1. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, GR 115455, Aug.

25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630

2. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, GR L-1123. Mar. 5, 1947, 78 Phil., 1

3. Arroyo v. De Venecia, GR 127255. Aug. 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268

4. Cunanan v. Tan, GR L-19721. May 10, 1962, 5 SCRA 1

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same
position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace
him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the
Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing
irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.

DECISION: Dismissed

RATIO DECIDENDI: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is
a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate
numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations.
However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To
correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to
vacate and turn over the office in contention.

5. Manalo v. Sistoza, GR 107369. Aug. 11, 1999, 312 SCRA 239

Facts:

On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating
the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief
Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S.
Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the
rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed
their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then
Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
 Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation
of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The
PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and
(3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

Held:

Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to
be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
6. Soriano III v. Lista, GR 153881. Mar. 24, 2003, 399 SCRA 437

Facts:

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed public respondents to different positions in the Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner questioned the said appointments for failure to undergo the confirmation
process in the Commission on Appointments.

Issues:

1. Does petitioner have any legal personality to file the instant petition?

2. Do the appointments of respondents required confirmation of the CA?

Held:

1. No. A private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that he has
personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be emphasized that a party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid,
but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as
such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.

2. No. The PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy under
Section 4 of RA 5173. It was subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control of the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it
was integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the
Philippine Navy under Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.

However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the President, issued EO
475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He later on again transferred the
PCG from the Office of the President to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer
from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

It is clear from Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel
or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a
construction that changes its meaning.

The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions
and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the
Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA. (Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24,
2003)

7. Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., GR 93711, Feb. 25, 1991, 194 SCRA 390

FACTS: On March 22, 1988, the petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of MSU in a concurrent capacity with her position then as Vice-
President for External Studies.

On January 2, 1989, the Office of the Vice-President for External Studies was merged with the OVCAA
and, as such, the functions of the former were to be exercised by the latter. The petitioner was
appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. The Board of Regents of the
MSU, on May 16, 1989, approved her appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs. cdrep

On May 14, 1990, respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU President, wrote the petitioner informing her that
he has decided to tap the petitioner’s talent for the MSU system as Vice- President for Academic Affairs
which position is under the administrative staff of the respondent MSU President. The petitioner, on the
same date, answered that she cannot accept the position since she has already started several projects
in the OVCAA which she wants to see through.

The respondent President, on May 16, 1990, designated Professor Macacuna Moslem as Vice-Chancellor
for Academic Affairs but the latter did not accept the designation. On May 28, 1990, the respondent
President issued Special Order No. 158-P designating Professor Corazon Batara, the other respondent in
this case, as Officer-in-Charge of the OVCAA.

ISSUE: won the petitioner may be removed from its office by the president of MSU without valid cause.

HELD: NO. As early as 1963, this Court ruled in Tapales v. President and Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines (7 SCRA 553 [1963]) that UP Deans and Directors enjoy security of tenure
and any attempt to remove them by limiting their terms of office from permanent to a five (5) year term
is unconstitutional. Deans and Directors are selected from faculty members. An appointment as
Professor is also needed for salary rating purposes but does not detract from the permanent nature of
the administrative position (id., at pp. 554 and 556). The fact that Professor Tapales was given another
appointment as Director of the U.P. Conservatory of Music does not mean that the second appointment
is only temporary in nature. In the present case, the fact that Professor Marohombsar has a permanent
appointment as Professor does not detract from the permanent nature of her present appointment as
Vice-Chancellor, especially since the same was duly confirmed by the MSU Board of Regents. The only
difference is that her position as Vice-Chancellor has a fixed term while that of Professor Tapales was
until he retired or resigned.

The attempt of the respondent to solve the problem by placing the petitioner in his own administrative
staff as Vice-President for Academic Affairs cannot be countenanced. The petitioner served in this
capacity from 1975 to 1978 after which she became Vice- President for External Studies in 1982. The
proffered position is not only less desirable to the petitioner but she expressly rejected it, preferring to
stay in her present position. She thanked the respondent but stated she would not be effective in the
new position while in the OVCAA she could complete a number of projects and programs. (Rollo, p. 21)
The correctness of the petitioner’s stand is explained by this Court in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 673
[1970]).There are transfers which appear to be promotions or lateral movements but are in truth
demotions. There is no showing that the interest of the service would be served if the proffered
appointment would be forced on her.

No less than the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, Secretary Isidro D. Cariño, opined, and the
Court agrees with him, that the petitioner may not be removed from the disputed office by the MSU
President without the authority of the Board. And, as correctly stated by the Secretary, Special Order
No. 158-P issued by the respondent president designating respondent Batara as officer in-charge of the
same office was unapproved by the Board, hence, the special order cannot revoke, or could not have
revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Vice-Chancellor. (Annex A, Petitioner’s
Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 119-120)

The respondent MSU President, perhaps realizing the vulnerability of his action, submitted Special Order
No. 158-P to the Board of Regents for approval. But such submission was made after the Court already
issued its temporary restraining order and consequently, his action constituted contempt of Court.
Considering, however, that the respondent appears to have acted in the honest albeit mistaken belief
that MSU would progress faster if the executive officers serve at his pleasure and discretion, the Court
rules that declaring him in contempt would be too harsh a remedy. The respondent President is,
nevertheless, admonished for his action. When this Court issues a restraining order, it must be obeyed.

8. Summers v. Ozaeta, GR L-1534. Oct. 25, 1948, 81 Phil. 754

9. Matibag v. Benipayo GR 149036. Apr. 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49

FACTS:

The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Such appointment was
renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier.
Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and assumed
their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments,
PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.

2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.

