Received: 15 December 2020 Revised: 14 April 2021 Accepted: 10 May 2021 IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution

DOI: 10.1049/gtd2.12211

ORIGINAL RESEARCH PAPER

A model for simultaneous location and coordination of protective

devices in radial distribution networks

Joaquín de la Barra1,2 Alejandro Angulo1 Esteban Gil1

1
Department of Electrical Engineering, Universidad
Técnica Federico Santa María, Valparaíso, Chile
2
inodú, Santiago, Chile
Correspondence
Joaquín de la Barra, Department of Electrical Engi-
neering, Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María,
Valparaíso, Chile.
Email: joaquin.delabarra.12@sansano.usm.cl
Current affiliation: inodú, Santiago, Chile.
Funding information
Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo,
Grant/Award Numbers: FB0008, 1210625
Abstract
Upgrading protection schemes in distribution networks can help electric utilities to
improve the reliability of their supply. Fuses and reclosers are still the primary protec-
tive devices used in distribution grids, and their optimal allocation allows isolating faults
with the least number of interrupted customers. However, most models used to select and
locate protective devices optimally do not consider their coordination or rescue schemes
for the fuses, resulting in unfeasible or impractical solutions. This paper presents a mixed-
integer linear program model for the simultaneous selection, localization, and coordination
of protective devices (reclosers and fuses), considering the fuses’ rescue schemes based on
electrical criteria. Local reliability indices and economic penalties for violating minimum
standards are integrated into the model, thereby providing new decision-making elements.
The proposed approach is tested in different distribution networks to showcase its key fea-
tures. Computational experiments show that the proposed model can satisfactorily handle
the trade-off between costs and reliability.

1 INTRODUCTION adopted in the future, protection systems in current distribution

The primary function of an electrical power system is to sup-
ply its customers with electrical energy as economically and
as reliably as possible [1]. Distribution systems are the essen-
tial link between the bulk power system and its customers. To
meet energy users’ expectations in terms of reliability of sup-
ply and increasingly stringent requirements imposed by legis-
lation [2], electric utilities need to explore different alterna-
tives, such as: (i) replacing or upgrading infrastructure [3, 4], (ii)
grid topology reconfiguration [5, 6], (iii) automated detection
and location of faults [7], and (iv) improvement of protection
systems.
The growing importance of distributed energy resources
has been increasing the complexity of protective schemes,
motivating research on smart grids with adaptive protective
devices capable of communicating with each other [8, 9].
However, many of these solutions are still untested, impractical,
or too expensive to deploy [10, 11]. Another solution approach
considers intentional islanding (e.g. [12]), which would involve
equipment and practices that are still not commonly used by
electric utilities. While these approaches will be increasingly
networks still rely mostly on reclosers and fuses acting inde-
pendently based on local conditions. Moreover, most models
proposed in the literature tend to neglect or overly simplify
the role that proper location, selection, and coordination of
fuses and reclosers may play in maintaining reliability indices
such as SAIDI and SAIFI at acceptable levels. Thus, our focus
in this work is to optimize the location, selection, and coor-
dination of reclosers and fuses to improve radial distribution
grids’ reliability.
Partly due to the challenges brought by the complex interac-
tions between different protective devices, few researchers have
explored their role in distribution planning models. The con-
sideration of remote-controlled switches in laterals and main
feeders is explored in [13]. A genetic algorithm was proposed
in [14] to locate a fixed number of reclosers in a 70-bus grid,
minimizing the reliability indexes SAIDI and SAIFI. In the
same line, a differential evolutionary algorithm is proposed in
[15] to localize a fixed number of reclosers minimizing several
reliability indices. A solution for grid reconfiguration and
restoration of service installing limited to just reclosers was pro-
posed in [16]. The inclusion of fuse-saving schemes and their

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© 2021 The Authors. IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Institution of Engineering and Technology

2734 wileyonlinelibrary.com/iet-gtd IET Gener. Transm. Distrib. 2021;15:2734–2746.

