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Gabhart, M. (1999) - Spinoza On Self-Preservation and Self-Destruction
Gabhart, M. (1999) - Spinoza On Self-Preservation and Self-Destruction
Gabhart, M. (1999) - Spinoza On Self-Preservation and Self-Destruction
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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0814
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Spinoza on Self-Preservation
and Self-Destruction
MITCHELL GABHART
1 .
2i
[6t3]
614 J OU R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9
ties e m o t i o n s , i.e., a f f e c t s u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f m i n d , i n t o t w o t y p e s : a c t i o n s
a n d p a s s i o n s . ~ S p i n o z a d o e s n o t ( c o n t r a r y to his p r e d e c e s s o r D e s c a r t e s ) p o s i t
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a s e p a r a t e f a c u l t y s u c h as will to t r a n s f o r m p a s s i o n s i n t o
a c t i o n s . R a t h e r , "we a c t w h e n s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n s , in us o r o u t s i d e us, o f w h i c h
w e a r e t h e a d e q u a t e c a u s e , i.e., (by E 3 D 1) w h e n s o m e t h i n g in us o r o u t s i d e us
follows f r o m o u r nature, w h i c h can be clearly and distinctly understood
t h r o u g h it a l o n e . " ~ C o n v e r s e l y , w e a r e a c t e d u p o n " w h e n s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n s
in us, o r s o m e t h i n g f o l l o w s f r o m o u r n a t u r e , o f w h i c h we a r e o n l y a p a r t i a l
c a u s e . " 4 C o n s e q u e n t l y it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to o p p o s e will a n d i n t e l l e c t in o r d e r to
differentiate action from passion. The mind includes both adequate and inade-
q u a t e i d e a s (E3P1) a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n b e a l t e r n a t e l y b o t h a g e n t a n d p a t i e n t .
T h e d e p a r t u r e f r o m D e s c a r t e s is s t r i k i n g : si n ce (1) i d e a s e i t h e r a r e o r a r e n o t
a d e q u a t e a n d (2) e a c h a d e q u a t e i d e a c a r r i e s its o w n c e r t i t u d e ( E 2 P 4 3 ) , t h e n e e d
f o r a s e p a r a t e f a c u l t y o f a s s e n t , w h i c h is w h a t v o l i t i o n m u s t a m o u n t to, is n u l l i -
fied. I n s t e a d , v o l i t i o n a n d a p p e t i t e a r e c o n s i d e r e d by S p i n o z a to b e n o m o r e
than distinct manifestations of one central striving, the former a purely mental
d e s c r i p t i o n a n d the latter an a c c o u n t o f b o t h m e n t a l a n d physical aspects o f the
individual.5
S p i n o z a i n t r o d u c e s t h e k e y t e r m conatus to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e activity o f m o d e s
b u t it is a c o n c e p t w h i c h also b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l -
ity, i n d e e d t h e e s s e n c e , o f f i n i t e m o d e s . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n a t u s is d e f i n e d by
S p i n o z a as a s t r i v i n g (E3P7), i.e., " t h a t s t r i v i n g by w h i c h e a c h t h i n g strives to
p e r s e v e r e in its o w n b e i n g is n o t h i n g b u t t h e a c t u a l e s s e n c e o f t h e t h i n g . "6 T h i s
2At the end of Part 3 (General Definition of the Affects, 11/~o3, ~9-33), Spinoza defines the
affect. "An Affect that is called a Passion of the mind is a confused idea, by which the Mind affirms of
its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, when it is given,
determines the Mind to think of this rather than that." Here, Spinoza might seem to imply that
affects are purely passive. But in E3P58 (11/187, ~5-27) Spinoza states: "Apart from the Joy and
Desire that are passions, there are affects of Joy and Desare that are related to us insofar as we act."
3E3De (11/139, 6-9).
4E3D 3 (11/139, ]1-13).
