A.

The Constitution
1. Definition, Nature and Concepts
 Constitution
i. It is a body of rules and maxims in
accordance with which the powers of
sovereignty are habitually exercised. -
Judge Cooley
ii. It is the supreme law of the land.
iii. It is the fundamental law of the land.
 Interpretation of the Constitution
i. Verba Legis – Its provisions are interpreted
with its plain and ordinary meaning.
ii. It is interpreted in accordance with the
intent of the framers.
iii. It is interpreted as a whole.
 The 1987 Constitution has 18 Articles.
 Constitutional Law
i. A branch of public law of a nation or state
which treats of the organizations, powers
and framers of the government, the
distribution of the political and
governmental authorities and functions,
 the fundamental principles which are to
regulate the relations of government and
citizen, and which the public affairs of the
nation or state are to be administered.
ii. It is the section of the law which interprets
and enforces the provisions of the
Constitution.
 Classification of Constitution
i. As to form
1. Written – reduced in writing at a
particular time
2. Unwritten – not reduced in writing
rather it is a product of political
evolution
ii. As to origin
1. Cumulative or Evolved constitution –
product of historical evolutions,
customs and formal manner
2. Conventional or Enacted constitution –
product of a deliberate assembly,
adopted in a conscious formal manner.
iii. As to constitutional change
 1. Soft, flexible or elastic constitution –
One that can be amended easily, by
mere congressional act
2. Hard, Rigid or inelastic constitution –
one that is difficult to amend.
iv. The 1987 Constitution is a written,
conventional or enacted and rigid
constitution.
2. Parts
 Constitution of Government
i. Those provisions that provide, define and
distribute the powers of the government.
ii. Article 6, 7, 8, and 10.
 Constitution of Liberty
i. Those provisions that provide the civil and
political rights of individuals.
ii. Article 3 Bill of Rights
 Constitution of Sovereignty
i. Those provisions that provide the manner in
which sovereign people exercise their
powers to change and/or amend the
fundamental law of the land.
 1. Article 17 Amendment and Revision
3. Amendments and Revisions
 Stages of Amendment and Revision
i. Proposal – Draft output of the changes
ii. Ratification – Submit through plebiscite of
the proposal, not earlier than 60 days but
not later than 90 days after the approval
of the proposal of the amendment or
revision or sufficiency of People’s Initiative
Petition.
 Amendment
i. Three ways to amend constitution
1. Constituent Assembly – ¾ votes of all
members of the Congress, voting
separately
2. Constitutional Convention – 2/3 votes
of all the members of the Congress or
by a majority votes of all its members,
submit to electorate the question of
calling such convention
3. People’s Initiative – upon petition of at
least 12% of total number of
registered voters, of which every
 legislative district must be represented
by at least 3% of the registered voter
therein.
 Revision
i. Two ways
1. Constituent Assembly
2. Constitutional Convention
 Two Test to distinguish Amendment and
Revision
i. Quantitative Test
1. Amendment - Addition, reduction or
deletion without altering the basic
principles. It only affects specific
provisions being amended
ii. Qualitative Test
1. The main inquiry is whether the change
will accomplish changes in the nature
of our basic government plan as to
amount to revision.
2. If there is alteration in the form of
government, it is considered as
revision. (Lambino v Comelec)
 Lambino vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006
i. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition
changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article 6 (Legislative
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article 7
(Executive Department) and by adding
Article 18 entitled “Transitory Provisions.
These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential System to a
Unicameral-Presidential form of
government.
ii. There can be no mistake about it. The
framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's
initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to
 propose revisions to the Constitution, the
people cannot propose revisions even as
they are empowered to propose
amendments.
 Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, GR 127325,
March 19, 1997
i. Petition to amend the Constitution, to lift
term limits of elective officials by People’s
Initiave (Delfin Petition). Delfin Asserted
RA No. 6375 governs the conduct of
initiative to amend the Constitution.
ii. DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate
to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to
have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation;
iii. The conclusion then is inevitable that,
indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory.
4. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions
 Doctrine of Self-Executing Constitutional
Provisions
 i. A constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent or the right
conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
 Court pronounced several constitutional
provisions as not-self executing:
1. Article 2 - Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and
18
2. Article 13 – Section 3 and 13
3. Article 14 Section 1, 2, 6, 14, 15,
 Not-Self executing provisions show that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation
 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR 122156, Feb.
3, 1997
i. The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the
1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State
 shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,
is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollary,
they ask whether the 51% shares form part
of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
ii. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution
mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,
 it means just that — qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred.
iii. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that
a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can
be cataclysmic.
 Pamatong vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April
13, 2004
i. Comelec declared Pamatong as a nuisance
candidate. Pamatong argued that this was
against his right to “equal access to
opportunities for public service,” citing
Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution,
and that the COMELEC was indirectly
amending the Constitution in this manner.
ii. The "equal access" provision is a
subsumed part of Article II of the
 Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The
provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is
no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision.
Like the rest of the policies enumerated in
Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise
to any cause of action before the courts.
