Process Plant and Equipment Integrity Management-Module 1

The South African Institution of Mechanical Engineering
PROCESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
MODULE 1
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR ASSETS!

by
Naren Sukaih
Tel : 031-480-1069
E-mail : naren.sukaih@sapref.com
Disclaimer
While the information presented in this document is intended to assist users in the safe design and operation of
facilities, the user is advised, that neither the writer, nor the organizations nor persons involved in producing this
publication warrant or represent, expressly or implicitly, the correctness or accuracy of the information presented
herein.
This publication is intended for general guidance and not advice for specific situations. It remains the
responsibility of the user of the publication to determine its suitability for the particular application intended, to use
the information provided in the publication in a manner appropriate to that application, and to consult with
qualified professionals as necessary.
PROCESS PL ANT AND EQUI PMENT INT EGRIT Y MANAGEM ENT MODUL E 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
No. DESCRIPTION PAGE

Table of Contents 1-2
Introduction 3
1. Understanding your business 4
1.1 What makes a business? 4
1.2 Management and leadership 8
1.3 Business process cycle 14
1.4 Process plant management systems 17
1.5 Lessons for high reliability organisations 19
2. The business case for asset integrity management 23

2.1 Introduction 23
2.2 What is Asset Integrity? 23
2.3 Benefits of asset integrity management 23
2.4 The Path Forward 26
3. Competency requirements in the changing world of asset integrity 27

management
3.1 Introduction 27
3.2 The case for change for competency requirements 27
3.3 Major challenges facing the integrity assurance 28
3.4 Skills and competency elements 29
3.5 The shared custodianship approach 33
3.6 Conclusions and recommendations 34
4. Asset integrity management -getting organised 36

4.1 Integrity management objectives and risks 36
4.2 Integrity management policies, plans, strategies (direction) 36
4.3 Integrity management organisation and resources 44
4.4 Standards, procedures 52
4.5 Implement, monitor, correct 56
4.6 Review and improve 57
APPENDIX 4A: CASE STUDY- An Integrity and maintenance 58
plan for a batch chemical plant
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COPY RIGHT © N SUKAIH 2008
No. DESCRIPTION PAGE

5. Asset degradation 67
5.1 Types of degradation 67
5.2 General degradation mechanisms – all industries 68
5.3 Degradation mechanisms- refining, petrochemical, chemical 69
6. Detection of aging and degradation 70

6.1 Degradation rate and the accumulation of damage 70
6.2 Failures modes, patterns and condition monitoring Failure Modes 71
6.3 Failure development 72
6.4 The four stages of equipment life 73
6.5 Inspection and non-destructive testing 75
7. Strategies to consider when degradation is detected 77

7.1 When to assess Fitness-For-Service and Remaining Life 77
7.2 Considerations for Repair and/or Modification 78
7.3 De-rating as an Alternative to Repair 79
7.4 Reasons for Making Repairs 79
7.5 Repair Methods for Temporary or Permanent Repairs 81
7.6 General Considerations 82
7.7 Review of schemes of examination and condition monitoring 86
Process Plant and Equipment Integrity Management modules 89
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PROCESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Irrespective of the size or nature of the plant, someone will have a legal responsibility to ensure that
the plant continues to remain fit for service and that risks to health; safety and the environment are
properly controlled. This duty may fall to different people or entities under different regulations and
may even fall within the remit of different regulating authorities. Ageing plant may not necessarily
mean a plant that is a few years old, or operating beyond its original design life. It is more about the
extent of our knowledge about the current condition of the plant, the active degradation mechanisms
and whether we have confidence in its continued fitness for service. Based on this we might expect
that concerns with ageing plant would arise where:
 Operating limits move beyond design limits and known operating experience
 Inspection reveals accelerating or unpredictable deterioration
 Major repairs, refits or replacements are needed
 Decreasing intervals between inspections are specified as a result of diminishing
confidence in continued fitness for service
 The costs of remedial work and inspection begin to outweigh the benefits of
continued operation.
Some of these issues could be relevant to relatively new plant, but equally there may be other cases
where they may not arise for many decades of service, provided of course that there is an
appropriate integrity management programme in place.
The integrity management process of process plant can be considered as the following:
Getting organised in terms of responsibilities, management, resources, systems and tools, data, and
awareness of ageing issues. Detecting and identifying ageing through various the stages of
equipment life. The consideration of the options, which may includes fitness-for-service
assessment, repairs, and revalidation when ageing damage is detected or changes made. The
following sections will highlight the requirements and cover the key issues that if adequately
catered for will ensure successful integrity management of ageing plant.
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1. UNDERSTANDING YOUR BUSINESS
1.1 What makes a business?

1.1.1 Elements of a Business
In simple terms a business is where raw materials or a knowledge base is converted into a value
added product or service. The product or service is then supplied to customers at a profit. However
to convert and add value to the raw materials or a knowledge base, resources are required. These
resources represent the core of the operation and the organisation and usually consist of the
Management Team, Employees, Assets (hardware and software) and Systems, tools and procedures.
Further a business is also influenced by other parties and these may include Shareholders,
Surrounding communities, Competitors and Local and nation regulators. The elements of what
makes a business is shown in the Figure 1 below. For a business to be sustainable all element must
be taken into account.
SHAREHOLDERS
COMPETITORS
CUSTOMERS
MANAGEMENT
TEAM
PRODUCTS /
EMPLOYEES $$ SYSTEMS,
RAW MATERIALS / SERVICES
$$ TOOLS &
KNOWLEDGE BASE
PROCEDURES
ASSETS
SUPPLIERS LOCAL & NATIONAL

REGULATORS
SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES
Figure 1.1: Elements of a business
1.1.2 Six Steps to Success

These are at least six steps to success:
• Entrepreneurial Spirit
• Productivity
• Quality
• Management
• Innovation
• Employees
This list changes from time to time. But it represents some of the key steps of what can help a
business succeed.
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Entrepreneurial Spirit
Instill this spirit in your organization: The entrepreneurial spirit is what makes a good company
great. The entrepreneurial spirit has to start at the top of the organization and trickle down to the
rest of the employees. You want your management team to think like an entrepreneur.
Reward success and failures: If you expect great ideas from your management and employees, you
have to reward them for successful ideas. You should also reward them for the failures as long as
they are few and they learn from the mistakes. If a person does not make a mistake or wrong
decision every now and then, then they are not trying new innovative ideas or suggestions. You
want to foster trying new ideas without fear of reprisals.
Everyone in your business should act as if it was their own company: Every one in your company
should think of the company as if it was their own and how they would improve it if they could.
They should believe that spending or wasting a dollar of company’s money is like taking a dollar
out of their pocket, because in the long run it is the same.
Know your limitations: Know your limitations and don’t try to be everything. There will be areas
where you will have to bring in expertise to help the business out or hire the skills needed to be
successful.
Foster “thinking outside the box”: Fostering “thinking outside the box” is another way of expressing
entrepreneurial spirit. You should never hear anyone give a reason for doing a task as “we have
always done it this way”. They should know why the task should be done and what benefit it is to
the company.
Productivity
Productivity and technology (a form of productivity improvement) are ways to improve bottom line
profits. Throughput is a way of measuring profitability and productivity. Throughput is the rate at
which the system generates money through sales. Another way of stating it is throughput equals the
revenue from selling your product minus raw materials. In the case of a process plant, throughput is
the dollars received from the sale of products minus the cost of the raw materials. This is the money
you have to pay your operating expenses including labor and what is left over is profit. This
management philosophy is called constraints management or Theory of Constraints.
Minimize waste or non-value added work is a measurement of time used to make your product. Any
operation that you do in order to produce your product, you should be asking the question, “Does
this add value to the finished product?” Most companies find out that there is only 10% value added
work used to produce a product and the other 90% is waste. This management philosophy is called
Lean Manufacturing.
You should manage for productivity by using management philosophies that promote increased
productivity. Many times the productivity is reduced by the management policies or beliefs of the
business. Ask the question “Why?” five times when someone responds to a question on a policy or
reason for doing something to get to the root reason or cause.
If you don’t see improvement in the profit of the company when a suggestion is made or a change
takes place, then question why you need to do it. All improvements should lead to improved
“bottom line” results. Keep in mind the goal of all companies is to make money now and in the
future.
Reduction of inventory increases cash flow and throughput and maintains maximum flexibility in
production.
Quality
You can insure quality in your product and manufacturing process by writing manufacturing
procedures with quality in mind. Also use visual means to help the operator know if a product is
within specifications or not. For example, have a vial of what the in process product should look
like every step along the way. This way the operator can compare an in process sample with the
standard and have a quick initial indication that the product might be in spec.
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Design quality into your plant by making it difficult for the operator to make a mistake. One easy
way to help reduce contamination is using back flow prevention devices. Another way of reducing
the possibility of adding the wrong material to the manufacturing process is to colour code the pipes
for the raw materials.
Implement ISO 9000 procedures in you operation. Even if you don’t get ISO certified, you should
be compliant. This is an easy way to adopt quality procedures and processes in your company and
use a method that is tried and proven and accepted in the industry.
Many times you hear that quality is in the eyes of the customer. Whether the quality is real or
perceived it makes sense to know what is the market standard and the customer is used to. Quality
demanded by the customer varies by market and geographical location.
Make sure you know what markets would accept the quality of your product and byproducts.
Management
Make sure the persons who fill the management roles in your company have the right skills and
knowledge you are looking for. Also make sure they share the same management philosophies.
Having the right person for the job is one of the most important decisions you have to make.
Management can make the company run smoothly or not.
Once you have a manager in a position, continually evaluate them to see that they are meeting your
need for that position. Make sure that the evaluation of them is conducted by the superiors as well
as their peers and subordinates.
Keep management small and delegate responsibility downward. In many manufacturing operations
today, there is only one level of management and the employees make most of their own production
decisions.
Utilize the individual strengths of your management team and don’t be afraid of creating job
descriptions that maximize the knowledge and experiences of the managers.
Sometimes the traditional job titles will not fit the job responsibilities your management team
members have.
Share the profits of the company with your management and employees. A bonus system or profit
sharing is a few ways to tie performance to personal profit or pay.
Innovation
How often have we heard “don’t re-invent the wheel”? I am proposing that you do reinvent the
wheel, or at least see if there is a better way. Too often we do something because it has been done a
certain way for as long as we can remember. Today in the competitive climate we operate in, it is
the company that “re-invents a better wheel” or finds a better way to produce a product that ends up
making the profit.
Don’t be satisfied with current technology; always be seeking out new technology or research. Talk
to the experts and find out where the technology is heading or what is on the horizon. Devote some
of your manpower and resources to developing new technology and conduct your own research.
This can challenge the employee’s innovative thinking and increase their understanding of the
process at the same time.
Protect your technology if it is new and innovative. Patents are one means of protection and trade
secrets are another.
The final suggestion under innovation is to use innovation in your management of the company.
There are new innovative management philosophies being used by companies today. The traditional
management style is yielding to the more participative and innovative style of management of the
employees and business. Theory of Constraints, Six Sigma, Lean Manufacturing are a few
management tools that innovative managers are exploring and picking the best of each to form the
style that works best for them.
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Employees
Under the topic of employees, the following is needed to succeed in today’s business climate:
• Treat them fairly and consistently
• Involve them in the business decision process
• Communicate the business well-being and performance, including the finances
• Consider them a resource, not a cost
• Empower them to make decisions
• Create a win-win situation and share the profits
Most of these suggestions are self-explanatory, although few companies take advantage of them.
The more you involve your employees in the business and delegate responsibility to them, the more
likely they will feel a part of the company. The more they feel involved in the decision making
process of the company the more they will be willing to help it succeed, especially if they can share
in the profits or have a steady and rewarding job.
Communications is the key to any successful relationship with the employees. They are the most
valuable resource a company can have and the return on investment in training and development
will pay off in the future.
Summary
In today’s business world, we must operate a smarter business and embrace technology to be
competitive on a global scale. We must use technology to our advantage, not only in the
manufacturing process, but also in the whole business including management.
Employees are one of our best assets.
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1.2 Management and leadership
1.2.1 Management
What goes wrong if a company is not well-managed?
People in that company carry out activities that are not relevant; key activities may fall between
cracks; the quality of the work may be insufficient; the efficiency may be low, activities may be
done unsafely, etc. Departments may be working in different directions, or their activities overlap.
People may be unmotivated because future prospects are depressing; because they hardly ever see
their line manager and don’t know whether their work is valued; or on the other hand because they
do not get enough freedom to do what they are quite capable of doing on their own. They may have
to do work that they don’t understand the purpose of, don’t feel comfortable with, and haven’t been
trained for. Knowledge management is lacking and learning from incidents is not captured and used
for improvement.
For the company this will mean poor profit margin generation, a high level of costs, accidents, loss
of customers, loss of staff and eventually an untenable position.
What does a well-managed company look like?

