Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

Author(s): James Gouinlock

Source: Ethics , Apr., 1978, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Apr., 1978), pp. 218-228
Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2379941

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Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

James Gouinlock
Emory University

John Dewey was once preeminent among American moral philosophers.

His ideas were thought to be morally enlightened, innovative, and a basis
for further development. In the last thirty years, however, his reputation has
suffered a decline. This reversal would be unobjectionable if it were traceable
to crucial defects in his analyses, and there are doubtless today philosophers
by the hundred who are confident that precisely such defects account for
Dewey's loss of stature.
If philosophers believe they have no compelling reason to study Dewey's
works, they can do so on what seems to be very good authority: There have
been two distinguished critics who declare great admiration for Dewey's
work and yet are constrained to say they find it essentially defective. Both
Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson have reluctantly judged that
Dewey's ethical theory fails at decisive points. 1
My contention is that White and Stevenson have created a near total
misunderstanding. It is not that there are flaws of logic in their respective
critiques, but they have misconceived the very nature of Dewey's moral
thought. In this paper I will confine myself to indicating the systematic
misunderstandings by White and Stevenson; but these reflect typical pre-
suppositions about the problems, aims, and methods of moral philosophy.
These presuppositions are mistakenly imputed to Dewey. Hence, what is
fundamentally at issue is a distinctive conception of moral philosophy. It is
an issue which has too long been left in obscurity, but it can only be treated
in passing in the present paper. The focus here will be on Dewey's theory
of moral deliberation. White's arguments will be considered first, then Ste-
venson s.

1. Morton White first criticized Dewey in his article, "Value and Obligation in
Dewey and Lewis," Philosophical Review 58, no. 4 (July 1949): 321-30. Essentially the same
argument was repeated in chap. 13 of his Social Thought in America (New York: Viking
Press, 1949). Charles L. Stevenson analyzed Dewey's ethical theory in chap. 12 of Ethics and
Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944) and in essay 6 of Facts and
Values (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963). (The latter essay was first publishe
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 62 [1961-62], under the title, "Reflections
on John Dewey's Ethics.")
?0 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0014-1704/78/8803-0003$01.02

218

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 219 Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

Taking "The Construction of Good"2 as most representative of Dewey's

ethical theory, White fastens upon the way in which Dewey distinguishes
the desired from the desirable. In every case, White reads "desirable" as
"ought to be desired" or-less commonly-"imposing an obligation." "The
problem," says White, "is to give an analysis of 'a is desirable' when it is
construed as meaning 'a ought to be desired.' "3 White understands Dewey
to be arguing that "desirable" means "desired under normal conditions."
"The important point is that Dewey thinks that judgments of desirability
are simply judgments that something is desired under conditions which have
been thoroughly investigated in the way that the scientist checks his test
conditions. "4 "The Construction of Good" is taken as specifying an opera-
tional definition of "ought to be desired": in brief, an attempt to solve the
"is/ought" problem. White's analyses succeed in showing that there are
insuperable difficulties in the alleged attempt, and he concludes that Dewey
has failed to solve "the fundamental problem of ethics. "5 As we shall see,
the assumption that Dewey was working on the "is/ought" problem is simply
gratuitous.
What was Dewey working on in "The Construction of Good?" His aim
will be easy to detect by raising three points, all of which elucidate the context
of the pertinent discussion in The Quest for Certainty. It would be difficult
to underestimate the importance of understanding this context. The first
point concerns his general aims as a moral philosopher.6 In this capacity, he
was engaged in assisting human beings in a task they will be engaged in in
any case: All persons strive in various ways to improve the quality of their
existence. They are funded with an array of desires and aversions, and ef-
fective in their conduct is a diversity of moral commitments. Human beings
function in complex, demanding, and perplexing circumstances, so the tasks
of discerning and achieving intrinsically welcome forms of experience are
typically difficult. These problems arise, Dewey held, in conditions of as-
sociated life, and it is in the same conditions where instruments for the ef-
fective prosecution of these tasks might be contrived.
Dewey's analysis of problematic situations is familiar. Actual problems
of conduct arise in particular circumstances. Specific values, conflicts, ob-
stacles, and potentialities define each situation. The agents involved desire
to effect a transformation of their circumstances. They desire to establish
a mode of activity which will unify hitherto conflicting values and engage
and fulfill their operative interests. Inquiry into the constituents and possi-
bilities of the situation will, if successful, yield a plan of action to accomplish

2. John Dewey, "The Construction of Good," in The Quest for Certainty (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929).
3. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 322.
4. White, Social Thought in America, p. 213.
5. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 329.
6. See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
1920), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958),
esp. chap. 10; and the article "Philosophy," in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New
York: Macmillan Co., 1934), 12:118-28.

