LESLEY LE GRANGE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION

IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Education which was a site of struggle during apartheid has become a site of trans-
formation (at least at the level of policy) in post-apartheid South Africa. Follow-
ing the democratic elections in 1994, a myriad of policies were developed (includ-
ing education ones) signalling widespread changes to the education system. The
changes are associated with challenges presented by a rapidly changing and glo-
bally interconnected world on the one hand, and on the other hand, the restoration,
rejuvenation and reimagining of traditional values that had become eroded during
the colonial and apartheid periods. One such value is that of Ubuntu, a linguistic-
philosophical construct that has gained prominence in multiple discourses (busi-
ness, education, popular, etc.) in post-apartheid South Africa. In this chapter I wish
to critically discuss the construct Ubuntu and its potential to transform education
in South Africa. I shall begin this chapter by providing a brief background of cur-
riculum policy change in South Africa post 1994 so as to trace the infusion of indig-
enous knowledge and notions as such as Ubuntu in the national curriculum.

THE INFUSION OF UBUNTU IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM

In the immediate years following South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections in 1994,
curriculum change was not necessarily substantive. Jansen (1999, p. 57) goes as far
as to argue that syllabus alterations which took place during this period had very
little do with the school curriculum and more concerned with an uncertain state
seeking legitimacy following the national elections. In the main, curriculum revi-
sion involved exorcising of racial content as well as outdated and inaccurate sub-
ject matter of school syllabuses. Jansen (1999, p. 57) points out that the haste with
which the South African state pursued what he terms, ‘a super¿cial cleansing of the
inherited curriculum’, needs to be understood in terms of a set of pressures faced
by a South African state in transition. Jansen (1999, pp. 64-65) points out that syl-
labus alterations immediately after South Africa’s ¿rst democratic elections might
be understood in four ways: in the context of the constitutional and bureaucratic
constraints of political transition under a Government of National Unity; as a proc-
ess that emerged in the context of weak political leadership in the then Ministry of

Wiel Veugelers (Ed.), Education and Humanism, 67–78.

© 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
LESLEY LE GRANGE

Education; as a process propelled by mounting pressure on the Minister of Educa-

tion from the media; as a process made possible by a weak political challenge from
the education community on the educational terms of the project.
However, in March 1997 the National Education Ministry launched the new cur-
riculum entitled Curriculum 2005. Curriculum 2005 was the ¿rst comprehensive
curriculum framework produced by the post-apartheid government. It was launched
in 1997 and introduced into grade 1 in 1998. The curriculum focused on general
education and training (GET) and after revision was called the Revised National
Curriculum Statement (RNCS) for GET. This curriculum was envisaged to replace
content-based education with outcomes-based education and teacher-centred peda-
gogies with more learner-centred pedagogies. Another change was the replacement
of the 42 school subjects offered to learners in South African primary schools by
eight learning areas. The learning areas combine the old subjects, in a sense, os-
tensibly to promote a more holistic and integrated approach. Each learning area has
curriculum-linked outcomes which learners should attain through engaging with
learning activities.
Since the gradual phasing in of the new curriculum, the curriculum had undergone
revision. The curriculum revision process followed a period of vociferous debate and
¿erce contestation as to the merits of outcomes-based education (OBE) (see, for ex-
ample, Jansen and Christie, 1999). There were also other concerns such as dif¿cul-
ties with implementation of the new curriculum in resource poor contexts. For exam-
ple, authors of the Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 observed
that historically disadvantaged schools did not have the resources (reference and
textbooks, stationery, photocopying facilities and other technologies of teaching) to
implement Curriculum 2005 effectively (Chisholm et al., 2000). In response to some
criticisms levelled against Curriculum 2005, South Africa’s second post-apartheid
Minister of Education commissioned a committee to review Curriculum 2005. The
review committee made several recommendations based on visits to schools by its
members; its review of published literature on Curriculum 2005; its review of sub-
missions made by organisations and individuals; and further investigation (for detail,
see Chisholm et al., 2000). The developments that I have just discussed have rel-
evance to the General Education and Training (GET) band. South Africa’s National
Quali¿cations Framework (NQF) has three bands: General Education and Training
(GET); Further Education and Training (FET) and Higher Education and Training
(FET). In short the GET band comprises pre-school, primary school and junior high
school (grades 0 – 9); the FET band senior high school (grades 10 – 12); and the HET
band, university education (degrees/diplomas and higher degrees/diplomas). In the
year 2006 a new curriculum phased in for the FET band.
One of the principles on which the National Curriculum Statement (NCS) for
Further Education and Training (FET) is based is: ‘valuing indigenous knowledge
systems’ (DoE 2003, p. 4). The principle is elaborated as follows: ‘Indigenous knowl-
edge systems in the South African context refer to a body of knowledge embedded
in African philosophical thinking and social practices that have evolved over thou-

