PROPERTY IN GENERAL
—Machinery which is movable in
Standard Oil v. Jaramillo
CHATTEL MORTGAGE; REGISTRATION;
NOTICE.—The efficacy of the act of recording
a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that
registration operates as constructive notice of the
existence of the contract, and the legal effects of
the instrument must be discovered in the
document itself, in relation with the fact of
notice. Registration adds nothing to the
instrument, considered as a source of title, and
affects nobody's rights except as a species of
constructive notice.
2, ID. ; ID. ; FUNCTION OF REGISTER.—The
duties of a register of deeds in respect to the
registration of chattel mortgages are purely of a
ministerial character, and he is clothed with no
judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the-
nature of the property, whether real or personal,
which is the subject of the mortgage. Generally
speaking, he should accept the qualification of
the property adopted by the person who presents
the instrument for registration and should place
the instrument on record, upon payment of the
proper fee, leaving the effects of registration to
be determined by the court if such question
should arise for legal determination.
Davao Saw Mill v. Castillo
PROPERTY; MACHINERY AS PERSONAL
PROPERTY; CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 334,
PARAGRAPHS 1 and 5, CONSTRUED.— A
lessee placed machinery in a building erected on
land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not
included in the improvements which would pass
to the lessor on the expiration or abandonment
of the land leased. The lessee also treated the
machinery as personal property by executing
chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The
machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as
personalty pursuant to a writ of execution
obtained without any protest being registered.
Held: That the machinery must be classified as
personal property.
ID.; ID.; ID.
its nature only becomes immobilized when
placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.
Berkenkotter v. Hijos
MORTGAGE; IMPROVEMENT ON THE
MORTGAGED PROPERTY, INCLUDED IN
THE MORTGAGE.—The installation of a
machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar
central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the
purpose of carrying out the industrial functions
of the latter and increasing production,
constitutes a permanent improvement on said
sugar central and subjects said machinery and
equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon.
(Article 1877, Civil Code.)
ID.; ID.; PERMANENT CHARACTER OF
THE IMPROVEMENT.—The fact that the
purchaser of the new machinery and equipment
has bound himself to the person supplying him
the purchase money to hold them as security for
the payment of the latter's credit, and to refrain
from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
them does not alter the permanent character of
the incorporation of said machinery and
equipment with the central.
ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP OF THE
IMPROVEMENT.—The sale of the machinery
and equipment in question by the purchaser who
was supplied the purchase money, as a loan, to
the person who supplied the money, after the
incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar
central, does not vest the creditor with
ownership of said machinery and equipment but
simply with the right of redemption.
Manarang v. Ofilada
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ; BUILDINGS;
HOUSE is PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR
PURPOSES OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE
ONLY; REMAINS REAL PROPERTY.—The
mere fact that a house was the subject of a
chattel mortgage and was considered as personal
property by the parties does not make said house
personal property for purposes of the notice to
be given for its sale at public auction. It is real
property within the purview of Rule 39, section
16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a
permanent fixture on the land, which is real
property.
GSIS v. Calsons
Civil law; Mortgage; When machineries are
considered part of immovable property; Case at
bar.—Where, as in the case at bar, the disputed
mortgage covers the lands “together with all the
buildings and improvements now existing or
which may hereafter be constructed” thereon;
and the machineries found thereon were
permanently attached to the property and
installed therein by the owner to meet the needs
of certain works or industry therein, said
machineries are considered part of the
immovable property pursuant to Article 415 of
the Civil Code, and need not be the subject of a
separate chattel mortgage in order to be deemed
duly encumbered.
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor CDO
Property; Immovable Property by Destination;
Two requisites before movables may be deemed
to have immobilized; Tools and equipments
merely incidental to business not subject to real
estate tax.—Movable equipments, to be
immobilized in contemplation of Article 415 of
the Civil Code, must be the essential and
principal elements of an industry or works which
are carried on in a building or on a piece of land.
Thus, where the business is one of
transportation, which is carried on without a
repair or service shop, and its rolling equipment
is repaired or serviced in a shop belonging to
another, the tools and equipments in its repair
shop which appear movable are merely
incidentals and may not be considered
immovables, and, hence, not subject to
assessment as real estate for purposes of the real
estate tax.
Ago v. Court of Appeals and Grace Park
Property; Immovables by destination;
Installation of sawmill machineries in building
of sawmill company.—By the installation of the
sawmill machineries in the building of the
sawmill company, for use in the sawing of logs
carried on in said building, the same became a
necessary and permanent part of the building or
real estate on which the same was constructed,
converting the said machineries and equipments
into real estate within the meaning of Article
415 (5) of the. Civil Code.
Serg’s Product v. PCI Leasing
Civil Law; Property; The machines although
each of them was movable or personal property
on its own, all of them have become immobilized
by destination because they are essential and
principal elements of petitioners chocolate-
making industry.—In the present case, the
machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory
built on their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although
each of them was movable or personal property
on its own, all of them have become
immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry.
In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing
that the said machines are real, not personal,
property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil
Code.
Same; Same; Contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal.—The Court has held that contracting
parties may validly stipulate that a real property
be considered as personal. After agreeing to
such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein.
Same; Same; The Lease Agreement clearly
provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal property; Under the
circumstances they are proper subjects of the
writ of seizure.—In the present case, the Lease
Agreement clearly provides that the machines in
question are to be considered as personal
property. x x x Clearly then, petitioners are
estopped from denying the characterization of
the subject machines as personal property.
Under the circumstances, they are proper
subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
Same; Same; That the machines should be
deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease
Agreement is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned.—It should be
stressed, however, that our holding— that the
machines should be deemed personal property
pursuant to the Lease Agreement—is good only
insofar as the contracting parties are concerned.
Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith
are not affected by its stipulation characterizing
the subject machinery as personal. In any event,
there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.
