The World Cruise of The American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909

The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909
Author(s): Thomas A. Bailey

Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec., 1932), pp. 389-423
Published by: University of California Press
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The World Cruise of the American Battleship
Fleet, 1907-1909'
Thomas A. Bailey
The world cruise of the American battleshipfleet,from

December, 1907, to February,i909, was unquestionablythe
most significantpeace-timenaval demonstrationin modern
history.In lookingback over theeventsof his administrations,
Theodore Roosevelt wrote that "the two American achieve-
mentsthat really impressedforeignpeoples during the first
dozen yearsof this centurywere the digging of the Panama
Canal and the cruiseof the battlefleetround the world." He
further observed,presumablynotoverlookingtheNobel Prize
whichhe had won in 1906,thatthedispatchingof thisarmada
was "themostimportantservicethatI renderedto peace. . ." 2
It is notnecessary,however,to accept Roosevelt'sown evalua-
tionto realize thatherewas an eventwhichdeservesconsidera-
tionas a major episode in the emergenceof the United States
as a worldpower.
In his AutobiographyRoosevelt gives the impressionthat
thesendingofthefleettothePacificwas a suddendevelopment.3
As a matterof fact,forabout twoyearspriorto the announce-
mentofthecruisethenaval authorities had seriouslyconsidered
and had several timesrecommended a voyageto the Pacific as
a neededsubstitute forthecustomaryshortcruisingand harbor
1 The writeris indebted to the Stanford UniversityCouncil of Research in the Social
Sciences for financial assistance that made possible the use of certain materials in
Washington, D.C.
2Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York, 1913), 563, 565.
3 Roosevelt wrote: "I determinedon the move withoutconsultingthe Cabinet, precisely
as I took Panama withoutconsultingthe Cabinet. A council of war never fights,and in
a crisis the dutyof a leader is to lead and not to take refuge behind the generally timid
wisdom of a multitudeof councillors." Ibid., 563.

390 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
work.' In October,1906, theseplans were complicatedby the

serious internationalcrisis resultingfromthe segregationof
Japanesechildrenin the San Francisco schools,and Roosevelt
was believedtohave postponedthetripin ordertoavoid further
misunderstanding.5 At this time,however,therewas consid-
erable agitationin theUnited Statesin favorof movinga part
of the fleetto the Pacific,and Captain A. T. Mahan, alarmed
by rumorsthatfourof thebestbattleshipswere to be detached
for that purpose, wrote to Roosevelt on January
Io, 1907,
regarding the danger of dividing the The
fleet.6 President
immediatelyreproved Mahan for thinking him capable of
an act of such "utterfolly,"and assertedthathe had no more
intentionoftakingsuch a stepwhile therewas theleastfriction
withJapanthanhe had of "goingthitherin a rowboatmyself."
On the contrary,should war become in the slightestdegree
possible he would "withdrawevery fightingcraft fromthe
Pacific untilour whole navycould be gatheredand sentthere
in a body." This early Rooseveltstatedhis convictionthat if
a fleetwere to go it should be the most formidablethat the
United Statescould muster;yethe gave no indicationof favor-
ing such a cruise.'
The tensionwas greatlyrelieved when the San Francisco
authoritiesrespondedto Roosevelt'svigorousintervention and
repealed the objectionablesegregation resolutionin March,
1907.8 During the next few weeks the anti-Japanese feeling
of the San Francisco labor agitatorsand hoodlumswas kept
withinbounds,butlate in May, 1907, a flare-upresultedin the
wreckingof two Japanese places of business,a development
which not unnaturallyaroused to new bitternessthe more
excitableof the Japanese newspapers.9While affairswere in
4 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1907, 7; Boston Evening Transcript,
July 5, 1907; New York Times, July6, 1907; San Francisco Chronicle,July 6, 1907.
5 Boston Evening Transcript,July1, 19o7.
6 Mahan to Roosevelt,January Io, 1907,Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. Here-
after cited as Roosevelt Papers.
7 Roosevelt to Mahan, January 12, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
8 San Francisco Chronicle,March 14, 1907.
9 Ibid., May 25, 1907; Wright (American Ambassador to Japan) to Root, June 12, 27,

BAILEY: CRUISE OF THE AMERICAN BATTLESHIP FLEET 391
this critical posture,the usually well-informedWashington

correspondent oftheBostonEvening TranscriptwroteonJune
11, 1907, that the administrationhad decided that it would
be highlyinjudiciousto sendtheAtlanticfleetof sixteenbattle-
ships to the Pacific.'o A number of newspapers,however,
notablytheNew York Herald in the East and the San Fran-
cisco Call in theWest,began a belligerentcampaignto secure
the transferof sufficientnaval strengthto the Pacific to make
Americansea powertheresuperiortothatofJapan." Whatever
the resultsof this agitationmay have been, the same corre-
spondentof the BostonEvening Transcriptmade thestartling
reporton JulyI, 1907, thattheadministration had justadopted
the policy of concentratingthe entire battleshipfleetin the
Pacific, and it was hoped that this movementcould soon be
made withoutoffenseto Japan. When the truthof this an-
nouncementwas officially denied severaldays later,thecorre-
spondentflatlyassertedthathe had spoken"by authority"and
that he had purposelyrefrainedfrombeing embarrassingly
specific.'2Subsequenteventstendedto supporthis claims.
On the next day, July 2, 1907, the same informationwas
reportedby a large numberof reliable correspondents, and it
was evidentto discerning observers that the news had come,
or
directly indirectly, from an official
source."3Nevertheless,
Truman H. Newberry,assistantsecretaryof the navy, and
William Loeb, secretaryto thePresident,immediatelydenied
thatanysuch movementof battleshipswas in contemplation."'
Two days later, on July 4, 1907, Loeb issued the following
supplementarystatement:
of sendinga fleetat once to the Pacific.For thelast
There is no intention
1907,file1797,Divisionof Communications and Records,Department of State.All file
numbers cited,unlessotherwise
hereafter indicated,referto thissource.
10BostonEveningTranscript, Juneii, 1907.
11For a convenient summary of a fewof theseexpressions, see LondonTimes,June
21, 29, I907.
12BostonEveningTranscript, JulyI, 5, 1907.
13LondonTimes,July3, 19o7; San FranciscoChronicle, July2, 1907; HenryPringle,
TheodoreRoosevelt(New York,I931), 410o.
14New York Times,July3, 1907.

two yearsthe Administration has been perfecting its plans to arrangefor

a longoceancruise.. . This cruisemaypossibly be to thePacific,butmight
possiblybe onlyto the Mediterranean, or the SouthAtlantic.It maypos-
siblytake placenextWinter,but, on theother hand,itmaynotbe convenient
to arrangeit untillater. . . The relationsbetweenthe United Statesand
all the otherpowersneverwere morepeacefuland friendlythan at the
presenttime,and if thefleetweresentto thePacificthefactwould possess
no moresignificance thanthefurther factthatthreeor fourmonthslaterit
wouldbewithdrawn fromthePacific.Bothwouldmerelybe partoftheordi-
naryroutineof the naval administration."5
Later on thesame day and obviouslywithouttheknowledge
of Loeb, Secretaryof the Navy Victor H. Metcalf,who was
thenvisitingfriendsin California,statedin an interviewthat
a fleetof eighteenor twentybattleshipswould definitely come
to San Franciscoduringthe approachingwinteron a practice
cruise. He furtherobserved that he might have made this
announcementbeforeleaving Washington,but being a Cali-
fornianhe wanted to bring the good news in person to the
people of thecoast."6This unequivocal statement, which flatly
contradicted the officialdenial issued two days previously,
indicateda lack ofcooperationin highplaces. It would appear,
however,fromtheofficialleaks and fromLoeb's tergiversating
statement, that Roosevelt had made up his mind to send the
fleetto thePacific,butin orderto avoid stirringup thejingoes
at home and abroad he had thrownout the generalsuggestion
of a long cruise,which,when the excitementhad died down,
would be followedwithan announcement of thespecificdesti-
nation. Metcalf's statementappears to have ruined this
strategy."
Furtherdenialswerenowoutofthequestion,and thevarious
battleshipsweresoonorderedtomake ready.'"On July9, 1907,
15Ibid.,July5, 1907.
16Ibid. There weresomewhobelievedthatMetcalf,withpoliticalendsin view,had
a good deal to do withpersuadingRooseveltto sendthefleet.
17See ibid.,July6, 1907. For sometimeafterthisinterviewrumorswerecurrentthat
Metcalfwouldresign.The Rooseveltcorrespondence, however,containsno mention of
thisapparentindiscretion, and thereis good evidencethatthe relationsbetweenthe
Presidentand his secretary cordialforsometimethere-
of thenavywere particularly
after.See Rooseveltto Metcalf,November13,x9go,RooseveltPapers.
18BostonEveningTranscript, July6, 19o7.

Metcalf gave out anotherstatement which,in the lightof his

previousexperience,may be considered official.He asserted
thatthe fleetwould definitelymove to the Pacific duringthe
coming winter on a practice cruise."9This declaration was
confirmedby Loeb on August I, 1907; and on August 23, 1907,
followinga conferenceof naval heads with Roosevelt,it was
officiallyannouncedthatthe battleshipfleetof sixteenvessels
would sail forSan Francisco in December throughthe straits
of Magellan and would returnby a routenot yet decided.20
As yet the administrationhad made no public mentionof a
world cruise,althoughthis was undoubtedlywhat Roosevelt
had in mind,21 and the movementwas spokenof merelyas a
practicecruisefromone coastof theUnited Statesto theother.
The questionnaturallyarisesas towhenRooseveltdefinitely
decided to send the fleetto the Pacific. Althoughthe project
had beendiscussedforsometimebythenaval authorities, there
is no evidence in the voluminousRoosevelt correspondence
thatthe Presidentseriouslyentertainedthis idea until late in
June,1907. At thattime,in responseto an inquiryfromRoose-
veltas towhatstepsshouldbe takenin theeventthatwar should
become imminentbetweenthe United States and Japan, the
joint board of armyand navy expertsrecommended,among
other things,that the "battle fleetshould be assembled and
despatchedfortheOrientas soon as practicable."22 About this
time,apparentlybeforethesubmissionof thereport,Roosevelt
talked the matterover with Henry Cabot Lodge, and he ap-
pears to have given the latterto understandthat he favored
sendingthe fleetbut that he was not then prepared to make
a definitedecision. Upon reading Metcalf's announcement,
Lodge wrote to Roosevelt in some perturbation,hoping that
19 Ibid., July 9, I907.
20 New York Times, August z, 24, 1907.
21 Within a few days after the Pacific voyage had been announced, Roosevelt was
making repeated referencesin his correspondenceto the "world cruise." Roosevelt to
Lodge, July zo, 1907; Roosevelt to Root, July 13, 23, 1907; Roosevelt to Speck von
Sternberg,July x6, 1907; Roosevelt to Newberry, August 6, o10, 9o7; Roosevelt to
Senator Jonathan Bourne, August 13, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
22 Taft to Roosevelt, June 22, 19o7, Roosevelt Papers.

therehad been no new developmentswhich implied danger."

