CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 NOTES

ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 – DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person
be denied of the equal protection of the laws

LIFE (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990)

That state of animals, plants and humans o of an organized being, in which its natural functions and
motions are performed or in which its organs are capable of performing their functions

LIBERTY
- Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right
to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude”
- Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint;
it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom (City of Manila vs. Laguio,
April 12, 2005)
- Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honourable conscience of the individual – Apolinario Mabini
- Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to act according to one’s
own will; it is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same by the others (Rubi vs The Provincial Board of Mindoro, March 7, 1919)

PROPERTY
- Property designates those things commonly recognized as the entities in respect of which a
person or group has exclusive rights
- Based on Article 414 of the Civil Code “All things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either: (1) immovable or real property; or (2) movable or personal
property

THE RIGHT TO BE ALIVE

- While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive -
upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned – the right to security of person
is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz:
- The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo,
October 7, 2008)

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

- By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial
- Daniel Webster (1782-1852)
American lawyer and statesman
Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 17 US 518 (1819)

NOTICE AND HEARING

- Due process of law requires notice and hearing
- Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal
 - The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the
absence of independent, competent and impartial tribunal (Fabella vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
110379, November 28, 1997)

ASPECTS OF DUE PROCES

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
- Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property
- In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for
the government’s action (City of Manila vs. Laguio, April 12, 2005)

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

- It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
1) It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid;
2) It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle (People vs Dela Piedra, January 24, 2001)

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

- Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person’s life, liberty, or property
- Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of
hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action (City of Manila vs.
Laguio, April 12, 2005, EN BANC)

APPEAL IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT OR PART OF DUE PROCESS

- Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it is an essential part of judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative,
but instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (Sapad, et, al vs. Court of
Appeals, December 15, 2000)

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IS EMBRACED IN THE CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS

- The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play
- The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction (Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, November 11, 1993)

EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIRES UNIFORMITY

- The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformity on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed
- It allows reasonable classification
- If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated
differently from another (Gallardo, et. Al vs. People of the Philippines, April 21, 2005)

EQUAL PROTECTION LIMITS GOVERNMENTAL DISCRIMINATION

- The “equal protection of the law is a pledge of the protection of equal laws”
 - It limits governmental discrimination
- The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned (City of Manila vs. Laguio, April 12, 2005)

EQUAL PROTECTION DOES NOT REQUIRE ABSOLUTE EQUALITY

- The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favour and individual or class
privilege
- It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed (JMM Promotions, Inc. vs. CA,
August 5, 1996)

EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORKERS IS EQUAL PROTECTION

- Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages is frowned upon by the Labor Code
- Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a
female employees as against a male employee for work of equal value
- Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization (International
School Alliance of Education vs. Quisumbing, June 1, 2000)

REQUISITES OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION

1) Such classification rests upon substantial distinctions;
2) It is not confined to existing conditions only
3) It applies equally to all members of the same class
4) It is germane to the purpose of the law
- People vs. Vera, November 16, 1937
- City of Manila vs. Laguio, April 12, 2005

ELECTION TO PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT A REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

- Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
- The Court cannot validate badges of inequality
- Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement (People vs. Jalosjos, February 3, 2000)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 – ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge
after careful examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized

REQUISITES:
The constitutional requirements of a valid search and warrant or warrant of arrest are the following:
1) It must be based on probable cause
2) The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge
3) The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
4) It must particularly describe the placed to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SCOPE OF PROTECTION
 The constitutional right is available to all person including aliens, whether accused of crime or
not (Mercado vs. People’s Court, 80 Phil. 1; Silahis vs. Solate, 482 20 SCRA 660), and even
corporations (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383), although they may be required to open their
books of account for examination by the State in the exercise of police power or the power of
taxation. As a rule, however, their papers and effects seized except by virtue of a valid warrant.

{Note: The guaranty may be invoked by a person inside a phone booth. It has been held that
eavesdropping on an accused in a public phone booth, unless with a warrant, is illegal}

 It may be invoked even by known criminals or fugitives (Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279)
 The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and may be invoked only by
the person entitled to it. Therefore, one who is not the owner or lessee of the premises
searched, or who is not an officer of a corporation whose papers are seized, cannot challenged
the validity of the search and seizure. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383)
 The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals (People vs. Marti, Jan 18, 1991)

{Note: If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of a private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. (People vs. Marti, Jan
18, 1991)}

 The constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable only
against government authorities (including barangay tanods) and not private individuals. (See Del
Castillo vs. People, Jan 30, 2012)

{Note: The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because
the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures being applicable only to
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. Having been established that the
assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the
searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of person in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as wee as the barangay tanods were acting
as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. (See Del Castillo vs. People,
Jan 30, 2012)}

{Note: The barangay tanod and barangay chairman are law enforcement officers for purpose of applying
Article III, Section 12 (1) and (3) of the Constitution (People vs. Malngan, cited in Dela Cruz vs. People, Jan
11, 2016)}
{Note: Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures
are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of poisonous tree. (Miguel vs.
People, July 31, 2007)}

Salazar vs. Achacoso, March 14, 1990

- For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
- 1) Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only the judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search;
- 2) The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President
and the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
- Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUIONAL and NULL and VOID

THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF PERSON

- First the right to security of person is “freedom from fear”
- Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security
- Third, the right to security of person is guarantee of protection of one’s right by the government
(Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, October 7, 2008)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

- The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared
and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations
- No one can enter the house of another without the consent of its owner or occupants (US vs
Arceo, March 5, 1904)
- The king was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few
exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the
face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as
any of the kingly prerogative
- “A man’s house is his castle” has become a maxim among the civilized people on earth

PURPOSE
- The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted (Nala vs. Barroso, August 7, 2003)

In the Philippines, there are four (4) instances in the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure where
probable cause is needed to established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is
required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by
law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest or a
commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be issued and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice;
(3) In Section 55 (b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless
arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be
issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produced, and particularly describing the place to be search and the persons or things
to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines

 In all of these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the
likelihood, or probability, of guilt (Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Jan 21, 2015, cited in
ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, Mar 11, 2015)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
 A preliminary investigation serves two-fold purpose: first, to protect the innocent against
wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare the state form using its funds and resources in
useless prosecutions (De Lima vs. Reyes, Jan 11, 2016)
 In preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the respondent is probably guilt thereof and should be held for trial (Ricarforte vs.
Jurado, Sept 5, 2007)
 It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part
thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof.
 The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At
most, it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused person to participate in preliminary
investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights
are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase “due process of law” (Lozada vs. Fernando,
cited in De Lima vs. Reyes, Jan 11, 2016)

{Note: Hence, any alleged irregularity in an investigation’s conduct does not render the information void
not impair its validity. (Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano, cited in De Lima vs. Reyes)}

 A preliminary investigation (for purpose of filing criminal complaints) is essentially inquisitorial,

and its function is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry onto whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in
support of the charge (Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, April 7, 1993; United Coconut Planters Bank
vs. Looyuko, Sept 28, 2007)

{Note: The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor’s conduct of preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are given
wide latitude of discretion to determine whether information should be filed in court or whether the
complaint should be dismissed. (See Crespo vs. Mogul; De Lima vs. Reyes)}
  The court’s duty is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive determination
of probable cause (in a preliminary investigation) was done without or in excess of grave abuse
of discretion (Aguirre vs. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Mar 3, 2008)

PROBABLE CAUSE
 Is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
 Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than bare suspicion and can never be left to
presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic. (Barlongan vs. Pena, Nov 23, 2007; Vergara
vs. The Hon. Ombudsman, Mar 12, 2009)
 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and that there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by
the accused (Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, April 6, 2016)
 Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty
(Chan vs. Secretary of Justice, Mar 14, 2008; Pineda-Ng vs. People, Nov 15, 2010)
 Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining the probable
cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does
not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties (Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Jan
21, 2015)
 In Webb vs. De Leon, this court ruled that determination of probable cause during preliminary
investigation does not require trial-like evaluation of evidence since existence of probable cause
does not equate to guilt
 In Reyes vs. Pearlbank Securities, Inc. finding probable cause is not equivalent to finding with
moral certainty that the accused committed the crime… During preliminary investigation, a
public prosecutor does not adjudicate parties’ rights and obligations, or liabilities.. Estrada also
highlighted that a “preliminary investigation is not part of the criminal action. It is merely
preparatory and may be disposed of in certain situations” (ABS-CBN vs. Gozon)
 A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
pronouncement of guilt (Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan; Ampil vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Jul 31,,
2013)

PROBABLE CAUSE IS MERELY BASED ON OPINION

- Probable cause is “merely based on and reasonable belief, and so it is enough that there exists
such state of facts or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so (Pimentel, Jr. vs.
COMELEC, 235 SCRA 196)
- The Public Prosecutor during the Preliminary Investigation does not decide whether there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged (People vs. Castillo, 333
SCRA 506)

HEARING IS NOT REQUIRED

- Again, we stress that before issuing warrant of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused
 - In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause
- They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence (Webb vs. De Leon, March 23, 1995)

PARTICULARITY IS REQUIREMENT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE

- Probable cause must first focus on a specific location
- If the applicant or official is unable to state with sufficient precision the place to be searched
and why he reasonable believes that contraband or evidence of criminal activity will be found
therein, it is highly doubtful that he possesses probable cause for a warrant
(People of the Philippines vs. Delos Reyes, October 25, 2004)