BARRA ET AL.
effect in reliability indexes is presented in [17] and [18]. While
[17] considers a linear formulation [18], introduces a non-linear
formulation and genetic algorithms to solve it. The authors
in [19] also quantified the benefits of fuse-saving schemes but
incorporating an additional penalization to elicit additional
investment in protective devices. However, most works men-
tioned above and the ones included in the last bibliography
review [20] do not include the protective devices’ characteristics
in their formulations. In some cases, they would lead to infea-
sible or impractical solutions due to the lack of coordination
between different protection elements. Although some works
presented in [20] offer the possibility to include constraints
when the coordination between two specific protection devices
is not possible, this is decided previous to the optimization
process, and the optimality of the solution may be lost.
In the few studies where the protective devices’ electrical
characteristics have been considered, the location of the devices
is fixed and not a decision variable. The authors in [21] and
[22] have developed new schemes based on relays settings to
improve their coordination with fuses in the presence of dis-
tributed generation. The distributed generation’s impact has also
been considered in [23], where the authors present an iterative
algorithm to restore coordination. Nevertheless, they only test
a single grid without optimizing the location of the protective
devices. Moreover, their algorithm does not scale appropriately
for large–sized networks. The authors in [24, 25] include the
coordination and selection of protective devices in the presence
of distributed generation considering their electrical characteris-
tics, but not to plan their location. None of these two last works
consider reliability indexes, and in [25] all the fuses are set to
operate with a fuse–saving scheme.
Load flow has been included in [26] and [27]. The first work
places protective devices and considers the thermal limits of
the network after a reconfiguration. The second one included
demand response, an important element of smart grids.
The load uncertainty of the distribution grid has been
explored in [28]. This work is extended on [29], where the
advantages of the fuse blow and saving scheme are explained,
but without electrical criteria to implement them. Lastly, the
authors incorporated distributed generation and island oper-
ation into their model [30]. Regardless of the important
contributions related to the uncertainty model and the dis-
tributed generation, none of these works develop criteria to
properly coordinate the devices and characterize the fuse
schemes.
Thus, although many studies have dealt with specific aspects
of protective systems planning, fewer researchers have simul-
taneously considered the problems of locating, selecting, and
coordinating realistic protective devices considering standard
industry practices such as fuse-saving schemes. Furthermore, to
the best of our knowledge, previous studies have considered the
reliability and economic aspects of protective systems planning
separately, without integrating them into a single optimization
model. Therefore, this paper’s main contribution is develop-
ing a novel Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model
that simultaneously locates, selects, and coordinates protective
devices on a radial distribution network, including reclosers,
2735
fuse-blowing, and fuse-saving schemes. Some of the model’s key
features are:
∙ The formulation’s flexibility allows the definition of objective
functions and constraints based on reliability, operational and
economic criteria.
∙ An electrical criterion for the fuse-saving schemes determin-
ing their feasibility when a temporary fault occurs.
∙ Use of operation curves (inverse time) of the protective
devices, avoiding coordination problems and ensuring feasi-
ble solutions in practice.
∙ Inclusion of local reliability indexes, incorporating local con-
straints to protect sensitive customers, or fulfill reliability
requirements.
This research is relevant because it provides options to
improve current distribution systems’ reliability before consid-
ering replacing or upgrading infrastructure, proposing realistic
short-term alternatives. This type of information can be use-
ful both for electric utilities and regulatory entities. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some ana-
lytical considerations and characterizes the fuse-saving scheme.
Section 3 presents and tests the proposed model and showcases
some of its key features. Section 4 shows computational exper-
iments and illustrates the scalability of the proposed approach.
Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and suggests directions
for further research.
2 ANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Distribution reliability indices
Distribution utilities have traditionally used only historical data
and expert criteria to decide the location of their protective
devices. However, different authors have recognized that this
may not be the best practice as more objective optimization-
based approaches have emerged [31, 32]. The main two quan-
tifiable criteria for decision making are costs and reliability. To
incorporate the latter into the formulation, a chosen reliability
metric is usually associated with a cost. In this work, the con-
sideration of the reliability indices is employed to quantify the
reliability of the system and have objective criteria to locate and
coordinate protective devices in radial distribution networks.
To objectively quantify the reliability of a distribution sys-
tem, many different indices have been presented in the liter-
ature [32], [33] and included in reliability standards (e.g. [34]).
The indices used in this work are adopted from the Chilean reg-
ulatory framework [35]. At the system level, we use the Sys-
tem Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), the Sys-
tem Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), and the
Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS). The SAIDI and SAIFI
quantify the duration and frequency, respectively, of interrup-
tions longer than three minutes, considering all the customers:
Total number of customer interruptions
SAIFI = , (1)
Total number of customers served
2736 BARRA ET AL.

 Customer interruption duration

SAIDI = . (2)
Total number of customers served

The EENS quantifies the amount of energy that can not be

delivered to the final clients due to interruptions or congestion
in the system. To estimate the EENS, an average value of con-
sumption per client is considered in this work. In this study, only
interruptions due to failures in the distribution grid will be con-
sidered.
At the end–user level, we use the Customer Interruption Fre-
quency (CIF) and the Customer Interruption Duration (CID).
The CIF and CID characterize the frequency and duration,
respectively, of interruptions longer than three minutes in the
supply of final clients connected to nodes of the distribution
system [35]. In this work, CIF and CID will be quantified in
terms of the failure rates and reparation times but, in general,
the indexes can simply be defined by counting the interruptions
at node n:

CIFn =  Customer interruptions at node n, (3)

FIGURE 1 Proposed schema flowchart

CIDn =  Customer interruption duration at node n. (4)

taneous protection operates. The above can mathematically be
All these indices can be readily included in a linear program- expressed according to (6).
ming formulation [32], as shown in Section 3.2.
r,ins f
top lj
≤ topl j . (6)

2.2 Fuse-saving scheme
The recloser’s instantaneous curve can protect the down-
stream fuses when a temporary fault occurs [36]. This fact
may be used to avoid unnecessary loss of supply, improving
the system’s reliability indices. Due to operational conditions,
a fuse-save scheme is not always possible. Some fuses will
blow with temporary faults, disconnecting a part of the system
and incurring a replacement cost. Thus, the model needs to
discriminate when the fuse-save scheme is possible, as this may
significantly impact decisions related to installing reclosers and
fuses.
The instantaneous setting of each recloser is limited by the
magnitude of the line’s nominal current where it is installed
(|I nom |). If a small overloading factor (FSC) is allowed, the
criterion to decide if a fuse located in line j will be protected
by a recloser located in line l can be stated as (5). If this
inequality does not hold, the fuse will have a blow-scheme.
In this relation, the recloser’s instantaneous setting cannot
be set in a value lower than its line’s nominal current. Other-
wise, false tripping would happen. Note that the magnitude
of the fault current (|I f |) in line j depends on the faults’
location.
FSC |Ilnom | ≤ |I jf |. (5)
Another important consideration is that, if the fault current
is too large, the fuse can be blown before the recloser’s instan-
In order to have a rescue scheme, both inequalities have
to be fulfilled. These inequalities are evaluated prior to the
optimization model in the preprocessing stage, and entered
into the model through parameters s and q, respectively. Only
balanced faults with null impedance are considered because
they produce the highest fault current. The save-scheme is
not an input but results from the model: a fuse can have a
saving-scheme for specific lines but a blowing-scheme for
others.
3 FORMULATION
3.1 General procedure
The general procedure of the proposed schema is presented in
Figure 1, where the inputs of the different interacting models
are represented as ovals. A brief description of each component
is presented as follows:
∙ Electrical parameters and operational conditions: The line
parameters and installed power used to compute the oper-
ational conditions in the electrical model. Another input are
the curves of the available protective devices.
∙ System topology: Topological information of the lines.
∙ Electrical model: It computes the nominal and fault cur-
rents of the system by conducting power flow simulations.
The save scheme of the fuses is also computed in this part,
BARRA ET AL. 2737

