JSB978 Just War Theory Lecture 6 Peoples War

Peoples War
Wars are now fought on behalf of the population rather than the monarch. Under a democracy sovereignty resides in the voting population even though the decisions are made by the elected government. Similarly, under a Communist government, at least theoretically, the Central Committee is acting on behalf of the citizenry. Consequently, wars are now fought between nations and not between monarchs. There are a number of ethical consequences of this change in focus: The goal of military action is to defend the nations way of life rather than for conquest and acquisition. o The entire populace participates in the war effort either through military service or supporting roles, including food production, industry etc. Thus they are both combatants and valid targets. Because we are fighting for our existence the boundaries of acceptable behaviour may be pushed beyond ethical niceties.

Way of Life If Australia were invaded today, the greatest issue for our population would be the loss of freedom. We would cease to be Australians in the sense that we would lose our free society. Had we been under a European monarch in, say, the 16th century, loss of a war would have resulted in a new king. This may have been annoying but our everyday life would not have changed. The same could not be said today. Conquest would necessitate the loss of democracy, self determination and other freedoms. Our everyday lives would change significantly. This would be intolerable to many, if not most, of the current population. They would fight longer and harder, and probably continue a guerrilla war after the invasion. We can see evidence for this when Western nations lost their freedom in World War II. The Germans conquered France in 1940 and instituted a tyrannical fascist government. Many were executed as a threat to the German Reich (this group would probably have included all you free thinking students with Justice Degrees). Others were exterminated such as Jews and Gypsies.

Many of the remaining population acquiesced and survived as best they could under the Germans, with a hope, if not an expectation, that eventually the Allies would win and freedom would be returned. Others were more active and continued to fight in the French Resistance and Marquis. The key point is that the war was personal. Most people could not simply accept the loss and move on with their lives because the act of conquest changed not only their lives but who they were as independent, free individuals. The same was true in other nations. The Spanish could not accept the conquest of their country by the French in 1808 and fought a guerrilla war. Everyone in the populace fought. In discussing a battle against guerrillas, Jean-Michel Chevalier, a French soldier said: Our enraged soldiers clambered up the rocks all around, and despite the inhabitants' desperate defence, despite a hail of bullets, we reached the main town square. And then, everything was sacrificed to our implacable vengeance. The old men, women and children fired on us from the windows or threw stones down at us We were finally forced to set the entire town on fire. And there then took place under our eyes the most terrible scene: women, old men and children rushed out of the burning houses, and threw themselves at the feet of their conquerors But the various soldiers slaughtered them! (quoted in Bell 2007, p.273) The Population at War Everyone in the population goes to war. The government changes the law to centralize control of production and maximize the war effort. Goods are rationed and industry directed towards producing products for the war rather than the consumer market. People are conscripted and persuaded and occasionally coerced into serving in the military. This has three consequences. First, the army is larger. Participation in military service is no longer a feudal contract but a civil duty. The nation can introduce a levee en masse in which all males of a fighting age are required to fight. This allowed the French Revolutionary government to build an army large enough to fight off all the armies of Europe after the Revolution. Over time, the nature of the levee en masse changed. The requirements of modern warfare give victory to the trained and professional army over the amateur levee. Thus the nature of the peoples army had to reflect this and the levee gave way to a formal system of training under conscription. After the French Revolution, in 1798 the Directory passed the Jourdan Law which imposed conscription on the population. The levee had only been a temporary arrangement when the nation was in danger, while conscription became a permanent system of regular call ups for service (Bell 2007, 210). As we will see in a future lecture, the question of conscription has been accepted in most Western nations, but is far less popular in Australia. Second, everyone in the population is now required to work in support of the war. Men who are