5Hampshire puts thas point as follows: "The word affectus.., represents the whole modifica-
tion of the person, mental and physical. The 'affection' is a passion (in Spinoza's techmcal sense)
insofar as the cause of the modification or 'affecuon' does not lie within myself, and it is an action
or active emotion in so far as the cause does lie within myself; this is another way of saying that any
'affection', of which the mental equivalent is not an adequate idea, must be a passive emotion; for
an adequate idea as an idea which follows necessarily from the idea which preceded it." Stuart
Hampshire, Spinoza (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), lO6- 7. Reason is the mode of thought
which is sufficient for the adequacy of ideas, and at exists not as a separate faculty but as a mode of
knowing which has as its cause the understanding itself, as opposed to ideas which are occasioned
merely through the body's interaction with an external object.
6E3P 7 (II/146, 2o-2~).
SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 615
endeavor for self-preservation viewed m relation to both the mind and the body." Henry E.
Allison, Benedict de Spinoza (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 134- 5.
0For a discussion of Spinoza's physics and tts importance in Spmoza's overall system, see
David Lachterman, "The Physics of Spmoza's Ethics," in Spinoza: New Perspectives, Robert Shahan
andJ. I. Biro, eds. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 71-112.
~~ the importance of Spmoza's physics for his theory of knowledge and individua-
tion, Lachterman notes" "The familiar thesis of psycho-physical parallelisms attributed to Spinoza
and regarded as his chief "advance" over Descartes fails to do justice to a point of capital importance
subtly woven through the text of the Ethzcs; where the career of the body is autonomous, the life of
the mind is heteronomous, in the sense that thinking has no objects all its own, no noeta; it has as its
object the nature and affections of the external bodies by which its own body is affected, i.e., forced
to move or to come to rest. The advance from inadequate imagination to adequate conception is by
means of the things which are common to all (E I I, P38); the reference (in the Corollary) to Lemma 2
of the "Physical Digression" makes it plain that common notions are those of the physical character-
istics of all bodies (e.g., motion, rest quantity, etc.) ." Lachterman, "The Physics of Spinoza's Ethics,"
In Spinoza" New Perspectzves, 145-6.
SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 617
t i m e by m a i n t a i n i n g a r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e p a t t e r n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to
its e n v i r o n m e n t . 11
11Lee Rice observes: "It Is also the case that, disregarding the external forces operative in this
union, [between bodies forming an individual and external bodies] the bodies umted will interact
among themselves. If this interaction is such that it results in a fixed and determinate relation
among the simpler bodies, then the resultant complex is an individual; and it is this fixed relation
of motion and rest (or interchange of energy) among ~ts parts which mdividuates it. It is the
relauon among the parts, and not the parts themselves, upon which Spinoza fixes in order to
characterize an individual. . . . Individuation is thus accomplished solely through the constant
presence of a fixed quantum of motion and rest." Lee Rice, "Spinoza on Indlviduation,"in Spinoza:
Essays ~n Interpretatzon, 2o~.
~ Spinoza's position on the mind-body relationship has been characterized as neutral in the
sense that mind is not reducible to matter or vice versa but "neutral" is a misleading term: rather,
mind and matter are expressive aspects of a fundamental substance; the modes that constitute
individuals have determinate existence within that reality.
~sE3P9, Sch. 01/148, 5- lo).
14See E4, Pref. (II/2o5, 16-II/2o9, ao) for Spinoza's elaboration of the term 'perfection.'
618 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER I999
,5 Tr~stitia and laetitza are translated by Curley, respectively, as ~joy'and 'sorrow.' This transla-
tion is not consistent among translations and sometimes the terms are translated, respectively, as
'pleasure' and 'pain': for example, compare Samuel Shirley's translation, Ethics (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1982). This can be confusing since Curley translates titillatzo and dolor,
respectively, as the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain.' This may particularly be the source of confusion
since quite a number of secondary sources follow Shirley.