DESCRIPTION NEEDED FOR SEARCH WARRANT

- The description of property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily
precise, and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property or
its character is a matter of concern; the description is required specific only in so far as the
circumstances allow (Kho vs. Judge Makalintal, April 21, 1999)

ARTICLES NOT DESCRIBED IN THE WARRANT MUST NOT BE SEIZED

- “The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those,
and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed”
- The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person
and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (Tambasen vs. People, July 14, 1995)

ARREST WARRANT
The determination of probable cause may either be EXECUTIVE or JUDICIAL (People vs.
Desmond, June 26, 2013; Delos Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, June 26, 2013; Mendoza vs. People, April
21, 2014)
(1) The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is
given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal
information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause
in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not compelled to pass upon (People vs.
Castillo, June 19, 2009)
(2) The second is one made by the Judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that on the basis of evidence
submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate ends of
justice. If the judge, therefore finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be force to issue the arrest
warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or nonexistence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity (Leviste vs. Alameda,
Aug 3, 20110), if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the
evidence without a full-blown trial. (People vs. Desmond, June 26, 2013)
  There is a distinction between preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant arrest, and the preliminary investigation, which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released.
 The determination of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge.
 The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charge – is the function of INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR.
The task of the PRESIDING JUDGE when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused (People vs Gabo, Aug 3, 2010)

 The first kind of preliminary investigation is EXECUTIVE in nature. It is part of prosecution’s job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is JUDICIAL in nature and lodged with the JUDGE (Co vs. Republic, Nov 28, 2007)
 The judge’s determination of probable cause has a different objective than that of the
prosecutor. The JUDGE’S finding is based on DETERMINATION of the existence of facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The PROSECUTOR, on the
other hand, determines probable cause by ascertaining the existence of facts sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. (Fenix vs. Court of Appeals, July 11, 2016)
 The issuance of warrant of arrest is not a ministerial duty of the judge who had the right to
determine for himself the existence of probable cause. While he could rely on the findings of
the prosecutor, he is nevertheless not bound thereby. (Placer vs. Villanueva)
 A preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him in
making the determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Judge
does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic note (if any) and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s
certification which are material in assisting the Judge in making his determination (Baltazar vs.
People, July 28, 2008; People vs. Alcantara, July 4, 2018)
 Judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. That falls
under the office of DOJ Secretary (Fenix vs. Court of Appeals)
 Once a complaint or Information has been filed, the disposition of the case is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, subject only to the qualification that its action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of People to due process of law (Fenix vs. Court of
Appeals)

1. PROBABLE CAUSE
- Probable cause means “such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper”
- Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined as “such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched”
 - As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt (Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp Inc., September 13, 2004)

2. DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE

- What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine
the complaint and witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda)
- It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
“personally”, a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
constitutions
- This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial
judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions
(Abdula vs. Guiani, February 18, 2000)

3. AFTER PERSONAL EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION

- The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must make his own extensive
inquiry on the existence of such license, as well as on whether the applicant and the witnesses have
personal knowledge thereof (Nala vs. Barroso, August 7, 2003)

4. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

- This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant and or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. In determining its existence, the examining
magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma examination of the
applicant and the witnesses (Nala vs. Barroso, August 7, 2003)

5. DESCRIBE PARTICULARLY THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS THINGS TO BE SEIZED
- The warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized (Asian
Surety vs. Herrera, December 20, 1973)

ENFORCEMENT OF ARREST WARRANTS

 An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. (Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 1)
 An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in
making an arrest
 The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention
(Section 2)
 It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him
to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay (Section 3)
 The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the
warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report
 to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state
the reason therefor (Section 4)
 An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night (Section 6)
 When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested
of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except
when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when
the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in
his possession at the time of arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the
warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable (Section 7)
 An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to
assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in
effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself (Section
10)
 An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as
provided in Section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested
is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his
authority and purpose (Section 11)
 Whenever an officer has enter the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding
section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself (Section 12)
 Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another
acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any
other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a
relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right (Section 14)

DESCRIPTION NEEDED FOR WARRANT OF ARREST

- “General warrants” are proscribed and unconstitutional (Nolasco vs. Pano, 139 SCRA 152)
- The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants (Stonehill vs. Diokno, June 19, 1967)

JOHN DOE WARRANT

- A John Doe Warrant (a warrant for apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown)
satisfies the constitutional requirement of particularity provided that contains a DESCRIPTIO
PERSONAE such as will enable the officer to identify the accused (People vs. Velosos, 48 Phil
169, 1925)
- In such case, the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the
warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his
occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other
circumstances by which he can be identified (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40)

WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST FIFTY JOHN DOES

- Insofar as the warrant issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to
the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, totally subversive
of the liberty of the subject
- Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
described the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified
subjects, be voided (Pangandaman vs. Cesar, April 14, 1988)
{Note: In Hill vs. California, decided by the United States Supreme Court, and which was cited in the
Marshall case, it was held that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and the
arresting officer had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the person arrested was in fact the one being
sought for a crime, then arrest of the second party is a valid arrest. (Office of the Ombudsman vs.
Brillantes, Sept 28, 2016)}

{Note: The settled rule is that law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of proof to the contrary. Almoite failed to show that respondents have any reason to arrest him
for no cause or that they were impelled by any unlawful motive to arrest him. As found by the CA,
respondents acted in good faith and in the honest belief, as based on the information they have gathered
from their surveillance and intelligence operations which points to Almoite as the same “Ali” being
referred to in the warrant of arrest. As pointed out by the CA, Almoite goes by different names or
aliases. Nonetheless, he was sufficiently identified through a profile as well as a cartographic sketch
provided by a detained suspected terrorist who pointed to Almoite as the same person who goes by the
alias of Ali Ambing. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Brillantes, Sept 28, 2016)}

OTHER ARREST WARRANTS

 Independently of the requirements of Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, a judge may
issue a warrant of arrest against an accused if he fails to appear before his court for arraignment
despite notice (Tan vs. Casuga-Tabin, Jan 20, 2009; Uy vs. Javellana, Sept 5, 2012)
 He may also issue an arrest warrant in connection with his court’s power to cite for contempt
under Section 8, Rule 71 of Rules of Court, which provides that “when the contempt consists in
the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it” (Roxas vs. Tipon, June
20, 2012)
 The Congress, in its exercise of its power of legislative inquiry, may likewise provide for the
arrest and detention of persons for contempt (Sabio vs. Gordon, Oct 17, 2006)

{Note: The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked. (Balag vs. Senate, July 3, 2018)

WARRANT FOR FINAL DECISION OF DEPORTATION

- The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue warrant only for the purpose of
carrying out a final decision of deportation (CID vs. Judge De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853) or there is
sufficient proof of guilt of an alien (Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, June 28, 1988)

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
- Evidence obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding for being the fruit of a poisonous tree (Stonehill vs. Diokno, June 19, 1967)

FRUIT OF THE “POISONOUS TREE”

- According to this rule, once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible
 - Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is the indirect result of the same illegal act (People
vs. Alicando, December 12, 1995)
- The “fruit of the poisonous tree” is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but
it is equally inadmissible
- The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the original illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, December 12, 1995)

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Section 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112 (Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 5; People vs. Dela Cruz, April 4, 2016)

{Note: When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his
authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense,
is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (Rules of
Court, Rule 113, Section 5)}

LAWFUL ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT

- A) Arrest in flagrante delicto (CAUGHT IN THE ACT)
- B) Hot pursuit arrest
- C) Arrest of an escapee
Section 5, Rule 113, The 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

RIGHT AGAINST WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCHES MUST BE ZEALOUSLY SAFEGUARDED

- Indeed, while the power to search and seized may at time be necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (Valdez vs. People, GR no. 170180, November
23, 2007)

OBJECTION TO WARRANTLESS ARREST MUST BE RAISED BEFORE ENTERING PLEA

- It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition
by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived (People vs. Lumiwan, September 7, 1998)
APPLICATION FOR BAIL NOT A BAR IN CHALLENGING ILLEGAL ARREST
- An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of
his arrest provided that he raises them before entering his plea
Section 26, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

A) IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST

- When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense (Section 5 (a), Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure)
- A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out undet the
parameters of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, been spurred by probable cause to
arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto(Macad vs. People, Aug 1, 2018)

REQUISITES FOR A VALID ARREST IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO (CAUGHT IN THE ACT)

- For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section
5 to be valid, two requisites must occur:
1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime;
2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
(People vs. Laguio, March 16, 2007)

PEOPLE VS. LAGUIO, MARCH 16, 2007

- Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order
- Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty
- As Justice Holmes once said “ I think it is less evil that some criminal should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part”
- It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself”

{Note: Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test,
showing that “the accused xxxx exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that
(she) was in possession of illegal drugs at the time (she) was apprehended.” Absent any overt act
showing the commission of a crime, the warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in case where a person
was apprehended for merely carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously.
Similarly, in People vs. Racho, a search based solely on a tip describing one of the passengers of a bus
was declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said accused was not “committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers” not did he commit a crime or was about to commit one. (Reyes vs.
People, June 6, 2018)}

{Note: In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of of the arresting officer.
(Saraum vs. People, Jan 25, 2016)}

 People vs. Penaflorida, April 10, 2008

The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that the appellant was transporting marijuana to
Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already
in transit and already committing a crime. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in
 flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence,
demonstrating that crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the
police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the
warrantless arrest is justified
 In Umil vs. Ramos, the military arrested without warrants, among others, a suspected rebel,
bedridden because of a bullet wound, for subversion, which was considered by the military as a
continuing offense, a sleeping man, who was hog-tied and bodily dumped into a police jeep, for
allegedly subversive remarks made by him the day before, and suspected murderer for a murder
supposedly committed by him fourteen days earlier. These were considered as in flagrante
delicto arrest for offenses committed in connection with subversion and rebellion, which were
considered as continuing offenses.

