Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation Republic vs Orbecido III

Article 26 of the Family Code – Divorce

FACTS:
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges
States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
Ciprianolearned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,Stanley and her child by him currently
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages.
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
claimed benefits under the WCA.
the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought
ISSUE: reconsideration but it was denied.

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
ISSUE:
HELD: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.
HELD:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for
In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for
benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however
foreigner; and
ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact.
Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the
remarry.
amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that
if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being.
of the marriage, but their citizenshipat the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said,
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
Justice Gutierrez dissenting
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization he is
the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC. still barred from remarrying.
 Ting v. Velez-Ting
FACTS:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two yearsold, Carmen filed a
verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on Article36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
theirmarriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null andvoid. The RTC gave credence to
Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of
his deposition, and foundhim to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial
court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof
of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolutenullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized.
HELD:
No, by the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it
is logical and understandable to give weight to theexpert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
notconditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisivebut not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough tosustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need not beresorted to. The trial
court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision
not solely on the expertopinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatriststracing the root cause, gravity and
incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion
should bepresented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage
The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even
before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the
Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end
of his term, except when temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The
question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume
the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to
do so. May a mandamus lie to compel the submission of JBC’s nominees to the
president?
This issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the
Nation. A lot of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions.
We limit our discussion with GR 191002 for brevity.
Issues:
Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar
Council has until May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of nominees
to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno.
The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of
the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The question
raised before the court is in fact of transcendental importance. The court dispels all
doubt to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue
squarely presented. Standing is a peculiar concept to constitutional law because in
some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest.
 The court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR 191002
and GR 191149 and the petition for mandamus in GR no. 191057 for being
premature; dismissal of the petitions for prohibition in GR 191032 and GR 191342 for
lack of merit; and grants the in AM No. 10-2-5-SC and accordingly directs the JBC to:
resume proceedings for the nomination of candidates, prepare short list of nominees
for the said position, submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees, and
to continue proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto
in accordance with this decision.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529
Ponente: Justice Brion
Facts:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review
and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-
List System Act, COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party, may
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the
last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the
votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for
accreditation as a party-list organization. One of the arguments cited is that the
Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – MINERO (Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy. One
of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's.
Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT (Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency) vs COMELEC.
COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO
ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Issue:
Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.
Held:
According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system.
First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two separate reasons for delisting.
Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section
6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as
similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.
What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not
participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list
votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law's clear
and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios
differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers
of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs
COMELEC where the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly
invalidated.
The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for
delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualify for
a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied
under the authority of the Supreme Court to state what the law is and as an exception
to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established).
The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from
ruling case law is that it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an
application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot
sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of
the legislature and to the rule of law in general.
Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBI’s petition and accordingly, annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner
PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's
motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or
organization in the May 2010 elections.
Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines
GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)
Facts:
Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs.
Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to
avail the benefits of firs time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but
was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that probation and suspension
of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked to
avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking, application for probation
should be denied. As a side issue, the court discussed the availment of suspension of
sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE
Whether suspension of sentence under RA 9344 can still be invoked given
the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
HELD
NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344
could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the
offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep.
Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of
age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying
Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.
Garcia v. COMELEC (supra, see p.93)Paras v. COMELEC
Facts:
Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular
barangay electionin 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition. On
December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set a new the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. Top revent
the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction. The RTC issued a TRO. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner
and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt form is representing that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval. In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time,
re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a TRO and required the OSG to comment on the
petition. In view of the OSGl’s manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter
through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply
.Issue:
WON the recall election may be barred by the SK elections.

Section 74 (b), LGC: no recall shall take place within one (1)year from the date of the official’s
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election

P: the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the SK) election was set on the first Monday
of May 1996. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be
had for barely four months separate the SK election from there call election.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the
SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the LGC on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A.
No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase “regular
local election”, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the
recall provision of the LGC.


In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the LGC, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in
conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a LGC which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read
according to its spirit and intent.

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular
local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office
of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election
who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a success or elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be
more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to
an election where the office held by the local elective officials ought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the
Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months
away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.