1. A well-managed company will ensure that it has well-motivated and loyal staff,
who value honesty,
integrity,
openness and trust,
a team spirit and
respect for other people.
Staff competent to do their job and taking pride in doing it professionally, willing to learn and
trying to do everything a bit better than the last time it was done, capable and authorised to take the
decisions required by the job
2. A well-managed company maintains a company culture with characteristics, as follows:
 every employee feels that his/her contribution is important and is valued.
 people trust each other.
 every employee understands how his/her activity fits into the larger scheme and what impact this
activity might have, if not carried out as and when intended.
 all departments and all echelons are working towards achieving the company’s objectives and
actively contribute to developing ways and means to make them achievable
 good communication up- and down the Line
 good informal networking across organisational boundaries
 a continuous improvement mentality at every level
 actively benchmarks itself against the best and strives for operational excellence in all it does.
 maintaining pro-active relationships with external parties (statutory parties, customers,
contractors/suppliers, neighbours, shareholders, other industries in the region).
3. Activities in a well-managed company are grouped into logical sequences; sequences of such
related activities may be called business processes. All business processes go through a similar
cycle of Plan-Do-Check-Act. The figure below represents an expanded view of this cycle.
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Figure 1.2: Business process
The company will have a visible, deeply and widely understood Management System for each of
the business processes, describing how the above cycle is gone through.
A typical Management System will address the following:
 Objectives, Risks and Opportunities
 Policies, Plans, setting Direction
 Organisation, Resources
 Standards, Procedures
 Implementation, Monitoring and Correction
 Review and Improve
The main focus of this document is on item 3 above. Each of these headings will be described
generically in the following section, and, in the subsequent chapters, to be further applied to each of
the business processes.
Measures taken to address these headings are also known as “business controls”. A company having
business controls in place therefore means that the company has identified their business processes,
has got Management Systems in place for each of the business processes, thus ensuring that
continuous improvement will be achieved and risks are minimised.
When do you implement a system and to what level of complexity and details?
The level of detail in which Management Systems (MS) should be described depends on the
circumstances. The requirement is for a system that is fit for purpose, reflects the complexity and
risks inherent in the facility, and achieves the basic requirements outlined. In order to be used, and
to be effective, the Management Systems needs the understanding and commitment of all persons
in the organisation.
Key variables being firstly how critical a System is for the Company (i.e. what are the
consequences if there would be deviations from the intent of the System.
Secondly the capacity and level of maturity of the organisation (i.e. competence, experience, team
working etc.). Related to that is the rate of change in the organisation, in terms of company
objectives, of company plans and organisational changes, or in terms of turn-over of staff. The
higher the risk (high rate of change and/or low the level of maturity in the organisation), the bigger
the need for detailed Management Systems.
Thirdly it depends on the size and complexity of the organisation.
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Inherent
Risk of Simpler MS World Class High
Facility
Integrity MS.
Less extensive
High monitoring, audit, Extensive
review monitoring, audit, review
Simpler MS World Class High

Integrity MS
Less extensive
monitoring, audit, Less extensive
review monitoring, audit, review
Low
Small, simple Large, complex Size and

Complexity of
Facility
Figure 1.3: Fit-for purpose management system
1.2.2 Leadership
Good management comprises all the above. Leadership comes on top of that.
Good leadership will ensure that clear choices are made, that the need for change in the company is
identified early. Good leadership will inspire the organisation, will mean a positive “pressure” on
the company culture, good communication and will encourage learning from mistakes and from
others. It will install shared values and high performance behaviour, which is so deeply embedded
that it will be robust to temporary periods of weak leadership.
A good leader, when joining a company will recognise the strengths of the company and endeavour
to maintain them; he will identify the weak sides of the company and endeavour to improve them.
He does all of this in good consultation with the company’s staff. Taking this into account and the
six steps to success, see how the Leadership skills below can apply to the Business environment!
Leadership skills
Many years of experience in Exploring have shown that good leadership is a result of the careful
application of 11 skills that any post leader or officer can learn to use. With practice, these skills can
become a part of the adult’s or youth officer’s leadership style and will prove helpful in Exploring
and all other leadership situations.
Understanding the needs and characteristics of the post

Each individual participant of the group has certain needs and characteristics.
1. A leader should understand his or her own needs and characteristics.
2. A leader should understand the needs and characteristics of each participant of the group. This
helps the leader to deal with each person as an individual, to treat that individual with respect, and
to help the person grow.
3. This understanding helps in planning the program and in getting things done.
4. This understanding creates trust and builds confidence among group participants.
Through conversation and informal surveys of post participants, try to find out:
• Why they joined your post
• What they expect from the post’s program
• What their major interests are
• What their plans for the future are.
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Knowing and using the resources of the group

Resources include all those things necessary to do a job. Resources also include people, because
people have knowledge and skills. Knowledge is what a person learns through familiarity or
experience—what you know. Skill is the ability to use what you know. Attitude includes the desire
to do something—motivation—and the belief that you can do it— confidence. When the leader uses
the knowledge and skills of group participants to get a job done, the participants gain experience
and improve skills. They also develop a positive attitude toward using a skill.
• Keep the post’s program capability inventory up-to date and use it in planning.
• Understand the purpose and resources of your participating organization.
• Survey the participants’ parents; include them in your program capability inventory.
• Find out your post participants’ skills, interests, and resources.
Communicating
To improve your skills in getting information:
• Pay attention and listen carefully.
• Make notes and sketches.
• Ask questions and repeat your understanding of what was said.
To improve your skills in giving information:

• Be sure others are listening before you speak.
• Speak slowly and clearly.
• Draw diagrams, if needed. Ask those receiving information to take notes.
• Have the listeners repeat their understanding of what was said. Encourage questions.
Planning
Planning is an important part of everything we do in Exploring. The following is a simple process
for planning:
• Consider the task and objectives. What do you want to accomplish?
• Consider the resources—equipment, knowledge, skills, and attitudes.
• Consider the alternatives. Brainstorm.
• Reach a decision, evaluating each option.
• Write the plan down and review it with the post.
• Execute the plan.
• Evaluate the plan.
Controlling group performance

A leader influences the performance of the group and individual participants through his or her
actions. Why is control needed? A group needs control as an engine needs a throttle— to keep it
from running itself into the ground. A group
works together best when everybody is headed in the same direction. If a plan is to be properly
carried out, someone must lead the effort. Control is a function that the group assigns to the leader
to get the job done. Control happens as a result of recognizing the difference between where the
group is and where the group is going. The leader is responsible for developing a plan to help the
group get to its goal. Setting the example is the most effective way of controlling the group.
When working with post participants, do the following:
• Continually observe the group. Know what is happening and the attitude of the group.
• Make your instructions clear and pertinent.
• Pitch in and help when necessary.
• Quickly deal with disruption. Guide the post toward self-discipline.
Evaluating
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Evaluating helps measure the performance of a group in getting a job done and working together. It
suggests ways in which the group can improve its performance. There are two basic categories of
evaluation questions.
After any event or activity, ask these questions:
Getting the job done—
• Was the job done?
• Was the job done right?
• Was the job done on time?
Keeping the group together—
• Were relationships between group participants helped or hurt?
• Was participation equally distributed among group participants?
• Did the group enjoy the activity?
• Did the group handle conflicts well?
Setting the example

Setting the example is probably the most important leadership skill. It is the most effective way to
show others the proper way to conduct themselves, and is even more effective than verbal
communication. Without this skill, all the other skills will be useless. One way to think about
setting the example is to imagine yourself as part of a group and think about how you would like
your leader to act.
Sharing leadership
While there are various ways to exercise leadership, the goal of Exploring leadership is exemplified
in a quote from the ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao-Tzu:
“But of a good leader . . . When the work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say, ‘We did this
ourselves.’ ”
The Exploring leader wants to give post participants the skills he or she possesses, not to use those
skills in ways that keep the post weak or dependent. He or she offers leadership opportunities to
post participants and teaches them the skills they need.
Counseling
Counseling is important
• To help people solve problems
• To encourage or reassure
• To help an Explorer reach his or her potential
Counseling can be effective when a person is