INVALID WARRANTLESS ARREST

{Note: Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restrain, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary (Luz vs. People, Feb 29, 2012; Homar vs. People, Sept 2, 2015)

 People vs. Doria, Jan 22, 1999

The accused was “not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give round for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the
finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit”. In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified
under the second instance of Rule 113”
 Sindac vs. People, Sept 6, 2016
It is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Penamora and PO1 Asis had proceeded to apprehend
Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous surveillance operations
conducted on Sindac’s alleged drug dealing activities. Advancing to a warrantless arrest based
only on such information, absent circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer’s
“personal knowledge” as described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting
requirement of Section 5, Rule 112. It is settled that “reliable information” alone – even if it was
a product of well-executed surveillance operations – is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. It is further required that the accused performs some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, which, as
already discussed, is missing in the instant case.
 Antiquera vs. People, Dec 11, 2013
When police officers and two civilian operatives out on a police visibility patrol chanced upon
two unidentified men rushing out of a house, they approached the house instead of running
after the two men, and peeked through the partially opened door. It was then that they saw the
accused, one “holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter” while the other held “an
aluminium foil and improvised burner”. At that point, the police officers entered the house,
introduced themselves as police officers and arrested the accused after opening a “wooden
jewelry box atop a table”, which “contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small
 transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and
seven unused strips of aluminium foil.” The Supreme Court acquitted the accused who were
convicted on the basis of the evidence then seized by the police officers. Clearly, no crime was
plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant.
 People vs. de la Cruz
Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. Since accused-appellant was not in
possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid. His
arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as
he was not proved to be committing any offense

{Note: The warrant of arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas, the dispersal and warrantless arrest
of the KMU and NAFKU-KMU members during their rallies in the absence of proof that those petitioners
were committing acts of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards or any form prior restraint, as well as the warrantless search of Tribune offices and whimsical
seizures of its articles for publication and other materials are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL (Prof Randolf
S. David vs. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, May 3, 2006)}

BUY-BUST
 People vs. Palaras, July 11, 2018
As a “trap for unwary criminal” a buy-bust operation is generally considered a valid means of
arresting those who commit violation under RA No. 9165, where the idea to commit the crime
originates from the offender without inducement or prodding from anybody. It finds its basis in
the validity of an in flagrante delicto arrest, when a suspect has just committed, or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit an offense.
 People vs. Rivera, July 20, 2016, citing People vs. Agulay, Sep 26, 2008
An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid “warrantless arrest”, in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of
the Revised Rules of Court.
 People vs. Manlangit, Jan 21, 2011; People vs. Juatan, Aug 20, 1996
Indeed, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in
flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but
duty-bound, to apprehend the violators and to search him for anything that may have been part
of our used in the commission of the crime.
 People vs. Agojo, April 16, 2009; People vs. Macatingang, Jan 19, 2009)
Buy-bust operations of various law enforcement agencies, particularly those involving the illegal
sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs, have consistently been considered as lawful warrantless
arrest, or arrests in flagrante delicto, likewise leading to lawful warrantless searches and
seizures
 People vs. Dumagay, Feb 7, 2018
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment used to apprehend drug peddlers. It is considered
valid as long as it passes the “objective test”, which demands that the details of the purported
transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale
{Note: To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are
typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. (People vs. Lim, Sept 4, 2018)}

 People vs. dela Rosa, Jan 26, 2011; Quinicot vs. People, June 22, 2009
Moreover, it has further been held that prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust
operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by
the informant. That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of no moment for there is
no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
 People vs. de la Cruz, June 8, 2011
A warrantless arrest made in connection with what was styled as a buy-bust operation on the
basis of information received by the police officers that he had sold shabu a week prior to the
arrest is void.
 People vs. Bayani, June 17, 2008
It must be noted though that while a buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction
as a legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit, it must be distinguished from instigation,
when a person who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or lured or
talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not (People vs. Bajo,
Feb 6, 2013)

{Note: There is instigation when “the accused is lured in commission of the offense charged in order to
prosecute him”. On the other hand, “there is entrapment when law officers employ ruses or schemes to
ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.” (People vs.
Dumagay, Feb 7, 2018)}

TIPS
 People vs. Rancho, Aug 3, 2010; People vs. Aruta, 1998
Warrantless arrests made on the basis alone of “tips” or “reliable information” have consistently
been considered as not sufficient for them to be considered as lawful. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
 People vs. Aruta, 1998
A “police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving
from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the
police assembled a team to deploy themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in
Olongapo City. While thus positiond, a Victory Liner bus stopped in front of the PNB building
where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the
woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a travelling bag. Thereafter, the team approached
her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the
apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was to found to contain dried marijuana
leaves.” Said warrantless arrest and searched were invalid.

{Note: The warrantless arrest of the accused which were solely based on a “report from a civilian asset”
or mere “information” were also declared as unlawful by the Supreme Court in People vs. Tudtud and
People vs. Nuevas)}

{Note: Simply relying on “tipped information” and “seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white
plastic bag with a box or carton inside” would not, according to Supreme Court, justify a warrantless
arrest. (People vs. de los Reyes, Aug 31, 2011)}
{Note: A mere tip form an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge
into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While these are
instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the
constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at
bar. (Villamor vs. People, March 2, 2017)}

 People vs. Bolasa, 1999

An anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited
drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They
walked toward the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they
peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana. They
then entered a house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug
paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. The Supreme Court declared both the arrest and
searched ad seizures in this case as unlawful because the accused were not caught in flagrante
delicto or as a result of a hot pursuit, and the objects seized were not in plain view, as it was
shown that the police officers had to peep to see them. The Court noted that, under the
circumstances, the police officers ought to have conducted a proper surveillance and obtain a
search warrant.

B) ARREST IN HOT PURSUIT

- When an offense has just committed and he has probable cause to believed based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
Section 5 (b), Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
- A warrantless arrest may be also considered as lawful though if made in connection with what is
known as a “hot pursuit” in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 113 of Rules of Court. According
to the Supreme Court, this type of warrantless arrest “necessitates two stringent requirements
before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it (People vs. Agojo, April 16, 2009)

CONDITIONS FOR A VALID HOT PURSUIT ARREST

- First, the offender has just committed an offense
- Second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it
- It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion
(People vs. Cubcubin, July 10, 2001)

SEARCH WARRANT – is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for certain personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.(Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 1)

REQUISITES FOR ISSUING A SEARCH WARRANT

- A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation
 of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines
Section 4, Rule 126, Rules of Criminal Procedure

REQUISITES OF VALID WARRANT

- (1) probable cause is present;
- (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
- (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
- (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
- (5) the warrant specifically describes the person and place to be searched and the things to be
seized
(Nala vs. Barroso, August 7, 2003) RULE 113

UMIL VS. RAMOS, JULY 9, 1990

- The ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile that subversion is a continuing
offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at any times as long as the
authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense
- That is a dangerous doctrine

{Note: Where the search and seizure is made only for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used
against the accused, the warrant is unlawful as it would violate the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. But “search and seizure of a man’s private papers to be used in evidence for the purpose
of convicting him of a crime, recovering a penalty, or forfeiting his property, is totally different from the
search and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like,
which rightfully belong to the custody of the law (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil 886), The return of
those goods, even if illegally seized, may not be ordered by the court. (People vs. Marcos, 117 SCRA 999;
Mata vs. Bayona, March 26, 1984)}

NATURE
 A search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a
prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to
get possession of personal property.
 It is a special peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity
 It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as JOHN DOE proceedings. While
an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an
action
 A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by
the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of criminal process, restricted
to cases of public prosecutions
 A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power and has no relation to a civil
process.
 It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the
public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private
persons.
 It may only be applied for in furtherance of public prosecution
(United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, 2005; Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, Jan 13, 2014)
  Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, May 6, 1994
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed
 Pita vs. Court of Appeals
The Supreme Court, after making an extensive exposition of the interpretation of the word
“obscenity”, declared that copies of a magazine entitled Pinoy Playboy could not be summarily
confiscated in line with the anti-smut campaign of the City of Manila. A search warrant must
have been issued after the judge shall have been convinced of the existence of probable cause
that the materials sought to be seized were indeed obscene.

