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Strydom V Roodewal Management Committee and Another
Strydom V Roodewal Management Committee and Another
Before: De Villiers J
Keywords
Hammond, Harvey and Newton v Union Textile Mills, Ltd 1949 (3) SA 398 (E) - Applied
Judgment
DE VILLIERS, J.: Applicant is a European male and owner of plot No. 70, Roodewal,
District Bloemfontein. First respondent is the Committee of Management of Roodewal,
with corporate capacity, established in terms of the Small Holdings Ordinance 17 of
1954. Second respondent is also a plot-owner in Roodewal. On the 14th September,
1957, one van Vuuren, chairman of first respondent, convened a meeting for the purpose
of electing a 7th member to the Roodewal Committee of Management. Applicant and
second respondent, both registered plot-owners in terms of sec. 40 of Ord. 17 aforesaid,
were the only duly nominated candidates for the vacancy. At
Page 491 of [1958] 1 All SA 489 (O)
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the meeting despite applicant’s protest, the chairman admitted a number of proxy votes
on behalf of second respondent. The majority of votes cast by the members present at the
meeting and the votes cast by proxy were in favour of second respondent, and second
respondent was declared duly elected. The majority of the votes cast by the members
present at the meeting were in favour of applicant.
On the 26th September, 1957, applicant on notice of motion petitioned this Court for an
order
(a)
setting aside the decision of first respondent and/or its chairman allowing the proxy votes
as validly cast votes and declaring second respondent as having been duly elected
(b)
(c)
At the hearing there was no opposition on behalf of first respondent and second
respondent consented to the orders sought. The Court granted the orders as prayed and
intimated that reasons would be handed in later.
“Whenever a legal person or partnership is the owner of land in a smallholding area, such
legal person or partnership may authorise a European person of or over the age of twenty-
one years to vote on its behalf for the purposes of this Ordinance, and such person’s name
shall also appear on the list compiled in terms of sub-sec. (1).”
The crisp question which arises in this case, is, whether the proxy votes in question were
validly cast or not, although, in general, what a person sui juris may do himself, he may
delegate to another to do for him (cf. van der Linden Institutes 1.15.14). There are certain
exceptions. For instance it is against public policy to allow a person to delegate to another
authority to do an unlawful act. (Cf. Story on Agency p. 10). Also, where the act to be
performed is of a personal nature in the sense that the identity and personal attributes of
the performer of the act are of material importance to another who has an interest in its
performance, delegation is not permitted. (Cf. Belonje v. African Electric Co. (Pty.) Ltd.,
1949 (1) S.A. 592 (E); Hammond Harvey & Newton v. Union Textile Mills Ltd., 1949 (3)
S.A. 398 (E)).
the exercise of discretion in the use of a power held for the benefit of a third party, and as
an example of such a power is mentioned the right of a citizen to vote at a public election,
presumably because the citizen is in the position of a fiduciary. In so far as members of a
corporation are concerned it was decided as far back as 1883 in England that by Common
Law they have no right to vote by proxy (cf. Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch.D. at p. 35).
In the light of the foregoing I am of opinion that the proxy votes in question were
wrongly admitted. In Ord. 17 of 1954 the legislature created a special class of persons as
being entitled to vote for the election of members to a committee of management, namely
plot-owners of or over the age of 21 years who are furthermore registered as such in
terms of sec. 40 and are not affected by any of the disabilities referred to in sec. 28. A
member of this class in exercising his or her vote exercises a discretion and in doing so
acts in a fiduciary capacity. Since the Committee to be elected will have power to make
regulations affecting thousands of other persons who have no vote (cf. sec. 51), for this
reason he must exercise his vote personally and cannot delegate his voting power to
another. The present case is an example of the exception to the general rule that a person
may delegate to another a power which he may himself exercise, namely that he may not
do so where by statute he has been chosen by reason of special qualifications to exercise
a particular power in the exercise of which others have an interest. Nor is there any
indication in the statute that the legislature intended otherwise. On the contrary sec. 40
(3) quoted above affords some indication that the legislature intended that all votes
should be cast personally and not by proxy. (Cf. Belonje v. African Electric Co. (Pty.)
Ltd., supra at p. 599).
Appearances
CEL Beck - Advocate/s for the Applicant/s
Parallel Citation
Page 272 of 1958 (1) SA 272 (O)
Parallel Citation
Page 273 of 1958 (1) SA 272 (O)
Parallel Citation
Page 274 of 1958 (1) SA 272 (O)