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英文 Ch.6 Goldie Wokler Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 2006 Extract
英文 Ch.6 Goldie Wokler Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 2006 Extract
∗ Translated by George St Andrews and Sylvana Tomaselli and adapted by Robert Wokler.
1 In the past thirty years scholarship on the Encyclopédie has benefited from work by specialists studying
the history of book production and the book trade as well as those working on the text itself. The
starting points are Lough 1968, 1971; Proust 1962, 1965, 1972. There are indexes and inventories in
Schwab et al. 1971–3. For the Encyclopédie as an enterprise see Bowen 1969; Kafker 1976; Venturi
1946; and especially Darnton 1979. For its early press reception: Birn 1967; Lough 1971, pp. 98–111.
On the wider intellectual background: Chartier 1990; Furet 1965; Roche 1965–70, ii.
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in general, bringing a fresh outlook upon all the productions of the human
mind together with an optimistic faith in the capacities of human reason to
progress towards the triumph of truth. The Encyclopédie managed to apply
to the whole of human knowledge a method which for Bayle had been
restricted to theology and history alone. Yet its dedication to the classification
of facts by way of a lexical ordering of information also implied new methods
of controlling that information. In applying inductive methods drawn from
their precursors to social institutions and political concepts, no less than to
natural phenomena, Diderot and d’Alembert opened up the prospect of the
organisation and analysis of the human sciences along lines mapped by the
disciplines of English experimental science and physics.
While the prospectus of 1750 acknowledges a debt to earlier English dic-
tionaries, including John Harris’s Lexicon Technicum (1704–10) and Thomas
Dyche’s New General English Dictionary (1735), the Encyclopédie followed
such precursors mainly in its lexical organisation and critical attitude, rather
than by recapitulating specific entries. The influence credited to Ephraim
Chambers’s Cyclopedia or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, which
first appeared in 1728 and was itself inspired by earlier French, Italian, and
English dictionaries, might have proved of a different order, if the initial
aspiration of the Encyclopédie’s publisher, André François Le Breton, to pro-
duce nothing more than a translation of Chambers’s text, had been pur-
sued. Johann Jacob Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae (first published in
Leipzig between 1742 and 1744, with a supplementary volume in 1766)
was, however, to remain a constant model for Diderot in particular, many
of whose articles on philosophical and political themes proved little more
than French translations of the Latin text of this German pastor, whose
own entries had been inspired by both Pufendorf and Bayle. Diderot also
borrowed much material from other sources, including the Abbé Gabriel
Girard’s Synonymes français (1736), while d’Holbach, in his own philosoph-
ical contributions, drew heavily from, and frequently refers to, the Grosse
vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wißenschaften und Künste (Universal Lexicon
of Human Knowledge and Arts), published in Leipzig between 1732 and
1750 (Matoré 1968).
eager to harvest, with those based in Paris possessing the most ample means
to cultivate it. The new fashion also had political significance, to which
Diderot was especially attuned. It coincided with the emergence into print
of French political economy (Perrot 1984). After the economic crises of the
early eighteenth century, including the collapse of John Law’s schemes of
reform around 1720 which had greatly shaken the social fabric of France,
fresh avenues of self-promotion and economic mobility came to be impro-
vised whose steps could be lexicologically followed and plotted. In spite,
or perhaps even because, of its indiscreet theological bias, the Abbé Noël
Antoine Pluche’s Spectacle de la nature (The Spectacle of Nature, 1732–50)
symbolised the new state of mind, in uniting the practical utilitarian goal
of cataloguing and disseminating knowledge of the natural world with a
philosophical history of humanity’s evolution and progress. In propounding
a providential ethic of work which gave warrant to human enterprise and
ambition, it helped undermine the holistic, static, and unadventurous prin-
ciples of Christian political economy before the age of enterprise. While
marvelling at the wonders of God’s creation, Pluche was equally enraptured
by the ingenuity of inventors and scientists, whom he invited to join with
philosophers so as to publicise the practical experience accumulated by gen-
erations of artisans. He held the advance of human thought and science to
be inseparable from material progress. In his eulogy of economically pro-
ductive forces, reconciled with due respect for dogma, can be found one of
the great fissures that separated eighteenth-century France from its classical
heritage as well as the hidden hand and force which was to steer a new
culture of sociability.