not fighting work to support the army. Women make uniforms and support the troops. The children are the future soldiers of the nation. No longer can anyone in the population be a spectator to war. Third, if everyone is a supporter of the war then it is a short logical step to conclude that everyone is a valid target of military operations. The preservation of noncombatants is a carryover of a time before peoples warfare. Bell argued that peoples war changes the nature of the military in society. Under the nondemocratic government, there was a military class that ruled over everyone else. Some governments tried to modify the nature of the military class to make it more inclusive, but they simply altered its appearance without changing the class conflict. Under an egalitarian government the military had to be re-characterised. European states in the eighteenth century had already shown some tendencies to segregate their military forces from the rest of society, above all by building permanent camps and barracks for soldiers and by trying to remake officer corps into full-time professional bodies. But in France, these reforms did not go far enough to change the military's essentially aristocratic character, and at the start of the Revolution, it was precisely this aristocratic character that made the army an object of such enormous, almost paranoid, suspicion to radicals. As a result, not only did the Jacobins bloodily purge aristocrats from the officer corps, but also, through the levee en masse, they sought to erase the distinction between army and nation entirely. "What is the army?" a deputy asked. "It is France as a whole All French citizens are the army." Most radicals still believed in the coming end of the age of war and did not want to see France transformed into a permanently warring Sparta. But until the final peace, everyone would fight (Bell 2007, 217-218). The army now became an expression of the peoples will, that is, the actions of the military as agents of the citizenry become the actions of the people of the nation. Thus we celebrate Anzac Day as an Australian event while the Battle of Bosworth in 1485, was a personal victory for King Henry VII over Richard III. In France itself, the nation and the military, after having supposedly melted into each other in the white heat of the levee en masse, did not solidify back into the early, complex social latticework dominated by a hereditary military class. Instead, a far more radical process took place, which saw "the military" separate out into a society and culture far more distinct than before from a sphere that could now be fully characterised, in opposition to it, as civilian. Finally, the reglorification of war in no way entailed a return to the traditional aristocratic code of splendour, self-control, and dedication to the service of the hereditary prince. The new model of military glory was less a model of aristocratic perfection than of Romantic transcendence. It had a relationship to the Revolution's febrile celebration of patriotic self-sacrifice, but it now came to focus less on the Revolution's cold and high ideals than on the prowess of individual warriors. In short, war was becoming ever more something that societies must desire, and this desire took physical form in the person of Napoleon. (Bell 2007, 191) We can find one exception with Bells analysis. At least in the West, the excesses of Revolution have not been retained. As we saw last week, Western governments have rules for warfare and actively try to prevent unrestrained destruction and genocide. So the Revolutionary fervour has

died off. But the logic of excessive conduct is still ingrained in peoples war. The French Army of the Revolution suffered from another problem. It did not keep the connection between the military and the people. As the army was away from home and fighting without apparent support of the rest of the people, it started to internalise its success and develop its own identity. After 1794, however, new and far deeper cracks open up between the military and civilian society. The soldiers recruited in the first two years of the war remained in the field, largely outside of France and isolated from civilian society. Naturally, they began to identify principally with the army itself, and with generals like Napoleon, who so ostentatiously look out for their welfare. The Revolutionary indoctrination through speeches, songs, and newspapers, to which the Jacobins had subjected the rank and file, did not long survive the end of the Terror and its radical enthusiasms. Now, the generals are encouraged soldiers to take pride in victory for its own sake and for its extension of French power The generals forced the weakened central government to do away with the political commissioners who had accompanied the armies under the Terror. Increasingly, like Napoleon in Italy, they behaved like princes. Most significantly for the future, they also drew a severely unfavourable contrast between the patriotism that allegedly prevailed in the armies and the corruption and partisan bickering back home. (Bell 2007, 217-218) Thus the Revolutionary fervour was fragile. We have seen this many times in recent history when armies overthrow governments on the pretext of being better able to serve the people than the elected government. Pervez Musharraf led the Pakistan military in a coup in 1999 to prevent corruption in the Pakistan government. He kept power till resigning on Monday of this week, almost ten years after the coup. Whether sincerely or not, the coup was characterised in the terms of an act in support of the people rather than the selfish intentions of the army. The problem for military leaders is that they have to continue the battle to justified their extended retention of power. Logically, if the military takes over they should immediately call a new election to vote in a government to replace the old one. But they will claim that the pockets of resistence need to be removed before it is safe for a new election. In the same way Napoleon justified his imperial position on the basis on continual conquest across Europe. The French people did not need him once the war was over, so he had to keep fighting or lose his post as Emperor. Unfortunately for him, the nation could not supply an unlimited number of troops for a never ending war. Eventually, the country was unable to support his military ambitions and he was beaten (Bell 2007, p.232-233). You need to win the hearts and minds of the people in order to win a peoples war. You must convince the populous, not your enemies, that your goal in the war is just, that your goal is both desirable and viable and ensure that they do not suffer war weariness. Lansdale (1964) points out that the USA lost the Vietnam War because it failed on each of these points.