 Ocampo vs Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
November 08, 2016
i. During the campaign period for the 2016
Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that
he would allow the burial former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the
May 9, 2016 elections.
ii. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is
not a self-executing provision considering
that a law should be passed by the
 Congress to clearly define and effectuate
the principle embodied therein. – Art11
Sec1 – Public office is a public trust.
iii. The presidential power of control over the
Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and
does not require statutory implementation,
nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. – Article 7
Sec.1
5. Constitutional Supremacy
 A doctrine whereby the legislature, the executive
branch and judiciary must act within limits of
the provisions of the Constitution.
 The constitution is the Supreme law of the land.
If a law is not in consonance with the
Constitution, therefore it that law is invalid.
 James M. Imbong, et al. Vs. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al. G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
April 8, 2014
i. RH Law - Shortly after the President
Aquino placed his imprimatur on Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and
 Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the
Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience.
ii. This theory of implantation as the beginning
of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the
fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object – it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by
those who had population control in mind.
To adopt it would constitute textual
infidelity not only to the RH Law but also
to the Constitution. It is the Court’s
position that life begins at fertilization, not
at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is
not the point of beginning of life.
iii. The demarcation line between Church and
State demands that one render unto Caesar
 the things that are Caesar’s and unto God
the things that are God’s. The Court is of
the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector.
iv. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. “The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
v. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
B. General Considerations
1. The Concept of State
 A state is community of persons, more or less
numerous, occupying a definite territory,
possessing an organized government, and
enjoying independence from external control.
 State is a political concept while Nation is racial or
ethical concept.
 Elements
 People
 The entire body of those citizens of a state
who are invested with political power for
political purposes. It is necessary to the
existence of the State. The number should be
neither too small nor too large. A casual
gathering of individuals by chance, a group
of bandits or a society of pirates do not form
people as an element of State.
 Province of North Cotabato vs The
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008
1. Peace talks between the MILF and the
GRP Representative result to
Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).
2. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being
 fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with
other states.
3. No province, city, or municipality, not
even the ARMM, is recognized under our
laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local
or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
 Territory
 It is a geographical area under the
jurisdiction of another country or sovereign
power or state. It must be fixed territory which
the inhabitants occupy. A state must have a
territory sufficient in extent to provide for its
maintenance and growth.
 Article I National Territory – the national
territory comprises of the Philippine
archipelago with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting its terrestrial, fluvial
and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves
and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between and connecting the islands,
regardless of their breadth and dimension,
form part the internal waters of the
Philippines.
 Archipelagic doctrine – 2nd sentence of
Article 1. Clue ( ABC – BD - FIW)
 Baseline Laws
1. Statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zones and the
 extended continental shelf under the
UNCLOS III.
 Four modes a state can acquire territory:
1. Discovery and occupation
a. A state may acquire a territory by
discovering a continent, an island
or land with no inhabitants or
occupied by uncivilized
inhabitants, and thereafter,
occupying it by placing it under its
political administration.
2. Prescription
a. It is a mode of acquiring a territory
through continuous and undisputed
exercise of sovereignty over it
during such period as is necessary
to create under the influence of
historical development.
3. Cession
a. It is assignment, transfer, or
yielding up of territory by one state
or government to another. It may
 be in the form of sale or donation.
Example is Treaty of Paris.
4. Subjugation and Annexation
a. It is a mode of acquiring a territory
belonging to a state by occupation
and conquest made by another state
in the course of war and by
annexation at the end of the war.
5. Accretion is another mode of acquiring
territory by addition of portions of soil,
either artificial such as the reclamation
area in Manila Bay, or natural by
gradual deposition through the
operation of natural causes such as the
waves of the ocean.
 Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167,
July 16, 2011
1. RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of
the national territory because it discards
the demarcation set forth by the Treaty of
Paris.
2. Under TOP, PH has sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles (nm) around the PH
 archipelago, embracing the rectangular
area delineated by TOP.
3. UNCLOS has nothing to do with
acquisition or loss of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating sea-use
rights over maritime zone.
4. Baseline Law is only a statute to delimit
with precision the extent of maritime
zone and gives notice to international
community of the scope of maritime
space and submarine areas within which
state parties exercise treaty-based rights.
a. Exercise sovereignty over territorial
waters.
b. Jurisdiction to enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration and sanitation
laws in contagious zone
c. Right to exploit resources on EEZ
5. It does not delineate the Philippine
Territory.
 Republic vs. Provincial Government of
Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018
1. The National Government is entitled of
60% share of the profit of Camago –
Malampaya natural gas project. Palawan
LGU alleged they are entitled to 40%
share of the government’s earnings
derived from the project
2. "municipal waters" inland waters .and
marine waters up to fifteen (15)
kilometers from the coastline
3. The Republic also maintains that Article
X, Section 1 of the Constitution does "not
require that every portion of the
Philippine territory be made part of the
territory of a local government unit." It
asserts that a local government unit's
territory only pertains to its land area
and not to its waters. It maintains that it
cannot be estopped since the Province of
Palawan was neither misled nor injured by
the State's prior declarations.