{Note: A proclamation of a governor, which issued (in connection with a kidnapping incident in his
province which he considered as a terrorist act) on the basis of provision of the LGU Code which
authorized him to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities,
under which he claimed to possess the authority to establish “choke points” and conduct searches and
seizures, is invalid. (Kulayan vs. Tan, July 3, 2012)}

CYBER WARRANTS
 Section 19 of Republic Act 10175, or the so-called Cybercrime Law, which authorized the
Department of Justice to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer date when the
same is found prima facie to be in violation of the provisions of said law, is unconstitutional
 The Supreme Court has since promulgated its Rule on Cybercrime Warrants, which sets forth
procedure for the application and grant of warrants and related orders involving the
preservation, disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, as well as the
custody, and destruction of computer data, as provided for under Republic Act No 10175,
otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012”
 An application for a warrant under this Rule for violation of Section 6, Chapter II of RA10175 (all
crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special laws, if
committed by, through, and with the use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology)
shall be filed by the law enforcement authorities with the regular or other specialized regional
trial courts, as the case may be, within its territorial jurisdiction in the places above-described.
 Once a criminal action is instituted, a motion to quash and other incidents that relate to the
warrant shall be heard and resolved by the court that subsequently acquired jurisdiction over
the criminal action
 Before issuing a warrant, a judge must personally examine in form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the applicant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
judicial affidavits submitted
 Any warrant issued under this Rule shall only be effective for the length of time as determined
by the Court, which shall not exceed a period of ten days form its issuance. The court issuing
the warrant may, upon motion, extend its effectivity based only on justifiable reasons for a
period not exceeding ten days from the expiration of the original period

WHO MAY APPLY

 The rule is that “every application for search warrant shall be personally endorsed by the heads
of such agencies enumerated in Section 12 Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC (Tomas vs.
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Nov 9, 2016)
 This Court, however, finds that nothing in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC prohibits the heads of National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Anti-Crime Task
 Force (ACTAF) from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search
warrant to their assistant heads. (Tomas vs. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Nov 9,
2016)

WHERE TO APPLY
 An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction of a crime was committed
(b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action
has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action
is pending (Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 2)

 Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
 Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.
 The Judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made
known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard (Del Castillo vs. People, Jan 30, 2012; Petron Gasul LPG vs. Lao, July 18,
2016)

 Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People

Evidence to show probable cause to issue search warrant must be distinguished from proof
beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required
 Ogayon vs. People, Sept 2, 2015
The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, but only after examination by the judge of the complainant and
his witnesses. As the same examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution,
we declared that affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the
factual basis for probable cause. Personal examination is indispensable, and the examination
should be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or rehash of the affidavits
 Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil 33
A search warrant based on a an affidavit which, in turn, was based on “reliable information” and
“correct to the best of knowledge and belief” is invalid
 Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388
Mere affidavits are usually not enough to issue a search warrant. The judge must take
dispositions in writing and attach them to the record as these are necessary to determine the
existence of probable cause
 Ogayon vs. People, Sept 2, 2015
Generally, the judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of search warrant is
accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for the
determination
 People vs. Posada, Sept 2, 2015
 The judicial finding of probable cause in issuing a search warrant should not be doubted when
the judge personally examines the applicant and/or witnesses and there is no basis to doubt his
reliability and competence in evaluating the evidence before him

 A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and the particularity describing the place
to searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines (Rules of
Court, Rule 126, Section 4)
 A warrant would be valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to
be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized (Hon. Ne Chan
vs. Honda Motors Co.,)
 A search warrant fulfils the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued. (Bache and Co., (Phil) Inc. vs. Ruiz)
 A description of a place to be searched is sufficient of the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended (People vs. Veloso)
 A search warrant need not identify with particularity the person against whom it is directed; it
suffices that the place to be searched and things to be seized are described (People vs. Lagman)
 But while a John Doe warrant is generally held in valid, it will satisfy the constitutional
requirement if there is some descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the
accused. Accordingly, it was held in People vs. Veloso that the warrant is valid although issued
against a John Doe only where it was shown that he was described as occupying and in control
of a building at a specified address.

ENFORCEMENT OF SEARCH WARRANT

 A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (Rules
of Court, Rule 126, Section 10)
 The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any
part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein (Section 7)
 No search of a house, room,, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of this family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality (Section 8)
 The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night (Section 9)
 The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the
absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property (Section 11)

{Note: The search of the premises must be witnessed by the lawful occupant or the family members;
otherwise, the search become unreasonable, thus rendering the seized items inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule (People vs. Del Castillo)}
PROPERTIES THAT MAY BE SEIZED
 According to the Rule of Courts, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal
offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of search incidental to lawful
arrest. (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency vs. Brodett, Sept 28, 2011)
 A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of
the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; (c) used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense (Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 3;
see People vs. Pastrana and Abad, Feb 21, 2018)

{Note: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. People vs.
Collado, Jun 17, 2013)}

 Disini vs. Executive Secretary, Feb 18, 2014

Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial
search warrant

RETURNED OF SEIZED PROPERTIES

 Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used
as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken or to the person who is entitled to
its possession is but a matter of course. (Caterpillar, Inc. vs. Samson), except of it is contraband
or illegal per se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should
the Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution (Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency vs. Brodett)
 If said seized property is used as evidence, the order for its disposition or return can be made
only when the case is finally terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings. (Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency vs. Brodett)
 But although the properties may have been seized in violation of the said provision, it does not
follow that its owner shall be entitled to recover it immediately. If the said property is the
subject of litigation, like a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, it will remain in custodia
legis until the case is terminated (Roan vs. Gonzales)
 To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds if evidence or articles relating to a
crime. Objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to the
person from whom they were unlawfully seized. (Dimal and Castillo vs. People)

C) ESCAPEE
- When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from the penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgement or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
Section 5 (c), Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

 The court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra’s compound without a valid
 warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant for a valid search and seizures, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the
evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having
been obtained in violation of the said right. (Villamor vs. People, March 22, 2017)

WHEN ALLOWED
 Among the recognized instances when warrantless searches and seizures may be allowed are
consented searches; as an incident to a lawful arrest; searches of vessels and aircrafts for
violation of immigration, customs and drug laws; inspection of buildings or premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations (see Frank and Maryland; searches of
moving vehicles; searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; where the
prohibited articles are in “plain view”, “stop and frisk” operations of the so-called Terry search
(see People vs. Lopez, Sept 26, 2008; Epie, Jr. vs. Ulat-Marredo, March 22, 2007; People vs.
Cabugatan, 2007; customs searches; an searches conduct under exigent and emergency
circumstances (People vs. Gonzales; People vs. Dequina). Warrantless searches and seizures at
military checkpoints have likewise been acknowledged as justified on the basis of the right of
the State to protect itself. (Valmonte vs. de Villa)
 Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted.
These searches include: (1) search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure of plain view; (3) custom
search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to
lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances (Alcaraz vs. People, Nov 17, 2014)
 In search to incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process
cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the later may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence (People vs. Comprado,
April 4, 2018)

CONSENTED SEARCH
- When the right against warrantless search has been voluntarily search has been voluntarily
waived (People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil 221)
- The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein (People vs. Compacion, GR No. 124442, July 20, 2001)

{Note: Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is specific,a
and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of
voluntariness are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded
location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her education and
intelligence; (e)the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found; (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting (Saluday vs. People, April
3, 2018)}
  When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations)
 An arrest may also be made without warrant where the right thereto is waived by the person
arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly decided not to invoke it. (People vs.
Tabar)
 When the accused did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags containing
marijuana, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution,
they were considered to have consented to be searched. (People vs. Martinez, Dec 13, 2000)

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant
Section 13, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

 In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct
a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizures of evidence of
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. (Valeroso vs. CA, Sept 3, 2009)
 A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made only within the permissible area
of search, or the place within immediate control of the person being arrested. Thus, marijuana
seized from the house of the accused after his arrest on the on the arrest was held inadmissible
evidence because it was unlawfully obtained. (Espano vs. CA)
 The valid warrantless arrest gave the officer the right to search the shanty for objects relating to
the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. (Saraum vs. People, Jan 25, 2016)

SEARCHES AT AIRPORTS
- Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their personal
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognized as reasonable
- Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures (People vs Leila Johnson, December 18,
2000)

PORT SEARCHES
- Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable search per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety
of the travelling public (Dela Cruz vs. People, Jan 11, 2016)
- Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning
machines for inspection of passenger’s bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the
existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of
petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan (Dela Cruz vs.
People, Jan 11, 2016)
- Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port
security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against possible harm to
society caused by lawless persons.
VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST MUST COME FIRST
- A valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed
- In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
a search can be made – the process cannot reversed (People vs. Chua Ho San, June 17, 1999)

SEARCHES OF VESSEL AND AIRCRAFT FOR VIOLATION OF FISHERY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS LAWS
- The special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify
reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport
- In other words, the search made by the PAF team was in the nature of a customs search
- As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it
exercised police authority under the customs law (Salvador vs. People of the Philippines, GR No.
146706, July 15, 2005)
- Searches and seizures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws are
valid (Roldan vs. Arca)

INSPECTION OF BUILDINGS
- Inspection, of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations (Camara vs. Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 1967)

SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE

A search of moving vehicle may either be a mere routine inspection or an extensive search. The
search in a routine inspection is limited to the following instances:
- (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds;
- (2) simply looks into a vehicle;
- (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
- (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
- (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual inspection; and
- (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area
On the other hand, extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is
probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officer conducting the search have reasonable and
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be search (Macad vs. People, Aug 1, 2018)