Ethical Excess After the French Revolution in 1789, the government fell into disorder. In the eyes of the new government, the Revolution had to be defended against those who would undermine it. Under the Assembly, France would no longer fight according to aristocratic niceties but had to take any steps necessary to eliminate their enemies (Bell 2007, 108). This is a consequentialist argument; the survival of the Revolution justifies all action taken to defend it. The French Revolution was the first of many revolutions that embodied this dictum. In later manifestations, such as the Communist Revolutions, it was not uncommon for the dictator to take the logic a further step and embody the Revolution in themselves. Napoleon was the first to do so when he said The Revolution is over. I am the Revolution. If you do not support me then you do not support the Revolution. My desires and success can be supported by the same excesses as were allowed in support of the Revolution. The people of the Vendee region, in western France, were monarchist and opposed the Republican government. The Assembly waged war against the people in the Vendee rather than a breakaway government. It was intended that the Vendee be exterminated to save the Revolution. What we would call the genocide they called populicide (Bell 2007, 158). A number of campaigns of pacification against the region took place between 1793 and 1796. In 1794, General Turreau was instructed to eliminate the populace, including women and children. His troops marched in separate columns, called the infernal columns (colonnes infernales). It is estimated that more than half the population of 800,000 were killed. The massacre in the Vendeans was the not the first massacre in history but it was the first justified by modern ideology of peoples war. War took on a new conceptual form as a fight to the death between us and them. If they exist we cannot thus they must be exterminated. This conclusion was justified with flimsy rationalisations of their inhumanity or the comparative importance of the Revolution verses the lesser value of the lives of our opponents. In most cases this will be further justified by the unrestrained violence on the part of our opponents who share similarly dehumanised feelings for us. The difference was total war. It was not simply that the vendee took place in wartime did the Camisard revolt, so did the 1745 Scottish rising). It was that it took place in context of a kind of warfare whose scale had little or no precedent, whether in mobilization of population and resources, the ambitious and ill-defined war aims, (so the the the

demonization of entire enemy populations, or the threats of the French leadership in the case of defeat. It was a perceived war to the death, in which, as we have seen, parts of the Revolutionary leadership were beginning to romanticise combat in a new and sinister way. And this sort of war, the threats of "extermination" dealt out on all sides were in fact meant in deadly earnest. Enemies of the Revolution, whether Vendean, aristocratic, Austrian, or English, were perceived as an existential evil. They were inhuman monsters. They were barbarians condemned by the High Court of history for a failure to accept the blessings of Revolutionary civilisation. They were obstacles to the triumph of liberty and therefore to the coming of a final, universal peace. They did indeed deserve death. In its very theory, warfare was turning exterminatory. On most of France's battlefields during 1792-94, the practice did not live up to this theory. But in the Vendee, three exceptional conditions combined to produce a convergence between them. First, after December 1793, the revolutionary forces in the region did not face serious military opposition, and therefore could act without the possibility of reprisals that elsewhere helped limit atrocities - for instance, staying the hands of French generals ordered to execute British prisoners. Second, the experience of civil and guerrilla war, with massacres on both sides and the constant threat of ambush, generated powerful states of hatred and fear that allowed soldiers to overcome the natural human repugnance for slaughtering helpless prisoners and civilians. Third, for a brief but decisive period in late 1793 and early 1794, control of military operations in the Vendee, to the extent that it existed, passed partly into the hands of the revolutionary faction known as the Hebertists, after Jacque Hebert, editor of Le pere Duchesne the Hebertists were revolutionaries who combined the most fervent dedication to classical fantasies of total war with the least actual military experience. They were are also those most likely to demand that insufficiently victorious or sanguinary generals be sent to the guillotine. Turreau followed what was to a great extent of their plan and acted under their influence, while fearful, as he later put it in a self justifying memoir, that "the least refusal -- what I've am I saying, the least negligence -would have led to the scaffold." it was thanks to these factors that in the Vendee, the rhetoric of total war was fully translated into blood-streaked, exterminatory fact." (Bell 2007, 160-161)

Private Military Contractors

Private military contractors (PMC), also called Private Military Firms, have existed since the creation of civilized warfare. They are usually called mercenaries, which are soldiers who sell their services for anyone who will pay. Throughout history the public support and opposition for PMC has varied. They have been glorified, like the mercenary Ronin in the movie The Seven Samurai (later made into a Western called The Magnificent Seven). They have also been pilloried as parasites who make money off killing and have no moral compass.

What is a PMC? PMC come in two forms: the bayonet strength soldier and the REMF. The latter have seen continual service in all armies in history while the former almost disappeared from the mainstream military from the Napoleonic Wars till the last couple of decades. Kidwell (2005) says that PMCs share certain characteristics that distinguish them from the normal military: For-profit organizations providing military services in a global market; They provide services traditionally conducted by uniform personnel; They are driven by market demands; They are controlled by company policy not governments; They optimize profit through modern business management techniques (Kidwell 2005, 1).

