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Mudrovcic Regimes of Historicity
Mudrovcic Regimes of Historicity
Mudrovcic Regimes of Historicity
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María Inés Mudrovcic
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María Inés Mudrovcic is a Full Professor at the National University of Comahue and Eliminado: Author 1 blurb
Keywords
Historicity, Historical time, Orders of time, Multiple time, Historical temporality, Human Eliminado: h
temporality, Science of time, Presentism Eliminado: o
Introduction
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François Hartog coined the term “regimes of historicity” in a critical note entitled “Marshall Eliminado: h
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Sahlins et l´antropologie de l´histoire” (1983) on Marshall Sahlins’s lecture that was Eliminado: s
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published in the American Anthropological Journal. This notion was born from the encounter
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between history and anthropology. Hartog and Gérard Lenclud defined it for the first time in Eliminado: (Hartog 1983)
1993 as “the type of relation that every society has with its past, the way that it is treated by it
and how she treats it to use it and build this thing that we call history” and subsequently
added that the regime of historicity “refers to the modality of a self-consciousness of a human
community” (Hartog and Lenclud 1993: 26, my translation). In 2003, Hartog developed this
concept in his key book on this topic Régimes d´historicité: Présentisme et experiences du
temps, and he defined it as “the ways in which these universal categories or forms we call
‘the past’, ‘the present’, and ‘the future’ are articulated,” namely, the ways that societies in Eliminado: ,
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different times and in different spaces organize the past, present, and future. These categories
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“partake both of thought and of action, actualized at different times, and in different places Eliminado: the
and societies, … make possible and perceptible a particular order of time” (Hartog 2015: 17).
Although the concept has circulated in France for almost a decade, Lenclud credits Hartog
Following the text that he wrote with Lenclud in 1993, Hartog gave the notion a broad
meaning of the “relations of men with time … [and] the modalities of self-awareness of a
human community” and a more restricted sense that refers to “how a society treats its past”
(2003: 19, my translation). In an interview conducted in 2009, Hartog defined the regime of
historicity as “the passage from the individual and plural experiences of time to an Eliminado: [
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elaboration of them” (Delacroix, Dosse, and Garcia 2010: 154, my translation), and in the
Preface to the English translation of Régimes d´historicité in 2015 as “a category (without Eliminado: p
content), which can elucidate our experiences of time … nothing restricts it to the European
or Western world alone” (Hartog 2015: xvii). As Jacques Revel recognized, in the French Eliminado: Jacques Revel (2000: 16)
context, “regimes of historicity” is a “plastic notion” that is not at all stabilized (2000: 16).
Why the concept of “regime” rather than an “order,” “modality,” “way,” or “form” of
historicity? In the text that Hartog wrote with Lenclud, he noted that a “regime” can be
understood in many ways or have many registers: (1) in the sense of a Constitution (politeia),
(2) in the sense of a lifestyle or diet (diaita), and (3) in a mechanical sense (the regime of a
motor) (Hartog and Lenclud 1993: 22). In the Preface of the English translation of Régimes, Eliminado: 1993
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despite some criticism, he confirms his preference for the concept of “regime” over other
concepts because “it reveals the idea of degrees, or more or less, of mixtures and composites,
and an always provisional or unstable equilibrium” (Hartog 2015: xv). Similarly, why
“historicity” rather than “temporality”? Despite the objections by Claude Calame and
Lenclud, among others, that it would be better to speak of temporality than historicity, in the
Preface of 2015, Hartog affirmed that the notion of temporality has the disadvantage “of Eliminado: p
referring to an external standard of time” (2015: xvi), while “historicity” refers directly to a
human temporality; it expresses the relation of humans with time. Originally, the notion had a
strongly epistemological and methodological objective; that is, it was conceived as a tool to
analyze how different societies organize the past, present, and future. However, although Eliminado: s
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Hartog always insisted on this heuristic function, by pairing it with the hypothesis of
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presentism, it acquires an ontological quality with regard to the human historical condition.
Presentism is the term used by Hartog to characterize our present “throughout, and primarily
in opposition to futurism which had long dominated the European scene.” It is a “disoriented Eliminado: .
time, marked by greater uncertainty” (196). In any case, the publication of Regime in 2003 Comentado [KB1]: AU: Please provide full citation details.
crystallized into two concepts—regimes of historicity and presentism—two ideas that were
floating in the air around historians: (1) different cultures, different temporalities and (2) the
Background
The concept of “regimes of historicity” was born in France from the confluence of various
factors: (1) the encounter between history and anthropology, (2) the exhaustion of the
quantitative, serial and “longue durée” history that led to the “critical turn” of the Annales’
research program, (3) the influence on the French context in general and on Hartog in Eliminado: me
particular of Koselleck’s work, and (4) the impact of Pierre Nora’s and Paul Ricoeur’s works
during the “memorial turn” in France during the 1980s. Until the publication of Hartog’s Eliminado: eighties
book in 2003, the notion was used mainly in a methodological or heuristic sense. However,
since Hartog strongly correlated “presentism” with the “regime of historicity” that we are
supposed currently going through and opposed it to “futurism” or the “modern regime of
historicity,” the notion has acquired a historicist tint that many scholars are unwilling to
accept (for example, Jordheim 2014; Lorenz 2019; Stewart 2016; Tamm and Olivier 2019). Comentado [KB2]: TS: Please link to reference.
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Maurice Mandelbaum stated that “essential to historicism is the contention that a meaningful
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place which it occupied … within a process of development” (42), namely, as a successor of Eliminado: i.e
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and opposed to “futurism.”