VISUAL SEARCH AT CHECKPOINTS

- It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize
all checkpoints, i.e at all times and under all circumstances
- Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed by the government (Valmote vs. Gen De Villa, May 24, 1990)

NOT ALL CHECKPOINTS ARE ILLEGAL

- For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot regarded as
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks,
 when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive (People of the Philippines vs Escano,
January 28, 2000)

CONDUCT OF “AREAL TARGET ZONING” AND SATURATION DRIVE”

- The areal target zonings were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by
elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the “drives” were conducted
- Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient
numbers (Guazon vs. De Villa, January 30, 1990)
- A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not
violated
- A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one-
on-one confrontations where search warrants and warrant of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured
- Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited (Guazon vs. De Villa,
January 30, 1990)

WHEN THERE IS A GENUINE REASON TO “STOP-AND-FRISK”

- This is in the light of the police officers experience and surrounding condition to warrant a belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed (Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, December 1,
1997, citing Terry vs. Ohio)
- Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant.
{Note: The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspicious and attempted to fell with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose

WHERE PROHIBITED ARTICLES ARE IN PLAIN VIEW

- Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight
- In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view
- It must immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure (Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, January 15,
2002)

GENERAL RULE FOR THE APPLICIATION OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

(a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
- (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are;
- (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
- (d) “plain view” justified were seizure of evidence without further search
(People of the Philippines vs. Compacion, July 20, 2001)

REQUISITES FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

 The “Plain view “doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
- The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area
- In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incrimination the accused
- The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent
(Nala vs. Barroso, August 7, 2003)

PEOPLE VS. DORIA, January 22, 1999

- Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence

PEOPLE VS. MARTINEZ, Dec 13, 2010

- The element of “inadvertence” for purpose of an application of the plain view doctrine would
not be present if the “police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance
or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items”

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE COULD ONLY BE INVOKED AGAINST THE STATE
- The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law
- Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed (People of the Philippines vs. Bongcarawan, July 11,
2002)

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS A RESTRAINT UPON THE GOVERNMENT

- The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a restraint upon the government
- It does not apply so as to require exclusion of evidence which came into the possession of the
government through search made by a private citizen (People vs. Marti, 93 SCRA 57 (1991)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 3 – RIGHT TO PRIVACY

(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding (Exclusionary Rule)

SCOPE
- The right covers all forms of private communication and correspondence. The only exceptions
are upon
- (1) lawful order of the court;
- (2) when public safety or public order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND ZONES OF PRIVACY

 The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone” (Cooley on Torts, Sec 135, vol 1, 4th ed.,
1932)
 The right to privacy is “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or
from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
ordinary sensibilities (Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR nos. 157870, 158633
& 161658, November 3, 2008)
  It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned (Ople vs. Torres, 354 Phil 948, 970 (1998), 293 SCRA 141)
 The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty, in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection
 “The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen” (Morfe vs. Mutuc, January
31, 1968)
 “Liberty in constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom” (Justice Douglas, Dissenting Opinion, Public
Utilities Commission vs. Pollak, 343 U.S 451, 467, 1952).

{Note: In Public Utilities Commission vs. Pollak, the US Supreme Court “rejected the claim that
radio programs on buses and streets cars of a private company regulated by the District
Columbia invaded the rights of privacy of passengers in violation of the due process clause”}

 The “right to be alone” is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men” (Justice Brandeis, Dissenting Opinion, Olmstead vs. United States, (277 US 438,
478, 1928). In Olmstead, the US Supreme Court interpreted the rule on searches and seizure as
applicable only to tangible objects. In this case, the US Supreme Court admitted in evidence
“wiretapped private telephone conversations, obtained by federal agents without judicial
approval”

ANTI WIRETAPPING LAW – REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200, JUNE 19, 1965
- It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or Dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder

ANY PERSON MAY BE HELD LIABLE

- Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of
the acts declared to be unlawful shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
- By imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years
- And with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is
an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings (Section 2, RA 4200)

 It was held that a telephone extension was not among the devices covered by this law and that
the use of that instrument to listen in on a private conversation was not prohibited as a “tap”
(Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112)
 The people’s right to privacy protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard,
the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the
State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards, “can disturb them in the privacy of their homes” (Sony Music Entertainment (Phils),
Inc. vs. Judge Espanol, 493 Phil. 507, 516)
 This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions
to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been
 impractical or even impossible. “Allow the forces of a technological age operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society” The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution
guarantees. (Disini vs. Executive Secretary, February 18, 2014)

ZONES OF PRIVACY
 In our jurisdiction, the “zones of privacy” are “recognized and enshrined “ in the provisions of
our Constitution on due process and equal protection, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the privacy of communication and correspondence, the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, the right to association and the right against self-incrimination
 Zones of Privacy includes the Civil Code provisions which requires every person to respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons of meddling
and prying into the privacy of another (Article 26); Article 723; the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on violation of secrets by an officer (Article 229); revelation of trade and industrial
secrets (Article 290-292), and trespass to dwelling (Article 280); other special laws
 There are (so-called) three stands of the right to privacy, namely: LOCATIONAL OR
SITUATIONAL PRIVACY; INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY
“Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important
decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. On the other hand, informational privacy has two aspects: the right
not to have private information disclosed and the right to live freely without surveillance
and intrusion” (Disini vs. Executive Secretary, February 11, 2014)

 Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy
of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion (Disini vs. Executive Secretary, February 11,
2014)

REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, Courts have invariably used the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in determining violations of the right to privacy. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated. (Sabio vs. Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 715)
 Two-fold test (Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, September 29, 2014)
1st is a subject test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation
of privacy over a certain matter
2nd is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable.

{Note: The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-

case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case (Ople vs. Torres)}
  Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screen to limit
access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friend en masses, becomes more manifest and palpable.
(Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, Sept 29, 2014)
 Consequently before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity – in this case, Facebook – it is first necessary that said user manifests that
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of these privacy tools. In other words, utilization of work, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy (Belo vs. Guavarra, Dec 1, 2016)

{Note: The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant,
which posts respondent, insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence
that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or
that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his
statement that the subject posts , as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle
of friends, respondents statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. (Belo vs.
Guavarra, Dec 1, 2016)}

{Note: Thus, restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook post to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one’s circle of friends. The user’s
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends”. Under the
circumstances, therefore, respondent’s claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. (Belo vs.
Guavarra, Dec 1, 2016)}

COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

 The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding COMPELLING STATE INTEREST.
Employing the RATIONAL BASIS RELATIONSHIP TEST, as laid down in Morfe vs. Mutuc, there is
no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is
for a VALID PURPOSE, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose constitute a reason compelling enough to proceed with the
assailed legislative investigation. (Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institution, Dec 27, 2007)
{Note: There is “no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclose
information is for valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption,
maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration”. (Morfe
vs. Mutuc)}

 The right to privacy is not absolute. A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been
regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited form him or to be published about him institute matter of a public character. Succinctly,
the right to privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matter of public
 interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right to privacy is the right to be free from
“unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern”. (Ayer Productions PTY vs.
Capulong)
 A public figures, legislators enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compare to ordinary
individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. The right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial
transactions. (See Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256)

LAWFUL MEASURES
 Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. (Imbong vs. Ochoa,
April 8,, 2014)
 The Supreme Court upheld the law as it was made to apply to students, saying that students
essentially waive their right to privacy when they enrol in a school. “Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies”. The court added that “authorities are
agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and
defers to the state’s exercise of police power”
 A similar ruling was made with respect to the drug testing of employees who were considered
by the Court a having a “a reduced expectation of privacy”. The court explained that “based on
the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth
in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Moreover, civil servants, are, by constitutional command, required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiently. (Social Justice
Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, Nov 3, 2008)
 The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from the
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and
not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. IN THE PRESENT CASE, SINCE THE
LETTERS WERE NOT CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE DETAINEES AND THEIR
LAWYERS, the official of the ISAFP Detention Center COULD READ THE LETTER. If the letters
are marked CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION between the detainees and lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees. (Alejano vs Cabuay, Aug 25,, 2005)
 Thus, we do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the
present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in
a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a VALID measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.