Tumalad v. Vicencio
Same; In detainer cases; Claim of ownership is
a matter of defense; Allegations in complaint
and the relief sought determine jurisdiction.—
When the question to be determined is one of
title, the Court is given the authority to proceed
with the hearing of the cause until this fact is
clearly established. In the case of Sy vs. Dalman,
L-19200, 27 Feb. 1968, wherein the defendant
was also a successful bidder in an auction sale, it
was likewise held by this Court that in detainer
cases the claim of ownership “is a matter of
defense and raises an issue of fact which should
be determined from the evidence at the trial.”
What determines jurisdiction are the allegations
or averments in the complaint and the relief
asked for.
Same; Property; Status of buildings as
immovable property.—It is obvious that the
inclusion of the building, separate and distinct
from the land, in the enumeration of what may
constitute real properties (art. 415, New Civil
Code) could only mean one thing—that a
building is by itself an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said structure and
the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner.
Same; Same; Same; Deviations from rule.—
Certain deviations, however, have been allowed
for various reasons. In the case of Manarang vs.
Ofilada, No. L-8133, 18 May 1956, 99 Phil. 109,
this Court stated that ‘‘it is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be
real property.’’ Again, in the case of Luna vs.
Encarnacion, No. L-4637, 30 June 1952, 91 Phil.
531, the subject of the contract designated as
Chattel Mortgage was a house of mixed
materials, and this Court held therein that it was
a valid Chattel mortgage because it was so
expressly designated and specifically that the
property given as security ‘‘is a house of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason; Owner is
estopped.—The view that parties to a deed of
chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house
as personal property for the purposes of said
contract, is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon
the principle of estoppel. Hence, if a house
belonging to a person stands on a rented land
belonging to another person, it may be
mortgaged as a personal property as so
stipulated in the document of mortgage. It
should be noted, however, that the principle is
predicated on statements by the owner declaring
his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may
conceivably estop him from subsequently
claiming otherwise.
Same; Mortgagor is entitled to remain in
possession during period of redemption and to
collect rents.—Since the defendants-appellants
were occupying the house at the time of the
auction sale, they are entitled to remain in
possession during the period of redemption or
within one year from and after 27 March 1956,
the date of the auction sale, and to collect the
rents or profits during the said period.
Navarro v. Pineda
Chattel Mortgage; Subject-matter; House on
land belonging to another treated as movable
property between the parties.— Where a house
stands on a rented land belonging to another
person, it may be the subject-matter of a chattel
mortgage as personal or movable property if so
stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in
an action by the mortgagee for foreclosure, the
validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be
assailed by one of the parties to the contract of
mortgage.
Property; Immovable Property; House on land
belonging to another; General rule and
exceptions.—Although in some instances, a
house of mixed materials has been considered as
a chattel between the parties and that the validity
of the contract between them, has been
recognized, it has been a constant criterion that,
with respect to third persons, who are not parties
to the contract, and specially in execution
proceedings, the house is considered as
immovable property.
Makati Leasing v. Wearever Textile Mills
Property, Mortgage; Replevin; Where a chattel
mortgage is constituted on machinery
permanently attached to the ground the
machinery is to be considered as personal
property and the chattel mortgage constituted
thereon is not null and void, regardless of who
owns the land.—Examining the records of the
instant case, We find no logical justification to
exclude and rule out, as the appellate court did,
the present case from the application of the
abovequoted pronouncement. If a house of
strong materials, like what was involved in the
above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a
chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to
the contract so agree and no innocent third party
will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no
reason why a machinery, which is movable in its
nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise
treated as such. This is really because one who
has so agreed is estopped from denying the
existence of the chattel mortgage.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—In rejecting
petitioner’s assertion on the applicability of the
Tumalad doctrine, the Court of Appeals lays
stress on the fact that the house involved therein
was built on a land that did not belong to the
owner of such house. But the law makes no
distinction with respect to the ownership of the
land on which the house is built and We should
not lay down distinctions not contemplated by
law.
Benguet Corporation v. Central Board
Civil Law; Taxation; Property; The Real
Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of
"real property".—The Real Property Tax Code
does not carry a definition of "real property" and
simply says that the realty tax is imposed on
"real property, such as lands, buildings,
machinery and other improvements affixed or
attached to real property." In the absence of such
a definition, we apply Article 415 of the Civil
Code.
Same; Same; Same; The tailings dam of the
petitioner does not fall under any of the classes
of exempt real properties enumerated under
Section 2 of C.A. No. 470.—Section 2 of C.A.
No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment
Law, provides that the realty tax is due "on the
real property, including land, buildings,
machinery and other improvements" not
specifically exempted in Section 3 thereof. A
reading of that section shows that the tailings
dam of the petitioner does not fall under any of
the classes of exempt real property therein
enumerated.
Same; Same; Same; Court is convinced that the
subject dam falls within the definition of an
improvement because it is permanent in
character and it enhances both the value and
utility of petitioner's mine.—The Court is
convinced that the subject dam falls within the
definition of an "improvement" because it is
permanent in character and it enhances both the
value and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover,
the immovable nature of the dam defines its
character as real property under Article 415 of
the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under
Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
Meralco v. CBA
Taxation; Civil Law; Property; Storage tanks
although not embedded on land considered as
improvements and are subject to realty tax.—
We hold that while the two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land,
enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two
tanks have been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the considerable
quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations. Oil storage tanks were held to be
taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
Same; Same; Same; Real property, for taxation
purposes, defined.— For purposes of taxation,
the term “real property” may include things
which should generally be regarded as personal
property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal
property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs.
Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
OWNERSHIP AND CO-OWNERSHIP
Lilian Sanchez v. CA
ivil Law; Co-ownership; Definition.—Sanchez
Roman defines co- ownership as “the right of
common dominion which two or more persons
have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially
or physically divided.” Manresa defines it as the
“manifestation of the private right of ownership,
which instead of being exercised by the owner in
an exclusive manner over the things subject to it,
is exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is one
and the same.”
