For the reason that by specific constitutional precept, “no canrot, however, control the specific terms of a statute2s Pill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than once subject Although considered an aid in interpretation, the preamble of an ‘which shall be expressed in the ttle ofthe bill." act or decree is not the law subject thereof.%* In such case, courts “are compelled by the Constitution 40 consider both the body and the tile in order to arrive atthe legislative intention." Thus, one can say that the Title of the law, as well as from. the accompanying Explanatory Note, which provides the context, the situation, the circumstances and the conditions it seeks to As previously discussed, the Title of the law provides an insight as to the content of the instrument as well as to its legislative intent, It declares the subject matter within the ambit of its provisions pursuant to the observance of due process as guaranteed under the Constitution ‘The entire text of the law is considered as an intrinsic ald. It is here where the definitions, if any, are provided, as well as the entire principal provisions of the law are found. Also, we can find within the body of a statute the interrelated provisions that make the entire law as well as references to other provisions of existing laws. Note also, that in the filing of a proposed bill in Congress, this is usually accompanied by an Explanatory Note wherein the author of the measure enunciates the reason behind the proposed legislation. In older laws, one might find that the law contains a Preanible of sorts but in newer legislations, this practice has been done away with in lieu of the accompanying Explanatory Note In examining the Body of the law, one might opt either to adopt a liberal or a strict interpretation or construction depending, on the nature and purpose of the law as well as the Gircumstances within which it was drafted and enacted by the legislature. It is here where the records of the deliberations of Congress — either through its Record or Journal — is, instrumental in assisting you in its examination. As regards the preamble, note that in one case the High ‘Court mentioned that the “whereas” or perambulatory clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking, as they do not form part of the operative language of the law. This therefore depends on a number of things — be it Public policy, the legislative intent, the nature of the law or subject’ matter or the result it will provide taking into consideration the attainment of justice and observance of equity in law. Though helpful to the extent that they articulate the ‘general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, they + Llamado vs. Court of Appeals, G.A, No. 84850, {1989}; 174 SCRA 566 citing Yaz09 & Mississipi Valey A. Co. v Thomas, 182 US 174 [1989], 23 L. Ea. 202, {and Kaho Commission on Human Rights vo. Gampbel, 506 P. 2d 112; 95 1 218 1973), 38 See 21 [1], Art. VI, Const, #4 City of Baguio vs. Marcos, No. L-26100. February 28, 1969; cing 37 A.LAL 952 ™* People vs. Balasa, G.R. Nos. 106357, 108607-02, [1996] 295 SCRA 49,85, 186 187‘Thus, when the interpretation of the law according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart ot contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. If, on the other hand, the provision of the law is clear and unequivocal, then one only needs to implement the law regardless of the seemingly harsh effect it would create. Dura lex sed lex. In the interpretation or construction of the provisions of a law, contract or any instrument, particularly its Body, one may encounter and resort to, infer ali, some of the following: a) Casus Omissus; b) Stare Decisis; «) Distinetions; A) Exceptions; ©) General é Special Terms; 8) Ejusdem Generis; §) Iictusio Unius; h) Associated Words; 1) Negative Word: j) Mandatory & Directory Words; k) Conjunctive & Disjunctive Words; }) Computation of Time; and m) Functions of a proviso, 188 Casus Omissus Literally translated as — a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted — applies when a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases or objects, but ‘omits to make any provision for a case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen, it is called a “casus omissus”. ‘The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can ope-ate and apply only if and when omissions have been clearly established. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally” As settled by the High Court in an early case — “Where the provisions of law are couched in mrtdatory form, courts should not distinguish between material and immaterial omissions. What the law decrees must be obeyed. "24 A word of caution though, such omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts. ‘The High Court established early on that courts are not at liberty to supply the omissions in statutes, that would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of legislation 2 The rule of “casus omisus pro omisso habendus est can operate and ‘apply only ifand when the emission has been clearly established, ™ Ghua vs, CSC, 208 SCRA 65 {1962}; People vs. Manantan, § SCRA 684 (962) Serna vs. CFI of Bukidnon, 24 SCRA 715 (1968) Luzon Brokerage vs. PSC, 87 Phil 536 189In the case at bar, the Legislature aid not exclude or omit justices ofthe pence from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan politcal activites. Rather, they were merely called by another term — "judges ‘The rte, therefore, has no applicability to the instant cnse People vs, Manantari® Manantan_was charged with violation of the Revised Election Code because despite being a justice of the peace, he still participated in the electoral process. Defendant, however, interposed the defense that the term “justice of the peace” was not included in the enumeration Inid down by the law. ‘The provision of law in question read — "No justice, judge, ical, treasurer, or assessor of amy province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any ‘amdidate, or exert any influence i any marener in any election oF take part iherein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve pubiic peace, if he isa poace office.” When Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words “justice of the peuce,” the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation. 1s justice of the poace included i the probibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code? In ruling against the defense, the High Court observed that the argument overlooks one fundamental fact. [tis to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word “judge” was modified or qualified by the phrase “of Firs! Instance”, while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such ‘modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i, judge of the First Instance and justice 8 No. L-14129, 5 SCRA SSA [1962| 190 ‘of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity anymore to include justices of the peace in the ‘enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, “judge.” It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace, ‘The rule of “casus omisus pro omisso habendus est” is cewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the ‘operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, The rule, however, has no applicability to the case atbar ‘The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude ‘or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers preciuded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 5 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called “judges.” Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been ‘omitted intentionally?! Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been ‘omitted intentionally.22 1 La BugalBLaan Tribal Assocation, inc. vs. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148, January 27, 2004 People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, July 31, 1962 191Stare Decisis “Stare decisis et non quieta movere”2% Store decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. 24 ‘This is the bedrock of what we now refer to as precedents. Itis a general rule that, when a point has been settled by a decision, it becomes a precedent which should be followed in subsequent cases before the same court. The rule is based wholly on policy, in the interest of uniformity and certainty of the law, ut is frequently departed from.255 The doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adapted by the United States In our very own jurisdiction, the Civil Code echoes this by declaring that — judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the tegal system of the Philippines2 The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere is embodied in Article § of the Civil Code of the Philippines 2% ‘This is the doctrine that, when a court has once laid down @ principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same. Follow past precedents and do not 25 From sete precedents, thero must be no departure 1 Dela Cruz vs. Cour of Appeals, 305 SCRA 209, March 25, 109 5 Cail, Cyclopodie Law Dietonary [1922] Ting vs. Volez-Ting, 582 SCRA 894 2000} = Anicle 8 8 Lazatin vs. Desierto, $88 SCRA 265 (2000) 192 disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the mers cannot be subject of litigation again, But note that this rule does not elicit blind adherence to precedents.2" Its based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.2# ‘Only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.251 The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall {form part ofthe legal system ofthe Philippines. ‘The rule follows the settied legal maxim — “legis interpretato legis vim obtinet"” — that the interpretation placed! upon the written lao by a competent court has the force ofl. PESCA vs, PESCA%® Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca were a married couple Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean- going vessel barely a month after the marriage. After establishing their residence, the couple could only stay together for 2 months in a year — when respondent was fon vacation. But despite this they begot four ehildzen. Chong vs. Sactetary of Labor, 79 Phi. 240 * Fermin ve, People, 550 SCRA 152 [2008] 2 Lazatin vs. Desieni, 588 SCRA 285 [2003], #2 GF No, 196921 (2001), 193It was only in 1988, when petitioner began to notice that respondent showed signs of “psychological innpacity” to perform his marital covenant. He was emotionally immature, an irresponsible Ihusbond, cruel and violent, and was also a habitual drinker, Petitioner and their children was also treated ‘with physical violence, Loran filed a petition to the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity, On November 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void ab initio, This decision, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals ‘on the basis that Lorna failed to show proof that Zosimo was indeed suffering from psychological ineapacity that would cause him to be incognitive of the basic marital covenant, Appellant filed 2 petition for review with the Supreme Court contending that the doctrine laid out by Santos vs. CA? and Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals. and Molina should have no retroactive application and on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature ‘The appellant further contends thatthe application of the Satos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal Did the Court of Appeals err in giving retvoactioe ‘application to the doctrine laid oxt in Santos vs. Court of ‘Appeats and Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina? ‘The High Court found no merit in the petition, ‘The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article B of the 2 1998 1097 194 Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rue follows se settled legal maxim — “gi interpretado legis vim obtinet” — that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. ‘The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. ‘The latter as so interproted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute isenacted, Ibis only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and hhave acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “ex prospicit, non respci.” ‘The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise.25 ‘Once a case has been decided one way, the rule is settled that any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner under the principle stare Aecisis et nom quieta movere.26 ‘The principle of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for ‘when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that © Republic vs, Nilas, 512 SCRA 286, January 29, 2007 2 Petron Corporation vs. Commission of intemal Revenue, 626 SCRA 100, July 28,2010 195principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.2” Distinctions Ubi lex non distingwit nec nos distinguere debemus26% When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish2® ‘The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance 27° ‘The courts should administer the law not as they think it fought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.2" If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court? If the intention ofthe law in the second paragraph were to refer onty fo Iomicide and murder, it should have expressly said so. Verily, where the tax doesnot distinguish, neither should we. Sison vs, People” Around 8:00 PM. of April 16, 2003 the vie boarded a passenger van owned and driven by Sison at the Bocaue toll gate. She sat at the front seat as it was the ‘only vacant seat. One by one, the passengers alighted 207 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Thied Division), 268 SCAA16, March 07, 1997 2 yee the law does not estinguish, we should not distinguish 28 Mania intematlonal Airport authority vs. CA, 495 SCRA $91 [2008] 2% Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Sank vs. Equitable Banking Corporation, 187 SORA 188 [1988] 271 Roxas & Company Inc. vs, DAMBA-NFSW, €07 SCRA 33 [2000]; Phiippine ‘Bish Assurance Company ws. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987], 2” Castillo vs, Univide Warehouse Club, 619 SCRA 641 [2010}, 2G. R. No, 187228 (2012) 196 upon reaching Quezon City and the victim was the only [passenget left who is supposed to alight at Aurora Blvd. Accused told her that he had no change for the bill she paid thus accused continued driving but when he did rot stop in a store they passed by, the victim felt uneasy, texted her officemates then told accused she would alight however he suddenly pulled her nearer to him by putting his right hand on her shoulder and pointed a gun at her chest. ‘Accused continued to drive for about 10-20 ‘minutes until they reached a motel in Sta. Mesa. Accused ragged the vietim inside a room, satisfied his bestial desires, and directed her to dress up and warned he would shoot her if she made any scene outside. Accused dropped her off somewhere in Cubao after getting her cell phone number. The victim boarded a taxi and proceeded to her office where she narrated to her supervisor and officemates what happened to her. They accompanied her to Police Station 7 where she reported the ineident and executed a sworn statement at around 12:20 a.m of April 17, 2000. Policemen immediately conducted follow-up operations which led to the arrest of the accused in front of Baliwag Bus Terminal, Cubao, QC. recovered from hhim was a 45 caliber pistol with serial number Adt4 and five (5) ammunitions. Accused’ Permit to Carry Firearm No. 1-B149052 has already expired on January 11, 2003 ‘April 24, 2003, Medico-Legal Report submitted by Dr, Carpio stated that — "Subject is im non-virgin state piiysicaily, There are wa external signs of application of any form of trauma.” Other issues asile, did the Court of Appenis err in affirming the decision of Regional Trial Court sentencing the accused of legal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions as a separate ofense under Republic Act No. 8294? In reversing the Court of Appeals, the High Court hold that there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms in the commission of any erime. 197al In this case, the plain meaning of Republic Act No. 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant as penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. ‘The law is clear — the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime veas committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second parageaph were to refer only to homicide and mucdes, it should have expressly said so. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application 274 The word “Congress” used in Article VIL, Section (2) of the Consttttion is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever i= ‘made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, bet that, in ether case, only a singular representative may be allowed 10 sit in the JBC. Chaves vs. [BCP In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC — cone from the Fouse of Representatives and ane from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. ‘Then, the JBC er banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Escudero and Congressman Neil Tupas, then simultaneously sat inthe JBC as representatives ofthe legislature 2 Alonto vs. People, 445 SCRA 624, December 09, 2004 7 aps 16,2013 198 It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress." I is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory ‘components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either dlivests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution, Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which isto legislate. ‘Thus, when Section 8(1), Articte VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses ‘which comprise the entire Congress, Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the [BC's current composition. ‘The respondents also questioned petitioner's belated filing of the petition. Does the current practice of the JBC to perform its furetions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are tmienthers of Congress, run counter fo the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution? The word “Congress” used in Article VIL, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in sither ease, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the IBC. ‘The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate In voting Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the slatute asa whole and not of av isolated part or a particular provision atone. This is a cardial rule of statutory construction. For take int the abstract, a ‘word or phrase might casily convey a meaning quite different from the one ‘actusity intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those 199‘with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a Timited application if viewed together with ather provisions Aboitiz Shipping vs. City of Cebu ‘The case involved the legislative powers of the Municipal Board under the law which provided, inter alia, that — except as otherwise provided by lace, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: (x) To fe the charges to be paid by all waterrafts tansing at or using public toharves, docks, levees, or landing places ‘The lower court ruled upholding appelices contention inthis respect, that in using the terms “public toaroes, dock, levees, ar lending places,” the legislature made no distinction between those owned by. the National Government and those owned by the City of ‘Cebu and that consequently both fall within the scope of the power granted, May the City of Cebu provide by ordinance for the callecton of wharfuge from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharees of piers located in said city but ‘owned by the National Government? ‘The word "public’, as employed to describe wharf, does not refer to its ownership either by the ‘National Government or by a province of municipality, It denotes rather the nature of its use, ‘Thus public wharves have been held to be those used generally by the public, free of charge or for compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive enjoyment or use thereof, Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use, the right lo impose wharfage dues rests on a different basis — that of ownership. For wharfage is a charge against the vessel by way of rent oF compensation for its being allowed to lie em 1ascnAag 200 alongside a wharf for the purpose of loading or unloading freight Under the foregoing test the right to collect the wharfage in question here belongs to the National Governmeni, as in fact It has always collected the same from appellants. Tris unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves” in Section 17(w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved, ‘The National Government did not sureender such ownership to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose. Section 17(w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a ‘ease in point. It authorizes the Municipal Board to fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts Ianding at or using ‘public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. ‘There is indeed no distinction therein between public wharves owned by the National Government and those owned by the city itself But the subsection immediately preceding (v) impliedly establishes such a distinction. It empowers the Municipal Board “to provide for the construction and ‘maintenance, and regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, pers, docks and levees." It seems fairly evident that when the lawmaking, body used the term ‘public wharves, etc." in subsection 2, it meant to refer to those mentioned in the preceding. subsection, namely, the "public wharves, et.” constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebs. Section 30 of the charter has a similar bearing on the question, in granting to the City Engineer "the cre and custoy fal pic docks, wharves, pers, levers, ad lending places, when erected” — undoubtedly referring. to those 201constructed and owned by the city. For in so far as those belonging to the National Government are concerned they remain under the exclusive control, direction and management of the Bureau of Customs, according to Section 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. And appellants have accordingly been paying to the National Government fees for the use of its wharves in Cebu, pursuant to law, particularly Republic Act Ne. 1371 which took effect on July 1, 1955 and was later on embodied in the new Tariff and Customs Code. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is 2 cardinal rule of statutory construction, For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which icis associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio27 Ubi lex non distinguit , nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, we ‘ought not to distinguish2 In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application.2* 2” Ot things dissimilar, the rule i cssinitar 2% Commissioner of Internal Raverue vs. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 456 SCRA 414, Ape 15, 2008 = Alonto vs. People, 445 SCRA.24, December 09, 2004 202 there are facts and islature intended a The courts may distinguish when circumstances showing that the le distinction or qualification 9 Exceptions Exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exeptis.28 Every rule is subject to its own exception and every exception is a rule2® In statutory construction, the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify ita Since “The Inside Story” is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which # has power of review — It then follows that since “The Inside Story” isa television program, it i within the Jurisdiction ofthe MTRCD over which it has power of review. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board ‘vs, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation’ (On October 15, 1991, respondent ABS-CBN sited “Prostitution,” an episode of the television (TV) program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda, It depicted female students. moonlighting. as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees, In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed ‘The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the Garda vs Sales, Jc, 274 SORA 767, Api 18, 1997 An exception estabshos the ul ast things not excepted * Omnis regulat suas pttur exceptions est omnis excepto est regula, SMTROB vs. ABS-CBN, 488 SCRA 7S (2005) +448 SCRA S75, January 17,2005, 203facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served! as the background of the episode. ‘The showing of “The Inside Story” caused uptoar in the PWU community. Dr, Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and ‘Teachers Association filed _letter-complainis with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some ofits female students, In their answer, respondents explained that the “The Inside Story” is a “public afeirs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial,” the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom af expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no Power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, imposing a Php 20,000.00 fine on respondents with a directive that future shows shall be sent prior to its showing to the MTRCB, which was then affirmed by the MTRCB Chair. Said decision was subsequently set aside by the Region a Trial Court. The issue for resolution of the High Court was whether the MIRCB had the power or authovly to review the “The Inside Story” prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is ‘compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it Ubi lex now distinguit nee distinguere debemes. Thus, when the law says “all television programs,” the word “all” covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. ‘The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression, It then follows that since “The Inside Story” is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MIRCB over ‘which it has power of review. Here, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term “television programs” on the ground that the "The Inside Story” is a “public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial” protected under Section 4, Article Ill of the Constitution. Albeit, respondent's basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo, but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a. preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each ‘man to believe as his conscience directs x x x." Yel despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, stil this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia inf Cristo’: religious program from petitioner's review power. ‘Moreover, Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story’ is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press, However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision fon freeciom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of PD. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and 2) newsteets Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the “The Inside Story” falls under the eategory of newsreels, which to the mind of the High Court was unpersuasive. It observed that — PD. No. 1986 does not define “newsreels.” Webster's dictionary defines newsreels as 205short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events, A glance at actual samples of newsreels shows that they are mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. Some concrete examples are those of Dziga Vertov's Russian Kino-Pravda newsreel series (Kino-Prawa means literally “flm-truth,” a term that was later translated literally into the French cinema write) and Frank Capra's Why We Fight series. Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of events. They are depiction of “actualites.” Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. No. 1985 define newsreels a5 “siraight news reporting. as distinguished fram news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels” Clearly, the “The inside Story” cannot be considered a newsreel, It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news treatment; cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Certainly, such kind of program is thin, petitioner's review power. It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review “The Inside Story.” Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner vielated Section 4, Article Ill (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no lave shall be passed! abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press, Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing, ‘of the program, Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner “The Inside Story” for its review and approval. Therefore, we nced not resolve whether certain provisions of Presidential Decree No, 1986 and the MIRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution When the law does not make any exception, courts may ot except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. Excepto firmat regula in. casibus non exceptis.25 28 The exception confirms the goneral rue in'eases not within the exception, 206 Exceptions are usually introduced in the body of the law through the use of provisos. General and Special Terms General terms in a statute are to receive a general consrruction, unless retained by the context or by plain inferences from the scope and purpose of the law. General terms or provisions in a statute may be restrained and limited by specific terms or provisions with which they are associated. Special terms in a statute may sometimes be ‘expanded to