• Undecided—he or she can’t make a decision
• Confused—he or she doesn’t have enough information or has too much information
• Locked in—he or she doesn’t know any alternatives
How do you counsel?
• First, try to understand the situation. Listen carefully. Summarize. Check the facts. Paraphrase to
make sure you understand.
• Second, help list as many options as possible.
• Third, help list the disadvantages of the options.
• Fourth, help list the advantages of the options.
• Finally, let the person decide on a solution. The counselor’s role is to give encouragement and
information, not advice.
Representing the group
Where do you represent the post? Post leaders represent the post at post committee meetings,
Advisors’ meetings, 0fficers’ meetings, and planning conferences, and to the participating
organization.
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The leader represents the post in two situations:

• Without consultation—when he or she doesn’t have the opportunity to consult with post officers
about a decision
• With consultation—when he or she can meet with post officers about the issue
In some cases the leader must represent the post’s decision exactly; in other cases, he or she must
use independent judgment. You will need to solicit and analyze participants’ views and attempt to
represent those views within the guidelines of your post, your participating organization, and
Exploring.
Effective teaching
Effective teaching is a process to increase the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the group and its
participants. The focus is on learning, not teaching. For teaching to be effective, learning must take
place.
The steps of effective teaching include
• Choosing the learning objectives
• Providing a discovery experience that helps the learner understand the need for the skill
• Demonstrating or explaining the skill
• Allowing the learner to practice the skill
• Evaluating the process
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1.3 Business process cycle

The general context of a business process cycle has been described in section 1.2. The steps in the
cycle are described in more detail here. The cycle is applicable at various levels in an organisation -
ranging from Executive level, Process Plant Management level to first line of supervision. While
the general context is for Process Plant applications, “Process Plant” can be replaced by any other
business entity.
1.3.1 Objectives, Risks
Figure 1.4: Business process cycle
Starting point is good understanding of the nature of the business, the environment in which the
Process Plant operates and the internal and external boundaries which need to be respected.
With that understanding Objectives should be formulated for the Process Plant, with due regard to
longer-term sustainability and properly balancing the interests of the stakeholders.
The term “objectives” is used in the wide sense, and is intended to comprise the Mission, Vision and
Strategic Objectives.
There will be factors which could influence the achievement of the Objectives (these factors will be
called risks, in this documents, although “opportunities” are comprised in the term as well). The
risks (/opportunities) should be listed and assessed for significance, in terms of potential impact and
likelihood.
Response to risk will utilise some or all of the following strategies:
 Terminate, e.g. by ceasing a particular activity
 Transfer, e.g. through insurance, partnerships, etc.
 Treat, by suitable business controls, as described below
 Take, a level of risk, having applied a degree of Treat to reduce impact and likelihood to
acceptable levels
Setting Objectives and assessing the related risks may be an iterative process; which is also
influenced by a learning/ improvement feedback loop within the Process Plant.
1.3.2 Direction; Policies, Plans

Having set Objectives, general principles and guides for action need to be developed, which provide
the organisation with focus and facilitate alignment. “Direction” documents comprise policies plan,
budget, etc. More detail should be developed as the plan gets cascaded in the organisation, with an
ultimate link to individuals’ tasks and targets.
The plan and budget should cover the day-to-day business activities as well as the business
improvement activities. Each activity in the plan needs an owner, resources allocated and realistic
completion milestones. The plan should have measurable performance targets and indicators to
measure progress associated with them.
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Plans will usually cover a period of a few years, the plan for first year being a firm operating plan
and firmness and detail diminishing over the further plan period. The level of detail in the plan and
the frequency of updating depends on how dynamic the business environment is; the balance to be
struck is: 1) to be prepared and 2) not wasting resources on unnecessary detail.
In addition to the plans, general principles and guides for action need to be provided. These can
range from Statutory - and Operating Permit requirements, Industry Standards to Group and Process
Plant Policies.
(Items under this heading are known as “policy controls”.)
1.3.3 Organisation, Resources

The organisation should be suited to achieve the business objectives. The organisational structure
should be understandable and reporting relationships transparent. Responsibilities and
accountabilities should be clearly assigned and accepted; authorities should be unambiguous and
commensurate with assigned responsibilities.
People are at the heart of any organisation; people-related control elements comprise shared values
and ethics, communication, motivation, teamwork, learning networks, incentive schemes etc.
Resources should be sufficient for the execution of the plans. It should be ensured that people are
competent for the tasks entrusted, using a structured job development- and competency assessment
in conjunction with training- and development schemes.
Where activities are contracted out (externally or internally), a person in the organisation should be
assigned to be responsible for the contract and the contractor performance. This person should have
adequate competence and authority.
(Items under this heading are known as “organisational controls”.)
1.3.4 Standards, Procedures

Standards and Procedures specify or recommend how actions are to be performed to comply with
General Industry- or Statutory requirements, or the policies that should be observed within the
Process Plant. Adequate standards and procedures should be in place. The need for detailed written
procedures will depend on the complexity and criticality of the activity and the level of
competence/experience in the people executing the activity.
Documents that are essential for the efficient and safe use of facilities should be identified.
Standards, procedures and essential documents should be of the “controlled” type and requirements
for “controlled” documents should be established.
(Items under this heading are known as “procedural controls” or “operational controls”.)
1.3.5 Implement, Monitor, Correct

Supervision of activities will be required to monitor progress and quality of the work and make any
corrections, as necessary. Daily monitoring of competence, motivation, etc. should be a second
nature for line managers.
Performance against measurable targets should be monitored periodically; this should be enabled by
management/administration systems being designed such that performance indicators are readily
available from a consistent set of site data. There should be a coherent hierarchy of performance
indicators, cascading to the lowest level.
Where possible a distinction should be made between leading and lagging indicators; the former
being a measure of the capability of the organisation to perform in the future; the latter being a
measure of actual performance in the (recent) past.
Incidents and near misses with significant actual or potential consequences should be reported and
investigated. The level of rigor of investigation should be commensurate to the potential severity.
Supervisory activity, performance monitoring and incident reporting/investigation should aim to
find the cause of deviations and make any corrections, as necessary, within a short time frame,
depending on the type of activity. This time-frame may range from hours to days or weeks.
(Items under this heading are known as “supervisory controls”.)
15
1.3.6 Review, Improve

The Business Process Plant’s senior management should review and appraise, at least on an annual
basis, the continued suitability of the Process Plant’s Objectives and Policies; review the
effectiveness of the Organisation, the Procedures and the Monitoring Process, i.e. review the
Process Plant’s Management System (control framework). Annual forward improvement targets
and plans should be adopted accordingly. This should be part of a continuous improvement process,
whereby the organisation learns for past experience; it should take place at the overall level and for
each of the main business processes. In a high-performance organisation there will be a deep culture
of improvement at all levels, right down to the individual.
The interval between review and improve cycles depends on the activity and may range from
monthly through quarterly to yearly.
In addition to the Management Reviews, periodic formal reviews of personal performance should
be conducted between every level of management/supervision.
(Items under this heading are known as “review and appraisal controls”.)
It is essential that Objectives, Plans, Standards, Procedures, essential documents etc. are available
and are fully understood at the relevant levels in the organisation. Communication and training will
be needed on a continual basis to establish and maintain an adequate level of awareness.
16
1.4 Process plant management systems

A Process Plant Management System documents how the Process Plant is managed, how objectives
are set, risks and opportunities are addressed; how performance is driven; how policy-,
organisational-, procedural-, supervisory- and review/appraisal controls have been arranged for the
Process Plant business processes.
Typical Process Plant Businesses process may comprise of the following:

 Process Plant Management
(Overall Process Plant Management plus an overview of all processes with common
requirements)
 Asset and Infrastructure Management
 Develop and Improve, Maintain and Operate Equipment and Facilities.
 Feedstock and Production Management
 Supply chain, Production process, and product improvement
 HSE Management
 Essential Services Management
 Finance, Human Resources, Accounting, IT, Contracting and Procurement
The focus of these modules and presentation is mainly on Asset Integrity management. The
influence of Assets on a business is shown in Figure 1.5. With ‘fit for purpose’ assets and the
optimum Asset Integrity management strategies, businesses are more than likely to achieve success.
Is the asset degrading as a Is the asset available for

result of its use? use?
Is the performance of the asset

How do inputs and
in accordance with regulations?
outputs measure against
Is the quality of the product in
the plan?
accordance with specifications?
Figure 1.5: Asset management
Process Plant management teams should assess where they are currently, how critical the gap is (i.e.
what is the resulting risk of not achieving the business objectives); what time frame should be set to
move to the next level, where relevant:
External (ISO9001) certification of the Process Plant Management System should be considered.
It adds credibility for internal and external customers. It also encourages discipline (e.g. in requiring
appointment of management representatives, contract review, maintaining documents controlled,
17
record keeping, carrying out compliance audits, etc.). (ISO 14001 certification for Environmental
matters is mandatory).
It is recommended to structure the external certification along business process lines (as defined in
ISO9001), rather than organisational/ departmental lines. This will avoid requirements for major
updating in times of organisational change. The degrees of development that are recognised are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1.1: Degrees of development (reference: ISO9004-2000):

1 2 3 4 5
Awareness- Evaluation/Develop Implementatio Assessment – .Excellence/Complet
knowledge of ment - A process has n- Action plans The e – The element is
the element, been identified to and processes implementatio fully implemented
but essential manage the element. are being n phase has and the associated
practices are Key practices of the implemented been practices are
missing. element have been to manage the completed and benchmarks, and can
Minimal evaluated and action element, and performance is be viewed as an
processes are plans developed. are being being example of a
in place to Reactive approach executed with consistently Reliability top
manage the potential for tracked, performer. Best-in-
element. improvement. measured and class performance
No formal Stable formal reviewed.
approach. system Continual
approach. improvement
emphasised
No Problem- or Systematic Improvement Strongly integrated
systematic corrective-based process-based process in use; improvement
approach systematic approach; approach, early good results process; best-in-class
evident, minimum data on stage of and sustained benchmarked results
no results, improvement results systematic improvement demonstrated.
poor results available. improvements; trends.
or data available
unpredictable on
results. conformance
to objectives
and existence
of
improvement
trends.
18
1.5 Lessons for high reliability organisations