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 THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

sands of years’. Furthermore, the ten values1 identi¿ed in South Africa’s Manifesto
on Values, Education and Democracy (DoE 2001) are purported to ¿nd expression
in both the GET and FET curriculum statements. One of the ten values is Ubuntu
(human dignity). Ubuntu is an African word comprising one of the core elements of
a human being. The African word for human being is umuntu which is constituted
by the following: umzimba (body, form, Àesh); umoya (breath, air, life); umphe-
fumela (shadow, spirit, soul); amandla (vitality, strength, energy); inhliziyo (heart,
centre of emotions); umqondo (head, brain, intellect), ulwimi (language, speaking)
and Ubuntu (humanness) (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43). The humanness referred to here
¿nds expression in a communal context rather than the individualism prevalent in
many Western societies (Venter 2004, p. 151). Battle (1996, p. 99) presents the con-
cept Ubuntu as a concept that originates from the Xhosa expression: umuntu ngu-
muntu ngabanye Bantu. He writes: ‘Not an easily translatable Xhosa concept, gen-
erally, this proverbial expression means that each individual’s humanity is ideally
expressed in relationship with others and, in turn, individuality is truly expressed.
Or a person depends on other persons to be a person.’ Ubuntu then, is to be aware
of one’s own being, but also of one’s duties towards one’s neighbour. According to
Venter (2004, p. 156) Ubuntu is a concrete manifestation of the interconnectedness
of human beings – it is the embodiment of (South) African culture and life style.
Evidently, African philosophical thinking generally, and Ubuntu more speci¿-
cally, are central features of post-apartheid curriculum frameworks. The inclusion
of values such as Ubuntu is intended to restore through education values that have
become eroded as a consequence of centuries of colonialism and decades of apart-
heid. Given the reference made to African philosophical thinking in the curriculum
statements I shall brieÀy outline major trends in African philosophy so as to provide
an understanding of Ubuntu.

FOUR TRENDS OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

I use the four trends that Oruka identi¿es for framing my discussion but I am aware
that these are not the only identi¿able strands in African philosophy and that Oruka
himself later expanded his four trends to six (for details see Gratton, 2003). Oruka
(2002) identi¿es the following four trends in African philosophy: ethno-philosophy,
philosophic sagacity, national-ideological philosophy and professional philosophy.
Ethno-philosophy is exempli¿ed in the work of Placide Tempels on the ontology
of the Bantu. Tempels was probably the ¿rst person to use the term ‘philosophy’
with regard to the thoughts of African people. Gratton (2003) points out that for the
ethno-philosopher, ‘philosophy is latent within the everyday actions of a people;
philosophy, as such, is also the worldviews that guide and maintain a culture’. He
notes that ethno-philosophers reproduce both the latent and the explicit philosophi-
cal doctrines in the hope of providing future African philosophers with an ‘intellec-
tual matrix’ indigenous to Africa. Ethno-philosophy has been subjected to various
criticisms. For example, Hountondjii argues that ethno-philosophy is not African,