In his own article, ‘Encyclopédie’, published in 1755, Diderot criticises
Europe’s learned societies for their excessive specialisation and their neglect
of organising plans and principles of research. But the reasoned dictionaries
of the arts and sciences of the mid-eighteenth century were also the direct
and indirect heirs of Europe’s learned societies and the academic movement
which in the seventeenth century gave rise to them. The Encyclopédistes’
references to new terms drawn from the 1718 and 1740 editions of the Dic-
tionnaire de l’Académie française, and to material drawn from the Mémoires de
l’Académie des inscriptions and the Histoire et mémoires de l’Académie des sciences,
bear ample testimony to such debts. Despite the French monarchy’s control
of both the membership and publications of its national academies, there was
substantial collaboration and exchange between their diverse milieux and
the world of Diderot and his contributors: ‘An encyclopedia is not produced
on command’ (Diderot 1992, p. 22). Inspired by the Abbé Bignon, Réamur,
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provoked two years earlier in the wake of Damiens’s attempt on the life of
King Louis XV, Malesherbes once again brought legal proceedings against
the Encyclopédie to a halt. In January of that year the parlement of Paris con-
demned the work, while in May the royal council revoked the king’s privilège,
but Malesherbes managed to save the enterprise by ensuring that the pub-
lication of subsequent volumes could proceed with tacit permission, the
cancellation of full privilège actually serving the editors’ interest by sparing
them the rigours of preliminary censorship which could have accompanied
advance scrutiny of the text.
The publishers’ principal argument, accepted by Malesherbes, and
through him the crown, was that if the Encyclopédie came to be published
abroad, the French state and the persons gainfully employed in the work’s
production would incur a substantial financial loss. Paper manufacturers,
typographers, binders, booksellers, and other journeymen engaged in trades
associated with the burgeoning industry of the printed word would become
unemployed, while pirated editions produced in Geneva, Liège, Lucca, and
even St Petersburg, where other workshops were eagerly awaiting their
chance, would proceed to flood the French market. ‘The old institution
of privilège . . . of its essence a manifestation of absolutism, was thus made
to serve the cause of economic and ideological liberalism’ (Proust 1962,
p. 76). In point of fact, the Encyclopédie’s articles on theological themes were
a good deal less incendiary than Bayle’s and especially Voltaire’s, while its
philosophical and political essays were often remarkably tame if not down-
right insipid. Such threats to the established order which the work was
perceived as posing only became visible in the light of criminal activities,
like the attempted assassination of the king, which, according to its critics,
irrupted when proselytes were stirred by its alleged irreverence for author-
ity. The encyclopedic machine de guerre could then be portrayed as if it were
a swirling tide of dissidence, gathering momentum on the horizon. But
its ideological success, however that might be measured, was more prosaic.
Not only were its philosophical advocates more resolute than its detractors;
they also found an economy receptive to its charms because the authority of
reason and public opinion which had already gained ascendancy in England
and Holland in the previous century had now come, in the French-speaking
world as well, to undermine the traditional hegemony of both church and
crown.
By 1765, seventeen folio volumes of text had appeared, completing the
alphabet, but as yet none of the volumes of plates, nor the supplements,
nor the index were available. In the fourteen-year interval since its launch
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had come before and even surpassing it, Panckoucke managed to defuse the
original script by diffusing it (Bowen 1969; Darnton 1979; Tucoo-Chala
1977).