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In a distinguished lecture given to the American Anthropology Association in 1982, Con formato: Fuente: Sin Cursiva
Sahlins noted with regard to Fiji culture that “different cultural orders have their own mode
of historical action, consciousness and determination—their own historical practice. Other Eliminado: –
times, other customs” (1983: 518). In this lecture, he quoted the work of the anthropologist Eliminado: …
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Jørgen Prytz Johansen, who contrasts the Maori’s temporal experience with the historical
Eliminado: Johansen (1954),
meaning of the “unique event” in the West. “For Maori … events are hardly unique or new” Eliminado: ´
(Prytz Johansen 1954: 518). He concludes, “We should be wary, as Johansen cautions, of Eliminado: [
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imputing to Maori our own ideas of the individuality of event and experience” (528). For
Sahlins (1983), the time had come to leave behind the theoretical differences that divide Eliminado: Sahlins (
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anthropology and history. Anthropologists are often as diachronic as historians are
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experience of culture.” Historians must realize that other cultures, even in past times, have
other experiences of time that should not be seen through a Western lens. Sahlins named this
encounter between anthropology and history and between the synchronic and the diachronic
“Regimes of historicity” are these different experiences of times or, in Hartog’s Eliminado: ´
words, the idea that “each cultural order has its own historicity” (1983: 1258). In the critical
note on Sahlins’s lecture, Hartog states that it is a “working misunderstanding” (malentendu Eliminado: ´
productif) that an “event” in Maori culture would be understood with the same meaning as an
the past and present, as Michel de Certeau has stated, that does not exist in Maori culture, in
within the present (1259). For Hartog, the different status of the notion of “event” in different Comentado [KB3]: AU: Please provide full citation details.
cultures shows the differences in “ways of living and thinking (historical consciousness)”
(1261), namely, different regimes of historicity. The same idea is developed again in his Eliminado: i.e.
review of the French translation of Sahlins’s book (Hartog 1989). There, he recognizes that
Sahlins “makes the concept of history explode: not to destroy it, but to make it more complex
… through the tragic interference between two different cultural logics … the meeting of
Europe and the peoples of the South Pacific” (Hartog 1989: 1362, my translation).
A decade later, the historian Hartog and the anthropologist Lenclud wrote the chapter
“Regimes of Historicity” in a section devoted to reviewing the “new objects and methods of
history” in a book compiled by Alexandru Dutu and Norbert Dodille (1993). History is Eliminado: Alexandru Dutu and Norbert Dodille (
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anthropologized, and the concept of “regimes of historicity” is offered as a “common place”
“common-locks” of history and anthropology (Hartog and Lenclud 1993: 18). “Regimes of
historicity” is a concept that, for the authors, comes to confront, on the one hand, the
“structural anthropology” in force at those times, which relied on the “longue durée” and
“immobile time,” and, on the other hand, the classification of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Eliminado: ,
Likewise, for Hartog and Lenclud, regimes of historicity also attempt to overcome the
division between myth/history and myth/memory. For Hartog and Lenclud, Nora’s,
Ricoeur’s, and de Certeau’s works contributed to overcoming the opposition between myth Eliminado: ´
and history. History is not a product of science and stands in some truth sphere and myth is Eliminado: Neither
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not a kind of fiction of “primitive” people. Both history and myth are discourses of social
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identity. In relation to the opposition between memory and history, authors such as Henry Eliminado: is
Rousso, Jocelyne Dakhlia, and Pierre Joutard, among others, help to explain that history
should not be defined against memory. Since the 1970s, works from different disciplines
began to address, from different perspectives that have not always converged, issues such as
the role of collective memory in the present and in the constitution of collective identities,
memory and forgetfulness as political phenomena, and the incidence of memory in the
reconstructions of the past. In France, the historian Nora conducted the ambitious project of
reconstructing the history of French collective memory in Les Lieux de mémoire (1984–92).
Comparable works were conducted by sociologists and historians in the United States,
Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, and Israel, both in the study of national history and in the
study of social groups such as native peoples and sects within these nations (Agulhon 1981;
Baram 1991; Bodnar 1992). Much of this literature emphasizes the socially constructed
nature of memory and its current political, historical, and cultural uses. Likewise, in the
middle of the last century, the history of the present erupted, forcing a revision of the
presupposition of the rupture between the past and present that de Certeau had so clearly
exposed. The history of the present is “the historiography in which objects are social events
or phenomena that are memories of, at least, one of the generations that share the same
historical present, [and it] reveals the complex and conflicting relationship between the
historian´s present and the very recent past” (Mudrovcic 2014: 16–17). Thus understood, this
historiography’s field is especially consolidated in France as well as in Spain, Italy, and Latin Eliminado: ´
America. The creation of the Institut d’histoire du Temps Présent in 1978 under François Eliminado:
Bédarida´s direction, Nora’s seminar on the “Histoire du Présent” at the l’École des hautes Eliminado: ´
études en sciences sociales (EHESS) and the publication of the Journal Ayer by the
Asociación de Historia Contemporánea called into question the separation that historians had
established with the past. This “climate of time” affected Hartog and Lenclud, who suggest
that the notion of “regimes of historicity” allows a place for these oppositions—myth/history,
(1993: 22). Likewise, this notion helps to express the idea of the “event differential”
of anthropology (24). The regime of historicity determines the “project of historicity,” the Eliminado: 1993:
index of événementialité, and the proper temporality of a society. In other words, it expresses
“the relationship that every society establishes with its past, the way in which it treats and is
treated by it and constitutes that kind of thing called ‘history’.” In a narrow sense, “the Eliminado: .
relating to the past; historiography would be one of those forms, and, in a broad sense, it is a
symptomatic element of the regime of historicity that encompasses it” (26, my translation). In
this way, a regime of historicity and a regime of historiography are not placed on the same
plane (27).
In their 1993 work, both authors acknowledged that Ricoeur’s work had been a great
contribution to the debate on the regimes of historicity and the modalities of temporality.
Ricoeur pointed out the importance of stories received for the constitution of communities’
own identities, the set of which anthropologists call “tradition.” In other words, there is a
society (“regime of historicity”); the story is the conjunction between temporality (or
historicity) “lived and acted” (Hartog and Lenclud 1993: 32). Temporality can only be Eliminado: 1993
grasped through the story, so both anthropologists and historians have access to the
temporality “experienced” by other cultures through their stories. In turn, the reconstruction
work on the peoples of the Pacific is an example of this. Cultures have different
characteristics and have a different openness to history: “The regime of historicity would then
be defined as a way of carrying out in the bosom of a human community this ‘symbolic
dialogue of history’ … between the categories received and the contexts perceived” (36, my
translation). The chapter ends by presenting Nora and his Lieux de mémoire as a diagnosis
“on the historical moment and a historiographic response to this moment,” which is
diagnosis of “presentism” that, since 2003, Hartog has conducted. However, in the 1993 text,
the notion of a regime of historicity is the dominant axis that is understood in a heuristic
sense.
The strength that this concept acquires among French historians is reflected in an
editorial written by the Editorial Committee of Annales in 1994 when it presented its new
subtitle, “Histoire, Sciences Sociales,” instead of the tripartite division of “Économies, Con formato: Fuente: Sin Cursiva
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Societés, Civilizations.” At this moment of historiographical renewal and openness to other
Con formato: Fuente: Sin Cursiva
social sciences such as anthropology and sociology, the editorial board, chaired by Bernard Eliminado:
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Lepetit, affirmed that history, “without losing its identity or forgetting its methodological Eliminado: .
references … must preserve and amplify its sense of diachrony and their ambition to
understand regimes of historicity in their diversity” (3, my translation). The notion of Comentado [KB4]: AU: Please provide full citation details.