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 220 Ethics

the transformation. The features of the situation which are experienc

immediately attractive (or unattractive) prior to inquiry Dewey calls
blematic goods. The particular action that is expected to integrate th
uation he calls the end-in-view, and the unified activity itself he calls
proper, or consummatory experience. The plan of action which would
transform the situation from problematic to consummatory he designates,
idiosyncratically, a moral judgment.7
A clarification of the generic features of these situations is necessary
for the agents involved to avail themselves of the intellectual and material
instrumentalities at their disposal. Dewey's intent as a moral philosopher
was precisely this: He wished to clarify the nature of the human situation
in such a way that its resources and limitations could be identified and uti-
lized. Persons would then be equipped, individually and collectively, to solve
their own problems and construct a more satisfactory existence. Dewey was
not intent upon prescribing unconditional moral imperatives; he was con-
cerned, rather, to propose and recommend forms of behavior which could
be put at the disposal of human beings in coping with their typical predic-
aments. The adoption of these procedures would hardly guarantee the so-
lution of all moral problems, and Dewey never supposed it would. Indeed,
he believed that such a solution is impossible. Much of this discussion is
summarized in the following remarks from the Ethics, which Dewey's in-
terpreters should ponder:
Realization that need for reflective morality and for moral theories grows out of the
conflict between ends, responsibilities, rights, and duties defines the service which moral
theory may render, and also protects the student from false conceptions of its nature. The
difference between customary and reflective morality is precisely that definite precepts, rules,
definitive injunctions and prohibitions issue from the former, while they cannot proceed from
the latter. Confusion ensues when appeal to rational principles is treated as if it were merely
a substitute for custom, transferring the authority of moral commands from one source to
another. Moral thoery can (i) generalize the types of moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling
a perplexed and doubtful individual to clarify his own particular problem by placing it in
a larger context; it can (ii) state the leading ways in which such problems have been intel-
lectually dealt with by those who have thought upon such matters; it can (iii) render personal
reflection more systematic and enlightened, suggesting alternatives that might otherwise
be overlooked, and stimulating greater consistency in judgment. But it does not offer a table
of commandments in a catechism in which answers are as definite as are the questions which
are asked. It can render personal choice more intelligent, but it cannot take the place of
personal decision, which must be made in every case of moral perplexity.8

The argument so far strongly suggests that Dewey would not be con-
cerned to provide an operational definition of what ought to be desired, but
7. These distinctions are examined in detail in my John Dewey's Philosophy of Value
(New York: Humanities Press, 1972), chap. 3. On moral judgment see ibid., pp. 129-30,207-8,
299-314.
8. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt & Co.,
1932), pp. 175-76. This and all further quotations from Ethics in this paper are taken from
portions written by Dewey.

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 221 Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

if the suggestion seems premature, let us proceed to the second point, whic
clarifies his position.
There is probably nothing more prominent in Dewey's philosophy than
his criticism of dualisms. It is important to see why he was occupied in this
way. The conceptions of modern philosophy were such that the actual and
potential relations between man and nature were obscured. As a conse-
quence, philosophers could not identify the continuities of existence which
are so vital to the discernment, criticism, and achievement of values. Human
nature and physical nature were thought to be, in essence, wholly separate
and self-enclosed systems, each working according to its own inherent laws.
Nature was nothing but matter in motion, devoid of qualities of any sort;
hence also devoid of value. Experience was held to be subjective-an im-
penetrable veil between subject and object. Events of experience, therefore,
give no clue to the continuities of the processes of nature. The domain of
value was regarded as either subjective or transcendent. In the former case,
according to the fundamental assumptions of modern philosophy, the events
of nature have no implication for value. The latter case was like the former,
in that the alleged transcendent norms of morality provided no guidance
regarding the sequences and possibilities of natural events.
If, as Dewey argued, human nature and value are functions of processes
inclusive of organism and environment, a wholly different set of conceptions
was needed in order to characterize the human situation in a way which
would clarify the means at human disposal for carrying on our urgent and
persistent tasks. Hence the need for refuting the dualistic positions and for
a new explication of man and nature. Dewey's foremost philosophic work,
Experience and Nature, is devoted to such an explication, in which precisely
the needed conceptions are attempted. Human Nature and Conduct has
the same purpose, but it is focused more on man in society than on the generic
theme of man in nature. The significance of understanding human values
as functions of processes inclusive of both man and nature is stated most
bluntly in Reconstruction in Philosophy, but it is also at the forefront of The
Quest for Certainty. Remembering that the criticism of dualisms is prin-
cipally motivated by moral considerations, let us turn to the third point, a
statement of the particular aims of The Quest for Certainty.
In this work, Dewey is concerned with the nature and means of
knowledge. He argues that experience is not a barrier to knowledge but a
condition of it. Science and experience are not antithetical to each other or
concerned with separate realms of being. The propositions of science state,
rather, the conditions upon which the occurrence of experienced things
depends. Science is also creative: Its hypotheses are innovative, and they
predict events which are contingent upon specified reconstructions of existing
conditions. Neither traditional empiricism nor rationalism had any con-
ception of such hypotheses. Empiricists regarded all ideas as simply and
completely extracted from past experience, while rationalists regarded ideas
as direct intellectual grasp of the inherent essence of reality. Contrary to
empiricism, Dewey urged, ideas are not summaries of antecedent sensations;