4. Since the Camago-Malampaya gas
reservoirs were located in the continental
shelf, this territory would be beyond the
Province of Palawan's territorial
jurisdiction.
 Philippines vs. China, ITLOS (West
Philippine Sea Case), 12 July 2016
1. China has always argued for historic
rights, as demarcated by the Nine Dash
Line.
2. Philippines raised issues in the South
China Sea Arbitration against China’s
claim.
3. Tribunal concluded that Scarbo Shoal,
cauteron reef, fiery cross, johnson,
mckennan and gaven reefs, were all found
to be high tide features. The High tide
features at Scarbo shoal and the reefs were
rocks that cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own
and so have no EEZ or continental
shelf. Spratly was the same, therefore
china has no entitlement to any maritime
zone in the area of mischief reef and
second Thomas shoal but they form part
of the EEZ and continental shelf of the
PH as the lie within 200nm without
overlapping entitlements in the area with
respect to china.
 Government
 It is the totality of authorities which rule a
society by prescribing and carrying out
fundamental rules which regulate the freedom
of its members.
 The agency or instrumentality through
which the will of the State is formulated,
expressed and realized.
 Kinds of Government Function
1. Constituent, are those which constitute
the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature such as the
maintenance of peace and order,
regulation of property and property
rights, the administration of justice, etc.
2. Ministrant – those intended to promote
the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people, and which are merely
optional for government to perform
a. BERNAS – the principles for
determining whether or not a
government shall exercise certain
of these optional functions are –
 i. That a government should do
for the public welfare those
things which private capital
would not naturally undertake;
and
ii. That a government should do
those things which by its
nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public
welfare than is any private
individual or group of
individuals
 Classes of government
1. De jure – government of law – it is the
legal, legitimate government of a state
and is so recognized by other states.
2. De facto – government of fact – it is a
government which actually exercise
power or control but without legal title.
a. Usurps by force
b. Established independent
government by the inhabitants of a
country
 c. Maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory.
 Government – is the agency which
formulates, expresses and realizes the will of
the people.
 Administration – is composed of group of
persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being. It is the
administration that runs the affairs of the
government for a given period of time, after
which another administration may be called
upon by the people to serve them.
 That is why we say that administration
changes but the government does not.
 Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 177728,
July 31, 2009
1. Eliseo Soriano the host of Dating Daan
aired in UNTV37 blurted out remarks
that are obscene. MTRCB suspended
the show for 3 months as punishment.
Soriano alleged violation of freedom of
speech under sec 4 art 3 constitution.
2. SC held that his right was not violated.
Petitioners’ remarks were obscene at
 least with respect to an average child
and the medium where it was uttered is
accessible to children. His freedom of
speech was weighed against the duty of
the government to protect the
development and welfare of the youth.
The statements were deemed to be
unprotected speech as it could corrupt
the young minds of the children. This
constitutes a compelling state interest in
regulation the petitioner’s utterances as
provided for by PD 1986 (creating the
MTRCB).
 Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines vs.
Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
1. Petitioner assailed the legitimacy of the
government of Cory Aquino. Aquino
issued Proclamation 1 announcing that
she and the VP Laurel were taking
power.
2. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made
 the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government.
 Sovereignty
 The supreme and uncontrollable power
inherent in a State by which that State is
governed.
1. Legal Sovereignty – supreme power to
affect legal interests either by
legislative, executive or judicial action.
2. Political Sovereignty – is the sum total
of all the influences in a state, legal and
non-legal, which determines that course
of law.
3. Effects of change in sovereignty –
political laws are abrogated but
municipal laws remain in force.
4. Effects of belligerent occupation – no
change in sovereignty but political laws,
except the law on treason, are
suspended and municipal laws remain
 in force unless repealed by the
belligerent occupant. At the end of the
belligerent occupation, when the
occupant is ousted from the territory,
the political laws shall automatically
become effective again, under the
doctrine of jus postliminium – the right
by which persons and things taken in
war are restored to their former status
when coming again under the power of
the nation to which they belonged.
 Laurel vs Misa, G.R. L-409, January 30,
1947, 77 Phil 856
(1)Laurel filed a petition for habeas
corpus. Alleged that giving aid and
comfort to the enemy during the
Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for treason because the
sovereignty of the Philippines and the
allegiance to the Philippine government
is suspended.
(2)The absolute and permanent allegiance
of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not severed
 or stopped by the enemy occupation
because sovereignty of the government
is not transferred to the occupier.
(3)What may be suspended is the exercise
of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant. The
political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation
of government and citizens, are
suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
 Peralta vs Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285
(1)Petition for habeas corpus. Peralta was
prosecuted for robbery and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Alleged
that ordinance 7 that created Court of
Special and Executive Criminal
Jurisdiction was a political
instrumentality of the forces of Japanese.
(2)We have already held in our recent
decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that
 all judgments of political complexion of
the courts during the Japanese regime,
ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation
of the islands by virtue of the principle
or right of postliminium. Applying that
doctrine to the present case, the sentence
which convicted the petitioner of a crime
of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid
ipso facto upon the reoccupation or
liberation of the Philippines by General
Douglas MacArthur.