Same; Same; Characteristics; Co-ownership has
the following characteristics.—The
characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality
of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of
or material indivision, which means that there is
a single object which is not materially divided,
and which is the element which binds the
subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and obligations of
the co-owners.
Same; Same; Nature; In co-ownership, the
relationship of such co- owner to the other co-
owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.—
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-
owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in
character and attribute. Whether established by
law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-
owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to
the interest of his co-owners. Thus, the legal
effect of an agreement to preserve the properties
in co-ownership is to create an express trust
among the heirs as co-owners of the properties.
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-
owner is a trustee for the others.
Same; Same; Co-owners; Rights; He may
validly lease his undivided interest to a third
party independently of the other co-owners.—
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of
an undivided interest in the property the right to
freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the
other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part
of the thing owned in common because his right
over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal
portion without any physical adjudication.
Vda. de Ape v. CA
Actions; Co-Ownership; Redemption; The
exercise of the right to redeem presupposes the
existence of a co-ownership at the time the
conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it
is demanded by the other co-owner or co-
owners—as legal redemption is intended to
minimize co-ownership, once the property is
subdivided and distributed among the co-
owners, the community ceases to exist and there
is no more reason to sustain any right of legal
redemption.

Same; Same; Same; Partition; Although a CONSTRUCTION EXPENSES. —The
partition might have been informal, it is of no
moment for even an oral agreement of partition
is valid and binding upon the parties.
Sps. Pardel v. Sps. Bartolome
REALTY; COUNTERCLAIM.—From the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Chanco, J.
Plaintiffs claim one-half of the value of
certain undivided realty. Defendants
acknowledged plaintiff's right, less certain
amounts expended by them in rebuilding one of
the houses, for which sum, together with
interests, and for the fees due to the
administrator, they set up a counterclaim. In
conformity with section 498, Code of Civil
Procedure, judgment reversed and case
remanded for the appointment of a
commissioner to examine the accounts.
Longings Javier v. Segundo Javier
1. REALTY ; POSSESSION; JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR.— Alfonso vs.
Natividad, No. 2518, April 30, 1900,
followed as to the right of a judicial
administrator to recover possession of
real estate belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
2. ID.; ID.; GOOD FAITH;
REIMBURSEMEXT.—The defendants,
knowing that the land which they
occupied was the property of others,
were not possessors in good faith (art.
433, Civil Code) and are not entitled to
be reimbursed for the cost of a house
built thereon by them. (Art. 453, Civil
Code.)
3. ID.; OWNERSHIP; COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY.—The ownership of a
house by one person, and of the land on
which it stands by another, does not
create a community of property as that
term is used in articles 302 et seq. of the
Civil Code.
4. ID.; TENANTS IN COMMON;
defendants, tenants in common with
others of a tract of land, built a house
thereon. Held, That they could not
compel their cotenants to share in the
expense of such construction, though
they tacitly consented thereto. (Art. 397,
Civil Code.)
Enriquez v. Watsons
CIVIL PROCEDURE; BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS; BY WHOM TO BE SIGNED.
—Where a stenographic record has been made
of the proceedings at the trial, the bill of
exceptions may, in the absence of the trial judge,
be settled, allowed, and signed by the judge
present at the time the bill is presented for that
purpose.
Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay
CIVIL CODE; COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
ALTERATIONS. —Article 397 of the Civil
Code provides: "None of the owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make any
alterations in the common property even though
such alterations might be advantageous to all."
While the property referred to in this case was
leased, without the consent of all the coöwners,
building thereon one house and three
warehouses, it cannot be considered that the
alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify
the lease, especially so since none of the
coöwners objected to such alterations until over
twenty years after the execution of the contract
of lease.
Lopez v. Martinez
REALTY; TENANTS IN COMMON; SALE
OF UNDIVIDED INTEREST; PARTITION.—
M. and the defendant were owners as tenants in
common of twenty-eight separate tracts of land.
M. sold to the plaintiff his undivided one-half
interest in two of these tracts by contract with
pacto de retro. Before the right to repurchase
had expired M. and the defendant made a
voluntary partition between themselves of the
twenty-eight tracts, by which partition the two
tracts in which the plaintiff was interested fell to
the defendant. M. did not exercise his right of
repurchase. Held, That the partition between M.
and the defendant did not affect the plaintiff, and
that he was the owner of an undivided one- half
of the two lots in question.
Ramirez v. Bautista
ESTATES; RlGHT OF COHEIRS TO
ALIENATE COMMUNITY PROPERTY.—
Every coheir has the absolute ownership of his
share in the community property and may
alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as
to purely personal rights, but the effect of any
such transfer is limited to the portion which may
be awarded to him upon the partition of the
property.
Tuazon v. Tuazon
COMMUNITY PROPERTY ; PARTITION;
RESCISSION.—A contract among land co-
owners wherein they agreed to fill their
property, construct roads therein and then
subdivide it into small lots for sale, the proceeds
to be later divided among them, and to this end
one of them was to finance the whole
development and subdivision, to prepare a
schedule of prices and conditions of sale subject
to the approval of the other two co-owners, to
sell the subdivided lots and execute the
corresponding contracts with buyers, and to
receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of
the lots and the rents that may be collected f rom
the property while in the process of sale, the
remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal
portions among the three co-owners,—does not
violate article 400 of the Civil Code. Far from
violating the prohibition against a co-owner
being obliged to remain a party to the
community, the contract precisely has for its
purpose and object the dissolution of the co-
ownership and of the community by selling the
parcel held in common and dividing the
proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The
obligation imposed in the contract to preserve
the co-ownership until all the lots shall have
been sold is a mere incident to the main object
of dissolving the co-ownership.
