BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a typical transitional society that is yet to fully arrive in the 21th
century. Notwithstanding misleading superficialities like its nuclear prowess or
ballistic missiles. the country is still largely a feudal and tribal society which is self-
contentedly basking in its easy-paced and change resistant agricultural life-style. In
terms of Rostov‟s stages of economic development it is still preparing for take-off.
With limited industrial or commercial employment opportunities for its rapidly
growing population (almost 70% of which is below 25 years of age) disguised
unemployment or under-employment (made possible by small subsistence agricultural
holdings) is the norm. Given the ample supply of time people are very fond of verbal
exchanges of all kinds: from the ubiquitous chat to the equally common emotionally
charged religious debates and political discussions. Thus the nation appears to be one
of talkers and idlers.

Strange as it may seem to the uninitiated foreigner, for a nation with as high a
rate of illiteracy as Pakistan has, the citizens are far more well informed and
opinionated that could be expected. The Pakistanis have opinions about issues on
which even the supposedly well aware in the developed world are likely to fail us.
One possible reason for this may be that Pakistanis like many of their fellow
countrymen of the LDCs are confronted with real life issues of hunger and disease,
shelter and employment, bureaucratic indifference and political corruption at a much
more basic and personal level than citizens in the developed world.

Generally fond of talking as Pakistanis are, some topics are national

favourites. While accurate statistical data may not be available with regard to what
Pakistanis like to talk about most, from general experience it can be said that politics,
government activities and the full scope of officialdom command great public interest
when it comes to a chat in the early hours at the office, at the all-too-usual gossip
sittings or debates in colleges. Perhaps, in other countries which have similar
conditions of excessive government and unstable politics, and where people have
plenty of „do-nothing time‟ the two “cracies” of the “bureau” and “demos” are also
hotly debated issues.

But whether it is Pakistan or any other nation state, these two powers - of
government officials and public representatives - appear to be intricately linked and
essential parts of the whole that is a modern state. In countries where true
representative governments exist, the permanent government officials or bureaucrats
(i.e. government functionaries whose employment is not connected with the change of
government) are necessarily subservient to the constitutional dictates of elected
representatives. In such countries the issue of functional dichotomy posed by Max
Weber with regard to bureaucracy as being either a functional organ of the state or the
government does not arise because long traditions of representative and constitutional
governance have settled basic jurisdictions of the state and governments. Called by
any of the varying terms used to describe them - civil servants, public servants,
government officials, state functionaries or bureaucrats, these persons owe their basic
loyalties to the state but work for the governments in power which have come into
existence and remain in power through constitutional processes. Day to day work is
carried out according to legislated rules and established SOPs and not the
idiosyncratic whims of politicians in power.

However, in countries which do not have the good fortune to be ruled

according to the true wishes of their people or even laws which have been otherwise
legislated the situation becomes very different. It is here that government officials
must make their own decisions as to who is their employer, the state or the
government in power, that is if there is any difference between the two. In many
cases, the de facto powers of apparently democratically elected politicians also far
exceed what could be considered the norms of good governance. Usually the law of
survival dictates that the difference between state and government is put aside for the
time being and the person or group in power be accepted as the full and only
arbitrator of rightful government.

There is yet another situation that of countries where political instability has
been the rule. Here dictatorship and democracy have played hide and seek and the
latter has not been able to take root in the national ethos. Here the permanent
government employees, especially those in offices which have a significant bearing
upon national policy making and its execution on a day to day basis, see themselves
as a constant factor that provides continuity from one period to another. However, as
can perhaps be expected, the bureaucrats in such political situations go beyond merely
providing the much needed continuity in an unstable political environment, and tend
to directly or indirectly provide the missing links in the political leadership. The
Pakistani situation and that of its civil servants resembles this last case most closely.
Indeed as will be borne out later, this situation may be equated to a zero-sum game
where a gain of power and prestige by politicians has traditionally meant an equal
and opposite loss by bureaucrats and vice versa.

Pakistan has been a classic example of Third World political instability and
chaos, so much so that leading scholars have chosen to name their books on the
country as The Enigma of Political Development (Ziring) or From Crisis to Crisis
(Feldman). Fifty years into its existence the roles of the three groups that have run the
country - the politicians, soldiers and bureaucrats have yet to be finally decided. The
role of the people of Pakistan in its governing has, unfortunately, been fairly minimal.
Even in the limited periods when democracy has existed it has been of varieties
restricted either by prevalent socio-political conditions that do not provide equality of
opportunity for the constituents or by manipulative politics of dictators and
demagogues garbed in the camouflage of electoral popularity. Of recent the judiciary
has also become fairly involved in national politics, at least in the public perception, if
only by way of its interpretation of the Constitution which has at times bounded on
legislative

The massive illiteracy combined with a non-proportional system of

representation has meant that democratic governments do not enjoy a true mandate of
the people. A weak party system, has led to floor-crossings being the norm (until the
present parliament which is restricted by a anti-defection law) which has in turn led to
weak oppositions. Governments have been placed in power with as little as a third of
the total popular vote. In other situations “non-party elections” have led to an almost
immediate formation of “the government party” allegedly prompting one provincial
Chief Minister to claim that he had never been guilty of the rather unbecoming
conduct of floor-crossing as he had always been in one party i.e. the government
party.

Pakistan, like most other countries born out of former colonial empires has
had a very bureaucratic past. Even when the areas now constituting the country were
governed as part of local empires, the rulers were very distant from their subjects and
the only channel bringing these two together were the “royal servants.” As a reminder
of that period, the two most common terms for bureaucrats in the Pakistan national
language Urdu continue to be naukar-e-shahi (royal servants) and afsar-e-shahi (royal
officials). Indeed, the coming of the colonial power made little or no difference for the
great majority of the people. Rudimentary democratic practices did exist in local tribal
and peer groups but democracy in the modern sense of a system of government by
peoples‟ representatives chosen by universal suffrage was a new concept that was
paradoxically introduced by alien rulers who had come a long way to set up an
empire.

Considerations like the great distance to the imperial capital and high cost of
bringing and maintaining expatriate officials as well as general political expediency
meant that the new rulers required local mediators to execute the policies developed
by the home country for driving maximum benefit from the territories under their
control. Thus, developed the British Indian bureaucratic state which one author has
called “one of the most remarkable and successful bureaucracies developed in any
country.”[1] At the centre of this bureaucracy was an organisation called the Indian
Civil Service (ICS). The members of this organisation, which was termed variously as
a “governing corporation” and “the steel frame on which British rule in India rested”
were perhaps the best known of all bureaucrats anywhere. Patterned on the Guardians
of Plato and the Mandarins of China, these officers became known as the “heaven
born” and the “kept class”. This group was specially created to serve as the executors
of Whitehall‟s commands.