Roosevelt replied that there had been "no change save that
thenaval board decided soonerthanI had expected."24
In view of thedelicate international
situationand thesuspi-
cious mannerwith which the announcementwas made, the
Japanesemightwell have been expectedto show resentment.
Yet theJapaneseambassadoratWashington,Siuzo Aoki, came
forwardwith assurancesthat the contemplateddispatch of
shipsfromoneAmericanporttoanotherwould notbe regarded
as an unfriendlyact,even if the fleetwere to be senton to the
Philippines.25Japanesenaval officialsremainedunmovedand
expressedsurprisethatthe news should have been sensation-
ally reported.26 The Japanesepress,in thewordsof theTokio
of
correspondent the London Times, "showed absolutesang-
froid."27The general view was that since the United States
had definitely launchedout upon an imperialisticpolicyit was
only natural thather naval strengthin the Pacific should be
increasedto a point more nearlycommensuratewith her in-
tereststhere.It was also feltthata great naval power should
be permittedto engage in extensivemaneuvers,as did other
nations,withouthaving its motivescalled into question.The
greatmajorityof the leading Japanesenewspapersrefusedto
considerthe movementa demonstration againstJapan, for it
was feltthatif any demonstration were in order it should be
undertakenby the aggrieved nation.28Indeed, the hope was
widelyexpressedthatthefleetwould continueon to theOrient
and give theJapanesean opportunity to show the sincerityof
theirfriendshipand hospitality.29 As a furtherindicationof
23 Lodge to Roosevelt, July 8, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
24 Roosevelt to Lodge, July Io, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
25 New York Times, July 3, 1907.
26 North China Herald, July 19, 1907, x8.
27 London Times, July9, 1907.
28 For a useful symposiumof the views of the leading Japanese newspapers see Japan
Weekly Mail, July 13, 1907, 30-31. See also New York Times, July 8, 1907; London
Times, July Ix, 1907.
29 Japan Weekly Mail, July 13, 1907, 30-3x, December 21, 1907, 69o; North China
Herald, July12, 1907, 63; New York Times, December 20o,1907; London Times, July9,
November 6, 1907.

theimprovedstateof feeling,it was notedthattheTokio share

market,which had been depressedfor months,was showing
considerableimprovement."3Rooseveltviewed thesedevelop-
mentswith satisfaction,and on July Io, 1907, wrote to Lodge:
. . . I thinkthatbeforemattersbecomemorestrainedwe had bettermake
it evidentthatwhenit comesto visitingour own coastson the Pacificor
Atlanticand assembling thefleetin our own waters,we can not submitto
any outsideprotestsor interference.
Curiouslyenough,the Japs have seen
thismorequicklythanour own people.31
There was, however, an occasional disapproving voice

among the Japanesestatesmen,and the jingo pressevidenced
some displeasure.32Luke Wright,American Ambassador to
Japan, although observingthat the newspaperswere "uni-
formlycalm," fearedthatthe proposed demonstration might
have "an unfavorableeffectupon the mind of the average
Japanese."33Of the leading newspapers,the Hochi Shimbun
alone questionedthe timelinessof the cruise. The fear was
expressedby a fewJapanesethatthe San Francisco hoodlums
would see in thefleettransfer
officialapprovaloftheirconduct,
and thatthejingoeson bothsideswould be spurredto renewed
outbursts. In somequartersitwas evensuggestedthattheUnited
States would have done well to follow the example of the
Japanese government, which, a few monthsbefore,had not
permitted Japanesetrainingsquadronto call at San Fran-
the
cisco lest some untowardincidentresult.34
The questionhas frequently beenaskedwhyRooseveltshould
have chosenthiscriticaltimeto take a stepwhich could easily
have resultedin thegravestmisunderstanding. Some observers
30 Ibid., July i6, 1907.
31 H. C. Lodge (ed.), Selections from the Correspondenceof Theodore Roosevelt and
Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, I925), II, 274-75. Hereafter cited as Lodge, Letters.
32 London Times, Julyx2, I3, October 3, 1907; New York Times, Julyxz, 19o7; North
China Herald, July I2, 1907; Allan Nevins, Henry White (New York, 193o), 292-93;
D. S. Jordan, The Days of a Man (Yonkers-on-Hudson, 1922), 11,423. The New York
correspondentof the London Times learned from a private source that Aoki's public
statementswere simplymade for publication and that Japan resented this inopportune
and tactless waving of the big stick in her face. London Times, July 13, 1907.
33 Wright to Root, July zo, x907,file 1797.
34 Japan Weekly Mail, July 13, 1907, 31.

professedto see in the projectedcruise an object lesson that

would hasten the completionof the Panama Canal; others
interpretedit as an attemptto follow up the extraordinarily
happy resultsof SecretaryRoot's recentSouthAmericangood
will trip."5There was also some feeling,particularlyabroad,
thatforthefirsttimetheUnited Stateshad come to realize its
obligationsas a world power in the Pacific, and that it was
makinga belatedattempttowrestfromtheJapanesetheirnaval
supremacyin thosewaters and restorethe proper balance.3
Roosevelt himselflater confessedin his Autobiographythat
his "primepurposewas to impresstheAmericanpeople," and
he quotedwithapprovala statement fromtheLondonSpectator
to theeffectthathe was seekingto arouse popular supportfor
a moreambitiousbattleshipprogram."This was probablythe
reasonwhyRooseveltdevotedso muchattention to theproblem
ofsecuringacceptablenewspapercorrespondents forthetrip."s
The reason most frequentlygiven at the time, at least in
officialquarters,was that the proposed voyage was merelya
necessarypracticecruise.In his privatecorrespondence Roose-
velt referredrepeatedlyto "the practicecruise,"and on July
24, 1907, he informedTruman H. Newberry, Acting Secretary
of theNavy, thatthe"fleetis notnow goingto the Pacific as a
war measure. . ." 39 Moreover,at thattimeconsiderabledoubt
35London Times, October 3, 1907; San Francisco Chronicle, July 6, May 8, x9o8;
FortnightlyRe'view, February, 19o8, 211. It was also suggested that the cruise was
designed to stimulate recruiting,and Roosevelt testifiedthat for the firsttime since
the Spanish War the battleshipsput to sea overmanned.Autobiography,566; Harper's
Weekly, February 29, 1908, i6.
36 London Times, December x8, I9o7, June 24, 90o8; San Francisco Argonaut,October
5, 1907, 212; FortnightlyRevievw,February, 1908, 211. The article in this journal by
SydneyBrooks developed at some lengththe relation of the cruise to the Pacific r61leof
the United States. It struckRoosevelt as being "so sympatheticand appreciative" that
he sent a personal letterof congratulationto the writer. Roosevelt to Brooks, March 21,
190o8,Roosevelt Papers.
37 Roosevelt, Autobiography,564-565.
38 Roosevelt to Newberry,August io, 17, 19o7; Admiral W. H. Brownson to Roosevelt,
August 17, 1907,Roosevelt Papers.
39 See Roosevelt to Newberry, July 24, 1907; Roosevelt to von Sternberg,July 16,
1907; Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, September 3, 1907, Roosevelt Papers. Captain A. T.
Mahan stated that such a practice cruise was imperative,particularly since "the navy
has only now reached the numbers,sufficiently homogeneous, to make the movement

existedas to whetherthefleet,in case of necessity,could make

the trip around South America and arrive in fightingtrim.
Rooseveltwas aware of thisuncertainty, and he was insistent
that the experiment,with its inevitablemistakes,should be
made in timeof peace, and not in timeof war. If the voyage
could not be completed successfully,he concluded, it "was
muchbetterto knowit and be able to shape our policyin view
of the knowledge."40Furthermore,Rooseveltwas convinced
that only by showing the difficultiesinvolved would he be
able to forceopponentsof a big navyin the Senate "into pro-
vidingwhat the navyactuallyneeds."4
It is probablytruethatall of the reasonsthusfarmentioned
weretakenintoconsideration whenthefinaldecisionwas made.
But none of them,not even the practicecruise,explains why
thismovementwas necessaryat the verytimewhen deference
to the already injured sensibilitiesof Japan would have sug-
gestedfurtherpostponement. It was frequentlyobservedthat
if a long cruise was highlyimperativea trip to the Cape of
Good Hope would servethepurposeadmirablyand would not
be interpretedas a threatagainstJapan. In fact,a numberof
naval expertsof highreputewere preparedto arguethatshort,
intensivecruiseswere morebeneficialthanlong,tediousones,
and thatthedepartureof thefleetat thattimewould seriously
interruptthe perfectionof certaintechnicaldetails. Further-
more,it was noted that thiswas a peace-timevoyage during
which the ships could cruise along at the most economical
speed and put into various ports.Such an experiencewould
obviouslybe of littlevalue in time of war, when the vessels
would have to steamunderpressureand dependon themselves,
insteadof upon neutrals,forall theirneeds.4"
exhaustivelyinstructive."A. T. Mahan, "The True Significanceof the Pacific Cruise,"
in ScientificAmerican,December 7, 1907, 407. This considerationmay also have appealed
to Roosevelt. See Roosevelt to Lodge, July io, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
40 Roosevelt, Autobiography,564. See also Roosevelt to Lodge, July io, 1907; Roose-
velt to Root, July 13, 23, 90o7,Roosevelt Papers.
41 Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 19o7, Roosevelt Papers.
42 See Independent, December 26, 1907, 1546, 1548; Harper's Weekly, November
30,
1907, 1755; Literary Digest, July 13, 1907, 41; CurrentLiterature,November, 1907, 48o.