Romana Cortez v. OliviaLlMITATION OF
ACTIONS; RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF
SUGAR MlLL.—In an action for the recovery
of possession of a sugar mill wherein it appeared
that the defendant had been in possession for
more than four years under a claim of
ownership, Held: That the action had prescribed
at the date of its institution under the provisions
of section 43 of Act No. 190.
ID.; ID.; ADVERSE POSSESSION BY
COTENANT.—Ordinarily possession by one
joint owner will not be presumed to be adverse
to the others, but will, as a rule, be held to be for
the benefit of all. Much stronger evidence is
required to show an adverse holding by one of
several joint owners than by a stranger; and in
such cases, to sustain a plea of prescription, it
must always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the
claims of his coöwners, and that his coöwners
were apprised or should have been apprised of
his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership
before the alleged prescriptive period began to
run.
De Santos v. BPI
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION ; CONTEST
OF PARTITION IN CASE OF FRAUD OR
PREJUDICE TO CREDITORS.— Inasmuch as
article 403 of the Civil Code authorizes creditors
to contest a partition already made in case of
fraud, or when it has been made to the prejudice
of existing rights and interests, and inasmuch as
the oppositor-appellee herein, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, was not notified of the
partition made among the herein petitioner-
appellants and their coöwners Felipe de Santos
and Isidoro de Santos, and was not given an
opportunity to contest the partition already
made, nor the approval thereof by the cadastral
court, the case should be remanded to the court
a quo in order to permit the aforesaid oppositor-
appellee, Bank of the Philippine Islands, to file
the objections it deems convenient, in
accordance with the provisions of article 403 of
the Civil Code cited above.
Garcia de Lara v. Gonzales de Lara
PARTITION; NECESSARY PARTIES.—A bill
will not he for the partition of an undivided
interest in land without the joinder of all
cöwners.
BPI v. Veloso
The general rule in redemption is that it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem
manifests his desire to do so. The statement of
intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes
the exercise of the right to repurchase. In several
cases decided by the Court where the right to
repurchase was held to have been properly
exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of
payment for the full amount of the repurchase
price. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is
ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily
implies a reasonable and valid tender of the
entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the
redemption period fixed by law can easily be
circumvented. As explained by this Court
in Basbas vs. Entena:
The existence of the right of redemption
operates to depress the market value of the land
until the period expires.
In order to effect a redemption, the
judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the
redemption price composed of the following: (1)
the price which the purchaser paid for the
property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the
purchase price; (3) the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may
have paid on the property after the purchase; and
(4) interest of 1% per month on such
assessments and taxes x x x. Furthermore,
Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides: The vendor cannot avail himself of the
right to repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale x x x. It is not
difficult to understand why the redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or
else validly consigned in court. Only by such
means can the auction winner be assured that the
offer to redeem is being made in good faith
Aguilar v. Aguilar
Requisites for the Exercise of Legal Redemption.
—The following are the requisites for the
exercise of legal redemption: (1) There must be
a co-ownership; (2) one of the co- owners sold
his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made
before the partition of the co-owned property;
(4) the right of redemption must be exercised by
one or more co-owners within a period of thirty
days to be counted from the time that he or they
were notified in writing by the vendee or by the
co- owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be
reimbursed for the price of the sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Si v. Court of
Appeals, Court ruled that a co-owner with
actual notice of the sale is not entitled to a
written notice.— Petitioner’s contention lacks
merit. The old rule is that a written notice of the
sale by the vendor to his co-owners is
indispensable for the latter to exercise their
retracto legal de comuneros. More recently,
however, we have relaxed the written notice
requirement. Thus, in Si v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the
sale is not entitled to a written notice for such
would be superfluous. The law does not demand
what is unnecessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; After a property has
been subdivided and distributed among the co-
owners, the community has terminated and there
is no reason to sustain any right of pre-emption
or redemption.—By the time Senen filed Civil
Case No. 95-039 for legal redemption, his right
was no longer available to him. We have held
that after a property has been subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the
community has terminated and there is no reason
to sustain any right of pre-emption or
redemption.
Lee Chuy v. CA
Legal Redemption; To avail of the right of
redemption, what is essential is to make an offer
to redeem within the prescribed period, either
through a formal tender with consignation or by
filing a complaint in court coupled with
consignation of the redemption price within the
prescribed period
Where the right to redeem is exercised through
judicial action within the reglementary period,
the formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a
bona fide tender of the redemption price, while
proper, may be unessential—the filing of the
action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem.
n sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a
distinct step or condition sine qua non to the
filing of the action in Court for the valid exercise
of the right of legal redemption. What
constitutes a condition precedent is either a
formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action
in court together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary
period.
Public policy favors redemption regardless of
whether the redemptioner is a co-owner or
mortgagor, although perhaps with unequal force
and effect since each is given a fixed but
different period.
POSSESSION
Sps. Luciana Dalida v. CA
Civil Law; Unlawful detainer; Land Titles;
Main issue in action for unlawful detainer is
determination of who between rival claimants
has better right of possession to the property.—
We agree with petitioners that in an action
illegal detainer the main issue is the
determination of who between the rival
claimants has a better right of possession with a
view to protecting the same and preventing
disorder and breaches of the peace. As found out
by the court a quo, the Court of First Instance
and finally the Court of Appeals, private
respondent and/or his predecessor-in-interest,
bona, fide applicant of the land in dispute, had
been in open, actual, exclusive and uninterrupted
possession of the property in question in the
concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years
and petitioners were in fact residing on the same
property as caretakers hired to oversee the land
and the improvements thereon.