characterizing if a fuse can be protected by a recloser based ∑

̃f tot = ̃fl f , ∀l ∈ , (10)
on its type and location. This computation is made for each l
f ∈
type of fuse and for each possible location. If a fuse has a
blow scheme for certain failure it will operate faster than any ̃ptot ̃ tot
l = r̃l + f l , ∀l ∈ ,
tot
(11)
recloser upstream to guarantee selectivity. Nevertheless, it will
operate slower than any device downstream, to avoid unnec-
essarily loss of load. ̃ptot
l ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ , (12)
∙ Economical information: Installation cost of protective
devices, budget constraints, and economic penalizations for ∑
the violation of reliability indices. || (1 − ̃fltot ) = r̃ tot
j , ∀l ∈ , (13)
j ∈dl
∙ Reliability requirements: Minimum reliability standards. The
model is illustrated using 4 indices, but it can be easily ∑
+ 𝜆l ̃fltot .
pr
extended. fb = l ∈ 𝛾l
ef
(14)
∙ Reliability information: Historical register of failure rates and
reparation times. Information of failure rates provided by The investment costs associated with the installation of fuses
manufacturers. and reclosers in the system are quantified in (8), together with
∙ Reliability model: In this work, the expected value of the the costs associated with the replacement of fuses and the
failure rates and repair times are considered. This can be energy not supplied. An existing recloser is always considered
extended to incorporate complex relations with other vari- in the main feeder, thus including its cost is unnecessary.
ables, such as weather information. Binary variables associated with the location of protective
∙ Model for simultaneous Location and Coordination of pro- devices in the lines are defined in (9), (10), and (11). Constraint
tective devices: This is the main part of the proposed scheme. (12) limits the number of protective devices in a line to avoid
It combines the information provided by the other two the installation of a fuse and a recloser in the same line. The
models and obtains the optimal locations and types for installation of reclosers downstream fuses is avoided by (13).
the protective devices. It also includes operational require- The number of expected fuses burned in a year of operation is
ments related to the coordination of the devices, budget calculated according to (14).
constraints, reliability constraints, and fuse blowing/saving ∑ ∑
schemes. The objective function and the constraints can be r̃lr top
r
+ ̃fl f topf + tc ≤
ll ll
adjusted depending on the study’s purpose. r∈ f ∈
∑ ∑
The main results of the model are the location and type of r̃ jr top
r
+ ̃f j f topf
jl jl
protective devices (decision variables of the model). Further- r∈ f ∈
more, the model also provides the reliability indices and the +(1 − r̃ tot ̃ tot
j − f j )M , ∀(l , j ) ∈  × ul , (15)
expected costs, which can be written up as linear combinations
of the decision variables.
|I |nom ≥ |I |nom ̃fl j , ∀(l , j ) ∈  ×  . (16)
f l

3.2 Model for simultaneous location and The coordination between protective devices is addressed by
coordination of protective devices (15). Note that this equation refers to the slow mode of the
reclosers. The last term on the right-hand side ensures that the
The proposed model is as follows. The objective function  in constraint is valid when there are no elements on upstream line
(7) is chosen based on the study to perform. Depending on the l . The installation of a fuse with a proper nominal current is
analysis, we consider the minimization of reliability indexes or guaranteed by (16).
minimizes the total costs in this work.
∑ f
r̃ tot
j sl jk ≤ slk M ,
fr
∀(l , k) ∈  × dl , (17)
min  , (7) j ∈ul
r̃ , ̃f
∑ f
s.t. r̃ tot
j sl jk ≥ slk ,
fr
∀(l , k) ∈  × dl , (18)
j ∈ul
∑ fu ̃f tot
l ∈ (c l + c re r̃ltot ) − c re ∑
ql j ̃fl f ,
f f
xl j = sl j ∀(l , j ) ∈  × dl , (19)
+ f b c fu + 2 EENS c fa = Costs, (8) f ∈
∑
∑ ylk = xlk (1 − x jk ) ̃f j f , ∀(l , k) ∈  × dl , (20)
r̃ltot = r̃lr , ∀l ∈ , (9)
r∈ j ∈dl ∪uk
2738 BARRA ET AL.

when a recloser is in the line.

nl j ≤ yl j , ∀(l , j ) ∈  × dl , (21)
∑ pr
SAIFI = (𝜆l − 𝜆l )
yl j ≤ || nl j , ∀(l , j ) ∈  × dl . (22) l ∈
∑ pr ∑
j ∈ (𝜆 j + 𝛾efj ) n∈ 𝜍n j 𝜅n
Expressions (17) and (18) define the variables associated + ∑ , (29)
with the saving–schemes requirements due to nominal cur- n∈ 𝜅n
rents, which depends on the existence of upstream reclosers. ∑ pr
The saving-schemes requirements due to high fault currents are SAIDI = (𝜏l − 𝜏l )
included in (19), (20), (21), and (22). The variable x quantifies l ∈
the operation of the fuses in presence of temporary faults. ∑ pr ∑
j ∈ (𝜏 j + 𝜈efj ) n∈ 𝜍n j 𝜅n
∑ + ∑ . (30)
pr
𝜆l = 𝜆lAA ̃ptot
pr
𝜆 j ̃ptot 𝜅n
l − l , ∀l ∈ , (23) n∈
j ∈dl
SAIFI and SAIDI are computed in (29) and (30) as a function
pr ∑ pr of the protected temporary and permanents failure rates and
𝛾l = 𝛾lAA ̃ptot
l − 𝛾 j ̃ptot
l reparation times, respectively. For the temporary failure rates
j ∈dl
and reparation times, the effective value is considered.
∑
+ (nl j − xl j ̃fltot )𝛾 j , ∀l ∈ , (24) ∑ pr pr
j ∈dl
CIDn = 𝜏l − 𝜏l + (𝜏l + 𝜈lef )𝜍nl , ∀n ∈  , (31)
l ∈
pr ∑
𝛾lef = 𝛾l (1 − r̃ltot ), ∀l ∈ . (25) CIFn =
pr pr
𝜆l − 𝜆l + (𝜆l + 𝛾lef )𝜍nl , ∀n ∈  . (32)
l ∈
The protected permanent failure rate is defined in (23). Every
permanent failure rate downstream is considered, but the ones Local reliability indexes CID and CIF are computed in (31)
already protected by other protective devices are discounted. and (32) for each node in the system. These indices are per client
This rate will be zero if there are no elements in the line, and in theory, but their value is equal for all the clients in the same
it is independent of the nature of the element. The protected node.
temporary failure rate follows the same logic as the permanent ∑
one (24) shows. This variable will be zero for fuses with a saving- EENS = CIDn Pn , (33)
scheme. n∈
When a recloser operates due to a temporary failure, the reli-
ability indexes remain unaffected. To incorporate this in the CEENS = 2 EENS cfa . (34)
model, the variable 𝛾e f is defined in (25), which becomes zero
for reclosers and has the same value as 𝛾 pr for fuses. This vari- The EENS is computed in (33) as a product between the total
able is needed because the recloser affects the protected tempo- interruption time and the average consumption. Its related cost
rary failure rate of the elements upstream. is computed in (34), and could vary depending on the penaliza-
tion defined.
pr ∑ pr
𝜏l = 𝜏lAA ̃ptot
l − 𝜏 j ̃ptot
l , ∀l ∈ , (26)
j ∈dl
ˆ
SAIDI ≤ SAIDI, (35)

