Doctrines of Cases Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FINALS DOCTRINE CASES – JUDGE XES
probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, the average man only weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to calibrations of the rules of evidence
which he has no knowledge
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA V. the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court on the
LELA GIRON ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
what is only required is
probable cause - it is the AS A GENERAL RULE: the decision whether or not the criminal case against the accused shall be dismissed depends on the sound discretion of
existence of such facts and the Prosecutor; courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigation for the determination of sufficient probable
circumstances as would cause
excite the belief in a
reasonable mind acting on the EXCEPTION: The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion
facts within the knowledge of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause.
the prosecutor the person
charged was guilty of the The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed
crime for which he was to do after the alleged crime was committed.
committed She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated
in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively
during the preliminary stage of the case
CLARIDAD V. ESTEBAN The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively within the competence of the Executive
Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of
a) The complaint shall state the
address of the respondent and shall be Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
accompanied by the affidavits of the THE LACK OF REQUISITE CERTIFICATIONS FROM THE AFFIDAVITS OF MOSE OF THE OTHER WITNESSES WAS IN VIOLATION OF SEC.
complainant and his witnesses, as well
as other supporting documents to 3 OF RULE 112 OF
establish probable cause. They shall be THE ROC The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable
in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the
official file. The affidavits shall be parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits
subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official and supporting documents, through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings
authorized to administer oath, or, in
their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify “The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well
that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they
as other supporting documents to establish probable cause” 9 out of 16 statements or affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses were
voluntarily executed and understood sworn to before a competent officer that the succeeding pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by complainant are not admissible for either
their affidavits being incompetent or hearsay evidence
OCAMPO V. ABANDO - WERE THE PETITIONERS DENIED DUE PROCESS DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WARRANTS OF ARREST SINCE THE OTHER PETITIONERS WERE NOT SERVED A COPY OF THE COMPLAINTS BY THE PETITIONERS,
INCLUDING OTHER DOCUMENTS AND PIECES OF EVIDENCE?
- NO. the petitioners contend that they were not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 letters of Police Inspector to the
prosecutor. They contend that they were deprived of the right to file the counter-affidavits
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- ACCORDING TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTOR HOWEVER: the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their
last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses
- Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty
(d) If the respondent cannot be SEC. 3 (d) OF RULE 112 OF THE ROC:
subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does
not submit counter-affidavits within
Allows prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint filed based on the evidence before him, if the respondent could not be subpoenaed
the ten (10) day period, the - As long as efforts were made to reach the respondents, he was then given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence
investigating officer shall resolve the - Preliminary investigation remained to be valid regardless
complaint based on the evidence - The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of defenses
presented by the complainant.
- as long as efforts were made to - In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses.
reach the respondents, it is sufficient This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were
due process not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
- Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad's counsel filed a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006, Prosecutor
Vivero had a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare his defense.
- Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his counsel's formal entry of
appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
DUTERTE V. DE GUZMAN - WE HAVE JUDICIOUSLY STUDIED THE CASE RECORDS AND WE FIND THAT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST PETITIONERS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED NOT IN THE MANNER LAID DOWN IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07.
the respondent is required to file a
counter-affidavit, not merely a comment. it is
- petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and on SAR No.
only where the respondent fails to file a 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law.
counter-affidavit may the investigatiing officer
consider the respondent's comment as an
- They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier
answer to the complaint been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit Report.
- Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a
it is a mandatory requirement for the
complainant to submit his affidavit preliminary investigation was being conducted
and those witnesses before the NO INFORMATION MAY BE FILED AND NO COMPLAINT MAY BE DISMISSED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN AUTHORITY OR APPROVAL OF
respondent is compelled to submit
his counter-affidavits and other THE OMBUDSMAN IN CASES FALLING WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OR THE PROPER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
supporting documents IN ALL OTHER CASES.
- Note that in preliminary investigation, if the complaint is unverified or based only on official reports (which is the situation obtaining in the case
at bar), the complainant is required to submit affidavits to substantiate the complaint.
- The investigating officer, thereafter, shall issue an order, to which copies of the complaint-affidavit are attached, requiring the respondent to
submit his counter-affidavits.
- In the preliminary investigation, what the respondent is required to file is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only when the
respondent fails to file a counter-affidavit may the investigating officer consider the respondent's comment as the answer to the complaint.
Against the foregoing backdrop, there was a palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the fundamental requirements of
preliminary investigation.
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- it is mandatory requirement for the complainant to submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses before the respondent can be
compelled to submit his counter-affidavits and other supporting documents.
PEOPLE V. BORJE CRIMES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN; THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE DURING THE PRELIMINARY
Petitioners maintain that the INVESTIGATION OR REINVESTIGATION
preliminary investigation - function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted by the Office of the - empowered to determine, in the exercise of discretion, whether there is an existence of probable cause and to charge the person believed to
Ombudsman is an executive and have committed the crime as defined by law
not a judicial function – the - The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable cause which would warrant the filing of an information against respondents.
Sandiganbayan should have - Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause was done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
given deference (given respect) evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the same.
to the finding and determination - In the instant case, the act of filing an Information against respondents by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious,
of probable cause in their whimsical, or despotic amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records clearly reveals that accused Borje, Jr. was the
preliminary investigation payee of 4,406 checks amounting to P82,321,855.38 covering the reimbursements of the supposed payments for the anomalous and
- Whether or not the questionable repairs of the DPWH vehicles
executive function of - mere belief that respondents probably committed the crime suffices to establish probable cause. Whether they are, in fact, guilty of plunder is a
determining the existence different matter, which can properly be determined at a full-blown trial on the merits of this case.
of probable cause for the - Filing an Information against respondents in this case based on sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
filing of an information is committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be whimsical or despotic. As effectively shown by evidence, the
solely vested in the Ombudsman's charge was not at all baseless for the link between the respondents and the anomalous transactions herein has been satisfactorily
prosecution established. In the absence, therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the Ombudsman were done in a capricious and whimsical
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state with the Ombudsman's exercise of his constitutionally mandated powers
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
PEOPLE V. GABO It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, and the
preliminary inquiry - stage where there
is a determination of probable cause preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge.
The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged — is
the function of the investigating prosecutor.
WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY ISSUE: sec. 6 rule 113 of the ROC
10 days from filing the complaint or information – judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence
• He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
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• If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order of the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to
a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7
of this Rule
• The judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from the notice and issue must be resolved by the court
within 30 days from the filing of the complaint or information
Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of probable cause as the same is sanctioned under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The penultimate question to be resolved then was such exercise of jurisdiction attended by grave
abuse of discretion? - NO
The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. To this Court's mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating
the supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case against respondents
PEOPLE V. YECYEC - It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal.
, absent a finding that an - The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow
information is invalid on or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of
its the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
face or that the malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons.
prosecutor committed
- Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for
manifest error or
grave abuse of
doing so, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that
discretion, a judge's the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient.
determination of - In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft
probable cause is limited because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the Provincial
only to the judicial kind Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA shows that there is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause against the respondents, albeit with
or for the the RTC and the CA having varying opinions as to the application and interpretation of such basis. Hence, as the Information was valid on its
purpose of deciding face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when
whether the arrest they overturned the finding of probable cause against the respondents.
warrant should be It was clearly premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to make a determinative finding prior to the parties' presentation of their respective
issued against the evidence that the respondents lacked the intent to gain and acted in good faith considering that they merely sought to recover the rubber
accused. cup lumps that they believed to be theirs. It has long been settled that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits
BORLONGAN V. PENA Petitioners contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their counter-affidavits and were not accorded the
right to a preliminary investigation
- 2 years, 4 months and 1 day. The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months of imprisonment
- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than that 5,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon:
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the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary rules. In such instance, preliminary investigation as
cases not required for defined in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such section covers only crimes cognizable by the
preliminary investigation the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9 (a) is the applicable rule. (4 years 2 months and 1 day is the prescribed penalty for preliminary
prosecutor may solely rely on
investigation)
the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not
submitted by the complainant. mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint.
In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason
to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information
HOWEVER:
➢ in the accusatory portion of the complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the
crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did
not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to be a member of the board.
➢ The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have
been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial for a
crime he did not commit.
➢ it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before
filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty.
CRESPO V. MOGUL ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FISCAL HAS THE AUTHORITY TO FILE A MOTION TO DIMISS ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE AFTER THE INFORMATION HAS ALREADY BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT - NO
once a criminal complaint or - General rule: a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the
information is filed in Court, any same commit no error.
disposition of the case as its
- The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt
the sound discretion of the EXCEPTION: the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control.
court. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case may be and it may be elevated for
Although the fiscal retains the review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
discretion Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
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After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action - the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of
the case.
LANIER V. PEOPLE When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search
once a complaint or team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense.
information is filed with the When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the
court, any disposition of the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
case rests in the sound - When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of
discretion of the court Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion.
it is the bounden duty of the - Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther
court to make an independent with the trial.
assessment of the merits of
- While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
such motion
- When the trial court's Order rests entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent evaluation, the trial court
effectively abdicates its judicial power and refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
- once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.
- The rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. When the trial
court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with
the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
CAJIPE V. PEOPLE The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."
The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo) in claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.
It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF officer, identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another
RSAF officer who also wore such a vest. Castillo did not see the act of shooting but confirmed that two police officers gave chase and took shots at
the fleeing vehicle then turned back to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver of the get-away car.
FENIX V. PEOPLE HOWEVER