The unscrupulous commercialisation of the Enlightenment achieved in
Panckoucke’s hands is amply demonstrated in the stratagems, false accounts,
and projections adopted throughout all the contractual negotiations for the
republication and improvement of the Encyclopédie in which he was engaged
(Darnton 1973). In its manifestation of the entrepreneurial spirit of capital-
ism, Panckoucke’s career was exemplary. By publishing his editions outside
France he of course freed himself from such interference as the parlements
and French clergy had sought to exercise over his Parisian precursor, while at
the same time adding to the attractions of a work which could be portrayed
as having barely escaped the clutches of aspiring censors. No less than Le
Breton, moreover, Panckoucke had powerful official protectors in France
as well, whose best endeavours helped bring his speculative ventures to
fruition, smoothly oiling the path of volumes poised for prohibition by dis-
creetly promoting them instead. If the crisis of 1759 had briefly obstructed
the Encyclopédie’s first publication, in Italy the republic of Lucca’s defiant
refusal to register the papal denunciation endorsing the Paris parlement’s and
French royal council’s censure, exhibited both Tuscan independence from
the Holy See as well as an indigenous receptivity to progressive currents
further afield (Rosa 1972).
In England, with a more prevalent, if still restricted, tradition of freedom
of the press, the public appeared to be more bemused than entranced by such
Continental adventures, and no pirate edition of the text was contemplated
after the 1750s. A notable letter to the Edinburgh Review by Adam Smith
in 1756 made plain that, at least in enlightened Scotland, interest in the
Encyclopédistes’ daring and in the political and economic influence of their
ideas could be readily mustered, but in England the 1772 translation of
the Esprit de l’Encyclopédie proved unsuccessful. The republication in five
volumes of Chambers’s Cyclopedia between 1778 and 1786 occasioned no
fresh references to the Parisian counterpart originally conceived in its image,
while William Smellie, the editor of the first edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica (1768–71), judged the French Encyclopédie unremarkably similar
to other works whose authority he invoked. The Britannica, commissioned
by the master printer Colin Macfarquhar and the engraver Andrew Bell,
both from Edinburgh, was conceived for a much more limited market than
the Encyclopédie; in appointing Smellie, himself a journeyman printer with
scholarly inclinations, they launched a three-volume work of reference,
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2 For the contributors to the Encyclopédie see: Kafker and Kafker 1988; Lough 1968, 1973, 1975; Proust
1962, pp. 9–43; 1965, pp. 78–105; Roche 1965–70, ii. On individual contributors: Hankins 1970;
Morris 1979; Naves 1938. Estimates of the number of contributors have varied from 139 to 179.
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on the Arts and Sciences (1751) produced an account of the moral effects of
civilisation which seemed to contradict the very purpose of the Encyclopédie.
In 1755, when the fifth volume was published, Diderot was still Rousseau’s
closest friend, but he would soon have occasion to regret his encomium of
a man whom he here asserts that ‘he never had the strength to hold back
from acclaiming’ (Diderot 1992, p. 26).
If the article ‘Encyclopédie’ forms a part of his philosophy of history,
Diderot’s more specifically political contributions concentrate instead on
principles such as justice, authority, and natural right, illustrated with exam-
ples drawn most often from antiquity. After the crisis of 1752 deprived him of
the services of a number of liberal theologians who had been responsible for
material on the history of political thought, Diderot took over this subject
himself, borrowing copiously from Sully, Fontenelle, Bayle, Gabriel Girard,
Claude Buffier, and other sources, and relying above all on the political
thinker whose authority throughout the first half of the eighteenth century
was unrivalled – that is, Pufendorf. In the article ‘Cité’ he adopts Pufendorf’s
formulation of the idea of the state as a corporate body entrusted with the
collective will of its various members, and in the article ‘Citoyen’ he accepts
Pufendorf’s distinction between the duties of man and those of the citizen,
while nevertheless objecting to his preference for native-born as opposed to
naturalised citizenship on grounds prevalent in ancient Athens but super-
seded by the more permeable entitlements offered in Rome (Diderot 1992,
pp. 12–17).
