Art. 820.

Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article
805 of this Code. (n)

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

1.

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS: Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a
petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will
was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following
grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and
sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of
the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding
that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely
no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.

ISSUE: W/N a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible
as required by Art. 805?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more than
just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820-821
must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a
will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on
the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo,
No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: “Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but
may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.”

Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction
of this right is void.

2.
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO,
PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are the nieces/nephews of Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The
four heirs believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hence they filed an intestate proceeding.
However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will
which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a
probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the house
helper under the instruction of the deceased

The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will
was sufficiently proven.

ISSUE: W/N the will was revoked by Adriana?

HELD: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur, the  'corpus' and 'animus' must
concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a
will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence
to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the
burning though done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an
effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus
is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or
cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and presence.

3.

G.R. No. L-26317             January 29, 1927

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.

FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last
will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac and others. Said petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased
executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again
opposed by Mamuyac alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16
will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that said will was not the last will
and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on December
30, 1920.

ISSUE: W/N the April 16 will was revoked?

HELD: Yes. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is
never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with
intent to revoke it.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to
the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to
establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents,
the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in
which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation
or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the
law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has
been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

4. Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538             September 21, 1951

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS: Mariano Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs
but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his
nephews and nieces.
Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove
its due execution. 

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.

ISSUE: W/N the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939
will?

HELD: Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will
executed in 1939. The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of Dependent Relative
Revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for
the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

5. Diaz vs. De Leon

G.R. No. 17714             May 31, 1922

In the mater of the estate of Jesus de Leon.

IGNACIA DIAZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DE LEON, opponent-appellee.

FACTS:  Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in accordance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him.
As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his
nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will
has already been destroyed.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid revocation of the will?

HELD: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change
the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses
and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which
was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it  cannot be probated as the last will and
testament of testator.
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance
of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after
the testator's a death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or
after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

6.

G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.

FACTS: Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario.
Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement
proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as
well as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large
parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the
decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of
Ernesto should be disregarded.

ISSUE: W/N the probate of a will can be dispensed with?

HELD: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the
last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory
and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Probate of a will, which is a proceeding in
rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without
offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by
will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the
means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said
heirs and legatees.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of
the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account
of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

7.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.

FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died.
Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his
lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the
petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed
upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose
of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same.

ISSUE: W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

HELD: No. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Where the will on its face is of dubious legality, the court’s duty to pass first upon its
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The
prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo
executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

8.

G.R. No. c      December 23, 1964

PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament
where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while
each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.

Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probate then the Court admitted for probate the said will
but only for the part of Bernabe.

When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because she and
her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the
CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills.

ISSUE: W/N the will may be probated?

HELD: Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was probated by
a court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for
the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of
the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of
each testator.

The joint will is prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be
reexamine and adjudicated de novo.

The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.

A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will subject
to such probate.