“regimes of historicity” in the context of Annales is the concept that would define, from this
point forward, the specificity of history in relation to the other social sciences. This change
was preceded by a diagnosis of the exhaustion of quantitative and serial history, the growing
difficulties of the history of mentalities in renewing its objects and the challenge presented by
micro-history in those years. All these issues had been discussed in the publication of a
special issue called Le Tournant Critique (the critical turn) published by Annales in Eliminado: “
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December 1989. The change in the name of Annales in 1994 confirms this diagnosis. Until
then, history had been one more dimension among the social sciences; in the words of
Fernand Braudel, “all the sciences of man, including history, … [spoke] the same language”
(Braudel 1958: 18, my translation). The notion of regimes of historicity gave specificity to
history in an attempt to “broaden its approaches and integrate more diversified reflections on
temporal or social processes.” The editorial ends by affirming that the intersection of Eliminado: .
economics, sociology, and anthropology, on the one hand, and history, on the other, would
Reinhart Koselleck´s book Futures Past was translated into French in 1990 and was
edited by the EHESS. Koselleck had been known in the field of French historians since 1985 Eliminado: L´École des hautes études en sciences sociales
through Ricoeur and his Temps et Récit. Ricoeur was a philosopher who circulated in the
field of historians. In Jacques Guilhaumou’s review of Futures Past published by Annales in Eliminado: the
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1991, Koselleck’s contribution to the field of conceptual history and its tensions and
differences in relation to social history are emphasized. However, in Hartog and Lenclud’s Eliminado: ´
text, Koselleck’s notions of the “space of experience” and “horizon of expectations” are put Eliminado: text (1993)
experience and expectation, Koselleck can see historical time as a product of the tension that
is established between the two categories” (Hartog and Lenclud 1993: 29, my translation). Eliminado: 1993
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However, both authors immediately note that it is the “modern regime of historicity” that
Faced with the metahistorical and universal character that Koselleck gives to the
possibility of the temporality of history, first Hartog and Lenclud and then Hartog prior to the
publication of Regimes in 2003 supported the operative and heuristic nature of the notion of
“regimes of historicity.” In this regard, Lenclud maintains that Hartog “clearly separates
himself from Koselleck … [since] Hartog does not use the notion as a universal key that
would open particular historical locks; this is a key that is used to identify the locks to be
opened. Its function is entirely heuristic” (Lenclud 2006: 37, my translation). According to
Lenclud, although Hartog “feeds” on Koselleck´s enterprise, his program is quite different: Eliminado: me
“Koselleck hopes that semantics will lead him to the heart of the theory of history; … Hartog
hopes that the notion of a regime of historicity will be put more at the service of historians
and anthropologists in a broad sense; ‘Regime of historicity’ is only grasped in plural” (32, Eliminado: Lenclud 2006:
toward the present between Koselleck and Hartog: “the principle according to which, for the Eliminado: s
former [Koselleck], each historical present articulates the past and the future; the way in
which the past, the future and the present are related to different historical presents for
Hartog” (32, my translation). Koselleck’s work was translated in France at the moment when
historians began to wonder about time. In the introduction to Regimes, entitled “Ordres du Con formato: Fuente: Sin Cursiva
Pomian (1984), who was a pioneer in the discussion of historical temporality in the French Comentado [KB5]: TS: Please link to Pomian.
sphere. Footnote 5 of the same introduction presents the question of the debate on temporality
If the conception of regimes of historicity had remained within the limits of “temporal
“presentism,” namely, that our current experience of time would be commanded by the Eliminado: i.e.
present and that we would find ourselves transiting a different regime of historicity from the
modern one commanded by the future, gives the concept a strong imprint of ontology of the
historical condition that exceeds epistemological and methodological limits. The relationship
between “presentism” and the regime of historicity is clearly expressed in a 1995 text that
Hartog dedicates to Nora’s work. Les Lieux (1997) are, for Hartog, a “symptom” since they Comentado [KB6]: TS: Please link to reference – Nora.
“pretend to be a history of the present, in the present, that respond to a crisis of the present,
since the present, as Nora maintains, has ‘become a category for understanding of ourselves’”
(1995: 1233, my translation). Our current experience of time or the regime of historicity has Comentado [KB7]: AU: please provide full citation details.
passed from “futurism to presentism”: “a present that is, itself, its own horizon,” a present
without a past and without a future (1224). This relationship between both concepts is
deepened in the Prologue to the English translation of Regimes in 2015. Hartog states, “My Eliminado: p
together. The notion of a ‘regime of historicity’ helps shape the hypothesis of presentism, and
the latter helps flesh out the notion of a ‘regime of historicity.’ The two are inseparable, at
least in the first instance” (2015: xv). This inseparability triggers a redefinition of the notion
of regimes of historicity from the perspective of presentism: “a tool for creating this distance,
with a view to having a finer understanding at the end of the process of what is close by”
(xv). The distance that Hartog refers to is the result of historians’ works. Historians, “by Eliminado: ´
taking a step back,” discover “something other than this mesmerizing present” (xv).
Historians are those who, by their profession, have the necessary perspective to realize that
the actual experience of time is a different regime of historicity than the modern one in which
the future commanded. In the Prologue of the English translation, Hartog established a strong Eliminado: p
relation between “presentism” and the “regime of historicity”—as two sides of the same
The hypothesis of presentism has been present since Hartog’s early works. First, the Eliminado: ´
concept appeared in the form of question: “Would not there be today a link between the
vague idea that there is no future, neither ahead nor behind (without future, living in the
present) and the hypertrophy of the event?” (Hartog 1983: 1262, my translation). Second, it Eliminado: 1983
was a diagnosis of the “historiographical situation”: “The quick rise, then the primacy of
‘contemporary’ or ‘present’ as the dominant category would be the first feature of this
figure there. The contemporary is an imperative” (Hartog and Revel 2001: 20, my Eliminado: .
translation). Finally, “presentism” is the concept that characterizes the regime of historicity
we entered around approximately 1989: “To characterize our present, I have used the term
“presentism” throughout, and primarily in opposition to futurism, which had long dominated
the European scene. When it disappeared, there emerged a disoriented time … presentism,
understood as a confinement to the present alone and to the present´s vision of itself” (Hartog
2015: 196–7). Hartog coined the term “presentism” to indicate the hegemony of the present
of the actual regime of historicity. This concept gained popularity in others’ proposals. Jean
Chesneaux (1996) proposed the term “presenteeism,” Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (2014) Comentado [KB8]: AU: Please provide full reference
details.
discussed the “broad present,” and Paul Virilio (2009) used the term “instantaneism.” “A Eliminado: Chesneaux (
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number of authors have spoken of the ‘ideology’ or even the ‘tyranny of the present,’ ‘the
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grip of the present,’ ‘the redirection of expectation toward the present’ … in other words, of Comentado [KB9]: TS: Please link to reference.
