Mozambique's Widening Foreign Policy

Author(s): Norman Macqueen

Source: The World Today, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 22-28
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395550
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Mozambique's widening foreign
policy
NORMAN MACQUEEN

Paradoxically, in a period when so much Western policy towards the Third

World appears to be formulated on a model of simple ideological polarity,
Mozambique, originally a neo -conservative bête rouge of the deepest hue, has
been developing an increasingly broad and pragmatic network of foreign rela-
tions. Despite a continuing declaratory commitment to the Soviet bloc in the
main issue areas of East- West confrontation, President Samora Machel and his
Foreign Minister, Joaquim Chissano, have shown an evident interest in mov-
ing the avowedly Marxist- Leninist Frelimo1 government towards closer politi-
cal and economic relations with the West. This has extended even to the mili-
tary sphere with Portugal, a Nato member, undertaking wide commitments
in the training and equipping of the Mozambican army. The tour of West
European capitals undertaken by Machel, Chissano and other Politburo
members in October 1983, has most recently confirmed this reorientation.
The reasons for this rapprochement with the West are various. The East
European model for development originally applied by Frelimo has proved in-
appropriate to the country's post- independence circumstances and needs. In
consequence, the enthusiasm for undifferentiated Marxist economics has
declined in recent years. Also, Soviet bloc military aid, constrained as it is by
broad considerations of East- West relations in the region, has not been ade-
quate to meet either the direct threat posed by the South African Defence
Forces on the border or the Pretoria-orchestrated campaign of internal destabi-
lization by the anti-Frelimo National Resistance Movement (MRN). Addition-
ally, the process leading to the independence of Zimbabwe and subsequent
developments in southern African regional co-operation have brought
Mozambique into contact with such non-Soviet international entities as the
Commonwealth and the European Community. All this has caused not pre-
cisely a westward move in Mozambique's diplomatic orientation - certainly
not one comparable with, say, that of Somalia further to the north - but a clear
widening of its foreign policy perspective. The early post -independence im-
pression of Mozambique as a kind of African Albania closed to all but her
ideological mentors has, despite the prevailing tone of super-power relations,
gradually been dispelled in the past three years.
1 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo). For background, see Robert D'A Hender-
son, 'Principles and practice in Mozambique's foreign policy', The World Today, July 1978.

Dr MacQueen, formerly at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies of the University of
Glasgow, is now Lecturer in Politics at the Hatfield Polytechnic. Previously he spent two years
(1977-9) working for the Ministry of Education and Culture in Maputo. A German version of this
article is appearing in Europa-Archiv (Bonn).

22

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 MOZAMBIQUE 23

The Soviet-US perspect

Frelimo's strong identifi
1975 was the inevitable ou
Communist weapons again
present during the early
been eclipsed by that of t
dence, Frelimo's Third Co
for political and economi
classical, non-Maoist Marx
sector served by a seconda
was developed with East G
from the ashes of war. Th
however. Lacking trained
after independence, and e
infrastructure adjusted t
than internal developmen
same time, the agricultura
subservient role in nation
flood and drought and, th
tive terrorism of the dissi
tal in the frustration of M
Talks on the issue in Mo
dence', as opposed, in Kre
tween the Mozambican de
In the sphere of military
predominance of the Sovi
training has been signific
ning ofthat year, immedi
claimed to be African Nat
of Maputo, two Soviet wa
flag of solidarity in the w
against the socialist camp
Alexei Yepishev was des
Mozambique's rapidly d
Significantly , the interve
which government force
incapable of quelling an
Navy in Maputo harbour.
The lessening of military
be greeted with satisfaction
2 For an account of the general
independence years, see Nico
Socialism', in Peter Wiles (ed.
1982).
3 Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series), Vol. 18, No. 2, 15 March
1981, p. 5957.