In the article ‘Autorité politique’ in volume i, Diderot subscribes to
Pufendorf’s conception of the true source of authority, which must lie in
the consent of the people themselves, rather than in nature or force. In
relinquishing their liberty to their princes, the inhabitants of civil society
act in conformity with right reason and so establish a common power in the
public interest. This is the doctrine of the social compact, which binds citi-
zens to the prince, but also princes to their subjects, limiting their authority,
as Diderot conceived it, under conditions stipulated by natural law (Diderot
1992, pp. 6–11). The moral foundations of the state might thus appear to be
without need of any theological framework. Yet, together with Pufendorf,
he contends that subjects retain no right of resistance against the authority
they have established, however despotic they might judge it, since they are
bound by religion, reason, and nature to abide by their undertakings. Men
should remain free in matters of conscience, Diderot observes in his article
‘Intolérance’ in volume viii, since conscience can only be enlightened, never
constrained, and violence merely renders a man a hypocrite (pp. 29–30). But
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he does not follow the anabaptists or Locke, who held similar views, in their
suggestions that conscience and good faith may justify a right of resistance.
The argument of ‘Autorité politique’ gave rise to no such implications,
though it excited fierce hostility, in the Journal de Trévoux and elsewhere,
mainly on the part of advocates of the divine right of kings. To allay any
misunderstanding, Diderot added an erratum to the article, which appeared
in volume iii, to the effect that subjects’ consent to the rule of their princes
does not contradict but rather confirms the proposition that real authority
stems ultimately from God (pp. 11–12).
Pufendorf had put forward his account of the popular and contractual
foundations of monarchy in conjunction with a theory of human nature
and a speculative history of the origins of civil society. Much persuaded
by the Hobbesian doctrine of man’s fundamental insecurity and selfishness,
he nevertheless maintained that Hobbes had been mistaken to suppose that
man was by nature a solitary creature whose ambitions incline him towards
war, since, on the contrary, the weakness of savages must have led them to
seek survival through association with their neighbours, their selfish socia-
bility prompting them to establish and accept the regulations of civil law.
In his article ‘Droit naturel’ (Natural law), published in volume v, Diderot
pursues much the same critique of the idea of natural conflict, reproaching
Hobbes, whom he portrays as a ‘violent interlocutor’, for supposing that
each person’s passions must bring ‘terror and confusion to the human race’.
The Hobbesian thesis is either insane or evil, he observes, ‘for man is not just
an animal but an animal which thinks’, capable of exercising his reason in
accordance with justice (Diderot 1992, pp. 18–19). In his Suite de l’Apologie
de l’abbé de Prades of 1752, forming his own defence of a maligned contrib-
utor to the Encyclopédie, Diderot had already remarked that the pure state of
nature was an état de troupeau – a barbarous condition of men living in herds,
each individual motivated by fear and his natural passions alone. But only a
contemptible Hobbesian could suppose that the unlimited power of princes
had been established as a remedy for man’s original anarchy, since the passage
of the human race from an état de troupeau to an état de société policée – from
its natural state to the state of civil society – had come about just because
of men’s recognition of their need to subject themselves collectively to laws
whose beneficial effect was manifest to them all.
In ‘Droit naturel’ Diderot considers how selfish individuals, motivated
by private interest, can form such agreements. Before the institution of
governments, he claims, justice can only be settled by what he describes as
the tribunal of mankind as a whole. For although ‘private wills are suspect . . .
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the general will is always good’, and each of us partakes of that general will
by virtue of our being members of the human race, prescribing both our
fundamental duties as well as our inalienable rights (Diderot 1992, pp. 19–
20). It was in this way that Diderot introduced his idea of the volonté générale, a
term which had achieved some currency in the theology of Malebranche in
the late seventeenth century and had been taken up again from time to time
in the eighteenth, but which had been of scant significance in the history of
political thought before the publication of the Encyclopédie. In his own article
‘Economie politique’, published in the same volume, Rousseau employed
the term himself for the first time, with a cross-reference to Diderot’s article,
already cited in the original manuscript, which has survived (Rousseau
1997b, p. 7; Wokler 1975, p. 71). Here, in his sole political contribution
to the Encyclopédie, deeply inspired by Plato’s Laws, Rousseau defines the
volonté générale as the will of the body politic as a whole, serving as its source
of laws and its standard of justice, although his ascription of that principle
to the whole of humanity retains some resemblance to the argument of
Diderot’s ‘Droit naturel’. Later, in The Social Contract (1762), he was to
attribute a very different meaning to the concept, insisting that it could
only be realised within, and never outside, the state.