PMCs vary in size from individual contractors to globalised mega-corporations (Kidwell 2005, 2). Singer (2008) divides the PMC industry into military providers who provide tactical services on or near the front-line, consulting firms providing capacity building services for a military body, and support firms that are logistical service providers. The latter are the largest component of the PMC industry. Brooks breaks them down into PMC that provide active services like training and combat as opposed to Private Security Companies (PSC) that provide passive security. Although he notes that some companies would be both PSC and PMC (Brooks 2002, 129-130). Brayton, on the other hand, provides three types of mercenaries:

1. Those who supply war fighting or direct combat support. 2. Large commercial companies who provide operational command such as war planning and general staff roles. 3. Specialised service applications such as electronic surveillance. (Brayton 2002, 307-308) There is a consensus of a distinction between combat services and REMF services; what Faite (2004, 168) calls active and passive services. The latter do not attract the same suspicion and scorn as the former. Brooks differentiates both forms of companies from freelance mercenaries, at term he limits to individual soldiers hiring themselves out to fight in combat. Freelance mercenaries are individuals that generally exhibit few of the inhibitions that influence companies to maintain a degree of ethics in their operations. (Brooks 2002, 131) These are the men who are targeted by anti-mercenary laws. Difference between PMC and Mercenaries No one likes mercenaries. They fill a profile of profiteering from warfare and having no loyalty to anyone but themselves. All nations want to outlaw mercenaries but they also want to use PMC. This has led to a ineffective legal regime to prevent the occurrence of mercenary activity. Article 47 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention 1977 defined mercenaries as: Specifically recruited to fight overseas Participates directly in fighting Motivated by private gain Not a national nor resident of the region in which the fighting takes place Not a member of either sides armed forces Not an official representative of a third party armed forces.

Note that all six categories must be met before a person is deemed a mercenary. The terms of the International Convention Against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989 (came into force in 2001) uses similar wording. There were some special types of troops who were not the classic mercenaries. Some of these like the Gurkhas and the French Foreign Legion are foreigners who form part of the permanent army of a nation. These are not mercenaries because they are regarded as foreigners serving in the national army. Alternatively there are some armies that are staffed and paid for by another nation, such as the Arab Legion that fought for Jordan in the 1920s to 1950s. Hughes argued that a British soldier who fought in the Arab Legion was not a mercenary as they were still serving

their own nations interests. They knew it was in Britains interest because the British government paid for their service in the Jordanian military. Many were still permanent soldiers in the British army who were seconded to the Legion. Hughes listed three types of service for a foreign nation: (Hughes 2008) Article 47 is easily overcome. All a nation using mercenaries needs to do is formally incorporate the force into its national military and they cease to be mercenaries. As Percy notes any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shotand his lawyer with him! (Percy 2007, 369). Article 47 also only applies to international conflict, thus it does not refer to mercenaries in a civil war (Faite 170). Many PMC are made up of retired elite soldiers. The average special forces soldier is forced to retire at about the age of 40. They have only every known a military life and only developed military skills. Thus they seek out employment that will best utilize these skills. So it is not surprising that groups like the Gurkhas have formed a company called Gurkha Security Guards and many other corporations like Armour Corp hire former SAS soldiers. History of PMC The use of PMC is not new. Private contractors have provided services to the military throughout history. The modern corporations have been increasing their involvement with the military over the last century. By the 1970s in the United States PMC were becoming more popular because they are outside of congressional oversight. The post-Vietnam US military was reduced in size. The smaller military led to a greater reliance on PMC. Current US arrangements and designed to allow the military to concentrate on war fighting; more tooth, less tail (Kidwell 2005, 18). PMC allow rapid deployment, coordinated skills, and keep troop numbers within congressional mandates. However, command and control is difficult because contractors did not reflect commanders intent and foreign PMC working with the US led to language difficulties. In a short wall and the benefits of having a PMC outweigh the negatives. It is cheaper to hire the PMC than build their own army. Thus the first Iraq war left the use of PMC is in a good light (Kidwell 2005, 19-20). PMC began to grow in strength in Africa in the 1960s as nationalist struggles brought warfare across the continent. Mercenary groups are significantly cheaper, better equipped and trained than any army the locals could have raised. Mining companies did, and still do, hire PMC to protect their operations in African nations disrupted by civil wars. The first was De Beers in the 1950s and now almost all companies have security firms on contract (Dokubo 2000, 54).