pr ∑ pr
𝜈l = 𝜈lAA ̃ptot
l − 𝜈 j ̃ptot
l SAIFI ≤ Sˆ
AIFI, (36)
j ∈dl

∑
+ (nl j − xl j ̃fltot )𝜈 j , ∀l ∈ , (27) B ≤ B̂, (37)
j ∈dl
∑
pr B= (c fu ̃fltot + c re r̃ltot ) − c re . (38)
𝜈lef = 𝜈l (1 − r̃ltot ), ∀l ∈ . (28) l ∈

Analogously to the failures rate, the failure duration is cal-
culated in (26) and (27) for permanent and temporary failures,
respectively. The structure of those equations is the same used
in the protected failure rates. Similarly, (28) defines the effective
reparation time due to a temporary fault, which becomes zero
Constraints (35) and (36) could be used as thresholds for the
system reliability, and (37) to limit the amount of investment,
defined in the expression (38). In general, these constraints will
not be simultaneously active, and their inclusion will depend
on the modeling’s purpose. Also, they could be formulated as
BARRA ET AL. 2739

TABLE 2 Reliability indexes and disaggregated costs for 5-bus test system

Case SAIDI (h/y) SAIFI (int/y) CI&R ($) CEENS ($)

Base case 17.1 2.9 0 3433.6

Case I.A 6.8 1.51 216 1234
Case I.B 6.8 1.51 12000 1234
Case II 12.9 2.48 4000 2431
FIGURE 2 Five-bus distribution grid used for proposed model testing
Case III.A 3.7 1.4 0 316.72
Case III.B 2.35 0.95 76 191.44
TABLE 1 Line parameters for the 5-bus test system Case III.C 18.82 6.44 436 1249.84

Line R (𝛀 ) X (𝛀 ) 𝝀 (int/y) 𝜸 (int/y) trep (h)

1 0.0922 0.047 0.5 5 2

2 0.493 0.2511 0.9 9 3
3 0.366 0.1864 0.8 12 8 TABLE 3 Local reliability indexes for 5-bus test system

4 0.366 0.1864 0.7 12 10 Case Index N1 N2 N3 N4 N5

Base case CID (h/y) 0 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1

CIF (int/y) 0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9

soft constraints using a suitable penalization cost. Similarly, the Case I CID (h/y) 0 1 3.7 7.4 10.7
inclusion of bounds on the CID and CIF would allow to include CIF (int/y) 0 0.5 1.4 1.3 2.1
specific constraints per node. This procedure is useful when leg- Case II CID (h/y) 0 10.1 10.1 10.1 17.1
islation imposes a minimum reliability level per client (as in [35]) CIF (int/y) 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9
or due to requirements from sensitive clients such as hospitals.
Some of the constraints presented above are non-linear (for
example (23) or (27)). Although there are algorithms to solve
optimization problems including these types of constraints, in
this work we prefer to reformulate them linearly (for further the original reliability indices. System-level results are presented
clarification refer to [37]), as this procedure allows obtaining in Table 2, while nodal results are presented in Table 3.
faster solutions and guarantee an optimal value. As there are not protective devices in the grid (except the
Lastly, the proposed model can be easily extended to incor- recloser in L1), any permanent fault will affect all the customers.
porate other indices. For example, the Momentary Average Thus the CIF and CID of every node will be the same. Tempo-
Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI) can be considered by rary faults will not affect the reliability indexes because there are
adding the variables 𝛾 pr , which accounts for the operation of no fuses in the grid. The CIF of any client will be the sum of all
the reclosers. the permanent fault rates of the system. Analogously, the CID
will be the sum of every expected reparation time due to the
system’s permanent faults.
3.3 Model testing
∑
CIFn = 𝜆i = 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.8 + 0.7 = 2.9 int/y,
To test the proposed formulation and confirm that the model i∈
gives coherent results, the 12.66 kV grid in Figure 2 is ana- ∑ ∑
lyzed extensively. The parameters of the system are presented CIDn = 𝜆i ⋅ trepi = 𝜏i
in Table 1. The number of clients is [0, 4, 6, 5, 10] and the con- i∈ i∈
nected power is [0, 116, 98, 144, 144] kW for nodes [1, 2, 3, 4 = 0.5 ⋅ 2 + 0.9 ⋅ 3 + 0.8 ⋅ 8 + 0.7 ⋅ 10 = 17.1 h/y.
,5], respectively. The costs considered are $40 for fuses, $4000
for reclosers, and 0.2 $/kWh for the failure cost. The coordina- pr pr
Variables 𝜆i , 𝜏i , 𝛾ief and 𝜈ief are zero for every line i in
tion time required between two consecutive protective devices is
the system, so that expressions (29) and (30) are simplified to
0.3 s . The grid has a recloser in line L1, which is not considered
the sum of the failures rates and reparation times, respectively.
in the planning cost.
Another way to see this is that SAIFI and SAIDI are weighted
averages (by number of clients) of CIF and CID.
3.3.1 Base case—Original system values ∑
SAIFI = 𝜆i = 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.8 + 0.7 = 2.9 int/y,
By minimizing installation costs (i.e.  = Costs) while eliminat- i∈
∑
ing constraints (35) and (36) related with SAIFI and SAIDI SAIDI = 𝜆i ⋅ trepi = 17.1 h/y.
requirements and making c fa = 0 in (8), it is possible to obtain i∈
2740 BARRA ET AL.