Diderot conceived the law of nature to be a rational principle of com-
mon humanity, which restrained the selfishness of individuals and made the
establishment of civil society both necessary and possible. Many philoso-
phers of natural law had put forward similar notions before, but from his
references and allusions to both the De jure naturæ et gentium (On the Laws of
Nature and Nations, 1672) and the De officio hominis et civilis (On the Duty of
Man and Citizen, 1673), it is clear that his account was principally indebted
to Pufendorf alone. That debt, however, was by and large indirect, since
Diderot drew most of his Pufendorfian principles not from their original
source but from Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, which he consulted
time and again, many of his own contributions on subjects drawn from that
work – which accordingly must be regarded as one of the mainsprings of
the whole Encyclopédie – amounting to little more than plagiarism. Yet while
the article ‘Hobbisme’ is an almost literal translation of Brucker’s account
of Hobbes, it includes a postscript of Diderot’s own conception, compar-
ing the system of Hobbes with that of Rousseau, to the detriment of both
thinkers (Diderot 1992, pp. 27–9). According to Diderot, mankind is neither
simply naturally good nor simply naturally wicked, since goodness and evil,
together with happiness and misery, are finely balanced in human nature.
If Hobbes had falsely supposed that men are by nature vicious, Rousseau
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had been equally wrong to believe that they always become so in society.
For Diderot, virtue and vice were each natural and social, and man was thus
at once impelled and enabled to form civil associations which brought both
benefits and harm to the human race. A Pufendorfian perspective of a soci-
ety of selfish agents could therefore be invoked as a corrective not only to
Hobbes but to Rousseau as well. With the publication of his Theory of Moral
Sentiments in 1759, Adam Smith made such sceptical principles central to
his philosophy and later came, in his Wealth of Nations of 1776, to envisage
the place they occupied among the necessary foundations of commercial
society.
It was Rousseau, however, rather than Smith, who lent weight to Diderot’s
Pufendorfian political theory – and that by way of refutation. For just as
Diderot had attempted to rebut both Hobbes and Rousseau in his arti-
cle ‘Hobbisme’, so Rousseau, in the draft of The Social Contract known as
the Geneva Manuscript, sought to challenge Hobbes and Diderot together
(Rousseau 1997b, pp. 153–61; Wokler 1975, pp. 90–110). Arguing against
‘Droit naturel’, he also employed the dialectical approach of the article
‘Hobbisme’, since he judged Hobbes correct to surmise that outside civil
society there could be no agreed principles of law constricting our natural
rights, but wrong to imagine that the exercise of such rights unavoidably
led to conflict. The idea of natural right was thus a chimerical concept, he
claimed, because it ascribed a moral rule to a state of mere licence, though
Diderot had rightly perceived that even in their natural state men could still
live in peace. As an alternative to each doctrine Rousseau advanced a theory
of benign but amoral human nature, transformed either for better or worse
by the establishment of civil society. Both his philosophy of history and his
theory of the social contract thus address themes brought to his attention
by Diderot’s contributions to the Encyclopédie.
Readers who sought information about the meaning of natural right
and the foundations of political authority had access not only to Diderot’s
and Rousseau’s pronouncements in these articles but also to the views of
Boucher d’Argis in another article on ‘Droit’, published in volume v, as
well as to those of Jaucourt on ‘Gouvernement’ in volume vii, or, within
the broader context of moral philosophy, the definitions of ‘Intérêt’ sup-
plied by the Marquis Jean-François de Saint-Lambert in volume viii. While
justifiably aggrieved at the liberties taken by his publisher with the text he
supplied, Diderot himself promoted the work’s multiplicity of voices – of
deism, materialism, and even orthodoxy in theological matters, for instance,
or liberalism and mercantilism in political economy. His choice of diverse
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