, IT BEARS STRESSING THAT THE RTC NEVER CONSIDERED ANY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THAT WHICH THE PANEL HAD ALREADY
PASSED UPON.
The only difference was that unlike the RTC, the panel did not give any serious consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, the
recantation of Santos or the affidavit of Bishop Bacani. That the trial court did so spell the difference between the divergent findings.
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THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REJECTION OF THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS UPON THE FAILURE TO SUBSCRIBE AND SWEAR
investigating prosecutor may TO THEM BEFORE THE PANEL
set a hearing if there are facts - Under Section 3 (a) and (c), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, counter-affidavits may be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
and issues to be clarified government official authorized to administer oaths or, in their absence or unavailability, before any notary public. Notably, the counter-affidavits
(merely discretionary) of Ong and Santiago, the recantation of Santos, and the affidavit of Bishop Bacani were all subscribed and sworn to before government
- clarificatory hearing prosecutors.
- the exclusion of the affidavits - the failure of Ong and Santiago to appear before the panel did not justify the exclusion of their duly submitted counter-affidavits and annexes.
of the respondents due to their Section 3 (e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
failure to appear at such - Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
hearing was unjustified - (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present
at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may
be asked to the party or witness concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
- THE CONDUCT OF A CLARIFICATORY HEARING IS NOT INDISPENSABLE; rather, it is optional on the part of the investigating prosecutor
as evidenced by the use of the term "may." That hearing fulfills only the purpose of aiding the investigating prosecutor in determining the
existence of probable cause for the filing of a criminal complaint before the courts.
- The clarificatory hearing does not accord validity to the preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, nor does its absence render the proceedings
void.
- Necessarily, the failure of Ong and Santiago to appear at the scheduled clarificatory hearing might have caused some slight inconvenience to
the investigating prosecutor, but it did not result in the exclusion of the affidavits or counter-affidavits already submitted by the parties. In fact,
under the rules, an investigating prosecutor may resolve a complaint based only on the evidence presented by the complainant if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit a counter-affidavit within the prescribed period.
- The panel's act of resolving the complaint against petitioners and Ong primarily on the basis of Doble's evidence, and in spite of the timely
submission of the counter-affidavits, was clearly committed with grave abuse of discretion.
SANTOS-DIO V. CAGUIOA - The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge
must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant
- since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately
upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate
attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial
- it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must
himself ascertain from the latter's findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce." While a judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, SECTION 5
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(A), RULE 112 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE EXPLICITLY STATES THAT A JUDGE MAY IMMEDIATELY DISMISS
A CASE IF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE, VIZ.: SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may
issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause
RULE 113 – ARREST