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 24 THE WORLD TODAY January 1984

tinuing (albeit recently overshadowed) strategic con

Ocean region. In reality, the Reagan Administration
bique has not been as hostile as its general ideological p
suggest. Prior to the mid-1970s, the United States had s
southern Africa and its current concerns in the contine
almost exclusively with the radius of Libyan influence i
and with Angola and Namibia.4 The Reagan State Depar
tion with Pretoria drew a sharp response from Maput
diplomats were expelled amidst something of a spy feve
African raid of January 1981. Subsequently, the A
Mozambique has been more circumspect. A State Depar
December 1982, while warning against the internation
frontation with South Africa, nevertheless acknowledge
to self-defence and indicated that regional African milit
acceptable to Washington.5 The possible 'internationali
cerns the American Administration, of course, would
Cuban forces. The Cuban presence in Mozambique, w
appear to be entirely civilian. These 'cooperantes ' are pa
education, medicine and agriculture. Moscow has so far
to prevail upon Cuba to act in any more muscular capa
Such movement as there has been in Mozambican-Soviet relations should
not be overstated. The removal of the veteran Frelimo leader and poet of the
revolution, Marcelino dos Santos, from the government in April 1980, for ex-
ample , was not , as was suggested in the West at the time , a move against a par-
ticular pro-Soviet faction within the party. In contrast to Angola's MPLA, such
factionalism has not been a characteristic of Frelimo and the reasons for the
reshuffle (and frequent subsequent ones) were to do with personal abilities
and governmental morale rather than ideological alignments. Despite the
closing of the Comecon door on Mozambique in 1980, extensive economic and
trade agreements have since been entered into. In the military sphere,
although the Soviet Union's presence is evidently being reduced and its con-
tinued role as the major supplier of arms is in question, it will obviously con-
tinue to occupy a central position in relation to the Mozambican army - and
more particularly the MiG equipped airforce - in the foreseeable future. This
centrality however, in both the economic and defence spheres, looks as if it will
be shared more and more with others in coming years.

Portugal and the European Community

The leading contender to date for such a position would appear to be Por-
tugal. Post -independence relations with successive Lisbon governments were
not good. While Angola moved relatively quickly to a friendly accommoda-
tion with the ex -colonial power, Mozambique remained unheeding of the peri-
4 See Christopher Coker, 'Reagan and Africa', The World Today, April 1982, passim.
The Guardian, 1 1 January 1983. Both Tanzania and Zimbabwe have troops inside Mozam-
bique supporting anti-MRN operations.

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MOZAMBIQUE 25

odie overtures from Por

engaged in a somewhat
co-operation in early 197
Portuguese nationals we
anti-Frelimo guerrilla ac
sequent expulsion of the
ever, the danger of a gen
itself on the leadership.
interest in normalization
At the end of March 19
Lisbon. This was followed
Eanes and the relationship
half of 1982, a number
political relations were f
Prime Minister, Pinto Ba
Most significant, though
undertaken in 1981 and
communiqué was issued w
co-operation. It was rep
tuguese Deputy Chief of
delegation to make initia
units of the Mozambican
protocol was signed by
tary instructors would b
was held out of Portugu
Mozambique. Plans were
tuguese arms by Moza
Western, indeed a Nato,
brought the worried Ge
The impending accessi
bring a greater symmet
The relationship with Li
being developed with th
independence, co-opera
- most notably France
of Zimbabwe and Mach
bique into greater pro
unexpected favour wit
main obstacle to its full
gramme remained. Thi
Mozambican foreign pol
Because of the relations
Germany, the governm
6 The Times, 7 December 19
1 Africa Research Bulletin,

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26 THE WORLD TODAY January 1984

to the Lomé Convention: recognition of West Berli

Republic. A protracted search for a compromise on
ing. However, during 1982, a year of considerable a
Europe, the difficulties preventing Mozambique fr
the European Development^Fund (EDF) appear to ha
The approach to Western Europe in that year began
Machel cancelled a tour of Britain , France and the N
following month. This was because, it was annou
security situation within the country and on the bor
served a certain diplomatic purpose, of course, by h
which South Africa's strategy of continuing destabi
routine processes of foreign policy as well as econo
Clearly, European governments ought to be concer
a westward road tentatively embarked on by a supp
easily be obstructed by South Africa. On the Mozam
tour represented a further stage in the search - whi
year in Lisbon - for the maximum diplomatic supp
It was against this background that the Berlin imp
amounted to a capitulation by Maputo. In the face
man opposition, the Land designation for West
Mozambique in the wording of two relatively mino
Federal Republic (concerning industrial and food ai
The diplomatic logjam having been discreetly cleared
ship with both Bonn and the EEC as an institution d
agreements were signed with the Federal Republic
and, most importantly, the way was now open for a
vention.8 In October 1982, Mozambique's intention
for the 1986-90 Convention was announced by the
pean Communities.
The 'lost' European tour of the summer of 1982 eve
tober 1983. The Mozambican delegation, according t
statements, sought military training and supply agr
and France on this occasion. However, no clear indica
existence of such arrangements emerged following th
and President Mitterrand. Presumably, both the Bri
more reticent than the Portuguese about any undert
national military personnel in what at times appears
with South Africa. Clearly, though, it was in the in
maximize publicly the level, actual or potential, of m
the West for the very reason that, under certain
involvement might indeed occur. The consequen
immediate interests was a certain confusion around
question of military assistance, though, the visit w
success. From Britain, for example, which currentl
8 The Guardian, 10 August 1982.