The heading of the section is quoted from the book “Lessons from Longford” by Andrew Hopkins
(CCH Australia Ltd, ABN 67 000 630 197, 2001). This book contains a highly relevant and
interesting description of a major accident in 1998 in the Esso gas plant in Longford, Victoria,
Australia, its causes and its investigation. The accident killed two men, injured 8 others and cut
Melbourne’s gas supply for two weeks.
Because of its relevance to the Chemical Process industry in general, part of the book’s conclusions
are quoted here:
After the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident researchers noted that there were numerous
examples of high risk, high tech organisations which functioned with extraordinary reliability - high
reliability organisations (HROs) - and they set about studying what it was that accounted for this
reliability. Weick and his colleagues (ref. Research in Organisational Behaviour 21, 81 - 123)
summarised the findings from these studies in a word - mindfulness.
Typical HROs - modern nuclear power plants, naval aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems -
operate in an environment where it is not possible to adapt the strategy of learning from mistakes.
Since disasters are rare in any one organisation the opportunities for making improvements based
on one’s own experience are too limited to be made use of in this way. Moreover, even one disaster
is one too many. Management must find ways of avoiding disaster altogether. The strategy which
HROs adopt is collective mindfulness. The essence is this idea is that no system can guarantee
safety once and for all. Rather, it is necessary for the organisation to cultivate a state of continuous
mindfulness of the possibility of disaster. “Worries about failure are what give the HROs their
distinctive quality.” HROs exhibit a “prideful wariness” and “a suspicion of quiet periods”
HROs seek out localised small-scale failures and generalise from them. They act as if there is no
such thing as a localised failure and suspect instead that causal chains that produced the failure are
long and wind deep inside the system.
Mindfulness involves interpretative work directed at weak signals. Incident reporting systems are
therefore highly developed and people rewarded for reporting. …
One consequence of this approach is that maintenance departments in HROs become central
locations for organisational learning. Maintenance workers are the front line observers, in a position
to give early warning of ways in which things might be going wrong.
The preoccupation of HROs with failure means that they are willing to countenance redundancy -
the deployment of more people than is necessary in the normal course of events so that there are
enough people on hand to deal with abnormal situations when they arise. This availability of extra
personnel ensures operators are not placed in situations of overload which may threaten their
performance. A mindful organisation exhibits extraordinary sensitivity to the incipient overload of
any of its members, as when air traffic controllers gather around a colleague to watch for danger
during times of peak air traffic.
If HROs are pre-occupied with failure, more conventional organisations focus on their success.
They interpret the absence of disaster as evidence of their competence and of the skilfulness of their
managers. The focus on success breeds confidence that all is well. Under the assumption that
success demonstrates competence, people drift into complacency, inattention and habitual routines.
They use their success to justify the elimination of what is seen as unnecessary effort and
redundancy. The result for such organisations is that current success makes future success less
probable.
…
For companies seeking to be mindful, the lessons which emerge from this analysis of the Longford
case are as follows:
1.5.1 Lessons of the Longford incident
• Ensuring the SMS is implemented and Effective. Are the procedures within the SMS
implemented, and are they effective in ensuring safe operation? Is there effective monitoring,
19
auditing, identification of deficiencies and corrective action? Is the SMS documentation

comprehensible and used by employees?
• Organisation, Structure, Roles and Responsibilities. Are safety roles and responsibilities
clearly defined for all parts of the facility, all levels of the organisation, all operating conditions,
and all control measures?
• Management of Knowledge. Is there an effective system for providing sufficient individual and
collective knowledge, skills and experience to operate the facility safely in the first place, and then
for retaining that knowledge, skills and experience? Is this system providing sufficient knowledge
of critical safe operating parameters, control measures, hazards, and potential major incidents?
• Management of Change. Are changes to the facility, management systems, organisational
structure and human resources analysed and their impacts on safety managed? Are Safety
Assessment programmes keeping up with the intended assessment schedules and with plant
changes?
• Learning from Incidents. Are learning opportunities from near misses and other incidents being
properly worked through, from analysis of root causes to communication of lessons and solutions?
Does the incident reporting and investigation system facilitate learning or hinder it?
• Management of Human Resources. Are there adequate human resources for carrying out all
safety roles? Is the management system actually devoting resource to where it is needed for safe
operation? Is there an effective process for ensuring the necessary skills and resources are available
at all times? Are hand-over requirements properly implemented? Are absences managed correctly?
Is there adequate supervision of employees and checking of work, response to process information,
adherence to procedures?
• Communications. Do communications ensure all relevant persons are aware of key process
conditions, the status of control measures, and other key issues? Do operating, engineering,
maintenance and other departments communicate with each other, to use each other's expertise, and
to work together effectively to plan and ensure safe operation? Is there effective two-way
communication to ensure senior management and employees are aware of problems and solutions?
Are operational communications unambiguous. Or can they be misheard or misinterpreted Are
operators making assumptions about safety critical issues? What level of checking or verification of
communications and operational assumptions occurs?
• Plant Surveillance, Facility Oversight, Trouble-Shooting. Is there any routine process for
monitoring plant/process condition and operational practices to identify abnormal and potentially
hazardous conditions? Is process or equipment monitoring information used to identify underlying
problems, evaluate trends and assist decision-making? Does any group or individual have an
overview of the facility as a whole? Is there sufficient awareness of the potential for interactions
between different equipment and installations within a complex integrated facility? Once a
potentially significant process deviation develops, is there an effective and timely means of
addressing the problem? Are there sufficient procedures, authorities, resources and expertise to step
back, evaluate and control the situation? Have all of the safety implications of abnormalities and
deviations been thought through, and procedures developed accordingly? Are safety hazards spelled
out alongside production issues in operating and trouble-shooting instructions?
• Recognition of Critical Safety Control Measures. Do operators and other employees recognise
critical procedures, equipment or control levels and the implications of their failure? Are steps taken
to prevent overriding of these measures?
• Understanding Significance of Process Information. Are operators able to understand the
significance of the signals provided by the process and other monitoring systems regarding the state
of the facility? Are all the necessary critical operating parameters known and their safe operating
limits defined? Are critical alarms discernible from and prioritised over other alarms? Are operators
able to respond to the information being generated by the facility during day-to-day and abnormal
conditions, and make safe decisions? Do procedures ensure safe response to alarm and other
abnormal conditions? Do operators have the necessary time, resources, support and ability to refer
matters to additional expertise or authority if needed?
20
• Production Demands. Could production demands potentially compromise the ability to operate
safely? Is there sufficient time and capacity within the system to be able to limit or halt production
on safety grounds? Do production demands result in short cuts being taken with critical control
measures?
• Corporate Culture. Does the corporate culture lead to a challenging of norms? Is potential for
corporate blindness recognised, and guarded against? Is the operator prepared to test and revise
their systems for safe operation? Do the communication and reporting systems encourage an open
exchange of critical views and information?
1.5.2 Further lessons can be learnt from more recent incidents

BP Texas City Refinery -2005
On March 23rd 2005, 15 people were killed and over 170 harmed as the result of a fire and
explosion on the Isomerization plant (ISOM) at the BP Products North America owned and operated
refinery in Texas City, Texas, USA.
Based on the investigation the following under lying causes were identified:
 Over the years, the working environment had eroded to one characterized by resistance to
change, and lacking of trust, motivation, and a sense of purpose. Coupled with unclear
expectations around supervisory and management behaviors this meant that rules were not
consistently followed, rigor was lacking and individuals felt disempowered from suggesting
or initiating improvements.
 Process safety, operations performance and systematic risk reduction priorities had not been
set and consistently reinforced by management.
 Many changes in a complex organization had led to the lack of clear accountabilities and
poor communication, which together resulted in confusion in the workforce over roles and
responsibilities.
 A poor level of hazard awareness and understanding of process safety on the site resulted in
people accepting levels of risk that are considerably higher than comparable installations.
One consequence was that temporary office trailers were placed within 150 feet of a
blowdown stack which vented heavier than air hydrocarbons to the atmosphere without
questioning the established industry practice.
 Given the poor vertical communication and performance management process, there was
neither adequate early warning system of problems, nor any independent means of
understanding the deteriorating standards in the plant.
The underlying reasons for the behaviors and actions displayed during the incident are complex,
and the investigation team has spent much time trying to understand them. It is evident that they had
been many years in the making and will require concerted and committed actions to address.
Reference:
1. FATAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT Isomerization Unit Explosion Final Report,
BP Texas City, Texas, USA, Date of Report: December 9th 2005, Approved for release by J.
Mogford, Investigation team leader
Sasol Secunda – 2004

The nature of Sasol’s business brings with it substantial inherent safety, health and environmental
(SH&E) risks. The group’s annual sustainable development reporting includes a comprehensive list
of these potential risks, the most substantial of which are:
_ The risk of fire or explosion at sites that host inventories of flammable hydrocarbons above
ground;
_ Risks associated with extensive underground coal operations; and
_ Toxicity risks associated with the wide range of hazardous chemicals that are produced.
21
The evolution of SH&E at Sasol before and after a number of safety incidents that were widely
reported in the press in 2004. Following a series of internal and external safety investigations and
reviews, Sasol has worked with staff, contractors and consultants to further improve safety
procedures and to instill a powerful culture of safety across the organisation.
DuPont’s findings and recommendations

While detailed feedback was provided to management, employees and union members at each site
reviewed in 2005, some of the overall findings and recommendations of DuPont’s review included
the following:
_ Management commitment to safety should be demonstrated by management team members, by
spending quality time at the operations and engaging with all levels of supervisors, employees and
contractors on safety issues.
_ The safety culture at Sasol should include more emphasis on process safety management elements
(management of change, contractor management and process hazard analysis), as well as general
hazard identification and treatment.
_ Because implementation of full-process safety management varies across sites, Sasol should
ensure that all elements are implemented across all sites, and should review the intensity and quality
of internal audits.
_ Additional training and coaching should be provided to allow people on site to correctly identify
and appreciate the nature of site-specific hazards and associated risks.
_ Developing a safety culture requires a high level of operating discipline, and requires disciplinary
action to be applied consistently and firmly. Sasol should therefore make sure that a ‘zero tolerance’
principle is applied consistently across sites.
_ Sasol should improve its sharing of best practices.
_ Although sites have robust contractor safety and management programmes in place, Sasol should
improve the quality of its review of each contractor’s performance after each contract.
DuPont’s recommendations, in 2005, formed the basis of a group-wide safety improvement plan
(SIP), as well as a series of site-specific plans. During 2006, DuPont was again commissioned, this
time to conduct a follow-up review of safety practices in a selection of Sasol’s South African
operations. This report spoke of an improvement in safety practices and performance, and made
further recommendations that led Sasol to roll out a revised safety improvement plan (called SIP2).
Reference:
1. Sasol Case Study for The Sustainable Business Handbook, 4th ed 24 MAY 07
2. Key Findings & Recommendations from External Process Safety Management & Occupational
Safety Management Review of Sasol Operations (South Africa), Compiled by DuPont Safety
Resources May 2005
22
2. THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
Shows Four Benefits:

• Corporate Responsibility
• Business Flexibility
• Risk Reduction
• Sustained Value
2.1 Introduction
Conclusive evidence that Asset Integrity provides benefits essential to your business:
Two qualitative benefits
– You can see them in the way the public, your shareholders, government bodies, and your
customers relate to your company
Corporate Responsibility
– Image, reputation, and brand
Business Flexibility
– License to operate
– Increased business options
Two quantitative benefits

– These have measurable impact in terms of your bottom line and company performance. All four
benefits combine to support the profitability, safety performance, quality, and environmental
responsibility of your business
Risk Reduction
– Asset Integrity prevents human injury
– Asset Integrity avoids significant losses and environmental damage
Sustained Value
– Asset Integrity helps boosts productivity
– It helps produce high quality products, on time, and at lower cost
– It contributes to shareholder value
2.2 What is Asset Integrity?