Luz vs. People of the THERE WAS NO VALID ARREST OF THE PETITIONER – when he was flagged down for violating a traffic ordinance, he was not arrested for such
Philippines reason.
- Violation of such traffic ordinance merely required the peace officers to confiscate the license of the driver and issue a receipt
- PNP manual: issuance of a citation ticket
under the rules of court, a ➢ At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest."
warrant of arrest need not be ➢ There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
issued if the information or ➢ Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
charge was filed for an offense waiting time.
penalized by a fine only
there needs to be an intent on ➢ City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
the part of the police officer to fine only.
deprive the motorist of liberty or ➢ Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only.
to take the latter into custody
the issuance of a citation ticket
It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
negates the possibility of an ➢ This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
arrest for the same violation ➢ Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former
may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates
ASSUMING THAT THE
ACCSED'S ARREST WAS
the possibility of an arrest for the same violation
VALID - the duty of the officer is ➢ The items seized were inadmissible – warrantless search is allowed when it is incidental to a lawful arrest. Since there was no valid arrest,
to inform the person to be the items seized are then inadmissible which should warrant the dismissal of the herein accused
arrested the reason of his arrest ➢ 2 features of an ordinary traffic stop: the detention of a motorist is presumptively temporary and brief, circumstances associated with the
and must show a warrant of
arrest, if any. typical traffic stop are not such that the motorists feel completely at the mercy of the police
constitutional requirements were ➢ ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT EVEN IF THE ACCUSED’S ARREST WAS VALID, the duty of the arresting officer is to inform the person
only complied with after the to be arrested the reason of his arrest and must show the warrant of arrest, if any.
petitioner had been arrested ➢ Persons to be arrested should also be informed of their constitutional rights; rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them
➢ In this case, these constitutional requirements were only complied with by the arresting officer only after the petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of drugs
Ocampo v. Abando DOCTRINE: basis of issuance of a warrant of arrest – prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause
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Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
a hearing by the judge after complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses
In fact, the judge's personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of
is not necessary (only necessary for issuing a warrant of arrest.
the issuance of a search warrant) It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor's report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause
for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
in the case of the issuance of a
warrant of arrest - it is enough that the
disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
judge personally evaluates the THE COMPLAINT:
prosecutor's report and supporting article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
documents showing the existence of personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
probable cause (Rule 112)
PETITIONER OCAMPO ALLEGES THAT JUDGE ABANDO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION IN
FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST PETITIONERS.
- JUDGES HAVE A WIDE LATITUDE OF DISCRETION IN THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST
- It cannot be interfered if there is no showing that there was no grave abuse of discretion
- Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations
in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
- Questions of fact are not within the purview of a certiorari, such as the petitions in the present case
People v. Collado Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it was not supported by a valid warrant.
DOCTRINE: THE ARREST WAS - The case involved an arrest in flagrante delicto - in the very act of committing the offense
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO - The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of
- the person to be arrested having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.
must execute an overt act - Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was
indicating that he has just made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes.
committed, is actually - Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no
committing, or is attempting showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment.
to commit a crime; and, - Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground.
- such overt act is done in the - THEY ONLY RAISED SUCH ISSUE ON APPEAL
presence or within the view - it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
of the arresting officer." unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
- This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
ON THE QUESTION OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
- The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime and it was done in the presence of an arresting officer
in this case, the crime was consummated before the presence of the arresting officer; Marcelino and Myra performed an overt act of selling to the police illegal drugs
they waived to question the irregularity of the arrest 9
People v. Cogaed When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
- STOP AND FRISK person to be arrested has committed it;
SEARCHES – are necessary the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner,
for law enforcement and that based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something
law enforcers should be as well.
given the legal arsenal to The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
prevent the commission of moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
the offense The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed
- The balance lies in the was "suspicious."
concept of "suspiciousness" ➢ The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.
present in the situation where ➢ It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should
the police officer finds not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
himself or herself in. This searched. " A valid "stop" by an officer requires that he has a
reasonable and articulable belief that criminal activity
may be undoubtedly based has happened or is about to happen. The "frisk" made
after the "stop" must be done because of a reasonable
on the experience of the belief that the person stopped is in possession of a
police officer. weapon that will pose a danger to the officer and others.
The "frisk" must be a mere pat down outside the
person's outer garment and not unreasonably intrusive.
People v. Sapla Gr: warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impractibility of securing a warrant under said circumstances
warrantless searches are valid on moving vehicles
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought
because of the impracticability of obtaining a - LIMITATION: police officers in such cases, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection
search warrant within reasonable time as the
vehicle can be moved quickly from one jurisdiction - Should be based upon a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer that an automobile or vehicle contains an
to another
in this case, the search is limited to routine checks item by which law is subject to seizure and destruction
where the examination of the vehicle is limited to - THE VEHICLE SHOULD BE THE TARGET AND NOT THE PERSON
visual inspection
the vehicle should be the target wherein the police - In this case, it cannot be said that the target of the police officers was the passenger jeepney, but the person who matched the description given
officers have reasonable belief that they will find
the instrumentality pertaining to the crime inside by the person who called the RPSB hotline – the person wearing the white collared shirt with green stripes, red ball cap and blue sack
the vehicle. PROBABLE CAUSE IS AN INDISPENSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH AND INTRUSIVE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
A MORE EXTENSIVE AND INTRUSIVE A MOVING VEHICLE
SEARCH BEYOND A MERE VISUAL SEARCH
OF THE VEHICLE NECESSITATES PROBABLE - Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of probable
CAUSE ON THE PART OF THE OFFICER
- sheer unverified information from an informant
cause.
does not engender probable cause - When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection,
- "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched."
- Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates probable
cause on the part of the apprehending officer
- SHEER UNVERIFIED INFORMATION FROM AN ANONYMOUS INFORMANT DOES NOT ENGENDER PROBABLE CAUSE ON THE PART
OF THE AUTHORITIES THAT WARRANTS AN EXTENSIVE AND INTRUSIVE SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
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REQUISITES:
- in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A
- manner of the search must be the least tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that
intrusive
(there was extensive search when the officers will arouse suspicion
reached info the contents of the bag
- the search must not be discriminatory - the
-
po0lice were looking for Sapla alone when they 1. Manner of the search must be the least intrusive – the search was extensive reaching into the contents of the blue sack
flagged down the jeepney
- for public safety 2. The search must not be discriminatory – the police were exclusively looking for Sapla and did not search for the belongings of the other
sufficient precautionary measures should have
been taken
passengers
3. Should be for public safety
4. Sufficient precautionary measures should have been undertaken
Villasana v. People The prosecution failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante arrest of the petitioner
The seizure of the shabu purportedly in his possession was unlawful
THE SC ENUMERATED THE REQUISITES OF IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
RELIABLE INFORMATION - For a valid warrantless search of in flagrante delicto
ALONE, FROM ASSETS IS - The person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that a crime has been committed, is committing or is attempting to commit
NOT SUFFICIENT TO - Such overt act is done in the presence of an arresting officer
JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS - Section 5B on the other hand, requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense had just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
ARREST AND SEARCH. knowledge of the facts indicating that the accused has just committed it
- there must also be - In both instances, the police officer himself witnesses the crime
independent circumstances THE POLICE OFFICER MUST HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
perceivable by the arresting - In this case, PO3 Martinez was about six (6) to ten (10) meters away when he saw petitioner emerge from an alley, talking to a woman while
officers suggesting that a holding a plastic sachet. His testimony fails to state that he had personal knowledge that the sachet contained shabu, or that he saw the sachet
criminal offense is being containing white crystalline substance, to create a reasonable suspicion that the sachet did indeed contain shabu.
committed to comply with the - From all indications — the time of the arrest being 11:30 p.m., PO3 Martinez's location, and the tinted front windshield of the van through which
requirements under Sec. 113 he was looking — it was highly doubtful that PO3 Martinez saw, let alone deciphered, the contents of the sachet. For sure, it was only when he
held petitioner's hand and confiscated the plastic sachet that he was able to verify its contents.
- Reliable information by assets alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search.
- There must be independent circumstances perceivable by the arresting officers suggesting that a criminal offense is being committed
to comply with the exacting requirements of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
the failure of the accused to question
his arrest before arraignment only - An accused must perform some overt act within plain view of the Police officers indicating that she or "he has just committed, is actually
affects the jurisdiction of the court over committing, or is attempting to commit a crime." None was present in this case.
his person
- it does not bar him from raising the
inadmissibility of the illegally seized - With petitioner's arrest being illegal, the subsequent seizure of the shabu allegedly in his possession becomes "unreasonable."
shabu
a waiver of an illegal arrest does not - ON THE QUESTION OF WAIVER - At this point, it must be emphasized that petitioner's failure to question his arrest before he made his plea
carry with it a waiver of inadmissibility
of evidence obtained during arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person
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- and does not bar him from raising the inadmissibility of the illegally seized shabu. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained during the illegal arrest.
People v. Andaya A BUY-BUST OPERATION IS A VALID FORM OF ENTRAPMENT OF A DRUG PUSHER