UNLAWFUL MEASURES
  A Law which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense was declared unconstitutional by
the US Supreme Court “on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the
right to privacy of married persons” (Griswold vs. Connecticut)
 An ordinance which required to construction of a see-thru fence on their property is invalid for
being violative of the right to privacy of Benedictine nuns, considering that such a fence would
“expose” their residence, which is also located within their property. (Fernando vs. St.
Scholastica’s College, March 12, 2013)
 It was highly irregular for the police officer to use accused-appellant’s cellphone while they were
in the process of filling the criminal case against her. This conduct is violative of accused-
appellant’s right to privacy. (People vs. Saunar, Aug 9, 2017)

INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS LAW

- Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation
(Section 4, RA 4200) the end does not justify the means

 The petitioner in De la Cruz vs. People, was arrested for extortion but was eventually charged
with a violation of the Dangerous Drug Act after a urine test he was required to undergo against
his will and despite his request for the assistance of counsel “confirmed” that he had used an
illegal drug, shabu. He was prosecuted and convicted principally on the basis of said
“confirmatory” urine test. The Supreme Court annulled the conviction on, among other
grounds, the violation of his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

COURT ORDER – SEC 8, RA 9372

- The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen
to, intercept, and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
upon an ex parte written application of a police or a law enforcement official who has been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such
ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or

BY CONTRACTING MARRIAGE ONE DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY
- The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity
- A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her (Zulueta vs. Court
of Appeals, February 20, 1996)

EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION

- Any authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall only be
effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of
 the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or
law enforcement official (Section 10, RA 9372, March 9, 2007)

DUTY TO INFORM THE SUBJECT

- If no case is filled within the thirty (30) day period, the applicant police or law enforcement
official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception and
recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording
- The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of
the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified above (Section 10, RA
9372, March 9, 2007)

CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS

- All tapes, discs, and recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or
memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expirations of any extension hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of
the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or
renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the
authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals (Section 11, RA 9372)

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
- The right to privacy is one of the most threated rights of man living in a mass society
- The threats emanate from various sources – governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc
- Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the
danger that A.O No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devasting dossier against
unsuspecting citizens (Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998)

ZONES OF PRIVACY
- The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of
trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling
- Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code (Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001)

DATA PRIVACY ACT (Republic Act No. 10173)

- The right of an individual
- Not to have private information about himself disclosed and
- To live freely from surveillance and intrusion

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11055 (National ID System)

- What is the Philippine Identification System or PhilSys?
- It’s a system that centralizes all personal information of Filipino citizens and resident aliens and
generates a Philippine ID (PhilID) and PhilSys Number (PSN) that will be used to authenticate
their identity in all government and private sector transactions
- This includes applications for drivers license, passport, tax-related transactions, voters’
registration, application to schools, and bank transactions
NATIONAL ID SYSTEM NOT A VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY
- The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities
- EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under
existing laws
- Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS< Philhealth, Mayor’s office, LTO, PRC
and similar government entities (KMU vs The Director-General, NEDA, April 19, 2006)

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
- There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose
- That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution
- This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand
that “only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed” (People vs. Mengote, June 22, 1992)

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

 Defined as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom form abuse in the
information age”. The writ of habeas data was particularly designed by the Court “to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy among others”. (See Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data
and the European Data Protection)
 The writ of habeas data which is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College)
 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. (Gamboa vs. Chan,
July 24, 2012)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

- Milton defined freedom of speech as “the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according
to conscience, above all liberties”
- The definition is understood to embrace all the other cognate rights involved in the
communication of ideas and falling under the more comprehensive concept of freedom of
expression. These rights include the equally important freedom of the press, the right of
assembly and petition, the right to information on matters of public concern, the freedom of
religion insofar as it affects the right to form associations as an instrument for the ventilation of
views bearing on the public welfare.
- Wendell Phillips offered his own reverence for freedom of expression when he called it “at once
the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate flower of all liberty” He was
 according it an honoured place in the hierarchy of fundamental liberties recognized in the Bill of
Rights

PARADIGMS OF FREE SPEECH

- There are “two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to equality
vis-a-vis liberty”
In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over
regulation, but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech” This view
allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power’ such as
protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often
systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that
there are dominant political actors, who, through authority, power, resources, identity,
or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is
especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian
world like ours.
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of
opportunity or equality in the ability of citizens as speakers should not have a bearing in
free speech doctrine.
Under this view, “members of the public are trusted to make their own
individual evaluations of speech and government is forbidden to intervene for
paternalistic or redistributive reasons….(thus, ) ideas are best left to a freely competitive
ideological market. This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of
viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of
speech

SCOPE
- Freedom of expression is usually exercised through language, oral and written. Symbolisms may
also be used, like the clenched fist, the bended knee, the salute to the flag, the flag itself, the
mace of the legislature, the picket line, pictures, caricatures and cartoons. Wordless, they
articulate.
- The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional
respect for human potentially and effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human being to
express and their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take
into consideration the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy
- Speech is “not limited to vocal communication. Conduct is treated as a form of speech
sometimes referred to as “symbolic speech” such that when speech and nonspeech elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, the “communicative element” of the conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the right to freedom of expression” (Diocese of Bacolood vs.
Commission on Elections, January 21, 2015)
- The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the
expression (Diocese of Bacolood vs. Commission on Elections, January 21, 2015)
- Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favourably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this
Court to impose its view on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free
to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavoured one” (Ang ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
 - Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s
infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech (Diocese of Bacolood vs. Commission on
Elections, January 21, 2015)

POLITICAL SPEECH
- Is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. Freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected
at all costs for the sake of democracy” Accordingly, the same must be remain unfettered unless
otherwise justified by a compelling state interest. (1-united Transport Koalisyon vs. COMELEC,
April 14, 2005)
- Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people into
action. It is concerned with the Sovereign right to change the contours of power whether
through the election of representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic
text of the constitution
- Political speech can be presented as satire speech (Diocese of Bacolood vs. Commission on
Elections, January 21, 2015)
- The posting of election campaign material on vehicles use for public transportation or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it
has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal (1-
United Transportation Koalisyon vs. COMELEC)

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS A HUMAN RIGHT

NATURE AND SCOPE OF FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
- This embodies the essence and spirit of freedom of speech and of expression in a free and
democratic society

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS CRUCIAL

- In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably
woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict is must be
met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be
allowed to curtail it
- When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to
prevent the free exercise of speech, it must be nullified (Francisco Chavez vs. Raul Gonzales,
February 15, 2004)

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS

- The exercise of this right or nay right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal
burden of responsible exercise of right
- The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the
rights of others (Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, September 16, 2008)

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
- Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic
government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or other liberties
 - For it is only when people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be
capable of rendering enlightened judgements
- In the oft-qouted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant

PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
- Public assembly means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form
of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause;
or expressing opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing
any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for
redress of grievances (Section 3(a), BP 880, Public Assembly Act of 1985)

PUBLIC PLACE
- Public place shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public ownership where people are
allowed access (Section 3(b), BP 880)

PERMIT WHEN REQUIRED AND WHEN NOT REQUIRED

- A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold public
assembly in a public place (apply 5 days before public assembly)
- No permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, or in the campus of a government-owned
and operated educational institution (EXCLUSION)
- Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act (Section 4, BP 880)
FREEDOM PARKS
Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of
this Act establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior
permit (Section 4, BP 880)

APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS
 The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly
 The mayor shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted
 The court’s decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same (Section 6, BP 880)

PERMIT IS NOT NEEDED IF THE PUBLIC ASSEMBLY IS HELD IN A PRIVATE PLACE

- If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, and not the assembly
itself, may be validly required
- Power of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition (Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil 71)

NON-INTERFERENCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

- Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly
- However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the
command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one
 hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all
times (Section 9, BP 880)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 5 – FREEDOM OF RELIGION

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

NATURE
 Religion is acknowledge as referring to any specific of belief, worship, conduct, etc., often
involving a code of ethics and a philosophy; also defined as “a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator”. (Aglipayan vs. Ruiz)
 Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.

RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

 Article II, Section 6 – SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
o Verily, the principle of separation of the State and Church is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
questions its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate the against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
belief and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that
the nation follow its belief, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country. (Imbong vs. Ochoa)
o Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it
pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed
because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society. (Leus vs. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, Jan 28, 2015)
o The court ruled that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral
involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis
the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and
respectable (Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc)
o Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of
religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be
secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose. (Perfecto vs.
Judge Esidera, July 22, 2015)

 Article VI, Section 28 (3) and Section 29 (2)

 Article XIV, Section 3 (3) and Section 4 (2)
 Article XV, Section 3 (1)
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 – LIBERTY OF ABODE
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

NATURE AND RESTRICTIONS

 Can be limited “upon lawful order of the court” and the right to travel by the requirements of
“national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
 Thus, a person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the court form leaving the country
or, if abroad, compelled to return.

