3 Mainstream theories Realism, rationalism and revolutionism John Vogler International Relations (HR) as a dstinet discipline dates Rom che immediate aftermath of the Fiest World War. Understandably its preoccupation was, and vemains, che problem of war and che achievement of security in whats often deseribed as an “asatchie” system of sovereign states see (Chapter 7), Environmental isues, whether seen as teansboundary disputes or the international dimension of managing common resources, were 2 decidedly minority interest (Stevis 2006). ‘The natural environment provided the context, rather than the subject, of international relations TThis situation begat to change from around the time ofthe United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held a Stockholm in 1972, In this issue atea a in others, scholars tended to react to changes in the world of practical politics and pohey-making. In developed world societies “green politics had begun to emerge in response to various environmental dsssters and public awareness of the scope of problems, such as air pollution, that were not soluble without international ation (see Chapter 30). The probably inevitable response by students of IR. was to attempt to frame such novel issues within existing theoretical traditions and to apply the same tools that had been used to analyse cooperation in managing the global economy or negotiating arm limitation in the Cold War (ee Chapter 30), Ite argusble that thi wat a mistake, and that something rther more radical would have been more appropriate — something that placed ecology oF perhaps green political theory at the centre of theoretical endeavour. Questions right have been atked, for example, about the long-run co-evolution of physical and socio/ international systems, ‘This chapter will review the way in which IR. theory engaged with international envison- ‘mental politics. IR theory may be characterized ata broad, expanding and eclectic church, One way of categorizing ite traditions derives from the insight of Martin Wight (1991), a leading exponent ofthe "English School” of international theory. He made tripartite division between the three Rs": realism, rational ond revoluioniem. Realism is very well known ae the (then) predominant theoretical approach emphasizing power relations between states in an anarchic and inherently war-prone sytem, Rationalism denoted a reformist and liberal tradition informed by reason. Under this heading one may find liberals, internationalists and “idealists” ~ a charac~ terization invented by realist antagonist that has proved remarkably resilient. As fir a the stady of international environmental politics ie concemed, liberal institutional really does consti tute the mainstream and accordingly will receive most attention below. The third category 30Mainstream theories contains those whote purpose isto provide a theoretical approach extical ofthe existing inter= ‘ational system with a view ¢o its ultimate replacement (see Chapter 4). Prominent amongst them ate scholats working within 1 Marxist tradition who have developed a distinctive alterna tive to the liberal mainstream, Inevitably, when conftonted with actual scholarship there ate rnuany ways in which the categories blur and overlap, but there are also key distinctions that wall be explored in what follows ‘The frst concems the ontological bases of theory ~ that which is held to exist, Whether, for example, the sate of global class relations constitute the fiandamental reality for theorists. In tandem with this we may also pose epistemological questions about how the various theoretical traditions claim to be able to know about relity, Here there are important distinctions between, those who follow the disciplines of social science seeking to find regularities and explain varia. tions through the objective study of empirical evidence and those lke social constructivists or members of the English School, for whom interpretation rather than “positivist” explanation, is key (see Chapter 5). In discussions of IR. theory this distinction is often presented as being becween “positivists” or “rationalise” and “rellectivie”, Positvitic IR. remains the dominant approach, especially in the United States, but even from the 1960s it has been subject to attack fom various strands of “reflecivist” thought from diverse positions, including Marsist-inspired structural, “critical theory" and “post-stucturil”, not to mention the original English School resistance to the behavioural trend in US scholarship. Finally, here are normative questions that address the purposes of theory. Usually in the study of international relations there is ach a purpote beyond a simple commitment to objec tive scholarship, Students of international environmental politics have frequently aimed to solve ‘or manage problems through international cooperation, For them the ultimate test of effective nes ie whether the institutional or other arangements deviced serve to redress degradation or ‘promote environmental quilty (cee Chapters § and 9). This was the specific intention of many research programme: and of the chairman of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, who spake of the advance of more recent discussions of the topic, called for “2 world system of governance” (Maurice Strong cited in Hass et al. 1993: 6). In this way the problematic was devised beyond the academy and translated into the following, frequently referenced, formulation: “Can a frag aiented and often highly confictual political system made up of over 170 sovereign state and sumerous other actors achieve the high (and historically unprecedented) levels of cooperation, and policy coordination needed to manage environmental problems om a global scale?” (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 1). This is, however, by no means a universal preoccupation amongst IR, theotiss, inetcapable” need for intemational cooperation and, in Realism ‘The realist tradition continues to animate popular and academic study of international relations Dut it has had only limited impact upon the specialism of international environmental politics, ‘One reason for this is that it tended to define the latter’s subject matter out of existence Environmental isues were for realists matters of “low politics” and the proper subject of IR was constituted by the “high polities” of satecrat, war and peace. Reaistsasiert the primacy of the state which is assumed to pursue it national interest, famously reduced by Hans Morgenthau. (1948) to the pursuit of power, but for most writers defined as the protection of its ceritorial mntegety and the achievement of economic security and other central objectives of the state (Gee Chapter 7). The natural environment is therefore, significant not in itelf, but in terms of resource competition between states, Such competition is conducted within an anarchic 31John Vogler “selhelp" system where the resort co force isan ever-present possibilty, Thus, the preoceupa tion of realist thinkers is with the management of power balances and the achievement of some kind of order in a world of conflict, A key realignment of realist thought was inspired by the “structural” theory of Waltz (1979). Neorealismn, which shares some important characteristics with neoliberal approaches (discussed below), sought to provide 4 parimonious theory of intemational power politic based upon a rational choice model of the way that any state would behave within an anarchic structure, Realist and neorealist assumptions were offen ‘embedded in attempts to provide social scientific and “testable” theories of international rela- tions (Vasquez 1983) ‘The environment rarely figured as the subject of such analyses, but realism provides one hypothesis that would be relevant to explanations of international environmental cooperation, ‘This isthe “hegemonic stability thesis”, developed like much ofthe kterature to account for the circumstances under which international economic cooperstion could occur. It followed from, realist postulates that self-interested states would only subject themselves to international rules if they were enforced by a dominant “hegemon”. The occupant of this role for much of the twentieth century was the United States and there was much concem from the 1970s onwards ato the fature of world economic regulation, once US dominance began to erode. For students of international environmental politics ths did not appear to be a plausible, still less a desirable, thesis because fom the Iste 1980s, through the period of major construction of international environmental accords, the USA was either absent or obstructive ~ having relinquished its earlier leadership role. Hegemonic stability docs not exhaurt the potential of relist theorizing. The emergence of climate change a¢ a centeal concer hae demonstrated, through its inextricable linkage to energy production and issues of economic growth, that iti close to the heart of national interests (eee Chapter 28); the designation of environmental politics as “low politics” ieno longer tenable ~ it ever wat. Realist thinking about shiing power constellations ie cleatly relevant (Rowlands 2001) as are the older traditions of geopolitical analysis which centred on struggles over terito- ‘al space and resources. Geopolitics, as outlined by such scholars as Sir Halford Mackinder, was usually located within politcal geography although it had clear associations with the realist power political analysis. In geopolitical writing the emphasis was always on resource conflict rather than the environment per se although prominent politcal geographers Harold and “Margatet Sprout (1971) managed to move on to the consideration of intemational environmen tal politics. As Stevis (2006: 20) notes, geopolitics was the predecessor of the contemporary environmental conflict and security research agenda (see Chapter 19). ‘The study of environmental security has produced an extensive literature in recent yeuts (Barnett 2001; Swatuk 2006; see Claapter 19}. When environmental secusity is defined in terms of the relationship between environmental change and armed conflict ~ whether war or insurgency ~ itis of interest to governments and the stategic studies community. Major studies have been fanded by, for example, NATO (Lietzmann and Vest 1999), with a view to providing posible future conflict scenarios and climate change, in patticulst, appeats routinely ip strategic assesiments asa “teat multiplet” (European Council 2008). leis not only the military establish ‘ment that hs become interested but others, whether governments or activists, who wish to rase the profile of environmental