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‘presentism’ as the ‘ethos of the contemporary moment’” (Bantigny 2013: XI, my Eliminado: ”
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translation).
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Importance Today Eliminado: “
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“Regimes of historicity” is a concept that has begun to gain strength among historians. When
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Hartog affirms that this concept must be understood as a “heuristic tool,” he means that Eliminado: ”
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“regimes of historicity” can be an operative term to compare different “orders or forms of Eliminado: ”
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temporality” of different cultures, whether diachronic or synchronic; that is, different
societies might have different ways of experiencing time, and Western society is only one
among others. Chris Lorenz calls “presentism n° 2” when the term is considered as an “order
of time,” namely, from a heuristic point of view, “a particular view on the relationship Eliminado: ,
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between past, present and future, in which one of them is dominant—and ‘presentism’
represents the regime of historicity in which the present is dominant” (2019: 23). Before Eliminado: 2019
approach using this concept. Revel defines this “plastic notion” as “a relationship—or rather,
a set of relationships—that a social actor or social practice maintains over time and,
eventually, with a history, as well as the way these relationships are embedded in a present,
which may be that of memory but also that of action” (2000: 16, my translation). Eliminado: 2000
Variety of Regimes of Historicity” (2000), he invites us to reject positions that propose a Comentado [KB10]: TS: Please link to reference –
Detienne.
distinction between societies with “historical consciousness” and those that supposedly lack Eliminado: ,
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it. For a society to have a temporal experience of time, it does not need to construct a model
of linear time or think that the past is different from and “something else” than the present. Eliminado: ing
When the descendants of pre-Columbian societies became aware that the Yankees had taken
possession of their lands, they took the United States to court. They “were then required by
the judges to provide ‘historical evidence’ of their rights over more or less extensive
territories,” namely, they “were under obligation to explain how they belonged to a history Eliminado: ,
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that they not necessarily lived or thought through” (Detienne 2000: 41). To demand
Comentado [KB11]: TS: Please link to reference.
“historical evidence” from them was to place them in a “temporal order” or “regime of
historicity” that is typical of Western societies that rely on archives and documentary
evidence that, in turn, are accepted by the state. These societies were led “to create for
the variety of regimes of historicity and their differences from the Western one, Detienne
used examples such as Chinese and Roman cultures, among others. In the same vein but
without using the term “regimes of historicity,” James Clifford noted that professional
anthropologists and historians played a major role in the Mashpee trial, but the American
court found their claims about the past unconvincing. For Clifford, there was a collapse
between the historicist perspective of the court underlying assumptions such as a narrative
continuity of history and identity and the Mashpee culture. “The Mashpee were trapped by
the stories that could be told about them. In this trial ‘the facts’ did not speak for themselves.
Tribal life had to be emplotted, told as a coherent narrative” (Geertz 1988: 204). Comentado [KB12]: AU: Please provide full reference
details.
In “Les régimes d´historicité: un outil pour les historiens? Une etude de cas: la ‘guerre
des races’” (2002), Patrick Garcia also tested the heuristic value of the notion. For him, the Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: Garcia (2002)
regime of historicity is “the social value assigned to each time period (past/present/future)”
(2002: 43). He analyzed the “war of races” that extended from the seventeenth century to the Eliminado: s
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first half of the nineteenth century in France. This “war of races” involved the dispute begun
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Reynaud, Comte de Montlosier, François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, and Augustin Thierry
about the origins of the nobility, the foundations of their prerogatives, and their legitimacy. In
other words, the term “race,” in this context, should not be understood in a biological way but
refers to the distinction between Francs and Gaulois, victors and losers (Garcia 2002: 3). For Eliminado: Garcia
François-René Chateaubriand, for example, the French Revolution was one among many
others: “There is nothing new under the sun” (14). By “revolution,” he intended the
astronomical meaning that died out at the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast, for an Eliminado: 18th
author such as Boulainverlliers, the French Revolution was a rupture. In reality, the treatment
fought for the installation of the “race” of the Franks and did not consider the Revolution a
milestone that separated the past and present. Tierry, on the contrary, saw in the Revolution
an “abyss” that separated the world of the Restoration from the Old Regime. After analyzing Eliminado: s
the works of those historians, Garcia concludes that a new regime of historicity, a new
historicity, was installed in France after the “force of the revolutionary event.” However,
Garcia is careful not to generalize. He has only “read the work of some historians and not of
the population as a whole.” In this sense, he indicates the imprudence of including the rest of
the population, in which different modalities and temporalities may coexist according to
Lemardelé, taking the term from Detienne, compared the biblical and Aztec regimes of Eliminado: B
into historiography through writing, that is, a written temporality. This written tradition
sought to legitimize an identity through a founding story. Lemardelé is clear about the
to know what is being compared, in this case, regimes of historicity. As a “simple tool,”
regimes of historicity is more than a “plastic” term, as Revel baptized it. Used in a heurist
way, namely, as a tool to compare different temporalities between different cultures, the Eliminado: i.e.
notion of “regimes of historicity” has wide semantic dispersion. Multiple temporalities are
the common places that cross through the notion. Another example of this is Alain de Libera,
a medieval philosopher:
When referring to “medieval worlds,” … he stated that “the Baghdad of the Eliminado: w
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third century of the Hegira and the Aix of the ninth century of the Christian
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era are contemporaries, but they are neither in the same time nor in the same Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: ‘
world or in the same story.” For the historian of medieval philosophy, there Eliminado: ’
Muslim duration, a Jewish duration.” (Revel 2000: 15–16) Comentado [Q13]: AU: As per style, quoted text of more
than 60 words need to be set as a display quote rather than
an in-line quote. Please check whether the change done here
Each cultural world has its own peculiar time. A multiplicity of times coexisted in medieval
in line with this style is appropriate.