The non-presentation of the a. The transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer
confidential informant as a b. The dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti
witness does not ordinarily
weaken the State's case against - Sale or transaction between the accused and the poseur buyer
the accused. However, if the - The dangerous drug subject to the sale is presented in court as evidence, corpus delicti
arresting lawmen arrested the ➢ a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher.
accused based on the pre- ➢ In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the dangerous drug and paying the price
arranged signal from the agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the
confidential informant who acted price or other consideration
as the poseur buyer, his non- ➢ Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal law.
presentation must be credibly ➢ The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in flagrante delicto, that is, the suspect has
explained and the transaction just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private
established by other ways in person.
order to satisfy the quantum of ➢ The confidential informant was not the police officer
proof beyond reasonable doubt ➢ He was designated to be the poseur-buyer himself
because the arresting lawmen did THE PRE-ARRANGED SIGNAL SIGNIFIED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BUY-BUST TEAM THE ARREST OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED.
not themselves participate in the ➢ The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur
buy-bust transaction with the buyer and Andaya.
accused. ➢ However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between
him and Andaya had taken place.
➢ There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction,
if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment
of the supposed transaction
The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause any.
Based on jurisprudence - there is a need to conceal the confidential informants' identities related to the confidential informants who gave information
against suspected drug dealers.
➢ The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be excused because there were
poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused.
➢ In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur
buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya
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➢ reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted
because the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-
bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction.
the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
People v. Villareal THE APPEAL OF VILLAREAL WAS HELD TO BE MERITORIOUS
- flight per se, is not 1. Person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
synonymous with guilt and and such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
must not always be attributed 2. (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
to one’s consciousness of officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
guilt. In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a),
- It is not a reliable indicator of the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
guilt without other In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless
circumstances. arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
- The appellant’s attempt to The Court disagrees.
run away from PO3 De Leon (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
is susceptible of various (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
explanations – it could mean the person to be arrested has committed it;
guilt as it could likewise THE OFFICER’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE IS ABOSLUTELY REQUIRED
indicate innocence THERE WAS NO LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST
- Considering that the - the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy,
appellant's warrantless from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance
arrest was unlawful, the (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant.
search and seizure that - That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
resulted from it was appellant's hands was indeed shabu.
likewise illegal. Thus, the - The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed
alleged plastic bag by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must
containing white in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
crystalline substances - Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant
seized from him is on account of the latter's previous charge for the same offense.
inadmissible in evidence, - To interpret personal knowledge as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
having come from an unnecessarily stretch the authority of police officers to effect a warrantless arrest based solely on their knowledge of a person’s previous criminal
invalid search and seizure infractions
it is not enough that PO3 De Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime etc. PO3 De Leon must also have personal knowledge. a crime must have
committed first.
People v. Edano FOR WARRANTLESS ARREST OF AN ACCUSED CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO TO BE VALID:
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a. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime
b. Such over act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
- In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In
fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.
- the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car.
- Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the
sale of drugs had been consummated.
- PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the
space wagon when he approached it.
- That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge
the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity.
Comerciante v. People - Comerciante contended that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Hence, the evidence gathered as a result of the illegal
warrantless arrest should be rendered inadmissible
OSG: maintained that Comerciante’s warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the stop and frisk rule, especially considering that he was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding
- A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante.
PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante
and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
- Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
- As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case
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- In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not
constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a
"genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
should be deemed unlawful
Pestilo v. Generoso BE UNMERITORIOUS

