This gloomy point of view is supported by some evidence.

The empirical data that were just described seem to

suggest that the untrained mind only uses 'quick-and-dirty' heuristics, as was stated before in this discussion. In
spite of this, I question the validity of such a conclusion. The standard that advocates of the heuristics-and-
biases school use to evaluate the cognitive systems of other individuals is one issue with the gloomy view.
Adopting what is known as the "conventional image of rationality," they claim that in order to be rational, one
must think in accordance with the canons of traditional forms of logic and probability theory (Samuels, Stich
and Bishop, 2002, p. 247). Nevertheless, there are problems with this premise. To begin, the meaning of the
word "probability" in and of itself is the subject of heated discussion. For instance, there are many who say that
the principles of probability theory may be applied to individual occurrences, while others maintain that the
principles can only be applied to groups of events. If the latter school of thought is right, then this would render
many of the tests on heuristics and biases involving one-of-a-kind occurrences worthless (Cosmides and Tooby,
1996, p. 3; Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1998, p. 207). Second, this traditional explanation of human reason
is agnostic to the specifics of the situation. In other words, it makes the a priori assumption that the rules of logic
and probability are normative, which is independent from the context of the issue and the participants' opinions
towards it (Gigerenzer, 2006, pp. 106; 121–122; Chase, Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1998, p. 207). These kinds of
criticism suggest that the standards that are used to evaluate rationality need to go through a round of revision.
As a result, I shall discuss the appeal for a more instrumental view of human cognition that has been made by
evolutionary psychologists in the part that follows.