Europe that also coexisted with the peculiar times of American or African peoples with Eliminado: ’
Eliminado: 2000
whom they had no interaction” (Mudrovcic 2019: 463). This is the same idea expressed by Eliminado: .
Eliminado: M
Sahlins in 1985: “Different cultures, different historicities” (x).
Comentado [KB14]: AU: Please confirm where the
opening quote mark should be inserted.
This beginning of the recognition by historians of temporal plurality (time in plural)
Comentado [KB15]: AU: Please provide full reference
details for Sahlins 1985.
between different societies and cultures was condensed in the heuristic use of the term
anthropologist Lenclud led many historians and, with them, philosophers and theorists of
history to discover multiple temporalities in cultures rather than only in language, as had
temporalities that includes Western societies as one among many others. This notion is a
history when the “time of history” “explodes into crumbs,” in François Dosse’s terms. The
time of history did not suffer the same fate as the encounter that took place a few years earlier
between history and sociology in the dispute between Braudel and Georges Gurvitch. Until
then, the question of temporality was a matter almost exclusively for philosophers.
méditerranéen a l´époque de Philippe II (1949). It was not organized chronologically but Comentado [KB16]: TS: Please link to reference – Braudel.
thematically: (1) the role of the environment; (2) collective destinies and general trends; and
(3) events, politics, and people. The first part contains an “almost immobile story”; the
second part contains a “slow-paced story” of group and groupings; and the third presents a
“traditional” story of events, “événementielle,” of “brief, fast and nervous oscillations.” The Con formato: Fuente: Sin Cursiva
three parts correspond to the three times that Braudel distinguishes in history: a “geographical
time,” a “social time,” and an “individual time.” Almost ten years later, in 1958, as Director
of Annales, he published his famous article, “Histoire et sciences sociales.” The “longue
durée,” which includes his reflections on the time of history and the time of sociology,
installed the binomial longue durée/événementiel. The event is “explosive”; it is better to use
the term “short time” tailored to individuals and everyday life. However, the “short time” is
the most deceptive of durations (Braudel 1958: 728). Economic and social history, unlike
political history, needs longer durations. The time of history, the long time, is measured, as
the economic cycles governed by the flow and reflux of material life are measured or as the
social structures that must be located according to concomitant structures are measured (749–
50). History is not a science of the idiographic, of the event, of the “short time.” The science
of history is concerned only with “all things that can be recorded in relation to the uniform
time of historians, the general measure of all phenomena, and not to the multiform social
time, a particular measure of each of these phenomena” (750, my translation). The “long
duration” is the “most useful” line of research for common reflection in the social sciences.
Braudel, in response to the challenges presented by structuralism, Marxism and the renewal
of anthropology and sociology, attempted, through the long duration, to establish a common
ground that transforms history into a true social science that leads the others (Maillard 2005).
This undertaking led him to discard the “multiple temporalities” that Gurvitch proposed from
sociology. If each “social reality hides its time or its time scales, like vulgar shells … [w]hat
would historians gain from that?” (Braudel 1958: 750). Eliminado: Braudel
Multiplicité des temps sociaux (1963) and in the Dialectique et sociologie (1962). As early as Comentado [KB17]: TS: Please link to reference –
Gurvitch.
1955, his first reflections on time appeared in Déterminismes sociaux et Liberté humanaine Eliminado: 1962
(1955), in which he recognized a time scale of eight genres ranging from the long duration to Comentado [KB18]: TS: Please link to reference –
Gurvitch.
the explosive time of creation. If for Braudel all social reality is historical, Gurvitch Eliminado: 8
of industrial societies.
collective and individual consciousness of human freedom whose action can Eliminado: ’
Eliminado: ,..
succeed in turning or to modify the structures and to rebel, to a certain
extent, against tradition, … the historical reality is opposed … to the so- Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: ,
called archaic societies and also, with some reservations, to the patriarchal
or traditional societies. (Gurvitch 1962: 209, my translation) Comentado [Q19]: AU: As per style, quoted text of more
than 60 words need to be set as a display quote rather than
an in-line quote. Please check whether the change done here
For Gurvith, “historicity” is not universal; the “cold societies” of Lévi-Strauss ignored it and
in line with this style is appropriate.
had other types of temporalities. At that time, Gurvith denounced the danger of the historian Eliminado: .
projecting his own time to the detriment of others: “It is for this reason that the great
temptation that weighs about the science of history is the ‘prediction of the past’ that often
sociologists who continued with the idea of multiple time. In 1996, the sociologist William
Grossin proposed the idea of “temporal ecology” to name a “science of times.” In Pour une
science des temps: Introduction a l’écologie temporelle, Grossin (1996) proposed a series of Eliminado: .
Eliminado: Grossin (
concepts as instruments of both empirical and theoretical research on time: “milieux
Eliminado: )
temporal” (“set of nested and intersected times”); “temporal regime” (“specific social Eliminado:
construction arising from human decisions”); “temporal culture” (“set of models, norms,
values that have to do with the social theme”); “socio-temporal frames” (“set of collective
beliefs about time historical and cultural changing”), and so on. The research program of a Eliminado: etc
Eliminado: me
“temporal ecology” as a science of times must be undertaken by psychologists,
anthropologists, and sociologists. In 1984, Grossin created the Temporalistes, a bulletin that
was, for eighteen years, an instrument of dissemination that brought together the best Eliminado: 18
specialists on individual or social temporal issues. In 2004, the Bulletin was transformed into
Temporalité, Revue des Sciences Sociales et Humaines, which aimed to favor all Eliminado: u
interdisciplinary initiatives around the issues of temporality. As he says in his editorial, the
journal addresses the foundations of temporal distinctions, the articulation and conflicts
between temporalities, the confrontation of various uses and languages of time, the modes of
historicity of the disciplines, and the confrontations of philosophical categorizations in
empirical works. Claude Dubar, the editor in chief of the journal, published a review in 2004 Eliminado: -
Eliminado: -
of Hartog’s Regimes (Dubar 2004). Although he begins with praiseworthy terms, he then
Eliminado: ´
Despite the long tradition of the Temporalists on the insistence of multiple temporalities, in
the review, Dubar focuses on the choice of the term “presentism” as the regime of historicity
that would succeed the modern regime. His criticism failed to detach the heuristic version of
the expression “regimes of historicity” used for Hartog in its heuristic meaning: “to denote Eliminado: , i.e.,
the various combinations of past, present, and future orientation, which form the prism
through which a society views its ‘historicity’ (in the historians’ sense of actual eventuation)”
(Stewart 2016: 86). The most important problem for anthropologists is with the concept of
linear; therefore, it is difficult to make it a suitable concept to deal with other temporalities
that are not only Western. At first, the concept seemed appropriate for anthropologists along
and “people-environment.” However, its full adoption has been hindered for two reasons: (1) Eliminado: .
