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To be one with all that lives! With these words virtue removes its
wrathful armor, the spirit of man lays its scepter aside and all
thoughts vanish before the image of the world’s eternal unity, just as
the rules of the struggling artist vanish before his Urania. —Hölderlin
Thus Hyperion writes to Bellarmin, lamenting both his exile and his schooling, the
pursuit of knowledge having left him a stranger before nature. “Oh, man is . . . a
beggar when he thinks.” When Bellarmin asks his friend to recall his youth, Hyper-
ion replies, “When I was still a serene child, and knew nothing of all that surrounds
us, was I not then more than I am, after all . . . the reflection and struggle?” But as
much as Hyperior’s words and Grecian hermitage capture a theoretical longing for
an ancient and natural order of things, Hölderlin’s protagonist is never so far at re-
move from the trappings of human life among others, open to contestation within
various registers of intimacy, as itself an engine of thought. His is a love affair, not
with solitude but with underlying agreements. A string of passionate encounters
ensues, what Paul de Man calls “a series of initiations”; first as a student, then a
friend, and later a lover. In the first instance, he meets the knowledge of his day and
rapidly rises above it. In a second, with Alabanda but also Bellarmin, we find the
force of friendship: “it is the specific mood of innocent man to be a ‘friend’ of na-
ture . . . in a powerfully spontaneous way. In a friendship between men this feeling
prevails in its purest form. Friendship is unity, and beyond that, it is conversation
(Gespräch) within the sphere of unity, the worldly equivalence of the conversation
between the gods and the child that was at the beginning of things” (de Man 1956:
32–33). In love, he writes, we reach the experience of this unity.
In the figure of Hyperion’s initiations, we encounter an imagination of what
it means to live and to think together, across multiple registers. It is a descrip-
tion at once familiar to the anthropologist, of thought grounded in conviviality,
in life lived with others with whom we share an intimacy that allows our forms
of thought, the very conditions of our experience of the world, to be challenged.
Life with those who offer not only competing answers to our questions but also
competing questions.1 If, as Claude Lévi-Strauss suggested, anthropology consists
in the pursuit of a posteriori logics, I understand ethnography to be the sensibility
through which we arrive at their shore, in the ways we live with others, in human
bodies, in spirits, or in their words. Dialectically we produce knowledge, gather
up of descriptions of states of affairs, kinship terms, modes of production and
consumption, superstitions, rituals—concepts are produced and contested. But by
means of this knowledge, our world and the logics that order it are transformed;
we arrive we hope, he says, at some measure of wisdom. It strikes at the very heart
of the transformations in Lévi-Strauss’ own thinking, as he lived among the struc-
tures of Murngin kinship and Kariera totems, with Bororo myths and Swaihwe
masks. We encounter others, as Heidegger taught us, not only in their immediate
presence to us but also in our involvement in a world we share, in which we live
with, com vivere, the products of their collective (un)consciousness, their words,
or their art. Life after all is not lived in the company of embodied humans alone
but also among texts.
We risk ourselves in engaging, moreover, not only new ideas but also new forms
of thought. Lévi-Strauss calls this the condition of the anthropologist (see also
Brandel 2015) a vocational narrative often chided as heroic but that, upon deeper
inspection, reflects the fragility of the ethnographer who stands to learn from the
world and not just about it, and who, in so doing, has sacrificed not only the surety
of her own convictions, even their very foundations. It is a way of thinking and liv-
ing ever struggling to find a footing in the world, ever on the move. “Ethnographic
experience,” Lévi-Strauss once said, “is an experimental form of research on some-
thing which escapes you” ([1991] 1998: 168).
This essay is an attempt to consider the epistemic and existential stakes of this
picture of anthropological thought by tracing its expression in the development
of Lévi-Strauss’ oeuvre, and in the conviviality (Geselligkeit) of the early German
1. In life together we meet resistance, we recognize that we mark one another, we are un-
settled, but at a minimum we share a boundary. We agree, Wittgenstein says, in a form
of life. And as our concepts are never fully unbound from this life, these exchanges
transform not only our ideas but also the very soil from which they spring. I am re-
minded of what Veena Das calls her “love affair” with anthropology, “in which when I
reach bedrock I do not break through the resistance of the other, but in this gesture of
waiting I allow the knowledge of the other to mark me” (2007: 17).