Initially closed to Indians, the ICS in time became the instrument of gradual
change through which the colonial power wanted to introduce reform aimed at a final
realisation of the goal of responsible self-government in the “crown jewel of the
British Empire”. In 1915, Indians comprised only five percent of the ICS, but the
various reform commissions assigned the task of enhancing this proportion envisaged
that in time at least fifty percent of the senior government employees of British India
became Indians. This figure that came close to being achieved until it was pre-
empted by the outbreak of World War II at which time some forty percent of ICS
officers were Indians. But while these officers were nominally Indian, they were
more of “Brown Englishmen” than Indian both in overall appearance and mental
outlook by virtue of having been brought up in the iron-cast mould of their masters,

This system of Indianisation of the civil service came about at a time when
another equally remarkable modern concept was gaining popularity with Indians:
their first flirtation with the Western democracy and the processes of self government.
However, the British did not proceed with the developments in Indianisation of ICS
and introduction of representative self-government hand in hand. The reasons for this
imbalance in developing a home-grown bureaucracy and home-grown breed of
democrats were easily understandable. For one, howsoever benevolent colonialists
that the British may have been (compared to their Dutch, French and Italian
contemporaries), they were still an alien power holding on to a vast area and
population for the primary intent of achieving their imperialist designs. Secondly, the
Indians were far from being a homogeneous community in which democracy could be
practiced as in the West: they were badly fragmented on religious, caste and ethnic
lines in which the possibility of a religious or ethnic majority permanently dominating
the minority community was more than likely. Thirdly, democratic aspirations were
deliberately shunned by and/ or simply beyond the historical and intellectual
experience of many Indians including the hereditary rulers of the princely states, the
influential members of the landed aristocracy or the illiterate masses. In short
democracy was an idea whose time had not come in the India of the early 20th
century.

Seen retrospectively, the movement towards Indian independence did not

come of age until perhaps 15 or 20 years before independence. Even at the time of the
unilateral decision by the Labour government to pull out of India by a self-imposed
deadline, as famous a British leader as Churchill expressed deep reservations and
future apprehensions over the Indians‟ inability for self-governance. Many British
genuinely believed that the natives still required extensive training in good
governance under their benevolent patronage.. To an extent they may have been
correct. Indeed, not too many Indians had been schooled in the delicate art of
democracy. To the Muslims democracy equated the unquotable: a moral, intellectual,
and minority of true Muslim believers acting as the guardian fathers of a theo-centric
state could never be ousted by mere numbers of commoners licking in good morals,
thought and Islamic belief. Governance was a prerogative of the wise and good few.
Muslim leaders also expressed apprehensions that democracy was not possible in a
country divided into a permanent religio-political majority and an equally permanent
religio-political minority. Thus, when independence came the institutions of
bureaucracy and democracy these two largest of Indian communities differed greatly
in their strengths.

Indian politics of this period revolved around a few great names and the two
great parties the Congress and the Muslim League could have been identified with a
handful of leaders. Party activists comprised mostly of youthful university students,
lawyers, journalists, liberal agriculturists and a mix of the mostly urbanized middle-
class from the more Central of India‟s provinces - the Punjab, U.P., C.P., Bihar,
Maharashtra and Gujrat. Unlike these fledging democratic institutions which could
only trace their beginning to 1885 when a British Indian civil servant initiated the
establishment of a forum for socio-political discussion, (later the Indian National
Congress), the “royal servants” had a much longer history of significant involvement
in the running of India, and of evolving into an institution.

Throughout the world, democracy had evolved out of long drawn and often
bloody struggle between forces of authority and liberty. In India this struggle was not
between indigenous people and local monarchs but a constitutional, generally non-
violent, and relatively short movement against alien domination made possible in the
first place by the rather benign attitude of the occupying power and other international
events. In contrast bureaucracy is, everywhere, an institution in which authority is
delegated by a higher power to persons enjoying its favour in order to carry out day to
day business.
 It is this perception of “higher authority” on part of the players in a democratic
polity which governs the relationship between politicians and state functionaries. If
the higher authority is that of constitutional supremacy, the bureaucrats are likely to
follow a more objective and mature course of actions. On the other hand if the power
of the bureaucrats flows directly from the wishes of the government in power, then an
unscrupulous, immoral and partial institution will be the logical result. In India the
rule of the British was not too strange in so far as the fact that foreign occupying
powers were not new to this part. Indeed if anything the British could easily justify
their colonization of India on the basis of a more benevolent rule that provided far
more in terms of justice and welfare for the highly pluralistic population than earlier
foreign or home-bred rulers.

The movement of India towards independence took what is now a familiar

road: growth of education, industrialization, liberal values and popular awareness of
the right of self-determination taking place in the back-drop of the rise of the nation-
state and rapid economic globalization. But India was a vast country that posed some
unusual problems. One of these was its lack of true unity.

Like the nation at large the development of Indian politics towards self-
government could also be easily divided into Muslim and Hindu spheres. Muslims
had been warned early of the pitfalls of democracy: The Muslim League, which laid
claim to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims, began with certain fundamental
premises and problems. The League based its representative claim of the basis of
absolute and unbridgeable gap between the two communities; it expounded the
concept of “separate Hindu and Muslim electorates” Much that the League‟s
constituency increasingly included Muslims from all areas and all socio-economic
classes, the party leadership remained concentrated in the hands of middle to large
landowners (mostly from U.P. and Punjab) and the urban elite.

Although powerful in their own right, these people were products of a colonial
period and a system in which ICS officers, particularly the District Magistrates, were
virtually legal sovereigns. Most of these Muslim leaders, especially the landlords
represented the conservative rather than the revolutionary forces. It was for these so-
called Muslim activists that Mr. Jinnah, not yet the Quaid-i-Azam, said in 1932, “The
Muslim Camp is full of those spineless people, who whatever them may say to me,
will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do”.[2] But the people
did what appeared logical: independence was no where in sight while the Deputy
Commissioner was the true symbol of British rule: A population of over 600 million
governed by a few hundred civil and military officers.