16On this point, see Jerome Neu in Emotion, Thought and Therapy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), 87-9 a.
S P I N O Z A ON S E L F - P R E S E R V A T I O N AND SELF=DESTRUCTION 6a 9
s a m e t h i n g , i.e., (by I I I P 7 ) , v i r t u e , i n s o f a r as it is r e l a t e d t o m a n , is t h e v e r y
essence, or nature, of man, i n s o f a r as h e h a s t h e p o w e r of bringing about
certain things, which can be understood through t h e l a w s o f his n a t u r e
alone."w But what we essentially endeavor--in accord with reason--is to u n -
derstand (E4Pz6)? s Since reason considers nothing t o b e to its a d v a n t a g e
except understanding (E4Pe6), good and evil are what, in a relative sense, aid
or detract from the exercise of understanding.
However, this state of activity enjoyed in the experiencing of adequate
i d e a s is n o t o u r c o m m o n lot. One's power--the force by which one perseveres
in e x i s t i n g - - i s n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d ( E 4 P 3 ) a n d o n e is a l w a y s s u b j e c t to p a s s i o n s ,
as a p a r t o f n a t u r e ( E 4 P 4, C o r . ) . B o n d a g e , i.e., " M a n ' s l a c k o f p o w e r to m o d e r -
a t e a n d r e s t r a i n t h e affects,"10 c h a r a c t e r i z e s the human condition. Bondage is
our condition because our own tendency to p e r s i s t , m e n t a l l y and physically,
lies n o t i n o u r o w n p o w e r ; it is c o n d i t i o n e d by the power of some contingent
cause greater than our own (E4D5). The relative contingency, possibility, and
temporal proximity--as w e l l as t h e s u p p o s e d good or evil--of the perceived
causes of our emotions are typically imagined b y u s to s u r p a s s o u r o w n p o w e r
of ordering our thoughts ( E 4 P 9 - 1 5 ) . ~~ K n o w l e d g e o f G o d is t h e n i n v o k e d b y
S p i n o z a as t h e g r e a t e s t a b s o l u t e g o o d , w h i c h h e e q u a t e s to k n o w l e d g e of the
most adequate i d e a s ; to t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e v a l u e t h e k n o w l e d g e of mind itself,
w e n e c e s s a r i l y a r e d e s i r i n g to k n o w G o d u n d e r the attribute of thought. Thus,
~ E5P15 (II/a9o, 17-19). Spinoza further claims that such love is bound to hold the chief
place m the mind and that it cannot turn to hatred; of course, smce God does not possess
emotions he cannot love us in return--and indeed we should not wish God to love us in return
(E5P 16-19).
SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 62~
to a state of greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in this, that the m i n d is
endowed with perfection itselfY 2
By this, I t h i n k S p i n o z a m e a n s t h a t b l e s s e d n e s s (love o f G o d as it a r i s e s
f r o m t h e t h i r d k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e ) is t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h a t w h i c h is p o t e n t i a l
in all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . T h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h c o n s t a n t l y s t r i v i n g
to c u l t i v a t e a d e q u a t e i d e a s , t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e c o n a t u s u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e
o f T h o u g h t . T h e p e r f e c t i o n o f this s t r i v i n g is u n i o n w i t h t h e " m i n d o f G o d , "
the mediate infinite mode of the attribute of Thought, an infinite attribute of
s u b s t a n c e , y e t t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e h u m a n m i n d as well. A n d , as e s s e n c e , it is
e t e r n a l a n d c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d . 2 3 So, t h e m i n d ' s e t e r n a l i t y ( a n d w i t h it salva-
t i o n , f o r S p i n o z a ) is r e a l i z e d in love o f a n i m m u t a b l e e t e r n a l b e i n g , a l o v e
w h i c h (1) c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d ( E 5 P 3 7 ) , (2) is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h i n t u i t i v e k n o w l -