problems by "securitizing” them. (The reference here is to the so called Copenhagen School whose approach to the study of security involved the way in whieh political “speech acts” served to increate the salience ofa particular policy by associating it with the potent idea of security (Busan etal, 1998), Fence attempts to focus governmental atention and resources on, say, climate change would describe it a security threat greater than that posed by terrorists (King 2004; see Chapter 28)) In April 2007, for example, the UK government 32Mainstream theories ‘introduced a UN Security Council Resolution on climate change, All this is despite the fact that as Deudney (1990) cogently demonstrate, there ate significant disadvantages aising from the attempt to bring environmental and military/strategie concems together. For one thing the ‘mindsets of soldiers and enviconmenta activists are a variance and che employment of military assets generally mote Likely to degrade than enhance environmental quality ‘A prominent research programme into the acwal connections between environmental deg- ridation and conflict has been undertaken by Homer-Dixon (1991, 1999) and bis associates who isolate three types of conflict that are likely to be causally connected to environmental changes: struggles over diminishing resources, conflict related to migration and insurrections as feagile states fil co cope with the streses of environmental change. As evident in cases such a¢ the Darfur confict in Sudan, there are connections between environmental change (desertfca- tion and loss of habitats; see Chapters 39 and 37), the displacement of farmers and ethnically stnactured conflicts. However, the precise causal mechanisms are notoriously hard to pin down (Barnett 2001; Gleditsch 1998). Much of the writing on environmental security is framed within {1se¢ of assumptions about conflict and security that align with realism, For example the Pentagon, has commissioned studies of not only the threats but ako the strategic opportunities opened up bby some of the scenarios for future climate change (Schwartz and Randall 2003). Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that a great deal of work in this field ie performed within the competing normative enterprise of peace research (Buecbler 1999). There is a similar comaitment to social scientific modes of explanation but peace research, with its pacifistc and often radical outlook. isin essential opposition to the realist paradigm. Rationalism ‘The use of the term rationalism can cause confusion, It does not in this instance refer to proce ral rationality ofthe sort that i to be found in the rational choice model: employed by both realists and their opponents, Rather, the sense is that rationalists have a reasoned approach in contrast tothe brutlities of power politics or the excessive idealism of those who would over tum the existing system. At the core of the rationalist tradition in IR are conceptions that can bbe traced back at leat to Grotius, founding fither of modern intemational law (see Chapter 10), States do not existin a perpetual Hobbesian “war ofall agains all” but are capable of developing shared norms and practices that can ameliorate their condition and even develop the righte of their citizens. Clasical rationalist thinkers were preoccupied by the problems of war, but the general approach docs comprehend the mainstream of studies of international environmental politics that endeavouts to improve the management of common problem by states, without the expectation that a revolutionary transformation of the international system, to provide a sustainable form of world ecological government is 2 realistic prospect for the immediate future Liberalism and neoliberalisrm Liberalism as a politcal and economic theory has diverse roots in the English constitutional and religious struggles ofthe seventeenth century and in the European enlightenment of the eigh- teenth. Its appeal is to the rights ofthe individual, the limitation of govemnment powers and the importance not only of fice association, but of free markess. In IK it has been eflected in a progressive beliefin reform ofthe states system, One version is “democratic peace theory” pos- ‘ring that war and peace depend upon the nature of particular states, while another powerfal idea, traceable to the nineteenth-century Manchester School, is that there is an equation between free economic exchange across fontiers, high levels of interdependence and a sable 33John Vogler and pacific intemational sytem: To the interwar period liberal internationals thinkers were in the ascendant at advocates of national sel-determination and the encoursgement of itera tional law and organization as the antidote toa war-prone intemational system. Variants of thi approach included “functionals” which proposed that integration across national boundaries can be achieved by low-level ocio-cconomic cooperation tht wil eventually “spillover” into the transfer of political authority beyond the nation-zate, Liberals have been suspicious of che state and receptive to the ids ofa more pluralist and transnational world system ee Chapter 1). ‘This, coupled with s strong beliofin the eficacy of fce trae forthe production of both wealth and political stability, har meant tha, in the aftermath of the Cold War, liberalism became the dominant ideology tht both celebrated snd justified the spread of economic globalization. The protection ofthe natural environment did not figure largely in liberal thinking, Indeed, citi will point out that liberal economics, in its encouragement of the rie of consumer capitalism, beat 4 major responsibilty for the degradation of nature stsociated with economic growth. ‘The liberal response i that fee markets wil provide the optimal allocation of resources in term of eficiency and sustainability if only the environmental cots of human activity (exteralties) ae properly taken into account in transactions (ze Chapter 15). ‘The fit that thie docs not occur and that sate authorities fl to coordinate thei activities in 4 rational way, beneficial to all in dhe longer term, provides a key to understanding liberal approaches to international environmental ies. Much ofthe intellectual inspiration for such thinking in IR. derives fron a preceding concem with running the international economy i the face of countezproducive “neo-mercantie” behaviour by goveraments In fct proponents of liberal political economy adit that markets i themselves would not aperate properly without a framework of rales Thus government should be encouraged to cooperate in what was astumied tobe their underlying collective interest ~a they had at the end of the Second World Wer with an economic setlemene that pu in place the Breton Woods monetary order and the global fice txade regime ~ 4 critical enabler of globalization. When eavironmental sues achieved wider salience during the 1980s iberal analysts were able to tp into existing work on the conditions required for intemational economic cooperation, (There were some exceptions such as Oran Young, who had aeady begun to seudy interational envionment cooperation inthe preced- ng decade) They adopted many of the assumptions of neoclassical economics (Keohane 1984) n the study of what were defined as collective action problems. In fact itis quit dificult to dlstinguish between work that can be clasifed as I and that which present an essentially eco- nomic analysis. Economists have performed extensive research not only on the viability of insteuments sch as emisions trading, but so ino the functions of international agreements and the coneitions under which they occur Barrett 2008). Atmospheric quality was, for example conceptualized a global public good and climate change was described as “the greatest exatn- ple of market filure we have ever seen” (Stem 2007: 1), In economic theory pubic goods canmot be provided by the operation ofthe market and thi fords justifiation for cooperation between governments to ensure ther supply. Key assumptions ofthis ype of approach included the notion of rational, wilty-maximizing ators who would ake strategie decisions to cooper ate ifthe incentives were right. Game theory provided a set of relevant models for such bargain~ sng and in particular the “prisoner's dilemma” game in which actor ced to overcome their mutual distrust in order to enjoy che gains avaiable fom cooperation ‘Ausciated with this war the need to overcome the “five-rider problem” posed by actors ‘who may profit fom agreements without conteibuting to them. An awareness ofthis possi was ssumed to be a mijor disincentive to potential patcipant in an agreement (Stern 2007). ‘The epistemological stance of these scholars of intemational cooperstion, often refrred to a aeoliberls, was ako closely aligned with mainstream economics. (The neoreuit confrontation, 34Mainstream theories with liberal critics is often referred to a the ‘neo-neo" controversy. Although the term neolib- cri is used to denote scholars who adopted many of the assumptions of their counterpart in cconomics there are definitional problems. Neoliberalism has a conventional political meaning denoting ideus ofa reduced state, privileging the private sector and the individual over the col- lective interest and inspiring the policies adopted by the Thatcher government in the UK and, at the international level, contained within the Washington Consensus, Some of the intellectual ‘underpinning: of both types of neoliberaliem may be similar but many of those who might be defined as neoliberal in the IR litersture would not hold with the political and economic programme of ncoliberalian,) Neoliberal scholarship sought, inthe min, to explain the patter of incentives under which cooperition was possible for self-interested actors, In some ways neoliberal represented a simplification because sates became the focus of analysis and other liberal preoccupations, for ‘example with a plurality of intemational actore and with transnational relations (Mansbach etal 1976), tended to be fargotten, It was often suid thatthe difference between neorealists and liber- als had been narrowed to such an extent that all that divided them war a disagreement over ‘whether the gaine of ate participants were relative or absolute ~ in line with the long-standing liberal credo (Lamy 2011: 123-3). Regimes and liberal institutionalism Ie is no exaggeration to say that the mainstream postin in the study of international environ rental cooperition is bberal instittionalisms. While shating many of the economic assump- sions discussed above, inssitutonalts understind that economic acavity and