It may also be interesting to note the observations of another well known

Pakistan-scholar, Khalid bin Saeed regarding the role of the Deputy Commissioner in
the 1937 elections when the newly organized Muslim League had the first test of its
claim as representative of all Indian Muslims. In Punjab where the Muslim landlords
enjoyed outright superiority, the League had a terrible taste of defeat. It received only
one seat out of eighty-six reserved Muslim seats; victory went to the Unionist Party
whose leaders were by and large the Muslim landed aristocracy. They took most of
the reserved Muslim seats and a clear majority of the total. Saeed attributes this
victory to the support of a triumvirate consisting of the landlords, their spiritual
counterparts, the pirs and the Deputy Commissioner.[3] This in one of the first
examples of direct interference of bureaucrats in the representative politics in India.
The study continues to highlight this point by noting that the Muslim League accused
the colonial officials including the governor of direct attempts to favour the Unionists
who had been predicted to win by the highest representative of the Crown the
Viceroy Lord Wavell when he expressed his feelings that “tried leaders” would
emerge victors (as reported by the former Prime Minister F.K. Noon).[4]

On the eve of independence, the “steel frame” on which British rule had once
rested was also unbolted and divided off between the two dominions. However,
Pakistan was by far the loser when it came to receiving the inheritance. The
administrative assets were no exceptions. Of a total of 1157 officers in the ICS and
the IPS (Indian Political Service) there were only 101 Muslims; of these 95 opted for
Pakistan. These were subsequently joined by 50 British, 1 Christian and 11 Muslim
army officers. Of the 95 Muslim Civil Officers, half had less than a decade of service
while less than 20 had 15 years of more.

Pakistan, unlike India, was being started from scratch. Most of the divisible
assets lay in areas falling in India. Millions of refugees were moving across the new
borders. Of these nearly a million were to perish in a massive frenzy of hate-killings
by Hindus and Sikhs. There was an almost total breakdown of day to day
administration and a very poor state of finances. Thus the administrative problems of
nearly 60 million people that were to be tackled by this thin force of a hundred odd
officers were far beyond the worst nightmare any of these officers could have had in
normal times. To compound the troubles the Muslim League could boast of only a
handful competent leaders. As for the national legislature - the Constituent Assembly
– it was a body which had been indirectly constituted from provincial legislatures
almost solely for the prime task of framing a constitution.

Such being the state of affairs, government servants and political workers and
leaders of the Muslim League formed a very small nucleus of talent available to the
new nation. Thus whatever rift that could have been expected between the
government functionaries and the leaders of the independence movement was set
aside for the time being. The former, who until not too long ago had been part of the
colonial administration that dealt with popular sentiments in a not-too-nationalistic of
manners, if not outright antagonism, became natural allies of those who had waged
the real battle for independence. Systematic reorganization of the administrative
system that had worked so well for so long, and which was showing its efficiency in
such times as well, could not have been contemplated even by a more capable and
stronger political leadership, howsoever much that they may have sported secret
apprehensions against former agents of the Raj. Apart from the need of the hour, it
was also the sagacity and vision of Mr. Jinnah and his companions that they were able
to realize that the ICS officers were not just spoiled “brown sahibs” but that their lot
included many able Muslim officers.

Mr. Jinnah, referred to as “the last of the great Victorians, a

parliamentarian in the mould of Gladstone and Disraeli … (whose) canons
were sound law and sound procedure” (by a pair of otherwise very caustic
writers), was indeed a stranger to the values of feudal and tribal cultures.
An extremely “un-Indian” and highly legalistic man, the Quaid‟s advise to
the civil servants of the new country was very clear and not too different
from his own principles and world-view:

“The administration must be impartial…you should not be

influenced by any political pressure, by any political party or
individual politician. If you want to raise the prestige and greatness
of Pakistan, you must not fall victim to any pressure, but do your
duty as servants of the people and State, fearlessly honestly and
according to the dictates of your conscience.

Governments come and go, but you stay on. Therefore, you should
have no hand in supporting this political party or that political party,
this political leader or that political leader. This is not your business.

Do not allow politicians to interfere in tour official duties or

succumb to their political pressure, because I leads to nothing but
corruption bribery and nepotism - a horrible disease a disservice to
Pakistan ….”

[Talk to civil officers at Peshawar, 14th April

1948]

Unfortunately the new state moved on from crisis to crisis, chief among them
being the further depletion of competent and sincere political leadership by the early
demise of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and tragic murder of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan. For these gentlemen as well as for their colleagues it had not been easy to find
talent to run the new nation. The Quaid-e-Azam was well aware of the talents of the
British officers who had stayed back as well as the ICI officers. So it was but natural
that the Muslim League cabinets came under a strong bureaucratic influence from the
very start: to quote K.B. Saeed:

“ It was a Mudie or a Cunnigham who sent detailed reports

about cabinet and party factions. The kind of advice that Jinnah
was receiving can be seen in the letters of these British
Governors. The main tenor of these letters was that the
politicians were not allowing the government machinery to
function with its pre-independence bureaucratic efficiency.
Jinnah could have drawn two conclusions from this: one to place
the politicians under bureaucratic tutelage; and two; to improve
the party machinery to eliminate some of the factions and
accommodate others. He was, after all, a dying man and could
think of only immediate short-term remedies. In setting for the
first alternative, he not only took care of the immediate
problems but laid the foundations for future actions and policies
of his successor governments that out did him in establishing
bureaucratic control over politicians”.[5]

The entry thus made by the higher bureaucracy into the corridors of power in
the new nation became even more permanent as the political leaders showed a
complete inability to come to grips with the problems of the new country. In every
sphere the well-nurtured bureaucrats matched the ineptitude and inefficiency of the
politicians with an equal and opposite attitude of efficiency and organisation. The
“great responsibility” which the Quaid had placed on civil officers‟ shoulders -
because they provided the continuity while governments came and went.
Unfortunately, for the country these bureaucrats were only too eager to conduct
themselves according to the letter and not the spirit of Quaid‟s words. They were
willing to take up the real mantle of power. The founding idealism was giving way to
“realism”.

