Asia-Pacific Review

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Historical Memories and Security Legislation:

Japan's Security Policy under the Abe
Administration

Yuichi Hosoya

To cite this article: Yuichi Hosoya (2015) Historical Memories and Security Legislation:
Japan's Security Policy under the Abe Administration, Asia-Pacific Review, 22:2, 44-52, DOI:
10.1080/13439006.2015.1123133

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2015.1123133

Published online: 26 Jan 2016.

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 Asia-Pacific Review, 2015
Vol. 22, No. 2, 44–52, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2015.1123133

Historical Memories and

Security Legislation:
Japan’s Security Policy
under the Abe
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Administration
YUICHI HOSOYA

In Japan, two political issues came to the forefront in the year marking the 70th
anniversary of the end of World War II. While usually dealt with separately, the
Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, issued on August 14, 2015, and the
security legislation based on the concept of a “Proactive Contribution to
Peace” both relate to the question of how we view Japan’s place in
international society. This article examines how both these issues support
Japan’s commitment to maintaining its identity as a peace-loving nation and
its responsibility to contribute to international peace and prosperity.

Introduction
t the 70 year-anniversary of the end of the Second World War, two political
A issues ignited heated debates in the summer of 2015. One is on Prime Min-
ister Shinzo Abe’s historical statement which was issued on August 14. The
other one is on the security legislation under the Abe administration based on
the concept of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.” While Abe’s historical state-
ment was largely welcomed by both domestic and international public opinion,
the debate on this security legislation reminds us of the deep ideological division
between the liberal-left and the conservative-right.
To put it simply, the liberal-left has been arguing that Japanese political
leaders should more steadfastly apologize for Japan’s aggression and colonialism
before 1945. On the other hand, the conservative-right argues that Japan should
not be exceedingly apologetic, and the Japanese people should have pride in
their own history.

# 2016 Institute for International Policy Studies 44

 Historical Memories and Security Legislation: Japan’s Security Policy under the Abe Administration

Likewise, the conservative-right generally argues that the security legislation

which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been promoting is both necessary and desir-
able to respond to the rise of Chinese military power. The liberal-left, on the other
hand, considers that the security bill is both unconstitutional and undesirable and
would inevitably damage the Japanese peaceful path after the end of the war.
Although these two issues are usually dealt with separately, we need to be
aware that both of them relate to the question of how we view Japan’s place in
international society. Japanese people are now searching for their new role in
international politics. This question is two-fold. First, to what extent should
Japan contribute to international peace and stability? Second, how and what
lessons can we learn from Japan’s path in the twentieth century?
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Japan’s national identity as a peace-loving country has now become a national

consensus which both the liberal-left and the conservative-right can uphold. Japa-
nese security policy has to start from this point. In his historical statement, Abe
said, “on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, I bow my head deeply
before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad.”1 Then he con-
tinued saying, “I express my feelings of profound grief and my eternal, sincere
condolences.” Based upon this “profound grief” and the “eternal, sincere condo-
lences,” Japan decided to pave a peaceful path when the war ended in 1945, and
has become a peace-loving country since then. As Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution prohibits Japan from exercising military force to solve international
disputes, Japan needs to rely principally on non-military means to bring about
peace and stability.
Yoichi Funabashi, a leading Japanese journalist, wrote soon after the end of
the Cold War that “emergence of a more internationalist and actively engaged
Japanese pacifism could play a constructive role in making Japan a global civilian
power.”2 Japan has been, and remains still, “a global civilian power” unlike other
major powers that have both nuclear missiles and striking capabilities. The Japa-
nese constitution allows Japan to have only defensive weapons.
Likewise, Prime Minister Abe declared the following in his historical state-
ment:

“We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a chal-
lenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly uphold
basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values
and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag
of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ and contribute to the peace and prosperity
of the world more than ever before.”3

Japan’s pacifist ideology remains very strong. Prime Minister Abe shares this
ideology and has the same goal as he indicated in his historical statement. Even

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 Yuichi Hosoya

conservative right-wing politicians cannot deviate from this path. His historical
statement surely upholds this national consensus. Therefore, according to The
Nikkei Shimbun opinion poll, 42% of respondents supported Abe’s statement,
while 33% did not.4 After Prime Minister Abe issued this historical statement,
the Cabinet support rate increased by 8%.
The important point is that even the most conservative Japanese prime min-
ister after World War II, Shinzo Abe, shares the Murayama Statement which was
issued by the most leftist Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama. At the 50th anni-
versary of the end of the Second World War, Murayama issued the most compre-
hensive historical statement by a Japanese prime minister on August 15, 1995. The
most famous paragraph of Murayama’s statement is as follows:
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“During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken
national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese
people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly
to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future,
I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here
once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow
me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at
home and abroad, of that history.”5