e d g e , a n d (3) is its o w n r e w a r d in t h a t e v e n i f w e d i d n o t k n o w t h a t t h e m i n d is
e t e r n a l w e w o u l d r e g a r d t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f t h a t l o v e as o f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e
(E5P 41).24 S p i n o z a s u c c i n c t l y c a p t u r e s this i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y o f v i r t u e in t h e l a s t
p r o p o s i t i o n o f t h e Ethics: " B l e s s e d n e s s is n o t t h e r e w a r d o f v i r t u e b u t v i r t u e
itself."~5
I n P a r t I o f t h e Ethics, G o d is d e s c r i b e d as f r e e i n s o f a r as G o d is b o t h
d e t e r m i n e d a n d d e t e r m i n i n g , n a t u r e n a t u r i n g (natura naturans). F u r t h e r m o r e ,
G o d as e x p r e s s e d in t h e a t t r i b u t e o f T h o u g h t - - a s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x p r e s s i n g
itself through the mediate infinite mode of one of God's infinite attributes--is
t h e s o u r c e o f a d e q u a t e k n o w l e d g e . A d e q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in t h e h u m a n
m i n d t h e n , in s o m e s e n s e , is u n i o n w i t h t h e m i n d o f G o d . A d m i t t e d l y this is
m u r k y b u t t h e p o i n t s e e m s to b e t h a t o n l y in t h e i n t e l l e c t , w h e n a d e q u a t e i d e a s
are determined purely by other adequate ideas, can one possess some sense of
e t e r n a l i t y , t h o u g h r e a l i z e d o n l y in t h i s life. E t e r n a l i t y s e e m s to t h e a w a r e n e s s
b y a f i n i t e m o d e t h a t w h a t is m o s t p e r f e c t in its e s s e n c e is a n e x p r e s s i o n o f G o d
as a n i n f i n i t e i m m u t a b l e b e i n g . T h i s i n v o l v e s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d e m o t i v e i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n w i t h G o d (or N a t u r e ) . O n e c a n n o t a c t u a l l y a t t a i n t h e s t a t u s o f G o d b u t ,
to t h e e x t e n t t h a t o n e ' s i d e a s , o r a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e m , a r e t h o s e w h i c h
a d e q u a t e l y u n d e r s t a n d s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y , t h e s e l f c e a s e s to b e m e r e l y a f i n i t e
death and that the act is voluntary. But this account is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
as Cosculluela himself admits, condition (4) is vague since the phrase "more or less" is vague. Yet
that is not an important problem because the intention and the act coincide in the right kind of
way. Second, the intention to bring about one's death, as specified in (1) must be understood in a
way that is charitable toward questions of double effect. A martyr whose intentional death is not
done for the purpose of dying, but to effect some greater good, is still intending his death in the
act of martyrdom.
~sE~P49, Sch. [III.B. (iv)] (1][/135, 25-3a).
29Wallace Matson, for example, in "Death and DestrucUon in Spinoza's Ethics," Inquiry 2o
(1977): 4o3-17.
3oSteven Barbone and Lee Rice, "Spinoza and the Problem of Suicide," Internatzonal Philosophz-
cal Quarterly XXXIV (a994): 23o.
3~E4P18, Sch. (I1/222, 17-21 ).
s2E4Px8, Sch. (1I/~22,24-26; 3~-33).
624 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER X999
W h e n the knife did its work, Seneca's body was not transmitting forces from the
outside. T h e causally sufficient conditions for his act were stored within him; the action
flowed from his n a t u r e as it then was, including his strengths a n d frailties, his attitudes
to pain a n d shame, his capacities to think thoughts through, and his belief that if he didn't
die that night he would suffer a worse death in the mormng. T h a t last deadly item was caused by
a message from Nero; but still it was an aspect of his nature at the m o m e n t when he
slashed his wrists. Seneca's death proceeded from his nature as it then was, including
his wish for dignity and a good reputation, and his having the deadly conditional belief.