pr pr pr
TABLE 4 Optimal location of protective devices for 5-bus test system = 𝜆1 + 𝜆4 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆3 − 𝜆4 − 𝜆2 − 𝜆3 = 0.5 int/y,
Case L1 L2 L3 L4 pr
𝜏4 = 𝜏4AA = 𝜏4 = 7 h/y,
Base case R - - -
pr
Case I.A R F F F 𝜏3 = 𝜏3AA = 𝜏3 = 6.4 h/y,
Case I.B R R R R pr pr pr
𝜏2 = 𝜏2AA − 𝜏4 = 𝜏4 + 𝜏2 − 𝜏4 = 2.7 h/y,
Case II R - - R
pr pr pr pr
𝜏1 = 𝜏1AA − 𝜏4 − 𝜏3 − 𝜏2
R: recloser; F: fuse
pr pr pr
= 𝜏1 + 𝜏4 + 𝜏2 + 𝜏3 − 𝜏4 − 𝜏2 − 𝜏3 = 1 h/y.

pr pr
From (33), we calculate EENS = 17.1 ⋅ (116 + 98 + 144 + Variables 𝜆l and 𝜏l capture the interruptions and the time
144) = 8584.2 kWh and its related cost, CEENS = 2 × 8584.2 × out of service of the line l , either due to failures in the line
0.2 = $3433.6. itself or due to failures in lines downstream that do not have
pr
protective devices. The variable 𝜆l quantifies the operations
of the protective element located in the line. Every time an
3.3.2 Case I—Minimum reliability indices operation occurs, the clients downstream will be affected, is
this represented by the second term in the CIF computation
Even if the system has protective devices in every line, it (32). The first term of the same equation considers that every
is impossible to reduce its reliability indices to zero. To fault in the system will imply an interruption in the supply for
exemplify this, consider the grid in Figure 2: a permanent every∑ client if there are no protective devices. In this case the
pr
fault in line 3 implies an interruption of the supply for the term l ∈ (𝜆l − 𝜆l ) is zero, because the system has protective
clients in node 4 that can not be avoided with protective devices
∑ in every line. Analogously, in the CID computation in
pr
devices. (31), l ∈ (𝜏l − 𝜏l ) is zero.
To minimize the reliability indices (i.e.  = SAIFI), in Case I
pr
we relax the investment budget in (37). It should be noted that, CIF2 = 𝜆1 = 0.5 int/y,
even if monetary constraints are not accounted for, it would
pr pr
not always be possible to install protective devices in every CIF3 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 = 0.5 + 0.9 = 1.4 int/y,
line due to constraint (15) guaranteeing their coordination. In
pr pr
this particular case, the coordination constraint will not be an CIF4 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆3 = 0.5 + 0.8 = 1.3 int/y,
issue because the available devices are enough to protect every pr pr pr
line. CIF5 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + 𝜆4 = 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.7 = 2.1 int/y,
Case I.A considers fuse–saving schemes, while Case I.B pr
neglects them. In Case I.A, the indices’ minimum value is CID2 = 𝜏1 = 1 h/y,
obtained by installing fuses in every line, while Case I.B installs pr pr
reclosers (see Table 4). As in Case I.A all fuses have a sav- CID3 = 𝜏1 + 𝜏2 = 1 + 2.7 = 3.7 h/y,
ing scheme; their effect in the indices is the same as that with pr pr
CID4 = 𝜏1 + 𝜏3 = 1 + 6.4 = 7.4 h/y,
reclosers (Case I.B).
pr pr pr
Thus, the system and nodal reliability indices are the same CID5 = 𝜏1 + 𝜏2 + 𝜏4 = 1 + 2.7 + 7 = 10.7 h/y.
in both cases and improve concerning the ”Base case” (see
Tables 2 and 3). The costs related to EENS also decrease. The Due to the saving-schemes, no fuse will be burnt when a
detailed computation for Case I.A is presented below, where the temporary failure occurs. Nevertheless, the permanent faults
only difference between the solutions for Cases I.A and I.B is in will make them operate, and they will need to be replaced.
the economic results. As before, the information about the operation of an ele-
The protected permanent failure rates for each line and their ment located in a line is captured in the variable 𝜆pr , so the
associated reparation times are computed using (23), (26), and expected quantity of burned fuses in an operation year can
that 𝜏l = 𝜆l ⋅ trepl . The protected temporary failure rates and pr pr pr
be computed with (14), f b = 𝜆2 + 𝜆4 + 𝜆3 = 0.9 + 0.8 +
their associated times are zero because all the fuses have a 0.7 = 2.4 fuses. The protected permanent failure rate in line
saving–scheme. 1 is not considered because it has a recloser. The infrastructure
pr cost can be computed by considering the number of installed
𝜆4 = 𝜆4AA = 𝜆4 = 0.7 int/y, and burnt fuses that needed replacement. Then, CostI &R = 3 ⋅
pr 40 + 2.4 ⋅ 40 = $216
𝜆3 = 𝜆3AA = 𝜆3 = 0.8 int/y,
EENS is calculated according to (33) as EENS = 1 × 116 +
pr pr
𝜆2 = 𝜆2AA − 𝜆4 = 𝜆4 + 𝜆2 − 𝜆4 = 0.9 int/y,
pr 3.7 × 98 + 7.4 × 144 + 10.7 × 144 = 3085.0 kWh. The penalty
cost is also computed to be included in the costs, CEENS =
pr pr
𝜆1 = 𝜆1AA − 𝜆4 − 𝜆3 − 𝜆2
pr pr
2 × 3085.0 × 0.2 = $1234. To compute SAIDI and SAIFI, it is
BARRA ET AL.
convenient to rewrite both expressions as a weighted average of
CID (39) and CIF (40), respectively.