What appearstohave beenan importantfactor-perhapsthe

mostimportantfactor- in thesendingof thefleetto thePacific
was a desire on the part of the administrationto handle the
Japanesesituationwithgreaterfirmness. Such a motivecould
obviously not be mentioned in
publicly officialquarters,but
the press,quick to sense the logic of the situation,generally
held thatthisotherwiseuntimelymaneuvercould notpossibly
be dissociatedfromthetensionbetweenthe United Statesand
Japan." The privatelettersand statements of Rooseveltpro-
vide a furtherkeyto the situation.The Presidentwas greatly
worriedover developmentson the Pacific Coast, and he wrote
to Henry White on June 15, 1907, that "the utterances of the
extremists in Japan have begunto make an unpleasantfeeling
in thiscountry." 44 On July13, 1907, shortlyafterthefleetan-
nouncement, RooseveltconfidedtoRoot: "I ammoreconcerned
over the Japanese situation than almost any other. Thank
Heaven we have thenavyin good shape. It is high time,how-
ever, that it should go on a cruise around the world. .. I think
it will have a pacificeffectto show thatit can be done. . ." 4
Furthermore, Roosevelthad come to theconclusion,probably
as a resultofthetoneoftheJapanesepress,thathis sympathetic
handling of the San Francisco difficulties was being inter-
pretedas fearof Japan. To a man of Roosevelt'stemperament
such a challengecould notbe permittedto remainunanswered.
On July 30, 1907, the President wrote to Henry White sub-
stantiallythe same thingthat he later told J. B. Bishop: "I
am exceedinglyanxious to impressupon the Japanese that I
have nothingbut the friendliestpossible intentionstoward
them,but I am none the less anxiousthattheyshould realize
43The Washington correspondentof the New York Times wrote that "no grown
man in Washington will believe that if the whole navy goes at once to the Pacific coast
it can be for any other reason than because trouble is expected with Japan." New York
Times, July 5, 1907. The New York correspondentof the London Times wrote: "All of
which deceives nobody.America is not going to remove the best part of her fleetfrom
the Atlantic for the purpose of seeing how successfullyit can make a long and trying
voyage." London Times, July 6, 1907. For similar expressions see FortnightlyReview,
February, 1908, 211, 215; Living Age, January I1, 1908, xIz.
44 Nevins, White, 292.
45 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York, 1920), li, 64.

thatI am notafraidof themand thattheUnited Stateswill no

moresubmittobullyingthanitwill bully.""4In October,191I,
with perhaps an unconsciouscoloringof the eventsthat had
occurredfouryearsbefore,Rooseveltwrotemore positively:
I had beendoingmybestto be politeto theJapanese,and had finally
become
uncomfortably ofveiledtruculence
consciousofa very,veryslightundertone
intheircommunications inconnectionwiththingsthathappened onthePacific
Slope; and I finallymade up mymindthattheythoughtI was afraidof
them.. . I foundthat the Japanesewar partyfirmlybelievedthat they
could beat us, and, unlikethe Elder Statesmen,thoughtI also believed
this. . . I definitelycame to the conclusion that . . .it was time for a
showdown.47
Rooseveltappears to have been convincedthatthetimehad

comeforan impressivenaval demonstration,notagainstJapan,
but for the benefitof Japan. The yellow journals of both
countrieshad whipped themselvesintoa veritablefrenzy,and
Rooseveltwas of the opinionthatthe appearance of a mighty
armada in the Pacific, a grim reminderof the fact that the
United States was the second naval power of the world and
would have a quietingeffectupon the jingoes
Japan the fifth,
of Japan. And thatwas why Rooseveltwanted "everybattle-
ship and armoredcruiserthatcan be sentto go." 48The Presi-
dentbelieved "thattheonlythingthatwill preventwar is the
Japanesefeelingthatwe shall notbe beaten,"49 and if themost
46 Nevins,White,292-293. BishopquotesRooseveltas havingsaid that"theJapanese
peopleshouldnotthinkthathis actionhad beentakenin fearof Japan,and he accord-
inglydecidedto sendthebattlefleetintothePacificand aroundtheworldto showthat
the UnitedStatesearnestlydesiredpeace, but was not in the least afraid of war."
Bishop,Roosevelt,11,65. The Washington correspondent of theLondonTimesreported
thatit was rumoredin Washington thatRooseveltwantedto sendthefleetjustto show
thathe was notafraidof trouble.LondonTimes,October3, 1907.
47Bishop,Roosevelt,I1,249-50.
48Rooseveltwantedall twentybattleships to go, if possible.Rooseveltto Newberry,
August6, 1907, RooseveltPapers. It is significant
thatonlyfourbattleships remained
in theAtlantic,and theywere all undergoing repairs.Rooseveltto L. F. Abbott,Sep-
tember13, 1907,RooseveltPapers.
49Roosevelt to Root,July23, 1907,RooseveltPapers. Germanhigh naval officials
agreed thatthe sendingof the fleetwas the rightthingto do. CharlemagneTower
(AmericanAmbassadorto Germany)toRoosevelt, November 2, 1907,RooseveltPapers.
The Kaiser remarkedthatthedispatchof thebattleships had greatlystrengthened the
positionof theUnitedStates,perhaps"even to the extentof preventing an immediate

powerfulfleetever senton a long cruise would not servethis

purpose nothingwould. So it was that Rooseveltwrote that
"far fromits being a war measure,"the dispatchof the fleet
was "really a peace measure."50
There is some groundforbelievingthatthe fleetannounce-
menthelped to produce the anticipatedquietingeffect.It was
widely observedin the East thatthis step was followedby a
suddencessationof the "pin-pricks"and the constant"hector-
ing" directedat the United States."5Roosevelthimselfwrote
thathis actionhad proved usefulin silencingthe clamor "for
hostilitiesagainstus bytheJapaneseyellowpress,"52and from
Tokio Ambassador O'Brien reportedthat the dispositionof
the United States"to make readyforcontingencies"had had
a salutaryeffecton public sentiment."5 Unquestionably,im-
proved relationswithJapan followedthe fleetannouncement,
butso manyfactorswere involvedthatcare mustbe takennot
to overestimatethe influenceof Roosevelt'sflourish.
The firstreactionof manyEasterneditorsto the announce-
mentwas to cryout againststrippingthe Atlanticcoast of its
defenses.Stressingthe cost of the voyage, the likelihood of
destructionfrom natural phenomena or sudden attack,the
wear and tear on machinery,and the danger of precipitating
war themoremilitantof thesejournalsissued"franticappeals
to Congressto stopthefleetfromgoing."54Othersurged,with-
out response,a Congressionalinvestigationof the cost;" and
one southernnewspapersuggestedimpeachingthe President
attackupon us by theJapanese." Tower to Roosevelt,January28, 1908, Roosevelt Papers.
50 Roosevelt to Newberry,August 6, 19o7, Roosevelt Papers.
51 New York Times, September27, 29,
x9o7.
52 Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, September 3, 1907, Roosevelt Papers. Four years later,
in October, 191x, Roosevelt wrote that "every particle of trouble with the Japanese
Governmentand the Japanese press stopped like magic as soon as theyfound that our
fleethad actually sailed, and was obviously in very excellent trim." Bishop, Roosevelt,
II, 250.
53 O'Brien to Root, October 25, 1907,file 1797.
54 Roosevelt,Autobiography,568. See also Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy,
1908, 5-6.
55The cost of the voyage was $z,6x9,843.32 above the normal cost of maintaining
Relativ'etotheVoyageoftheUnitedStatesAtlantic
thefleetinhomewaters.Information
FleetAroundtheWorld (Washington, x6.
x91o),

topreventthefatalstep."5Eugene Hale, chairmanoftheSenate

CommitteeonNaval Affairs, himselffromtheeasternseaboard
stateof Maine, announcedthatthe fleetwould notgo because
Congresswould refuseto appropriatemoney.Roosevelt,more
determinedthan ever now that his will was being opposed,
silenced the attackfromthisquarterby replyingthathe had
enoughmoneyon hand to sendthe fleetto thePacific,and that
if Congressdid not care to vote the moneyto bringit back it
could stay there."5In private,the Presidentwrote causticly
of the "hystericalviolence of the attacksof the Wall Street
crowd"and the"campaignon behalfof thewealthymalefactor
class . . . to preventthe fleetfromgoing to the Pacific."58
Strikingback at his criticsin a speech at Cairo, Illinois, on
October 3, 1907, Roosevelt remarkedthat "some excellent
people in my own sectionof the countryneed to be reminded
thatthe Pacific coast is exactlyas much a part of this nation
as theAtlanticcoast."" Yet, in spiteoftheuproar,thePresident
was of the opinion that"the people as a whole have been ex-
tremelywell pleased atmysendingthefleettothePacific. . ." 60
One of the mostunfortunate aspectsof the newspapercam-
paign was the insistenceupon the inevitabilityof war should
thefleetgo. Late in September,1907, thisoutbursthad become
so intemperatethateven dignifiedpapers like the New York
Timesprintedthemostinflammatory Well could
predictions.6'
theNew York correspondent of the London Times write: "Is
the Press of the United Statesgoing insane?"62 It was indeed
56 See London Times, December x6, 1907; CurrentLiterature, November, 19o7, 480.
57 Roosevelt, Autobiography,568. See also Roosevelt to von Sternberg,July x6, 1907;
Roosevelt to Newberry,July 30, 1907, Roosevelt Papers. To Congressman E. A. Hayes
Roosevelt wrote on September i8, 1907: "... I am Commander-in-Chief,and my
decision is absolute in the matter."See also Roosevelt to Taft, September5, 1907,Roose-
velt Papers.
58 Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, September3, 1907, Bishop, Roosevelt, II, 66-67.
59 New York Times, October 4, 1907. In a similar vein the San Francisco Argonaut
criticized "Easterners who regard the United States as a countrybounded on the East
by the Atlantic and on the west by the Alleghenies." September28, 1907, 196.
6soRooseveltto Lodge, September 2, 1907, Lodge, Letters, II, 279.
61 New York Times, September29, 1907; London Times, September30, 1907; Mahan,
loc. cit., 407.
62London Times, September30, 1907.