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 222 Ethics

and contrary to rationalism and idealism, they are not copies o

cedently given structure of reality. Ideas, then, are instrumental:
us from present to future experiences by stating the conditions
the institution of future events is contingent.
It follows from the characterization of knowing that the m
science are applicable to the analysis of values. Values, again, ar
of processes inclusive of both organism and environment. The
and consequences of the occurrence of values can be experim
termined. Things precious in experience can be made more secu
during, and our knowledge of natural processes will permit us to
values out of initially problematic situations. That is, we can for
potheses specifying forms of conduct that will convert situation
blematic to consummatory. Moral deliberation, as Dewey concei
precisely the process of attempting to formulate such hypothese
experimental formulations we identify the scientific character
deliberation. We should note as well that the formulation of hypo
values as natural functions is impossible on dualistic assumption
At this stage the discussion can be briefly summarized. Dewe
philosophy was addressed to formulating methods for dealing w
problematic situations which beset human conduct. To this end h
to formulate accurate conceptions of the nature of man and natu
continuities. The analysis of the generic characteristics of the human
discloses ways of functioning within that situation. That is, his s
ommendations for conduct are conditional upon the conclusions
in his most fundamental philosophic inquiries. "Love of wisdom,
is directed to "the opening and enlarging of the ways of natur
true wisdom, devoted to the latter task, discovers in thoughtful
and experiment the method of administering the unfinished p
existence so that frail goods shall be substantiated, secure goods b
and the precarious promises of good that haunt experienced thin
liberally fulfilled. "9
Seen in this context, the argument of "the Construction of
comes clear and unambiguous. The central point is this: The prior
in The Quest for Certainty about science, experience, and the creative
functions of ideas are directly applicable to the pervasive human interest
in enriching life experience. Immediately, this is a problem of converting
situations from problematic to consummatory-a matter of constructing
values, or goods. Accordingly, Dewey introduces a distinction between the
desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory. The distinction
expresses the difference between immediate reactions and the results of
deliberate inquiry into specific problematic circumstances:

To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in
existence; it is not to judge the value of that fact. . . . It is just correct or incorrect and that
is the end of the matter. But to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain

9. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 76-77.

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 223 Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

conditions. Function in status in meeting conditions is a different matter from bare existence.
The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it does not set
it. . . . There are many common expressions in which the difference of the two kinds is
clearly recognized. Take for example the difference between the ideas of "satisfying" and
"satisfactory." To say that something satisfies is to report something as an isolated finality.
To assert that it is satisfactory is to define it in its connections and interactions. The fact that
it pleases or is immediately congenial poses a problem to judgment. How shall the satisfaction
be rated? Is it a value or is it not? Is it something to be prized and cherished, to be enjoy-
ed? . . . To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions.
It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing "will do." It involves a prediction; it contemplates
a future in which the thing will continue to serve; it will do. It asserts a consequence the thing
will actively institute; it will do. 10

And he adds, "A judgment about what is to be desired and enjoyed is . . . a

claim on future action; it possesses de jure and not merely de facto quali-
ty."11
The expressions "to be desired," "de facto," and "de jure" warrant
special examination, and a close analysis of the text will be necessary. In the
context of Dewey's discussion-indeed, of his entire philosophy-it is evident
that in the phrase "to be desired," "to be" qualifies "desired" by making
reference to future experience rather than past. Values are something to be
constructed, rather than simply discovered already in existence. Dewey
indicates that there is a formal analogy between the construction of objects
of knowledge by experimental procedures and the construction of events
of value.'2 He writes,