international cooperition necesunly occur within a famework of rules and understandings (Young 1989). ‘This had long been che province of intemational law and organiation but institutional theorists ti IR developed the new concept ofan international regime, initially inthe study ofthe reguls- tion of the international econoniy. Regimes were sen as insttuions in the sociological sense of the word. They were defined a sets of norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectitions and behaviour would converge in a given isue aea (uggie 1975; Kramer 1983; Young 1989). International aw and international oxganizations (often referred to as institutions in established usage) were only constituent pats of this broader con- cept which was designed to analyse the les formal understandings upon which cooperation was bil ee Chapters 8, 9 and 10). Is contrast to teabist analysis, regimes were seen to have an indepenaent inypact upon the calculations of governments, Ako, they provided a means whereby “cooperation under anarchy” was posible without the leadership ofa hegenvonse power. As so ofien in IR theorizing, chere was a real-world isue diving these concer: che presumed loss of US hegemony fllowing the ending of the dolar standard in 1971 and alam a the consequent unravelling of the global monetary order. Libetal analysts argued that cooperation and stability could be achieved “afer hegemony” (Keohane 1984), Regime analysis was rely aapted to the sudy of international environmental cooperation (ce Chapter 9}; commencing with the Long Range Transboundary Aie Polktion Convention 1979 and the Vienna Convention on stratosphere ozone depletion 1985 and sts renowned Montueal Protocol 1987 (ee Chapter 29), the production of global envizonmental agreements boomed. Arguably, even though the origins of liberal institutionalst scholatship on regimes lay elsewhere, many ofits major developments have been located within the envionmental feld (Faas etal. 1993). The approach has been socal scientific, searching for pater in the empi cal evidence from numerous cases of enviconmiental cooperation (Young and Zar 2006) and looking o explain variance and to specify independent and dependent variables. The dependent 35John Vogler variables have been: the setting up of environmental regimes, the extent of agreement and levels, of compliance and effectiveness ~ ultimately in the solution or amelioration of environmental problems (see Chapter 9) Ac the beginning of the study of environmental regimes the question most frequently posed was the same a that posed by the economists — under what eizcurstances can cooperation occur (Young 1997)? From the extensive study of cates there were various answers. Perceived mutual vulnerability and a continuing interes im arrangements that safeguarded rights to use the global ‘commons would provide one explanation. The “geometry” of agreements has been a significant theme with the proposition that small “clubs” of interested countries are likely to make most progres: (Victor 2011). The continuing success of the Antarctic Treaty regime with its selective membership and the way in which the Montreal Protocol rested upon agreement amongst 4 relatively small group of chemical manufacturing companies would lend weight to this proposi- tion, The work of Oran Young (1989 and 1994) has been preeminent in establishing the more precise dynamics of the “institutional bargutsing” that underlies regime creation when consen- ss is requited. Young pretent series of hypotheses on the conditions of acces, inchiding the absence of a specified zone of agreement and the presence of uncertainty. Other factors include the need to find solutions that are regarded at equitable as well as enforceable. Extemnal shocks increase the possibility of access and entceprencuril leadership isa necessary condition (Young 1994: 81-116). This question of effective leadership has been extensively pursued in the litera~ ture (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Warzel and Connolly 2011). Leadership that cans mobilize far-sighted international action is significant because, despite the construction of hundred: of | international environmental agreements over the putt decades, most of the indicators chow a continting degradation of the Earth's natural systems. The underlying problem that students of | international environmental cooperation have to addres is, not so mich the absence of interna ‘ional agreements, but their tendency to revert tothe lowest common denominator ~ as form lated in Underdil's (1980) "law ofthe least ambitious programme”. A recent joint paper by many Jeading scholars in the feld call for “a ‘constitutional moment in the history of world politics, akin to the major transformative shift in governance after 1945” (Biermann et a. 2012: 7) The 2012 Rio plus 20 Conference, to which this appeal was addressed, only served to illustrate the ‘nlikelihood of an immediate transformation, ‘Aside from the question of the determinants of regime formation, an important and problem-focased par of iberal scholarship investigates institutional design. This i alo the prow= nce of international lawyers and covers such issues a the circumstances under which “soft law” muy provide more effective solutions than a comprehensive binding agreement (see Chapter 10). ‘There is much discussion of the future of the climate change regime conducted along these lines. There are related studies of appropriate policy instruments, whether “command and cos tuo!” or “market based”, such as emissions trading, These can be a fine-grained as explanations of variations of approach within a particular regime (Webster 2009). Finally, there is significant body of work on the question of compliance with international agreements and their effective nes. This involves both discussions ofthe meaning and measurement of effectiveness as well as erailed casestudies of particular regimes (Haas etal, 1993; Vietor eta. 1998), In recent yeas the focus upon regimes has broadened outin 2 number of ways (se Chapter 9) ‘There has been a — pethaps ~ ambitious rebranding of institutional studies as “earth systery governance” ot “global environmental governance” (Biermann 2007), Sometimes in official dis- course this can mean litle more than a reconfiguration of existing international organizations. Witness the long-running debate on whether to mie the status of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 4 specialized agency or to create 4 UN environment council alongside the Security and Homan Rights Councils. However, in the academic world 36Mainstream theories notions of global governance denote a move away from the state-centtie focus of easier regime analysis and recognition of the need to consider diferent levele of appropriate environmental governance and to include transnational actors such as NGOs, which had alveays received sig- nificant attention in the IR. literature (Princen and Finger 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998), and to embrace the possiblity thatthe private sector could provide significant governance alongside or even instead of nation-states (Pattherg 2007). This marks a return to several key themes in biberaliam that tended to be crowded out by previous attempts at parsimonious explanation through the assumption of rationally calculating unitary state actors, There is clearly a normative dimension that, in line with classical Hberalism, distrust the state and the possiblity that it might be “greened” and secks more virtuous altemative forme of governance (Vogler 2005). A recent tendency to be found in liberal instivationaliet work reflect an understanding that institutions do not stand alone but interact or "interplay" with one another in ways that are significant for their evolution and effectiveness (Obertair and Gebring 2006). Oran Young has considered not only the fit between institutions but the st between insitutions and their physical setting (Young 2010) Variations on the rationalist theme: cognitivism and the English School Mirroring neoclassical economic theory, liberal institutionalist analysts tended not +o delve ‘within the state but rather to assume a set of fixed preferences. Recently behavioural economics bas questioned this lack of interes in preference formation, but in the study of international environmental politics this has been a long-standing critique, A distinct “cognitivist” approach to the understanding of regimes was evident from around 1990 and the publication of Has (1990) work on the Mediterranean pollution regime, Critical enquiry into the supposed linear relationship between authoritative science and policy formulation began to apen up the “black box” of national policy positions, pointing out the significance of shifing discourses (Litfin 1994). Cognitive approaches to regime formation betray the influence of “reflecivist” IK and the rising interest in social constructivism (Wend: 1999). In one respect this was a challenge to Libera institaionalise orthodoxy because ofits explicit rejection of the rational choice model of bbuman behaviour in fvour of alternative “logics of appropriateness”. Added to this is critique fof assumptions about objective natural “fact” for science too is seen to be socially constructed (Gee Chapter 17). Such postions must raise questions about the validity of existing bea schol- auhip but can ako be incorporated into institutionalisn, Regimes ate themselves social cos structs with a shifting ideational and consticutive chatacter. In some versions of constructive there iso necessary contradiction with the epistemology of social scientific enquity and there- fore with mainstream liberal institutionalism. Altematively, a constructivism that seeks under~ standing of nonnative evolution rather than strict explanation would seem to align both ontology and epistemology inthe study of regimes (Vogler 2003), The extent to which rational choice and reflectivist approaches are commensurable remains one of the most disputed questions jn contemporary IR. theory (Smith and Owens 2008). (Tis i sometimes referred to as the rationalist-reflectivse” debate. Rationalist isa shorthand for rational choice and does not refer to Wight’s rationalist category used here in this chapter) ‘The English School defines itself in terme of a rationalist approach to international society ‘Adherents have adopted approaches that are in some ways coincident with moze recent con- stractivist theorist in their concern for the constitution and re-constitution of the intivutions, such as sovereignty and diplomacy or, indeed, international society itself (note the distinctive definition of