One of the drivers of the use of PMC was the increased complexity of logistics, and therefore the increased specialization of logistics providers. In addition, logistics providers increased in number in comparison to the bayonet strength of military units. The last 40 years, there is a change in US policy in relation to the reliance on PMC. They are no longer used as a necessity but are now seen as a natural part of the military. Current doctrine except the support of contractors and coalition partners as an integral component of military operations. In addition, the rapid tempo of current military operations often requires rapid deployment. (Kidwell 2005, 21) Some suggest that the US military could no longer actually go to war without PMC (Kidwell 2005, 22). Kidwell describes the rise of the PMC after the cold war as follows: global instability increase the demand for PMC; the relative safety of the US decreased the size of the military; the large number of military personnel leaving created a supply of qualified personnel to work within the PMC; and finally other that the increased size of the US military increase the role of PMC as a supporting element of the US military (Kidwell 2005, 27). PMC increased exponentially after the end of the Cold War. (Kidwell 2005, 3) Their advantage is that they can rapidly expand the size of the force, because the army does not need to mobilize and train the service people itself. You can simply hire the existing expertise from the private sector (Kidwell 2005, 3). Brooks says the increase in PMC occurred because of three reasons. First, third world dictators were no longer propped up by the US or USSR and lost power. Wars developed in the power vacuums left behind. Second, demilitarization left a lot of soldiers out of work. Third, the globalised market place allowed multinational corporations to start mining in small insecure nations, which resulted in a need for private security (Brooks 2002, 132-133). Executive Outcomes (EO) was the first major PMC in operation. It was formed by former senior officers of the Aparthied regime in South Africa and worked throughout the continent in both training, security and combat roles (Dobuko 2000, 58). The most famous contract was when EO ended the civil war in Sierra Leone, as depicted in the movie Blood Diamonds (2006). It is rumoured that EO was paid with mining concessions rather than in cash (Brayton 2002, 313). The best recongised incident in our region was when a company called Sandline, a subordinate of EO, assisted the Papua New Guinea government fight the rebels in Bougainville (Dobuko 2000, 60). EO was put out of business in 1999, when the South African government banned its citizens from participating in mercenary actions (Brayton 2002, 315). The explosion in PMC work outside Africa arose after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The nations involved in nation building refused to commit large numbers of troops because of the cost

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or risk of soldiers dying. The security void was filled by PMC. Even so, Brooks believes that the PMC industry is still in its infancy as a large number of small companies still dominate the market (Brooks 2002, 133) Some have supported the use of PMC in military operations because they are highly skilled and tend to be successful. While others note that PMC are restricted to one course of action, that is violence, to resolve issues (Dobuko 2000, 61) The current downturn in violence in Iraq has severely hurt the PMC market. The demand for security has fallen well below supply and prices and employment opportunities are plummeting (Hammer 2008). Ethical Issues Kidwell says that using PMC raises ideological, legal, moral, and ethical concerns. (Kidwell 2005, 4) Privatisation of Inherent Government Functions A problem arises over at differentiating what it called inherently governmental functions, various functions and that ought not be carried out by a private corporation. War fighting, for example, would be regarded as an inherently governmental function. Martin van Creveld used to call this Trinitarian warfare: the rule born at Westphalia that has guided modern conflict with the principle that in war it is the government that directs, the army that fights, and the people who suffer (Brayton 2002, 303-304) Brooks said that PMC are not restricted in their operational rules or thinking as governments must be and can offer a much cheaper and more flexible service than national armies. He gives the example of Executive Outcomes which defeated the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone for $40 million whereas the UN peacekeepers who arrived after them cost $50 million per month (Brooks 2002, 131). He believes this will continue as there is no hope of a successful peace keeping operation if the USA refuses to participate in a crisis (Brooks 2002, 134, Brayton 2002, 304). So perhaps the rise of the PMC is a direct consequence of the failure of governments to meet their own responsibilities. As James Woods, a PMC contractor, noted: If the international community cannot get its act together and help these countries keep themselves together and protect commerce and protect the citizenry, youre going to see more and more examples of private contractors doing the job. (Brayton 2002, 318) It may be that similar inaction by UN member states may force the UN to hire PMC to enforce Security Council decisions (Brayton 2002, 321). As with all forms of outsourcing, PMCs take over government roles but are not accountable to