The scientific revolution came about when the material of direct and uncontrolled
experience was taken as problematic; as supplying material to be transformed by reflective
operations into known objects. The contrast between experienced and known objects was
found to be a temporal one; namely, one between empirical subject-matters which were had
or "given" prior to the acts of experimental variation and redisposition and those which
succeeded these acts and issued from them. . . . The suggestion almost imperatively follows
that escape from the defects of transcendental absolutism is not to be had by setting up as
values enjoyments that happen anyhow, but in defining value by enjoyments which are the
consequences of intelligent action. 13

In each case, the temporally later object is determined by performing op-

erations on the temporally earlier. Hence value, like knowledge, is something
to be constructed. Dewey goes on to criticize both the sensationalistic and
transcendental theories of value for assuming value to be a trait of antecedent
being.14 The adoption of Dewey's conception of value would, he believed,

10. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn
Books, 1960), pp. 260-61.
11. Ibid., p. 263.
12. Ibid., p. 259.
13. Ibid., pp. 258-59.
14. Ibid., p. 263, and chap. 10.

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 224 Ethics

make the difference between cultivating arts of control rather than a

acceptance. 15
This analysis also makes clear the distinction between de facto and
jure judgments. These terms signify the difference between judgments
without inquiry and those as a consequence of inquiry. A de facto judg
is simply a statement that one does or does not like something, or fear it,
it, adore it, etc. A de jure judgment, on the other hand, is a hypothesis stat
specific means of establishing integrated activity. The first form of judgm
is not a guide to conduct; the second one is. It is so not because it expr
an obligation, but because it states the condition of a value. It does n
we ought to value something; it states the condition of that which is be
to be inherently welcome in experience. Judging by "The Constructi
Good," with "desirable" or "satisfactory" Dewey refers to the means to
unifications of experience which are achieved by deliberated effort.
desirable is the condition of value.
White's misunderstanding reduces to the following: He supposes
Dewey equates "desired under normal conditions" with "desirable" and t
"desirable" with "ought to be desired." But-to be as literal as possible-
"desirable" means "that which will convert the situation from problematic
to consummatory." In every case that Dewey uses "desirable," it is White
who adds, "in the sense of 'ought to be desired.' "Dewey himself never does
so. (In fact, Dewey never uses "desired under normal conditions" either.)
He was not in the least developing a theory of obligation in the disputed
passages. He was attempting to indicate the instrumentalities of thought and
conduct which would aid in the criticism, liberation, and fulfillment of
human interests.
Even when these methods are employed, the consequent choices of
conduct will not be identical; some disagreement is unavoidable. As we shall
see in the discussion of Stevenson, such concord as is possible in human affairs
is to be expected when deliberation is made public and social.
The nature of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation can be clarified
by specifying the tests that are crucial to determining the validity of the
theory. What are the inquiries that are pertinent to an examination of the
claims Dewey has made about moral deliberation? If White were to address
himself to Dewey's actual argument, the analysis would have to be directed
at three questions: (1) Is it indeed true that the qualities of experience are
functional constituents of continuous natural processes? (2) Can the methods
of experimental intelligence be used to reconstruct natural processes in a
deliberate way? (3) Has Dewey in fact presented distinctions which are
appropriate for recognizing the principal phases of experience from the
problematic to the consummatory? Since White has not undertaken this at
all, we may conclude that his analysis is altogether irrelevant to Dewey's.
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of Dewey's philosophy may be, we
must seek them elsewhere.
Turning to Stevenson, I will attend to two charges he makes against

15. These are terms introduced in chap. 4 of The Quest for Certainty to denote the
reorientation to nature made possible by the development of experimental method.