Mere caretakers of land without right to
possession of disputed land.—It is thus clear that
private respondent's predecessor-in-interest was
a bona fide applicant of the land in dispute and
in his favor was duly issued a permit pursuant to
Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279
dated 1945. Petitioners, on the other hand, have
nothing giving them any right to possession
other than that of mere caretakers as in the
allegation of private respondent, who, by reason
of the permit abovementioned, have solid basis
of their claim to the right of possession with
petitioners merely as caretakers
Right in a bona fide applicant, compelling
reasons of policy for recognition of.—There are
compelling reasons of policy supporting the
recognition of a right in a bona fide applicant
who has occupied the land applied for.
Recognition of the right encourages actual
settlement; it discourages speculation and land-
grabbing. It prevents conflicts and the
overlapping of claims. It is an act of simple
justice to the diligence of the pioneer, without
which land settlement can not be encouraged or
emigration from thickly populated areas
hastened.
US v. Tan Tayco
OPIUM LAW; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF;
ACQUITTAL.—Held, That the fact that a pipe
and other utensils for smoking opium were
found in the store of one of the defendants, and
in the sleeping room of the other, is not
conclusive proof of the fact that those utensils
were found in the possession of one or both the
defendants, so as to justify a conviction under
the provisions of section 7 of the Opium Law;
and that upon satisfactory proof of the absence
of the animus possidendi, they should be
acquitted.
In order to complete a possession two things
are required, that there be an occupancy,
apprehension, or taking; that the taking be
with an intent to possess (animus
possidendi). Hence persons who have no
legal wills, as children of insufficient
understanding and idiots, can not possess or
acquire a complete possession (Pothier,
Etienne, see 1 Mer., 358; Abb. Sh., 9); so
here stolen property is placed in the house or
upon the premises of A, without his
knowledge or consent, A is not properly
speaking in possession of such property, so
long as he does not assert a right to its
control, and is not moved by the animus
possidendi with reference thereto.
Alo v. Racomora
Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides: If the
same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the
shall be transferred to the
person who
m a y   h a v e   f i r s t   t a k e n   p o s s e s s i o n thereo
f in good faith, if it should be personal property.
Should it be real property, it shall belong to the
person acquiring it who first recorded it in the
registry.
Ramos v. Director of Lands
PROPERTY; LAND; POSSESSION.—Actual
possession of land consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own
property.
ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.—
The possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract of land, under claim of ownership of all, is
a constructive possession of all, if the remainder
is not in the adverse possession of another.
ID. ; ID. ; ID.—One who has color of title, has
acted in good faith, and has had open, peaceable,
and notorious possession of a portion of the
property sufficient to apprise the community and
the world that the land was for his enjoyment,
Held: To be entitled to a title to the entire tract
of land for which he asks registration.
ID. ; REMEDIES OF GOVERNMENT AS
AGAINST PRIVATE CLAIMANTS.—When
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property
collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
Great consideration, it may be stated, should,
and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to-
the opinion of the technical expert who speaks
with authority on forestry matters.
Arriola v. Gomez dela Serna
REALTY; PRESCRIPTION ; GOOD FAITH.—
In order that ownership and other property rights
in real property shall prescribe by possession, it
ownership
is necessary to occupy in good faith and with
proper title.
ID.; GOOD FAITH DEFINED.—Good faith
consists in the possessor's belief that the person
from whom he received a thing was the owner of
the same and could convey his title.
ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH.
—Any person who is not aware that there is in
his title, or in the manner of acquiring it, any
flaw invalidating the same, shall be considered a
possessor in good faith. Good faith is always
presumed, and any person alleging bad faith on
the part of the possessor is obliged to prove it.
ID.; OCCUPATION WlTHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECTIVE TlTLE.—A
person occupying and possessing real property
under a claim of hereditary title will not suffer
the consequences of the faulty possession of his
ancestor unless it is proved that he had
knowledge of the defects affecting it.
Bukidnon v. MBTC
Writs of Possession; In extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, an order for a writ of possession
issues as a matter of course, upon proper
motion, after the expiration of the redemption
period without the mortgagor exercising the
right of redemption, or even during the
redemption period provided a bond is posted to
indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale
is shown to have been conducted without
complying with the requirements of the law or
without the debtor violating the mortgage
contract.—The law and jurisprudence are clear
that in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an
order for a writ of possession issues as a matter
of course, upon proper motion, after the
expiration of the redemption period without the
mortgagor exercising the right of redemption, or
even during the redemption period provided a
bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case
the foreclosure sale is shown to have been
conducted without complying with the
requirements of the law or without the debtor
violating the mortgage contract. The rationale
for the ministerial issuance of a writ of
possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in
possession of the property sold without delay,
since the right to possession is founded on
ownership of the property.
Possession; By material occupation of a thing, it
is not necessary that the person in possession
should be the occupant of the property—the
occupancy can be held by another in his name.
—In the instant case, a writ of possession was
not the correct remedy for the purpose of ousting
the petitioner from the subject premises. It must
be noted that possession is the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right. It is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of
a right, or by the fact that a thing or right is
subject to the action of one’s will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. “By material occupation of
a thing,” it is not necessary that the person in
possession should be the occupant of the
property; the occupancy can be held by another
in his name.
Where a lease agreement, whether express or
implied, is subsequently entered into by the
mortgagor and the mortgagee after the
expiration of the redemption period and the
consolidation of title in the name of the latter, a
case for ejectment or unlawful detainer, not a
motion for a writ of possession, is the proper
remedy in order to evict from the questioned
premises a mortgagorturned-lessee
Carlos v. Republic of the Philippines
Land Registration; Judicial Confirmation of
Imperfect Title; Requisites.—Applicants for
confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title must show that he is in actual
possession of the property at the time of the
application; Taken with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction
Possession may be had in two ways: possession
in concept of an owner and possession of a
holder—a possessor in concept of an owner may
be the owner himself or one who claims to be so
while one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which
he believes to be ownership, whether his belief
be right or wrong; Under the law, only he who
possesses the property under a bona fide claim
of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title
Escritor v. IAC
Civil Law; Land Titles; Possession in good
faith; Well-grounded belief of ownership over
the land cannot be considered possession in bad
faith.— On the basis of the aforementioned
favorable judgment which was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor
honestly believed that he is the legal owner of
the land. With this well-grounded belief of
ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot
No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as
possession in bad faith.