institutions: see Chapters 20 and 9). They early on rejected the epistemological stance of US “behavioural” International Relations scholanbip of the 1960s in favour of more 37John Vogler binorically based interpretative approach. English School concems with the deeper norms of a5 international society of states would certainly be relevant to global environmental polities but the attention of most ofits adherents wat elewhere upon the problems of war, international lorder and human rights, There ate indications that this neglect is now being remedied for, as Falkner (2012: 509) argues, “Tn contrast to both realism and neoliberal insttutionalism, the English School offer: a rich account of the institutional phenomena that define the dursble patterns of and historically bound character of international society. Revolutionism Alongside realism and sationaliem, Martin Wight identified a revolutionie tradition in interna tional thought. Some of those in this category, Mansist and socialist writers, dd have an explic~ sly revolutionary purpose, but others had les developed spiation: forthe transformation of the interstate ayer into 4 more congenial and pacific world systema in which both individwal and communities would live in a greater degsee of ficedom and harmony. The wnifjing strind that is present in all ofthis work i a rejection of the satus quo and with tthe kindof interna- sional order that reals accepted at inevitable and rationales cought to reform and ameliorate (Goe Chapter 4). Typically, soversign tates ae viewed a part ofthe problem rather than poten- Sal promoter: of more comopolitan and ecologically sustainable world (see Chapter 28). To «se Cox's (1981) terminology, problem-solving theory is the domain of reais and rationalism, while revolutionise ate “entcal theorist Dating most of the twentieth century the most important revolutionst theorists espoused some form of Marien, Marssttheorits shared a ditinctive historical materialist approach in which the sate, fr fom being the centre of analysis, performed asthe agent ofa ruling class — “the executive committee ofthe bourgeosic". International politics, and in particular the impe- Salt struggles thut characterized the contemporary epoch, were to be understood in terms of che deeper undeying contradictions ofthe eapitast mode of production. During the Cold ‘War much effort was devoted to the analysis ofinsperiasm and patterns of economic underde- velopment in the global system, As with other contemporary brands of IR theory, very litle attention was paid to the natueal enviconmient until the final yeats of the twentieth century when the relationship between capitalist accumlation, globalization and the degradation ofthe Earth's natural syxtems began to crystallize (See Chapter 22), Because Marxist analysis seoks explanation through the ways in which an ever-changing system of capital accumulation deter~ imines economic activity that is findamentlly responsible fOr excessive resource use, loss of habitats and rising levels of pollution, s provides a powerful account of the global ecological predicament Paterson 2001), In particular it directly challenges liberal market-based oxthodox- tes on solving global environmental problems and achieving justice for the dispossessed (see (Chapters 28 and 24). In tom of TR. theory, Marxist structural analsit denies that environme tal issues can he portrayed asa collective action problem between sates, Intemational regimes and schemes of global environmental governance are “epiphenomena!”. They may serve a rnumnber of finctions forthe global capitals system but they aze a reflection oft eathee than 3 scans fo ensuring that twill be less environmentally destructive. Thus, for example, the prob- Jem of chimate change canmot be dealt with through the elaboration of the UN climate regime bot rather through more findsmental aherations in the natute ofthe captait growth model that will provide incentives to de-carbonize the global economay (Newell and Paterson 2011) Scholatship i the Marxist tradition hs often adopted a neo-Gramscian postion. Gramaci ha been sa inspiration because his writings pay attention to the ways in which the matesal base and the socal syperaructaze combine in a “hegemonic” process to manufacture consent for 3 38Mainstream theories prevaling order even amongst those whote interns would “objectively” be opposed to it {Hurphreys 1996: Keng 2004: Levy and Newell 2005) There is substantial degre of over- lip here sit range of ether literate that relocates the ecological problem beyond the srue~ tutes ofthe exiting imerational sytem and examines the implications of incorporating green political thought (Lafersitce and Stott 1999; Saurin 1996: Eckersley 2004) Conclusion In the year following the 1992 Rio Eaith Summ, Steve Smith (1993) took sn outsider's view ofthe emerging field of international environmental politics, His conclusion ws that it remained atthe periphery” dominated by 3 ibera institutionslis orthodoxy and immune to the theo retical crose-currents so evident elsewhere in IR, In term of most of the academic research and writing since then, there is still some truth in his observation, The rationalist project ie stil ‘prominent and is clearly motivated to solve environmental problems through an improvement and extension ofintemational cooperstion. The ques is for cumulative, evidence-bazed scientific knowledge which has poliey relevance to the tasks of global environmental governance ‘A grest deal of empirical understanding of the bates and operstion of international environmen tal institutions hae been gamered, Such knowledge has been presented within the fesmework of the Intemational [Tuman Dimensions Programme of the International Social Science Council (Biermann et al. 2012), which forms a small part of a much larger web of international scientific research collaboration. This indicates where the mainstream of liberal insticutionaliem would wish to position tel Ik is alo the cate that some participants in this enterprite would not regard themselves a¢ being fully committed to positivistic social science (gee Chapter 5). Since the early 1990s the mainstream has expanded to accommodate forms of IR. theory that have a more cognitive and reflective character and which reject the rather rigid assumptions of state-centric ritional choice analysis. In this repect there has been a major change since Smith's (1998) review of the liters ture. Critical “sevolutionist” writing has remained a significant presence within the seudy of international political economy and amongst those who view the mainstream concern with international cooperation a¢ fundamentally misplaced. The reilist tradition, so important else ‘where in IR. theorizing, has bad lite to say about global environmental change. This state of| aire may be changing, not only on account ofthe links between degradation and armed con flict, bu also ata consequence ofthe close connections between climate change and a long-term staple of realist analysis: the politics of energy resources (jee Chapter 28). References Sand Agrawal. 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MIT Pree (2002) The Istintonal Dimension of Environmental Change: Fit, Intaplay ond Sale, Cabsidge, MAS MIT Press, 2010) Iruntuional Danis: Emergent Paton: in Tnteratonal Eneronmental Governance, C ‘MA: MIT Pres ‘Young, OLR. and Zurn, M. 2006) “The international regimes datbate: designing and using a sophii- ‘cited tool for intiewional analy", Globl Ensonmental Poi, (3): 121-1, bride, a4 Alternative theories Constructivism, Marxism and critical approaches Hayley Stevenson This chapter surveys a diverse set of theoretical approaches that scholars draw upon to study global environmental politics, Ata basic level, what unites these scholars is their disatisfaction with the treatment of this subject by traditional theories of intemational relations (IR) (see Chapter 3), As Hovden (1999) and others have observed, traditional I has approached environ mental problems with the satve set of interests, theoretical asumptions and methodological tools that chey bring to the study of any other problem in international polities, The possibility hat the specific nature of these problems may requite 4 rethinking of these approaches has been overlooked by mort within the field of global environmental politics, ‘This chapter provides a9 overview of efforts to understand global environmental politics by venturing off the beaten track, The source of these scholars’ disatisfction is meta-theoretical, concerning ontology and epistemology For tome, the ontological asumptions held by traditional IR. scholars are problematic and generate incomplete understandings about why environmental problems occur and how they can be overcome. “Ontology” isthe theory of being; it concems the nature of the world ~ its cexence, boundaries and const nits. Traditional IR. is based on a rationalist ontology. ry rational actors who benefit calculations to maximize their relative or absolute power, Power it understood in material and coercive sense of one actor's ability to get another actor to do something they otherwise would not. The approaches in this chapter rest on different ontologies, which re the presence and significance of actors other than states, the socially constructed identities and interests of these actors, other forms of power and domination, and forms of nnon-instrumental rationality. For some scholars diseuwed in thie chapter, the epistemological commitments of traditional IR are problematic and counterproductive to the aim of ameliorating environmental degrada tion. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge: it concer the potential for acquiring know!