fortunatethat while this jingo campaign was at its height,

Secretaryof War Taft, thenin Japan on a visit of courtesy,
made a speech in which he blamed the newspapersof the
United Statesforstirringup the troubleand expressedconfi-
dence that the existing difficultiescould be ironed out by
diplomacy.It would be difficult to overestimatethe soothing
effectof this speech on public opinion in Japan,"6and the
London Times remarkededitoriallythat sensible observers
the world over were now confidentthatthe fleetwould make
thetripwithoutfiringa shot.64Furthermore, the severefinan-
cial crisis which came to a head in October, 1907, did much
to divertpublic attentionin theUnited Statesto othermatters.
In the meanwhile,preparationsfor the departureof the
ships were going steadily forward,and certain unforeseen
indicated that valuable lessonswere to
technical difficulties
be learned from the cruise." On December 16, 1907, sixteen
battleships,described by SecretaryMetcalf as the strongest
forceever assembledunder a single command,66 steamedout
of Hampton Roads. Unfortunately, the departureof the fleet
was the signal for a renewedoutburstof predictionsof war,
particularlyby the continentalEuropean press."6Roosevelt
was confident,however,that"Japan knew my sincerefriend-
ship and admiration forher and realized thatwe could not as
a Nation have any intentionof attackingher. . ." Accordingly,
in a personal interviewwith the officersbefore theyleft he
had said thatthetrip"would be one of absolutepeace, butthat
theywere to take exactlythe same precautionsagainstsudden
attackof anykind as if we were at war with all the nationsof
the earth. . ." He later observed that "if my expectations had
proved mistaken,it would have been proof positivethat we
were going to be attackedanyhow,and that in such eventit
63Taft to Roosevelt (cable), October i8, 1907, Roosevelt Papers; Dodge (Tokio
charge) to Root, October xx, 1907, file 1797; O'Brien to Root, October 3, 1907, file 8422.
64 London Times, October 8, 1907.
65 Mahan, loc. cit.,412; London Times, October 3, 1907.
66 Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy, 1907, 6.
67 London Times, December 24, 1907,January 3, x8, 90o8; New York Times, January
x9, 90o8.

would have been an enormousgain to have had the three

months'preliminarypreparationswhich enabled the fleetto
start perfectlyequipped." 68
Two factors,generallyoverlooked,operatedto make Roose-
velt'sventurelessrashthanit otherwisewould have been.First,
the United Stateswas, in July,1907, the second naval power
in theworld,rankingbelow England. Japan was in fifthplace,
and theAmericanfleetprobablycould have givenan excellent
accountof itselfagainstthe entireJapanesenavy.69Secondly,
in spite of generallybelieved rumorsof a world cruise, San
Franciscowas repeatedlyand officially designatedas thedesti-
nationof the fleet.70The Japanesecould not legitimatelytake
offenseat the transferof ships fromone American port to
another,7'butthebrandishingof thebig stickwould have been
a littletoo obvious had it been proclaimedin July,1907, that
thefleetwas steamingdirectlyto Far Easternwaters.Not only
was it good diplomacy to defer the announcementuntil the
ships reached the Pacific,but it mightalso avoid embarrass-
mentto see how thevesselsbehaved beforemakingknownthe
more ambitiousproject.Not until February21, 1908, did an
intimationcome froma "responsiblesource,"in thiscase from
SecretaryRoot, that the fleetmightcontinueon around the
world;72 and not untilthe fleethad reached Magdalena Bay,
in March, 19o8,was theworld cruiseofficially announced.73
564.
s8Roosevelt,Autobiography,
69On November1, 1907,theUnitedStateshad 29 vesselsof xo,oootonsor over built
orbuilding,as comparedwithx3forJapan.The tonnagefiguresas ofJuneI, 1907,were:
England 1,633,x16
United States 6xI,6x6
France 609,079
Germany 529,032
Japan 374,70o
Senate Documents,6o cong.,I sess., no. xoo,587-588;Scientific
American,December
7, 1907,414.
70 Occasional remarksof the officersand certain details in the equipping of the ships
indicated thata world cruise was definitelyin view. New York Times, December I5, 19o7.
71 Roosevelt to Bourne, August 13, x9o7; Roosevelt to E. A. Hayes, September x9,
19o7; Roosevelt to Lodge, July1o, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
72 London Times, February 22, 19o8.
73 After the fleethad put out to sea, an unofficialsignal from the flagship informed
the officersand men, on December x6, x9o7, that it was the "President's intentionto

The firststop of the fleetwas at Port of Spain, Trinidad.

There theofficialBritishwelcomewas courteous,ifnotcordial,
but the populace, to whom warshipswere no novelty,showed
"profoundindifference." 71
At Rio de Janeiro,however,there
occurredthe firstof those amazing outburstsof competitive
hospitalitythatwere to greetthe Americansfromthe South
American coast to China. An English edition of the Rio
Journalof Commercestatedthat"neverwas a heartieror more
spontaneouswelcome extendedto any representatives of any
nationthanthatwhich yesterdayBrazilians extendedto their
brothersof the North,""7 and Admiral Evans, in command
of thefleet,testified
thatthewarmthof thereceptionsurpassed
anything in his experience."7 Lavish entertainmentwas pro-
vided; special editionsof the great dailies were printedin
English; and felicitousmessages were exchanged between
Roosevelt and President Penna of Brazil."7 The latter took
occasion to announcea reductionof importduties on certain
Americanproducts,a gestureof friendshipthatmade a most
favorable impressionin the United States; " and the entire
visitunquestionably had a happyeffecton therelationsbetween
thetwo countries.79
The fleetwas unabletostopat BuenosAires,sO buttheArgen-
have the fleet return to the Atlantic Coast by way of the Mediterranean." Franklin
Matthews, With the Battle Fleet (New York, 1909), i4. This writer, a special corre-
spondent for the New York Sun, was one of the few civilians who accompanied the
fleeton its entire cruise. The book consists of a series of letters,written immediately
afterthe events described and checkedby naval officers, which were originallypublished
in the Sun. Ibid., xi.
74 Ibid., 38, 184; W. W. Handley (consul at Trinidad) to the Assistant Secretary of
State, December 31, 1907, file 8258. See also New York Times, December 25, go907.
75 Quoted in ibid., January 14, 1908.
76 Evans to Root,January 17, 190o8,file6072, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department.
77 New York Times, January 13, 14, i6, 90o8.
78 Ibid.
79I. B. Dudley (Ambassador to Brazil) to Root, January 27, 90o8,file 8258. One
Brazilian journal, the Diario de Noticias, remarked that the stay of the fleet was
"worth another trip of Mr. Root." Translated enclosure in ibid. President Penna, in a
message to Congress, dwelt particularly on the "cordial manifestationsof esteem"
which had resultedfromthe visit.Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 9go8, 43. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations.
80 Few importantnations of the world failed to extend to the United States, directly
or indirectly,an invitation to send the fleetto their shores. The Department of State

tinegovernment paiditsrespects ina striking

manner bysend-
a
ing squadron out to sea to salutethe American vessels." A
Chileancruiser escorted thefleetthrough thedreadedstraits
ofMagellan,wherea briefstopwasmadeat PuntaArenas.
Although Valparaisowasnota scheduled portofcall,Admiral
Evansswungthefleetintotheharborto salutetheChilean
President andflag,andthencontinued onhisway.Thisunusual
courtesy made a deepimpression on thepeopleofChile,par-
ticularlywhenitwasremembered thatEvans,thenincommand
ofthe"Yorktown," hadlastseenValparaisoduringthedays
following the Baltimore riot,andthathisstaytherehadbeen
characterized byextreme bitternessoffeelingon thepartof
thepopulace.82 JohnHicks, United States
Minister to Chile,
was"decidedly of theopinionthatthevisitofthefleet. . .
has servedto createin thiscountry a morefriendly feeling
toward theUnitedStatesanditwillhavea vastinfluence for
in
good thefuture.""8
At Callao andLimathePeruvians madea determined at-
tempt tooutdothewelcome oftheBrazilians.President Pardo
declared Washington's a
birthdaylegalholiday, and a special
bullfight washeldat Lima,whichthousands ofappreciative
sailorsattended.84Leslie Combs,UnitedStatesMinisterto
Peru,wroteinglowing terms ofthegoodfeeling engendered
bytheevent, andSamuelM. Taylor,consulgeneral atCallao,
asserted thatnothing"savethevisitofMr. Root,hasbeenof
was subjected to no little embarrassmentin refusingthese requests,but if they had all
been accepted the fleetwould have been drawn far from its course and would have
returned home dangerously behind schedule. Coaling and harbor facilities also had
to be taken into consideration. Consequently,few changes were made in the original
itinerary,and those for very good reasons.
81 Matthews, Battle Fleet, 115 et seq.
82 See Robley D. Evans, A Sailor's Log (New York, 190o), 258 et
seq.
83 Hicks to Root, February 21, I908, file 8258. In his annual message to Congress
President Montt of Chile stressed "the demonstrationof international courtesy made
to us lately by a great fleetof the United States" as a manifestation"of sincerefriendship
which ought to inspire confidencein the Governmentand people of the Great Republic."
Foreign Relations, 9po8,58, 59.
84 Matthews wrote that the Callao reception,though less demonstrative than that
of Rio, was probably the most heartfelt encountered in Latin America. Matthews,
Battle Fleet, 213-214,312. See also New York Times, February 25, 90o8.

so much advantageto the United Statesas the recentvisit of

the Atlantic fleet . . . and I feel certain the results will be
beneficiallyfar reaching."8"
As thebattleshipssteamedaway fromSouthAmerica it was
evidentthat theirvisit had done much to cementthe happy
resultsof SecretaryRoot's good will tour throughthe Latin
Americancountriesin 19o6.8" Perhaps equally importantwas
thevivid impressionwhichthefleetleftbehindas to theability
of the United Statesto guaranteethe stabilityof the western
hemisphereagainst European aggression.The Zig-Zag, a
Santiago weekly, remarkedthat the outcryof jubilation at
the visit of the battleshipswas like that of "a person who,
in danger of a blow froma strongenemy,sees himselfunex-
pectedlyhelped by a friendlyathleteof Herculean propor-
tions.""8It was perhapswiththisthoughtin mindthatRoosevelt
stated, in an address on July 22, 19o8, before the Naval War
College, thatthecruisewas the"mostinstructive objectlesson
that had ever been affordedas to the realityof the Monroe
Doctrine."88
On March 12, 19o8, two days ahead of schedule, the fleet
dropped anchorin Magdalena Bay and, with the permission
of the Mexican government,began preparationsfor target
practice." Admiral Evans reportedto the Navy Department
that the fleetwas in betterconditionthan when it had left
Hampton Roads, and that it was ready to enterupon active
service." The American pressthrilledwith pride at the suc-
85 Combs to Root, March 4, 190o8; Taylor to the Assistant Secretaryof State, March
12, 1908, file 8258. Felicitous messages were exchanged between Roosevelt and Pardo,
and the latter, in a message to Congress, referredto the visit of the fleetas "evident
proof of the cordial relationswhich unite the two Governments,and in which the people
of the one and the other countryfullyshare. . ." Foreign Relations, r1o8, 683. See also
New York Times, February 25, 1908.
86 See Matthews,Battle Fleet, 99. It should be notedthatthe torpedoboat flotillavisited
a numberof Latin American ports not touched by the fleet.Roosevelt, Autobiography,
566-67.
87 Quoted in Re'view of Revie'ws, May, 90o8,609.
88 New York Times, July23, 190o8.
89 Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy, 1908, 5.
9o New York Times, March 13, 1908.