 Act of State
 This doctrine says that a nation is sovereign
within its own borders, and its domestic
actions may not be questioned in the courts of
another nation.
 The act of state doctrine prevents claimants
from doing indirectly what they could not do
directly, that is, require a domestic court to
impeach the sovereign conduct of an immune
foreign state.
 Republic of Philippines vs. Marcos, 818
F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987) Decided June 4,
1987
(1)The complaint also alleges that during
Marcos' rule, he and his wife converted
and caused to be converted property
worth $1.55 billion belonging to the
Philippine government and its citizens.
Most of this, approximately $1.5 billion,
allegedly went into Swiss bank accounts;
four million dollars went to buy a house
in Beverly Hills; some $800,000 went
into two bank accounts at Lloyds Bank
in California; and property worth $7
million is in the Hawaii crates.
(2)Plaintiff's case implicates the act of
state doctrine in its most fundamental
sense. In order to resolve plaintiff's
various claims against Marcos, the court
will have to adjudicate whether Marcos'
actions as President were lawful under
Philippine law. A number of the acts
plaintiff challenges are purely
governmental ones, such as
expropriation of property and creation of
 public monopolies. These were not
merely the acts of Ferdinand Marcos,
private citizen, while he happened to be
president; they were an exercise of his
authority as the country's head of state
and, as such, were the sovereign acts of
the Philippines. As the Second Circuit
recently noted, to the extent that
"Marcos's wealth was obtained through
official expropriation decrees or public
monopolies," they were public acts.
2. State Immunity
 The State cannot be sued.
 RATIONALE – there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends. This is based on the
principle of juridical and practical notion that
the state can do no wrong which is a
restatement of the expression – the King can
do no wrong. The Sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends.
  A continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused
to private parties, the loss of government
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance
of its multifarious functions are far greater if
such a fundamental principle were abandoned
and the availability of judicial remedy were
not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity of the people to go to court, at the
least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that
constitutes such an effective obstacle, could
very well be imagined.
 Determine whether suit is against the state
 TEST – on the assumption that decision is
rendered against the public officer or agency
impleaded, will the enforecement thereof
require an affirmative act from the State, such
as the appropriation of the needed amount to
satisfy the judgment? If so, then it is a suit
against the state.
  State immunity from suit may be invoked as
long as the suit really affects the property,
rights or interests of the State and not merely
those of the officers nominally made party
defendants. (Tan v. Director of Forestry)
 If the suit would require an affirmative act
of appropriation should damages be awarded,
it is a suit against the State. (Veterans
Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v.
CA)
 A suit is against the state in the following instances
—
 When the Republic is sued by name
 When the suit is against an unincorporated
government agency
 When the suit is on its face against a
government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer
but to the government.
 Except — the state can be sued in the following
cases —
 If it gives consent to be sued, express or
implied
 The State may be sued if it gives consent,
whether express or implied. The doctrine is
also known as the “Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty”.
 Where no consent is shown, state immunity
from suit may be invoked as a defense by the
courts at any stage of the proceedings,
because waiver of immunity, being in
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly and must be construed in strictissimi
juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or
counterclaim) against the State must allege the
existence of such consent (and where the same
is found), otherwise, the complaint may be
dismissed. (Republic v. Feliciano)
 How should consent to be sued be given?
1. Express consent — can be given only
by an act of the legislative body, in a
general or a special law. (Republic v.
Feliciano)
a. CA327, as amended by PD 1445,
which requires that all money
claims against the government must
first be filed with the Commission
 on Audit before suit is instituted in
court;
b. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code — The
State is responsible in like manner
when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is
provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.
c. Art. 2189 of the Civil Code —
Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the
defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their
control or supervision.
d. Sec. 24 of the Local Government
Code — Local government units
and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property.
2. Implied consent —
a. When the state enters into a private
contract, unless the contract is
merely incidental to the
performance of a governmental
function. (Santos v. Santos 1952)
b. When the State commences
litigation against a private party, in
which case, it becomes vulnerable
to a counterclaim, unless the suit is
entered into only to resist a claim.
(Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
1954)
c. When the State enters into a
business contract or agreement
i. In entering into a compromise
agreement, the Republic
stripped itself of its immunity
and placed itself in the same
level as its adversary. When
the State enters into a contract
through its officers or agents,
in furtherance of a legitimate
aim and purpose and pursuant
 to constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual or
reciprocal benefits accrues and
rights and obligations arise
therefrom, the State may be
sued even without its express
consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract, the
sovereign descends to the level
of the citizen. (PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan)
 Consent to be sued does not include consent
to the execution of judgment against it. Such
execution will require another waiver, because
the power of the court ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment, unless such
disbursement is covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. (Republic vs
Villasor)
 Funds belonging to government corporations
(whose charters provide that they can sue and
be sued) that are deposited with a bank are
NOT exempt from garnishment. (PNB vs
 Palaban) ‣ If the funds belong to a public
corporation or a government- owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a
personality of its own, then the funds are not
exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
and is to be treated like any other corporation.