I conclude that Seneca falsifies 3P4 [No thzng can be destroyed except through an external
cause]. I suppose that Spinoza would deny this, saying that I have misunderstood the
notion of Seneca's "nature." What, then, does he mean by nature?"34
T h a t is m y q u e s t i o n as well a n d it b r i n g s u s to S p i n o z a ' s t h i r d e x a m p l e , o f
" h i d d e n e x t e r n a l causes" a f f e c t i n g o n e ' s i m a g i n a t i o n so t h a t o n e ' s b o d y takes
o n a n o t h e r n a t u r e . T h e r e is s o m e d o u b t as to w h a t S p i n o z a m e a n s : h e c o u l d
p l a u s i b l y b e r e a d as r e f e r r i n g to (1) p h y s i c a l disease w h i c h c a u s e s d e l i r i u m , (2)
m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s u c h as p a r a n o i a o r d e p r e s s i o n , o r (3) c h e m i c a l a g e n t s s u c h
as d r u g s w h i c h c o r r u p t o n e ' s n a t u r e . A n y o f t h o s e I t h i n k w o u l d b e c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h E 3 P 4 ( s u p p o s i n g m e n t a l disease to h a v e s o m e sort o f o r g a n i c basis).
H o w e v e r , S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f s u i c i d e t h e n c o m e s d a n g e r o u s l y close to o b s c u r -
i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u i c i d e a n d a n y o t h e r f o r m o f d e a t h . T o say t h a t
J o n e s c o m m i t t e d s u i c i d e is to say t h a t J o n e s ' s n a t u r e was c h a n g e d by a n e x t e r -
n a l c a u s e i n s u c h a w a y t h a t it t o o k o n a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e t h a n b e f o r e .
O f c o u r s e , g i v e n the b a c k g r o u n d o f S p i n o z a ' s m e t a p h y s i c s , we k n o w t h a t all
s~See, for example, E2Ax. 4; the Lemmas and Axioms following E2Pa3; E3P1; E4Ax. 1; and
E4P2- 5.
~6Ep. 23 in Spinoza: The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1995), 165-9.
626 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 9
i m p u l s e to s u i c i d e as a p u r e l y c o u n t e r f a c t u a l n a t u r e : "A f r e e m a n t h i n k s o f
n o t h i n g less t h a n o f d e a t h , a n d his w i s d o m is a m e d i t a t i o n o n life, n o t o n
d e a t h . "37
L e t u s f i n a l l y t r y to p i e c e t o g e t h e r w h a t S p i n o z a m e a n s b y a p e r s o n ' s
n a t u r e . O n e p o s s i b i l i t y is t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e o f a h u m a n b e i n g is t h e u r g e
to p r e s e r v e h i m - o r h e r s e l f a c c o r d i n g to v i r t u e , w h i c h is a f u n c t i o n o f a d e q u a t e
understanding. A human being who fully enjoys such understanding most
e x e m p l i f i e s h u m a n n a t u r e , a n d it is to t h a t p e r s o n t h a t s u i c i d e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e .