On the political side, the Muslim League‟s inability to establish itself as a

popular party with deep roots in the people had increasingly made it a loss cause; in
its place a new group of power elite was coming up. These included in addition to the
old power groups of the landlords, the lawyers, middle class urban professionals and
the rising business class, and, of course, the servants of the state whose immense
power would always ensure the continuity of this new patched up ruling class. In time
military officers were also to make their debut into the power elite. The extent of this
power could only be fully appreciated by people who lived under the clout of the
District Magistrate or know of the extent of his legal powers. The tenure of a
bureaucrat was by far longer than any national leader: 3 decades versus 2 years (on
the average).

Viewed from another angle, the entry of the bureaucracy into the power elites
was a blessing. The country was passing through what could well be called “the
decade of difficulties”. Keith Callard, author of Pakistan: The Formative Phase,
credits the very functioning of the country “almost entirely to the work of the
services, for the quality of the political leadership was neither high nor vigorous.”[6]
“Writing in 1956, Callard stated,

“The politicians have spent nine years in tearing each other to

pieces. When responsible government broke down, the civil
services took over …. The periods of direct bureaucratic rule
have been in many ways those of most efficient government.
There are large numbers of people in Pakistan who would not be
dismayed at the thought of a lengthy period of government by
soldiers and civil servants.”[7]

Callard goes on to quote from an editorial of a leading Karachi newspaper, the Times
of Karachi, which writes in its publication of April 28, 1955:

“We do not believe that in our own situation the first call on the
government is to stabilize the country; democratizing it can only
be a secondary objective ….. We are sure that if democracy
clashes with the objective of stability, the people will rather
prefer some other system.”[8].

Strong as these words may seem, in 1958, they were proven right and the
people did prefer the military coup of Ayub Khan as shown by contemporary reports.
A statement of Fatima Jinnah, sister and sole companion of the Quaid-i-Azam, in the
Morning News of October 29, 1958 read:
 “A new era has begun under General Ayub Khan and the
Armed Forces have undertaken to root out the administrative
malaise and anti-social activities to create a sense of confidence,
security and stability. I hope and pray that God may give them
wisdom and strength to achieve their objective”.

The immediate objective of Ayub Khan was to put away the politicians, who
had failed the country for almost 10 years. This banishment was to last for quite some
time. The General felt that enough time had been given to them. Indeed, when the
civil servant turned head of state, Ghulam Mohammed had asked him to impose
Martial Law in 1954 the General had not obliged. The new system in which
politicians were to have no place, at least not in the first phase, therefore turned
almost automatically to the support of the civil bureaucracy and this alliance of
military and civil bureaucrats resulted in what Lawrence Ziring calls “a full-blown
administrative state”. Ziring writes:

“Schooled in an imperial tradition, the civil-military bureaucrats

stressed authoritative decision-making and frowned upon debate
and controversy ....The nature of the system attracted to its
support people with similar instincts …. The landlord class,
which was primarily concerned with the perpetuation of its
status, quickly gave its support to the Martial Law regime.
Ayub‟s decision to accept them underscores his need for a larger
base than represented by the union of the bureaucracy and
armed forces. The peasant population, Ayub was to note, was
barely ready for anything resembling self-government”.

Although the Martial Law was to remain in force for nearly three and a half
years till June 1962, the Army was removed to the barracks within months of the
October 1958 coup and routine administration passed into the hands of the CSP. Very
quickly these 400 odd officers came to be perceived by many to be the real force
behind the regime. According to Ziring, this dependence on the bureaucracy was
prompted by Ayub‟s vision of the country in which Islam was not strong enough to
hold the country together and where politicians could not rise high enough to “reflect
national purpose and resolve”. Moreover, he identified the bureaucracy with
education and experience and which as a group was loyal to him and the country. To
quote Ziring again:

“To Ayub they (the bureaucrats) were familiar with modern

equipment and ideas, and had the confidence in their ability as well
as commitment to their calling. National consciousness was a
characteristic of their profession and their patriotism was
unquestioned. Ayub was drawn towards the services that he knew
and understood.”

Given their undue power and prestigious status, the CSP soon became one of
the chief whipping posts of the critics of Ayub‟s regime. Not only did the politicians
fighting against the regime oppose their power but the common man also raised his
voice against the extreme power and privileges of the chosen few.

On the political side, the lack of democracy led to serious cracks developing in
the heterogeneous body of the nation which, towards the end of Ayub‟s period, was
manifesting itself in the form of the East-West tussle. This tussle was also reflected in
the bureaucracy where of the 741 CSP and other central government officers only 51
were Bengalis. This large number of members of the bureaucracy from a province
steeped in feudalism had, in the views of many scholars, a significant influence upon
the delay in the establishment of representative government. The feudal background
of many civil servants led to a constant egg-or-chicken first type questioning of
whether suitable pre-conditions or democracy itself should come first. Acting on the
advice of his bureaucratic advisers, Ayub Khan had implemented the 80,000 strong
“Basic Democracy” system in which these easily manipulated individuals served not
only as local councillors but also as the electoral college for the President. Such “pre-
conditions” for the “real democracy” constituted the classical bureaucratic delaying
tactics.

Democracy appeared on the horizon in 1970. But as the events turned out, the
return of the country to democracy came with the attendant loss of the Eastern Wing.
Chaos returned to the country with a big bang. However, as the situation improved,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto started to come to grip with many of the now depleted Pakistan‟s
problems. And in his view one of the top ranking problems was the CSP which was
still too powerful for him to be comfortable. His thoughts could very well be
expressed in Mushtaq Ahmed‟s words: “A civil service conscious of its powers and
mastery over the procedure of its exercise has been a perennial problem of every
government in Pakistan.” Cutting the bureaucracy down to size was among the major
issues of Bhutto‟s party manifesto.

Thus the old institution which still maintained its cold colonial colours and
esperit de corps and which had failed to reform itself, now had the 1973
Administrative reforms forced upon it by the great demagogue. To begin with, the
CSP lost the titular designations which they so coveted (and wrote after their names
like the OBE or MBE); according to the politicians and the people even such small
things demonstrated that their colonial attitudes were very much alive. Far more
important, however, was the great dent in their erstwhile indeflatable ego and
unchallenged supremacy. The CSPs who had been labelled by some as the Brahmins
of Bureaucracy, lost the reservation of key posts which had until then ensured their
supremacy in the highest offices of the Secretariat. The unthinkable happened: The
CSP was dispersed as Tribal Affairs Group, District Management Group, and
Secretariat Group and replaced by not only fellow civil officers from other
“occupational groups” but also had their noses rubbed in the dust when the People‟s
party brought in its own version of the American “spoils system”.