 There is no doubt that health officers may restricts access to contaminated areas and also
quarantine those already exposed to the disease sought to be contained. (Lorenzo vs. Director of
Health)
 Where there is threat of volcanic eruption, for example, residents in the affected area may be
forced to evacuate and prevented from returning until the danger is over. In the Unites States,
it has been held that the Secretary of the State may regulate or even prohibit the travel of
citizens to hostile countries to prevent possible international misunderstanding and conflict
(Zemel vs. Rusk)
 The issue in Caunca vs. Salazar, was whether or not a maid had the right to transfer to another
residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced by an employment agency, who
was then detaining her transportation from the province. The respondent said she could not.
The Supreme Court, ruled otherwise. In this petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner’s liberty
of abode was sustained and her detention declared unconstitutional.
 Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one’s residence, to leave it
whenever he pleases and to travel whenever he wills. Thus, in Zacarias Villavicencio vs Justo
Lucban, the Court held illegal the action of Mayor of Manila in expelling women who were
known prostitutes and sending them to Davao in order to eradicate vices and immoral activities
proliferated by the said subjects. It was held that regardless of the mayor’s laudable intentions,
no person may compel another to change his residence without being expressly authorized by
law or regulation. (See Genuino vs. de Lima; Arroyo vs de Lima)

RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 – RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

NATURE
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as
the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association and religion

 Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if
made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself
reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
 serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by
law. (Samahan ng mga Progresibog Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City, Aug 8, 2017)
 While the right travel is a constitutional right that may be impaired only “in the interest national
security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law”, there are recognized
exceptions other than those created by law. Foremost is the restriction on the right to travel of
persons charged of crimes before the courts. Another is the restriction on persons subpoenaed
or ordered arrested by the Senate or House of Representatives pursuant to their power of
legislative inquiry. There are also restrictions on the rights to travel imposed on government
officials and employees. For example, Office of the Court Adminstrator Circular No. 49-2003(B)
requires judges and court personnel “to secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court
Administrator” before they can travel abroad even during their approved leave of absence or
free time. This restriction to travel abroad is imposed even in the absence of a law. (Arroyo vs.
De Lima, Nov 15, 2011)
 It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if
weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility. Any perceived
curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port security measures is
a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society caused
by lawless persons. (Dela Cruz vs. People, Jan 11, 2016)

STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
1) The Human Security Act of 2010
2) The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or RA No. 8239
3) The “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”
4) The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or RA No. 8042, as amended by RA
No. 10022
5) The Act on Violence against Women and Children or RA No. 9262
6) Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or RA No. 8043

 The State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors’ exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds. (Samahan ng mga Progrresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City)
 It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of
the court and, on the other the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns
national security,, public safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for
a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress must responds to the need by explicitly
providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to the primacy of the right to travel,
being a constitutionally-protected right and not simply a statutory right, that it can only be
curtailed by a legislative enactment. (Genuino vs. de Lima, April 17, 2018)

INHERENT LIMITATIONS
 Inherent limitation on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from the source.
These are very basic and are built-in with the power. An example of such inherent limitation is
the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the country.
(Silverio vs. CA, April 18, 1991)
 In Manotoc vs. CA, the petitioner who was out on bail while facing several criminal charges for
estafa, filed motions for permission to leave for the United States “relative to his business
transactions and opportunities”. When his motions were denied, he went to the Supreme Court,
invoking his right to travel. His petition was dismissed on the principal ground that the
 condition of the bail bond that he would be available at any time the court should require his
presence was a valid restriction on his right to travel. Moreover, his reason for leaving was not
urgent, and it had not been shown that his sureties had agreed to his departure.
 True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is
not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to
travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting
the Court’’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No.
49-2002 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain pr
prohibit a person form doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule
(Office of Administrative Services – Office of the Court Adminstrator vs. Judge Macarine, July 18,
2012)
 As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA
to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for eh
orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel
abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be disruption in the
administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel
together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly
arise. For said reason, members and employees of Judiciary cannot invoke and demand their
right to travel. (Leave Division vs. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011)

{Note: To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and the
society as well. In a situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice, litigants can get
disappointed and disheartened. If their expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their
hands which results in public disorder undermining public safety. In this limited sense, it can even be
considered that the restriction or regulation of a court personnel’s right to travel is a concern for public
safety, one of the exceptions to the non-impairment of one’s constitutional right to travel. (Leave
Division vs. Heusdens, Dec 13, 2011)}

 That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning
has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution
proposed in the House of Representatives and sighed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines “as a genuine unselfish gesture for
true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws.” The Resolution
does not question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines;
rather, it appeals to the President’s sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in
his country. (Marcos vs. Manglapus, Sept 15, 1989)

 The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty to abode and the right to travel, but it is well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle in
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of law of the land (Art. II, Sec 2 of the
Constitution). However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys different
protection under the International Convent of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
“arbitrary deprive” thereof (Art. 12 (4)) (Marcos vs. Manglapus,, Sept 15, 1989)
ARTICLE III, SECTION 7 – THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

NATURE
 Armed with the right to information, citizens can participate in public discussion leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence of proper functioning of any democracy. (Initiatives for Diaglogue and
Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. vs. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, Oct 9, 2012)
 The right of access to public document has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional
right. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above quoted Section 28 complement
the right of access to information on matter of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. Intended as
“splendid systemetry” to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. (The Province of North Cotabato vs.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, Oct 14,
2008)
 The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on mater of public concern enunciated
in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public
disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II. These
provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy making as well as in the operations of
Government, and at safeguarding the exercise of the people of the freedom of expression.
(Sereno vs. Committee of Trade and Related Matters of NEDA, Feb 1, 2016)

{Note: There are clear distinctions between right of Congress to information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of document pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not an individual citizen. (Senate vs. Ermita, April 20, 2006)}

APPLICATION
 In Chavez vs. PCGG, a former solicitor general demanded the right to be informed of the
negotiations between the government and the Marcoses regarding the disposition of their
alleged ill-gotten wealth. The respondent had opposed the move mainly on the ground that no
final agreement had as yet been reached and the proposed terms and conditions had not yet
become effective and binding. The court directed the disclosure of the information sought but
noted that the right to information was subject to certain recognized restrictions, among them:
1) NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS AND INTELLIGENCE NFORMATION; 2) TRADE SECRECTS AND
BANKING TRANSCATIONS; 3) CRIMINAL MATTERS; AND 4) OTHER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
 In Echegaray vs. Secretaty of Justice, the Supreme Court held that making the Lethal Injection
Manual inaccessible to the convict was unconstitutional and saw no reason why he could not
 obtain a copy should he so desire. It declared that the contents of the manual were matters of
public concern “which the public may want to know either because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen”

REASONABLE REGULATION
 But the people’s right to information is not absolute. (Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and
Related Matters of the NEDA, Feb 1, 2016)
 According to Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information
“does not open every door to any and all information”. It is limited to matters of public concern,
and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full
public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. (Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters
of the NEDA, Feb 1, 2016)
 This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records,
such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. (Re: Request for Copy of 2008
Statement of Assest, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum
Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary, June 13,
2012)
 While national board examinations, such as the CPA Board Exams, are matters of public
concern, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to
properly administer the exam. (Antolin vs. Domondon, July 5, 2010)

COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS
 While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
Government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information in public concern
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agency.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of madamus in a proper case. (Legaspi vs. Civil Service
Commission; cited in Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, Nov 19, 2013)
 Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus, firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest. And secondly, it must not be exempt by laws from the operation of th
constitutionall guarantee. (Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters of the NEDA,
Feb 1, 2016)
First requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that
the public may want to be familiar with because the issues have a direct effect on them or
because the issues “naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen” As such, whether or not
the information sought is of public concern or public interest is left to the proper determination
of the court on case to case basis.
Second requisite is that the information request must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In the regard, the court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets, and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-
 door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.

{Note: The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people and
aids them in engaging in public discussion leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority an Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp.).
By itself, it does not extend to causing the award of the sale of government assets in failed public
biddings. Thus, assuming that Dong-A consortium may access the records for the purpose of validating
the indicative price under the right to information, it does not follow that respondent is entitled to the
award. (Privatization and Management Office vs. Strategic Development and/or Philippine Estate Corp.,
June 13, 2013)}

EXCEPTIONS
 In Chavez vs. PCGG, has provided the following limitations to the right: (1) NATIONAL SECURITY
MATTERS AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; (2) TRADE SECRETS AND BANKING
TRANSACTIONS; (3) CRIMINAL MATTERS; and (4) OTHER CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SUCH AS
CONFIDENTIAL OR CLASSIFIED INORMATION OFFICIALLY KNOWN TO PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES BY REASON OF THEIR OFFICE AND NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC AS WELL
AS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, CLOSED DOOR CABINET MEETINGS AND EXECUTIVE
SESSIONS OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS, AND THE INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT
 In Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority, the court has ruled that the right to information does not
extend to matters acknowledged as “privileged information under the separation of powers”,
which include “Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings”. Likewise exempted from the right to information are “information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.
(Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters of the NEDA, Feb 1, 2016)
 Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. The extraordinary
character of the exemption indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Senate vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, April 20,, 2006)
 The disclosure of the details on the “offers” of the Japanese Government in connection with the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) may not be compelled. (AKBAYAN
vs. Aquino, July 16, 2008)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 8 – FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form union,
associations, or societies for purpose not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

NATURE
 As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-organization includes the
right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same
purpose for their mutual aid and protection. This is line with the policy of the State to foster the
free voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement as well as to make sure that
 workers participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare. (Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, Oct 14,
2015)
 The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrate Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (In re Edillon, Aug 3, 1978)

{Note: Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohensive
group of which every lawyer is already a member. (In re Edillon, Aug 3, 1978)}

 Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, Aprill 8, 2010)

REASONABLE REGULATION
 In Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, the Supreme Court sustained a provision in the
old Industrial Peace Act allowing laborers to disassociates from or not join a labor union despite
its closed-shop agreement with management if they were “members of any sect which prohibits
affiliation of their members in any such ‘labour organization”. It was here held that the right to
associate includes the right to not associate and that this particular exemption was intended for
the benefit of labourers who were inhibited from joining labor unions because of their religious
beliefs.
{Note: The close-shop is, of course, a valid form of union security and a provision therefor in a collective
bargaining agreement is not considered a restriction of the right to association. (Villar vs. Inciong; Lirag
Textile Mills vs. Blanco; Liberty Flour Mills Employees Associatios vs. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc)}