NHA is one such corporation; thus, its funds
are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. (NHA vs Heirs of Quivelondo
2003).
 Where the municipality fails or refuses,
without justifiable reason, to effect payment
of a final money judgment rendered against it,
the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment
and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance and the corresponding disbursement
of municipal funds to satisfy the money
judgment. (Municipality of Makati v. Court of
Appeals).
 Suability should not equated with outright
liability. Liability will have to be determined
 by the Court on the basis of the evidence and
the applicable law.
 If the property can still be restored, the suit
for restoration and damages must be against
the officer in his private capacity (Festejo v.
Fernando 1954). If the property can no longer
be restored and is in fact being enjoyed by the
State, then the State must be deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for
purposes of fixing the just compensation.
(Ministerio v. Court of First Instance 1971)
 Immunity of other states, organizations, and
instrumentalities
 Other Sovereign States
 International Organization
 Government Agencies, Instrumentalities or
Government owned or controlled corporations
1. Incorporated – immune from suit except
if the charter provides that the agency
can sue and be sued then the suit will
lie, including one for tort.
2. Unincorporated – immune from suit
except if consent is given expressly or
 impliedly. Such as if it enters into a
private contract, this is a waiver of the
immunity from suit based on such
contract
3. Government agencies, instrumentalities
or GOCCs not engaged in governmental
functions are not immune from suit.
 Public Officers
1. Immune from suit, provided they act
within the scope of their official
authority
2. The doctrine of State immunity also
applies to complaints filed against
officials of the State for acts performed
by them in the discharge of their duties
within the scope of their authority.
3. EXCEPT — exceptions when a public
officer, acting in his official capacity,
may be sued without the prior consent
of the State —
a. To compel him to do an act
required by law.
 b. To restrain him from enforcing an
act claimed to be unconstitutional.
c. To compel the payment of damages
from an already appropriated
assurance fund or to refund tax
over payments from a fund already
available for the purpose
d. To secure a judgment that the
officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the State having to
do a positive act to assist him;
e. Where the government itself has
violated its own laws, because the
doctrine of state immunity “cannot
be used to perpetrate an injustice”.
 BUT — In the following cases, the public
officer may be sued even without State
consent —
1. Acts outside the scope of his authority -
The unauthorized acts of government
officials are NOT acts of state; thus, the
public officer may be sued and held
personally liable in damages for such
acts. (Shauf vs CA)
 2. Acts with bad faith, malice or gross
negligence - Where a public officer has
committed an ultra vires act, or where
there is a showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence, the officer can be
held personally accountable, even if
such acts are claimed to have been
performed in connection with official
duties.
3. Acts in his personal capacity - Where
the public official is sued in his personal
capacity, the doctrine of state immunity
will not apply, even if the acts
complained of were committed while
the public official was occupying a
public position.
 Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16,
2014
 Petitioner filed Writ of Kalikasan, alleged
Swift, 7th US Fleet Commander, operations of
USS guardian cause environmental damage in
different provinces in Sulu Sea.
 If the judgement against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
 must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded.
 U.S.A. vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
 USA has naval base in Subic. One of the
provided bases in Military Base Agreement.
US invited submission of bids for repairs in
the naval base. Respondent submitted such
and US requested to confirm the price from
their proposal. Respondent construed this as
acceptance.
 For other states or international
organizations, distinguish contracts entered
into by the State in jure imperii (sovereign
acts) and in jure gestionis (commercial or
proprietary acts). Where the contract is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, there is no
waiver of immunity, and no implied consent
may be derived therefrom.
 U.S.A. vs. Guinto, G.R. No. 76609, Feb. 26, 1990
 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their
 duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded.
 Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that
it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
 Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11,
2003
 Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972,” was filed against Minucher following a
“buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine
police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo
in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national,
where heroin was said to have been seized.
 Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims
that he had acted in the discharge of his
official duties as being merely an agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the
United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity.
 A foreign agent, operating within a territory,
can be cloaked with immunity from suit as
long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state.
 Rep. of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. 154705, June
26, 2003
 The Indonesian Embassy terminated the
Maintenance Agreement. The respondent
claims that the aforesaid termination was
arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a
complaint against the petitioners which was
opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
  The Republic of Indonesia is acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered
into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by
the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of
its governmental functions.
 Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464
 Petitioner filed for just compensation for
expropriation of their property to widen the
streets of Cebu.
 The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated
by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled
to such payment of the amount fixed, may it
"have the right to enter in and upon the land
so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment." If there
were an observance of procedural regularity,
petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
 are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand
to benefit. It is just as important, if not more
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the
part of officialdom if the rule of law were to
be maintained. It is not too much to say that
when the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits
to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no
thought then that the doctrine of immunity
from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
 China National Machinery and Equipment Corp
(Group) vs. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189 (2012)
 CNMEG and North Luzon Railways Corp
for feasibility study on possible railway line
from manila to la union.