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 225 Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

Dewey: (1) that his ethical theory is individualistic; (2) that he employs
persuasive definitions of ethical terms. That is, there is an emotive component
in Dewey's moral language, so his ethical theory is fatally prey to the non-
cognitivist critique. My analysis here will complement my critique of
White.
In his Ethics and Language, Stevenson attempts to diagnose the causes
of what he takes to be the defects in Dewey's theory, asserting that Dewe
stresses personal decisions at the expense of interpersonal arguments.16 T
same charge is repeated in a later work. Stevenson writes, ". . . I should
like to question Dewey's wisdom in emphasizing 'personal problems' in
ethics . . . as distinct from 'interpersonal problems.' . . . For suppose
one man's dramatic rehearsal leads him to act in favor of racial discrimina-
tion, say, and another man's . . . leads him to act against it. This certainly
involves an ethical issue; and Dewey's methodology for ethics, though it may
have implications with regard to such an issue, never works them out ex-
plicitly. "'1 Dewey, that is, does not explicitly address himself to the problem
of moral conflict. This criticism is as radically misdirected as White's.
As a moralist, Dewey is best known as an advocate of democracy, or-as
he also called it-social intelligence. More than any other thinker in the
history of Western thought, he stands for the method of solving social
problems by democratic means. As Dewey repeatedly insisted, social
problems are moral problems, for they involve the conflict of values. Henc
democracy, or social intelligence, is moral method. He says explicitly, "The
keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, a
the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation
of the values that regulate the living of men together. "18 Reference to "th
values that regulate the living of men together" is precisely a reference to
moral values. That is, democracy is the participation of every mature huma
being in the formation of moral values.
It is not necessary to characterize Dewey's theory of social intelligenc
in detail. The theory is founded in part on the fact that a human being is n
an isolated atom but lives, moves, and has his being as an organic part of more
inclusive processes. Most notable in these processes is the presence of other
human beings. It is within the conditions of associated life that moral pro
lems arise; morally problematic situations are social in nature. These are
situations in which several persons are involved, yet conflict of some sort arises
which prevents or alters unfavorably the continuation of activity. In such
cases, when social intelligence is utilized, the parties consult with each other
to see if they can determine a mode of conduct which all can agreeably share
in. The propositions submitted for consideration are proposals for particular
modes of conduct. In Dewey's terminology, the parties consider alternative

16. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 264.

17. Stevenson, Facts and Values, p. 115. Stevenson's reference to dramatic rehearsal
is taken from Dewey and Tufts, p. 303.
18. John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," School and Society
45 (1937): 457-62 (reprinted in part in Gouinlock, ed., The Moral Writings of John Dewey
[New York: Hafner Press, 1976], pp. 258-61; quotation is from the latter, pp. 258-59).

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 226 Ethics

means for transforming the situation from problematic to consummatory.

The method is social in that deliberation and consultation are public. As in
no other method, Dewey's proposed decision procedure involves commu-
nication. The method is also intelligent, in that the participants deliberately
investigate their circumstances and share their knowledge of the intellectual
and material resources at their command. The hypotheses which predict a
specified transformation of the situation are experimentally verifiable.
There is no guarantee, of course, that the method will always succeed
in achieving a mutually satisfactory solution. Dewey was not so naive as to
think it would, but he was convinced that it promised wider moral agreement
and greater unity of conduct than any other method. Moral absolutisms fail
in unifying social conduct because they by definition are unalterable in their
demands, yet exist in such diversity. Complete moral relativism, on the other
hand, presumes the impossibility of concerted behavior. In effect, both ab-
solutism and thoroughgoing relativism are individualistic, while democracy
is genuinely social.
With unremitting fervor, Dewey attacked the idea that we can solve
our problems with an individualistic method. Hardly a page of his educa-
tional writings, for example, fails to refer to the importance of each individual
conceiving of himself as a social being and learning to behave cooperatively
with others. It is true that some of Dewey's discussions ignore the social
context. "The Construction of Good" is a case in point, but it occurs in a book
that is singlemindedly devoted to explicating the continuities of science and
value. When Dewey's attention shifts explicitly to the social domain, in such
works, for example, as The Public and Its Problems, Liberalism and Social
Action, and Freedom and Culture, he invariably argues that our best hope
for solving our problems is in resort to social intelligence. Yet even in the
Ethics, from which Stevenson quotes extensively, his ethical theory is ex-
plicitly characterized as democratic.'9
It is evident that Stevenson has made a glaring error in this criticism.
It comes, apparently, from neglecting to consider a wide range of Dewey's
pertinent writings. Let us consider his second point. We have already learned
that "The Construction of Good" is not an attempt to define "ought to be
desired." It is true, nevertheless, that Dewey indulges in the use of ethical
language, and he readily proposes new usages of such language. Thus he is
guilty of defying the conventions of the English language, thereby opening
himself to the charge of committing the alleged naturalistic fallacy. Dewey
would happily admit to the charge that he defied linguistic conventions, but
he would at the same time insist that his ethical theory is not undermined
as a consequence.
He advocated reform in ethical language for the sake of denoting im-
portant distinctions in experienced events. Clarity in such language would
be all important, for it would make moral discourse a precise instrument o
inference and communication. If, however, such proposals for the use of
language either failed in their purpose or could be denied without contra-