Under this new “Lateral Entry” system the highly coveted government jobs in
the whole spectrum of prestigious offices (from the Foreign Service to the Central
Secretariat) were now dispensed without consideration of old concepts like cadres and
reservations, or even merit. More often than not, “the lateral entrants” were political
favourites who needed to be rewarded one way or the other. The strictly controlled
quality of the services was drastically down-graded to make the bureaucracy “more
representative”. No longer were there strict quotas or a prestigious examination
which ensured some degree of competence. In time the number of “lateral entrants”
rose of more than 1500 officers in the gazetted posts. These political appointees had
little sympathy for the long tradition of the bureaucrats and immediately set out to
carve out a large piece of the bureaucratic cake for themselves.

A “Common Training Programme” at the former Civil Service Academy (now

renamed as Academy for Administrative Training) replaced the elitist training of the
CSP with its pomp and show that had been manifested through colonial hangovers
like horse riding and very formal dress codes as well as strictly segregated and
training and class-consciousness. The deliberateness of the plan could well be seen
from attention to even such minor details as the change in the name of the institution.
So well thought out was the plan that even the palatial colonial British Residency
building of the Civil Service Academy was taken over by the Chief Minister of
Punjab. The “Brahmins” were sent off to be trained with all the other “untouchables”
in a building located in the midst of Lahore slum.

In view of the many inherent problems of the country including socio-political

heterogeneity, Prime Minister Bhutto who had had his formative political
development under the autocratic guidance of Gen. Ayub was convinced of the need
of a strong centralized government presided over by an unassailable leader. To be that
unassailable leader he again had to turn to the coercive powers of the police and
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy of Pakistan had always been a group of intelligent
people ready to adapt themselves to changing conditions. As the populist government
gave way to a regime that desired more power for the man and his party, the
bureaucracy was once again an institution ready to serve in the political field.
Extensive as the reforms may have seemed, they did not reach below the surface and
the District Magistrate continued to be an important power broker.

However, beyond the district police and executive authorities, the institution
of bureaucracy generally, and the career civil services in particular, saw an immense
loss of their traditional prestige and power during the political period from 1972 to
1977. The district authorities, for their part, remained in the limelight but at the cost of
excessive politicization. All civil servants in career positions were constantly
reminded of their plight by the stream of “lateral entrants”, “specially posted
officials”, and special pre-conditions to certain appointments (as in the districts) or the
special post-appointment orders that achievement of political and party objectives by
a non-administrative regime was diametrically opposed to the nurturing of a career
civil service system that posed a needless and troublesome power lobby for a political
government. Indeed, it was for similar reasons that the American founding fathers
chose not to establish such a career civil service which would have become an extra
element in the delicate „checks and balance‟ system. As a reminder of this period a
former CSP officer narrated to this author how he had declined to become a Deputy
Commissioner when offered the place with a big pinch of salt - clear guidelines that
he work in “co-operation” with the local party representative in the provincial
assembly.

Then in 1977, the Pakistani political pendulum swung once again and along
with this movement swung the fortunes of the bureaucrats, definitely for the better.
The enigmatic nature of our political development became apparent again and the
zero-sum game now turned against the politicians who were to remain out in the cold
for the best part of a decade. The regime from 1977 to 1988 was firstly and
foremostly a military dictatorship that started evolving, towards the mid 80s, into a
“controlled democracy” (as do most such dictatorships when faced with rising public
dissatisfaction). Like strong non-representative regimes anywhere, that of General Zia
needed the support of any and all the power groups who wished to join in and who
could be accommodated in the grand non-political national compromise.

Following in the footsteps of his military predecessor of the „60s, General Zia
once again turned Pakistan into a bureaucratic polity, as civilian bureaucrats,
wherever they may be, have always closely followed behind armed
forces/bureaucrats. This was partly because bureaucrats had the general reputation of
displaying a talent for being loyal to whosoever was in power but more particularly
because, the armed forces resembled the bureaucratic hierarchies in their close knit
corporate nature much more than the political institutions of the Third World.

Sympathetically speaking, one could not blame these bureaucrats for allying
themselves with a military dictatorship: every living being instinctively seeks a
favourable living state in a natural process called adaptation. While realism has
always dictated that the servants of the state ally themselves with the government in
power, some alliances come more naturally than others. Thus the new regime found
natural allies in bureaucrats who had felt angry and frustrated with the last political
government‟s efforts to curtail their institutional image. Special support came from
the 1300 plus government official whose services were terminated fairly early in the
Bhutto period, and on rather arbitrary grounds; these individuals saw the chance of a
second lease of professional life. Others who had not been terminated saw the chance
to have the Administrative Reforms of 1973 modified in a way that the bureaucratic
institution may regain its lost glory.

Like rulers everywhere, General Zia was in no quick mood to leave his newly
found stature . The respectable exit, which he unwittingly promised in his first speech
to the nation, by returning the country to democracy within 90 days of the coup, was
not to be. Instead what came was one broken promise after another and one
subterfuge after another. Having soon come to appreciate - and even relish - the
immeasurable benefits of power the General soon became one of the most cunning
politicians the country has seen. One of the chief features of Zia‟s cunning strategy of
delaying the return to democracy was his questioning of Western democracy‟s
suitability to Pakistani conditions. This was a repeat of General Ayub‟s line of action
when he had devised his Basic Democracies Scheme. Moving a step beyond Ayub,
Zia proclaimed that Western democracy‟s secular ideals were contrary to Islam‟s
ideologically correct, morally-controlled, democracy based not on parties but
principles. He also used the argument that democracy was only a simple head-count
not a “mind” or quality count: a hundred fools could never make one wise man.

Thus appeared the personal face and power saver of non-party elections under
a grossly altered constitution. Zia, the military bureaucrat turned master-politician had
undone the political framers of the constitution by bringing in the much-debated and
oft-used power of the President to dismiss elected assemblies and prime ministers.
Although it is not certain as to what part was played by the senior bureaucrats in the
framing of this plan for the non-party elections and the subsequent referendum that
gave General Zia another five years in power (through a cleverly worded statement
that equated the peoples desire to see his Islamization plan move ahead with Zia‟s
extension), the role of the district executive authorities in ensuring a favourable
outcome for the regime in these tests was no different than on other similar occasions
in the past.