The key question during the drafting process of Abe’s historical statement
was whether Abe would uphold some of the key words of the Murayama State-
ment such as “colonial rule,” “aggression,” deep remorse,” and “apology.”
The debate on the security legislation was linked to the debate on Abe’s his-
torical statement, as Japan’s public opinion expressed uncertainty on the direction
of Japan’s path in the future. Abe answered this question both in his historical
statement and in the security bill. This article attempts to examine the link
between the two political debates in the summer of 2015 in order to understand
the future trajectory of Japan’s foreign policy.

From war to peace and prosperity

Postwar Japanese security policy has always been linked with Japan’s historical
memories. Seventy-four years ago, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, and
war broke out between Japan and the United States. Japan also invaded British ter-
ritories in Southeast Asia. During the four years of the Pacific War, huge numbers
of human lives were lost both in Japan and beyond.
Mindful of the loss of human lives in the war years, Prime Minister Abe said
at the 70th anniversary of the end of the war that: “in countries that fought against
Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In

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 Historical Memories and Security Legislation: Japan’s Security Policy under the Abe Administration

China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battle-
fields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to battles as well as
hardships such as severe deprivation of food.”6
Based upon this historical reflection, Abe stated as follows:
“With deep repentance for the war, Japan made that pledge. Upon it, we have
created a free and democratic country, abide by the rule of law, and consistently
upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. While taking silent pride in the
path we have walked as a peace-loving nation for as long as seventy years,
we remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course.”
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Abe was fully aware of the fact that “deep repentance for the war” was the
basis of Japan’s postwar security policy. The basic foundation of postwar
Japan’s security strategy is often called the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Shinichi
Kitaoka, a leading historian of Japanese political history, wrote that “the main
aim of states is to promote economic interests based upon trade, and also to
deepen association with other developed economic powers.”7
Thus, during the Cold War years, the “Yoshida Doctrine” became the founda-
tional security strategy of pacifist Japan. By containing right-wing nationalist senti-
ment, economic growth became the main goal of Japan’s postwar foreign policy.8

Japan’s security strategy of “Human Security”

Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has maintained its passive and
restrained security policy for seven decades. Under Article 9 of the Japanese con-
stitution, Japan had presented a low-profile security policy during the Cold War
years. When the Cold War ended a quarter century ago, however, Japan was
often criticized by the international community as being a “free rider” that did
not sufficiently contribute to international peace and stability. The Japanese
government responded to these criticisms by launching a new diplomatic initiative
to spread both peace and prosperity.
In 1998, in the middle of the Asian financial crisis, Prime Minister Keizo
Obuchi launched a new diplomatic initiative with the concept of “Human Secur-
ity.” In his opening remarks, Obuchi emphasized the importance of this new
“Human Security” concept at the conference, “An Intellectual Dialogue on Build-
ing Asia’s Tomorrow,” on December 2, 1998:
“To support Asian countries in this economic crisis, we have pledged and stea-
dily implemented contributions on the largest scale in the world. With Human
Security in mind, we have given, as one of the most important pillars of our
support, assistance to the poor, the aged, the disabled, women and children,

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 Yuichi Hosoya

and other socially vulnerable segments of population on whom economic diffi-

culties have the heaviest impacts.”9

Then, in his speech in Hanoi, Vietnam in December 1998, Obuchi announced

that a Trust Fund for Human Security would be established in the United Nations
with contributions of US$4.2millon from Japan. Obuchi defined “Human Secur-
ity” as “a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival,
life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats.”10 This “Human
Security” initiative has become one of the central pillars of Japanese foreign
policy since then.
By launching this new concept, Japan developed its security policy and broad-
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ened its contribution to international peace and security. However, it was still diffi-
cult then to use military force to attain Japan’s security goals other than its own
national defense. Japan’s security policy had to principally rely upon non-military
measures, and the “Human Security” policy was within that boundary.