A management system to help prevent major incidents- Essential for managing complex chemical
process plant operations
Asset Integrity focuses on:
– Technology
– Facilities
– Personnel
2.3 Benefits of asset integrity management
Corporate Responsibility
An effective Asset Integrity program displays sustained corporate responsibility
It helps you:
– Fulfil your obligation to protect employees and the community
– Enhance customer and supplier relationships
– Comply with regulations
– Conform to industry standards worldwide
Corporate Responsibility - Asset Integrity:
 Protects reputation and shareholder value
 Creates lower risk perception by investors
23
 Increases value of corporate image and brand

 Reduces concerns within the local community
 Engages employees - morale, loyalty, retention
 Helps assure insurance coverage at attractive rates
 Enhances lenders’ confidence
 Helps regulators understand your facility
A company’s freedom to operate can be severely compromised due to an accident
– Regulatory scrutiny
– Legal complications
– Intervention by directors when key stakeholders sense increased risk
– Community discontent
Asset Integrity is how accidents are avoided
 Proves your worthiness to hold a license to operate
 Strengthens and maintains good relationships with the local community
 Helps investors feel confident in your ability to grow and earn profits
 Helps you attract and retain high performance staff
 Helps you obtain approval for expansion permits or new facilities more quickly
 Strengthens and maintains good relationships with regulators
Risk Reduction
A robust Asset Integrity program will help your company reduce risk and avoid loss
– Save lives and reduce injuries
– Reduce property damage costs
– Reduce business interruptions
– Protect market share
– Reduce litigation costs
– Reduce regulatory penalties from accidents
– Reduce regulatory attention
Risk Reduction - Benefits to your company

Significant reductions in injury rates
– reduced injuries and fatalities resulting from major incidents
– This saves $$$ million/year in losses
– Additional savings of $$$ million/year in worker’s compensation costs
Incidents cause operational interruptions
Incidents divert management’s attention from long-term business planning
Risk Reduction - Effective Asset Integrity programs provide industry-wide benefits

– What happens at your plant in Beijing can affect your plants in Brussels or Baton Rouge
– An incident at an unrelated company negatively affects the public’s perception of the entire
industry
– An incident at a raw material can keep you from meeting obligations to your customers
Sustained Value
Significant direct cost benefits:
– Increases in productivity
– Reduction in production costs
– Reduction in maintenance costs
24
– Reduction in capital budget

– Reduction in insurance costs
Sustained Value - Asset Integrity helps increase productivity:

– Increased process and equipment reliability from mechanical integrity programs
– User-friendly, accurate operating procedures
– Improved team effectiveness through employee training
– Employee ownership of the systems
– Enhanced troubleshooting capabilities
– Extended intervals between major turnarounds
– Decreased turnaround time for major turnarounds and minor repairs
Sustained Value - Production costs are reduced through

– Improvement in yields
– Lower costs for material rework (quality)
– Lower costs for waste stream disposal
– Prevention of hazards and operability issues before they occur
– More efficient staffing requiring less supervision
– Engaged employees participating in continuous improvement
Sustained Value - Maintenance costs are reduced through

– Effective equipment maintenance procedures
– Contractor safety programs
– Repairing or replacing critical equipment before it fails
– Avoiding unplanned shutdowns
– Lower maintenance turnaround costs
– Thorough periodic inspection
Sustained Value - Capital budgets are reduced through

– Inherently safer process designs that begin in the conceptual phase
– Process hazard analyses for new projects and facilities
– Lower capital expenditures because project teams have up-to-date Asset Integrity information
Sustained Value - Insurance costs are reduced through

– Effective emergency planning and response
– Reporting and investigation of “near misses” to identify potential problems early
– Thorough incident reporting and investigation programs to prevent incidents from being repeated
– Lower casualty insurance premiums
What Asset Integrity Can Do

Asset Integrity supports and underpins other management systems
One of the most robust:
– Responsible Care
– Quality
– Environmental compliance
– Worker health and safety
Combine Asset Integrity management with other systems to increase efficiency
25
Business Case Summary

A robust Asset Integrity program enhances your business four ways…
1. Displays your company’s high level of corporate and social responsibility
2. Gives your company the freedom to manage your business
3. Helps your company manage risk and prevent major losses
4. Creates sustained value for your company and shareholders
2.4 The Path Forward

REALIZE THE BENEFITS: Seven key steps
1. Assign personnel who will be accountable
2. Adopt a personalized company philosophy of Asset Integrity
3. Learn more about Asset Integrity
4. Take advantage of the strong synergy Asset Integrity has with your other business drivers
5. Set achievable Asset Integrity goals
6. Track your performance
7. Revisit your Asset Integrity program
Find out about:
–Asset Integrity resources
– Regular networking and conference opportunities
– Effective training resources
– Peer input to help you build or upgrade your Asset Integrity program
– Participation in projects that expand our industry’s capabilities in Asset Integrity
26
3. COMPETENCY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CHANGING WORLD OF ASSET

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
3.1 Introduction
Technological advances in the Inspection field over the years is increasingly going beyond the
scope of the traditional inspector, and in this respect, a weakness in terms of required competence
levels exists. The maintenance concept has also changed substantially due to Risk based
methodologies verses time based inspections. It is also recognized that Inspection departments
cannot work in isolation to the rest of the organization, specifically when the move is to business
processes (e.g. ISO 9001) [1], rather that functional departments. Therefore a Shared custodianship
approach to Asset Integrity management is to be considered.
The Inspection contribution to how the business manages integrity has changed considerably in
recent years. What do we mean by “Changing world”? In a nutshell, from routine (frequent)
inspections of relatively new plant, based on a like for like approach, to infrequent inspections
based on condition and Fitness for Purpose (FFP). This section attempts to outline the changes that
have taken place and give an indication of how competent we are to meet the requirements of a
good inspection section in the present and the future.
3.2 The case for change for competency requirements

Essentially we are in a process of changing from time based (statutory driven) to condition based
inspection ensuring integrity and safety yet maximising plant availability. The assumption is a
steady shift from statutory to onus being on the user to be fully accountable for the safer operation
of the site, including managing and setting up inspection frequencies. Some of the more obvious
changes are given in the table below:
TABLE 3.1 – Changes between past and present or future

PAST PRESENT/FUTURE
Routine time based inspections of all Equipment inspected based on condition within the
equipment of relatively new plant framework of DOL exemptions. Ref. Legal below.
(mostly statutory driven),
Inspection and repairs based on a Infrequent inspections based on condition and FFP (FEA,
like for like approach i.e. meeting the API 579,fracture mechanics)
requirements of the original code of
construction. Routine “compare to
last time’ inspection approach
Predominantly practically based To a mix of sound theoretical and practical experience
personnel
Relatively sweet feedstock’s Wide variety of cocktails processed
routinely processed
Inspection data captured during Far greater emphasis on capturing and managing useful
frequent time based statutory inspection data — essential for Risk/ condition based
inspection. Data entries often decisions:
incomplete or inadequate on which -degradation mechanisms/management
to estimate degradation rate and - establishing trends
arrive at inspection frequency - determining Inspection intervals
-determining repairs, modifications, renewals, optimum
material selection
Inspection history routinely captured Inspection history captured less frequently (fewer
(from frequent inspections) and opportunities). Inspection intervals vary down to
recorded in ERC’s individual pieces of equipment. Requires a complex data
management system and the skills to operate it.
27
Mostly visual inspections and simple Use of more advanced NDT techniques and tending to
NDT (Invasive Inspection) non-invasive
Operational window not clear to all Far greater emphasis on establishing operational windows
and little monitoring done and monitoring their violations to trigger RBI reviews.
Run periods short and shutdown Run periods extended and turnaround duration shortened
duration’s long considerably. Pressure to meet, and better, Pacesetter/best
in class performance! Ensure integrity and safety yet
maximises plant availability?
Dictatorial approach to deciding Team approach (through RBI) to setting
repairs and Inspection frequencies. Repairs decided on a FFP
Inspection frequencies approach. Inspector requires Leadership and negotiation
skills
Legal. Authorities dictate Inspection Authorities play far less of a role.
frequencies and play a role in Responsibility placed on the user to manage his business
inspection. safely.
Some latitude given following Inspection frequency decided by joint team approach -
negotiation with the DoL operations, technology, and maintenance —
(exemptions from requirements of RBI/selective/representative inspection evolved and
VUP Regs negotiated). applied. Statistical techniques.
Far greater responsibility placed on Inspector who now
requires specific qualifications (IPE, Competent persons).
Discipline. Knowing what is required Perform as advertised!
is one thing but performing as such is
another ‘Old ways die hard”
Limited procedures and work National Quality system and accreditation required
instructions in place (SABS 0227) assumes a steady shift from “statutory
dictated” to the “user” being fully accountable for the safe
operation of his site and includes managing and setting
inspection frequencies. Business process vs. Functional
approach – ISO 9000 -2000
3.3 Major challenges facing the integrity assurance