Very capable in perceiving the underlying motives of rulers, few know better
than bureaucrats as to when and how to gain from an eyewash specially when the
eyewash was self-serving. Their “pro-centralization anti-politicians” conservative
outlook had always led them to prefer dictatorship over democracy. The former with
its clear cut and efficient chain of command was easier to manoeuvre and far
preferable than a political regime with many masters and the requirement of pleasing
many diverse interests. Indeed, from a purely organizational management point of
view, political regimes place government functionaries in very unenviable positions.

In a typical situation (from the late 80‟s) which reflects this strain on
government servants is that of a Deputy Commissioner who was a Federal
Government officer serving in Balochistan on deputation. The DC was pressurized
by the provincial Muslim League Chief Minister to sort out a Member of the
Provincial Assembly belonging to the opposition. The trouble was that the MPA‟s
People‟s Party which was in power at the Centre. The DC began sending feelers of
non-co-operation with the said MPA but within days was forced to soften his attitude
when the MPA was invited by the PM to accompany him to the USA. The DC being a
federal employee on loan to the provincial government could have been transferred
him back to the Federal Establishment.

This uneasiness of federal employees serving in the provinces (due to the facts
that law and order are provincial matters and because both federal and provincial
employees are posted in the districts) assumed grave proportions in the late 80”s when
the opposition party at the centre - the Muslim league - was governing the largest
province of Punjab. Thus when the Chief Secretary of the province (the highest civil
servant) was seen to be too sympathetic to the Punjab Government - i.e. the
opposition at the Centre - he was recalled by the Federal Government. However,
under Rules of Business the provincial government also has to issue a notification
which allows the civil servant to hand over charge. If the civil servant left without
handing over charge that too would have led to some serious consequences later.
Thus even otherwise innocent civil servants were often faced with a Hobson‟s choice
that was quite similar to the early days of the cold war: to enter a bloc or try to remain
non-aligned.

It was during this period when party democracy was returning to Pakistan that
many civil servants finally took their chances of permanently aligning themselves
with one party or the other. This was they could at least expect to enjoy good
postings in the boom tenure of one government and then bracing themselves for the
next cyclic bust period. For instance a junior police officer an Assistant
Superintendent of Police (ASP) was posted to Murree, an important hill resort town
which sees a lot of VIP movement. This was the period when Mian Nawaz Sharif
was the Chief Minister of Punjab while Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister. When
Mian Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister this relatively junior officer was
posted as Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) in a very important city of Punjab
where he spent the three years in the first Sharif government It was widely understood
that this position was a reward for the officer‟s services beyond the call of duty while
in Murree. Upon return of Ms. Bhutto to Power, the officer spent the next three years
at the Sihala Police Training Academy which was one of the worst fates short of
being suspended, an action that could have been challenged in the courts. Upon
return of Mian Nawaz Sharif to power the officer regained his old post from where
had had left three years hence.

Unfortunately such instances are not the exception. Shahid Rafi another
Nawaz Sharif favourite rose from being DC Lahore to Commissioner Lahore and
went on to head the Pakistan Television more than 10 years before he could have
aspired to be in that position in the normal turn of events. Perhaps one of the most
striking and rapid rises of an officer is that of Imtiaz Shaikh: He was a very junior
grade 18 officer of the Federal Government when the late Sindh Chief Minister Jam
Sadiq picked him to be his Principal Secretary, a senior grade 20 post that would not
normally have come to him for at least 10 years. Subsequently this officer had
himself absorbed in grade 20 in the Sindh Government through a carefully designed
job-announcement that fit his training and experience first as a civil engineer and then
an administrator: the Director General of the Sindh Arid ones Authority. From this
“autonomous body” he was posted on deputation as the Secretary. Among the first
actions of the people‟s Party government was to terminate the services of Mr. Shaikh.
So hurried was this action that normal disciplinary procedures under rules were not
followed. Mr. Shaikh promptly went to the Services Tribunal. There the case was
kept pending for three years (obviously because of political considerations). As soon
as the Bhutto government was ousted in 1996 Mr. Shaikh returned as a provincial
Secretary.

So great has been the politicization of the civil services in Pakistan that its
extent can often stretch to the unimaginable - at least in terms of the standards
operating in more civilized countries. In Pakistan politicians who are unfavourably
disposed towards public servants can really stoop down to levels which are
unbecoming of their stature. But to those familiar with feudal or tribal societies, such
personal feuds and vendettas do not seem surprising. Indeed, while the years have
seen a steady deterioration of the standards of behaviour both of civil servants as well
as their political masters the fact remains that the use of unfavourable postings and
transfers is far from a new phenomenon. The use of the transfer-posting arm-twisting
methods are as old as formal bureaucracy is in these parts.

For instance, a grade 20 officer posted as Director General Hajj at Jeddah was
reportedly recalled less than one year into his 3 year tenure simply because his name
was Zia-ul-Haq and that he had served in the same Armoured Corps of the late
general who was his name-sake. After two years as an “Officer on Special Duty” or
OSD (see below) Major Zia was sent packing to Quetta as an instructor at the
National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA). Perhaps someone had suggested
that as an OSD the disliked officer was still living in his hometown with his family
and could be put to more trouble by an unfavourable posting. In any case, training
institutions have, unfortunately, come to be regarded as places where only the “less
realistic and untactful” or unwanted officers should be posted. Recently, the grade-20
head of the police administration (and reportedly informally in-charge of “other
matters”) in Ms. Benazir‟s home town of Larkana during her tenure was sent packing
to NIPA Karachi.
Similarly a 18 officer of the District Management Group (and a batch-mate of
Mr. Imtiaz Shaikh) was stopped from going abroad on a family trip when he
presented his passports at the immigration desk (after check-in). His crime was
having a brother who was a close confidante of the then Prime Minister‟s brother and
political opponent - the late Murtaza Bhutto. This brother had once expounded the
cause of Bhuttoism so strongly that he had hijacked a Pakistani Boeing to demand
release of tens of Bhutto supporters put in jail by the military government. Upon
subsequent return to Pakistan he had been sentenced to death, only to be pardoned by
the military dictator and sworn Bhutto-enemy General Zia. The irony of the situation
was that this time the government in power was that of late Zulfiqar Bhutto's daughter
Benazir.