2. Maïté Maskens and Ruy Blanes (2013) have been inspired by a distinct tradition of ro-
manticism through Cervantes and a desire for militant subversion. I sense a greater af-
finity, however, with Michael Jackson’s (1989) radical empiricism, moving in the inter-
stices or clearings of thought, to gather one’s self. Another kin lineage might be through
Vincent Crapanzano’s (2004) “transgressive montage,” which not only tries to dislodge
experiential categories by pointing to their constructedness but also tries to subvert
the aesthetic criteria that are the conditions of such constructions. There is a manifest
kinship as well with Vincent Debaene’s (2014) rendering of Lévi-Strauss’ anthropology
as an entropological and endless circulation between documentation and evocation,
transforming the connection between the work of art, science, and myth. Lévi-Strauss
thus becomes the fulcrum on whom the French tradition of anthropology pivots in its
connection to literature.
1901: B78) distinguishes general from particular uses of the understanding, the
first containing the absolutely necessary rules of thought and the second consti-
tuted by rules for thinking about this or that object, hence as the organon of par-
ticular sciences. Within general logic, pure logic pertains to a priori principles and
thus makes up the canon of the understanding and reason, while applied logic is
“merely a cathartic of common understanding.” Anthropology becomes a neces-
sary partner to philosophy in the elaboration of human knowledge—a view that
Kant himself might, if in some other fashion, endorse—as the science of a posterio-
ri necessities within empirical systems of truths. We then understand Lévi-Strauss’
critiques of Sartre’s claim of a de jure or absolute difference between dialectical
and analytic reason, and its replacement with a conception of the dialectic in ad-
dition, as the “necessary condition for (analytical reason) to venture to undertake
the resolution of the human into the non-human” (Lévi-Strauss 1967: 246). The
difference between the two is relative; dialectical reason is constitutive insofar as it
is the “bridge” that analytical reason “throws out over the abyss,” and as such is the
gesture by which analytic reason reforms itself in the face of the social world.
The progress of ethnographic analysis is not (as in Rousseau) with the dissolu-
tion of differences between systems but with the “reintegration of culture in nature”
(Lévi-Strauss 1967: 247). The distinction of an order of inquiry then marks out
anthropology as the “principle of research” to this end, precisely because philo-
sophical inquiry makes one a “prisoner of his own Cogito.” Sartre’s “socializing” of
the Cogito, “merely exchanges one prison for another” (Lévi-Strauss 1967). Or put
another way, Sartre’s move trades in the possibility of a science of man for a science
of men. It is for this reason that Lévi-Strauss elsewhere calls Rousseau of the Dis-
course the founder of the human sciences (and specifically ethnology), and not, say,
Descartes, for we are liberated from the prison of the egoism by our methodology,
and our radical risking of ourselves qua the other (Lévi-Strauss 1976: 34).
Rather than invert a hierarchy established by Sartre regarding two different ways
to approach the world (through their contradictory temporalities), Lévi-Strauss
puts them on equal footing. On Lévi-Strauss’ reading of Sartre, dialectical reason
is at risk of being “carried away by its own elan”; but even more, we must avoid too
that “the procedure leading to the comprehension of an other reality attribute to
it, in addition to its own dialectical features, those appertaining to the procedure
rather than to the object.” Thus, not “all knowledge of others is dialectical.” Sartre’s
mistake is in thinking of our knowledge of the other as standing in dialectical rela-
tion to their thought. Lévi-Strauss claims Sartre’s language of a progress-regressive
method thereby for anthropology, but doubles it. First we observe, we analyze our
data, we put these ethnographic observations into the context of whatsoever his-
torical antecedents can be unearthed. But a second move is required on another
plane, one in which analytical reason tries to ford the distance (determined in the
first) to the “ever unforeseen complexity of this new object and the intellectual
means at its disposal” (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 253). The new totality that is formed is
then met with others, and little by little we accumulate mass, like the dualities of
Caduveo body painting. At every step, such a procedure requires moreover that
reason double back, to recall the totality that is both means and ends of the opera-
tion. In this way, analytical reason is said to account for dialectical, where the latter
can account for neither itself nor its counterpart; dialectical reason then at end is
3. My reading differs from Wiseman’s on the meaning and place of universality in Lévi-
Strauss, and, on Mythologiques status as poem. My own sense is we require a finer
distinction between the poetical and the poem.