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the public for their actions. Governments can outsource their ethical responsibilities. For example, the US government does not, and may not be able to, keep a track of how many PMC staff have been killed in Iraq nor how many civilians they have killed (Walzer 2008). Brayton explains how NATO allowed the private company MPRI to train the Croatian troops during the Balkan crisis. None of the NATO nations wanted to be seen to put troops on the ground, as opposed to flying in the air, and effectively enter the Balkan conflict. It appears that MPRI was extremely successful in their given task and the Croats took back a key strategic town from the Serbs, possibly with MPRI planning assistance. The company was given a further contract after the conclusion of the conflict to bolster the Croatian Army. There was hardly any public debate on the use of MPRI and it received little media attention. As Brayton said: This scenario demonstrates how private military companies can help policymakers achieve their goals free from the need to secure public approval and safe in the knowledge that, should the situation deteriorate, official participation can be denied. (Brayton 2002, 311) The eminent just war theorist Michael Walzer says that: It is not just accountability for politicians that matters; equally important is the question of accountability for individual fighters. And soldiers who get out of hand are accountable in ways that mercenaries are not. (Walzer 2008) At the heart of his concerns is the States monopoly on violence. This is an important aspect of a democratic nation. Violence must be restrained and only used for the public good. If the State is the sole legitimate source of violence and the state is accountable, then the public can ensure that violence is not used against the public interest. Walzer sees the rise of PMC as a breakdown on the States monopoly on violence. It is a very dangerous business to loosen the states grip on the use of violence, to allow war to become anything other than a public responsibility. (Walzer 2008) Modern governments have to be held responsible for the actions of PMC that they hire. For example, they could not simply stand at arms length and allow the PMC to run the war in whatever manner they wished. They could not allow the PMC to use biological weapons or land mines. They could not allow them to torture or kill indiscriminately. Profit Motive PMC have no vested interest in the national or humanitarian interests of the employer, they are only bound by the contractual provisions (Kidwell 2005, 4; Brayton 2002, 319). Consequently, they are given a free hand and can be violent without being responsible for its outcomes. But Singer argues that their needs of the PMC, namely profit, may not match the public good of the nation that hires them. That is, private companies as a rule are more interested in doing well than good. (Singer 2008, 217)

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However, some PMC argue that the profit motive is a positive as they can be relied on to act ethically because of the nature of market forces. Governments will not hire them if they have a bad reputation. As Brooks says: Companies fear retribution by their home governments for illegal or unethical operations, and recognized that a bad corporate reputation could result in the loss of future contracts to their competitors PSCs who wish to work with the UN and other humanitarian clients must maintain squeaky-clean operations and are scrupulous about their activities so that they are not tainted by any hint of mercenarism. Thus they are keen not only to emphasize what services they do provide, but also to emphasize what services they do not provide.(Brooks 2002, 131-132) Also many PMC operatives are not threatening to governments. Some firms specialize in nonmilitaristic services such as demining or logistics, which are seen as clearly legitimate activities (Brooks 2002, 132). He goes on to claim that: Most PMC/PSCs have publicly welcomed moves towards increased regulation in the industry, believing that the increased legitimacy will bring with it new clients, and also because regulations are a barrier to entry that helps to keep out new competition. (Brooks 2002, 137) Some claim that PMC do not use violence indiscriminately. They are more professional and have better discipline than many regular army troops. They do not harbour grudges against the local population as might an invading army (Singer 2008, 217). These factors specifically relate to PMC in modern conflicts. But bad publicity is tightening contract controls. Blackwater fallout Blackwater staff became so indiscriminate in their shooting and killing of civilians that new rules have severely restricted the ability of all security PMC to protect their clients (Hammer 2008). This was a fulfillment of a fear about PMC that existed throughout the 1990s, namely, the need to take responsibility for the potential harm a PMC could inflict rather despite the fact that up till then there was no critical event which undermined the reputation of PMC generally (Brooks 2002, 135). Legal Status The legal status of PMC employees in combat is not clear. For example, if a PMC employee was captured it is not clear whether they are POW, a noncombatant or some other form of participant. Faite suggests the following: Under Art 4 of the Geneva Convention PMC are non-soldiers accompanying armed forces with the consent of the army and therefore would be made POWs; Advisers who do not fight are civilians; PMC who fight are valid targets;

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PMC who have a commander, wear a fixed emblem, carry arms openly and accord with the laws and customs of war, are combatants under the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention;