Focus on, ‘What are the requirements to ensure integrity and safety yet maximising plant
availability?”
- Generic data. Considerable improvement in capturing, managing and understanding data required
(MEP’s, degradation library, codes and standards). Essential for RBI!
- Historic data. Considerable improvement in capturing, managing and maintaining data required.
Essential for RBI!
- Risk analysis (Reference generic and historic data above- essential elements in accurately
establishing risk). Essential for RBI.
- Greater depth of thinking /analysis — more graduates enter the section. Ensure balance between
the analytical and practical approach.
- Material - Design limitations, FFP
- Far greater emphasis on Leadership. From a dictatorial approach “This is what will be done!” to
multi-disciplined team approach and meeting requirements for FFP and setting inspection
frequencies.
- Negotiation skills, Must be able to negotiate from a position of respect and balance within the
organisation and out (authorities)
- Discipline. Knowing what is required is one thing but performing as such is another- “Old ways
die hard”. Perform as advertised
Manning levels: Average Shell/API norms for equipment verses inspector ratios. ~250
Current manning levels: ~>>500
28
3.3.1 How do we measure up? What are the short-falls and what can be done to address these?
In order to measure up we need to understand ‘What are the personnel requirements of a modern
Inspection section?”
The inspection personnel should be made up of a balance between the practically orientated
inspectors (those drawn from the artisan ranks) and staff capable of providing ‘depth”. In the past
Inspection personnel drawn from the cream of the artisan ranks, and provided with extensive
training, were perfectly suitable. They were more than able inspect on a comparative basis
(comparing to the last inspection and advise repairs in line with the code of construction).
However, the present day inspector needs to be far more analytical in his approach. Although he
may not have the depth required in some skills (e.g. material corrosion and design) he must know
where and when to call on these skills. There has to be a balanced mix of analytical thinking and the
practical implications to arrive at sound fitness for purpose solutions. This means that he must have,
for example, access to competent Materials/corrosion and Professional design engineers. Ideally he
should also have access to very seasoned Inspection engineer who can give direction.
Generally Inspection Sections lacks technical depth/analytical thinking. We have capable inspectors
drawn from the ranks some of whom have already obtained the qualifications required by the
OSHA and SABS 0227 (IPE, CP - boilers and pressure vessels). There is an imbalance between the
practically orientated personnel and the technical support provided resulting in additional pressures
on the Inspection manger.
TABLE 3.2 – Checklist for quick gap analysis.

REQUIREMENT GAP SCORE MITIGATION
(Vision) (CURRRENT
REALITY)
Generic data. Considerable improvement
in capturing, managing and maintaining
data required. Deep understanding of
degradation mechanisms Use of MEP’s,
Degradation library, etc
Historic data. Considerable improvement
in capturing, managing and maintaining
data required
Risk analysis
Greater depth of thinking & analysis
Material-Design imitations, FFP
Leadership
Negotiation skills
Discipline.
3.4 Skills and competency elements

The Technical areas in which skills and competency development is required are noted below. The
specific details will be extensively covered in the future. The typical competency levels are shown
in Table 3.3.
 Legislation & safety
 Documented procedures
 Plant design & construction
 Materials- selection & specification
 Welding technology & engineering
 Corrosion and protection
 Inspection and NDT technology
 In-service equipment inspection
29
 Communication & reporting

 Inspection and risk management
 (refinery and chemical plant process knowledge)
Table 3.3: The typical skill/competency levels

Awareness (A): A good knowledge of what is involved in an Area of Expertise and its relevance to the
business.
Skills: Performance:
Able to describe the main elements of the Area of Expertise and Sufficient awareness to contact
their importance to the business and Able to recognise how and required staff for help when needed
where competences in the Area of Expertise are relevant to own
job.
Knowledge (K): Being able to interpret and evaluate information and advice from experts in an Area
of Expertise.
Skills: Know and able to use correctly the terminology Performance:
(vocabulary) of the Area of Expertise and Able to hold an Can action with assistance.
informed debate with experts in the Area of Expertise and Able to
ask questions that test the viability of proposals in an Area of
Expertise
Skill (S): Being able to carry out consistently the activities of an Area of Expertise to the required
standard.
Skills:
Able to perform satisfactorily majority of activities of the Area of Performance:
Expertise and, Able to translate guidelines and standards for the Being able to apply and action most
Area of Expertise into practical actions and Able to solve jobs independently.
imaginatively common technical/operational problems in the Area
of Expertise and Able to guide and advise others in
operational/technical aspects of the Area of Expertise.
Mastery (M): Being able to diagnose and resolve significant, unusual problems and to successfully
adapt aspects of an Area of Expertise.
Skills: Performance: Being able to apply and
Able to creatively solve significant, complex, non-routine problems action more complicated jobs
in the Area of Expertise and Able to adapt practices from other independently and capable to TEACH
markets or countries for use in the Area of Expertise and Able to others.
generate substantial improvements to local practices and
procedures for the Area of Expertise
Note: It must be noted that other similar competency definitions can equally apply.
30
3.5 The shared custodianship approach

The Asset Integrity management proposes to achieve excellence in Pressure Equipment Integrity
Management (IM) through the Shared Custodianship of Assets (SCA) work process. SCA consists
of a shared ownership for IM issues between site functional groups, including operations,
engineering, maintenance, and pressure equipment integrity function (OEM-PEI). As such, SCA is
a vision for the future of how we manage pressure equipment assets when everyone shares the same
vision and mission for pressure equipment asset preservation. As such, SCA is the work process
that we expect to apply to get us “up off the IM plateau”, shown in Figure 3.1. We can achieve that
“circle” of IM excellence shown above if everyone who has a vital role in SSA works together as an
OEM-PEI Team, as described in the work process.
WHERE ARE WE GOING? PROACTIVE LEADERSHIP FOR

IM ISSUES AND NEEDS EXCELLENCE
SHARED CUSTODIANSHIP OF ASSETS IN
IM
QUALITY OF IM
THE IM PLATEAU
SUPPORT FOR IM ISSUES AND NEEDS
WHERE WE HAVE
BEEN? ACTIVE AND PASSIVE RESISTANCE TO
SILO’D
IM ISSUES AND NEEDS
MENTALITY
TIME
FIGURE 3.1: Quality of IM over Time
We can achieve that “circle” of IM excellence shown above if everyone who has a vital role in SSA
works together as an OEM-PEI Team, as described in the new work process. Figure 3.4 show the
typical role players that are involved in integrity management.
 A knowledge and skill standard exists for Operators, Craft and Engineers.
 There is a consistent means for evaluating the skill of the Operators, Craft and Engineers. The
evaluation is done periodically (approximately annually) and the individuals being evaluated are
involved in the process.
 A development plan for Operators, Craft and Engineers is prepared and implemented based on
the Knowledge and Skill evaluation.
 Operators, Craft and Engineers frequently and proactively share their experiences and
knowledge with their peers with the intent of expanding the knowledge of the collective group.
They also proactively seek insight from their peers.
31
Maintenance
GMR2.1 Contracts &
Management
Engineers
Procurement
LT -16.2
E&S Operations
PRESSURE EQUIPMENT ASSETS-
INTEGRITY & RELIABILITY
Process
HAZOP Control,
Project IPF Technology
MANAGEMENT OF Engineering
Engineering RRM -
OPERATING
WINDOWS
RCM Subject Matter

RBI
Experts, CME,
Inspection DESIGN SPECIALIST
IPE/CP CONSULTANTS
Figure 3.4: Role players in integrity management
3.5.1 Shared custodianship of assets work process

While it must be recognized that the Shared Custodianship of Assets (SCA) work process could
eventually apply to all types of equipment, such as machinery, instruments, etc. and even the RCM
work process. In the meantime, it should be clear, that this work process applies only to the Shared
Custodianship of Pressure Equipment Assets.
Two of the key aspects of the SCA work process are the creation of Corrosion Control Documents
(CCD’s) and the subsequent creation of inspection plans using Risk Based Inspection (RBI). These
two aspects of the SCA work process are a result of efforts by multi-functional OEM-PEI teams that
bring together all the necessary information to accomplish the mission. Key outputs of creating a
CCD for each process unit are:
1. A description of all the potential degradation problems that do, or might occur in each process
unit. This is vital input to doing inspection planning with RBI.
2. A recommendation on where the potential damage may occur, and
3. A list of all the key and critical variables (safe operating limits) that need to be controlled in
order to avoid unexpected degradation of process equipment.
Another key aspect of creating the CCD for each process unit is creating and implementing training
and knowledge transfer systems to ensure that each and every person who has a role in pressure
equipment integrity management understands their role and has the information necessary to
perform their role satisfactorily.
A third key aspect of the SCA work process is what we call the multi-functional Operations-
Engineering-Maintenance-PEI (OEM-PEI) team meetings that are periodically conducted to discuss
current and potential IM issues and problems associated with each process unit. The Asset Manager
32
plays a vital leadership role in these meetings, making it clear to everyone who has key roles, that
IM is now a very clear priority. At the outset, these OEM-PEI meetings are not combined with
other issues, like the daily planning meeting or the weekly status meeting.
3.5.2 Other changes required-: main elements

 Leadership
 Key Integrity /Reliability Processes
 Integrity Awareness
 Metrics & Analysis
 Skill Assessment
 Organization / Resource Utilization
 Use of Tools
Table 3.4: Stages of development

1 2 3 4 5
Awareness- Evaluation/Develop Implementation- Assessment – The .Excellence/Complet
knowledge of ment - A process Action plans and implementation e – The element is
the element, but has been identified processes are phase has been fully implemented
essential to manage the being completed and and the associated
practices are element. Key implemented to performance is practices are
missing. practices of the manage the being consistently benchmarks, and can
Minimal element have been element, and are tracked, measured be viewed as an
processes are in evaluated and being executed and reviewed. example of a
place to manage action plans with potential for Reliability top
the element. developed. improvement. performer.
Leadership
 Integrity Vision
 Understanding Strategy
 Periodic Look-backs, adjustment/renewal of strategy
 Leader Role Model
 Walk the Talk
 Ownership for Integrity
 Integrity part of the Business Plan
 Risk reduction / Integrity Project
 Understanding of Integrity in Production Plan
 Resource allocation to Integrity
 Long and Short Term Goal
 Accountability – All the Way Though the Organization
 Priorities defined / Number of Initiatives
 Balance in Proactive and “Fire Fighting”
 Critical Success Factors Identified/Publicized
Key reliability/integrity process
 List of Key Reliability Issues
 “Bad Actor” List
 Reliability Threats
 Philosophy/Strategy for Programmed Maintenance(PM)/Plant degradation
Management(PDM) and Operator Surveillance
 Look-back to determine success of Reliability Philosophy/Strategy
 Capital Project require Operability, Maintainability, & RCM Reviews
 Turnaround Workscope/Schedule use Risk Based Analysis
33
 Product Quality Control