4. As Debaene notes, quoting Lévi-Strauss, “As the instrument of his own observation, the
ethnographer must cease to be ‘a purely contemplative intelligence’ in order to become
‘the involuntary agent of a transformation conveyed through him’” (2014: 42–43).
“What, after all, have I learnt from the masters I have listened to, the philosophers
I have read, the societies I have investigated, and that very Science in which the
West takes such a pride? Simply a fragmentary lesson or two which, if laid end to
end would reconstitute the meditations of the Sage at the foot of his tree” (Lévi-
Strauss 1961: 294). The contradiction between critic and conformist, analysis of
and enmeshment within conditions of experience, is also dissolved in the last mo-
ment, as we recognize there is there no conflict—it is their isolation that produces
the appearance of distinction. It is a condition proper to “humanity as a whole
and bears within itself the reason for its existence . . . or what is the use of action,
if the thinking which guides that action leads to the discovery of the meaningless”
(Lévi-Strauss 1961: 396). This resolution cannot be thought but must rather be felt.
If there are many stages, “as in the Boddhi tree” or the system of philosophy, “they
exist as a single whole,” and if we are to reach shore thereupon, “I shall be called
upon continually to live through situations, each of which demands something of
me, I owe myself to mankind, just as much as to knowledge. . . . Like the pebble
which marks the surface of the wave with circles as it passes through it, I must
throw myself into the water if I am to plumb the depths” (Lévi-Strauss 1961: 396).
Allow me to juxtapose the pictures of the world and thought Lévi-Strauss offers
in the first volume of Mythologiques with the one he borrows from Boas in The
Savage Mind: first, “myths signify the mind that evolves them by making use of the
world of which it is itself a part” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 341), and second, “it would
seem that mythological worlds have been built up, only to be shattered again, and
that the new worlds were built from the fragments,” which he amends to recognize
the “continual reconstruction from the same materials” of thought, such that “the
signified changes into the signifying and vice versa.”5 Where—the question seems
to beg itself—might anthropological thought fall? Though the bricoleur works with
those “messages” that have been disclosed in advanced, the scientist, “whether he is
an engineer or a physicist” is always in pursuit of “that other message” (Lévi-Strauss
1967: 20). Lévi-Strauss writes in the Overture to The raw and the cooked, that such
an ethnological study aims to “show how empirical categories . . . which can only be
accurately defined by ethnographic observation and, in each instance, by adopting
the standpoint of a particular culture—can nonetheless be used as conceptual tools
with which to elaborate abstract ideas and combine them in the form of proposi-
tions” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 1). And then at the very end, when having rehearsed the
outcome of his mythographic study of the given dialectic, we are confronted with
a problem of structural method; “for if the myths of a particular society admit of
every kind of combination, the set as a whole becomes a nonredundant language;
since all combinations are equally meaningful . . . in this case mythography would
be reduced to a form of lallorhea” (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 333). Thankfully, this is the
not case, if we follow three methodological rules. First, various iterations of a myth
are “not all situated on the same level of mythological thought”; second, the capaci-
ty to fix the variables and their “relative degree of complex” means that versions can
be arranged in a “logical order”; and finally, each iteration provides an “image of
reality” such that, in our critical position, we are “able to replace the relation orders
5. The first reference is to Boas (1898: 18). The second is Lévi-Strauss’ addendum to Boas’
quotation, from Lévi-Strauss (1967: 21).