THE FOLLOWING MUST BE PRESENT FOR A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST:
personal knowledge of the crime 1) the crime should have been just committed; and
does not require the presence of 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within
the police officers at the scene his personal knowledge.
while a crime was being committed
it is enough that the evidence of THERE WAS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST
the recent commission of the crime - The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling less that an hour the crime
is patent transpired
- Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
- When the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso although
they narrated a different version of what transpired
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that
they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
- In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy;
- the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime.
- The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPO1 Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SPO2 Javier,
to render personal assistance to the victim.
- This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed —
the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the
scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed
the crime
Abelita III v. Doria PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS MUST BE BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE, WHICH MEANS AN ACTUAL BELIEF OR REASONABLE
GROUNDS OF SUSPICION.
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The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses
that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the
incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities
as to the existence of probable cause.
Plain View Doctrine
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.9
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms
inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the
incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Luspo v. People IT IS ADMISSIBLE

Tugaoen though questions the admissibility of her statement before the investigating committee that she did not deliver any CCIE items in exchange
for the checks on the ground that it violates her right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
CONTRARY TO THE ACCUSED TUGAOEN’S CLAIM, THE FACT THAT SHE WAS NOT INVITED BY THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE DOES
NOT BY ITSELF DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE INVESTIGATION WAS CUSTODIAL
- The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement was not a custodial investigation that would bring
to the fore the rights of the accused and the exclusionary rule under paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
- The investigator's reminder to Tugaoen of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be determinative of the nature of the investigation.
- Otherwise, following the logic of this claim, the law enforcer's own failure or even disregard of his duty to inform an individual he investigates of
his custodial investigation rights would suffice to negate the character of an investigation as legally a custodial investigation. Ultimately, the
nature of the investigation must be determined by appreciating the circumstances surrounding it as a whole
➢ In the present case, the investigation conducted by the PNP GHQ-OIG, was prompted by the report from the COA regarding disbursement
irregularities for CCIE items in Regions VII and VIII, North CAPCOM.
16
➢ In short, it was simply a general inquiry to clear the air of reported anomalies and irregularities within the PNP which a constitutional body
found and reported as part of its constitutional power and duty.
➢ NATURALLY, THIS INVESTIGATION WOULD INVOLVE PERSONS WITH WHOM THE PNP HAD CONTRACTS THAT ARE SUBJECT
OF THE COA SCRUTINY. That what was conducted is an ordinary administrative (and not custodial) investigation is supported by the fact
that the investigating committee also took the statements of other PNP officials who ended up not being charged with a crime.
People v. Chavez THE COURT CONVICTED CHAVEZ GUILTY OF HOMICIDE DUE TO UNBROKEN CHAIN OF EVENTS
1. He admitted that he went to the parlor of the victim at the time of the crime and was even allowed by the victim to enter inside his parlor
2. The missing cellular phones owned by Barbie were handed by Chavez’s mother to the police
3. Peñamante witnessed Chavez’s presence at the crime scene when he arrived from work
CHAVEZ’S MOTHER’S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE

- Chavez's mother was informed by the investigating officer at the police station of the consequences in executing a written statement
without the assistance of a lawyer. She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her son's confession of the crime
despite the warning
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UPON BEING QUESTIONED FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS PART OF THE MIRANDA RIGHTS
1. any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent;
2. anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
3. he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned
4. if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION – (RA 7438)
- The practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have been committed
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law
- Even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights
- Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to
surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
Veridiano v. People : Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his possession. - Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his
right to question any irregularity that may have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST
THE PETITIONERS WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL
THERE MUST FIRST BE A VALID ARREST BEFORE A SEARCH IS MADE
➢ in this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court.
➢ He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
➢ Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion.
In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received
17
➢ Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a
crime has been committed, was being committed or is about to be committed
➢ A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation,
that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless
search under Rule 113, Section 5 (b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
CONSENT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL, SPECIFIC, INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN AND UNATTENDED BY DURESS
OR COERCION
- MERE PASSIVE CONFOMITYOR SILENCE TO THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS ONLY AN IMPLIED ACQUIESCENCE - NO CONSENT
AT ALL
People v. Yau As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests.
This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over
their persons before they entered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and
active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-
appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing
that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. 35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the
bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the
illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error.
De la Cruz v. People The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal;
hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest.
However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest."
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
18
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand
ofcounsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987])
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
(People vs. Casinillo,
The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested
in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalia’s. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among
the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came from the body of the accused. The
Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine
but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is
replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for
the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant case.
First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point
to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken;
and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.
Homar v. People that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the
requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing
a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the
street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that the portion of
19
Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. These are
pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.
We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal
charge against an accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the prosecution’s lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest
the waiver of an illegal arrest does not
and search. This presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the
carry with it the waiver of inadmissibility constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence.
of evidence This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and the
the defect in the accused's arrest was burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.
cured when he submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by actively Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an
participating in the trial of the case. actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
since shabu was seized in illegal application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
arrest - inadmissible in evidence
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules.
In addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.
RULE 114 - BAIL