- cedge of the world, as well as the possible validity ofthis knowledge. Traditional IR ie informed by a positivist epistemology, which demands that scholars approach their study world as they would sal world; namely, with the aim of generating general lave by. identifying pattems of relationships across directly observable phenomena. These general laws then provide 2 basie for making predictions about the social world Blaikie 1993: 6-7). which assumer that states are ani sact on the bass of strict cost recog social 2Alternative theories ‘The approaches presented in this chapter tend to analyse the power of norms, domination, dis course and pattiarchy, which ate not only unobservable but ako contextual. Given that they do ‘not manifest uniformly actos all times and places, itis not posible to produce general laws and predictions. Yer, this does not undermine their signicance for our understanding of global environmental polities ‘Another sisuimption of positivism that is problematic forthe study of environmental polities isits aet-value separation, The positivist asimprion here is that scholars can and should aim for neutrality and objectivity by minimizing the potential for their own values to infiltrate and indla- fence analyses of howe the world setuslly is, Hoven (1999: 59) explains that thi separation is problematic because “by insisting on a separation of facts feom values, social scientific eng implicitly becomes supportive of the satus quo, because there is litle oF no room for social criticism in a positivist social scientific inquiry”. The theoretical approacher presented here all engage {if only implicitly) with one ofthese mets-theoretica critiques, while some depart from. traditional global environmental politics on both ontological and epistemological ground Constructivism Constructivism is essentially a social theory f intemational relations concerned with the under- lying ideas chat shape the behaviour of states and other actor. (This section draws om Stevenson 2012: ch. 3) We can best appreciate the distinctiveness ofthis approach by understanding its ontology, based principally on the mutual constitution of structure and agency. This means tht structures constrain and enable the behaviour of actor, but tht structares themselves ae repro- daced and tensformed through sctom’ behaviour. Structures are conceptualized and analysed in ideational terms of nom, culture and identity. The most important defining characteristic of these ideas is thei nteneubjectivty they are based on shared knowledge that rests on “collective intentionality” rather than individu belief (Ruggic 1998). Agency ie a property of actors that denotes their capacity to act spon sitwatons, and to fonmulate and implement decisions Interubjective meanings constitute structures, which in tara constitute agents “Tink, for example, ofthe Brith government: dhe physical presence of group of individ ale in Whitehall would be inconsequential in the absence of social ict auch a the “sovereign state", “national citizens", “voting” and others that constitute there individuals a a single actor. Acton interests and identities therefore cannot exist prior to their interaction with stucture: they ae endogenous to this proces. Understanding interests and identities therefore requires attention to the social context in which they reformed and transformed. It is ako imporent to note that intensubjective meanings are not univers, but rather specific to certain spatial, tee poral and socal contexts neither are they static but rather open to transformation, One ofthe bain concems of constructivist scholar isto undewtand and explain processes of change in international relations, including changes within the normative structure of global governance and changes within paticular tates’ eesponses to these norms Nom ate rypicaly defined, following Katzenstein (199%: 5), as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity’. There is some agreement among both rationalists and constructivist on the existence of norms; where they depate isin thet explana- tions for compliance with noms. ‘The distinction is captured by March and Okon's (1998) logics of action. Rationalss exphin norm conformance as diven by the “logic of conse- quences” whereby actors engaged in bargaining are understood to calculate the likely conse- quences of alternative ations and select that which bes sezves their exogenously given interests (1998: 949), Constructivists, by contest, invoke the “logic of sppropeatenes to explain norm conformance: “(human actors ae imagined to fllow rules that asocite particular identities to aHayley Stevenson particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situa tions” (1998: 951) ‘A number of scholars have analysed global environmental politics in terms of norms that over states’ actions (ce Chapter 9). Bernstein (2001) uses a constructivist lens to analyse the evolution of international environmental governance during the three decades following the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Specially, Bernstein sought to understand why a nonm-complex of “liberal environmentalism” prevailed over altemative interpretations that atributed environmental degradation to unregulated indus alization and exponential economic growth (sce Chapter 22): “Liberal environmentalism accepts the liberalization of trade and finance a consistent with, and even necessary for, inter ‘ional environmental protection. It to promotes market and other economic mechanisms over ‘command-and-conteol’ methods... the preferred method of environmental manage sent” (Bernstein 2001: 7). Bernstein offers “socio-evolutionsry” explanation for this normative development suggesting that nom selection isa product of “sol ftnes", of the fit Between new norms and the existing socal stuctare (2001: 20-1). ‘Others have examined contestation over the meaning of specific norms defining responsibil ity and appropriate response measures to climate change (Beeil 2000; Cass 2006; Eckersley 2007; Hares 2000; Hoffmann 2005; Pereenger 2007; Stevenson 2012). The norm of “common bu diferensiated responsibilities” has received the most atention. ‘his norm is based on che assumptions that sates are responsible for che protection of the global environment and ehat all should participate in is governance, but industrialized countries bear primary responsbility on the basis of their hisorical contribution to pollution and/or their greater capacity to bear the costs incurred, This nomn had earlier been insttutionalized in the Conventions on the Law of the Sea (ee Chapter 35), the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol (see Chapter 29) and the Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (Rajamani 2000; see Chapter 33). Nevertheles, is precise prescriptions for allocating responsibilty are open to interpretation and have been contested hcoughout the past ewo decades, The fact that negotiators axe consteained and enabled by this normative understanding arguably only makes sense wathin a constructivist ffamework rather than a rationalist one ip which states are asunyed to act only on the bass of value-free calcula tions of costs and benefits While much constructivist work is state-centic, there ate no theoretical restietions on extending the analysis to other actors in che international system. After all, constructivism is not 4 substantive theory of international relations (as in, say, realism or liberalism) but instead a meta- theory, Susan Park (2010) has adopted a constructivist framework to analyse processes of social ization within the World Bank Group. Rather than focus exclusively on states, Park examines the ideational power of transnational environmental advocacy networks and their efforts (0 bring the World Bank Group's policies into line with environmentalist norms. Park analysed this proces of change as one of sodalizaion, namely: a process wheseby agents internalise norms that consitte the socal structure in which they exs...[this isnot a linear process but one of continuous interaction between agents and structures...[that] can lead to fundamental shifts in an organisation's identity” (Park 2010: 8), Bpistemologicaly, constructivism rejects positivist asumptions. From a constructivist per= spective, our understanding of the social world will always be incomplete and potentially err0- cous if itis informed only by phenomena that are directly observable. Moreover, genera laws are only plausible in closed systems characterized by stability and consistency. The social world fs not such a system, Constructivism is instead compatible with an interpretivis epistemology, 4Alternative theories which secks to interpret the contextual “webs of meaning” that constitute the social world (Neufeld 1993) by “uncover(ing) the belief or meanings chat make actions and practices possible” (Bevie 2006: 283), However, constructivist scholar do not necessily challenge the fct-value separation that is central to positivism, Constructivism itself does not ental aay nor ‘mative commitments concerning how the world should be constructed Constructivist scholars who wish to extique consteuctions of the world must import norma tive commitments om political theory. Stevenson (2012) employs a “green constr Gamework to analyse interactions between state actors andl underlying social structures, a well 2s socially constructed interests and forms of rationality. The integration of green politcal theory provides 3 foundation for critiquing existing global climate governance in term of is institu tionalization of ecological irrationality, Others, though, ate not dicectly concerned with eri- tique; Bemstein, for instance, states that his purpose is to “uncover how and why liberal cavironmentalism became insitutionalized...rather than simply offering a critique of the out come” (Bernstein 2001: 7), Marxism Peter Newell (2011: 4) recently observed that capitalism is the “elephant in the room” among global environmental polities scholars, Although capitaliem is deeply implicated in global envi ronmental change, and defines the parameters of permissible responses to such change, scholars generally maintain a polite ilence about thie system, Newell sages that this silence emerges fom a pervasive reluctance to align oneself in opposition to a deeply established and seemingly immutable economic system. This may arise from a desire to pursue policy relevance or to avoid ‘usociating oneself with the filed socialist projects of the twentieth century. The former posi- tion has some merit, «o long asthe entire academy doce not opt for thie route; yet the Later i as ilogical ar rejecting democracy on the basis of the performance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As Pepper (1993: 59) argues, “[ylou cannot judge Marxism, socialism, of any other world view solely by the actions of those who profess them”, as their practices are frequently the antithesis ofthe philosophy. “Yet, not all scholars have shunned capitalim in their analyses of global environmental poli- tics, This section reveals a small literature inspired in different ways by Marts theory and cri- tique of capitalism, Marxism is a broad tradition encompasting a range of philosophical and politcal postions. Central to this tradition is the idea that humans’ experience is fundamentally shaped by the social organization of material production. This mode of organization is undes~ stood not as ahistorical and immutable. Instead, any specific mode of organization is produced, reproduced, altered or tansformed by actors assuming social identities and performing inherited