As for the civil servant brother, Prime Minister Bhutto was said to know his
name personally. This officer lost three of his valuable professional years for having a
brother the PM did not like. He was denied a posting by being kept on an informal
suspension (as a formal notified suspension would have meant that he at least receive
his salary - which he only got after three years and Ms. Bhutto‟s ouster from power).
At one time there were more than 100 OSD of various grades from 17 to 22 (the
highest level of civil servants) during the Benazir period. In fact the term OSD has
become synonymous with being declared a persona non grata by the government in
power. While technically the OSD is a financial mechanism to provide salary to the
officers who can only be paid against a post, the real fact is that it is the principal
manner of punishing officers who fall out of step with their political masters. In
Pakistani government employment the salary is just like the tip of the proverbial
iceberg. The legal benefits of a posting in one‟s own town and its attendant PR, car,
residence, and telephones, as well as the real-world spin-offs of corruption and
nepotism mean an almost life and death difference in economic terms. The “seat”
itself represents the difference between psychological well-being and permanent
depression.

Thus the requirements of pleasing diverse interests (including self-interests)

often cause a stand-off between bureaucrats and politicians. The latter operate in a
low-literacy feudal environment and are often returned on hereditary seats (from their
areas of influence). Even in the more well-informed urban areas voters do not vote on
the basis of issues but other considerations like ethnic, caste, or religious affiliations.
Many an organizational crisis has been precipitated by the politicians‟ attempts to
place far too many demands (often made by their constituents) on the system than the
available resources cannot meet. The inability of a professionally trained corps of
hierarchically organized officials, ideally governed by impersonal rules, to come to
grips with the requirements of non-professional, generally low educated, non-
organised group of politicians working very subjectively has led to a crisis laden
atmosphere in government corridors during political times. Examples of undue
political influence in routine administrative matters abound and are favourite subjects
of discussion in both official and public fora.

While merit has never been the most important factor in the rise of individuals
in the Pakistani civil services, which, given their importance in national life, have
been excessively influenced by extraneous elements of a polarized and parochial
society, these external pressures have always shown a significant rise in political
times. In such times even very ordinary, routine matters as promotions, postings,
transfers (especially from unfavourable seats to more coveted ones) and even the
allocation of government accommodation in large cities comes under the direct
control of ministers, if not the Prime Minister. This author is witness to four members
of a provincial assembly calling a Deputy Commissioner to stop the transfer of a
patwari, the lower most but a pivotal functionary in a district. Stories of even the
President of Pakistan paying-off the patwari (to maintain favourable relations as a
landlord of the area) abound. On another occasion when transfers of officers were
being discussed at an informal sitting, a DC assured two of his Assistant
Commissioners of what they already knew: they need not worry about their transfers
till 1990 (referring to the year when elections would have been due were it not for the
premature dismissal of the government). But then with the change of government,
these two officers, very predictably, received their transfer orders within days. At
times such orders come within hours of the regime‟s fall.

Such is the level of political interference in the civil services that few, if any,
realistic civil servants will even remotely contemplate a favourable appointment (as
that of a DC or a foreign posting) without first cultivating the right political
credentials. To be fair to the present day government and politicians, one must note
that the history of “mutually beneficial interaction” between bureaucrats and
politicians (as the interference of each of these groups into the other‟s territory is very
mutual as it is extensive) is as old as the nation itself. This historical aspect is clearly
brought forth by Keith Callard writing in the mid-50s:

“The political influence of government servants is very great. An

illiterate voter is ready to believe that he should do whatever he is
told by government. And the power of a District Magistrate can
either aid or hinder the candidacy of a politician. Consequently
political pressure has been at work to persuade or compel
government servants to intervene in party politics. The official has
often found it difficult to resist such pressure; the result might well
be his transfer to a „penal‟ station.”[9].

Callard goes on to quote from the recommendations of the Council for Administration
of West Pakistan:

“Tenures for most of the appointments should be fixed and transfers

before the expiry of tenure should be rare. Transfers should not be
made as a matter of punishment.”(10)

Today, fifty years later the situation is more or less the same. This issue of
using postings and tenures as reward and punishment, as well as other legal aspects of
the services of government employees has come to the forefront in much stronger
terms over the past decade. While initially this was because of centre vs. provincial
confrontation, such politicization of the services operates as a situation which is taken
for granted. Unfortunately for the civil servants, their proverbial realism does not
always come to their rescue and they become pawns in an ongoing great game.. The
absence of a proper course of conduct for civil servants (especially those caught in a
cross-fire) in political times takes us to the issue that has been cropping up in various
fora from time to time: constitutional guarantees for the protection of civil servants.
This issue can also be seen in the greater light of the imbalance development of the
bureaucratic and political institutions in Pakistan unlike neighbouring India with
similar social conditions.

In India the post-independence democratization of the polity did not lead to

routine official decisions being subjected to political whims of individuals in power,
but rather, to a continuity and evolution of institutions on a „check and balances‟
track.. In Pakistan, the initial political instability meant a heavy dependence of
politicians on permanent government employees who formed a self-serving interest
group of people who were “neither civil nor servants”. One is reminded of a young
probationary officer at the Civil Services Academy who when asked, “What would
you like to be called - a government servant, civil servant or public servant?” gave a
reply that was greatly appreciated by the then Director General and has survived as an
anecdote: “I would not like to be called by any term that has „servant‟ in it.” But
India was fortunate in not having as strong a tribal-feudal nexus as Pakistan as well as
a political leadership headed by Nehru which went through the essential land reforms
very early after independence.

In private circles, the less politically aligned of Pakistani bureaucrats concede

that classical bureaucracy in Pakistan no longer exists: there is no more a formal,
impersonal body of individuals upholding the rule of law. In many government
sectors, the formal organisation has been superseded by the informal ones. In several
known cases from a regional party, the political Minister is kept in check by his
personal secretary who has a higher rank in the political party hierarchy. The “direct
dialling” by breaking of the chain of command in cases where a “tactless” officer may
still continue to be formally posted between the political establishment and the “field”
has become very commonplace.

One mid-career officer of the Sindh Government recently remarked, “The life
has gone from the system. You can no longer show the law-book to the politician
who expects expediency as a normal way of life. If the Federal Secretary or the Chief
Secretary are unwilling to say “no” to a Federal Ministers or a Chief Minister, then
lower down it would be naïve to expect a Deputy Secretary to say no to the members
of the assemblies.