Eliminado: a
“the original formulations of historicity are pitched at a philosophical level that requires
adaptation to anthropological research,” and (2) “the constant presence of competing usages Eliminado: b
of the term historicity has caused confusion” (81). Born in a post-Enlightenment thought Eliminado: Stewart:
complex, the use of the term may also lead to the belief that ideas such as chronology,
temporal progression, and pastness must be human universals and are presuppositions of the
intellectual baggage of the anthropologist that makes him neglect other temporal forms to
experience the past. The point is whether the concept of “historicity” can be re-signified as a
cross-cultural analytic term that allows the study of all the diverse ways in which the past
may be construed (83). For Stewart, the concept “regimes of historicity” used by Hartog
involved small steps toward building a conception of plural times. However, the author Eliminado: s
concludes that despite these small steps, the sense of “historicity” remains unclear because
the greatest danger is to associate it to “historicism.” The same diagnosis is shared by Helge
Jordheim, who affirms that Hartog´s concept considers the diachronic succession—not the
“presentism” sits too firmly within the paradigm of “historicism,” which holds, among other
things, that the present succeeds the past and that anachronism is impermissible (Chakrabarty
2000b: 248). It is what Lorenz calls “presentism n° 1,” “according to which presentism Eliminado: 0
Eliminado: b
basically means our ‘present,’ ‘contemporary’ period, … a chronological ‘block of time’ that
Eliminado: ´
fits in the linear and progressive time conception of modern history” (Lorenz 2019: 1). Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: Lorenz
Hartog is unclear about these two different senses of the regime of historicity as
“presentism.” In his anthropological stage, namely, when Hartog read Sahlins, Lévi-Strauss, Eliminado: i.e.
or Claude Lefort and worked and wrote with Lenclud, we can find a looser use of presentism
as a regime of historicity or order of time that would characterize the contemporary epoch.
One could then agree with Hartog that regimes “are not supported by any teleology, in the
manner of the old phases or modes of production, and do not claim to give the key to history”
(Delacroix, Dosse, and Garcia 2010: 153, my translation). In other words, presentism was Eliminado: Delacroix et al.
intended to be more a “diagnosis” or “symptom” of the “temporal order” that was being
crossed (Hartog 1983, 1993). In the text written with Revel in 2001, the authors offer some
“brief notes” on the “historical situation,” “taking as support the French situation” (Hartog
and Revel 2001: 19). They observe an increasing supremacy of the “present” or of the
“contemporary.” “If there are no more great stories, great “master names” circulate in
revenge, … although they do not form a system, at least they constitute a network, … present,
memory, identity, genocide, testimony, responsibility, they are the ones who would surely
appear” (20, my translation). Hartog recognizes the imprint of the diagnosis of “presentism” Eliminado: Hartog and Revel 2001:
in the works of Nora and Pomian, and by the late 1980s, he had marked the beginning of the
presentist regime of historicity, the order of time in which the present is dominant.
historical regime, acknowledging that “the construction of the neologism” presentism “was
made above all with respect to the category of futurism” (Delacroix, Dosse, and Garcia 2010 Eliminado: Delacroix et al.:
158). Unlike the modern regime of historicity in which the future commanded, in our
presentist regime of historicity, the “future is perceived as a threat, not a promise. The future
is a time of disasters, and ones we have, moreover, brought upon ourselves, … [we are living]
in a world governed solely by an omnipresent and omnipotent, in which immediacy alone has
value” (Hartog 2015: xviii). By the late 1980s, Hartog marked the beginning of the presentist
regime of historicity, the order of time in which the present is dominant: “the Present has
become omnipresent” (Hartog 2005). The present is the only horizon but with a particularity: Eliminado: ,
past.” It is as if the present turns on itself to predict how it will be considered in the past,
anticipating how it will be seen by the past. As Lorenz has noted, this diagnostic of
which he calls “presentism n° 1” (Lorenz 2019: 1). Dubar’s (2004) review is an example of Eliminado: Lorenz
Eliminado: ´
this. Dubar calls “presenteeism” the “fourth regime of historicity.” The others are the “heroic
Eliminado: (2004)
regime,” that of “la Communauté” and its “history of kings and battles”; the “Christian
regime,” in which “the articulation between the past, present and future is based on eternity”;
and the modern or, better, “futuristic regime,” founded on “optimism of progress and the
future.” The latter enters into crisis and gives birth to the presentist regime of historicity. His
criticism of Hartog has nothing to do with the historicist presupposition of his own reading of
the regimes of historicity; that is, Dubar is “blind” to this linear developmental temporal
framework. His criticisms point in two directions: (1) questioning the “baptism” of the Eliminado: a
present time as “presentist” and not, for example, as “post-modernist” and (2) showing that
the concept of “identity forms” is more satisfactory because “contrary to Hartog’s regimes,
identity forms do not disappear when they cease to be dominant at any given time” (Dubar
2004: 132). The ambiguity that Lorenz identifies between a historicist version (presentism N° Eliminado: Dubar
1) and a version “as an instrumental concept to pluralize the notion of time” (presentism N°
Hartog’s diagnosis that at least Western societies are living in a new order of time is Eliminado: ´
widely shared. First, as a shift to the past that has been described as a “memory boom”
(Runia 2007; Winter 2006), a “surfeit of memory” (Maier 1993), a “world (that) is being
musealized” (Huyssen 2000; Lübbe 1983), or a “desire to commemorate” (Runia 2007). The
diagnosis seems unanimous: we are living in a period in which the present lives off the past,
in a kind of “a present past” (Huyssen 2000). This past that lives in the present has been
(Bevernage 2008), among other things. Several theories stress the presence of the past in the
Comentado [KB20]: TS: Please link to reference.
present (Bevernage 2012; Domanska 2006; Kleinberg 2017; Lorenz and Bevernage 2013; Eliminado: Lorenz and Bevernage 2013;
Comentado [KB21]:
Runia 2006; Tamm 2015). Others, such as Assmann (2013) and Gumbrecht (2014), attempt,
Eliminado: Assmann (
like Hartog, to conjugate the past, present, and future in a new order. Finally, Simon (2018, Eliminado: )
Eliminado:
2019) attempts to redefine temporality by stressing the future. “Shifting notion of time”
Eliminado: Finally, Simon (
(2019), Tamm and Oliver’s introduction to a very recent book, is really a state of affairs Eliminado: ,
Comentado [KB22]: TS: Please link to reference – Tamm
about current trends in the discussion of temporalities. The pertinence of Hartog’s analysis is and Oliver.