“Proactive Contribution to Peace”: What does this

mean?
When he became prime minister in September 2006, Shinzo Abe attempted to
modify Japan’s security policy by reforming the legal basis for security. For
this purpose, Abe established a new advisory group, named the “Advisory
Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” in May 2007. Japan
needed to broaden and deepen its security contribution to international peace
and stability in a more significant way. Abe thought that it was then necessary
to combine military and non-military means to more proactively contribute to
international peace. However, when Abe resigned his prime ministerial post,
the next prime minister did not show interest in the security legislation.
In December 2012, when Abe returned to the prime ministerial office, he
decided to resume the discussion in the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of
the Legal Basis for Security. After the successful victory in the Upper House elec-
tion in July 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced that he intended to publish
Japan’s first National Security Strategy along with the establishment of Japan’s
National Security Council. Abe began to use the phrase “Proactive Contribution
to Peace based on international cooperation” to present his more proactive security
policy to the Japanese public.
In the National Security Strategy document which was published in Decem-
ber 2013, it is written that:
“Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by
complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable

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 Historical Memories and Security Legislation: Japan’s Security Policy under the Abe Administration

for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international
cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the
international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace
and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.”11

For this reason, Japan has been enhancing its security cooperation with
countries which share values and interests. While the U.S.-Japan alliance remains
at the center of Japanese national security strategy, Abe’s government emphasizes
the importance of broadening Japan’s security cooperation with other democratic
countries globally. Thus, “Proactive Contribution to Peace” has become Japan’s
central aim in its security policy. It is written in National Security Strategy that:
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“Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will
continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving
nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even
more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international
community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, as a ‘Proactive Contributor to Peace’ based on the principle
of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national secur-
ity that Japan should stand to hold.”12

However, to implement these new policy initiatives, it was necessary to partly

reinterpret Article 9 of Japanese constitution and to draft a new security bill.
Therefore, Abe’s Cabinet first made a Cabinet Decision on July 1, 2014, and
then drafted a new security bill.

Incrementalism in Japan’s security policy

On July 1, 2014, the Abe Cabinet agreed on the “Cabinet Decision on Develop-
ment of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect
its People.” Since then, the National Security Secretariat together with Ministry
of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs began the drafting of the security
bill which would revise Japan’s legal basis for security.
The government showed two different perspectives on this attempt. On one
hand, the government says that there is no change to Japan’s basic posture and
orientation upheld for the past 70 years, including its identity as a peace-loving
nation. However, the government at the same time says that this will considerably
transform Japan’s security policy to enable the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to con-
tribute more to international peace and stability.
Even though Japanese and international media focused exclusively on the
change in the right of collective self-defense, the security bill will not radically
transform Japan’s options to join in collective defense or to dispatch the SDF to

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 Yuichi Hosoya

foreign countries to fight wars. The new security bill indicates that under the “three
new conditions,” only when “an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a
close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival,” is
the use of force permitted. “Three new conditions” for the use of force are as
follows: (i) when an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed
attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs
and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally
overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, (ii) when there is no
appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and
protect its people, (iii) use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary.13
It is easily understood that these “three new conditions” are the most strict
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restrictions of any country for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.
In other words, it would be extremely difficult to foresee any situation in which
Japan needs to exercise it under the “three new conditions.” Even though Japan
can theoretically exercise the right of collective self-defense in this extremely
limited occasion thanks to the new security bill, it would be more appropriate to
argue that Japan can exercise the use of force only for the purpose of defending Japan.
It was written in an article regarding this security bill in The Guardian that
“Japanese soldiers could fight abroad again after the security bill passed.”14
This is quite misleading. Japanese SDF had already been dispatched to Iraq, the
Indian Ocean, and South Sudan, among others. If they are attacked under
certain circumstances, they are permitted to use weapons to defend themselves.
On the other hand, “the use of force” is not permitted if an attack on a foreign
country will not “threaten Japan’s survival.” No other country has such a high
hurdle regulating the use of military force.
There are two other significant new areas where the SDF can expand its activi-
ties. These are Japan’s more proactive participation in peacekeeping operations
(PKOs), and support activities. Previously, Japan’s SDF had very strict limits to
its activities in PKOs. The new security bill enables the SDF to engage in: (i)
additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (including the protection of
civilians), and (ii) adoption of ROE (rules of engagement) for use of weapons
(small arms) to better align with current UN standard.15 As for support activities,
the security bill introduced the new concept of “situations that will have an impor-
tant influence on Japan’s peace and security.” In that case, Japan’s SDF can engage
in “support activities to armed forces of foreign countries.” These activities
could not be conducted under the previous security legislation.
These new areas of security activities are related to Japan’s more proactive
participation in PKO activities based on international standards. On the other
hand, it is still extremely difficult for the Japanese government to decide to use
military force to support a foreign country under attack, if it does not result in
“threatening Japan’s survival.”