PMC who simply carry a weapon are not automatically combatants; PMC who defend a military installation are valid targets even if they are otherwise noncombatants; and A nation that hires a PMC is responsible for its actions. (Faite 2004)

PMC are immune from prosecution for their actions in Iraq. They are neither local Iraqis nor members of the military and fall within a gap in the law. This has meant that no one could take action for what would otherwise be unlawful killing by PMC staff (Walzer 2008). This is one of the issues currently being debated between the Iraqi and US governments. The powerful PMC could become the law in the region in which it operates, could aggravate relations between states, and/or end up becoming a belligerent party in the dispute (Kidwell 2005, 4). Brayton says that many mining companies could use their PMC staff to help support a government that allowed the continuation of the mining arrangements. The mining company and its private troops could build up such power in the region that they become a de facto power in the nation (Brayton 2002, 309-310).

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Women in the Military

Women have traditionally been left out of the military.

Modern attitudes are changing with the only remaining restriction in modern Western armies being a ban on frontline service. Although shortages in Iraq may be forcing some units to ignore these regulations (Bender 2005) Issues A range of reasons have been given as to why women ought not be allowed to be in the military, or, if in the military, participate in front line battles. These were reviewed by a major investigation by the RAND Corporation (Harrell & Miller 1997) which debunked most myths about women in the military. First they looked at readiness, which they broke down into five categories: whether personnel are available, qualified, experienced, stable to the unit, and motivated (Harrell & Miller 1997, 34). They found that gender had no significant impact on readiness. Of the written comments noting issues for readiness 275 discussed training and only 2 mentioned gender. Availability female soldiers were unavailable for service because of being pregnant, a single mother or sick/injured. Pregnant soldiers cannot be deployed overseas and cannot perform some normal tasks that have a risk for the baby, including firing weapons. Officers and senior

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NCOs tended to plan their pregnancy to fit the needs of the unit. This was not true of junior soldiers. Single motherhood was an issue but based on numbers there were more single males parents than single female parents in the military. There was no difference in the availability issues for single parents based on gender. There was a perception that women were on sick call more often than men and that some officers did not push women to suck it up as they would for men. Also many male NCOs and officers did not know what to do when confronted by soldiers with female problems and tended to accept this as a excuse to be excused duty. Senior female NCOs and officers did not accept this excuse. Qualification gender had no effect on qualification of troops. The only issue was strength and most supervisors solved this issue by having tasks completed in groups rather than by individuals, thus negating any single soldiers strength deficiency whether male or female. There was no perception that women were not qualified for any occupation. Experience gender only played an issue in so far as women are excluded from frontline combat positions and therefore cannot obtain experience in core war fighting roles. Stability this relates to turnover of personnel in a unit. Other than pregnancy, stability only became an issue when women were a minority in a unit. If the small group of women rotated out of a unit and were not replaced by other women then the unit would lose the routine of having females around. They would have to relearn it when new women were assigned to the unit. Cohesion is also important. They discussed two types of cohesion. Social cohesion refers to the emotional bonds of the group. Task cohesion relates to the shared commitment of team members to complete a task. The military tries to ensure that social cohesion does not undermine leadership issues or task cohesion. They have made studies that show that too much or the wrong type of fraternisation breaks down the quality of the unit. Thus they ban fraternisation between officers and enlisted troops. However, the RAND study did not find that gender alone upset cohesion. In the navy, women had to have separate quarters to men. Usually all the members of a team berthed together but that was not possible with mixed genders. Different locations meant a breakdown in communication and coordination. Poor cohesion was only seen when both social and task cohesion in a unit were low and this did not necessarily relate to gender. Some men missed the old style male bonding such as they could no longer walk around half-naked on ship, sware and drink with the guys, go as a unit to a strip club with their leaders, or engage in hazing practices (Harrell & Miller 1997, 65) but this was now seen as unprofessional and undesirable. Also many men noted that personal hygiene improved amongst men when women joined the unit.

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Gender, race, religion, ethnicity and background had no effect on cohesion. The proportions of genders in a group made no difference and the gender of supervisors did not affect cohesion. Gender problems arose when women were first introduced to a unit and overzealous male officers afraid of sexual harassment claims banned their men from talking, sitting next to or going near the female soldiers. In the early days of mixing genders in a unit or on a ship female officers had to be careful that that did not generate rumours of sexual liaisons by socialising to often with the same men.

There was no perception that during combat men would fail to perform their duties in order to protect women. The only exception was if two people were in a couple.