∑
n∈ (𝜅n ⋅ CIDn )
SAIDI = ∑ (39)
n∈ 𝜅n
4 ⋅ 1 + 6 ⋅ 3.7 + 5 ⋅ 7.4 + 10 ⋅ 10.7
= = 6.8 h/y,
25
∑ the installation and replacement of the fuse of $76, so the
n∈ (𝜅n ⋅ CIFn )
SAIFI = ∑ (40)
n∈ 𝜅n
4 ⋅ 0.5 + 6 ⋅ 1.4 + 5 ⋅ 1.3 + 10 ⋅ 2.1
= = 1.516 int/y.
25
3.3.3 Case II—Coordination of protective
devices
Besides improving system reliability, protective devices must
maintain selectivity, avoiding false tripping through proper coor-
dination. However, if an electric utility has limited protective
devices, or if the feeder has many nodes, coordination con-
straints to ensure selectivity may become very restrictive. The
main reason behind this is that the fault currents for consecu-
tive lines may be similar in magnitude or at least similar enough
in relation to the difference between response times of the avail-
able protective devices.
Case II serves to showcase the model’s capability to consider
the coordination of different protective elements. To keep the
system simple for illustrative purposes, the characteristic curves
available for this study case are limited to two. Table 4 shows the
location of the protective devices. Even without an investment
limit, installing a protective device in every line is impossible due
to coordination constraints, so the model can only install two
protective devices. The installation of a third element will result
in a loss of selectivity because the difference in response times
of the elements is not enough to locally isolate the fault. Then,
in the presence of a fault, more than one element would operate.
Even though the reliability indices presented in Tables 2 and
3 improve related to the ”Base case” due to the recloser, they
do not reach the minimum theoretical value seen in Case I. Fur-
thermore, the indicators worsen concerning the case without
coordination requirements, by 6 h/y and 1.13 int/year for
SAIDI and SAIFI, respectively.
It is important to remark that the fulfillment of the coordi-
nation requirements is necessary to obtain the desired reliability
targets in real applications, and their omission may lead to poor
performance. The results of Case II proved that these require-
ments modify the optimal solution.
3.3.4 Case III—Fuse-saving scheme
Case III uses a simplified grid to exemplify the saving-schemes’
effect, so nodes 4 and 5 are eliminated with their respective lines.
The installation of a fuse is forced in the line between nodes
2741
2 and 3. The saving-scheme parameter is manually modified
to maintain the power of clients unchanged and compare the
EENS in both cases. Table 2 shows results for Case III.A (orig-
inal grid without fuses), Case III.B (fuse with saving-scheme),
and Case III.C (fuse without saving-scheme).
The inclusion of a fuse with a saving-scheme improves the
system’s reliability indices, and the EENS costs are reduced
by $115. Nevertheless, it implies an additional cost related to
net improvement is $39. For this particular case, a fuse with a
blowing-scheme will deteriorate the indices, increase the EENS
cost, and increase the cost due to installation and replacement.
The reason is that any recloser does not protect the fuse, so it
will operate with temporary faults, interrupting the supply to the
downstream clients. This fact has to be accounted for because
the saving schemes are not mandatory and depend on the sys-
tem’s nominal operating conditions.
To illustrate the temporary faults’ impact, we present the
computation of the indices for this case. The computation of the
permanent faults remains unchanged with respect to the previ-
ous cases.
pr
𝜆2 = 𝜆2AA = 𝜆2 = 0.9 int/y,
pr pr pr
𝜆1 = 𝜆1AA − 𝜆2 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 − 𝜆2 = 0.5 int/y.
The fuse has a blowing-scheme, so the temporary faults will
cause its operation, which is quantified in the variable 𝛾pr . For
the model, an extra variable 𝛾ef is incorporated: it will be zero
for the reclosers, and it takes the value 𝛾pr for fuses. The reason
for this new variable is that the reclosers protect the upstream
elements against a temporary fault without interrupting the sup-
ply. For this case, there are no elements upstream the recloser,
pr
so it is not necessary to compute 𝛾1 .
pr
𝛾2 = 𝛾2AA = 𝛾2 = 𝛾2ef = 9 int/y.
The reparation times related to permanent and temporary
faults are computed using (26), (27) and considering that 𝜈l =
𝛾l ⋅ trepl .
pr
𝜏2 = 𝜏2AA = 𝜏2 = 2.7 h/y,
pr pr pr
𝜏1 = 𝜏1AA − 𝜏2 = 𝜏1 + 𝜏2 − 𝜏2 = 1 h/y,
pr
𝜈2 = 𝜈2AA = 𝜈2 = 𝜈2ef = 27 h/y.
The first term of the CID and CIF equations is zero because
there are protective devices in every line.
pr
CIF2 = 𝜆1 + 𝛾1ef = 0.5 + 0 = 0.5 int/y,
pr pr
CIF3 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + 𝛾1ef + 𝛾2ef
= 0.9 + 0.5 + 0 + 9 = 10.4 int/y,
pr
CID2 = 𝜏1 + 𝜈1ef = 1 + 0 = 1 h/y,
2742