 Amount of off-spec
 Awareness of spec’s and corrective action
 Process to minimize off-spec volumes/incidents
 Incident Investigating Process
 Fact Based Problem solving
 Systemic vs. Hardware Specific
 Human Factors
 Repair Standard/Procedures
 Critical Equipment Management Philosophy
 Life Cycle Cost Philosophy
Reliability awareness
 Awareness of Design Standards
 Awareness of Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) / Protective Instrument Systems (PIS) /
Relief Protection System
 Awareness of Management of Change (MOC)
 A Location Reliability/Integrity Web Site
 Risk Analysis Culture
Metrics and analysis
 Reliability Performance Goals & Measures
 Leading as well as lagging
 Creditable and Realistic
 Best/Successful Practice Sharing
 Both Intra-Refinery and Inter-Refinery
 Networking
 Unit Performance Metrics are made available to all
 Familiarity of individual with Unit Performance
 Metrics are being evaluated and analyzed
 Level of Urgent / Emergency work
 Reliability Performance Measure Benchmarking
 Amount of PM/PDM and Operation Surveillance done
 Rework Tracking & Investigation
 At the Craft level
 Others Levels
3.6 Conclusions and recommendations

With respect to competency development, the following is recommended
Gap analysis
Design Survey Questionnaire
Conduct Survey
Analyse Survey results & identify gaps
Define mentoring/training strategy (per element)

Self taught & test
Coaching
Training courses
Define/Specify a Score Card (Criteria) for Success
Assessment of evidence of competency:
– Certification/Industry approval/qualification
34
– Training records
– Performance appraisal records
– Documentary
– Direct questioning and testing (professional review)
– Observation/Demonstration
PROCESS
– Continuous process
– Same criteria for plant engineer & inspector (weighting differs)
– Re-assessment at certain frequencies
– Maintain minimum qualified level( e.g. level 3 or higher)
– Issued with authorisation certificate
Critical Success Factors for Shared Custodianship of Assets

There are at least seven critical success factors (CSF) for SSA. In this case CSF’s are defined as
those things without which the process is not likely to succeed. Hence each of these seven CSF’s
are key to success of any site effort to implement SSA.
 Senior Manager and Asset Manager leadership for SSA. Note that this is not just “support”
for IM, this is truly “walking the talk”. Support for IM is what we have now.
 Asset Manager scheduling and participation in OEM-PEI team meetings for their respective
process units (explained above).
 Proactive ownership of IM issues by process unit engineers, who are knowledgeable in all
the IM reliability issues in their respective process units.
 Utilization of risk assessment work processes by the OEM-PEI teams to prioritize the issues
for mitigation.
 Knowledge transfer of information in the CCD’s by PEI subject matter experts to operators
and crafts persons on information that they need to know to operate and maintain the units in
a safe and reliable manner.
 Additional resources to create CCD’s and to implement RBI.
 Effective communication, sharing and implementation of all the PEI key and critical
variables that are generated by the creation of the CCD.
Expected Results of Excellence in IM though the SCA work process

After fully implementing the Shared Stewardship of Assets work process for pressure equipment,
we can expect to achieve:
 Fewer process safety incidents related to IM issues
 Improved reliability and profitability of our assets
 Low life cycle costs for pressure equipment
 Risk mitigation on identified higher risk issues
 Known acceptable risks on lower risk issues
 Multi-million dollar savings from fewer leaks and incidents
 Fewer staff consumed with “fire fighting” type activities
 More staff available for profitability enhancement activities
Reference list
(1) N Sukaih, Failures 2006, 7th INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM on RISK, ECONOMY and
SAFETY, FAILURE MINIMISATION and ANALYSIS
35
4. ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT -GETTING ORGANISED

This section describes the Asset Integrity Management along the lines of the typical business
process cycle.
Figure 4.1 Integrity management business process
4.1 Integrity management objectives and risks

Objectives for Integrity Management are subsidiary to the overall plant objectives; the Integrity
Management Objectives should address:
 Reliable operation of the assets, sustainable for the long term.
 optimised low cost operation and profit generation
 maintenance-related environmental aspects
 The plant’s benchmarked position.
Maintenance factors (“Risks”) that could have a significant influence on Achieving the Plant
Objectives should be systematically analysed and ranked with respect to their relative importance;
risk control measures (as described in this chapter) should be developed / implemented /
communicated to an extent commensurate with the identified level of risk.
4.2 Integrity management policies, plans, strategies (direction)

Plant Policies related to the Integrity Management business process should comprise the following:
 Compliance with integrity laws and regulations
 Maintenance, Integrity and Reliability (jointly owned by Maintenance, Inspection, Operations
and Process engineering)
 Shutdowns (e.g. long interval major planned shutdowns vs. opportunistic work during unplanned
shutdowns; work on-the-run vs. work deferred to a plant shutdown). (Jointly owned by
Maintenance, Inspection, Operations and Process Engineering); Consultation required with other
plants in the region to phase shutdowns appropriately
 Incident/Accident reporting and investigation policy (i.e. maintenance/ inspection/ integrity/
reliability incidents to be treated similar to HSE incidents, including root-cause analysis of the
high- and medium potential incidents.)
 Maintenance and the Environment (e.g. catch oil when opening equipment; acceptability of oil
leaking to water in heat exchangers; minimising leakage from compressor-, pump- and valve
seals, etc.)
 Demolition of facilities no longer needed. Reduce the asset increase the integrity.
Plant Plans should cover the following areas related to inspecting and maintaining the plant (read
the term plant as to include utilities):
 Competence development and refresher training, covering discipline-specific items, risk and
reliability management; commercial awareness; process awareness; Gross margin generation,
costs, benchmarked position, HSE case, root cause analysis etc.
36
 Risk-based inspections plan covering all disciplines (mechanical, civil, electrical,

instrumentation, fired equipment) and all assets (on-plot, off-plot, off-site).
 A rolling overall plant shutdown plan, covering an entire shutdown cycle (developed jointly by
Maintenance, Inspection, Operations, Technology, E&S and Supply)
 Plans for individual plant shutdowns
 Reliability-centred maintenance development plan / annual reliability action plans for each plant
(jointly developed by Maintenance and Operations)
 Risk based inspection development plan (“corrosion loops”), including consultation with
statutory authorities, where required.
 Plan for the development of SIL’s (Safety Integrity Levels)
 Documentation update plan, summarising the requirements to keep documents controlled/ up-to-
date, in order to ensure sufficient resources are allocated; sufficiently qualified.
Were are procedures deemed to be inadequate or impractical, there will be a natural tendency for
“private knowledge” to be applied and informal work practices will develop, which may be
incorrect or unsafe. Regular updating of procedures, with involvement of the users and the
relevant subject matter expertise should avoid this.
 Maintenance and service contracts renewal plan
 Best practices exchange and implementation plan
 Plan to acquire or maintain ISO9001 certification
 compliance auditing plan
 Annual service plans for central engineering departments
All plans should be challenged and endorsed as part of the annual Targets and Resourcing planning
cycle.
In addition to the longer term plans, mentioned above, shorter term work and manpower planning
should be done routinely, to prioritise work, minimise cost and optimise workflow.
Note: It should be recognised that the process of prioritisation of maintenance work involves
judgements made by people that may not have a complete picture of (indirect) consequences.
Deferral of work deemed low priority may therefore cause unintended loss of efficiency,
reliability or safety. Long outstanding work may therefore require periodic scrutiny;
alternatively work should be required to be completed within a defined time span, even if low
priority.
4.2.1 Setting the strategy

Asset Management Policy Document
In complex installations, it is appropriate to have a defined written policy for management of the
assets in terms of the equipment, and the feed and product inventory. This may provide
identification of the risks from failures (both equipment and human), and an assessment of
equipment condition and fitness-for-service. The asset management policy will be specific to the
type of industry, plant location, and company objectives.
The policy document may define (but not list, except perhaps in Appendices) the assets concerned,
with an overview of a means of managing, inspecting and maintaining each type of asset, and the
design life of each plant or asset. As a generic document, it will deal pragmatically with risk (to
safety, business, reputation, employment, and neighbours), recognising that all activities carry some
risk and that the objective is to manage risk to the benefit of all. It may define the framework for
plant outages and reliability targets in terms of production or availability.
Structural Integrity Management Plan

The Asset Management Policy Document may reference a Structural Integrity Management Plan
(SIM Plan). This is a particularly important document for installations where there are significant
hazards and/or the inventory of equipment is large. The SIM Plan will normally set out the means
37
and procedures by which structural integrity is assured to meet statutory and company requirements.
Typical elements referenced in a Structural Integrity Management Plan include:
• The original design assessment and design life.
• Operating limits and instructions.
• Maintenance policy document and equipment schedules.
• Inspection policy and schemes of examination.
• Fitness-for-service assessment and revalidation.
• Repairs, modifications and replacements procedures.
• On-line and periodic condition monitoring.
• Equipment retirement policy.
The plan should consider interactions between these elements and the relative strength and
combination of the elements required for different categories of equipment.
Maintenance Policy
It is good practice to have a document that describes the maintenance policy for equipment.
Manufacturers’ recommendations for maintenance may be sound but can be over-protective. A risk-
based approach is to identify the safety and production-critical equipment, and to analyse what may
go wrong and set maintenance policy accordingly. Alternative approaches can be condition-based
or reliability-centered. Typical outcomes can range from ‘no maintenance’ through increasing levels
of monitoring, inspection and maintenance. The resulting maintenance schedule is a balance
between the impact of carrying out maintenance (cost, effort, downtime, risk of damage), and the
impact of a failure (safety, cost, downtime). When the maintenance policy and schedules have been
defined, they should be explained to those involved in their implementation. It is useful to have a
mechanism for feedback on performance through a system for recording and analysing equipment
failures. This can then form the basis of an improved plan to balance maintenance cost and impact
with the financial consequences of potential failures.
Establishing a Integrity and maintenance plan and schedule

The previous sections considered the best way of maintaining individual items. Consideration of the
plant as a whole, seeking opportunities for co-ordinating the aggregate of procedures, will now he
examined. This will involve a compromise between the individual optimum periodicities, the most
economic use of labour and the maximum plant availability.
A systematic six-step method