19. Dewey and Tufts, p. 365.

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 227 Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation

diction, there would be no loss to Dewey's ethical theory by abandoning its

moral language altogether. In his later years, indeed, he insisted that mora
language creates more obscurity than clarity; it is emotionally loaded, an
we would do well to eschew it in moral analysis and discourse. He deplore
the use of emotive or otherwise unverifiable language.20
In the light of Dewey's own conception of the aims of moral philosophy
and moral discourse, it is perfectly clear that these functions could be fulfilled
without a distinctively moral vocabulary. The processes of inquiry an
communication requisite to the transformation of situations may proceed
without it. Certainly nioral language is not needed in order to formulate
hypotheses which specify alternative courses of conduct, and it is by no means
clear that the use of moral language makes persons wiser or more sensitive
to human values. Accordingly, whatever fault there may be in the use of
persuasive definitions is of no consequence when there is no resort to them
At the same time, whatever merit there may be in Dewey's ethical theor
persists undiminished when it is rid of its ethical language; everything h
wished to communicate could be expressed in verifiable language. Thus
Stevenson's second criticism is obviated.
It will be protested that verifiable definitions of moral expressions are
necessary in order to achieve moral agreement. This proves to be a superficial
claim. In the first place, if moral agreement is actually to be achieved, it is
to be sought not in the analysis of language or in the contrivance of definitions
but in agreement about the policies and norms that might be expressed in
moral language. That is, definitions would be the last item agreed to, if at
all, and not the first, and the crucial agreements would already be made by
the time the linguistic issue came up. If moral consensus is to be wrought,
it must be in the deliberations concerning the conditions and possibilities
of human existence and the means of contending with them. Verifiable
definitions of moral terms would seem to be but the expression of a result
already achieved and thus, again, superfluous.
In the second place-to make explicit reference to Dewey's views-he
regarded the eradication of conscientious moral conflict to be impossible.
"Conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits," he wrote.21 Social intelligence
is an alternative to absolutisms; it acknowledges the reality of conflict, and
its appeal consists largely in the fact that it provides an effective means of
conducting human affairs in which conflict arises. Thus in the Ethics he
declares, "The problem of bringing about an effective socialization of in-
telligence is probably the greatest problem of democracy today."22 That is,

20. See, for example, John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1938), pp. 494-97; and reply to a letter from Albert G. A. Balz printed in Journal
of Philosophy 46 (1949): 338-40. That Dewey deplored any emotive content in ethical lan-
guage is sharply evidenced in his "Ethical Subject-Matter and Language," a review of Ethics
and Language in Philosophical Review 42 (1945): 701-12.
21. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, Inc.,
n.d. [most recent printing]), p. 12.
22. Dewey and Tufts, p. 408.

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 228 Ethics

the universalization of democratic habits of behavior is our best

carrying on our shared activities.23
It is true that Dewey believed that we could attain a wider c
of moral convictions than we now possess. This consensus, he belie
not be achieved by solving the so-called is/ought problem, but by
social intelligence. If Stevenson, or others, would criticize Dewey
of moral deliberation, they must show that methods alternative
intelligence would be more successful than it in adjusting, unitin
riching the aims of concrete human beings. Precisely this sort of
needed if Dewey's philosophy is to receive its appropriate test. H
we find no recognition of such crucial issues in the criticisms n
examination. It seems obvious that if we are to identify the best i
resources of Dewey's moral philosophy, his work must be reexam
context altogether different from that provided by White and
I suggest that this examination would be most fruitful.
As I indicated at the outset, what is fundamentally at issue in
the remarks of White and Stevenson is the very nature and aim
philosophy. For those who suppose that philosophers are omnico
in the moral domain, capable of providing the basis for the solu
moral dilemmas, Dewey's philosophy will be inadequate. I suggest,
that it is inherently beyond the competence of philosophy or of a
discipline to provide that capability. But this is a topic for anot
sion.

23. See also John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P.
Sons, 1935), p. 79; Intelligence in the Modern World, ed. Joseph Ratner (New Yo
Library, Inc. 1939), pp. 431-32; Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P. Putnam's
p. 176; and "Creative Democracy-the Task before Us," in The Philosopher of
Man, ed. Sidney Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 227.

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