 In the Complaint, respondents alleged that
the Contract Agreement and the Loan
Agreement were void for being contrary to (a)
the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184
(R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)
 Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and
(d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code.
 There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical
or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in
the courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis.
 CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activity
 University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA
54
 UP and Stern entered in to a contract. UP
was not able to pay the 3rd bill due to
disallowance made by COA.
 Stern sued UP. RTC and CA granted the
petition. Asked UP to garnish funds for it’s
released.
  Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that
it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that
"no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law." The execution of the monetary
judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no
moment that a final and executory decision
already validated the claim against the UP.
 DBP vs COA, G.R. No. 216538 and 216954, April
18, 2017
 The RR-MVLPP involved the acquisition of
motor vehicles to be leased or sold to
qualified officers of GFIs. Under the plan, the
GFI concerned was to constitute a fund
 sourced from the appropriation in such
amount necessary to finance the acquisition of
brand-new motor vehicles to be leased or sold
to the GFI’s eligible officers. The officers
availing themselves of the benefits under the
plan were required to execute a Lease
Purchase Agreement with maximum periods
of 10 years, and the aggregate monthly rentals
for one year of not exceeding 10% of the
acquisition cost of each motor vehicle would
be payable through salary deduction.
 On July 20, 1992, the Office of the President
approved with certain modifications the RR-
MVLPP, which applied to GFI officers
occupying positions with salary grades (SG)
of not lower than SG-25.
 Among the GFIs covered by the RR-
MVLPP was Development Bank of the
Philippines. On July 30, 1992, DBP issued
Circular No. 25 to establish the conditions for
the plan consistent with the RR-MVLPP,
including the maximum loan period of 10
years and annual rental equivalent to 10% of
the acquisition cost of the vehicle payable
through salary deduction. However, five years
 later, DBP’s Board of Directors adopted
Board Resolution No. 0246 dated June 13,
1997 constituting the MVLPP Fund. As a
matter of fact the said Board Resolution No.
0246 was formulated in order to cater for their
own benefits.
 It is also notable that the MVLPP car funds
were trust funds, in that they came officially
into the possession of DBP as an agency of
the Government, or of the public officer as
trustee, agent, or administrator, or were
received for the fulfilment of some obligation.
Pursuant to Section 4 of PD No. 1445, “trust
funds shall be available and may be spent only
for the specific purpose for which the trust
was created of the funds received. Their
nature as trust funds constituted a limitation
on their use or application.
 Here, however, no exceptional circumstance
existed that warranted the application of
estoppel against the COA. Accordingly, the
Court cannot declare the disallowance invalid
on that basis.
 The fourth and last issue is whether or not
the persons identified by the COA as liable
 should be ordered to refund the total amounts
disallowed by the COA.
 The COA counters that the circumstances
surrounding the availment of the car loans
revealed a scheme that clearly contravened the
RR-MVLPP; that such scheme was enough to
debunk the claim of lack of bad faith in the
part of the officers-availees; that accordingly,
there could be no condonation of the
obligation to refund pursuant to the Notice of
Disallowance; that the assailed decision and
resolution specified the necessary factual and
legal basis for holding the individual
petitioners personally liable; and that the
pronouncement of the petitioners liability
under the Notice of Disallowance should be
read together with the body of the Notice of
Disallowance as well as the attached schedule
of the payees who were liable.
3. General Principles and State Policies
 Article II, 1987 Constitution
 BERNAS — The "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies" is a statement of the basic
ideological principles and policies that underlie the
 Constitution. As such, the provisions shed light on
the meaning of the other provisions of the
Constitution and they are a guide for all
departments of the government in the
implementation of the Constitution.
A. Preamble
 Preambulare – latin – to walk before.
 What is the function of the Preamble in the
Constitution?
1. BERNAS — The Preamble is not a
source of rights or of obligations.
Because, however, it sets down the
origin, scope, and purpose of the
Constitution, it is useful as an aid in
ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous
provisions in the body of the
Constitution. It is thus a source of light.
2. NACHURA — The preamble does not
confer rights nor impose duties. It
indicates authorship of the Constitution;
enumerates the primary aims and
aspirations of the framers; and serves as
an aid in the construction of the
Constitution.
 What is the origin, scope and purpose of the
Constitution as set out in the Preamble?
1. BERNAS — Its origin, or authorship, is
the will of the "sovereign Filipino
people." Its scope and purpose is "to
build a just and humane society and to
establish a government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve
and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality and peace.”
 Why does the Constitution now say
"Almighty God" instead of "Divine
Providence," as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did?
1. BERNAS — The phrase "Almighty
God" is more personal and more
consonant with personalist Filipino
religiosity.
 What is the meaning of "common good" and
how does it differ from the "general welfare"
of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions?
1. BERNAS — The phrase "common
good" projects the idea of a social order
that enables every citizen to attain his or
her fullest development economically,
politically, culturally, and spiritually.
The phrase "general welfare" was
avoided because it could be interpreted
as "the greatest good for the greatest
number" even if what the greater
number wants does violence to human
dignity, as for instance when the greater
majority might want the extermination
of those who are considered inferior.