cessfulcompletionof what had been widely regarded as an

exceedinglydifficultfeatof navigation,and the voices of the
Cassandraswere hushed." Even theNew York Nation, which
had regardedthe cruise as "ill-timedand ratherhazardous,"
observedthatthesafe arrivalat Magdalena Bay was a "legiti-
mate cause fornationalgratification,"and it was pleased that
"our ships,so far,have been muchmore activeforpeace than
forwar in leavinga trailof internationalgood will along both
coasts of Latin America."92The European press,which, to-
getherwith foreignnaval experts,had followed the voyage
with the keenestinterest,was generousin its expressionsof
admirationand praise."9
The day afterthearrivalat Magdalena Bay, SecretaryMet-
calf announcedthat the fleetwould returnhome by way of
Australia,thePhilippines,and theSuez Canal.94Not onlydid
this statementofficiallyconfirmthe widely believed rumors
of a world cruise but it also announcedthe acceptanceof the
Australian invitation,which had been forthcomingduring
thepreviousmonth.95 Rooseveltlaterwrotethatit had notbeen
his intentionto sendthefleettoAustraliabuthe had acceded to
this request"for I have, as everyAmericanought to have, a
heartyadmirationfor,and fellowfeelingwith,Australia,and
I believe thatAmerica should be readyto standback of Aus-
tralia in any serious emergency." " When Prime Minister
Deakin read thegood newsto a Sydneyaudience,thecall went
forthforthreecheersfortheUnitedStates,and thecrowdarose
91 See San Francisco Argonaut, May 9,
19o8, 305; Harper's Weekly, July xi, I908,
3o; World's Work, May, x908, 10177.
92Nation, March 19, 1908, 25o; February 25, 190o9,IS.
93 London Times, March 9, x9o8; Literary Digest, March 21, 1908, 393; Review of
ReQiews, April, 1908, 4o2; Spectator, August IS, 19o8, 2z8.
94 New York Times, March 14, 1908.
95 Prime Minister Deakin had approached the American consul general at Melbourne
on this subject as early as December, 19o7. John Bray to the Assistant Secretary of
State, December 24, 19o7, file 8258. Deakin used his influencewith Whitelaw Reid,
American Ambassador to England, and the invitationwas finallypresentedby Ambas-
sador Bryce, who was friendlyto the scheme. Deakin to Reid, January 7, 19o8, copy;
Reid to Root, March 3, x908; Bryce to Root, March 2, z9o8, file 8258.
98Roosevelt, Autobiography,568; see also Roosevelt to Metcalf, February 21, 19o8,
Roosevelt Papers.

40o8 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
en masseand respondedwith"deafeninghurrahs."9 Prepara-

tionswere thenbegun to make good the boast thatif the fleet
came to Australia the South American receptionwould be
eclipsed."8
On March 18, 1908, fivedays aftertheannouncement of the
world cruise, Baron Takahira, Japanese Ambassador to the
United States,deliveredto the Departmentof State an invita-
tionforthefleetto visitJapan."9Aftera discussionin thecabi-
net, which was reportedto have hinged on the question of
whetheror nottheAmericansailorsweresufficiently well disci-
plined for such a an
mission, acceptance was announced the
followingday. Takahira expressedhis pleasure at the prompt
decision and intimatedthat the invitationwould have been
forthcoming soonerhad theUnitedStatesnotdelayedannounc-
ing the world Ambassador O'Brien was somewhat
cruise.100
alarmedby thenewsthattheentirefleetwas comingto Japan,
and he immediatelysuggestedto Root that the effectmight
be betterif only one squadronwere sent.But subsequentin-
quiries among Japanese officials,including the Minister of
Marine and the Minister for Foreign Affairs,convinced
O'Brien thattheJapaneseweresincerelyanxiousto be honored
bya visitof thelargestpossiblefleet,and thattheywell under-
stoodthemoral value of such a friendlydemonstration."'
The Japanese people expressedgreat satisfactionover the
acceptance,and theTokio correspondent of theLondon Times
reportedthattheJapanesepresswas "profoundlygratified."102
The reactionof public opinion in the United States was no
less favorable,and even journals like the New York World
97MelbourneArgus,March I6, 90o8.
98LondonTimes,February24, 1908.
99Takahirato Root,March18,19o8,file8258.
1ooNew York Times,March21, 19o8; Bacon (assistantsecretary of state) to Taka-
hira, March 20o, 908, file 8258. The matterof grantingshore leave occasioneda
considerableamountof discussion in official
circles.Rooseveltto Metcalf,April17,1908,
RooseveltPapers.
101O'Briento Root,April x6,May 20o,June19, 190o8, file8258.Takahira made in-
quiries and reportedthat the Japanesewould "be greatlydisappointedin case the
wholefleetcouldnotvisitJapan."Takahira to Root,May 15, 190o8,file8258.
102LondonTimes,March26, 190o8.

and the New York Sun, both bitter foes of the cruise, were
pleased withthisdevelopment;and the latterrejoiced "to see
a feelingof distrustsucceeded by one of internationalgood
will and mutualconfidence."'o BeyondquestiontheJapanese
invitationwas a disarmingstrokeofdiplomacythefar-reaching
effectsof which cannotbe overestimated.'4Rumors of war,
whichhad greatlydecreasedsinceTaft's Tokio speech,almost
disappeared, distrustgave way to cordiality,and the voyage
ofthefleethenceforth was tobe regardedas a guarantyofpeace.
Concluding extended target practice at Magdalena Bay,
the fleetleft for the California coast on April I , 1908. The
and menwere receivedwithgreatenthusiasmin South-
officers
ernCalifornia,and whentheyreachedSan Francisco,on May
6, 1908, they were greeted with frenzied rejoicing. It was
estimated that 300,000 visitorswere drawn fromevery western
stateto thatport alone.'05The fleetthen proceeded to Puget
Sound, where it was warmlyreceivedand where it remained
forseveral weeks for refitting.'06
By July7, 1908, the battle-
shipswere back at San Francisco,and on thatday steamedout
of theharborfortheFar East underthecommandof Admiral
Sperry,who had relievedEvans."07
Aftera week in Hawaii, duringwhich the picturesquehos-
pitalityof theislandswas lavishedupon theofficers
and men,'s0
103Quoted in ibid., March 23, x9o8. The New York correspondentof the London
Times wrote: "Few events have been hailed with more genuine satisfaction by the
entire people and Press of the countrythan the proposed visit of the American fleet
to Japan. . . It should be regarded as puttingthe seal of real internationalfriendship
upon the final settlementof the differencesbetween the two nations." Ibid.
104The Japanese invitation was such a clever move that the suggestion was made
in certain quarters that it may have been promptedby Japan's ally, England. See Bristol
WesternDaily Press, March 23, 1908; Bristol Times and Mirror, March 21, 90o8.
105San Francisco Argonaut, May 23,
90o8,338; Matthews, Battle Fleet, 318.
106San Francisco Chronicle,May 22, 1908.
107 Evans was in extremelypoor health and would have reached the retirement
age
before the returnof the fleet.He retired with honors. See Roosevelt to Evans, March
23, x908,Roosevelt Papers. Sperry was a singularly happy choice for a position which
required a speechmaker,a diplomat,and an admiral. Roosevelt was highlyappreciative
of his services. Roosevelt to Sperry,October 28, Igo8, February 27, 1909; Roosevelt to
Mahan, October I, 90o8; Roosevelt to Admiral J. E. Pillsbury,October 23, 19o8, Roose-
velt Papers.
108 San Francisco Chronicle,July 18,19, 90o8; Franklin Matthews, Back to Hampton

the fleetbegan its long voyage to Auckland, New Zealand,

which was reached on August 9, 1908. The overwhelming
exuberanceof the receptionthereled Franklin Matthewsto
write: "California went mad; New Zealand not only went
fleetmad but it developed a new disease - fleetitis."10 Admiral
SperrytoldtheLondon Timescorrespondent thattheAuckland
receptionwas more enthusiasticthan any encounteredon the
westerncoast of America."l The welcome of Sydney,where
the fleet arrived on August 20, 1908, was even more unre-
strained."' By the time the ships had left Melbourne and
Albany,Admiral Seaton Schroedercould writethat"no pos-
siblevehicleofgreetingwas leftunharnessed," 112 and Roosevelt
laterdescribedas "wonderful"the"considerate,generous,and
open-handedhospitality"of thesepeople."3
The Australianwelcome was so overwhelmingas to cause
speculationelsewhereas to the weakeningbonds of empire.
These rumors,which appear to have had theirorigin in the
United States,were promptlydisavowed by the Australians,
and England did not appear to be seriouslydisturbed by
them." The general explanationgiven for the outburstwas
that these isolated people, hungeringfor excitement,were
electrifiedby thesightof themostimpressivefleeteverto visit
the Pacific, and the subsequentoutpouringwas in large part
an attemptto congratulatethese American cousins on their
splendid achievement."5Certain other factors,however,un-
doubtedlylay behind the exuberanceof the Australianwel-
come.There was someevidenceof a desiretomakethesituation
as attractiveas possible in the hope of attractingimmigrants
Roads (New York, 1909), 1-27.
109 Ibid., 29. This expression took hold. See Literary Digest, February 27, 1909, 327;
Harper's Weekly,February 20, i909, 9.
110London Times, August io, 90o8.
111See ibid., August 21, I908.
112Seaton Schroeder,"America's Welcome Abroad," in Independent, 1909,478.
x11Roosevelt, Autobiography,568.
114London Times, August io, ii, September 5, 8, z9o8; Melbourne Age, August
12, 1908.
115London Times, September 5, 1908; San Francisco Argonaut, September26, 19o8,
195; Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads, 129.