FIGURE 3 Protective devices optimal locations in IEEE 33-bus system
pr pr
CID3 = 𝜏1 + 𝜏2 + 𝜈1ef + 𝜈2ef
= 1 + 2.7 + 0 + 27 = 30.7 h/y.
The temporary faults will cause the fuse operation, increas-
pr
ing the number of burned fuses, f b = 𝜆2 + 𝛾2ef = 0.9 + 9 =
9.9 fuses. The installation/replacement cost is computed with
this information, CostI &R = 1 × 40 + 9.9 × 40 = $436. The
EENS is computed with the CID and the average demand in
each node, EENS = 1 × 116 + 30.7 × 98 = 3124.6 kWh. Then,
the associated cost is calculated as CEENS = 2 ⋅ 3124.6 × 0.2 =
$1249.84. Finally the system reliability indexes are computed as
weighted averages of CID and CIF.
4 ⋅ 1 + 6 ⋅ 30.7
SAIDI = = 18.82 h/y,
10
4 ⋅ 0.5 + 6 ⋅ 10.4
SAIFI = = 6.44 int/y.
10
4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
Simulations were implemented on a ASUS GL553VD laptop
with an Intel Core i7 - 7700 HQ 2.80GHz and 12 GB RAM
using CPLEX 12.8 [38] and AMPL 20190223 [39].
Different experiments were performed on the IEEE 33-bus
distribution grid shown in Figure 3 to show the applicability of
the model. When the grid has a single recloser in the first line,
the original reliability indices are 27.3 h/y, 9.7 int/y, and 124.2
MWh for SAIDI, SAIFI, and EENS, respectively. For the pro-
tective devices, fuses type K where considered (data available
in [40]) and reclosers with flexible curves and instantaneous of
0.01 s. The model is set up to minimize the SAIDI, and the
installation cost was constrained to $1000. Figure 3 shows the
installation decisions.
Figure 4 presents the time-current characteristic together
with a fault in the line 2-19, with operation time in a logarithmic
scale to improve the visualization. When a fault occurs in
line 2-19, the current is 38 kA, and the fuse blows before the
instantaneous curve of the recloser can act (xl2−19 ,l2−19 = 0) , no
matter if the fault is temporary or permanent. If a temporary
fault occurs in line 21-22, the current is 3 kA and the instanta-
BARRA ET AL.
6
Fuse L2-19
4 Recloser L1-2
2 S1 S2
recloser modification
log(top)
0
-2
If21-22 If2-19
-4
-4.6
-6
6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11
log(If)
FIGURE 4 Time-current characteristic for faults in lines 2-19 and 21-22,
without (S1 ) and with (S2 ) modification of recloser instantaneous setting
neous setting of the recloser protects the fuse (xl2−19 ,l21−22 = 1).
Nonetheless, if the fault is permanent, the instantaneous setting
will not operate anymore and the fuse will blow, because due
to the coordination constraint it has to operate faster than
the slow curve of the recloser. This situation is also useful to
remark that the fuse saving scheme is dependent on the fault
location: a fuse can operate with a fuse-blowing scheme for
certain currents and with a fuse-saving scheme for others.
The protective devices operation is detailed in Table 5 . In
most cases the reclosers are able to protect the fuses during tem-
porary faults. In case of permanent faults, the fuses will blown
before the slow curve of the reclosers, avoiding unnecessary
load interruptions which degrade the system reliability. As this
grid is relative short, the nominal current of the reclosers is not a
limitation to set their instantaneous setting. In extended grids, it
is expected that some reclosers are not able to protect the fuses
due to the relatively low fault currents.
If a large load is connected in node 2 (or in another down-
stream node), the nominal current in line 1-2 will increase, and
the instantaneous setting of the recloser has to be changed to
avoid false tripping. In some cases, this modification will remove
the protection of the fuses for some faults. Figure 4 illustrates
this situation, where the setting has been changed from S1 to S2
(xl2−19 ,l21−22 = 0).
In most cases, the inclusion of distributed generation reduces
the nominal currents while increasing the fault currents, impact-
ing the effect described before. Suppose other reliability indexes
are included, like the Momentary Average Interruption Fre-
quency Index (MAIFI). In that case, it may be useful to coordi-
nate the reclosers’ instantaneous settings to guarantee selectivity
even for the temporal faults. This can be achieved with (15) and
a different coordination time tc .
The SAIDI and SAIFI of the system decrease when the limit
on the investment is progressively relaxed, as Figure 5 shows.
The improvement rate is different for each case, and near $5000
the incremental improvements become insignificant: even if the
available investment budget increases, the indices will remain
unaffected (this same effect was reported in [41]). Even if there
are protective devices in every line, some interruptions will
imply a loss of supply. This result is essential for utilities to
decide how much it is worth investing in protective devices in
BARRA ET AL. 2743