 What is the significance of the specification
of "equality?"
1. BERNAS — It emphasizes that a major
problem in Philippine society is the
prevalence of gross economic and
political inequalities.
 What is the import of "the rule of law?"
 1. BERNAS — This expresses the concept
that government officials have only the
authority given them by law and
defined by law, and that such authority
continues only with the consent of the
people. The statement is: "Ours is a rule
of law and not of men."
 Estrada vs Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651,
June 22, 2006
1. Alejandro Estrada requested to Judge
Caoibes RTC branch 253 LP City, for
an investigation of Soleda Escritor.
Estrada alleged that escritor was
committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court. Estrada
alleged that respo lives with a man not
his husband and had a son.
2. 10 years living together – executed
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
Once legal impediment lifted the
validity of the declaration ceases and
couple should legalize their union.
3. Benevolent neutrality rule -
Accommodation of religion may be
 allowed, not to promote any of its
favored forms, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their respective
religions without hindrance.
4. Our own preamble also invokes the aid
of a divine being. These constitutional
provisions are wholly ours and have no
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or
its amendments. They all reveal without
doubt that the Filipino people, in
adopting these constitutions, manifested
their adherence to the benevolent
neutrality approach that requires
accommodations in interpreting the
religion clauses.
B. Republicanism
 A republican state is a state wherein all
government authority emanates from the
people and is exercised by representatives
chosen by the people.
 RATIONALE — To prevent concentration
of authority in one person or group of persons
that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse
in its exercise to the detriment of republican
 institutions. To secure action, to forestall
overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain
efficiency. (Pangasinan Transporation Co. v.
Public Service Commission)
 BERNAS — In the view of the new
Constitution the Philippines is not only a
representative or republican state but also
shares some aspects of direct democracy such
as "initiative and referendum" in Article VI,
Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2. The
word "democratic" is also a monument to the
February Revolution which re-won freedom
through direct action of the people.
 NOTE — Constitutional authoritarianism,"
as understood and practiced in the Marcos
regime under the 1973 Constitution, was the
assumption of extraordinary powers by the
President, including legislative and judicial and
even constituent powers. Constitutional
authoritarianism is compatible with a
republican state if the Constitution upon which
the Executive bases his assumption of power is
a legitimate expression of the people's will and
if the Executive who assumes power received
 his office through a valid election by the
people.
 What are the manifestations of
republicanism?
1. NACHURA —
a. Ours is a government of laws and
not of men
b. Rule of the majority. (Plurality in
elections)
c. Accountability of public officials.
d. Bill of Rights.
e. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable
laws.
f. Separation of powers.
 Representative and Renovation - Under the
concept of renovation, it does not allow
permanent legislation as well as permanent
Governmental acts. These governmental acts
are subject to changes by future government
officers.
1. Representation and Renovation
2. Elective officials as a representative
 3. Renovation – we have the power to
replace elective officials
 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
1.
C. Incorporation Clause
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines vs. Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007
 Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618,
February 1, 2011
 Rearing of the Youth
 James M. Imbong, et al. Vs. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al. G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
April 8, 2014
 Department of Education vs. San Diego, 180
SCRA 533
D. Social Justice
 May be regulated by police power but not
probihit.
 Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726
E.Separation of Church and State
  Aglipay vs Ruiz, 64 Phil 201
 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No.
10-4-19-SC, March 07, 2017
F.Balanced and Healthful Ecology and to Health
 Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No.101083, July
30, 1993
 MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
 Resident Marine Mammals vs Reyes, G.R.
No. 180771, April 21, 2015
 International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-biotech Applications Inc. vs. Greenpeace,
G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016

4. Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances

 The government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
powers into the legislative, the executive and the
judicial.
 Principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances— operates as an implicit
limitation on legislative powers as on the other two
 powers. ‣ Three great powers of government — a.
Legislative b. Executive c. Judicial ‣ It means that
legislation belongs to the legislative, execution to
the executive, and settlement of legal controversies
to the judiciary. Each is prevented from invading
the domain of the others ‣ The separation is not
total. The system allows for checks and balances.
The net effect of which being that, in general, no
one department is able to act without the
cooperation of at least one of the other
departments. ‣ Such as — legislation needs the
final approval of the president, president cannot act
against laws passed by Congress and must obtain
the concurrence of Congress to complete
significant acts, money can be released from the
treasury only by authority of Congress, the
Supreme Court can declare the acts of Congress or
the President unconstitutional.
 Belgica vs Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 11,
2013 – PDAF (Pork Barrel Misuse)
o The enforcement of the national budget, as
primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally
assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. Thus, unless
 the Constitution provides otherwise, the
Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go
into the implementation of the national budget
as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law. Clearly, these post-
enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr.
puts it "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities"
and the "regulation and release of funds" in
violation of the separation of powers principle.
o Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount
ofP24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum
 allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it necessarily means that the actual
items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations
Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto.
o In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects
in the rules within which it operates. It has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution, the
system has violated the principle of separation
of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto
legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it
has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in
the process, denied the President the power to
veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by
giving legislators a stake in the affairs of
budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired
public accountability ; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national
officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine
local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-
related purposes only to other purposes he may
deem fit as well as other public funds under
 the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects," it has
once more transgressed the principle of non-
delegability.