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN ADMISSION TO BAIL IN OFFENSES PUNISHED BY DEATH, OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT OR RECLUSION PERPATUA IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
– hearing is indispensable • the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. • the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,
"such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty." • It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution
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THE HEARING WHICH MAY BE EITHER SUMMARY OR OTHERWISE IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT SHOULD PRIMARILY DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG AGAINST THE ACCUSED
• Summary hearing - such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits
or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross examination
TRILLANES V. PIMENTEL In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied.
The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that
accused must be detained in jail the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying
during the pendency of the case rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
against him unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail
or on recognizance. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law.
prisoners under preventive He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.
detention cannot exercise their
profession nor engage in any He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
business or occupation recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor
it is a necessary consequence of engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
arrest and detention
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jalosjos succinctly expounds: Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system
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PEOPLE V. CABRAL • "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate
judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished
the failure to include every piece of capitally if the law is administered.
evidence in the summary hearing
presented by the prosecution in their
favor - not giving them the opporunity • "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear,
to be heard in said hearing and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
SUMMARY HEARING - should be
complete compilation of all the pieces
refused.
of evidence resented during the
hearing proper There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part
AN INCOMPLETE ENUMERATION
of procedural due process wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most
OR SELECTIVE INCLUSION OF importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior
PIECES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered
PROSECUTION - cannot be at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means not only giving every contending party the
considered a summary
opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.
AN INCOMPLETE SUMMARY IS
NOT A SUMMARY AT ALL Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is for the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion.
Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion. Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete
compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as
to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution’s pieces of evidence were enumerated, said
enumeration was incomplete.
An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a
summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution.
A "summary" that is incomplete is not a summary at all. the absence of a summary in the order would make said order defective in form and
substance. Corollarily, an order containing an incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained
or be a semblance of validity.
PEOPLE V. GONZALES Granting that the bondsman notified the accused long before the hearing on November 27, 1956 requiring him to appear on said date, that notice
alone is not a sufficient compliance with its commitment under the bond for under Section 17, Rule 110, a bondsman is in duty bound to produce the
person of the accused when his appearance is required by the court, which shows that mere notification is not sufficient but the bondsman must
make every effort to see that he actually makes his appearance.
a bondsman is required to produce the person of the accused when his appearance is required by the court - mere notification is not sufficient. the bondsman must see to it that he must make every effort to see that the accused will actually
makes his appearance.
22
Because of such inaction, the trial court considered the bondsman negligent in the performance of its duty as the rule requires. We are not disposed
to disturb this finding for in cases of this nature the determination of the sufficiency of the explanation given is a matter that lies within the discretion
of the court.
Another claim of the bondsman for its failure to produce the accused on time is that it is not required for it to know all the whereabouts of its principal
so that it may be ever ready to produce him when required by the court for, "To require the sureties to know each and every actuation of the accused
all the time is to carry the obligation of the bail too far and indicates lack of appreciation of the actual conditions under which defendants in criminal
cases are bailed out."
This claim is untenable for, as this Court had aptly said" "When the obligation of bail is assumed, the sureties become the law the jailers of their
principal.
Considering, however, that the bondsman was able to produce the accused within the period set by trial court, this can be considered enough
justification to mitigate its liability and in our opinion the reduction made by the trial court of the amount of the bond to 20% is reasonable.
LAVIDES V. CA In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he
could, by being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases.
Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even
if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art.
III, §14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the
grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment. This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information
is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required. On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to
choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge
him with a crime and his right to bail.8 It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made
only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16,
1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance
with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite
due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case,
trial shall proceed in absentia."
LEVISTE V. CA ➢ LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS - In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should
23
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court
➢ The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding six years.
➢ THE FIRST SCENARIO DEALS WITH CIRCUMSTANCES ENUMERATED IN THE SAID PARAGRAPH NOT BEING PRESENT.
➢ THE SECOND SCENARIO CONTEMPLATES THE EXISTENCE OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE SAID CIRCUMSTANCES.
➢ In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
➢ This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail.
➢ An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
are absent.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of
the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Thus, a finding
that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail
RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PEOPLE V. ALEJANDRO • THE COURT ACQUITTED THE APPELLANT FOR THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
• The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In doing
so, the prosecution must rest its case on its own merits and cannot merely rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to
meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense does not even need to present any evidence in its behalf; the presumption of innocence
prevails, and the accused should be acquitted
• THERE WAS REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE CORPUS DELICTI – what is material in the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
is proof that the transaction or sale took place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti – the body or substance of
the crime that establishes that a crime has been committed
• The narcotics or substance is the corpus delicti
• It is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handles of specimens will use the markings as reference
• The records do not show that the apprehending officers marked the seized items with their initials immediately after confiscation
• CHAIN OF CUSTODY MUST BE DONE: In the presence of the apprehending violator, immediately upon confiscation
• If at the first instance or opportunity, the apprehending team did not mark the seized item/s, then there is nothing to identify it later on as it
passes from one hand to another.
• In the absence, however, of specifics on how, when and where this marking was done, and who witnessed the marking procedure, we cannot
accept this marking as compliance with the chain of custody requirement required by the law.
24
• Notably, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person who took custody of the seized item at the police station.
Although the request for laboratory examination was signed by P/Supt. Fegarido, we cannot assume that he was the person who received
the seized item from PO1 Mengote, in the absence of any testimony proving such fact.
• For the succeeding links in the chain of custody, the evidence shows that the confiscated item was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory
by one SPO2 Pepano, and then received by a certain "Relos." P/Insp. Gural examined the submitted specimen and found it positive for the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
• As previously discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the confiscated item after it left the possession of PO1 Mengote.
IN SUM:
• the totality of evidence presented in the present case does not support the appellant's conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. The prosecution’s failure
to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act compromised the identity of
the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. In accordance with the constitutional
mandate that the guilt of the appellant must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, we hold – for failure to establish the required quantum
of evidence – that the presumption of innocence must prevail, and acquittal should follow as a matter of right.
PEOPLE V. ERGUIZA • FACED WITH TWO CONFLICTING VERSIONS, THE COURT IS GUIDED BY THE EQUIPOISE RULE. Thus, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
EQUIPOISE RULE - where the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.89 The
capable of 2 or more explanations equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the
- one is consistent with the innocence scales in favor of the accused.
of the accused
- one is consistent with guilt • It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
evidence does not fulfill a test of moral inevitable conclusion.
certainty and not sufficient to support a • What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty.
conviction
criminal case is evenly balanced - • Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the
constitutional presumption of innocence thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.
tilts in favor of the accused • Wherefore, the accused was acquitted
PEOPLE V. RAPEZA • There is no direct evidence of appellant's guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti.
• Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - must and must perforce be discarded
not be one of general inquiry
- practice of issuing an invitation to a • The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should,
person who is investigated in be assisted by counsel, unless he waives his right in writing and in the presence of counsel – appellant did not make such waiver
connection with an offense he is • The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling
suspected to have been committed.
or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
• the standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence for the prosecution.
25
• Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellant's counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he
assisted appellant.
• The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant
his constitutional rights.
• Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears that his participation
in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellant's confession. Such participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should
be accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.
• Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant's counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through the
barangay officials. Appellant's failure to interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the
prevailing circumstances.
• As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own choice.
• Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant was informed of his right to a counsel of his own choice and
that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall provide him with one, it was overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear
in the same statement that appellant was advised that he had the option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police authorities.
• Set against the clear provisions of the Constitution and the elucidations thereof in jurisprudence, the foregoing lapses on the part of the police
authorities preclude the admissibility of appellant's alleged confession.
PEOPLE V. GUILLERMO • Appellant’s alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no
serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the
even of the admission or confession is
gospel truth, if it is made without the
appellant’s right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday.
assistance of a counsel, it is • Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had
inadmissible as evidence regardless of waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel.
the absence of coercion or even if
voluntarily given • As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
HOWEVER, the inadmissibility of • The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and
the appellant's confession does
not necessarily lead to his acquittal contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed.
- Constitutional safeguards on • Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed" of his
custodial investigation does not rights.
apply to spontaneous statements
- those NOT elicited through • Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence
questioning by law enforcers does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles)
appellant confession to private do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary
individuals (not applicable to the
constitutional sefaguard) manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense.
• The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals.
According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had
killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos’ testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor
General points out, appellant’s statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
26
PRINCIPLE OF RES GESTAE - an exception to the hearsay rule 1. principal act is a startling occurrence 2. statements were made before the declarant had a time to devise his confession 3. statements must concern the occurence in question and its
immediately attending circumstance
• Under the Rules of Court,48 a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur:
• (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence;
• (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
• All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his
employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he had an
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser.
Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the
Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
• Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters,
but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter
Kara David of GMA Channel 7
• The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were
not under the direction and control of the police.
• There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not
just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even
supplied details of Keyser’s killing.
• As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible
in evidence.
• Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant’s alleged confession to the police, the prosecution
has amply proven the appellant’s guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in
contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and
David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible
prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly
described before the trial court
TANENGEE V. PEOPLE PETITIONER’S WRITTEN STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

• Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
• The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
• Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
• Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof
(1) to remain silent,
(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
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(3) to be informed of the two other rights above.

• In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounseled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the
branch he managed, the following are clear:
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be
said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written
statement.
• However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation.
• Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity
he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
PEOPLE V. GUILLEN • Indeed, records show that appellant remained silent and passive despite being confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station
immediately after his arrest. In taking appellant’s silence as an implied admission of guilt, the RTC ratiocinated that:
• Owing to the complaint of the victim, the accused was apprehended by responding police officers of the Sampaloc Police Station. At the
police precinct, the accused was presented to the victim and he was positively identified as the person who raped her. At this juncture, the
accused after he was positively identified as the malefactor who sexually molested and raped the victim just remained SILENT.
• In other words, he did not DENY the accusation lodged against him by the victim much less register any vehement PROTEST at the station.
• The aforesaid blatant FAILURE of the accused to deny victim’s complaint against him is equivalent to an IMPLIED ADMISSION of guilt.
• Assuming arguendo that he is innocent of the accusation filed against him, he should have stood firm in his contention that he didn’t
rape/abuse the victim and should have stressed at the police station that on the date and time of the incident he was having a drinking spree
with his friends.
• A person who is accused of a felony/offense which he did not commit should be as BOLD and FEROCIOUS as a LION in protecting the
trampled rights as an innocent person.
• APPELLANT CLAIMS THAT HIS SILENCE SHOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST HIM AS HE WAS JUST EXERCISING HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
We agree with the appellant.
• It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect to the crime of rape.
• As such, he was already under custodial investigation.
• Section 12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz:
• Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
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• If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
• Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his
basic and fundamental right to remain silent.
• At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him.
• Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this
right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
• In any case, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court’s
Decision convicting appellant of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was based
on the testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH

PEOPLE V. ODTUHAN In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the
he who contracts a second marriage accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
before the judicial declaration of nullity of • The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
marriage assumes the risk of being
charged and prosecuted for bigamy
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
- immaterial that the first marriage was • It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
declared null and void transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
• What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the
• Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
offense and liability appends to him until only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
extinguished by law exists.
• Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
time of filing a complaint or information
• If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
is only material in determining
prescription petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him.
• Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity
of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him.
• Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.
• Thus, as held in Antone:
• To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following
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the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
court denied the respondent's defense in his motion to quash that his case is an exception to the rule that facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO • An order granting an accused's demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further
prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
legal jeopardy attaches only:
- upon a valid indictment
previously made some exceptions.
- before a competent court • The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan presents one exception to the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due
- after arraignment process of law
- a valid plea having been entered • Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e)
- the case was dismissed or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not
otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
• In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
• Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence.
• The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
• In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v.
United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.
• The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
• The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may
not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
• Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
•
• The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
• Given the far-reaching scope of an accused's right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
• Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence
and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an
invalid warrantless search. The trial court's ratiocination is quoted as follows:
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• No double jeopardy. - It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal
or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process.
• The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the
prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
PEOPLE V. SALAZAR The court found no reason to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The appellant is guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment. The
essential elements of large scale illegal recruitment, to wit: a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 8042); and c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group,7 are present in this case.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant enlisted the three (3) complainants for overseas employment without
any license to do so. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the subsequent recantations of Alviar and Pagcaliwagan since these were made a year
after their testimonies in court. Also, Alviar failed to offer any explanation for her change of mind, while Pagcaliwagan admitted that he recanted
because the appellant returned the money he paid. We have often stressed that recantations are frowned upon since a recantation is exceedingly
unreliable; it is easily secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
PEOPLE V. LAMSEN recantations are viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is
settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention.
recantation of testimony is frowned
upon
• The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
affidavit of desistance is not reliable consideration.
only when there exists special
circumstances in the case - coupled • Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.
with the retraction raise doubts as to
the truth of the testimony or statement • There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.
given can retractions be upheld • Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.
• This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court. The asserted motives for the repudiation are
commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious
doubt.
• Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after the judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is
too late in the day for his recantation without portraying himself as a liar." At most, the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative
value.
• Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where
previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence.
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• A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and
the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed.
• The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going
through the burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit
against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is
actually a farce and the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation. And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is
recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay
unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court. • In the case at bar, the trial court gave great weight and credence to the collective statements of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, including
those of Reyes and Marcelo, as their testimonies were candid, straightforward, and categorical. • It is likewise worthy to mention that their respective
testimonies were deemed credible as they withstood extensive cross-examination, and possibly, even re direct and re-cross examinations. Absent
any special circumstance’s attendant to this case, Reyes’ and Marcelo’s recantations fail to cast doubt to the truth and veracity of their earlier
testimonies, and to the collective statements of all of the prosecution witnesses as a whole.
SORIANO V. PEOPLE Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused. In People v. Doriquez, two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the
MAIN CONTENTION OF THE same"
ACCUSED: That more than one
offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various • if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
offenses is prescribed by
law - hence, his motion to quash
should be granted
• Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
BUT - there are 2 different laws element of the other. Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with
defining 2 crimes settled doctrine.
- jeopardy to one of them will not be
an obstacle to the prosecution of
another As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to
- although of the offenses arise from observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and
the same facts
- if each crime involves an important other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into
act which is not essential element of corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false
the other - no double jeopardy pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against
Soriano was, therefore, proper
LAZATE V. SANDIGANBAYAN At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion
to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon
and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court This general rule, however, is subject to
certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
32
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of
discretion. The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde
will not be considered.
Go v. lim The failure of the trial court judge to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant’s right
to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC,
so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw
Informations anew.
In dismissing the criminal cases against the respondents, the RTC in this case relied on the unwillingness of the Department of Justice to prosecute
these cases and the awkward situation in which the public prosecutor would find himself.
• the dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other than the judge’s own personal individual conviction that there was no case
against the respondents. Thus, the trial judge improperly relinquished the discretion that he was bound to exercise, and the Orders dated 11
February 2004 and 29 June 2004 are invalid for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution prescribes the rule against double jeopardy:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in: (1) there is a valid complaint of information; (2) the complaint should be
filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases against the
respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004.
Therefore, the fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case without his or her approval,
was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.
It is the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, or dismissal or termination of the case without the approval of the accused that bar
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof.
At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would
arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The constitutional provision, therefore, guarantees that the State shall not be permitted
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty. Nevertheless, the prosecution is entitled to one opportunity to require the accused to stand trial. Should the prosecution waive this right to a
full-blown trial, the defendant has the right to have his or her trial completed by a particular tribunal. If the trial is terminated before it is completed,
and it is dismissed with the consent of the defendant, then double jeopardy will not attach.
SALDANIEGO V. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods
PANGANIBAN provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
33
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could
be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to
a provisional dismissal.
She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present
its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of
provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with
the express consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed
complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.
Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial.
the case is a victimless crime - there But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's
is no private offended party who can
file a motion to revive motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto. In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated that "in her
- it is the arresting officer who filed a Comment/Objection, the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in, because the provisional
motion to revive the case dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the accused."
Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a public crime, hence, it is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes
where the participation of the private offended party is generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular
private offended party who can actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is the arresting officer, PO2 Villas,
who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew
his absence was the cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.
We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we are aware that in drug-related cases, the arresting officers are usually
required to explain by their superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to appear during trial.
Thus, in order to exonerate themselves from a possible administrative and criminal liability, the arresting officers would then opt instead to file the
motion to revive on their own.
The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was made with the express consent of the accused, thus,
there is no double jeopardy.
Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against
him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites
must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused,
(4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his
34
express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been
an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.16
In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking, considering that here the dismissal was merely
provisional and it was done with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with
the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal
of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned
exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact
of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established
CUDIA V. CA Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the
judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks in the doctrine that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
there was no waiver to question the With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first
lack authority of the city Prosecutor information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
WANT OF JURISDICTION MAY BE It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga
RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited
PROCEEDING or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
- it is a valid information signed by a
competent officer, among other Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is
requisites, which confers jurisdiction deemed a waiver thereof.
on the court over the person of the As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections
accused and its subject matter
to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a
there must have been a valid and long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed
sufficient complaint or information in by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the
the former prosecution - first jeopardy
did not attach
subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot
be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was
insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a
bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution.
• Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the
prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be
dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
35
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information
meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply
with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
OCAMPO V. ABANDO double jeopardy only applies when:
(1) a first jeopardy attached;
(2) it has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
• To recall, an Information for the crime of rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.
• However, petitioners were never arraigned in the criminal case
• Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition
before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution
panel due to lack of impartiality and independence.
• When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal
Case No. 06-944.131
• We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the ₱100,000 cash bond posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain
on provisional liberty until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations.
Their provisional release from detention under the cash bond of ₱100,000 each shall continue under the condition that their temporary release shall
be limited to the period of their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until the termination
of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace
negotiations are concluded.
VILLAREAL V. ALIGA The case does not fall within the

exception to rule on double jeopardy
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are:
(1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial,
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.
Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make any allegation to that effect.
36
What the records show is that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same
is true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and,
for this reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even allege that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he asserted was that the CA
"gravely erred" in the evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the purported errors
of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law, which, as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65
petition.
37

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FINALS DOCTRINE CASES – JUDGE XES

FENIX V. PEOPLE HOWEVER

RULE 113 – ARREST

People v. Andaya A BUY-BUST OPERATION IS A VALID FORM OF ENTRAPMENT OF A DRUG PUSHER

Pestilo v. Generoso BE UNMERITORIOUS

Luspo v. People IT IS ADMISSIBLE

CHAVEZ’S MOTHER’S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE

RULE 114 - BAIL

This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention

TANENGEE V. PEOPLE PETITIONER’S WRITTEN STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

(3) to be informed of the two other rights above.

RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH

VILLAREAL V. ALIGA The case does not fall within the

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