One aspect of the rapidly changing public-service scenario in Pakistan is the

massive rise of financial corruption. Being part of the same whole the unscrupulous
amongst both politicians and civil servants have become voluntary participants of an
unholy alliance. Although this issue is not directly related to the current topic, it has,
nonetheless, a crucial bearing upon the national governance environment. Public
service is no loner economically or morally viable for the honest and just officers.
Thus many of the academically bright, value-oriented young people, especially from
the urban middle class opt for the professions or the upcoming private sector. This
“brain-drain” away from the higher bureaucracy has also contributed to the
deterioration of the former codes of acceptable behaviour. Extremely wide-spread
corruption has led to lowering of the general socially acceptable standards of moral
conduct. Government officers across the board now accept compromise as a way of
life - whether or not they themselves become part of it.
 In the ultimate analysis, for a country like Pakistan where political instability
has been the norm rather than the exception the distinction between politicians as
being the formulators of national policy and bureaucrats as its executors cannot be
maintained. Indeed, even in more developed and stable countries these dividing lines
are hard to maintain. When political considerations in a system like ours, which is
religiously, socially, economically and politically polarised, lead to the bureaucrats
being invited for political policy formulation, then these individuals must be prepared
to face political pressures in their own day to day decision making process. Whether
such co-operation is based on self-interest and voluntary participation or restrained
and unwilling surrender to realism, the distinction is increasingly becoming irrelevant
and the final fact only remains that both bureaucrats and politicians are essential
elements of a modern system of governance. As in any other walk of life, mutual
relationships between members of this system are products of historical development
peculiar to each case.

While a decade ago - when the most recent and longest running phase of
Pakistani democracy had just begun - it could have been said that the future of
relationship between democracy and bureaucracy in Pakistan is as open to conjecture
as any other aspect of this young nation, this is no longer so. Pakistan at 50 has yet to
exhibit any significant stabilisation of its new national institutions. Indeed, far from
strengthening the institution which it inherited, even the semblance of order which
had existed in long-established institutions like the civil bureaucracy has now eroded
to a point of no return. Pakistani politicians, whose pretensions about democracy are
just that, and who had long had a stormy relationship with the equally authoritative
civil servants, seem to have finally won the battle.

Though not, perhaps, the result of a deliberate policy from either side, this
surrender is nonetheless a reality. From the bureaucrats point of view this could also
have been a semi-conscious policy of appeasement, which accompanies every
attrition of one group by another, that led to its logical end. It may also be argued that
the grand-compromise of the higher bureaucracy in the face of a rising power is one
which manifests a natural cause-and-effect relationship. The changing post-1971
ground realities and the political economy of postings, plots and pelf were hardly
conducive to institution building. Unfortunately the lead in this rapid deterioration
was taken by the seniors who themselves had been trained and nurtured in the
principled traditions of the old guard - the proverbial fish has rotted from its head
once again. Alternately, the old guard may itself have been falsely portrayed in
contemporary records of the period for they were as much a group of mercenaries as
any who were available to whomsoever willing to harness their energies. If they
could have been willing to unquestionably serve alien masters the least they could
have done was to be available to the home-bred variety.

Although Pakistani civil servants had always been too willing to compromise
with their political or military bosses - specially with enlightened self-interest in view
- the deliberate decimation of the services begun by Mr. Bhutto has now given way to
an unprecedented chaos in which all-out corruption and ruthless struggle for political
ascendancy by the civil servants themselves have left their institution in tatters.
Arguably, the civil servants‟ adoption of a quasi-subservient role has been a policy to
salvage whatever they could of the old-facade, while at the same time not losing out
in the self-interest race. The bottom line for Pakistani bureaucrats was recently written
(in an article under a pen-name) by a person who is now a Federal Secretary:

“A good officer does not create any difficulties in the advancement

of the career of his superior who obviously tries his level best to
bend or break the rules in furtherance of his prime objective of
pleasing his own bosses…. He should be able to show servility as
the sole criterion for service. The officer should be politically right
and morally wrong.”

The one thing which is certain is that the golden age of Pakistani bureaucracy
is over. Instituted in its place there is a very effective spoils system, which while not
being formally recognised as such, is a well-integrated hierarchical regime of
corruption that is covered up by a conspiracy of silence. It is also certain that this new
equilibrium suits the majority on both sides. The Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats
are very much from the same nation and thus their aspirations as well as short-
comings at any given point in time would be similar if not alike. Both groups have
needed each other in the past and this requirement of mutual co-operation would
continue in the future. Problems exist only for those individuals who for any reason
are unable to recognise or come to terms with this new dispensation Such individuals
are destined to become irrelevant to the system, if they have not already been
marginalized.

As for the common citizen the nation‟s ever-growing social and economic
problems are seen to be the direct result of mismanagement by the equally corrupt
politicians and civil bureaucrats alike. Even though it would be sometime before
Pakistani rulers and officials learn to restrict their greed and lead Pakistani into an age
where rule of the law exists, all is not lost. Even thought the country has not seen a
turn-around in essential social-development indices like higher literacy or lower birth-
rates, the world-wide phenomenon of lesser government (read lesser red-tape and
official high-handedness) will lead to a more democratic Pakistan. Globalisation of
technology, trade and living styles will cause a lessening of the power-distance ratios.
When that time comes, most Pakistanis would been happy in having rid themselves of
a corrupt body of officials that could neither control its own deviant members not
persuade its political masters to follow rules that they themselves had made.

Writing 10 years ago, this author had said, “no one can only say what the
future of relationship between democracy and bureaucracy in Pakistan would be; this
is as open to conjecture as any other aspect of this young nation which is yet to
exhibit significant stabilization of its national institutions.” For good or bad this is no
longer true. Any senior Pakistani bureaucrat figuring prominently in his official
realm is now either an ineffective “walk-over” figurehead or a highly politicized
extension of the governments in power to be used at their discretion.
REFERENCES

1 Kieth Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, (Karachi 1968) p.284

2 A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, (Lahore 1950) p.209
cited in K.B. Saeed, Politics in Pakistan (New York 1980), p.10.

3 Khalid B. Saeed, Politics in Pakistan, The Nature and Direction of Change, (New
York, 1980) p.10

4 Firoze Khan Noon, From Memory (Lahore,1966) cited in K.B. Saeed, op cit., p. 12.

5 Saeed, op. cit., p.26.

6 Callard, op. cit., p.301

7 Ibid.

8 Times of Karachi, April 28, 1955, editorial cited in ibid, p.301

9 Callard, op. cit., p 297.

10 Rowland Egger, The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan, cited in

ibid, p.297.