Eliminado: ´
widely recognized by the editors considering the book’s subtitle, “New Approaches to Eliminado: (2019)
Eliminado: ´
Presentism.” The first part of the book is titled “Presentism and New Temporalities.” Both
editors note in the introduction that because the “ambiguous use of the term has created a
certain confusion … our use of the term in this introduction, ‘presentism’ is to be understood
only as a regime of historicity (what Lorenz calls Hartog’s ‘presentism n° 2’).” There is a Eliminado: ´
Eliminado: ´
recognition of the methodological dimension of presentism as a regime of historicity to
Eliminado: ´
pluralize temporality but a strong criticism of every historicist interpretation of the concept
because the term historicity restrictively refers only to the configuration of the past. Likewise,
he prefers the term “logic” (logique) instead of “regime” since it is better interwoven with the Eliminado: “
Eliminado: ”
correlation between the nunc and the hic; that is, a logic of temporality would also imply a
regime (or a logic) “of spatiality” (2005: 59, my translation). In the same vein, Lenclud Comentado [KB23]: AU: Please provide full citation
details.
suggests that we should speak of “temporality” rather than “historicity” (Lenclud 2010).
However, according to both Hartog and Lenclud, Ludivine Bantigny suggests that the term
scholars approach it—it tends to freeze a period in its relation to time and history, to
crystalize its domination, to reify its essential traits” (Bantigny 2013: III, my translation).
Although Jordheim prefers “temporal” instead of “historicity,” he agrees with the term
and negative sense …. Transposed into the analytics of multiple times, the term serves to
remind us that time is also a question of power, the power of control movements, to decide
about beginnings and endings, to set the pace, to give the rhythm” (Jordheim 2014: 510).
Undoubtedly, the notion of “regimes of historicity” has had a great impact, especially
in the English-speaking world after the English translation of Regimes in 2015. As Peter
Seixas recognizes in his review, the concept of regimes of historicity “is itself an important
contribution.” Hartog’s work was vastly known in Latin America before the Spanish Eliminado: ´
Eliminado: ´s
translation of Regimes in 2007. The translation was carried out by the Universidad
Iberoamericana of México, where Hartog was invited to lecture several times. The concept
was used to think of the multiples experiences of time in a multicultural nation such as
México (Hernández Reyna 2016), the relation between regimens of historicity and regimens
of historiography (Mudrovcic 2013), the link between the cultural heritage and presentism
(Aravena 2014), among other things. The enthusiasm with which this category was received
in the international academic sphere is reflected in a recent book including renowned Western
history, cultural geography, and humanities in general (Tamm and Olivier 2019). In the Comentado [KB24]: TS: Please link to reference.
conclusion, Assmann sharply notes the “irritation” that “resonates through all the essays of
this volume” (2019: 208). Western researchers have suddenly discovered that universal and Comentado [KB25]: TS: Please link to reference –
Assmann.
linear time—which has been taken for granted—not only turned out to be contingent and
debatable but also has the same epistemological and normative values as other times in other
cultures. In her analysis of the foregoing chapters, Assmann cannot avoid a historicist reading
of the notion of “regimes of historicity.” The time regime of modernity “collapsed, … when
the past became sticky and resisted being shed and left behind like the skin of a snake … the
past, the present and the future have not only dramatically changed their valence and
meaning, but also the ways in which they have been connected” (208). She recognizes that Eliminado: 2019:
for (Western) people, there is a “new regime” of temporality that must coexist with the Eliminado: [
Eliminado: ]
multiplicity of cultural temporalities and that “implies coming to terms and living together
with multiple time regimes in a global culture” (218). Neither she nor the other contributors Eliminado: 2019:
to the book (or most Western researchers) question the three temporal dimensions of past,
present and future. This threefold division of time as self-evident and universal is one of the Eliminado: -
In the Future
Hartog’s expression “regimes of historicity” in its methodological use has undoubtedly Eliminado: ´
applied across different cultures. The concept is one, among others, which Western culture
historians and theorists and philosophers of history. However, the idea of multiple
temporalities that the concept involves in its heuristic or methodological version was not such
In a very well-known article, the American linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf claimed that
“the Hopi language is seen to contain no words, grammatical forms, constructions or Eliminado: [
Eliminado: ]
expressions that refer directly to what we call time, or to past, present or future, or to
enduring or lasting … the Hopi language contains no reference to time, either explicit or Comentado [KB26]: AU: Are these emphases in the
original?
implicit” (1950: 67). His study was an example of his “linguistic relativity hypothesis,” the Comentado [KB27]: TS: please link to reference – Whorf.
idea that the language one speaks influences the way one thinks. He found it “gratuitous” to
“assume that a Hopi who knows only the Hopi language and the cultural ideas of his own
society has the same notion of time and space we have, and that are generally assumed that
are universal” (67). This Whorf¨s controversial claim originated a debate about “Hopi time” Eliminado: 1950:
and what is known as the theory of “linguistic relativity.” In the same vein, researchers at Eliminado: .