§
The problem of the subject recurs, then, in relation to its capacity to remake the
world through art. If we trace a genealogy from Lévi-Strauss to Jung to the roman-
tic philosopher F. W. J. Schelling, we find the subject displaced however in art’s
counterpart in mythology (Bowie 2003). Schelling regards ideas in the realm of
mythology as the products of a “natural consciousness . . . left to its own devices,”
distinct from the free action of the subject. Schelling’s compatriot A. W. Schlegel, is
likewise interested not in the intentional activity of the subject but “the surrender
to the other,” a return to another way of inhabiting the world. As we reach out to
7. A. W. Schlegel and F. W. J. Schelling respectively, as cited in Beiser (2003: 17).
and closer to Goethe’s active empiricism.8 Classification in his view required also a
thoughtful consideration of the internal make up of things (the endogamous rela-
tions of mineral and organic nature) (Novalis 1988: vol. 3, 141). The aim was not
to impose a subjective order on the world, but in arranging knowledge of nature,
to reveal its underlying structure (370). The organization of scientific knowledge
moreover requires both a principle of necessity and of completeness (358). How do
we come to know Nature? By means of our body, which is a variation of the whole,
what later he would call the world-all; the individual is a member of the world
(Weltglied) (Novalis 1988: vol. 2, 551). Knowledge of the world through its variant
is a symbol of the essence of existence, an analogy. Scientific knowledge (of nature)
is transformative, not merely mimetic. “Nature, through its study, through experi-
ments and observation, refers to us, and the examination of ourselves, through
experiments and observation, refers to the outer world. . . . We can examine the in-
ner soul of nature only through thought, just as [we can only] examine the body of
nature and the external world through sensation” (Novalis 1988: vol. 2, 429). Like
Goethe’s scientific method, his is an “active empiricism” (Novalis 1988: vol. 2, 641),
one that requires the play of critical imagination and thorough observation. It was
Goethe, after all, who wrote of “the experiment as mediator between subject and
object,” and who imagined the human body as the exacting instrument of system-
atic inquiry. This position had allowed him to maintain both the freedom of the
individual and the “objectivity” of scientific method by calling for the great prolif-
eration of free positions. Goethe describes his “genetic method” beginning from
the empirical encounter with an object and following its creation through a series
of steps to its originary moment, and nevertheless holding this progression in the
mind as an “ideal whole.” As nature leaves no gaps, one has to approach progres-
sion as if it were an “uninterrupted activity,” achieved by “dissolving the particular
without destroying the impression itself ” (Goethe 1988).
Part and parcel to the fundamental character of such an effort of writing (and
living) was the fragment, a “text for thinking” Novalis liked to say, which ebbed
between completeness and incompleteness. Fragments stand outside mereological
adjudication. Any suggestion, or representation, is determinately incomplete—if
the issue were to be settled, the fragment would cease to be what it is. Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy read the fragment as an embodiment of the
promise of the System, as the systactical (as they say, in Heidegger’s language) ideal.
The System is the System-Subject.9 “Because the System itself must be grasped ab-
solutely, the fragment as organic individuality implies the work, the organon. ‘Sys-
tasis’ (association, coming together) necessarily takes the place of the organicity of
an organon, whether it be a natural creature, society, or a work of art. Or rather,
that it be all of these at once, as is indicated by the absence of a specific object for
8. Dalia Nassar has traced their shared conception of knowledge as an infinite activity
within and upon the world, through “creative, living thinking”—a process immanent to
the world itself, or more precisely to nature, from which the knower is never detached,
a potentiation (2011: 86). Thus Goethe and Novalis share a conviction, as she quotes
from the latter, that “idealism is nothing but genuine empiricism.”