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LESLEY LE GRANGE

because it is addressed to Western audiences and in so doing reinforces stereotypes

of African thought as being pseudo-philosophy or pre-scienti¿c. Bodunrin also ar-
gues that ethno-philosophy provides a false sense of the ‘tradition’ as devoid of the
problems and struggles which characterise all societies.
Oruka’s second trend, philosophic sagacity, is based on his own research on Ken-
yan wise men and wise women. For Oruka (1990, p. 28) philosophic sagacity is the
‘thoughts of wise men and women in any given community and is a way of think-
ing and explaining the world that Àuctuates between popular wisdom and didactic
wisdom.’ He argues that ‘one way of looking for the traces of African philosophy is
to wear the uniform of anthropological ¿eld work and use the dialogical techniques
to pass through the anthropological fogs to the philosophical ground’ (Oruka, 1990,
p. xxi). Oruka regards philosophic sagacity as being distinct from ethno-philos-
ophy, since sages do not simply transmit the thoughts of their communities, but
rather critically evaluate what might be unquestioningly accepted by members of
communities. One of the dif¿culties with philosophic sagacity is that one cannot
easily distinguish the source of the ¿eld reports when the researcher is a trained
philosopher – are the ¿eld reports a record of the philosophic ideas of the sages or a
reconstruction of them by a trained philosopher (as was the case with Oruka) after
engagement with the ideas of the sages (Gratton, 2003, p. 68)? Bodunrin (1984) has
sympathy with Oruka’s notion of philosophic sagacity, but argues that, together
with ethno-philosophy, it comes perilously close to non-philosophy, because it is
based on the views of everyday people.
The third trend in African philosophy that Oruka identi¿es is the nationalist
ideologies produced by Africa’s ¿rst post-colonial leaders, including Leopold Sen-
ghor, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah. These African leaders sought not only
to decolonise the nations they led, but also their people’s minds (Gratton, 2003, p.
69). Although these leaders were strongly Pan-Africanist; they were inÀuenced by
Western ideas ranging from Existentialism to Marxism. Bodunrin (1984) argues
that these national leaders took up ethno-philosophy ‘to glorify an African past in
order to forecast an almost utopian non-colonial future’. However, Bodunrin ar-
gues that the ideas of these nationalists lacked rigour and systemisation, and there-
fore cannot be regarded as philosophy. The rigour and systemisation that Bodunrin
refers to is provided by Oruka’s fourth trend, professional philosophy. Bodunrin
(1984, p. 2) describes this trend as the work of trained philosophers. Many of them
reject the assumptions of ethno-philosophy and take a universalist point of view.
Philosophy, many of them argue, must have the same meaning in all cultures al-
though the subjects that receive priority, and perhaps the method of dealing with
them, may be dictated by cultural biases and the existential situation in the society
within which the philosophers operate. According to this school, African philoso-
phy is the philosophy done by African philosophers whether it be in the area of
logic, metaphysics, ethics, or history of philosophy.
Gratton (2003) points out that this trend identi¿es strongly with the analytic
tradition of Western philosophy as evidenced by the fact that universalists such as

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 THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Wiredu, Hountondji and others have referred to themselves as the Vienna circle of
African philosophy. It is this association that universalists have with the analytic
tradition that has been a source of critique. For example, Ikuenobe (1997) refers
to the universalist position as parochial, because its uses Western analytic phi-
losophy as the yardstick by which to measure whether the other trends in African
philosophy qualify to be called ‘philosophy’. He argues that there is an array of
traditions and approaches within Western philosophy that universalists do not
account for.
In summary, the four trends in African philosophy provide a continuum with
extreme positions of a narrow particularism characteristic of ethno-philosophy at
the one end and a narrow universalism of professional philosophy on the other.
What I wish to suggest is that the four trends might also be used as a heuristic for
mapping nuanced understandings of notions such as communalism and Ubuntu. In
this chapter, however, I shall use the broad categories of particularist and univer-
salist to frame my discussion. For particularists philosophy and culture are tightly
intertwined – so much so that cultural values/expressions are perceived as com-
mensurate with philosophy. For particularists Ubuntu is not only a cultural value
but a philosophy. For universalists the notion of Ubuntu may be the object/subject
of philosophical inquiry, but cannot simply be referred to as philosophy – it has to
pass the test of rigour and systematisation.

