (JM
Part II and PartIV(G)) require that all Financial Ltd) to 200,299 n Percent x (mean) S/D
listed firms establish an audit committeeemployees in the largest State controlled 59 11.8 .058 .067
and a shareholder/ investor grievanceworkforce (State Bank of Family controlled 290 58.0 .046 .073
Widely-held 78 15.6 .028 .052
committee. Annexure ID of Clause 49 alsoIndia).
Foreign MNC 73 14.6 .035 .074
includes the establishment of a Total 168 100 .043 .070
remuneration committee as a The most common
Levene's test is significant
recommendatory guideline. Notownership type for the (Sig b .05 at .003). F (3, 496)
surprisingly, therefore, it was mostIndian firms surveyed was = 4.801, p b .00. Welch's F
common for CNX500 firms to have a totalthe family-controlled firm (3, 155.84) = 3.52, p b .05
of three board committees (202(290 firms or 58%). Next at .017.
companies), with four board committeesmost common was the
the next most common number (94widely-held firm (78
companies). firms or 15.6%) followed
by the foreign-controlled on that board, with a
Firms in the financial services sector MNC (73 firms or Pearson's correlation
were more likely to have a greater number14.6%). State controlled coefficient of r = .063,
of committees as a means of ensuring firms were in the minority and a significance value
compliance with prudential regulations. An(59 firms or 11.8%). of p b .158.
inde-pendent t-test indicated that financial These findings are A final test was run
sector firms had a mean average ofsummarised in Table 6. after combining data from
between six and seven board committees China for 2010, and from
(x = 6.68, SE = .428), while firms in other Hypothesis 1. The size India (2011). The results
industry sectors (using a dummy variable of a company's board will of a two-tailed Pearson's
to represent all firms outside of the be positively correlated correlation test revealed a
financial services sector) had an average with the proportion of significant correlation
(mean) of between three and four board women on the board between the size of a
committees (x = 3.89, SE = .077). This company's board and the
difference was significant: t(61.805) = A matrix was board of directors on that
6.403, p b .00). Levene's test for equalitygenerated using SPSS board, with a Pearson's
of variances was significant (p b .00), so(Version 20) to show the correlation coeffi-cient of
equal variances were not assumed. Seecorrelation between the R = .114, and a
further summary of findings in Table 4. size of a company's board significance value (two-
and the proportion of tailed) of p b .003.
women on that board.
Women were very unlikely to hold aHypothesis 1 not being a
position as com-mittee chair. Over 90% of directional hypothesis, a
of a company (measured
all CNX500 firms (459 companies) had no two-tailed Pearson's
by market capitalisation)
woman as committee chair, while only 28 corre-lation test was run.
firms (5.6%) had one committee chairedThe results revealed a will be positively
by a woman. Eleven firms had twopositive, but not correlated with the
committees chaired by women, while twostatistically significant, proportion of women on
firms (HT Media and Vishal Retail) had correlation between the the board
four committees chaired by a woman — insize of a company's board
both cases the same woman chairing four and the proportion of A two-tailed Pearson's
correlation test was run
committees. There were a total of 1,994women directors
board committees established by CNX500 (using an SPSS Version
20 matrix) to explore the
firms as at 31 March 2010, of which 58
(3.6%) were chaired by woman. relationship between the
size of CNX500
A large number of NSE-listed Indian companies in the sample
firms do not provide details of workforce population and the
size in either the firm's annual report or on proportion of women on
the firm's website. Where possible, the board of those
employee numbers were obtained from companies. A positive, but
external sources (e.g. not statistically significant
www.businessweek.com), but this still left correlation was revealed
71 firms for which employee numbers (r = .067, p b .132).
were not obtained. Of the 429 firms for Hypothesis 2 was
which employee numbers were obtainable, therefore not supported by
the data.
firm. A statistically = .508, significant at p
The relationship between board size significant positive b .001).
and company size (market capitalisation) correlation was revealed,
was also explored, and a statisticallywith a Pearson's Hypothesis 4. The
significant positive correlation wascorrelation coefficient of r proportion of board seats
discovered, with a Pearson's correlation= .111, signifi-cant at p filled by women will be
coefficient of r = .303, significant at pb .05, p = .022. higher in the financial
b .01. Hypothesis 2 is supported services sector than in
by this finding. other industry sectors.
Firms in other service-
Hypothesis 3. The size of a company's A statistically oriented sectors, such as
workforce (number of employees) will besignificant positive health care, consumer
positively correlated with the proportion of correlation was also goods and consumer
women on the board discovered between the services (including
size of a CNX500 telecommunications and
A two-tailed Pearson's test was run tocompany (market utilities), are also likely to
explore the relationship between the sizecapitalisation) and the have a higher than
of a company's workforce and thenumber of employees average percentage of
proportion of women on the board of thatengaged by that firm (r women directors