Same; Same; Same; Possessor in bad faith,
concept of; Absence of flaw in the title of the
legal owner.—As defined in the law, a possessor
in bad faith is one in possession of property
knowing that his title thereto is defective. Here,
there is no showing that Escritor knew of any
flaw in his title. Nor was it proved that
petitioners were aware that the title of their
predecessor had any defect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A possessor in bad
faith should not prejudice his successors-in-
interest; Bad faith is personal and
intransmissible.—Nevertheless, assuming that
claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith,
this should not prejudice his successors-
ininterest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that
only personal knowledge of the flaw in one’s
title or mode of acquisition can make him a
possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not
transmissible from one person to another, not
even to an heir. As Article 534’of the Civil Code
explicitly provides, “one who succeeds by
hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences
of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it
is not shown that he was aware of the flaws
affecting it; x x x.” The reason for this article is
that bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its
effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the
person who acted in bad faith; his heir should
not be saddled with such consequences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Good faith is always
presumed; If no evidence is presented proving
bad faith, the presumption of good faith remains.
—Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good
faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests
the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented
proving bad faith, like in this case, the
presumption of good faith remains.
Damages; Fraud by a party in having the land
registered under his predecessor’s name, not
proved; Absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
by the petitioners; Petitioners were possessors
in good faith and should not be held liable for
damages
Kasilag v. Roque
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH.—It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the
laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation
of the land. In taking possession thereof and in
consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know,
as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession
and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a
lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion
that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may,
therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do
not give much importance to the change of the
tax declaration, which consisted in making the
petitioner appear as the owner of the land,
because such an act may only be considered as a
sequel to the change of possession and
enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, about
which we have stated that the petitioner's
ignorance of the law is possible and excusable.
We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in
good faith in taking possession of the land and
enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith
within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil
Code and having introduced the improvements
upon the land as such, the provisions of article
361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore,
the respondents are entitled to have the
improvements and plants upon indemnifying the
petitioner the value thereof which we fix at
P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner
to have the land by paying its market value to be
fixed by the court of origin.
Heirs of Pedro Laurora v. Sterling
A person in possession cannot be ejected by
force, violence or terror—not even by the
owners.—Notwithstanding the actual condition
of the title to the property, a person in
possession cannot be ejected by force, violence
or terror—not even by the owners. If such illegal
manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in
the present case, the party who proves prior
possession—in this case, petitioners—can
recover possession even from the owners
themselves.
Usurpers are entitled to remain on it until they
are lawfully ejected therefrom.—Verily, even if
petitioners were mere usurpers of the land
owned by respondents, still they are entitled to
remain on it until they are lawfully ejected
therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances,
respondents may file, other than an ejectment
suit, an accion publiciana—a plenary action
intended to recover the better right to possess; or
an accion reivindicatoria—an action to recover
ownership of real property.
Chua v. CA
Possession; Possessors in Good Faith; There is
no provision of law which grants the lessee a
right of retention over the leased premises on
the ground that he made repairs on the premises
—Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 546, which provides for full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on a land in the belief that
he is the owner thereof.—The appellate court
found petitioners guilty of bad faith in refusing
to leave the premises. But petitioners contend
that they acted in good faith under the belief that
they were entitled to an extension of the lease
because they had made repairs and
improvements on the premises. This contention
is devoid of merit. The fact that petitioners
allegedly made repairs on the premises in
question is not a reason for them to retain the
possession of the premises. There is no
provision of law which grants the lessee a right
of retention over the leased premises on that
ground. Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Art. 546, which provides for full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, applies
only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner
thereof. In a number of cases, the Court has held
that this right does not apply to a mere lessee,
like the petitioners, otherwise, it would always
be in his power to “improve” his landlord out of
the latter’s property. Art. 1678 merely grants to
such a lessee making in good faith useful
improvements the right to be reimbursed one-
half of the value of the improvements upon the
termination of the lease, or, in the alternative, to
remove the improvements if the lessor refuses to
make reimbursement.
Alburo v. Villanueva
LANDLORD AND TENANT; REPAIRS;
IMPROVEMENTS.— The word "repairs" as
used in paragraph 2 of article 1554 of the Civil
Code implies the putting of something back into
the condition in which it was originally and not
an improvement in the condition thereof by
adding something new thereto, hence the filling
in of a vacant lot is not a repair in the sense in
which the word is used in this article.
ID.; ID.; NECESSARY EXPENSES.—
Necessary expenses (gastos necesarios) as used
in article 453 of the Civil Code are "no others
than those made for the preservation of the thing
upon which they have been expended."
(Manresa, Código Civil, vol. 4, p. 250.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; REIMBURSEMENT.—A tenant
holding under a rental contract is not entitled to
indemnification under the provisions of article
361 of the Civil Code
MWSS v. CA
Rights of a possessor in good faith and a
possessor in bad faith.—Moreover, under Article
546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith
shall be refunded for useful expenses with the
right of retention until reimbursed; and under
Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good
faith may remove useful improvements if this
can be done without damage to the principal
thing and if the person who recovers the
possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given
a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for
pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by
paying the value they may have at the time he
enters into possession (Article 549, Id.).
Pascua v. Sideco
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DAMAGES IN
REPLEVIN; MULTIPLICITY OF ACTIONS.
—A separate action for the recovery of damages
arising out of a replevin suit may not be had, in
view of section 272 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by section 17 of Act No.