‘PHILOSOPHY’ OF UBUNTU AN ETHNOPHILOSOPHY?

Ubuntu like all other African cultural values have circulated primarily through
orality and tradition – its meaning is interwoven in the cultural practices and lived
experiences of African peoples. However, Ubuntu has become abstracted from its
geographical and cultural situatedness and has been taken up in several written
discourses. It is in written discourses that much of the contestation around Ubuntu
may be found. Traces of ethnophilosophy may, for example, be found in Makgoba’s
perspective on Ubuntu. He writes:

Ubuntu is unique in the following respects: it emphasizes respect for the non-
material order that exists in us and among us; it fosters man’s respect for him-
self, for others, and for the environment; it has spirituality; it has remained
non-racial; it accommodates other cultures and it is the invisible force uniting
Africans worldwide. Therefore unlike Confucian or European philosophies, it
transcends both race and culture (Makgoba quoted in Enslin & Horsthemke,
2004, p. 24).

Reference to ethnophilosophy is evident in Makgoba’s suggestion that Ubuntu is

distinct from Chinese and European philosophies and that it is the invisible force
uniting Africans (in an ethnic sense) worldwide. Likewise Higgs (2003) and Venter
(2004) ascribe to Ubuntu uniqueness with the African experience.

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LESLEY LE GRANGE

Representing Ubuntu in ethnophilosophical terms might be problematic for a

number of reasons. Ethnophilosophies take a phenomenological approach to cultural
values/practices/knowledges which tend to reify it. As Price (2005, p. 3) so cogently
puts it, ‘the phenomenological approach to indigenous knowledge tends to reify it – if
people say something is true, then it is true for them, and since this is ultimately the
only truth, we can’t argue with it’. Also, cultures are not monolithic entities but rather
subsume nuances, contradictions and contestations. Cultural values/practices/knowl-
edges do not reside in ‘pristine fashion’ outside of the inÀuences of other cultures
that ethnophilosophers seem to suggest. Dei (2000, p. 113) points out that bodies of
knowledge (and I would add cultures) continually inÀuence each other demonstrat-
ing the dynamism of all knowledge systems/cultures. Rendering a false dichotomy
or moral evaluation between good (African) and bad (Western) knowledges/cultures
(Dei, 2000, p. 113) is not useful. Therefore arguing for African philosophies that are
intrinsically unique could be problematic. Moreover, there is a parochialism associ-
ated with ethnophilosophies that Ramphele (quoted by Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004,
p. 24) neatly captures with respect to certain interpretations of Ubuntu:

Ubuntu as a philosophical approach to social relationships must stand alongside

other approaches and be judged on the value it can add to better human relations
in our complex society. (…) The refusal to acknowledge the similarity between
Ubuntu and other humanistic philosophical approaches is part a reÀection of the
parochialism of South Africans and a refusal to learn from others. (…) We have
to have the humility to acknowledge that we are not inventing unique problems
in this country, nor are we likely to invent new solutions.

Ramphele’s perspective demonstrates that all Africans do not hold the same view
of Ubuntu - that it is not a cultural value/practice/knowing that has been preserved
and withstood all the storms of history – that the rei¿cation/objecti¿cation of Ubun-
tu might problematic. Rather, Ubuntu is a term that is open to interpretation and
contestation and, moreover, an idea that is not simply natural but rather imagined
and politically driven - that our thinking and writing about Ubuntu represents (re)
constructions or (re)imaginings of the term that cannot be separated from the socio-
politico-cultural discourses that are available to us in post-apartheid South Africa.
Discourses on Ubuntu represent in similar ways to Oruka’s philosophical sagacity
(re)constructions which might be called philosophy. The research for a unique Afri-
can difference through the invocation of notions such as Ubuntu promises to remain
illusive if the term is rei¿ed/objecti¿ed. Masolo’s (1998) caution in this regard is
worth noting:

The search for this [African] identity [through Ubuntu] and for what is authen-
tic about it is the thread that runs through Oruka’s idea of ‘The four trends in
African philosophy’, and it reveals its own contradictions in the very search
for a universal and homogeneous African difference. For, so long as the mono-

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lithism of the above assumptions remains suspect, the efforts of postcolonial-

ity remain only, and validly so, a search for something that remains constantly
illusive.

PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU

As a background to my discussion on professional philosophy I wish to raise some

critical perspectives on Western philosophy/knowledge. My concern here is not
with Western knowledges/philosophies per se, but rather with particular con¿gura-
tions of Western knowledge/philosophy such as Eurocentrism. ‘Eurocentrism’ is
the assumption that Europe functions independently from other parts of the world
and that Europe and people of European descent owe nothing to the rest of the world
(Harding, 1993, p. 2). In fact, many Westerners would contend that the exemplary
achievements of ‘their’ science and technology prove that they are different from
those of other cultures. Moreover, that ‘their’ science and technologies are the most
important measures of progress. Harding (1993, p. 7) asserts that many Westerners
‘insist that the development of modern science shows how progressive, rational, and
civilised is the modern West in contrast to the backward, irrational, and primitive
rest’.
I suggest that it is important to understand that Western knowledge systems/phi-
losophies only have the appearance of universal truth because of colonialism and
imperialism. As N. Gough (1998, p. 508) notes, ‘European imperialism has given
Western science [philosophy] the appearance of universal truth and rationality, and
often is assumed to be a form of knowledge that lacks the cultural ¿ngerprints’
that appear to be much more conspicuous in other knowledge systems/philosophies.
Harding (1993, p. 8) expresses similar sentiments to Gough and writes: ‘European
sciences [philosophies] progressed primarily because of the military, economic and
political power of European cultures, not because of the purported greater rational-
ity of Westerners or the purported commitment of their sciences [philosophies] to
the pursuit of disinterested truths’. Western philosophies might therefore be under-
stood as ethnophilosophies (situated knowledges) that have moved from their sites
of production as a consequence of European imperialism and colonialism.
The hegemony of Western science/philosophy as a consequence of military, eco-
nomic and political power means that Western science/philosophy has not been
objectively situated in world history nor have nonwestern sciences/philosophies
been assessed in objective ways. Consequently, in recent years there have been
increasing calls from among others, postcolonialists, anti-colonialists, philosophers
of science, feminist poststructuralists for the democratisation of science/philosophy
so that Western science/philosophy can be decentred and non-Western sciences/
philosophies demarginalised (see Harding, 1993; Harding, 1994; Harding, 1998; A.
Gough, 1998; N. Gough, 1998; A. Gough, 1999). This however, does not mean that
those of us who have been interpellated by Western traditions should totally aban-
don the Western sciences/philosophies. As Harding (1993, p. 2) neatly formulates