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 MOZAMBIQUE 27

development than for se

the write-off of an exist
The diplomatic move to
Frelimo in March 1983;
resolution noted 'with p
of Western countries' , w
tion of the nature of the
from South Africa referr
area as much as consider
tions with Western Euro
tion (both individually a
Africa's activities in th
speed in its approach to
many of its neighbours in
identification with it and
probably be of greater
capitals in the region.

The regional dimensio

A further impetus tow
directed - foreign policy
structures in southern A
are marked on different charts from those in circulation in the northern
hemisphere and Mozambique has since independence maintained generally
cordial relations with its (black) neighbours, regardless of their broader inter-
national leanings. Some unlikely diplomatic connexions have been made by,
for example, inclusion in the front-line grouping, the membership of which
represents a broad spectrum of international orientations beyond the region
itself. Since 1980, a particular set of connecting relations has emerged from the
formal structure of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Con-
ference ( S ADCC).
Formally established at a summit in Lusaka in April 1980, the SADCC com-
prises Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Zambia and Zimbabwe . The long-term objective of the Conference is to
end the region's economic dependence on South Africa. Its strategy towards
this end lies in the development and appropriate restructuring of transport and
communications. In this, of course, Mozambique with a 2500 km coastline
and its rail- served port facilities will play a central part.9 At a SADCC meeting
in Maputo in December 1980, projects costed at two billion dollars were
presented to potential donors of which about 40 per cent would be invested in
Mozambique. At that time, concern was expressed in the European Com-
munity (potentially a principal donor) at the fact that Mozambique, which re-
9 This was acknowledged at the Lusaka meeting by the creation of the Southern African Trans-
port and Communications Commission, to be permanently based in Maputo under Mozambican
chairmanship.

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28 THE WORLD TODAY January 1984

mained outside the Lomé agreements, might receive s

aid. l0 Some Community governments reportedly took
ture of the Lomé Convention by Mozambique should b
EDF participation in SADCC schemes. A relationship
at one remove was not deemed a sufficient commitme
This, of course, added a considerable economic impetu
cerns which led Maputo some eighteen months later to
modation with Bonn.
The SADCC has developed into the major structure for attracting and
canalizing multilateral development aid for the region. The donors of this aid
(with the exception of some OPEC involvement) are exclusively Western.
Clearly, Mozambique's position as the leading national recipient of this in-
vestment capital will move it some considerable distance from the degree of
dependency on the Soviet bloc suggested by the development strategy first
embarked upon after the Third Congress in 1977 . The political and diplomatic
implications of this move have yet to be fully delineated but, assuming suc-
cessful accession to the Lomé Convention and a continuing 'fair appreciation'
by Western Europe of the conflict with Pretoria, they may well be far reaching.

Conclusion

The recent direction of Mozambique's foreign relations has been deter-

mined by considerations of both national security and economic development .
The effect of South Africa's policy of destabilization, ironically, has not been
to push the government further 'into the arms of the Kremlin' as conven-
tional wisdom might have it. Rather, it has been to create an awareness of the
value of the widest possible range on international relations. On the economic
side, a viable development programme for Mozambique inevitably must in-
clude a major regional aspect. In the light of the political disposition of its
southern African neighbours, this involves a primary dependence on Western
aid donors and a degree of political identification with these donors through
such structures as Lomé. It would be quite wrong, though, to speak in terms of
a move to the West in Mozambique's foreign policy if this is taken to imply a
move away from the East. The process has been one of expansion rather than
drastic redirection . Political relations with the Soviet bloc will remain close and
the extension of Maputo's rapprochement with the West to include any
greater cordiality with the United States would seem highly unlikely at this
time. This must be especially so after the Grenada affair - an issue which im-
pinges on the fundamental commitment on the part of Frelimo to solidarity
with other radical Third World regimes. Nevertheless, the closer relationship
with Western Europe seems set to continue and to become increasingly
established as the various military and development agreements are embodied
in ever more solid diplomatic structures.
10 The Economist, 29 November 1980.

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