1627, the object being to determine finally all
the matters growing out of the controversy in the
replevin action and thus prevent a multiplicity of
suits.
Section 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended by section 17 of Act No. 1627,
reads:
"After a trial of the issues the court shall find in
whom is the right of possession and the value of
the property, and shall render judgment in the
alternative for the delivery thereof to the party
entitled to the same or for the value, in case
delivery cannot be made, and also for such
damages as either party may prove, and for
costs."
Ortiz v. Funetabella
EJECTMENT; DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF TITLE.— Declaration of nullity of a title
does not imply that it was acquired in bad faith.
ID.; ID.; POSSESSION IN BAD FAITH.—
Possession acquired after having knowledge of
certain facts that put in doubt the title of the
assignees must be regarded as in bad faith.
Tacas v. Tobon
LANDS; POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH;
TITLE OR MODE OF ACQUISITION.—
According to article 433 of the Civil Code, one
who is not aware of a flaw in his title or mode of
acquiring the ownership, is deemed a possessor
in good faith. And according to article 451 of the
same Code, the possessor in good faith acquires
the fruits while his possession is not legally
interrupted.
ID. ; ID. ; INTERRUPTION OF POSSESSION ;
RETURN OF FRUITS.—But every possessor in
good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from
the moment he becomes aware that what he
believed to be true is not so. His possession is
legally interrupted when he is summoned to the
trial, according to article 1945 of the Civil Code,
and from that time he is obliged to return the
fruits received, for he ceases to be considered a
possessor in good faith.
Miraflor v. CA
Property; Ownership; Proof of exercise of acts
of dominion over property.—Severo Monsalud
has indeed exercised acts of dominion over the
land since 1938 considering that he has lived on
the land, built a house, declared the land in his
own name for tax purposes and religiously paid
the taxes thereon. (See Dacasin v. Court of
Appeals, 80 SCRA 89).
Prescription; Mere entry into premises by virtue
of oral lease agreement and payment P50.00
only for the first month, not possession or
ownership in the concept of owner; Acquisition
of land by acquisitive prescription.—The
records do not show an iota of evidence to prove
that Gregorio Miraflor asserted ownership or
even possession over the land in question. His
entry into the premises was by an oral lease
agreement whereby he agreed to pay P50.00 a
month for the use of one-half of the house’s
groundfloor. But the fact that he paid P50.00 for
the first month belies the presumption that he
entered the premises in the concept of an owner.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Severo
Monsalud acquired all the rights over the land
through acquisitive prescription. Gregorio
Miraflor can no longer come forward and assert
ownership over it.
Accion Publiciana; Refusal of a party to deliver
possession of property due to the adverse claim
of ownership of the same property, the action is
clearly for recovery of right to possession and
be declared as owner.
Gabrito v. CA
Ejectment; Possession; Admission by petitioners
unquestionably recognized private respondents'
prior right of possession over the questioned
property.—In a preliminary conference held
pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, defendants admitted that they entered
the premises as lessees and had been paying
rentals for the use of the land to Gloria Carillo,
private respondents' predecessor-in-interest
(Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No.
2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo,
pp. 72-73). When requested to vacate the
premises, petitioners asked for an extension of
time which request was granted. However,
petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also
stopped paying rentals. In view of said
admissions, petitioners had unquestionably
recognized private respondents' prior right of
possession over the questioned property.
Same; Same; Builders in good faith; Petitioners
not considered builders in good faith.—
Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they
are builders in good faith over the land as
provided for in Article 448 of the Civil Code is
untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of
the Civil Code, applies only where one builds on
land in the belief that he is the owner of the land,
but does not apply where one's interest in the
land is that of a lessee under a rental contract
(Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498,1983).
Same; Same; Same; Rule is well-settled that
lessees are not possessors in good faith.—"The
rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner,
are not possessors in good faith, because he
knew that their occupancy of the premises
continues only during the life of the lease, and
they cannot as a matter of right, recover the
value of their improvements from the lessor,
much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article
1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the
value of their improvements if the lessor so
elects."
Pada-Kilario v. CA
Property; Partition; No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered
in order to be valid; The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the
heirs that participated therein
Neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because
partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property.
Possession; Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission
cannot be considered possessors nor builders in
good faith .—Considering that petitioners were
in possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated
any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing
in which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot
be considered possessors nor builders in good
faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and
Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that
he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith.
Sarmiento v. Hon. Agana
Same; The landowner on which a building has
been constructed in good faith by another has
the option to buy the building or sell his land to
the builder, he cannot refuse to exercise either
option.
Same; Same.—The owner of the building
erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the
land until he is paid the value of his building,
under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner
of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article 361 (now Article 448), either to
pay for the building or to sell his land to the
owner of the building. But he cannot, as
respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land and compel the
owner of the building to remove it from the land
where it is erected. He is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
(italics ours)
Pecson v. CA
Property; Ownership; Builder in Good Faith;
Art. 448 of the Civil Code does not apply to a
case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or donation.—By
its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land
whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or
sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good
faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid
down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be
applied in determining whether a builder, sower
or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448
does not apply to a case where the owner of the
land is the builder, sower, or planter who then
later loses ownership of the land by sale or
donation.
Same; Same; Same; The provision of Art. 448
on indemnity may be applied by analogy to a
case where one loses the ownership of the land
on which he earlier built an apartment.—
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is
the builder of works on his own land, the issue
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not
apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we
believe that the provision therein on indemnity
may be applied by analogy considering that the
primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state
of forced co-ownership and that the parties,
including the two courts below, in the main
agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ
as to the basis of the indemnity.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Unjust Enrichment;
It is the current market value of the
improvements which should be made the basis
of reimbursement to the builder in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to retain
the improvements while the corresponding
indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built,
planted or sown and retention of ownership of
the improvements and, necessarily, the income
therefrom.—
Bulucanag v. Hon. Francisco
Civil Law; Leases; Ejectment; Builder in good
faith, not a case of; Principle of possessor in
good faith; Art. 448, Civil Code, applies only
where one builds on land in the belief that he is
owner of the land, but does not apply where
one’s interest in the land is of a lessee under a
rental contract.