9. We must moreover bear in mind the distinction here between the espirit systematique
rather than the espirit de systems.
the totality of the Fragments” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1998: 47). The frag-
ment manifests the truth of the work, in its relation to the System, “or better yet
the absolute fragmentary grasping of the System thus depends on the dialectic con-
cerning the Work taking place within the fragment” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy
1998: 47). It is the fragment’s self-containment, seeds as Novalis calls them, and its
call for association (in criticism), like the Hermetic divination of Proteus, in which
the fallow soil is forever being remade for the harvest.
10. The second book opens, “it must have been a long time before man thought to give the
various objects of their senses common names (gemeinschaftlichen Namen) and placing
them in opposition to themselves” (Novalis [1845] 1984: 64). The history of the world
becomes distorted and divided as the history of humankind. Many voices try their
hand at explicating nature in the course of the text. One exclaims science and poetry
are two aspects of the same friendship with nature, whereby scientists gather and order
stores, and poets make them into “daily food and consolation of human hearts” (75).
a cryptic story, known by most as the fairytale of the Hyazinth and Rosenblüt-
chen (Rose Petal). The story begins with Hyazinth in a state of nonconsciousness,
surrounded cheerily by the trappings of nature and his beloved Rosenblütchen. A
stranger arrives and tells the couple of all the marvelous places he has traveled and
leaves a book in an undecipherable script. Stirred to action by the stranger’s words,
Hyacinth sets out to find the “mother of things,” Novalis’ famed metaphor of the
veiled maiden. He wanders the world until finally he makes his way to the resting
place of the heavenly maiden where he falls asleep to reach her holy heights. There
he stands before her, and once he lifts her veil, his own Rosenblütchen falls into his
arms. The journey represents the loss and reclamation of the paradisiacal “immedi-
ate consciousness of the whole world.” But this return is one that moves forward as
it moves back.
For Novalis, “feeling” itself pertains to the relation of the self to itself. Against
J. G. Fichte, Novalis argued that the reflection of the subject on itself could not
rely on the positing of an Absolute subject who stood in a position outside reflec-
tion but rather self-feeling I was nothing other than representation. The distinc-
tion comes down to a technical incongruity between immediacy and self-reference.
Rather than ascribe to self-reference an exogamous fact-act (Tathandlung), the in-
tuited subject, Novalis argues that Fichte had conflated intuition and thought; self-
reference was in reality an act of representing what was given immediately, namely
the content of what was properly intuition (what Kant would call sensation, and
Novalis renames “feeling” and at times “not-knowledge” [nicht-Wissen] or “faith”
[Glaube]) and as such had to be distinguished for conceptual thought. When we
see self-feeling/self-intuition (Selbstgefühl) reflected in the “mirror of thought” we
think it is just as it appears; really we have caught nothing but the representation,
the mirror image of that intuition, not feeling itself. This grounds the sciences in a
“theory of intuition” that incorporates—in opposition to the Enlightenment view—
feeling and imagination with reason, and distinguishes Stoff (the substrate of rep-
resentation) from Materie (the substrate of intuition). The imagination mediates
between these binaries.
“Everything,” Novalis wrote, “irrespective of whether we reflect upon or sense
it, is an object and so stands under the laws of the object. . . . Presentation is also
object” (§290 of his Fichte Studien [1988: vol. 2]). These oscillations of the imagi-
nation, furthermore, are bound to essence of freedom, and thereby to the ethical
project of Bildung. Novalis famously writes in the Blüthenstaub (Pollen), “we are on
a mission: we are called upon to educate the earth.” And of anthropology, Novalis
tells us that if it is to be “truly tranquil and freely active in every kind of situation,”
that is “thoroughly healthy” and indicative of a “true presence of mind” then it
should strive unto a harmonious state of the negative and the positive activities
(that is, the subjective and the objective). He elaborates: “artist through morality”
and in brackets “the complete and perfect artist is above all moral through himself—
so too the complete and perfect human being in general” (Novalis 2007: 39). In a
stunning move beyond Kant (and one especially pertinent to ongoing theorization
in anthropology of the everyday), Novalis suggests that the “world making” capac-
ity of the imagination is not a transcendental overcoming of the noumena but an
“appearance . . . rooted in ordinary life” (Kneller 2006: 205). Novalis calls such or-
dinary events “a sensation of immediate certainty . . . the appearance (Erscheinung)
strikes us particularly at the sight of many human forms and faces, especially in a
glimpse of some eyes, some demeanors, some movements, or at the hearing of cer-
tain words, the reading of certain passages, certain perspectives on life, the world,
and fate” (as cited in Kneller 2006).