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LESLEY LE GRANGE

the point: ‘Our solution cannot be escape to ‘elsewhere’. Instead, we must learn to
take responsibility for the sciences/philosophies we have now and have had in the
past, to acknowledge their limitations and Àaws as we also value their indubitable
strengths and achievements. But to do so requires a more realistic and objective
grasp of their origins and effects ‘elsewhere’ as well as in the West.’
I am also concerned about more subtle forms of colonisation as knowledge is
produced and rapidly disseminated across the globe in contemporary society. I am
particularly concerned with a danger that indigenous ways of knowing/African
philosophies might become assimilated into an imperialist archive in the light of
complex globalization processes currently prevalent. My usage of the term ‘ar-
chive’ is borrowed from Foucault (1972). Smith (1999, p. 44) points out that West-
ern knowledges, philosophies and de¿nitions of human nature form what Foucault
(1972) has referred to as a ‘cultural archive’. It could also be referred to as a ‘store-
house’ of histories, artefacts, ideas, texts and/or images, which are classi¿ed, pre-
served, arranged and represented back to the West and Nonwesterners. Although
shifts and transformations may occur within Western thinking, Smith (1999, p.
44) argues that this happens without changing the archive itself, and without the
modes of classi¿cation and systems of representation contained within it, being de-
stroyed. She holds the view that systems of classi¿cation and representation enable
different traditions or fragments of traditions to be retrieved and are formulated
in different contexts as discourses, and then played out in systems of power and
domination, with material consequences for colonised peoples. It is in the light of
this that I ¿nd the universalism of professional philosophy (Oruka’s four trends)
problematic. Professional philosophy as a strand of African philosophy uses the
same methods/philosophical strategies of Western philosophy, because the belief
is that these methods/strategies are universal rather than speci¿c to a culture/philo-
sophical tradition. What makes Oruka’s professional philosophy African is that
it focuses on African cultural values/practices and Africa’s problems. It does not
equate African cultural values with philosophy, but these become the objects of
philosophical inquiry or needs to meet the test of rigour to be called philosophy.
Though the focus of philosophical inquiry is different for the African professional
philosopher, the methods and forms of representation are not different to those of
Western philosophy. I would argue that professional African philosophy therefore
becomes not just a strand of African philosophy, as Oruka suggests, but a strand of
Western philosophy alongside analytic, continental and North American pragma-
tism – probably the reason why it has been embraced by several universities in the
United States of America. Professional African philosophy does little, if anything,
to disrupt the hegemony of the Western cultural archive and as such holds the dan-
ger of (re)producing (neo)colonialist discourses. Methods/philosophical strategies
cannot simply be separated or abstracted from social/cultural contexts, as they are
socially/culturally (re)produced/constructed Therefore it is my interest to take the
discussion beyond the particularism of ethno-philosophy and the universalism of
professional philosophy.

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 THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

TOWARDS A DECONSTRUCTIVE/RECONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF UBUNTU

As mentioned, my interest is to decentre Western philosophy so that it is situated

more objectively in world history – to show that it is a situated philosophy (I use
philosophy here in a plural sense), an ethno-philosophy that has moved from its
site(s) of production to other places not necessary because of its superiority or
universalism, but rather because it was aided and abetted by military power, im-
perialism and colonialism. My interest is to disrupt the hegemony of the Western
archive by using philosophical strategies that might themselves be considered to
be Western – that is, I use Western philosophical strategies reÀexively. Though
I may be accused of contradicting some of my earlier arguments, I shall use the
strategy of deconstruction so as to open up possibilities for moving beyond stand-
points of narrow particularism and unreÀexive universalism. Deconstruction, I
argue, has the potential to disrupt hegemonic Western philosophies (it disrupts
rather than (re)produces the Western cultural archive) and new orthodoxies linked
to ethno-philosophies that may gain momentum in African contexts. My critique
of Ubuntu speci¿cally and African philosophy more generally is not to be dis-
missive of them, but rather to lay bare some of the problems of Ubuntu/African
philosophy when it is viewed through ethno-philosophical lenses. I argue that Af-
rican philosophy/Ubuntu must be brought into our conversations and discourses
– that it must be invoked if we are to decentre and deconstruct Western philoso-
phy.
The future of an African philosophy lies in the recognition that the post-colonial
present is hybridised and that a transcendental synthesis (of traditional and West-
ern) is unworkable (Gratton, 2003). However, the hybridised post-colonial presence
does not mean the conservation of two competing identities, but rather invokes
‘the important ways in which post-structuralists use the language of the dominant
structure in order to re-organize it from within’ (Gratton, 2003, p.73). As Bhabha
(1985, p. 2) writes:

A contingent borderline experience opens up in-between colonizer and colo-

nized. This space of cultural and interpretive indecidability produced in the
‘present’ of the colonial moment (…) The margin of hybridity, where cultural
differences ‘contingently’ and conÀictually touch (…) resists the binary op-
position of racial and cultural groups.

Recognising the reconstructive/deconstructive force of African philosophy negates

the idea of African philosophical practice being ‘reduced to that which is at worst
an a-historical (universalist) or relativist (particularist) enterprise’ (Gratton, 2003,
p. 65). Gratton (2003, p. 65), argues that by working on the margins of the dominant
colonial and metaphysical discourses, African philosophy ‘is able to render their
(i.e. Eurocentric philosophies’) blind spots and ¿ssures in order to displace them’.
African philosophy is at best a recounting/reconstruction of the African lived ex-

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LESLEY LE GRANGE

perience, but when it is invoked the consequence is the deconstruction of (Western)

philosophy. As Gratton (2003, p. 65) writes:

‘African[a] philosophy’ is a performative signi¿er that by its very name brings

together and calls into question an endless number of oppositions: past/future,
universalist/particularist, African thought/philosophy, etc.