structural roles. This process is captured by the term “historical materialism” (Rupert 2007 35-6), Marxism has eaditionaly critiqued capitalism as a social arangement for material pro duction. For some, this entails developing an alternative theoretical mode of organizing material production, generally some version of socialism. In the context of global environmental politics, this ertique manifests as analyses of capitalism's contribution to environmental degradation and as analyses of cosporations’ indluence on international envionmental policy. Here, T outline these two streams in turn (See Chapters 13 and 22) Te has frequently been observed that Karl Marx and his intellectual collaborator, Friedrich Engel, either had lite co say about nature or viewed it in purely instrumental txts (eg. Lipschatz 2004: 78). Several contemporary Marxist scholars have sought to refate the former (Gee Parsons 1977) and rectify the elements of truth found in the later (Foster etal. 2010; Kovel 2007; O'Connor 1988; Pepper 1993). Kovel (2007: 9-10) argues: “filince Marx emerged a 45Hayley Stevenson century before the ecological crisis matured, we would expect it received form to be both incomplete and fawed when grappling with a society, such as outs, in advanced ecosystemic decay” Despite the reductionism of historical materialism, Marx and Engels understood ecology as complex interacting proces and objects that could not be understood in isolation Gom one another (see Merchant 2008: 44), Navural objects were understood to constitute a part of human existence and consciousness, ultimately providing the material conditions for producing subsis- tence. Yet, the capacity for buans to master and deliberately destroy the envizonment through Inbour was aso recognized: “Let us not... latter ourselves overmuch on 2ceount of our human conquests over nature”, warned Engels, “For each sch conguest takes sts revenge on (quoted in Merchant 2008: 56). Criticism was particularly directed at capitalists for their free appropriation of natural esources, which broke the unity between man (i) and nature (Merchant 2008: 52-1) Certainly the most sophisticated account of capitalism's impact on environmental degrada- sion that Mans developed was that conceming the sol crisis. Central to this critique wae Marx's ‘concept of “social metabolism”. Metabolism itself refer to “the complex biochemical process of ‘exchange, through which an organism...draws upon materials and energy from its environment and converts these..into the building blocks of growth” (Foster et al. 2010: 402). Soil metabo- lism, then, captures “the complex, dynamic interchange [of matter and energy] between human beings and nature” (Foster 2000: 158). Marx observed that capital generated an unavoidable “metabolic ft” in coil nutrients by rupturing the "metabolic interaction” between humans and the earth (Foster ot al. 2010: 77), During earlier times when production and consumption, ‘occurred within close proximity, crops and astural wastage were retumed to the land a fertilizer, thus sustaining ts nutrient base and productive capacity. The accumulative imperative of capital- jem wat ‘eon to concentrate land ownership, depoptlate rural area, increase the density of urban living, and ultimately create an urban-rural divide that saw soil nutrients accumlate as urban waste Foster al. 2010: 77). Contemporary scholars have extended Marx's theory of the “metabolic ri” to analyse the modern global economy, which ie fir more ecologically damaging than anything witnessed in the nineteenth century (e.g., Poster et al. 2010; Moore 2000; Weis 2010; see Chapter 22). Foster et al. (2010) observe that the “metabolic rif has been globalized through colonialian, imperialism and market forces that ll aim to maximize capital accumulation of the cote states at the expense of environmental degradation in the periphery. “Riis” have been spread throug) fout the system ffom the application of “technological fixes”, including the intensive use of autificial nitrogen ferilizer to compensate for the loss of organic soil nutrients. Foster and col- leagues note that the resulting airborne nitrogen compounds conteibute to global warming, ‘he soil run-off increases the concentration of nutrients in waterways causing eutrophication, and marine “dead zones” (2010: 81-2). Effectively responding to this situation requites, they argue, a complete rejection of capitalism, which is inherently anti-ecologieal. Within the spe~ cific realm of agricultuee, industrial-scale production ought to be teplaced with Marx's proposal for “asociery of associated producers... [who] can regulate their exchange with nature in accor dance with natural limits and laws, while retaining the regenerative properties of natural pro cesses and cycles” (2010: 86). More generally, however, the ecological criss can only be resolved through 2 “revolution in the constitution of human society itself. aimed at the creation ofa just, and sustainable society” (2010; 38, 436), Fellow Marxist, Tony Weis, similsely argues that “the chtonic biophysical contradictions of ‘industrial capitalist agriculture are accelerating” and leading to food price volatility and “ruinous outcomes", These contradictions are generated by the organizing logic of capitalism, which 46Alternative theories prescribes ever grester efficiency for accusation, Yet ths logic will eventually be destabilized by the system's own externalized costs: sil erosion and salinization, depletion of water supplies, biodiversity low and greenhouse gas emissions, as well a an “intractable dependence” on fiite fossilized biomass (Weis 2010: 316-17). Yet Weis sees in this instability the potential for rebuild ing biodiverse food systems and remaking and valorizing agricultural work” (2010: 315). The second strand of capitalis-centred critique ir more explicitly inspired by twentieth century politcal theorist Antonio Gramci’s historical materialism. While Gramsci shared many of Marc's assumptions about capitalist processes and relations, he maintained a stronger notion of agency: social transformation would not necessarily emerge ftom phases of economic devel- lopment, but rather could be brought about by “historically situated social agents whose actions are enabled by ther social selE-understandings” (Rupert 2007: 40). The main concept informing Gramsci’: work was “hegemony”, referring to "the persistence of specific social and economic structures that systematically advantage certain groups” (Levy and Newell 2002: 86). Two dif. ferent understanding: of power emerge from this concept: ideological and strategic. Fist, power is ideological because the structures that privilege a social group owe their stability to being taken for granted as "common sense”. But this also creates an opening for civil society to act strategically and engage capitalists in a “war of position” that expose: the tensions and contradic tions of hegemonie projects, thereby de-reifying these and presenting an alternative social order (Rupert 2007: 40; Levy and Newell 2002) ‘The most indluential contributions to global environmental politics from the neo-Gramscian camp emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s (Paterson 1996, 2000; Newell and Paterson 1998; Levy and Newell 2002, 2005; Levy and Egan 2003). Early on, Paterson (1996) argued that che international politics of global warming were best explained using a historical materialist frame work comprising three elements, First, recognition of the structural power of capita, which emerges from what Marxists see as a primary function of states: ensuring capital accumulation ‘This empowers capitalists because they have the capacity to withhold or shift snvestment, and to construct “hegemonic ideas concerning the conditions for economic growth” (Paterson, 1996, 158). ‘The second clement is Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony”, which “denotes the ‘ideological struggles which occur over the projects of the dominant cass designed to secure the basic conditions for accumulation, The process of securing those conditions requires that capital engages in continual ideological struggles to create a capacity to keep capitalist societies together (Paterson 1996: 158). The final element ditects attention to inequalities generated (and exploited) by processes of capital accumulation, Paterson argues that the numerous North-South conflicts ‘m international climate negotiations ate the product of “structural inequality i the political economy” (1996: 171-2) Newell and Paterion draw on 4 “neo-Gramscian” flamework to generate further insights about climate negotiations. This overcomes two central fillacies informing regime analyses: firs, the assumption that states can be treated as unitary rational actor”, and second, that “states and markets ate two separate spheres of human setvity” (Newell and Paterson 1998; 679-80). Their famework directs atention to the politcal-economic dynamics that shape states’ postions in climate negotiations, By recogniting that states are positioned within capitalist societies, in which accumulation is driven by fossil fuels, Newell and Paterson are able to appreciate the influence of fossil fuel lobbies; yet, their power is not absolute because capita itself is not a “homogenous bloc”, Newell and Paterson observe how the insurance industry wat able to challenge the power of the fossil fuel lobbies by establishing “tactical alliances” with environmentaliss to advance other interests (1998: 680-1). This potential was limited, however, because the interests of the fol fuel lobbies also provide most "actions of capital” with the basic conditions for accumula tion because oil and coal ae so central to the global economy (1998: 692-3) v7Hayley Stevenson Levy and Newell (2002, 2005) employ 4 neo-Gramscian famework to analyse corporate politcal stategies more broudly in international environmental governance, ‘These strategies Include “technological innovation, partnerships with NGOs, and the development of private standards” (Levy and Newell 2002: 86), A number of contsibators to Levy and Newell's 2008) edited volume analyse the “war of position” in contexts including biotechnology, water, oxic ‘waste trie and climate change. These stadies undermine assumptions of determinisi in global environmental politics and expose the strategies that dominant and marginalized social groups adopt to conzolidate or weaken dominant structures Critical Theory: from the Frankfurt School to Habermas Critical Theory has had a small but important impact on the feld of global environmental politics. This tradition took shape in the mid-twentieth centary through the