 For the same purpose of protecting and advancing the public interest, this court has sustained
the validity not only of those requirements relating to the establishment and registration of
associations, but also the substantive standards delimiting who may join organizations. This
illustrated in united Pepsi-Cola Supervisory union vs. Laguesma, March 25, 1998), where the
court recognized the validity of the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which prohibits
managerial employees from forming, assisting, or joining labor organizations, relation to Article
III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. Here, this court recognized that a classification
distinguishing managerial employees form rank-and-file employees permitted to form and join
labor organizations is grounded on identifiable and appreciable differences. Thus, “there is a
rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations;
and “as to (managerial employees), the right of self-organization may be regulated and even
abridged. (Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs. Department of Education, Feb 23, 2016)
 Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Article III, Section 8 infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Article III, Section 8 is subject to
the condition that its exercise should be for purpose “not contrary to law”. In the Case of Art
245 there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations.
  To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial vs. NLRC, was dealing with the right of confidential
employees to organize. But the same reason for denying them the right to organize justifies
even more the ban on managerial employees from forming unions. After all, those qualify as top
or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not only
is confidential but also us not generally available to public, or to their competitors, or to other
employees. It is hardly necessary to point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is
unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in that case.
 A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for effecting the role of parents (who would
otherwise viewed as outsiders) as an indispensable element of educational communities.
Rather than being totally independent of or removed from schools, a parent-teacher association
is more aptly considered an adjunct of an educational community having a particular school as
its locus. It is an “arm” of the school. Given this view, the importance of regulation vis-à-vis
investiture of official status becomes manifest. According a parent-teacher association official
status not only enables it to avail itself benefits and privileges but also establishes upon it its
solemn duty as a pillar of the educational system. (Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. vs.
Department of Education, Feb 23, 2016)
 We find Letran’s rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to be a
reasonable regulation, not only because of the reason stated in DECS Order No. 20, s. 1990, but
also because of the adult-oriented activities often associated with fraternities. Expectedly,
most, if not all, of its high school students are minors. Besides, Letran’s penalty for violation and
in the Student handbooks its distributes at the start of every school year (Go vs. Colegio de San
Juan de Letran, Oct 10, 2012)
 While those employed in the public sector may form unions,, associations, or societies for
purpose not contrary to law, it is established that members of the civil service may not declare a
strike to enforce their economic demands. (Alliance of Government Workers vs. Ministry of
Labor and Employment)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 10 – THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

NATURE
 The impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in application to
laws that derogate form prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties (Philippine Association of Detective ad Protective Agency
vs. COMELEC, Oct 3, 2017)
 The purpose of impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements
against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected by the
legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the
parties or modify their rights and obligations (Siska Development Corp. vs. Office of the
President, April 22, 1994). The will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the
obligation of their contract must not be impaired. (Constitutional Law, Cruz and Cruz)
 Not all contracts, however, are protected under the non-impairment clause. Contracts whose
subject matters are so related to the public welfare are subject to the police power of the State
and, therefore, some of its terms may be changed or the whole contract even set aside without
offending the Constitution; otherwise, “important and valuable reforms may be precluded by
the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may
be prohibited’ (The Provincial Bus Operator Association of the Philippines vs. DOLE, July 17,
2018)
  Similar to the right to due process,, the right to non-impairment yields to the police power of
the State
 The police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. (BANAT vs.
COMELEC)
 The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such, regulations must be subject to change from time-to-time as the general well-being
of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity. (Beltran vs. Secretary of Health)

LAWS
 As used in the impairment clause, “law” includes statutes enacted by the national legislature,
executive orders, and administrative regulations promulgated under a valid delegation of
power, and municipal ordinances passed by the local legislative bodies (Lim vs. Registry of
Deeds). However, it does not include judicial decisions of adjudications made by administrative
bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
 To impair, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before its
enactment. There will be no impairment if the law is made to operate prospectively only, to
cover contracts entered into after its enactment

OBLIGATION
 The “obligation” of the contracts is the vinculum juris, the tie that binds the parties to each
other. The obligation of a contract is a law or duty which binds the parties to perform their
undertaking or agreement according to its terms and intent

CONTRACT
o The term “contract” as used in the impairment clause refers to any lawful agreement on
property or property rights, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible

ARTICLE III, SECTION 11 – FREE ACCESS TO COURT

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.

PURPOSE
o Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence
is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law

APPLICATIONS
o This guarantee of free access to the court is extended to litigants who may be indigent by
exempting them from the obligation to pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone who claims
to be indigent may be demand free access to the courts. The court declared that the exemption
may be extended only to natural party litigants; the exemption may not be extended to juridical
persons even if they worked for indigent and underprivileged people because the Constitution
has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a
 natural person can suffer. To prevent the abuse of the exemption, therefore, the Court has
incorporated Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 in the Rules of Court inorder to set the
guidelines implementing as well as regulating the exercise of the right to free access to the
courts (Pangcatan vvs. Maghuyop)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 12 – CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

(1) Any person under the investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provide with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
o Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him (Article III, Section 12)
o Custodial investigation has been understood to refer any questioning by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way (Miranda vs. Arizona)
o The above provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has termed as “MIRANDA
RIGHTS” (People vs. Cabanada)
o The MIRANDA doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right
to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in court of law; (c) he has
the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned; (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one
will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The said right are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest used of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (People vs.
Cabanada)
o The purpose of the safeguards prescribed by MIRANDA are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the “inherently compelling pressures”
generated by the custodial setting itself” which work to undermine the individuals will to resist,
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confession were voluntary. Those purpose are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they
are questioning of persons suspected felonies (Luz vs. People)
o But since Miranda vs. Arizona, the law has come to recognize that an accused needs the same
protections even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the criminal
process – when a person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a
person says or does during custodial investigation will eventually be used as evidence against
him at the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual conviction. His
trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-incrimination
and to counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as the MIRANDA doctrine. (De
Castro vs. People, Feb 2, 2015)
o The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion of the exercise of the
new right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to
police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that the certain procedural
safeguards take over – the person must be warned prior to the questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that the has the
 right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning. (De Castro vs. People, Feb 2, 2015)

 When accused-appellant Jocelyn signed the Certificate of Orderly Search, she did not confess of
her guilt to the crime charged. She merely admitted to the fact that a lawful search was
conducted while she was in the same premises. (People vs. Posada)
 Petitioner’s uncounselled admission during the confrontation at the police station is
inadmissible in evidence. In this case, the so-called “request for appearance” is no different
from the “invitation” issued by police officers for custodial investigation. (People vs. Cabanada)
 The right to counsel is not available during a police line-up as this not considered part of the
custodial investigation. (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
 Administrative investigation are likewise not considered as covered by Section 12, which is
limited to criminal investigation. (Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission)

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
 The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused. (Gamboa vs. Cruz)

WAIVER
 An extrajudicial confession to be admissible, must be:
(1) voluntary;
(2) within the assistance of counsel;
(3) in writing; and
(4) express
(People vs. Hernandez)

 A duly executed extra-judicial confession is admissible against the confessant. It may, in fact, be
admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-
accused. (People vs. Reyes)
 Any objection with respect to a violation of these rights must be raised before arraignment
 When a person fails to invoke this right “at the appropriate time” or when for instance he is
asked to provide samples of his signature (Nacu vs. Civil Service Commission), he is deemed to
have waived the same (People vs. Ayson)
 An extra-judicial confession obtained without the assistance of counsel but later affirmed by the
accused in open court during his trial has been considered admissible against him. (Abay vs.
People)

COMPULSION AND DETENTION

 Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by
competent and independent corroborating evidence, like medical certificates. (People vs. Muit)
 Where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence
of violence was presented, his extra-judicial statement shall be considered as having been
voluntarily executed. (People vs. Del Rosario)
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION
 Information elicited from the accused without his first being informed of these rights would
inadmissible against him (People vs. Lucero)
 Infraction of the rights of an accused during the custodial investigation or the so-called
MIRANDA rights render inadmissible only the extra-judicial confession or admission made during
such investigation (People vs. Malimit)
 The re-enactment of the crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against the
accused (People vs. Suarez)
 What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.
The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State
as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court. (People vs. Andan)
 Appellant’s confession to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by new reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and admissible in evidence (People vs. Andan)
 Uncounselled extrajudicial statement given to barangay tanods and barangay chairman have
likewise been considered inadmissible(People vs Mayo), but uncounselled admission to
neighbours and barangay kagawad which were not made during custodial investigations have
been admitted in evidence against the accused who made them (People vs. Gil)

ARTICLE III, SECTION 13 – RIGHT TO BAIL

All persons, except those charge with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong,, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be release on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeaus corpus is suspended. Excessive bal shall not be required

The general rule is therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of rights, and he retains his rights to an offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized (Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan)

 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court

WHO MAY APPLY

 All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance a prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
Metropolitant Trial Court, MTC, MTC or RTC, and (b) before conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, of life imprisonment (Rules of Court,, Rule 114)
HEARING
 The court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for a judge to properly exercise this
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence is guilt is strong.
This discretion lies not in the determination of whether the hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the
accused. (Villanueva vs. Judge Buaya)

SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended
 A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspended the privilege of the writ
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent or directly connected with the invasion.

ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 – RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

All persons, except those charge with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong,, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be release on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeaus corpus is suspended. Excessive bal shall not be required