Useful improvements; Application in case at bar
of Art. 1678, Civil Code, which gives the lessor
the option to appropriate useful improvements
by paying one-half of their value, and the
lessee’s right to remove the improvements even
if the leased premises may suffer damage.
Same; Same; Same; Implied new lease;
Continued possession of the premises by lessee
after expiration of the period with the
acquiescence of lessor and new owner creates
an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion, the
period of what is established by Art. 1687 of the
Civil Code
Floreza v. Evangelista
Civil Law; Builder in good faith, not a case of;
Applicability of Art 448 of the Civil Code.—We
uphold the Court of Appeals in its conclusion
that Article 448 of the Civil Code is inapplicable
to the factual milieu herein. Said codal provision
applies only when the builder, planter, or sower
believes he has the right so to build, plant or sow
because he thinks he owns the land or believes
himself to have a claim of title. In this case,
petitioner makes no pretensions of ownership
whatsoever.
Same; Same; Rights of a person who made
useful improvements on the lot of another before
effectivity of the pacto de retro sale of the lot;
Rights akin to those of the usufructuary.—Since
petitioner cannot be classified as a builder in
good faith within the purview of Article 448 of
the Civil Code, nor as a vendee a retro, who
made useful improvements during the lifetime of
the pacto de retro, petitioner has no right to
reimbursement of the value of the house which
he had erected on the residential lot of the
EVANGELISTAS, much less to retention of the
premises until he is reimbursed. The rights of
petitioner are more akin to those of a
usufructuary who, under Article 579 of the Civil
Code (Art. 487 of the old Code), may make on
the property useful improvements but with no
right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements should it
be possible to do so without damage to the
property. For if the improvements made by the
usufructuary were subject to indemnity, we
would have a dangerous and unjust situation in
which the usufructuary could dispose of the
owner’s funds by compelling him to pay for
improvements which perhaps he would not have
made.
Same; Damages; Liability for damages for
retention of property although redemption
thereof had been made.
Carbonel v. CA
Property; Possession; Sale; In case of double
sale of an immovable property, second
paragraph of Article 1544 directs that
ownership should be recognized in favor of one
who in good faith first recorded his right. If
there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior
possession in good faith.
Circumstances which indicate prior possession
in good faith in case of double sale of
immovable property.
Circumstances which show bad faith in case of
double sale of immovable property.—Bad faith
arising from previous knowledge by Infante of
the prior sale to Carbonell is shown
Right given to vendor to continue staying on
land sold for one year without paying and rent
is adequate part of consideration of the sale.
Quemuel v. Olaes
Ownership; Accession; Improvements on
land; Builders in good faith; Right of
landowner and builder: Option granted to
landoumer.—The right to appropriate the works
or improvements or to oblige the builder or
planter to pay the price of the land belongs to the
landowner. The only right given to the builder in
good faith is the right to reimbursement for the
improvements; he cannot compel the owner of
the land to sell it to him.
Same; Tenant cannot be a builder in good faith.
—Article 448 of the New Civil Code is intended
to apply only to a case where one builds, or
sows, or plants on land in which he believes
himself to have a claim of title and not to lands
wherein one's only interest is that of a tenant and
a tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good
faith, as he has no pretention to be an owner of
the land.
Resuena et. al. v. CA
Co-Ownership; Ejectment; Article 487 is a
departure from Palarca v. Baguisi which held
that an action for ejectment must be brought by
all the co-owners; A co-owner may bring an
action to exercise and protect the rights of all.—
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides
simply that “[a]ny one of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment,” is a categorical
and an unqualified authority in favor of
respondent to evict petitioners from the portions
of Lot. No. 2587. This provision is a departure
from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an
action for ejectment must be brought by all the
co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an
action to exercise and protect the rights of all.
When the action is brought by one co-owner for
the benefit of all, a favorable decision will
benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot
prejudice their rights. Respondent’s action for
ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the
property since petitioners were not able to prove
that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Necessary Expenses; Article 546 of the Civil
Code applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that
he is the owner thereof; Persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of
its owners are not possessors in good faith.
Macasaet v. Macasaet
Unlawful Detainer; In actions for unlawful
detainer, possession that was originally lawful
becomes unlawful upon the expiration or
termination of the defendant’s right to possess,
arising from an express or implied contract.
To show a cause of action in an unlawful
detainer, an allegation that the defendant is
illegally withholding possession from the
plaintiff is sufficient.—
This court has consistently held that those who
occupy the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that the occupants will vacate
the property upon demand. A summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce
this implied obligation
Sps. Delcanto v. Abesia
Sarona v. Villegas
Forcible entry and detainer; Forcible entry
distinguished from unlawful detainer; Nature of
entry determines cause of action.—Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
two entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a)
action to recover possession founded on illegal
occupation from the beginning—forcible entry;
and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by
a person who originally acquired possession
lawfully—unlawful detainer. The law and
jurisprudence leave no doubt that what
determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendant's entry into the land. .If entry is
illegal, then the cause of action which may be
filed against the intruder within one year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
entry is legal but thereafter possession became
illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which
must be filed within one year from the date of
last demand.
Unlawful detainer; Tolerance must be
from the start of possession sought to be
recovered.—A close assessment of the law and
the concept of the word "tolerance" show that
such tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer—not of forcible entry.
Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer; Failure to bring action within one
year; Remedy.—It is well to remember that after
the lapse of the one year period, suit must be
started in the Court of First Instance in
an accion publiciana.