a general signification by the consideration that the reason of the law is general. When a statute defines the particular words and phrases it uses, the legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense2* General laws are universal ix nature, itis sole basis for it speaks for ‘the common good, unless it is otherwise stated; and special laws are said to have exception and not everyone oat adhere to its provisions also usiless otherwise stated. I is a rule in general that the special provision of the lo ‘must prevail over the general. Duque vs. Veloso™ Veloso who was then the district supervisor of Quedan_and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation was administratively charged with three counts of dishonesty connection with unauthorized withdrawals of money. The respondent was found guilty of the charges and dismissed from the service, ‘The respondent appealed citing the following mitigating circumstances: (1) The respondents length of * Ofca0 vs. COMELEG, 616 SCRA 684 [2010], * 679 SCRA676 [20121 207service was 18 years; (2) The prompt admission of ‘culpability; 8) The return of money; (4) The respondent's status asa first time offender. Thus, the Court of Appeals considered and just dismissed him to (1) year of service without pay. The Civil Service Commission argued that there is no mitigating circumstance to warrant reduction of penalty Does Section 53 of Rule IV of the Uniform Ralls, pertaining to the general provision of appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstance apply to ‘administrative cases? ‘The High Court ruled in the negative General laws are universal in nature, it is a sole basis for it speaks for the common good, unless it is otherwise stated; and special laws are said to have exception and not everyone can adhere to its provisions also unless otherwise stated, It is a rule in general that the special provision of the law must prevail over the general ‘The offense made by the respondent isa betrayal of public ust and considered a social injustice which cannot be defended with mitigating circumstances, for dishonesty for a public office i so dishonesty for from the government and there is no excuse fo any necessary punishment provided tot Where there isin the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its mast comprehensive sense would include what 3s fembracest in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general Tanguage as are net within the provisions ofthe particular enactment Manila Railroad ‘v2, Collector of Customs Dust shields are manufactured of mixed wool and hair. The component material of chief value is the wool ‘6 52 Phil 950 [1925] 208 and are used by the Manila Railroad Company on all of its rallway wagons, ‘The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oll deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel “Dust guard,” which isthe same as “dust shiet." is defined in the work Car Builders’ Cyclopedia of ‘American Practice, 10th ed, 1922, p. 41, as follows: “A thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guar chamber at the back ofa journal box, ‘and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to exchude dust and lo prevent the escape of oft and waste, Sometimes called axle packing or box packing.” Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that dust shields should be classified as “manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.” That decision is entitled to our respect. The burden is, ‘upon the importer to overcome the presumption of 2 legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right.2* On the other hand, Judge del Rosario, took an ‘opposite view, overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs, and held that dust shields should be classified as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. This ‘impartial finding is also entitled to our respect. It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying faxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import ofthe language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the Gtizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor Colector of Customs [1913}. 26 Phi, 647 4 Emarct vs, Schvoader [1894], 155 U. S., 124; Bahn, Moyer of Co. vs. 209presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import =° The question involved in this appeal is the following: How should dust shields be classified for the purposes of the funder paragraph 141 or under paragraph 197 of section 8, ofthe Tariff Laz of 19097 ‘There are present two fundamental considerations which guide the way out of the legal dilemma, The first is by taking into account the purpose of the article and then acknowledging that its in reality used as a detached part of railway vehicles. The second point is that paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision, Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most ‘comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment?” The High Court then concluded that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8, of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to elassify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import: 5 U.S. vs, Wigglesworth [1842], 2 Story, 60; Froohlich of Kuttnar v3, Collector ‘of Customs [1911], 18 Pail, 461, . 125 A.C. Lp. 1010, citing numerous cases 210 Construction of General and Particular Provisions. — Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a genesal one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affec: only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment, Ejusdem Generis, Loosely translated as — of the same kind. In construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, when certain things are enumerated, and then a phrase is used which might be construed to include other things, itis generally confined! to things ejusdem generis. ‘Thus, “clerical or other defects” includes only formal defects? This rule is commonly called the “ejusdem generis” rule, because it teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as “and all others”, or “any others", are usually to be restricted to persons or things “of the same kind” or class with those specially named in the preceding words. ‘An enumeration of a class of things includes all others of the same class. It is a general rule of statutory construction that Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such gencral words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but, are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned ‘The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an 2c Wis, 682. © Osmena vs, Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 [1993 antenumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include — or to be restricted to — things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or elass as, those specifically mentioned 2 ‘The purpose of the rule on ejusidem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the Particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have sed only general terms. But this rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary. ‘The rule of gjusdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated.2% Rule of ejusiden generis is merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of 2 particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.2”” ** Liwag vs. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, 675 SCRA 744 [2012] ™ Pelitloy Realy vs. Province of Benguet, 695 SCRA 491 [2013] ¢ Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Securty Commission, 1 SORA 10 1961] 2 Philippine Basketball Association vs. Cour of Appeals, 397 SCRA 856 [2000] 212 : ‘The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general cord or phrase fllots an enumeration of particular and specie words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include — or to be restricied to — things akin to or resembling. or of the same kind or clas as, those specifically mentioned. Liwag vs. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association®™ ‘The controversy stemmed from a water facility in Happy Glen Loop Subdivision situated in Deparo, Caloocan City. The original developer of the subdivision obtain a loan from the Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt it assigned all its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision to the latter. ‘The new owner thereafter represented to. buyers as well as to government housing agencies that a water facility was available and operating within said subdivision. This water facility was located on Lot 11, Block 5 of the subdivision, When this parcel of land was sold to Hermogenes, Liwag wrote a leter to the association demanding the removal of the water tank on sald parcel of land which was refused arguing that i€ was considered as an “open Space”. This was agreed to by the HLURB Arbiter but was reversed by the Board of Commissiones. Is the parcel of land in question considered an open space? Contrary to petitioner's contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, the High Court found that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established by the subdivision owner and the original developer of the subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the residents! sole source of water. ‘The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by 675 SCRA 74d [2012] 213214 Prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through prescription, ‘The term “open space” is defined in Presidential Decree No. 1216 as “an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of ‘worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers aud other similar eciities and amenities. Considering that said Decroe makes no specific ‘mention of areas reserved for water facilities, the High Court resorted to the use of statutory construction to determine whether these areas fall under “other similar facilities ana amenities.” ‘As observed by the Court — the basie statutory ‘construction principle of gjusdem generis states that where @ general word or phrase follows an enumeration of articular and specific words of the-same class, the {general word or phrase isto be construed to include — or to be restricted to — things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned Applying this principle to the afore-quoied Section 1 of Presidential Decree No, 1216, it found that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community, ‘Thus, the phrase “other similar feclities and ‘amenities” should be interpreted in like manner, Here, the water facility was undoubtedly established for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic need in human settlements, without which the community would not survive. ‘The High Court therefore ruled that, based on the Principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of the law to create and maintain a healthy environment in human settlements, the location of the walter facility in the Subdivision must form part of the area reseryed for open space. Such illness must be grave enough fo bring about the disability ofthe pariy to assume the essential obligations of marriage. — Such illness must be ‘grave enough f0 bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential Obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterilogical peculiarities, mood chaages, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes Theillness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much tess il will. In other words, there is a natal or supzroening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapactates the person from really ‘accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential fo marriage. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Moting® Roridel Otaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year afte. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of hhis job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roricel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week latex, The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her ‘own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he eppeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 1 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the Regional ‘Trial Court's decision. Hence, the present recourse. Should the condition of opposing or conflicting personalities be construed as psychological incapactly? GR 108783, 13 February 1997 215216 ‘The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal. and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the Parl of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long hhaul for the attainment of the principal objectives of ‘marriage: where said conduct, observed and considered a8 a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats. the very objectives of marriage ‘warrants the dissolution of the marriage. ‘The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos vs, Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to ‘no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated. and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendiment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological Incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give ‘meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of 2 “cifculty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the Performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable diferences” and. “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the Buldelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing, any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: 8) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintii, ) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and cleacly ‘explained in the decision; €) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; 4) the incapacity must be dlinically er medically permanent or incurable; such illness must be grave ‘enough; 8) the essential marital obli must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 229 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their chile 8) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial ‘Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and 1) the trial must order the fiseal and the Solicitor General to appeal as counsels for the State, Root case of pycolegi incpaciy ist be leifed as a pepdotopte ns ats iepcine nave fly exated pe Eaton may be given by guid pyc and cna poeta Te ra emus of the paychlegia icipcty mat ef) meal oF lineally Send, () aged In The complaint, suicetly proven Dy espe and () cary explained inthe devi. Arti of he Fm Code ‘epares ha the incipacty mast be pechlogtal nol physi alte is Irene andor syns ny be pst. The codence must eonsnce Bie out that the parti, oro of hom os mentally oF pohly io Such an extent tht the prs cold nol hace Ko the biaions he os Aecaming- or hsoiig ther, ould not have gen vali