BAILEY: CRUISE OF THE AMERICAN BATTLESHIP FLEET
41I
from the United States."'1 Furthermore,Prime Minister

Deakin, who later admittedthatone of his objectsin inviting
the fleethad been to secure supportfor his pet project of a
separateAustraliannavy,"11 saw to it that as many people as
possiblewere given an opportunityto witnessthisgreatnaval
demonstration.Then there was the white Australia ideal,
whichwas widely interpretedin the United Statesas the fun-
damentalreasonforthehystericalgreeting.Such a conclusion
was so obvious that certainAmerican observersviewed the
unrestrained Australianwelcomewithalarm lesttheJapanese,
the nextforeignhosts,take offense.118In fact,some uneasiness
in
was expressed Japan over thisdevelopment.19.
Facing the teemingOrient,the Australianshad for some
timelived in dread of a yellow inundation,and this fear ac-
counted for their white Australia policy and the recently
developed emphasis on national defense.'20 The renewal of
theAnglo-Japanesealliance in 1905 had led tosomemisgivings
in AustraliathatEngland had weakenedin her supportof the
whiteideal,121 and thegreetinggiventheAmericansmay well
have been an attemptto remindthe mothercountryof her
imperial obligations.122In July,1908, the Prime Ministerof
New Zealand, Sir JosephWard, made a speech in which he
expressedthebeliefthatin thefuturefightto determinewhite
or OrientalsupremacytheUnited Stateswould standshoulder
toshoulderwiththeAustralians.123ShortlyaftertheAustralian
invitationhad been extended,the Melbourne Age, perhaps
the mostinfluentialnewspaperin Australia,observed:
Ever sincetherenewalof theAnglo-Japanese alliancethenaval supremacy
of the Pacifichas been in the hands of Japan . . . the effect. . . has
5, 1908; Matthews,Back to HamptonRoads, 128-129.
116 LondonTimes,September
117MelbourneAge, September 9, 1908; LiteraryDigest,August22, 90o8, 2 z.
118JapanWeeklyMail, September 5, 1908,2781; LiteraryDigest,August22,1908,239.
119O'BrientoRoot,October25, 1908,file8258.
120London Times,Decemberx4, 1907, Februaryx, 90o8; New York Times,July
8, 1907.
121LondonTimes,January4, x9o8,quotingthe SydneyMorningHerald.
122See Matthews,Back to HamptonRoads, 87.
123LondonTimes,July22, 1908.

beento placeour rich,sparselysettled,and as yetundefended countrymore

or less at themercyof a coloredrace whomour "whiteAustralian"ideal
has bitterlyoffended.
The amazingadvanceof Japanintotherankof a firstclass Power and
hernewlyconceivedcolonisingambitions, fortunatelyforus, have aroused
our Americancousins,and persuadedthemto makea bid to recapturefor
theAnglo-Saxonbloodthenaval predominancy in thePacificwhichBritain
Japanis at presentour Imperialally. . . Nevertheless
latelyrelinquished.
we are unfeignedlyglad thatAmericahas invadedthe Pacific.It is a move
thatcannothelpbutlessenour dangerof Asiaticaggression and strengthen
thegroundsof our nationalsecurity.124
It is not surprising,then,thatthe Australiansshould have

welcomed,witha view to possiblefutureassistance,thebattle-
ships of a people whose views on Japaneseimmigrationcoin-
cided with theirs.The Australian,however,was too perfect
a hostto dwell upon sucha selfishtheme,and theemphasiswas
consequentlyplaced upon the desirabilityof Anglo-Saxon
solidarity.'25This avoidanceof thesubjectnaturallyled to the
conclusion in some quartersthat fear of the Japanese had
nothingwhateverto do with the overwhelmingwelcome. It
has alreadybeen noted,however,thatbeforethearrivalof the
fleetthe newspapersand the leaders of public opinion were
less guardedin theirutterances,'26and evenwhile thefleetwas
in port a sufficientlylarge numberof expressionsleaked out,
in speechesor in the press,to indicatewhat the people were
thinking.127 The WellingtonPost, theWellingtonTimes, and
theMelbourneAge, forexample,were notaverseto discussing
therelationof thevisitto thewhiteAustralianideal even after
thefleethad reachedAustralianwaters.128It is difficult,
there-
fore,toavoid theconclusionthatthealleged Orientalperilbore
an importantrelationto the extravaganceof the welcome.129
124MelbourneAge, February25, x9o8.
125Ibid., August25, 1908; London Times,September5, 1908; Matthews,Back to
HamptonRoads,67.
126See also MelbourneArgus,March 17, 90o8.
127For expressions
in speechessee LondonTimes,August13, 190o8;Matthews,Back
to HamptonRoads,66.
128LondonTimes,Augustio, 90o8,quotingfromWellingtonPost and Wellington
Times; MelbourneAge, Augustio, 19, 90o8.
129A numberof Canadians entertained similarideas. MackenzieKing, Canadian

FromAustraliathefleetwentto Manila, arrivingon October

2, 1908. Althoughpreparationshad been made for entertain-
ment,theepidemicof cholerathenragingresultedin thewith-
holding of shore leave fromall save officers."30 On October
18, 1908, thebattleshipsarrivedat Yokohama and were imme-
diatelyaccorded a receptionwhich Rooseveltlater described
as the"mostnoteworthy incidentof thecruise. . ."~' Officers,
men, and correspondentswere unanimousin describingthe
greetingof the Japanese as the warmestencounteredon the
voyage,12 and AmbassadorO'Brien was assuredthatit outdid
in magnificenceeven that accorded to Admiral Togo on the
Not onlyhad the arrange-
occasion of his victoriousreturn.'33
mentsbeen workedout with marvelousprecision,as was evi-
denced by the teachingof Americannationalsongsto tensof
thousandsof school children,but the spontaneousoutpouring
ofthepeople was unrestrained and whole-hearted.134Whatever
thecause-whether a desireto outdo theAustralians,whether
an impulsetoshowthattheattitudeofJapantowardtheUnited
States had been misrepresented, whetherrelief at the recent
disappearance of all war talk, whethera genuine feelingof
friendshipforthe United States-the unstintedhospitalityof
theJapanesemade a profoundimpressionon the officers and
men, and the reactionof the press of the United States was
appreciativeto a high degree.3"'Well could O'Brien report
the "extraordinarysuccess" of the visit,the "universallyfa-
vorable"toneoftheJapanesepress,and a beliefthat"theeffects
of thevisitwill be materialand far-reachingforgood." 136
Commissionerof Labor and Immigration,personally thanked Roosevelt most earnestly
for having sent the fleet to the Pacific. Roosevelt to Arthur Lee, February 2, 90o8,
Roosevelt Papers.
130San Francisco Chronicle,October 2, 3, 90o8; Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads,
156-157.
131Roosevelt, Autobiography,568.
132Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads, 183; San Francisco Chronicle,October 19, 20,
25, 90o8;New York Times, October 20o,24, 1908.
133 O'Brien to Root, October 25, x9o8, file 8258.
134Ibid.; Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads, 187; Japan Weekly Mail, October 24,
1908,487, October 31, 1908, 519; San Francisco Chronicle,October 19-25, 190o8.
135See LiteraryDigest, October 31, 190o8, 614; New York Times, October20, 1908.
136O'Brien to Root, October 25, x908, file 8258. O'Brien enclosed with this dispatch

Here and therea voice was raised in the United States to

warn the people that the demonstrationof the Japanese had
merelybeen a subterfugeto hide theirtrue feelings.'"'This
reaction,however,was theexceptionratherthanthe rule.The
and men came away thoroughlyconvincedof Japan's
officers
sincerity;13s and the New York Times observed: "No nation
teachesits childrento sing the songsof a people forwhom it
has unfriendlyfeelings."139 Perhaps themostconvincingrefu-
tation of the charge of insinceritywas writtenby Admiral
Schroeder:
I call uponall goodAmericansnottoletanygermsofdoubtentertheirminds
as to the whole-heartednessof that greeting.The unstudiedeloquenceof
carelessattituderevealedat everyturncannotbe controverted by a distant
view possiblytinged with prejudice. . . When it is said that thousands of
schoolchildrenlinedthe hedgesalong the highwaysand waved in unison
the flagof thestarsand stripesand the flagof the risingsun,it has been
retorted,"That is easilydonebyimperialcommand."So it is. . . But when
crowds lining the thorofares. . . five,ten, even fifteenfilesdeep, day after
day at all hours from morninguntil late at night . . . are smiling with
lipsunmistakably
framing the"Banzais" thatrendtheair in one continuous
chorus- no suchretortis possible.140
thundering
After leaving Japan on October 25, 1908, the fleetdivided,

part returningto Manila formaneuversand part proceeding
toAmoyin responseto an invitationoftheChinesegovernment
accepted in March, I9o8.141 Fear was expressedby American
officialsin China thattheappearanceof thispowerfularmada
mighthave the unfortunateeffectof leading the Chinese to
believethattheUnitedStateswas preparedtoback theirclaims
against those of Japan in Manchuria, but Root admonished
MinisterW. W. Rockhill to combat any such misinterpreta-
long extractsfromten of the leading Japanese newspapers showing the extremegratifi-
cation of the Japanese over the visit. It is also significantthat the Tokio stock market
was strongerduring the firstweek of October than it had been for the past two years.
Review of Reviews, November, 1908, 539.
137 See San Francisco Argonaut, October 31, 19o8, 276.
138Matthews, Back to Hampton Roads, 184.
139New York Times, October 30, 90o8.
140 Schroeder,loc. cit.,479.
141Root to Wu Ting Fang, March 24, 19o8,file 8258.

tion.142As a resultof therecentremissionof the Boxer indem-

nity,as well as otherdevelopments,the relationsbetweenthe
UnitedStatesand China wereparticularlycordial at thattime,
and the appropriationby the Chinese governmentof 4oo,ooo
taelsfortheAmoyentertainment was regardedas an expression
of appreciation."43 A number of adverse factors,however,
among them a typhoon,caused such great difficulties
thatthe
bestthe Chinesewere able to do could be only an anti-climax
aftertheJapanesereception."44 Nevertheless,friendlyfeelings
were aroused by the visit,and the American consul at Amoy
could reportthatamongthenumeroustelegramsof felicitation
which poured intohis officefromall partsof China were two
fromnewspapersthatthreeyearsbeforehad takena leading
part in the anti-Americanboycott.145
Afterunitingat Manila forextendedtargetpractice,thefleet
lefton December I, 90o8,forhomewaters.On theday before,
an exchangeof notesknownas the Root-Takahira agreement
had takenplace atWashington.""This diplomaticachievement
was the culminationof a seriesof treatiesor conventionsthat
had been negotiatedduring the general clearing of the air
followingthe acceptanceof theJapaneseinvitationin March,
19o8. On May 5, 1908, an arbitrationconventionhad been
signed at Washington between representativesof the two
powers,'47and althoughthisagreementwas notintrinsically of
greatimportance, theWashingtoncorrespondent oftheLondon
142Charles Denby (consul general at Shanghai) to Root, April
x8, 1908; Rockhill to
Root (telegram), April IS, 1908; Rockhill to Root, April 21, 19o8; Root to Rockhill
(telegram), April 28, I908, file 8258.
143See London Times, Julyzo, October 31, 1908. Early in October, 1907, Taft wrote:
"The truthis that the Chinese are now very favorable to us. Indeed they are growing
more and more suspicious of the Japanese and the English and the French in their
desire for exclusive concessions and they turn to us as the only countrythat is really
unselfishin the matterof obtaining territoryand monopolies. I thinkit thereforeworth
while to cultivate themand accept courtesiesat theirhands." Taft to Roosevelt, October
5, 19o7, file 1797.
144North China Herald, October 31, 90o8, 248; Japan Weekly Mail, November 7,
1908, 552; November 14, 90o8,585; San Francisco Chronicle, October 26, 1908.
145J. H. Arnold to the Assistant Secretaryof State, November 27, 19o8,file8258.
146 Foreign Relations, 1908, 510-512.
147Ibid., 503-505.