work of social theorists at Frankfur’s Institute for Social Research, hence the common reference to this tradi tion asthe Frankfurt School. The tradition is typically divided into two “generations”: the first generation of Theodor Adomo, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, and the second gen- eration led by firgen Habermas (Biro 2011), While confronted with the significantly dimin- ished potential of overthrowing the clas «ystem, the Frankfurt School theorists maintained Mare’ commitment to a critique of domination, Their interpretation of domination has clear ‘Minities with the concems of green politcal theories, and herein lies the (only partially realized) potential contribution to global environmental politics. Andrew Biro (2011: 10), together with ‘William Leise (2011) and others argue that the Frankfurt School, and expecially the concept of | domination of mature, can help us understand contemporary environmental crises and pars doxes, Adorno and Horkheimer criticized instrumental reon (or rationality) that was penetra ing all areas oflife and dominating humans and the non-human world alike. Reaton, Horkheimer claimed, isa disease “born ffom man’s urge to dominate nature” (Horkheimer 1947, quoted in Leise 2011: 23) From an instrumental perspective, nature has no intrinsic value; itis merely “a stockpile of resources” to be mastered for human ends (Biro 2011: 14). Yet in our attempts at mastering nature “human beings distance themselves from nature” in such a way that ultimately rebounds in the domination of other humans. Less explains: the enlarged social apparatus that i required to refine, enlarge, and administer control over nature takes ite revenge, for “the power of the system over Inuman beings increases with ‘every step they take away fom the power of nature”. Enlarged, collective domination over nature is matched at every stage by a comparably heightened domination by some people over others. (Leiss 2011: 24, quoting Adomo and Horkheinser) ‘The contemporary significance ofthis has been noted in pare by Sausin (1994), who argues that key elements of modernity including, “distanciaton”, “technical~ationalism and bureaucracy’ and the displacement of various local episteme and tedhne has led to “large-scale and systematic degradation” of ecosystems (1994: 46-9). ‘This i illustrated, again, with the case of agriculture whereby subsistence social relations have been subordinated to “an agricultural episteme whieh 4s based on monocultures and mass production” Dobson notes that the Critical Theorists critique of instrumental reason resonates with (and provides sophistication to) the environmentalist asuimption that the relationship between humans and the non-human world is “troubled” because we treat this a8 a means fo our own 48Alternative theories ends (Dobson 1993: 194), Catical Theorists reject the idea that huang can re-captare “a roms tic pre-Enlightenment human-nature relationship” and, on the whole, are fairly pessimistic about the prospects for progressive social change (Dobson 1993: 194). Nevertheless, the posibil- fay remains of “domesticating” instrumental reason and supplementing it with substantive rea- soning, Substantive rewoning entals value-infased deliberation about the goals pursued by society, not merely a value-feee assesment ofthe means to stain pre-given goals, For Horkacimer, such reasoning was only possible once certain material conditions bave been felled for human, communities. Yet, environmental degradation has accelerated in step with material development since he was writingin the 1940s, Hence, the precise conditions under which substantive resson- ing can occur remains an open question ‘One response to this question has come feom a second generation of Critical Theorists led by Habermas. Eckersley (1990) expressed scepticism about the value of Habermas for the green movement, expecially deep ecologists. The key point of contention was Habermas revision of the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason, Habermas's concept of the “scientization of politce” rejected the technocratic capture of social problems, which he saw as a source of domination of the citizenry by experts and bureaucrats, Ukimately, for Habermas, sence and technology become ideology when directed towards social and political objects because they serve “merely in the end to conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and prescient decisions” (Habermas 1971, quoted in Outhwaite 2009: 20). Yet, unlike the Frankfurt School, Habermas made a clear distinetion between inter-buman relations and humans’ relations with nature, He argued that the only way humans can know and relate to the non-human world is inetrumentaly through labour and technology. To do otherwise is to jeopardize the survival of the human species (Eckersley 1990: 743, 753). Hlamane’ relations with each other, however, should be governed by “communicative rationality” whereby probleme are addressed by seck- ing a reaoned consensus. Rationality is thus directed to subjecting social norms and goals ‘open and participatory critique rather than efficiently pursuing pre-given goal: ‘The arguments presented in such a process ought ta be generilizable beyond particular inter- ests and have the potential to be accepted by diferently positioned individuals. Such a process say advance human emancipation, but Eckersley pointed out that che process fuls to diminish the domination of the non-human world because "s norm is considered ‘right if it is achieved via a consensus of truthful, uncoctced and rational agents, Tt follows that ifa ‘speech comm nity’ agrees, after fice and tational discussion, to direct technology in such a way a to continue to manipulate and subjugate ‘external nature,’ then Critical Theary can raise no objection” (Cekersley 1990: 757), Nevertheless, numerous scholats have tumed to Habermas, and specially che theory and practice of “deliberative democracy”, to advance ecological concems. Perhaps the most well- Known and comprehensive work in chs area is that of Dryzck (e.g., 1987, 1994, 2006). For Dayzek, the green potential of communicative rationality requires accepting an “anthropoce: ti life-support approach” as a minimum bass for deliberation (1987: 38), Ifa human beings shave an interest in sustaining the “productive, protective, and waste-assiilative value of ¢co- systems”, then this Becomes “the generalizable interest par exallowe” (Dryzek 1987: 34, 204). There is thus stcong potential for rationally legitimated social norms to be “ecologically rat nal”. Baber and Burlet also emphasize the importance of broadening knowledge production, and decision-making beyond scientists and technocratic elites. Those opposed to an enviros ment-related proposal wll not be swayed by the avalabikty of more information “but, rather, public involvement in the production of information through a process of discursive will: formation” (Baber and Bartlet 2008: 97). Moreover. they observe, itis impossible “to protect the environment from human degradation in the abtence of s human commitment to do $0”; this 9Hayley Stevenson commitment will only come about through decentralized and democratic public dicourse (2005: 98), ‘This is a position shared by others including Robert Brulle (2002) and Douglas Torgerson (1999), For Brule, the aims of human and ecological emancipation will only be realized if strong public sphere i developed where “ecological polities would take place and meaningfl disagreements and debates about our society and the actions necessary to foster ecological ‘ainability would be carried out” (Brulle 2002: 16). The importance of globalizing deliberation to account for the global nature of many contemporay environmental problems i an ise that some global environmental politce scholars have recently taken up. Dingwerth (2007), for ceximple, has amlysed the quality of deliberation in transnational environmental networks and found tride-off between deliberative quality and other democratic qualities including account ability, transparency and inclusiveness, Dryzek and Stevenson (2011), meanwhile, have analysed global climate governance in deliberative systems terms and proposed a number of ways in which democracy (understood as deliberative capacity building) can be enhanced at this seale (gee Chapter 26). They have stressed, for example, the importance of avoiding deliberative enclaves and fostering deliberation across climate discourses (Stevenson and Dryzek 20123). and enhancing deliberation and legitimacy in mululateral negotiations through a formula of ‘minilateralinn plus discursive representation” (Stevenson and Dryzck 2012) Foucauldian approaches Michel Foucault, a twentioth-century French social theorist, has inspired some scholars of global environmental politics dissatisfied with the offerings of traditional IR. theory. Foucauldian- oriented studies start ffom the assumption that the material world, including “nature”, is mean inglees until s is interpreted and assigned meaning by humans, There is no deterministic relationship between the material and the meaning: to assign meaning is an act of power, Foucauldians refer to this at "productive power”. This power lies in the capacity to define how Jumane act upon the material world. The power to assign meaning ie alto the power to margin alize, sappress or delegitimize other potential interpretations. In the field of global environmen tal politics, Foucauldian-inepired scholars have pursued two main task: first, discourse analysis has been employed ta uncover potential meanings about the environment, and the processes by which one single interpretation has been imposed and institutionalized; and, second, govern sientality analyses have been carried out to expose the dominating effect of this productive power on people's ives ‘One of the earliest contributions was Hajers analysis of environmental policy-making in the ‘United Kingdom and Netherlands. Hajer argued that “policy-making involves muuch more than, srerely dreaming up clever ways of creating solutions. It requires first ofall the redefinition of a given social phenomenon in such a way that one canals find solutions for them” (Fler 1995: 2. He thus traces hovr easier debates about the radical restructuring demanded by environmental crises were delegitimized asa new manageable way of understanding environmental degradation «emerged in the ate 1970s. This discourse of “ecological modernisation’ established dominance with the idea that “pollution prevention pays”: environmental estes do not discredit capitalist development but instead present opportunities for business to innovate and