esuption thee. Alough no example of sich incapacity nel be given Hee som nlf the application of the provision ner the prinple of Guadem seers, eval sc ese mt be elie ea pj! Hess ad 217its incapacitating watwre fully explained, Expert evidence may be given t ‘qualified psychiatrists and clinical pychologists. oes In connection with the preceding case, note that in one case, the High Court observed that — Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marviage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to the Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to, tis quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to a a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. marriage Mutue vs. Comelecd The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units euipped with sound systems and loud spenkers” on 22 October 1970 Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to frue speech. Respondent however contended that the Prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful idates “lo purchase, produce, request or distribute scmple ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashligh, attic goods ot ‘materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigaretes, ‘and the like, wohether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by Petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the lke,” * Do the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like"? ‘ , ‘=° Santos vs. Cour ot Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) "GR L.92717, 96 SCRA 228, 26 November 1870 218 ‘The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distelbution of gadgets of the kind, referred to a a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like."). Taped jingles, therefore, were not prohibited Applying the principle in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, ie, “where general words follow an enumeration oF persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general ‘words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held 43 applying ony to persons or things ofthe same Kind! or clas ws those specifically mentioned,” section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAD’s dispositions are binding om ‘administrative or executive agencies. — Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having the “force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision.” ‘The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of the COSLAPs determinations, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions “shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same.” An agercy is defined by statute as “any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or gevernmtent-owned or controlled corporation, oF a local government or a distinct wnit therein.” A department, on the other hand, “refers 219fo an executive department created by law.” Whereas, a bureau is understood to refer “to any, principal subdivision of any department.” In tum, an office “refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to axty major functional unit of @ department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to «any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions ave defined by law or regulation,” An instrumentality is deemed to refer “lo ay agency of the National Government, not integrated ‘within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by lat, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds and enjoying operational autonomy, ustally through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.” Applying the principle in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, ie., “where general words follow an enumeration or persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not fo be construed in their widest extent, but are to bre heli as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class 4s those specifically mentioned,” section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently inclicates that the COSLAPs dispositions are binding on ‘administrative or executive agencies. The history of the COSLAP itself bolsters this view. Prior enactments enumerated its ‘member agencies among, which it was to exercise a coordinating function.20 To reiterate — under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such {general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.% {6° United Fesidents of Dominican Hi, Inc. vs. Commission on the Settlement ot Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782, March 07, 2001 © Philippine Basketball Association vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 358, ‘August 06, 2000 220 Inclusio Unius Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other..% As such the legal maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio aiterius” finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The phrase “intclusio unius est exclusio alterius” refers to the general tule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, of consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Such rule, however, is not applicable if the application would result in manifest injustice or when there is no reason for the exception. The maxim “inclusion unius est exclusio alterius” does not apply where the omission of something which othe-wise within the statute has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment.%% Inclusio unius est exclusio aiterius. ‘The solemn power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the Jaw do not include the power to correct the law by reading into it what is not written therein.” People vs. Estenzo™® Th a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastcal Court, Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public’ land. Respondent Aotes filed on 23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Republie Act No, 931 as amended by Republic Act No. 6236, Aotes claimed that since the ‘+ Pope vs. City our of Say, 74 SCRA 247, December 09, 1978, *** Lanid ve, Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 739, June 29,2000 ‘6 Mobil Ol Philipines vs. Reyes, 124 SCRA379 [198] *” Subicio Lines, ne. vs. Curso, 615 SCRA'S75, March 17,2010 £98 GA L-05376, 99 SORA 651, 11 September 1980 221222 time limit for filing applications for free patents. and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete andl imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended untit 31 December 1980. ‘The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendezed decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of 44 each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed the instant petition, Was the extension provided for under Republic Act No. £6263 also apply tothe re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings? Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention. is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, a8 a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind, If Republic Act No. 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to exelude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in Republic Act No. 6236 is made clearer by reference to Republic Act No. 2061 which includes the reapening of cadastral cases, but not so included in Republic Act No, 6236 ‘Thus, Republic Act No, 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents! contention. It will be noted that while Republic Act No. 