Times noted that it was expected greatlyto accelerate "the

decidedimprovement thathas recentlytakenplace in American
public sentimenttowards Japan." 148
Fourteen days later, on May 19, 19o8, two treaties were
signed providingfor the protectionof trade marksin Korea
and in China.149Then, on November30, 1908, came the Root-
Takahira agreement,a diplomaticunderstandingof the first
importance,whichprovided,amongotherthings,forthepres-
ervationof the statusquo in the Pacific and the open door in
China.5soIt is significantto notethatAmbassadorAoki, more
thana year previouslyand beforethesendingof the fleet,had
independently proposedan agreementalong preciselythesame
lines,but his government and had
had discouragedhis efforts
shortly thereafter recalled him.'"' The Root-Takahira agree-
mentwas receivedwith great satisfactionin both the United
Statesand Japan,and it was generallyregardedas an achieve-
mentgrowingout of thevisitof the fleet.'52Roosevelthimself
sharedthisview,forin writingtoArthurLee of theagreement
he observedthathis "policy of constantfriendlinessand cour-
tesy toward Japan, coupled with sending the fleet around the
worldhas bornegood results.""
The returnvoyage was uneventful,except for a shortstay
at Messina to help earthquakesufferers,"4and afterits46,ooo
mile cruise the fleetreached Hampton Roads on February
22, 1909, just in time, as certain unfriendly critics observed,
to usherout theRooseveltera in a blaze of glory.'55
The Presi-
148London Times, May 8,
x908.
149 Foreign Relations,
190o8, 518-523.
150For textsee ibid., 5o10-52.
151See Roosevelt to Aoki, December 19, 90o8, Roosevelt Papers; O'Brien to Root,
November 3, 1907,file 1797; O'Brien to Root, December 12, 1908 (enclosure), file x6533.
152The London Times spoke of the agreementas "a remarkable diplomatic achieve-
ment to which the visit of Mr. Taft to Japan and the receptionof the American fleet
in Japanese waters doubtless contributed."November 30, 19o8. The New York Times
observed: "It may be regarded as the echo in diplomacy of the splendid manifestation
of friendshipin Japan on the occasion of the visit of the fleet."November 29, 19o8. See
also Independent, December 24, 1908, 3558.
153Roosevelt to ArthurLee, December 20, 19o8, Roosevelt Papers. Italics Roosevelt's.
154On the returnvoyage the fleettouched at Colombo, Suez, and Gibralter.
155San Francisco Argonaut, May 23, 19o8, 338; New York Nation, September 3,

dentwelcomedtheofficers and menwithgreatenthusiasm,and

complimentedthemon bringingthe fleethome "a muchmore
efficient
fighting instrumentthanwhenit startedsixteenmonths
before."156 A chorusofpraisearosefromthepressoftheUnited
States,even fromthose newspapersthat had condemnedthe
venture.The New York Sun, whichhad been mostbitterin its
denunciation,lauded this "achievementwithoutprecedentor
"'
parallel" as "spectacularlysplendid." The New York cor-
respondent oftheLondon Timeswrote:"PresidentRoosevelt's
judgment orderingthis venturesomenaval movementhas
in
beensplendidlyvindicated.It is impossibleevenforhisenemies
to begrudgehim the-genuinesatisfactionand pleasure of ten-
deringto the battlefleetthe nation'swelcome. . ." s"
Perhapsthemostdamaging criticismdirected againstthe
fleetafter
itsreturn
wasthatithadawakened inforeign peoples
a lamentable ofenvyandemulation."59
spirit It istruethatafter
thecruisehadbeenannounced theEnglishandGerman fleets
engagedinimpressive thatAustrialaunched
demonstrations;
outupona threedreadnaught program; andthatSpainbegan
a renovationof her navy.'6" Much of this activityhad been
planned in advance, and it would be extremelydifficultto
provethatit was influenced to anyappreciableextentby the
moveoftheUnitedStates.It mustbe admitted, however,that
thevisitof thefleet,as Deakin had hoped,did encouragethe
Australiansto go ahead with theirplans for a separatenavy;
but the movementin thisdirectionhad already assumedcon-
siderableproportionsbeforetheannouncement of thecruise."'
x908, 199.
158 Roosevelt, A utobiography,566.
157 Quoted in Literary Digest, March 6, 19o9, 366.
158London Times, February 22, 90o9. Shortlyafter the returnof the fleetRoosevelt
wrote that at first"it seemed as if popular feeling was nearly a unit" against him, and
that after the safe returnit was "nearly a unit in favor of what I did." Roosevelt to
Taft, March 3, x9o9, Roosevelt Papers.
159 See Ad~ocate of Peace, January, 190o8, 2, April, 1908, 73-
16oAnnual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 90o7,8-io; ibid., 90o8,xo; Literary
Digest, May 8, 19o9, 788; London Times, June 29, July8, November I3, 90o8.
161Ibid., August 21, October 2, x9o8; Harper's Weekly, July ix, 19o8, 30; Literary
Digest, April o, 190o8,589.

On the otherhand, this demonstration cannotbe blamed for

theAnglo-Germannaval race,whichhad begunin all earnest-
nessseveralyearsbefore.162Shortlyafterthe South American
visit, Brazil placed orders for a number of warships with
European builders; and Argentina countered by voting a
$55,ooo,ooonaval increase."6Pacifistspointedtothesedevelop-
mentsas directresultsof the cruise;""
164
yet the factwas over-
looked thatthe Brazilian programhad been in contemplation
for a numberof years and that it had actually been adopted
priortothedepartureofthefleet;and theArgentineappropria-
tion was probablydictatedby the necessityof followingthe
lead of Brazil.'"6 It should furtherbe observed that during
1908Japanslashedhernaval expendituresand thattheRussian
Duma refusedtoacceptan ambitiousprogramfora newfleet.'66
Most notablyof all, theAmericanpeople,while applauding
theexploitsoftheirnavy,refusedto be sweptofftheirfeet.Not
satisfiedwithhaving"morethandoubledthenavyoftheUnited
States,"'"67Roosevelt vigorduslydemanded four new battle-
ships; but Congressruthlesslypared the administration pro-
gramdown to two.'6sBecause of the impossibilityof securing
Americancolliersto accompanythe fleet,despitethewilling-
nessof thenaval authoritiesto pay fifty per centmoreto home
industry, the to
battleshipspresented the world the highly
incongruousspectacle of being accompanied by more than
a scoreof vesselsflyingforeignflags.Alarmiststhroughoutthe
United States were quick to point out that in the event of
hostilitiesa strictobservanceof neutralitywould deprive the
battleshipsof theircolliers,witha consequentparalysisof the
naval arm.'69Despite thisunmistakableobject lessonas to the
162 See Winston S.
Churchill, The World Crisis, p19r-IIz4 (London, 1923), 38.
163Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy, x908, ro.
164 Advocate of Peace, July, x9o8, 154, November, I9o8, 24o.
165Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy,
190o8,1o.
166Advocate of Peace, May, 90o8,98.
167 Roosevelt to Brooks, December 28, x908, Roosevelt Papers.
168Roosevelt confessed privatelythat he had demanded four so as to be sure of two.
Roosevelt to White, June 30, x9o8, Roosevelt Papers.
169
Cong. Record, 60 cong., x sess., 2372 et seq.; New York Times, September 27,
October 5, 190o7; London Times, October 4, 1907; Roosevelt to Lodge, September 29,

need of a largermerchantmarineforauxiliarypurposes,Con-
gress stubbornlyrepeated its previous action and refusedto
approve a subsidybill. It may well be doubted, therefore,
whetherthe cruisegave any dangerousstimulusto naval con-
structionin theUnited Statesor elsewhere.It was a day when
big navies were in the air, and the United States,far from
leading the procession,was contentto follow along.
In summarizingthe resultsof the cruise certainimportant
developmentsof a purelytechnicalnaturemustbe mentioned
briefly.The generalefficiency and disciplineof the fleetwere
markedlyimproved; new standards of economyin coal con-
sumptionwere establishedas a resultof competitiveawards;
valuable lessonsin self-sustenance and in handlingall needed
repairs were learned; trainingwas affordedin holding the
vesselsaccuratelyin formationand in operatingthemas a unit;
and a greatimprovement in targetpracticewas recorded."7'In
addition,experiments werecarriedon withwirelesstelephony,
and the necessityof securinga supply of high grade coal on
the Pacific Coast led to an investigationof the Alaskan and
British Columbian coal fields."' Furthermore,the demon-
stratedneed of betterbases on the Pacific Coast and adequate
drydock facilitiesresultedin agitationforadditionalimprove-
mentsat Mare Island, California,and Bremerton,Washing-
ton, and the inaugurationof long-delayedimprovementsat
Pearl Harbor.172
In its larger aspect perhaps the most significantresultof
the cruise was that it marked the furtheremergenceof the
UnitedStatesas a worldpower.""73 The Americanpublic,which
1907; Roosevelt to Knox, February 8, 1909, Roosevelt Papers.
170Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 90o8,6; ibid., 1909, 29. Sperry to
Pillsbury,July25, 90o8,file 6072, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department; Roosevelt,
Autobiography,571, 572; New York Times, January 17, 90o8;London Times, January
i6, 1907; ScientificAmerican, February 20o, 1909, 146.
171Annual Reportof the Secretaryof the Navy, 1911, 59-60; ibid., 1913, x6; Roosevelt,
Autobiography,57x.
172Annual Report of the Secretaryof the Navy, 190o8,33; ibid., 1909, 30; ibid., 191o,
36; San Francisco Argonaut, June 6, 1908, 370; San Francisco Chronicle,July 5, 1907,
May 8, May 22, July 18, 1908.
173A recent writer described the event as "an incident of America's coming of age