Forum (2014),
wsif.2014.01.008
aimed, amongst other things, at

An ANOVA test was run (using SPSS Version 20) in order to support for the idea that firm improving women's position in
compare differences in the mean proportion of women directors between size, in particular workforce the workplace.
firms from each of the GCIS industry sectors. The results of the ANOVAsize, can be an influence for
are summarised in Table 4. It was discovered that firms from within the bringing more women into the
consumer discretionary, telecommunications, healthcare and financialleadership pipeline, and thence This study, which forms the
services sectors had, on average, a higher proportion of women on the to the boardroom. first part of a larger study, has a
board of directors than firms from within other industry sectors. Firms One of the more interesting number of limitations which
from within the energy and industrials sectors performed worst when in findings of this study was in need to be taken into account
came to board gender diversity. These findings are similar to those for relation to the effect of when considering the
the Chinese H-share firms surveyed in this study, and similar to other company ownership on the generalisability of its findings.
studies from Australia and elsewhere (e.g. Reibey Institute, 2011). Theypresence of women at the A first limitation of the study
are findings which tend to support Hypothesis 4. boardroom table. While in stems form the fact that while
China, family-controlled firms the Indian sample of 500 firms
have a higher proportion of is representative of the broader
women at the boardroom table Indian market (in terms of
Hypothesis 5. Family-controlled firms will have, on aver-age, a than do state-controlled firms, industry sector representation),
higher proportion of women directors on the board than either state- the opposite is true in India. the same is not true of the
controlled or widely-held firms This may well reflect the fact Chinese sample. This
that women's political compromises the validity of any
In order to explore this hypothesis, an ANOVA test was run to empowerment is greater in India comparisons made when data
compare differences in the mean proportion of women directors on the than in China. In particular, it relating to the two samples is
boards of firms from the four different ownership groups. The results of may well be that women's analysed.
the test are summarised in Table 6. Levene's test was significant, greater economic empowerment
meaning that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated.in India has an influence in Second, given the broad
The ANOVA indicated that state-controlled firms had a higher average ensuring that when government- diversity amongst the
proportion of women on the board of directors than did either family- appointees are nominat-ed to economies, cultures and
controlled or widely-held firms. This finding means that Hypothesis 5 board seats in state-controlled societies of Asia, the study
was not supported. firms, such nominations are cannot be generalised beyond
more equally distributed the two countries studied.
between men and women than Moreover, the small size of the
Conclusions when government departments Chinese sample means that
use similar nominating powers findings need to be treated with
This study supports previous findings in two important respects. in China. caution before generalizing to
First, it demonstrates that women have a signifi-cantly greater presence the broader Chinese economy.
at the boardroom table in publicly-listed Chinese firms that in major In both China and India,
Indian companies. This finding also supports previous findings that have In China, the percentage of however, this study should serve
noted the greater economic participation of, and opportunities open to, state-owned shares in the to raise awareness amongst HR
women in China than in India. In China, while the proportion of women market has steadily declined managers of the gender-bias of
directors increased slightly over the period 2008–2011, the percentagesince 2005 when the govern- company recruitment practices,
of company supervisory commit-tee seats occupied by women declined. ment began its state-owned workplace policies and/or
This may indicate that a number of women have shifted from less share reform initiative. In the promotion practices. Gender-
powerful positions as company supervisors to more influential posi-early 2000's, the state controlled bias awareness is a key first step
tions on the company board. over 60% of all listed Chinese towards the development and
company shares; by 2012 this implemen-tation of new
had declined to around 30% ( strategies aimed at eradicating
Second, this study supports previous findings that firms from within McGuinness, 2009; Yang, Chi, the detrimental impacts of such
the financial services sector and other service-oriented sectors are & Young, 2011). It would be bias.
performing better in terms of gender equality at the boardroom table interesting, but not easy, to
than their counterparts from within other industry sectors. The financial explore the effect of this gradual An important aim of this
services sector was not, however, the outstanding leader in terms of exit by the state from the share study was to provide a
boardroom gender equity that other studies have portrayed it as, market on the presence of foundation for the second half
suggesting that gender equity initiatives in this sector have remained women at senior company of a larger study into attitudes
static, while other service-oriented sectors are ‘following the leader’ andleadership in China. The main towards different social policy
catching up. difficulty for such a research interventions aimed at
project would be the need to improving gender diversity on
This study also supports previous studies which have found that isolate the impact of share- corporate boards in China and
simply increasing the total number of directors on a company's board,market reforms by controlling India. While there are
does not by itself serve to improve gender representation as a proportion for the effects of rapid social limitations to the data collected
of boardroom voting power. At the same time, however, this study does and economic change in China, so far, preliminary findings do
provide some as well as for the effects of support some of the existing
legislative reform initiatives research in this area, and
(such as the 2007 Labour Law) highlight the need for greater
social
Please cite this article as: de Jonge, A., The glass ceiling that refuses to break:
Women directors on the boards of listed firms in
China and India, Women's Studies International
Forum (2014),
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Please cite this
article as: de
Jonge, A., The
glass ceiling that
refuses to break:
Women directors
on the boards of
listed firms in
China and India,
Women's Studies
International
Forum (2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.wsif.2014.0
1.008

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WSIF-01707; No of Pages 13

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proportion of women on the

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sector exhibited a culture that

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boards of HKEx-listed mainland

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aimed, amongst other things, at

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and pay. GAO Report number

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