TABLE 5 IEEE 33- bus system failure clearance 6

Node 11
Node 16
Line/Failure Temporary Permanent 5 Node 19
Node 25
1-2 R1-2 R1-2 4

CIF (int)
2-3 R1-2 R1-2
3
3-4 R1-2 R1-2
2
4-5 R1-2 R1-2
5-6 R1-2 R1-2 1

6-7 R6-7 R6-7 0

1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
7-8 R6-7 R6-7 Investment ($)
8-9 R6-7 R6-7 (a)

9-10 R6-7 R6-7 20

Node 11
10-11 R6-7 R6-7 Node 16
Node 19
11-12 R6-7 F11-12 15 Node 25

12-13 R6-7 F11-12

CID (h)
10
13-14 R6-7 F11-12
14-15 R6-7 F11-12
5
15-16 R6-7 F11-12
16-17 R6-7 F11-12
0
17-18 R6-7 F11-12 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Investment ($)
3-23 F3-23 F3-23 (b)
23-24 R1-2 F3-23
FIGURE 6 Local reliability indices CIF and CID versus investment for
24-25 R1-2 F3-23
selected nodes of the IEEE 33-bus test system
2-19 F2-19 F2-19
19-20 F2-19 F2-19
a system before trying other options, considering a baseline for
20-21 F2-19 F2-19 reliability in a feeder.
21-22 R1-2 F2-19 One novel aspect of the proposed model is that it allows
6-26 R6-26 R6-26 including local reliability indexes. Figure 6 shows the behav-
26-27 R6-26 R6-26 ior of CIF and CID for some nodes as the level of invest-
27-28 R6-26 R6-26
ment increases. While some indices improve considerably, oth-
ers remain unaffected and even deteriorate, as the CIF of node
28-29 R6-26 F28-29
11 when the investment increases more than $3000. This find-
29-30 R6-26 F28-29 ing confirms that the installation of protective devices does not
31-32 R6-26 F28-29 benefit all clients equally. In some cases, it is necessary to sac-
32-33 R6-26 F28-29 rifice the reliability of some of them to improve overall reliabil-
ity. This point is essential because some legislation such as [35]
imposes a minimum reliability index per client.
The total costs consider those related to installa-
14 tion/replacement of equipment and the compensations for
SAIDI (h)
SAIFI (int)
energy not supplied. Figure 7 presents the costs’ behavior.
12
The proposed model allows making a sensitivity analysis of
10 the investment level and the penalization cost, which can
be useful to analyze the regulatory framework to encourage
Index

8
investments. Notice that other costs could easily be included in
6 the model, such as fines for violating local or system reliability
4
indices.
The calculation time turns out to be strongly dependent on
2
0 5000 10000 15000 the input parameters, such as the available investment budget.
Investment ($) Scalability was tested by varying the investment budget for three
networks: the IEEE 33-bus grid and two networks of 69 and
FIGURE 5 SAIDI and SAIFI versus investment in IEEE 33-bus test
system
117 nodes, respectively (the data of these systems is available in
2744 BARRA ET AL.

5
104 Additional research would be required to analyze meshed net-
Expected energy not served costs
Installation and repairment costs
works. The proposed implementation considers a power flow
4 Total costs before the failures but not after them. For radial networks, this
is acceptable, but in meshed networks, the overloading of cir-
3
Cost ($)

cuits and the impedance blockings are important issues to con-

sider, and a post-failure power flow analysis may provide valu-
2
able insights.
1
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
0
0 5000 10000 15000
This work was supported in part by the National Agency for
Investment ($) Research and Development (ANID) Chile through a project
under Grant 1210625 and in part by the Advanced Center
FIGURE 7 Optimal costs versus investment in IEEE 33-bus test system for Electrical and Electronic Engineering, AC3E, Basal Project
FB0008, ANID.

[40]). The geometric average of computation times were 0.7 s, NOMENCLATURE: Sets
2.2 s, and 20.2 s, respectively.
Considering these computation times, the proposed model  Set of branches.
has proven to be useful in a planning process context. For large  Set of nodes.
networks, it is advisable to apply clustering techniques or grid  Set of fuses.
reductions. Additionally, it is also possible to select individual  Set of reclosers.
radial feeders rather than considering the entire grid at once. dl Set of branches downstream line l .
Furthermore, this would allow to exploit parallel processing to ul Set of branches upstream line l .
further reduce simulation times. aa
l Set of branches adjacent and downstream line l .
n Set of interruptions affecting node n.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK Parameter s

This paper has put forward criteria to optimally selecting and tc Coordination time between two protections (s).
e
locating protective devices in distribution systems, account- top Operation time of an e element located in line l1 when
l 1 ,l2
ing for coordination requirements, curves of real fuses and a fault in line l2 occurs (if ins is included it refers to
reclosers, the feasibility of fuse-saving schemes, and the instantaneous protection) (s).
estimation of several reliability metrics. The model’s main tl Expected reparation time of line l (h/int).
contribution is that it provides practical solutions that can be c fu Fuse installation/replacement cost ($).
readily improved by including a more extensive selection of c re Annuity of recloser installation cost ($).
protective devices. c fa Cost of energy not supplied ($).
The MILP formulation was thoroughly tested and solved 𝜍n,l 1 if the line l supplies node n, 0 otherwise.
in reasonable computation times. Incorporating local and 𝜅n Number of clients connected to node n.
system-wide reliability indices is a powerful tool that extends Pn Average power consumption in node n (kW).
the model’s purposes beyond making selection and location 𝜆l Permanent failure rate of branch l (int/y).
decisions. For example, we are currently using the model to per- 𝛾l Temporary failure rate of branch l (int/y).
form a sensitivity analysis of the penalization costs and evaluate 𝜏l Duration of the repair for interruptions associated with
new feeders’ investments. Furthermore, the model could also a permanent failure in branch l (h/y).
assess the value of smart meters to accelerate reparation times 𝜈l Duration of the repair for interruptions associated with
and reduce the uncertainty of temporary and permanent failure a temporary failure in branch l (h/y).
rates. The location of these meters to enhance observability and slfr,l Binary parameter taking a value of 1 if a recloser in l2
1 2 ,l3
the analysis of their data is a current research topic (see [42], will protect a fuse located in l1 when a fault in l3 occurs.
f
[43] and [44]), especially with the emergence of smart grids. ql Binary parameter taking a value of 1 if a fuse of type f
1 ,l2
We are currently exploring other approaches, such as robust located in line l1 will be saved when a fault in l2 occurs.
optimization, to deal with the input parameters’ uncertainty. 𝜆lAA Permanent failure rate of line l and its downstream lines
The proposed model would have to be adapted to apply it (int/y).
in smart grids with high penetration of distributed generation. 𝛾lAA Temporary failure rate of line l and its downstream
The bidirectional flows and increase of fault currents are future lines (int/y).
challenges that would need to be considered not to lose selec- 𝜏lAA Reparation time due to permanent failures in line l and
tivity and efficiently provide protection. Further research can be its downstream lines (h/y).
conducted to incorporate new equipment, like communication 𝜈lAA Reparation time due to temporary failures in line l and
systems, to solve the problems mentioned above. its downstream lines (h/y).
BARRA ET AL. 2745

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How to cite this article: de la Barra J, Angulo A, Gil
E. A model for simultaneous location and coordination
of protective devices in radial distribution networks.
IET Gener. Transm. Distrib. 2021;15:2734–2746.
https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12211