RULING:

Nature of Ad Interim Appointments

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. xxx

…the term “ad interim appointment”… means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn
or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

Right of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that “[n]o officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated
to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the
office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for
cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How an Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second
cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all
ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over
the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC
xxx

Was the Renewal of Appointment Valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can
no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not
provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well
as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not
because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

10. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, GR 164978. Oct. 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587

Facts: Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur Yap (Agriculture), Alberto Romulo
(Foreign Affairs), Raul Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino Cruz Jr (National Defence),
Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph Durano (Tourism) and Michael Defensor (Environment and Natural
Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on 15 August 2004. The respondents took their oaths and
assumed duties. The Congress commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and Senators Aquilino
Pimintel, Edgardo Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim,
Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents.
The Senators contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary shall be
designated as acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while Congress is in
session there can be no appointments without first obtaining consent from Commission on
Appointments. When Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to the same respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretaries without the consent of th
Commission on Elections while Congress is in session.

Decision: Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the appointment of Gloria
Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of the Congress, the petition has
become moot. However as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

11. Arnault v. Nazareno, GR L-3820. July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29

Facts:

The Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates. The entire amount allocated to buy said estates was given to a certain Burt, through his
representative petitioner Arnault. Because of the anomalies regarding the sale of said estates, the
Senate created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal. Arnault
was called as a witness. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault testified that he delivered
two checks amounting to P1.5 million to Burt and deposited it in an account. Further, he testified that he
drew on said account 2 checks: one P500,000 which he transferred to another account, and another
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. When asked by the Senate committee to reveal the
name to whom he gave the P440,000, he refused and asserted that all the transactions were legal but
refuses to answer because it may be later used against him. In other words, he invoked his right against
self-incrimination. Senate committee cited Arnault in contempt and ordered him imprisoned at New
Bilibid Prison until such time he reveals the name sought. Arnault now petitions for habeas corpus. He
avers the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt because such information is immaterial to,
and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation.

Issues:

(1) Does the Senate have the power to cite Arnault in contempt and order his imprisonment?
(2) Does the Senate have the authority to commit Arnault for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950?

(3) May Arnault be relieved from answering the query by merely declaring that to do so is self-
incriminating?

Held:

(1) Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent
to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate,* and every question xxx must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation.** So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But it does not follow that every question xxx
must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the xxx character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question. The question which Arnault refused to answer is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. The
Special Committee, under the Senate Resolution creating it, is required to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the
person to whom Arnault gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination. It is
in fact the very thing sought to be determined. It is not necessary, as Arnault contends, for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

(2) Yes. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body (until
the adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953).*** The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. To rule otherwise would be to defeat that
purpose. In this case, as it was the Senate that committed Arnault, the Senate being a continuing body,
there is no limit as to time the Senate’s power to punish for contempt. Arguably, the Senate may abuse
such continuing power and keep the witness in prison for life. In such cases, the portals of this Court are
always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
(3) No. Since according to Arnault himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, there is no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

* or to expel a Member

** Notably, the 1935 Constitution under which this case was decided does not contain a provision on
legislative inquiry similar to Art VI, Sec 21 of the present Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that
Congress has the implied power to conduct such investigations for the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, which is not infrequently true, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed. (Arnault v. Nazareno, No. 87 Phil 29)

*** The Second Congress was constituted in 1949, and was to expire in 1953. The resolution of the
Senate committing Arnault was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress in 1950.

12. Senate v. Ermita, GR 169777. Apr. 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them
to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid
of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

13. Almonte v. Vasquez, GR 95367, May 23, 1995, 244 SCRA 286

FACTS:

Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally
disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office.
They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:

Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production
of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

14. Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250. May 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and dictator
Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment was made on a previous
contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). Prior to PEA, CDCP
was tasked to reclaim certain forshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The amended contract now
directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the development rights, title, interest and partitipation of CDCP in
the reclamation.

Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to PEA. These covered three reclaimed
islands known as the “Freedom Islands.”

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.
Former President Fidel Ramos then approved the JVA.
Controvery broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denouced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain which the government
has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands. Moreover, the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that the JVA itself was illegal.

In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued that the
government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of the renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to public corporations.

A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA). Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.

ISSUES:

Whether the amended JVA violates the Constitution. -- YES.

Whether information on ongoing negotiations may be disclosed to the public. -- NO.

HELD:

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157. 84 ha have been reclaimed. The
rest are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the agreement, AMARI will shoulder
the reclamation of the freedom island and it will get 70% of the usable area. AMARI wil acquire and own
a maximum of 367.5 ha of reclaimed land wich will be titled in its name.

PD No 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
However, at this time, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass
after PEA had already reclaimed it. However, the additional 592.15 ha are still submerged and forming
part of the Manila Bay. There is also no legislative or presidential act regarding these remaining areas.

Also, the mere physical act of reclamation of PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
It still needs the authorization of DENR, which classifies lands of public domain into alienable or
disposable lands subject to the President’s approval.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA
remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

PEA is also mandated to call for a public bidding. Only if this failed that a negotiated sale is allowed. The
failure of the public bidding involving only 407.84 ha is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of
750 ha.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project,
cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Ownership of PEA of the said lands of public domain does not convert them to private lands.
Jurisprudence holding that there is conversion to private land upon the grant of the patent or issuance
of the certificate of title does not apply to government units like PEA.

The rationale behind ban on corporation acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of public
domain is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings spawn
social unrest. In practice, this ban strengthens limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the
allowed area by simply stting up a corporation to acquire more land.

On the right to information:

The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers. In this case, the information demanded by Chavez is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers.
15. Chavez v. PCGG, GR 130716. Dec. 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred
to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-
gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that
would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general
have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.
They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be
compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.

Issue:

Whether or not PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

Ruling:

Yes, the PCGG should disclose public information regarding the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

The Court held that the "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution (Sec. 7 [Article III]) have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty
may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters,
and (4) other confidential information.