various universities have challenged the paradigm of conceptual metaphor based upon
claimed universal cognitive processes that has led to the assumption that the analysis of
linguistic space-time mapping are universal. “Time as Space is a deep metaphor for all
human beings. It is common across cultures, psychologically real, productive and profoundly
entrenched in thought and language” (Fauconnier and Turner 2008: 55). Some researchers
challenge this Universal Mapping Hypothesis. Chris Sinha, Vera Da Silva Sinha, Jörg
Zinken, and Wany Sampaio have shown that in a culture such as Amazonia, people do not
have an inventory of terms to express temporal relations as known by Western culture (Sinha
et al. 2011). Various contemporary approaches from cognitive sciences question our tripartite
version of time; there are cultures that experience time without distinguishing between the
Multiple temporalities have also been a central concern of subaltern studies and
subaltern studies exceeds that of the discipline of history and refers to how postcolonial
theorists have taken an interest in subaltern studies. One of the common points is the
the construction of social science knowledge” (Chakrabarty 2000b: 9). He recognizes that Eliminado: 0
Eliminado: b
multiple temporalities as well as religious, supernatural, and miraculous terms have
always successfully resisted historicist readings.” The peculiarities of the indigenous peoples
of America or Indian people resist being caught by what Chakrabarty calls a “transition
among others, are applied. “The British conquered and represented the diversity of Indian
The terms have changed with time. The medieval was once called ‘despotic’ and the modern
‘the rule of law.’ ‘Feudal/capitalist’ has been a later variant” (Chakrabarty 2000b: 32). In Eliminado: 0
Eliminado: b
these sorts of narratives, “Indian” was always “a figure of lack.” For Chakrabarty, to think in
terms of this sort of narrative is to “think a history whose theoretical subject was Europe”; the
“transition narrative” will always remain “grievously incomplete.” He concludes, “So long as
one operates within the discourse of ‘history’ produced at the institutional site of the
university, it is not possible simply to walk out of the deep collusion between ‘history’ and
the modernizing narrative(s)” (41). For Chakrabarty, it is not about producing new concepts
to be able to capture the diversities regarding temporal issues or other nature since in that way
historians will continue doing European history with non-European archives. Instead, it is
transcendental subject. This is the project of provincializing “Europe” that still did not exist
extreme, it would be impossible even to build bridges of meaning. How, then, can we
understand the radical “other”? This is a problem that has been central to all hermeneutics. If
the multiplicity of temporalities is a conception that is born when we associate time and
culture, is there a risk of reproducing cultural relativism? Is cultural relativism truly a risk, or
not possible to leave hegemonic categories to “read” the world in a different way?
In another sense, an author such as Zoltán Boldizsár Comentado [KB28]: AU: Please complete or confirm
deletion.
Simon suggests that the presentist regime of historicity helps “to gain an
conceptualizing it in the shape of a more or less comprehensive theoretical account” (2019: Eliminado: Simon
1). However, for Simon, the sense of debt to the past that characterized Hartog’s concept does Eliminado: ´
not help to “open” the future. The problem for Simon is that a presentist regime of historicity
understood in these terms obscures the emergence and future possibilities in the technological
and ecological domains (5–6). To address the complexity of the present moment, he coins the Eliminado: 2019:
concept of an “epochal event” to reflect the emerging societal experience of time in which
actual changes are occurring around us (Simon 2020). In the same vein, Ewa Domanska Comentado [KB29]: TS: please link to reference.
affirms that “[the] main challenge for today´s historical research lies … in applying a future-
oriented position (2020: 183). Comentado [KB30]: TS: please link to reference.
Conclusion
The concept of “regimes of historicity” is indeed a Pandora’s box. The concept was one that Eliminado: ´
helped “the West” to wake up from its “dogmatic dream” about a single, universal, and linear
time. Although many other concepts and different principles from a variety of disciplines
Eliminado: r
show potential for further analysis of time, the notion regime of historicity is currently at the Comentado [KB31]: TS: please link to reference.
Eliminado: r
center of the scene. The great impact it had when it was coined in the 1980s in the French
Eliminado: o
sphere was consolidated when Regimes was translated into English. It is one of the most Eliminado: r
Eliminado: ,
powerful concepts between all the shifting notions of time. It is a concept that, even in its
Eliminado: (
ambiguity or, perhaps, for its own sake, captured the climate of our times. Eliminado: ),
Eliminado: .
The preoccupation with the question about time is so central to our present that it has
Con formato: Fuente: Cursiva
even contributed to the emergence of a new field: “time studies.” This new field tries to Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: . 43–67
“track how time is conceptualized in our own moment.” The scholars who participated in a Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: .
collection of essays attempted to construct a “vocabulary of the present.” Time studies
Eliminado: Franc
involves parts of what the anthropologist David Scott has recently described as “a new time- Eliminado: e
Eliminado: ,
consciousness” (Burges and Elias 2016). The regime of historicity is perhaps another way to
Movido (inserción) [1]
name the same idea. Eliminado:
Subido [1]: A. J.
Further Reading and Online Resources
Eliminado: (
André, J. ed. (2010), Les Récits du Temps, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Eliminado: ),
Burges, J. and A. J. Elias, eds. (2016), Time: A Vocabulary of the Present. New York: New York
Eliminado: .
University Press.
Con formato: Fuente: Cursiva
Eliminado: ,
Eliminado: (
Eliminado: ),
Eliminado: .
Eliminado: ,
Chakrabarty, D. (2000), Provincialinzing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Con formato ... [1]
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eliminado: (
Detienne, M. (2000), Comparer L´Incomparable. París: Seuil. Eliminado: ),
Kuukkanen, J. M., ed. (2020), Philosophy of History. Twenty-First-Century Perspectives, Great Britain: Eliminado: .
Bloomsbury Academic. Con formato ... [2]
Eliminado: ,
Lorenz, C., and B. Bevernage., eds. (2013), Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between
Present, Past and Future, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck/Ruprecht. Comentado [KB32]: AU: Please provide city name.
Eliminado: ,.
Pomian, K. (1984), L’ordre du Temps, Bibliothèque des Histoires, Paris: Gallimard.
Eliminado: (
Simon, Z. B. (2020), The Epochal Event. Transformation in the Entangled Human Technological, and
Eliminado: ),
Natural Worlds, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Eliminado: .
Tamm, M. and L. Olivier, eds. (2019), Rethinking Historical Time: New approaches to Presentism, Eliminado: ,
London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Eliminado: .
Virilio, P. (2009), Le Futurism de L´instant: Stop Eject, Paris: Galilée. Con formato ... [3]
References Eliminado: (
Agulhon, M. (1981), Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880, Eliminado: ),
trans. J. Lloyd, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eliminado: .
Ankersmit, F. (2005), Sublime Historical Experience, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Con formato ... [4]
Eliminado: .
Aravena, P. (2014), “F. Hartog: la historia en un tiempo catastrófico,” Cuadernos de Historia: Revista
de la Universidad de Chile, (41): 227–34. Con formato ... [5]
Eliminado: ,
Assmann, A. (2013), Ist die Zeit auys den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des Zeitregimes der Moderne,
Eliminado: .
Munich: Hunser.
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Assmann, A. (2019), “Conclusion: A Creed That Has Lost its Believers? Reconfiguring the Concepts of
Eliminado: ),
Time and History,” in M. Tamm and L. Olivier (eds.), Rethinking Historical Time: New approaches to
Presentism, London: Bloomsbury Academic. Eliminado: .
Con formato ... [6]
Bantigny, L. (2013), “Historicités du 20e Siècle,” Vingtième Siècle: Revue D’Histoire, 117 (1): 13–25.
Eliminado: .
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