While Fichte began from identity of the I and itself in self-consciousness, an I
that posits itself and meets its limit (Anstoß) only insofar as it does (and abstraction
from which leads to the Absolute-I), Novalis regards a structure of representation
that places the I outside itself as removing its essential nature, namely its unity. The I
is not transparent to itself, because such knowledge would require understanding the
ground of that awareness in the first place, nor is I merely productive of itself outside
of a representation qua intellectual intuition. If we take the radical proposition that
consciousness is a “being outside being in being,” we might regard the I as a sign
(Frank 1989, 1997; Frank and Kurz 1977)—that is, as nothing, except for that every-
thing is given to it, and neither it nor the given are anything without the other. No-
valis uses the language of schema to describe the relation between sign and signified,
which he borrows from Kant’s definition as the link between the necessary and the
free (the receptive and spontaneous grounds of knowledge). It is through the schema
moreover that we understand the mutual intelligibility of signs to multiple subjects.
Andrew Bowie (2003: 90) explains, “language can only be understood as language
via the assumption that the necessitated . . . events in which it is instantiated . . . are
linked to the meaning intentions of a (free) subject. Communication is possible,
then, via the ‘as it were, free contract’ inherent in language.” Communication oper-
ates through the simultaneous acceptance of object-ive, or applied necessity of the
signs publically used and the acknowledgment that other language users are likewise
capable of free intentional meaning that might escape me. Language in its use car-
ries with it the possibility of its failure. In our reliance on this schematic relationship,
Novalis says, the I “paints” its own image under the “mirror of reflection” and “the
picture is painted in the position that it paints itself ” (as cited in Bowie 2003: 91).
They are (re)united in a transcendental poetics mutatis mutandis—the possibility
that through poetry one might take hold of what appears hopeless. The educated
feeling, at which we arrive at the end of the journey, is not the original identity of the
self and nature but rather one that has been rediscovered. Art mediates these modes
of thinking/relating, which we earlier called dialectical historical consciousness on
the one hand and mythological thought on the other. He says in relation to Fichte:
The law of the concept and the law of the object must be one—only in
reflection to be separated. . . . There [the I] is as an intelligence, here, as
a pure I, free. There it separates its reflective activity from its essence—it
goes outside of itself—here it unites both—it goes within itself. It must
do the former, in order to do the other. The latter is the purpose, the
former the means—the means produces the purpose. / All knowledge
should produce morality—the moral drive, the drive to freedom leads to
knowledge. Being-Free (Freyseyn) is the tendency of the I—the capacity
to be free is the productive imagination—harmony is the condition of
its activity—hovering, between opposites. . . . All Being, Being as such,
is nothing but Being-Free—hovering between extremes, which it is
necessary to unite and necessary to separate. (Novalis 1988: vol. 2, §555;
italics in the original)
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L’art de la convivialité
Résumé : Cet essai propose de concevoir l’anthropologie comme une science ro-
mantique qui s’intéresse à ce que Lévi-Strauss appelait la logique a posteriori. Je
déplace notre attention, en l’écartant des désaccords conceptuels et en l’orientant
plutôt vers les conditions d’expérience de notre savoir, c’est à dire vers le terrain
d’émergence des concepts: la vie en commun (com vivere). Cette importance de la
Andrew Brandel is a fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Aus-
tria. He is currently completing a book on the figurations of literary thought in
contemporary Berlin, and is coediting a volume on the anthropology of texts.
Andrew Brandel
Institute for Human Sciences
Spittelauer Lände 3
1090 Vienna, Austria
ABrandel@jhu.edu