B u t w h a t S p i n o z a g r a n t s h e also t a k e s away. I n t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P 7 ~ [A f r e e
m a n a l w a y s acts h o n e s t l y , n o t d e c e p t i v e l y ] S p i n o z a q u e r i e s : " S u p p o s e s o m e o n e
n o w asks: w h a t i f a m a n c o u l d save h i m s e l f f r o m t h e p r e s e n t d a n g e r o f d e a t h
b y t r e a c h e r y ? w o u l d n o t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r e s e r v i n g his o w n b e i n g r e c o m -
mend, without qualification, that he be treacherous?" which Spinoza answers:
" T h e r e p l y to this is t h e s a m e . I f r e a s o n s h o u l d r e c o m m e n d t h a t , it w o u l d
r e c o m m e n d it to all m e n . A n d so r e a s o n w o u l d r e c o m m e n d , w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a -
tion, that men make agreements, join forces, and have common rights only by
d e c e p t i o n - - i . e . , t h a t t h e y r e a l l y h a v e n o c o m m o n r i g h t s . T h i s is a b s u r d . " 3 s
A s i d e f r o m a n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f K a n t ' s c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , w e see h e r e a n
apparent contradiction: someone fully possessed of reason would choose
d e a t h o v e r d e c e i t , d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r to E 3 P 4 a n d like p a s s a g e s . I c a n e n t e r t a i n
t h e d e f e n s e t h a t t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n is o n l y a p p a r e n t , n o t r e a l . B u t to s u r m o u n t
t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n , w e m u s t b e a b l e to a d m i t , as S p i n o z a I b e l i e v e i n t e n d s , t h a t
h u m a n e s s e n c e is o n l y f u l l y a c t u a l i z e d in t h e f r e e p e r s o n , p o s s e s s e d o f a d e -
q u a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h o s e m i n d is in s o m e s e n s e e t e r n a l a n d w h o t h e r e -
f o r e c a n n o t b e d e s t r o y e d . W e m a y n o t b e r e a d y to g o to s u c h l e n g t h s . Yet
o t h e r w i s e , I see n o w a y to m a k e s e n s e o f t h e n o t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e t h a t
a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i e s t h a t s u i c i d e is a s t a t e o f b e i n g o v e r c o m e b y e x t e r n a l
f o r c e s in a w a y t h a t o t h e r f o r m s o f d e a t h a r e n o t .
Yet this a c c o u n t o f h u m a n n a t u r e c a n n o t u n e q u i v o c a l l y b e h e l d to b e
S p i n o z a ' s o w n . A s a f i n a l w r i n k l e in S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f a t h i n g ' s n a t u r e , we
c o n s i d e r his r e m a r k s in a p r e v i o u s l e t t e r to B l y e n b e r g h , E p . 21:
For instance, we say that a blind man is deprived o f sight because we readily imagine him
as seeing. This imagining may arise from c o m p a r i n g him with those who can see, or from
c o m p a r i n g his p r e s e n t state with a past state when he could see. W h e n we consider the
man from this perspective, c o m p a r i n g his nature with that o f others or with his own past
nature, we assert that sight pertains to his nature, and so we say that he is deprived of it.
But when we consider God's decree and God's nature, we can no m o r e assert o f that man
that he is deprived of sight than we can assert it of a stone. F o r to say that sight belongs to
that m a n at that time is quite as illogical as to say that it belongs to a stone, since nothing
37E4P 7 (II/261).
~SE4P72, Sch. (II/264, 20-29).
SPINOZA ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DESTRUCTION 627
m o r e pertains to that man, and is his, than that which God's intellect and will has assigned
to him. T h e r e f o r e God is no more the cause o f his n o t seeing than of a stone's not seeing,
this latter being p u r e negation. So, too, when we consider the nature of a m a n who is
governed by a lustful desire and we c o m p a r e his p r e s e n t desire with the desire of a g o o d
man, or with the desire he himself once had, we assert that this man is deprived of the
better d e s i r e , j u d g i n g that a virtuous desire b e l o n g e d to him at that p o i n t of time. This we
cannot do if we have r e g a r d to the n a t u r e of the decree and intellect of God. For from