develop new mat kets, Unlike, say, "limits to growth”, ecological modernization is compatible with existing pol teal and economic institutional arrangements, This congruence goes a long way towards cexplining its dominance asa policy discourse, atleast within Europe. Bur discourses do not exablish dominance on the basis of rational policy-makers selecting the most convenient farming of any given problem. Litin analysed how scientific knowledge 50Alternative theories rluenced inteznational negotiations about the problem of ozone depletion and pointed tothe importance of “knowledge brokers” (see Chapter 17), These are individuals who “fame and interpret scientific knowledge” and thereby exercise significant political (and productive) power, especially under conditions of scientific uncertainty (Litfin 1994: 4). In Lit6in’s analysis, che deployment of “rhetorical devices”, such asthe metaphors of “ozone layer" and “ozone hole” helped to establish acceptance fora risk-based discourse that promoted precautionary action (0 phase out ozone-depleting substances. More recenily, Epstein has contributed to Foucauldian environmental polities with an investigation into whaling and the power dynamics that enabled an anti-whaling discourse (0 supersede an earlier discouuse that promoted whaling for economic, military and politieal ends Epstein 2008; see Chagter 36). For Epstein, the study of discourse entails denaturalizing “what we assume to be right”, thus she does not explicitly treat the anti-whaling discourse as “che twuth" that prevailed over a historical “wrong” Instead, she is concerned to reveal how envie ronmental “reffamed perceptions and understanding by producing a new discourse on whales and whaling” that, in tom, reartculated state identities from whaling states to anticwhalng states (Epstein 2008: 13, 94-5). The rupture in states treatment of whales, Epstein argues, cannot be understood through a regime theoretical lens that focuses on narrow cost-benefit calculations because most states did not respond to the issue in ways that only reflected their material inte cats, Instead, they were “socialised” into the anti-whaling regime in ways tha actually redefined their interests and identities. Several scholars have drawn on Foucault's concept of "governmentality”to advance altema- tive understandings of global environmental governance (e.g, Death 2010: Epstein 2008; Luke 2011; Methmann 2012; Oels 2005; Paterson and Stipple 2010). This approach has been called analytics of government” (Dean 2010: 16). Foucault understood the term “government” to rear “conduct ofconduct” whereby’ isthe calculated process of leading, directing or guiding the behaviour and actions of others oF of oneself (Death 2010: 18). Goveramentaty concerns the rationalities of government, oF ‘how we think about governing” (Death 2010: 24). Death draws on this Foucauldian concept to analyse the “rationality of government” built into “sustainable development”; this involves ‘approaching, sustsinable development as an assemblage of practices of government which pr duce their own particular ways of seeing, knowing, acting and being” (Death 2010: 2). This approach allows him to focus on how “the scope, forms and identities of governmental action” ‘were deterined in part through “contests between competing rationales of government” at the Johannesburg Summit (Death 2010: 5, 9). ‘The prevailing rationality was an “advanced liberal rationality of government which relied upon the voluntary and responsible conduct of self selecting parters operating at distance fiom traditional centzes of power” (Death 2010: 9}. ‘his builds on easier work by Oels who argued that “climate change has been captured by advanced iberal government, which articulates climate change aan economic sue that requires rmatket based solutions to fieilitate cost-effective technological solutions” (Oels 2005: 185). Oek identified this rationality as weak ecological modernieation. By instiutionalizng tis discouse, climate change has been “rendered governable” by the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Oels 2005: 199; tee Chapter 28). “conduct” ieunderstood as averb anda noun. Government Feminism There is no single feminist voice in global envigonmental politics. What differene feminist per spectives share is their atention to gender inequalities and the power structures that reinforce them, Some fensinist scholars ate concerned about che presence and absence of women in global 31Hayley Stevenson environmental governance, while others are more concemed about the gendered assumptions ‘embedded in sich governance, ss well a the implications of governance for gendered relations Global environmental governance, it seems, has proven resistant to concems about both women and gender. Back in 1998, Bretherton observed that “attempts to ‘put gender on the agenda’ of ¢lobal environmental politics have reslted in, not the incorporation of gender, but the addition, of women” (Bretherton 1998: 85). She explains that “(glender analysis is not concerned per se with the incorporation of women in environmental decision-making and policy, but with..the broadly accepted, and expected, pattem of relations between men and women” Bringing women into policy-making i insulficient because “masculine values" are privileged over "fern- inine values" in most contexts; rectiffing the sex imbalance docs not rectify the enduring patri- archy (Bretherton 1998: 90). The importance of this is underlined by Bretherton’s argument that patriarchy is deeply implicated in environmental degradation. Specifically, she argues that the contemporary dominant form of “capitalist patriarchy” is baed on “overlapping norms and principle: of neoliberilism and Anglo-Americin hegemonic masculinity” that effectively “authorize conduct directly opposed to that demanded by an ethic of care forthe environment” (Brotherton 2003: 103-4) Similar sentiments have been exprested more recently by MacGregor who argues that envi- ronmentalizm has heen masclnized a “[majen dominate the issue a all levels, a scientific and economic experts, entrepreneurs, policy makers and spokespeople” (MacGregor 2009: 128). Feminist scholars of global environmental politics do not accept that sich observations are irrel- evant and unproblematic; instead, they are concemed with exposing underlying gendered nequalites. MacGregor explains the muasculinization of climate change at an effect of the dom- nant scientific and security framings of the issue, each of which “work() to inv and their concems” (MacGregor 2009: 128), Shiva goes as fr as claiming that science is based fon a “patriarchal mode of knowing (that) is necessarily violent to nature and women” (Shiva 1989: 23x). Boyd's (2009) analysis of the Clean Development Mechanism reveals how “the patriarchal underpinnings of the sustainable development and climate-change policy agendas" have undermined the potential of mitigation projects, Her study of dhe Noel Kempf project in Bolivia found that “practical gender needs” were successfully incorporated, namely, “immediate nnevesites that women perceive themselves as lacking ina specitic context, which would enable them to perform the activities expected of chem for example, 2 health post, vegetable gardens, ‘ors water pump”, However, “strategic gender needs” were neglected; this refers to “that which, ‘is necessity for women to change their status in society...» access to and ownership of land o ‘other property, control over one’s body, equal wages, or freedom from domestic violence” (Boyd 2009: 102). Notwithstanding these important insights, MacGregor claims that feminist research into the gender dimensions of climate change remains limited, She identifies a number of priorities for gender research, including the social construction of the problem to examine “the ways in Which gendered environmental discourses frame and shape dominant understandings of the issue” the impacts of climate change on men's and women’s everyday lives; "gender differences in perception of climate change-related risks"; and gendered responses to the problem of climate change (MacGregor 2009: 127-33; see Chapter 28) Conclusion For decades, the environment was treated by scholars of international polities as an issue of ite for no relevance, This tend begin to shift in the 1990s asthe environment was increasingly recognized as a problem of intemational political concem and at 3 focus for global governance. 52Alternative theories Nevertheless, since that time the study of global environmental politics has been dominated by rationalist approaches, in particular by neoliberal institutionalist (regime) theory (see Chapter 9) ‘This approach can undoubtedly generate important insights about institutional dynamics and inter-state cooperation over common pools and common sinks. However, this chapter has sought to uncover the fertile theoretial terrain that les beyond this traditional theoretical fore~ ground. For those who are atracted to the field of global environmental politics by a genuine concern forthe social and ecological consequences of global environmental change, these alter native theories provide 4 valuable set of lenses, By surrendering 4 commitment to pos social science, these spproaches provide foundations for critiquing global environmental gover nance by exposing its blind spots and moral shortcomings. These approaches also allow scholars to ty to understand the world rather than taking it as the starting point of analysis. This points to Cox's well-known distinction between problem-solving theory and critical theory (Cox 1981). According to Cox, problem-solving theory takes the world ai finds it, withthe prevailing social and power relationships and the insti- tutions into which they are organised, asthe given framework for action. The general aim. is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly...Critical theory...doce not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very smework for action..which problem-solving theory accepts at ite parameters. (Cox 1981: 128-9) ‘Thus the field of global environmental politics would be best served by a diversity of scholarship that i informed not only by traditional, problem-solving IR theory, but also by the critical theoties examined in this chapter. References Adorno, T.W, and Harkdicimes, M, (1944/1997) Disltic f Enlightenment, London: Vero Baber, W.F, and Bartlet, R. V, (2005) Delete Enstonmentl Politi: Demorrcy and Bilogicl Ratinality, (Carbide, MA: MIT Pres. Bernstein, S. 2001) The Compromise of Liesl Emnonmentaim, New York: Colombia University Press. ‘Beuill, MM. 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