 Francisco vs House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003
o Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.
o Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
 justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
 Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014
o When President Benigno Aquino III took
office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank
advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch”
Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
o The transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of
the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should
 only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
o The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may
not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.
 Emilio Gonzales III vs. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014
o Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the "protector of the people"
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau. This
constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the
Ombudsman an authority to directly check and
guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of
the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted RA No. 6770.
o In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting
the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter
egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its
key officials, all of them tasked to support the
 Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the
constitutionally-granted independence is what
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By
so doing, the law directly collided not only
with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but inevitably with the principle of checks and
balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize.
 Lagman vs. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018
1. Whether or not the Congress is vested
with power to extend the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and martial law
a. Yes, the Congress is vested with
power to extend the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and martial law pursuant
to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987
Constitution specifically provides
that “The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the
 President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
2. The Congress, if not in session, shall,
within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.”
3. Under the said provision, there are
limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to such
extension and these are the following:
a. the extension must be upon the
initiative of the President
b. it must be based on the continuing
rebellion and necessity for the sake
of public safety
c. Upon petition of any Filipino, it
has to be reviewed by the Court in
terms of the adequacy of factual
basis. Furthermore, the provision is
also clear in providing the
 Congress the power to decide on
the duration with regards to said
extension.
5. Delegation of Powers
 DELEGATION OF RULE-MAKING/QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE POWERS ‣ It is common
knowledge that, as a matter of practice, numerous
statutes have been passed creating administrative
agencies and authorizing them to exercise vast
regulatory powers and the issuance of “rules and
regulations” to implement laws. Such rules have
the force of law. Is this a delegation of “law-
making power”? ‣ NO. What is delegated is NOT
legislative or law-making power, but rather, rule-
making power or “law execution”. ‣ Such power is
known as “quasi-legislative” ‣ Quasi-legislative
power is the authority delegated by the law-making
body to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a
law and implement legislative policy. ‣ Legislative
power involves the discretion to determine what
the law shall be. Quasi- legislative power only
involves the discretion to determine how the law
shall be enforced. The former cannot be delegated.
The latter can be delegated. ‣ Administrative
 agencies may be given the — 1. Power of
Subordinate or Supplemental Legislation — Filling
up the details” of an already complete statute for its
enforcement or 2. Power of Contingent Legislation
— Ascertain the facts necessary to bring a
“contingent” law into actual operation
 VALIDITY OF SUBORDINATE/CONTINGENT
LEGISLATION ‣ RULE — CONGRESS MAY
DELEGATE RULE-MAKING POWERS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. HOWEVER,
THE STATUTE MAKING THE DELEGATION
MUST— 1. BE COMPLETE IN ITSELF
(COMPLETENESS TEST) ‣ It must set forth
therein the policy to be carried out or implemented
by the delegate ‣ Without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of law
2. FIX SUFFICIENT STANDARDS
(SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST) ‣ It must fix
a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
‣ Without such standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
 of his authority. ‣ NOTE — These requirements
are to ensure that the power delegated by the
legislature to administrative agencies is not law-
making power. If they are satisfied, the regulations
passed by an administrative body pursuant to the
delegation made by the statute are just as binding
as if the regulation had been written in the original
statute itself. If, however, these requirements are
not satisfied, the regulation will not be allowed to
affect private rights.
 Jaworski vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January
14, 2004
o PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an
instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority
and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming”, which granted
SAGE the authority to operate and maintain
Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino
locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to
service local and international bettors, provided
that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR,
appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness
of the games.
 o In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an
agreement with SAGE whereby the former
grants the latter the authority to operate and
maintain sports betting stations and Internet
gaming operations. The petition is GRANTED.
The “Grant of Authority and Agreement to
Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming”
executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is
declared NULL and VOID.
 Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
 Camid vs. Office of the President, G.R. No.
161414, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 711

B. Legislative Department
1. Who May Exercise Legislative Power
a. Initiative and Referendum
2. Houses of Congress
a. Senate
b. House of Representatives
(1)District Representatives and Questions
of Apportionment
  Aquino and Robredo vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
 Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700
 Tagolino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
202202, March 19, 2013
(2)Party-List System
 Atong Paglaum, Inc, et al vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April
2, 2013
 Abang Lingkod Party-List (Abang
Lingkod) Vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 206952. October
22, 2013
 Coalition of Association of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines vs.
COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786
 David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
3. Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and
Disqualifications
 People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875,
February 3, 2000
  Trillanes IV vs. Judge Pimentel, G.R.
No. 179817, June 27, 2008
4. Quorum and Voting Majorities
 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No.
127255, June 26, 1998
5. Discipline of Members
 Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863
 Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055,
April 18, 2001
 Pimentel vs Senate Committee, G.R.
No. 187714, March 8, 2011
 Revilla vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
218232, July 24, 2018