It is the deconstructive/reconstructive potential of African philosophy/Ubuntu that

needs to be explored and become part of our conversations and discourses within/
on a (South) African philosophy of education. In (South) Africa, where indigenous
knowledge systems reside among the majority of its people and Western philoso-
phies remain dominant through new forms of colonisation latent in processes such
as globalization, an African philosophy of education is vital. Hope for education in
(South) Africa depends on recounting visions of Africa’s history and reconstructing
it to the present, but also in displacing dominant discourses, including those evident
in South African education policy documents. African philosophy (of education)
as a reconstructive/deconstructive force might offer hope for education in (South)
Africa. It will also avert the danger of a single African philosophy (of education)
from becoming dominant in the way that Fundamental Pedagogics2 did under apart-
heid. African(a) philosophy (of education) as reconstructive/deconstructive force is
singular-plural.

CONCLUSION

As noted indigenous knowledge generally and Ubuntu more speci¿cally, have been
incorporated in South Africa’s national curriculum statements. Although Ubuntu
as a cultural value does reside among many (South) Africans and it derives from
aphorisms in different African languages (it is a linguistic phenomenon) there is
contestation concerning the concept in much of the recent writings on African
philosophy of education in South Africa (see Higgs 2003; Parker 2003; Enslin &
Horsthemke, 2004; Horsthemke 2004; Le Grange, 2004; Waghid, 2004). Moreover,
in multicultural South African classrooms teachers’ interpretations of Ubuntu and
related notions could be crucial for the project of transformation in South Africa. A
narrow interpretation (with ethnophilosophical leanings) of the concept might lead
to antagonism in classrooms and thwart critical deliberation. By this I mean that
certain groups might claim that the concept belongs to them (even though this might
contradict the meaning of the term) or hold the view that it cannot be subjected to
critical scrutiny. There is a danger of othering here – a narrow humanism that could
emerge leading to atrocities such as the spate of xenophobia experienced in South
Africa in recent times. On the other hand, if Ubuntu and related concepts are to be
subjected to the criteria of Western philosophy/knowledge for it to have legitimacy
it might simply be reconstructed in Western terms and assimilated into a Western
cultural archive, thus eroding its Africanness.

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 THE PHILOSOPHY OF UBUNTU AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Guattari (2001) argues that we cannot create new ways of living by reversing
technological advancement and go back to old formulas, which were pertinent when
the planet was less densely populated and when social relations were much stronger
than they are today. And so invoking Ubuntu can’t simply mean yearning back to
how things were in the past. It also can not only be legitimated by using so-called
universal criteria as professional philosophers suggest. It is the deconstructive/re-
constructive potential of Ubuntu that might have transformative effects on education
in South Africa. The transformative potential lies in (re)imagining Ubuntu anew.

NOTES

1 The ten values in The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy are: Democracy, social
justice and equity, non-racism and non-sexism, Ubuntu (human-dignity), an open society, account-
ability (responsibility), respect, the rule of law, reconciliation.
2 Fundamental pedagogics can be traced historically to C J Langeveld’s publication Beknopte Theo-
retische Pedagogiek in the Netherlands in 1944. The ¿ rst publication in South Africa was C K Ober-
holzer’s Inleiding in die Prinsipiële Opvoedkunde, published in 1954. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
Fundamental Pedagogics was a powerful doctrine in Afrikaans-medium universities. It was also
powerful in black colleges of education and in education faculties of historically black universities
that were dominated by Afrikaner lecturers. Fundamental Pedagogicians argued that the ‘scienti¿c
method’ was the only authentic method of studying education.

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Lesley Le Grange
Faculty of Education
Stellenbosch University

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