Gender was also not a major influence on morale. Only 8 out of 900 responses identified gender as a morale issue. There were claims of sexual harassment in the early days of mixed units but these were found to relate to some women simply not liking normal male behaviour such as swearing, tobacco chewing, or watching sports games or kung fu movies in the workplace or barracks rather than actual sexual discrimination, sexual statement or sexual advances. Nonetheless, many men were very conscious of their behaviour lest they open themselves up to a sexual harassment charge. Male officers were also more likely than female officers to believe a claim of sexual harassment. Many women who did face genuine harassment confronted the harasser and handled the situation on their own. Most soldiers of both genders agreed that officers did not treat women differently to men. Though amongst those who disagreed, the men believed women received less of the dirty jobs and women thought they received more of the dirty jobs. Also some men claimed women did not have to work as hard for benefits while women claimed they hard to work harder. The Culture of the Female Military Still women are a minority on the battlefield. They are usually outnumbered ten to one, or even more, when they serve overseas. This has led to two issues related to sex. It would be nave to assume that soldiers were not having sex with each other even when it is against the rules. In her memoir, Love my Rifle More than You, Kayla Williams (2005) said there were two phenomena. One related to how your own male colleagues saw you; she called this Queen for a year. A woman at war: youre automatically a desirable commodity, and a scarce one at that. We call it Queen for a Year [the term of a normal overseas posting] Even the unattractive girls start to act stuck-up Theres also this deployment scale for hotness. Let me explain. On a scale of ten, say

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shes a five. You knowaverage looks, maybe a little mousy, nothing special. But okay. Not a girl who gets second glances in civilian life. But in the Army, while were deployed? Easily an eight. One hot babe. On average every girl probably gets three extra points on a ten-point scale. Useful. After youre in-country for a few months, all the girls begin to look goodor at least better. It changeshow should I say this?the dynamics of being deployed The younger girls were the most susceptible. Many thrived and fed on the male attention they were getting for the first time in their lives. (Williams 2005, 19-20) Alternatively, the locals from a Middle Eastern country could not understand what women would be doing in the military and assumed they were prostitutes employed to service the troops. (Williams 2005, 21) Women in the ADF Women were first allowed in the Australian military when the colonial government of NSW set up an Army Nursing Service in 1899. Nursing was the only job women could hold in the Australian military until WW2. This did not mean they were out of the line of fire with 29 nurses being killed in WWI and 71 in WWII. The first womens service was the Womens Australian Auxiliary Air Force (WAAAF) in 1941 (later renamed the Womens Royal Australian Air Force or WRAAF). This was followed the next year by the Womens Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS). The Army did not follow suit with the Womens Australian Army Corp (WAAC) till 1951. During all this time women were not allowed to participate in operational roles. The separate services continued for decades. The Air Force were the first to incorporate women into the full service when they abolished the WRAAF in 1977. The first two female pilots were not commissioned till 1987. Other forms of discrimination were embedded into the womens services. Till 1969 women had to leave the service if they got married. In 1971 the government removed the requirement that women also had to leave the service if they fell pregnant. Females in the military did not receive equal pay to men till 1979. However, women were still banned form combat roles. Even the introduction and expansion of anti-discrimination legislation did not change this as successive governments allowed Defence Force exemptions from the Acts. Nonetheless the number of jobs in the military that were available to women increased over time from 23% in 1984 to 87% by 1992.

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The Navy were the first service to relax operational restrictions on women. The HMAS Jervis Bay became the first Australian naval vessel to have a mixed crew in 1984, albeit in a training role. However, the next year the WRANS were abolished and women were allowed to serve at sea. By 1991 women were also allowed to serve onboard submarines (ADF 1999). For a full history see the document provided on Blackboard called Chronology of Women in the Australian Military. The current percentages of personnel that are female in each arm of the ADF is: Navy 18% Army 12% Air Force 17%

(Dept of Defence http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/womenInDefence/#gHeader)

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Kidwell, D. 2005. Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press. Lansdale, E G. 1964. Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?. Foreign Affairs, 43: 75-87. Percy, S V. 2007. Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law. International Organization, 61: 367-397. Singer, P W. 2008. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Smith, R. 2007. The Utility of Force. New York: Knopf. Stiehm, J H. 2001. Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Gender Balance and Mainstreaming. International Peacekeeping, 8(2): 39-48. Walzer, M. 2008. Mercenary Impulse: Is there an ethics that justifies Blackwater?. The New Republic, March 18, 2008: 20-21. Williams, K. 2005, Love My Rifle More than You. W W Norton: New York.

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