that perspective the better desire pertains to that man's nature at that p o i n t of time no
m o r e than to the nature of the Devil or a stone. T h e r e f o r e f r o m that perspective the
better desire is not a privation but a negation. So privation is simply to d e n y of a thing
something that we j u d g e pertains to its nature, a n d negation is to deny something o f a
thing because it does n o t pertain to its nature.39
T h i s f i n a l l y calls i n t o d o u b t a n y m e a n i n g f u l d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t c a n b e m a d e b y
S p i n o z a b e t w e e n d e a t h a n d s u i c i d e s i n c e at t h e t i m e o f o n e ' s d e a t h , o n e ' s n a t u r e
is w h a t it i s , j u s t as it is at a n y o t h e r j u n c t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l d u r a t i o n . T h e t i m e o f
o n e ' s d e a t h is n e c e s s a r i l y o n e in w h i c h o n e is o v e r w h e l m e d b y o u t s i d e f o r c e s ,
j u s t as w i t h s u i c i d e . F u r t h e r m o r e , his t r e a t m e n t o f n a t u r e h e r e u n d e r s c o r e s his
t h o r o u g h g o i n g n e c e s s i t a r i a n i s m : t h e n a t u r e o f a t h i n g c a n b e n o o t h e r t h a n it is
d e t e r m i n e d to b e s i n c e all c a u s a t i o n a n d all e s s e n c e p r o c e e d s f r o m " G o d ' s d e -
c r e e . " G i v e n t h a t p e o p l e d o kill t h e m s e l v e s , w e s e e m f o r c e d to t h e f o l l o w i n g
c o n c l u s i o n s : (1) f o r S p i n o z a , a t h i n g ' s e s s e n c e c a n n o t g i v e rise to its o w n s e l f
d e s t r u c t i o n ; (2) t h e i m p u l s e to s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n m u s t b e t h e r e s u l t o f a n a l t e r a t i o n
in a t h i n g ' s n a t u r e r e s u l t i n g f r o m e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , s u c h t h a t it c a n n o l o n g e r
m a i n t a i n its e s s e n c e ; h e n c e , (3) ' e s s e n c e ' a n d ' n a t u r e ' c a n n o t m e a n t h e s a m e
t h i n g in e a c h c o n t e x t in w h i c h S p i n o z a u s e s t h o s e t e r m s . S o m e t i m e s , ' n a t u r e ' is
to b e e q u a t e d w i t h e s s e n c e , e.g., in t h e S c h o l i u m to E 4 P 18: call t h i s n a t u r e 1. I n
o t h e r p a s s a g e s , s u c h as E p . 21, ' n a t u r e ' s e e m s to r e f e r to c o n d i t i o n e d e x i s t e n c e
as a d e t e r m i n e d f i n i t e m o d e : call this n a t u r e s. B u t t h e e q u i v o c a t i o n , i f s u c h t h e r e
is, e i t h e r r e n d e r s S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f s u i c i d e t r i v i a l o r i n v o l v e s h i m in a f u n d a -
m e n t a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y in w h i c h s u i c i d e s r e a l l y d o f a l s i f y E 3 P 4.
T h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m is this: t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y t h i n g , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
its e s s e n c e , i n v o l v e s its d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y o t h e r o t h e r f i n i t e m o d e s , i.e., a t h i n g ' s
e x i s t e n c e c a n n o t b e e q u a t e d w i t h its e s s e n c e (this is t r u e o n l y o f G o d ) a n d , t h i s
b e i n g so, o n e ' s a c t i o n s a r e b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as f o l l o w i n g f r o m o n e ' s n a t u r e 2
r a t h e r t h a n f r o m o n e ' s e s s e n c e . H e n c e , to s a y t h a t o n e ' s e s s e n c e c a n n o t b e t h e
s o u r c e o f o n e ' s s e l f d e s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t E 3 P 4 b u t t h e n it also d o e s
n o t b e a r o n t h e p r o b l e m o f s u i c i d e as S p i n o z a t r i e s to m a i n t a i n . O n this i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n I c o n c l u d e , c o n t r a r y to B e n n e t t , t h a t t h e f a c t o f c o e r c e d s u i c i d e , s u c h as
t h a t o f S e n e c a , d o e s n o t f a l s i f y E 3 P 4 : it m e r e l y t r i v i a l i z e s it s i n c e s u i c i d e t h e n
f o l l o w s f r o m S e n e c a ' s n a t u r e ~ , n o t his e s s e n c e . T h e d e a t h o f a S e n e c a , a S o c r a t e s ,
A u b u r n University