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968, no. similar provision is found in Republic Act No. 6236 expressly extending the ime limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for by the Republic Act No, 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law, Republic Act No. 2061, expressly did, Truly, the extension provided for by Republic Act No, 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant ease, a proceeding entirely different from “ling an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.” ‘The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example” ‘The rule is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation which may be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. This maxim may be disregarded if adherence’ thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship, and injury to public interest.310 People vs. Mapa ‘The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 fn connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by Republic Act No. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in his and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. ‘The accused further stated that he isa secret agent appointed. by Gow. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidence of appointment. ®* Coconut Oil Retiners Assaciation vs, Totes, 485 SCRA 47 [2006], 9 Paople ws. Romualiez, 887 SORA 123 [2008], QR, No, L-22901 (1967), 223In hiss defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must be acquitted. because he is a secret agent which qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police and is covered by Article 879 Does the appointment to and holding of the positon of ‘a secret agent to the provincial governor constitute a sufcient defense to « prosecstion forthe crime of illegal possession of “frcarn and anmunition? ‘The law cannot be any clearer, No provision is made for a secret agent It stated that except as thereafter specifically allowed — “Tt shall be unlwful for any person tone possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms oF ammunition Uierfir, oF ‘any instrument or implement used or intended to be used i the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammanition.” ‘The next section provides that “firearms and ‘ammunition regularly and laufully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, oF marines fof the Armed Forces of the Philippines), the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureaw of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, ‘municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,” are not covered “iahen such firearms are in possession of such officials and publie sercants forse inthe performance oftheir oficial duties” ‘Therefore, the defendant is not exempted, The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio atterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other312 2" Conde vs. Abaya, 18 Phil 249, March 29, 1909 224 Associated Words This refers to the reference and use of associated words. Under the principle of “noscitur a soci,” when a particular word fo hrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is fourd or with which itis associated 30 Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which itis associated 1! Under this rule, the meaning of a particular term in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to it in the same statue. Stated differently, the obscurity or doubt on a particular word or phrase may be removed by reference to associated words. Its a fundamental Principle of statutory construction that words employed in a Statue are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related 36 This rule is adopted by our very own Civil Code when dealing with contracts stating that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful jones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 2% Gaca-Gola Bots Philppines vs. Gomez, 671 SCRA 18 [2008] Repub ve. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCA 721909) 2 Kua vs, Barbora, 542 SCRA'590 {2008} 2 ang Bagong Bayanl vs. COMELEC, 959 SCRA 698 [2001] 7 aoe 1374 225Under the dactrine of noscitur a sociis, «proper construction migy be iad by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in ‘question fs founded or with which itt associated. People vs. Betlo%* Graft charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan ‘against the Legal Department Head of the AFP-RSBS and other respondents, It was discovered by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that when acquiring lands, the AEP- SBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale, One would be an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price, which would be kept by the Legal Department and the other one would be a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price, which would be given to the vendors, This scheme enabled the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to tenable the vendors to pay lesser taxes, Respondents moved for dismissal arguing that the Sandigantuyare had no jurisdiction over them, being heads fof government-owned and controlled corporation: which was granted Does the Sandigantayan hee jurisdiction over these respondents? The Sandiganbayan invoked the doctrine of noscitur 4 soci, Under this doctrine, the proper construction may. be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in question was found az with which it is associated. Said doctrine was used in clarifying the meaning of the term “manager” as used in the law. It claimed that since the word “manager” was used with the words “present, directors, or trustees,” it was intended that the term “manager” be limited to officers who have ‘over-all control and supervision of GOCCs, Petitioner, however, argued otherwise and declared that “manigers" donot have the same responsibility as presidents or directors and_ instead, belong to a distinct class of corporate. officials, “Managers” under the law are deemed to have change of a 678 SORA 208 (2012 226 corporation's division or department. The decision was therefore reversed and the cases reinstated. Under the principle of “noscitur a sociis,” when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Further, according to the maxim noscitur a socils, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made cleat and specific by considering, the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated 2 ‘More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Soctis) provides that where a particular word or plrase in a statement is artbiguous in tse or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning mary be made clear and specific by considering the company in twhich itis found or with ohich itis associated.” Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner for the reversal of the Decision dated August 14, 1974 In said Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan which found petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act, Petitioner was said to have willfully, unlawfully, ‘and feloniously acted as an agent in the procurement of fan Insurance by soliciting therefor the application of Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, in the amount of Php 5,000.00, without having been licensed to do so. Rodolfo Aisporna, petitioner's husband, was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Coca-Cola Bottles, Pils, Inc. (CCBPI vs. Gomez, 871 SCRA 18, November 14,2008 % People vs. Flores, 629 SCRA 478, August 25, 2010 199 SORA 446, G.A. No, L-59418 [1982] 227