had followedthe courseof the fleetwith intenseinterest,lost

much of its provincialismby studyingthe geographyof other
parts of the world and the people, as described in detail by
special correspondents, who lived there.One prominentAus-
tralianwrote: "The delusionsof distanceand ignoranceand
thecaricaturesof humorhave been correctedby the realityof
contact."174To some extentsectionalismwas brokendown by
focusingattentionon the needs and strategicadvantagesof
the Pacific coast, and on the commercialopportunitiesthat
mightbe developed in the Pacific.As Rooseveltsaid afterthe
returnof the fleet,"nobody after this will forgetthat the
Americancoast is on the Pacific as well as on theAtlantic."175
The visitsto Hawaii and thePhilippinesemphasizedthevalue
of theseplaces to a nationthatessayedto setitselfup as a naval
power in the Pacific,and demonstrated to the natives,as well
as to investors,thatthe United Stateswas preparedto defend
itsoutposts.It was also assumed - a thingdifficultto prove - that
the good will tour,by introducingthe Americans favorably
to foreignpeoples,stimulatedthedemandforAmericangoods.
Beyond questionthe Monroe Doctrine took on an added sig-
nificance,and it became increasinglyevidentthatthe United
Stateswas to be no idle spectatorin the midstof international
developments.
It will be rememberedthat Rooseveltdescribedthe cruise
as the eventin the firsttwelveyears of the twentiethcentury
which,togetherwith the diggingof the Panama Canal, most
impressedforeignobservers.Contemporaneously he statedhis
convictionthat nothinghad "occurred in the historyof the
navy of greaterand more fortunatesignificanceto this coun-
in the family of nations." Mark Sullivan, Our Times: Pre-War America (New York,
193o), mI,5x4.
174G. H. Reid, "An After-Glance at the Visit of the American Fleet to Australia,"
in North American Review, March, 1909, 409.
175New York Times, February 23, 1909. One of the results of the voyage was a
persistentattempton the part of an elementon the Pacific coast to secure a permanent
battleship fleetin the Pacific, but Roosevelt, more convinced than ever of the folly of
dividing the fleetbefore the completionof the canal, steadfastly resisted these efforts.
See Roosevelt to Knox, February 8, x909; Roosevelt to Taft, March 3, 19o9, Roosevelt
Papers.

try. . ."s7 Afterexaminingthis entireepisode in detail, one

has no dispositionto quarrelwithhis assessment. Prior to 1908
no fleetapproachingin strengththatof the United Stateshad
ever made a voyage as far as the distancebetweenHampton
Roads and San Francisco."77 Many foreignexpertswere con-
fidentthatit could not be done successfully.'78Yet the fleet,in
fightingtrim,arrived at Magdalena Bay ahead of schedule,
and then proceeded to circumnavigatethe globe. Without
serious mishap or delay, despite several terrificstorms,and
with unqualifiedsuccess,the battleshipsarrived at Hampton
Roads ready to startout again. Judged by everystandardof
naval efficiency,thefleetreturnedhome,collectivelyand indi-
vidually, a more effectivefightingforce than when it had
started.'7 Henceforthit was evident that the United States
could defendboth of its coastswith vigor and dispatch,and
thatas a naval poweritwas notto be trifledwith.From France
AmbassadorHenryWhite wroteglowinglyof the impression
created,and he describedhow wonderfulit was, in contrast
withtheold dayswhenhe had no fleetat his back,to represent
a nationwithsuch a formidablenavy.1s8
In the light of the evidence presented,it would also seem
as if Roosevelthad good groundsforassertingthatthe cruise
of the fleetwas his most notable contributionto peace. The
trail of friendlinessand good will thatfollowedthe fleetun-
doubtedlyhad permanenteffects, especially upon the tensof
thousandsofimpressionablechildrenwho welcomedthesailors
in Japan. Barriers of ignoranceand misunderstanding were
176Roosevelt to G. H. Grosvenor, January 28, 1908, Roosevelt Papers. He also wrote
that he had "anticipated good in every way . . . but it has far more than come up to
my anticipations." Roosevelt to Sperry,December 5, 90o8,Roosevelt Papers.
177 The voyage of the ill-fated Rozhestvenskifromthe Baltic to Far Eastern waters,
1904-x9o5,was most frequentlycompared with that of the Americans. The Russian
fleet,however, was much less formidable,did not travel nearly so far, and arrived in
wretched condition.
178 Von Tirpitz told Roosevelt in 9ixo that he had not believed that the cruise could
be made successfully,and that the English Naval Officeand Foreign Officehad held the
same view. Bishop, Roosevelt, I1,249.
179See Roosevelt to Kaiser, January 2, 9og9,Roosevelt Papers.
180White to Roosevelt, March 20, 90o8,January 3!, 90o9,Roosevelt Papers.

brokendown, and throughoutthe cruise the functionof the

navyas a police forceand notas a threatwas constantly empha-
sized. But with referenceto peace Roosevelt was probably
thinkingparticularlyof Japan. At the time the cruise was
announcedwar was a distinctpossibility,and with thejingoes
of both countrieswarmingto theirtask,was fastbecominga
probability.This unmistakableexhibitionof naval powerhad
a quietingeffectupon theyellow pressof Japan,but mostim-
portantof all, the cruisegave the Japanesean opportunityto
invitethefleettotheirshoresand demonstrate thattheirfeelings
towardstheUnitedStateswerethoseofthesincerestfriendship.
The ensuingreceptiondispelled all war clouds and paved the
way fora diplomaticrapprochement which,a yearbefore,had
been thoughtimpossible.Whetherthesituationwould in time
have righteditselfis notforthehistorianto say; but it mustbe
admittedthathoweveruntimelyand ill-advisedthecruisemay
have appeared to unfriendly critics,Roosevelt'sdecisionset in
motiona seriesofeventswhichundoubtedlyhastenedtheunder-
standingthatfollowed."' Referringin this connectionto the
Venezuelan episode and his alleged use of the big stickon the
Kaiser,Rooseveltwrote:
The recentvoyageof thefleetaroundtheworldwas notthefirstoccasionin
whichI haveusedit [bigstick]to bringaboutpromptresumption ofpeaceful
relationsbetweenthiscountry and a foreignPower.But of courseoneof the
conditionsofsuchuse is thatit shouldbe accompanied witheverymanifesta-
tionof politenessand friendship - manifestations
whichare sincere,by the
way,forthe foreignpolicyin whichI believeis in veryfactthe policyof
speakingsoftlyand carrying a bigstick.I want to makeit evidentto every
foreignnationthatI intendto do justice; and neitherto wrongthemnor
to hurttheirself-respect; but thaton the otherhand,I am bothentirely
readyand entirelyable to seethatour rightsare maintainedin theirturn.182
The world cruisewas characteristically
Rooseveltian,done
181In I91o, Von Tirpitz and the Kaiser both told Roosevelt that the voyage had
"done more for peace in the Orient than anythingelse that could possibly have hap-
pened." Bishop, Roose'velt,Ii, 250-251. Ambassador Tower reportedthat the Kaiser told
him that in his opinion the fleet prevented an immediate attack by Japan and "the
dismembermentof China." The Kaiser's estimates during this period, however, were
unreliable. Tower to Roosevelt, January 28, x9go, Roosevelt Papers.
182 Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, December 4,
90o8, Roosevelt Papers.

in thegrandmannerthatRooseveltloved.At thetimeit was

announcedthepossibilities of misunderstanding and danger
weregreat.The Japanesemighthavebeengoadedintoa dec-
larationofwar; thefleetmighthavebeenwreckedinthestraits
ofMagellan;itmighthavebeenpounceduponbytheJapanese
inFar Easternwaters;itmighthavebeenstranded inAustralia
whilea Europeansquadronwas ravagingtheAtlanticcoast.3"'
Cautiousstatesmanship would have dictateda further post-
ponement oftheventure.But likea skillful
card playerRoose-
veltcarefullyweighedthe chancesand decidedto sendthe
fleet.His correspondenceabundantly revealsthathe wentinto
thisenterprisewithhiseyesopen.He knewtheshipsandmen,
he
and was confident theycouldgo aroundin safety-a confi-
dencesharedbytheofficers highincommand.'"4He hadreason
to believethattheoddsweredecidedlyagainstwar,and that,
ifhewon,thecruisewouldhavea mostsalutary Had he
effect.
lost, the condemnation of posteritywould deservedlybe
wreakeduponhishead.But he won,as he was accustomed to
winwhenthestakeswerehigh.SomehavecalleditRooseveltian
luck; othershave called it statesmanship. Call it whatyou
will, thehistorianmustadmitthatthisventure, hairbrained
thoughit mayhave beenregardedby manycontemporaries,
wasfar-reaching in itsresultsforgood.
THOMAS A. BAILEY
StanfordUniversity
183Roosevelt considered this point carefully and concluded that relations with all
of the European powers were so good that "it seems in the highestdegree unlikelythat
trouble will occur pending the absence of the fleet" and that he "could not send it to
the Pacific at a bettertime. . ." Roosevelt to L. F. Abbott,September 13, 1907. See also
Roosevelt to Newberry,August 6, 1907, Roosevelt Papers.
184 Roosevelt, Autobiography,566.


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The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909

Author(s): Thomas A. Bailey

This content downloaded from 131.252.96.28 on Sat, 17 May 2014 00:12:55 AM

The world cruise of the American battleshipfleet,from

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work.' In October,1906, theseplans were complicatedby the

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this critical posture,the usually well-informedWashington

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two yearsthe Administration has been perfecting its plans to arrangefor

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Metcalf gave out anotherstatement which,in the lightof his

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therehad been no new developmentswhich implied danger."

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theimprovedstateof feeling,it was notedthattheTokio share

There was, however, an occasional disapproving voice

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professedto see in the projectedcruise an object lesson that

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existedas to whetherthefleet,in case of necessity,could make

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What appearstohave beenan importantfactor-perhapsthe

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thatI am notafraidof themand thattheUnited Stateswill no

Rooseveltappears to have been convincedthatthetimehad

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powerfulfleetever senton a long cruise would not servethis

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topreventthefatalstep."5Eugene Hale, chairmanoftheSenate

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fortunatethat while this jingo campaign was at its height,

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would have been an enormousgain to have had the three

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The firststop of the fleetwas at Port of Spain, Trinidad.

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tinegovernment paiditsrespects ina striking

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so much advantageto the United Statesas the recentvisit of

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cessfulcompletionof what had been widely regarded as an

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en masseand respondedwith"deafeninghurrahs."9 Prepara-

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the fleetbegan its long voyage to Auckland, New Zealand,

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from the United States."'1 Furthermore,Prime Minister

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beento placeour rich,sparselysettled,and as yetundefended countrymore

It is not surprising,then,thatthe Australiansshould have

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FromAustraliathefleetwentto Manila, arrivingon October

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Here and therea voice was raised in the United States to

After leaving Japan on October 25, 1908, the fleetdivided,