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 Historical Memories and Security Legislation: Japan’s Security Policy under the Abe Administration

Therefore, Jennifer Lind is accurate in saying that “it represents more continu-
ity than change in Japan’s national security policy.”16 Lind continues that: “Even if
this legislation moves forward, Japan remains the most dovish of the world’s great
powers. It spends 1% of its gross domestic product on defense (in contrast to triple
that rate in China). Its government is preoccupied with internal problems such as
reinvigorating the economy and responding to enervating demographic change.
Its ‘hawks’ advocate a national security policy to the left of Canada’s. And, as
the crowds protesting the security legislation in front of the Japanese Diet attest,
its people remain deeply apprehensive about even the most restrained use of force.”
This is partly because of our historical memories of the war experience. Anti-
militarism ideology remains very strong among the Japanese people.
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Conclusion
The past and the present are interlinked very closely. Japan is resolved to maintain
its national identity as a peace-loving nation, based upon a proper reflection of its
historical past. At the same time, Japan needs to play a larger role in bringing
about both peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Japan still
needs to rely mainly upon non-military means to attain it.
It seems that Japan’s approach to peace and stability is more necessary than
before because major countries are now realizing the difficulty of dispatching their
forces overseas. Besides, the War in Afghanistan and also the War in Iraq have
shown the limits of ensuring peace and stability by simply dropping bombs on
countries where people long for a safe and prosperous life.
Japan can contribute to international peace and prosperity by combining
Japan’s “Human Security” strategy with its more proactive security policy
based on the new security bill. To do it, however, Japan needs friends and partners.
The greatest value of the current security bill is to enable Japan to cooperate with
its friends and partners.

Notes
1
Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, August 14, 2015. http://japan.
kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html
2
Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol.70, No.5, 1991, p.65.
3
Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, August 14, 2015.
4
The Nikkei Shimbun, August 30, 2015.
5
Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “on the occasion of the
50th anniversary of the war’s end,” 15 August 1995. http://www.mofa.
go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html

A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V V OLUME 22, N UMBER 2 51

 Yuichi Hosoya

6
Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, August 14, 2015.
7
Shinichi Kitaoka, “Yoshida Shigeru ni okeru senzen to sengo”, Kindai
Nihon Kenkyukai (ed.), Sengo Gaiko no keisei (Tokyo: Yamakawa
Shuppansha, 1994) p.127.
8
Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s National Identity in Postwar Diplomacy: The
Three Basic Principles” in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), East Asian National
Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2012) pp.171 – 2.
9
Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, “An Intellectual
Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow,” December 2, 1998, Tokyo. http://
www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/tomorrow/1obuchi.html
10
Policy speech by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at the lecture program
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hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam,

December 16, 1998, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia.”
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html
11
National Security Council, National Security Strategy, December 17,
2013.
12
Ibid.
13
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2015 (Annual White Paper), 2015.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/H27DOJ_Digest_EN_
web.pdf
14
The Guardian, September 18, 2015.
15
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2015.
16
Jennifer Lind, “Japan’s Security Evolution, Not Revolution,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 20, 2015.

About the author

Yuichi Hosoya, Ph.D., is professor of international politics at Keio University,
Tokyo. Professor Hosoya studied international politics at Rikkyo (BA), Birmingham
(MIS), and Keio (Ph.D). He is also Senior Researcher at the Institute for Inter-
national Policy Studies (IIPS). He was a visiting professor and Japan Chair
(2009– 2010) at Sciences-Po in Paris (Institut d’Etudes Politiques) and a visiting
fellow (Fulbright Fellow, 2008 – 2009) at Princeton University. His research inter-
ests include postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplo-
macy, and contemporary international security. His most recent publications in
English include “The Atlantic Community and the Restoration of the Global
Balance of Power: The Western Alliance, Japan, and the Cold War, 1947 – 1951,”
in Marco Mariano (ed.), Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals,
and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2010); and
“Japanese National Identity in Postwar Diplomacy,” in Gilbert Rozman (ed.),
East Asia National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2012). He won several book awards such as the
23rd Suntory Prize for Social Sciences; the 24th Sakurada Prize for a Book on Pol-
itical Science; and 11th Yomiuri Yoshino Sakuzo Prize.

52 A SIA -P ACIFIC R EVIEW V N OVEMBER 2015