A method for establishing the most appropriate combination of Inspection and maintenance
procedures for the many plant items is given below. The following method of a Top-Down Bottom-
Up Approach provides a structured approach. (Ref.: Maintenance Planning and Control, A Kelly)
Step 1—Determine critical plant units and production windows
Determine the nature of the plant process (continuous, batch, etc.). Classify the plant into units and
construct a process flow diagram. Carry out a simple consequences of failure analysis and estimate
the cost of lost production. Determine the production plan, the pattern of plant operation and the
expected plant and unit availabilities. From such information determine (a) the critical plant units,
perhaps even ranking them according to the cost and consequences of failure, (b) the schedule of
production windows (including consideration of the possibility of random production stops). In
addition, and also as part of Step 1, determine the existing maintenance plan—if any.
Step 2—classify the plant into constituent items

This will be a complete classification in the case of critical units, and a part classification in the case
of non-critical units.
38
Step 3—Determine and rank the effective procedures
Determine the effective procedures for each item and the best of these from a cost and safety
viewpoint. In general the procedures for the simple items will he reasonably certain and will he
mostly on-line maintenance. However, this will not necessarily he so in the case of the complex
items and the best approach is often to try to identify a simple method of condition checking. Such a
procedure should result in a table for each item.
Table 4.1: Maintenance Procedure for an Item

Item Timing On- Periodicity Time Initial On- Periodic Time Secondary
line maintenance line ity action
or action or
Off- Off-
line line
Step 4—Establish a plan for the identified work
The method here will depend upon whether the plant is series-continuous, product flow, batch
product flow, batch, or vehicle fleet. The large series-continuous plant presents the most difficult
problem because it has to be considered as a whole for scheduling; the item in a batch plant or fleet
can be considered individually.
Step 5—Establish a schedule for the maintenance and inspection: on-line, the off-line window and
the shutdown work
In the case of on-line maintenance the work can be scheduled independently down to item level.
Such work is usually classified by geographical area, trade and frequency and carried out as short-
term routines.
Off-line work can he carried out in production-windows (small jobs clustered at unit level) or as
part of an agreed shutdown (major jobs clustered at plant level) and can usually only be scheduled
by agreement with production. Because of the inevitable changes in the production plan it is
important that this schedule should he flexible.
In both cases the aim is to smooth the maintenance workload in order to make the best use of in-
plant resources. However, if a condition-based- maintenance plan is in operation then only the
inspection checks can be scheduled because timing of the subsequent work depends on the results
of these checks. However, it is important to take into consideration (where known) the approximate
periodicity of the subsequent corrective work load when planning resources.
Step 6—Establish corrective maintenance guidelines
In spite of preventive maintenance there will still be some unexpected failures, e.g. those due to
items which fail randomly and without monitor-able warning. Such failures have to he planned for
in terms of spares and manpower. In the case of critical units, careful consideration must also be
given to repair methods, documentation and decision guidelines.
Inspection, Examination, and NDT Policy

Inspection Examination, and NDT are often an important part of managing equipment by providing
39
information on the condition necessary to confirm that it remains within design limits or to assess
fitness-for-service. For pressure and some other types of equipment, a periodic examination of
inspections and other tests is a statutory requirement under VUP Regulations. While other
equipment and machinery may be exempt from regulations, the same principles of having
appropriate examination apply.
Unnecessary inspection can be detrimental if it involves opening or disturbing equipment, or
allowing in corrosive media. It can increase the risk of future failures (e.g. by damaging lagging,
protective coatings and flanged joints). Incorrect application of NDT or inappropriate selection of
inspection areas can produce a false sense of security by reporting no damage in the areas inspected,
whereas damage may have occurred, or damage elsewhere may be missed. Inspection affects
production and is usually labour-intensive, and can therefore be a significant cost. For these
reasons, inspection of equipment should always be well founded, and should be designed for the
purpose of looking in particular locations for specific conditions, measurements, defects and flaws.
Risk-based inspection (RBI), possibly based on a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), or at
least specialist knowledge and experience, can be a good and recognised policy. Where the
information required supporting risk-based inspection is not available, and for certain high hazard
low probability of failure equipment, a more general inspection may be used to establish or confirm
changes to the base-line condition.
Schemes of examination should adapt to the age and condition of equipment and to the knowledge
of its deterioration. For pressures systems the VUP Regulations requires the use of a Competent
Person to draw up and/or certify as suitable a written scheme of examination. In general, the
inspection policy needs to identify the approach to inspection planning and implementation, and the
provision of NDT services. New equipment, particularly on new processes or with new materials,
may have no known history (e.g. of corrosion rate) and may need more frequent inspection. Early in
life there may be great value in a sequence of measurements (e.g. thickness) taken at the same
place, combined with a visual inspection taking a more general look in areas, which might be
difficult to access or to clean. On equipment where experience shows little corrosion over 90% of
the area, there is little point in continuing detailed thickness checks over the whole surface once this
is established.
Most inspection policies will include visual inspection of internal and/or external surfaces. It is
appropriate to use NDT to complement visual inspection for the detection of flaws that may be
invisible to the naked eye. NDT can confirm and quantify expected deterioration mechanisms, and,
when used at an appropriate interval, provides a means for condition monitoring. In order to provide
a measure of defence-in-depth, the inspection and NDT policy may need to include elements that
would recognise damage due to unforeseen mechanisms, i.e. speculative inspections. Even when a
full RBI has been developed with sound knowledge of the process operation, limited speculative
inspection may be used to confirm its assumptions.
Strategies for Managing Corrosion and Vibration

In many plants, corrosion and vibration are threats to integrity that are so well recognised that it
makes sense to have specific strategies for managing them. Repair and replacement of corroded
parts can be a significant cost to all plants. The management of corrosion is a complex yet
achievable objective, but which can produce savings in the long run. The details of the methods
involve understanding the materials involved, environment (inside and outside) as related to
criticality of the process and the equipment. At its simplest level a corrosion strategy may be just a
schedule for repainting; at its most complex it may involve the optimisation of process conditions
and holistic plant economics. Specialist corrosion or materials engineers have helped many
companies draw up a strategy, reduce repair and maintenance costs, and demonstrate compliance
with legislative requirements.
40
Vibration has similar issues, but is usually (but not exclusively) associated with rotating machinery
and high flows. It can normally be managed by application of a number of techniques. Drawing up
an appropriate strategy to manage vibration has the same requirement as corrosion for appropriate
specialist support to give cost effective advice. The benefits from reduced vibration include reduced
power consumption, wear, noise, risk of cracking, operator fatigue and equipment failure rates. The
vibration mitigation strategy can include the assessment of locations at vibration risk (e.g. small
bore connections), strain gauge monitoring, re-balancing of rotating machinery, improved supports
and pipe-route redesign.
Dirty or scaling duty, build-up of deposits, (which cause out of-balance and wear, often of
bearings), and rapid changes in load and/or the operating environment (e.g. wind) are common
causes of failure. It may be worth monitoring vibration periodically, which is often done as a tour
by a specialist or trained operator, using a hand-held monitor with a data logger. The results are
then loaded onto a computer, trended, and nonconforming items identified. Continuous vibration
monitoring can be used as a process tool (e.g. to identify fouling on a centrifuge). When vibration
levels rise slowly over a long period of time, it is very difficult to define the point at which
equipment is definitely damaged and should be stopped. Alert levels (e.g. process wash, alert
management, stop & isolate) should be defined by management and set into the instrumentation or
monitoring alert equipment. Vibration detected on equipment that does not normally vibrate (e.g.
heat exchangers) is often a sign of problems and should be investigated promptly. Similarly, a
complete lack of vibration on something that normally vibrates indicates a failure, but probably
does not indicate a safety issue, unless it concerns failure of components such as a stirrer or agitator
in a batch reactor. The strategy should identify and recommend action for these contingencies.
Strategies for Machinery

Control of the adverse effects of ageing of machines is an important element in integrity
management, but there are other aspects that are equally important. First you need to ensure that the
equipment is suitable for the purpose for which it is provided. This assessment is generally more
complex for machines than for static equipment: machines generally have less tolerance to use in
situations to which they are not suited.
The same basic damage mechanisms apply to machines as to static equipment, but, in general,
machines fail more frequently. The integrity of machines should be managed with a greater
emphasis on the application of appropriate maintenance that adequately controls the risk of loss of
containment. Typical maintenance activities may include dismantling for inspection, replacement of
worn or damaged or life-expired parts, adjustment and lubrication.
Each maintenance activity should be planned in advance to ensure that the required time and
resources are available. On duties with hazardous fluids, maintenance frequency is normally time-
based or condition-based. Some equipment may be run with no scheduled maintenance (e.g. pumps)
on the basis of a risk-assessment. Potentially hazardous leaks from seals should be managed by
suitable safety-critical containment alarms, or low hazard leaks spotted during routine inspection.
(a) Time-based
Time-based maintenance is appropriate if the rate of deterioration is both known and consistent.
Time in this context can either be calendar time or time to reach a defined position such as
operating hours or total throughput.
(b) Condition-based
On-line condition monitoring can either be continuous or periodic. Both are carried out with the
equipment in operation. The former provides a real-time view of the measured parameters, but it is
more costly to install and operate. The latter provides intermittent information and therefore has
41
more chance of missing rapid deterioration. However, in general, deterioration due to normal ageing
mechanisms is relatively slow, and periodic condition monitoring is suitable providing that the
intervals are not excessive. The condition monitoring techniques that are most commonly used for
machines are vibration and oil sampling. Thickness testing and thermography are also useful tools.
Performance measures such as flow, pressure, temperature and power draw are the most effective
ways of detecting fouling or blockages.
Process Control
Degradation of equipment is usually strongly linked to the process operating conditions in terms of
the environment, loads and duty. Process control is therefore an important part of the equipment
management strategy. Its aims are to ensure that equipment operates within its safe operating limits,
while optimizing performance and minimising degradation, and it is a key instrument to prolonging
equipment life.
Process conditions are often changed over the life of a plant, maybe as a result of changes in
product, process or capacity. There may also be changes in conditions at times of shutdown, start-
up, cleaning/decontamination. It is important to recognise and review the impact of such changes,
and good co-operation between operators, maintenance and materials engineers is a significant part
of process control.
In many cases during fitness-for-service assessment where damage has been detected, it has become
clear that changes in operation increased degradation rates or introduced mechanisms that were not
considered at design. Small changes that may not have been significant, as individual steps (e.g.
small temperature changes, modified flush systems) became important over extended operation. It is
often difficult to predict the impact of process change over an extended period, and where there is
doubt increased monitoring and/or inspection is appropriate.
Role of Insurance
As part of their business asset management strategy, organisations will often protect their assets and
liabilities through the application of insurance. Typically an engineering insurance package for a
piece of industrial equipment would include such cover defined losses as a result of ‘Sudden and
Unforeseen Damage’ which would include breakdown, explosion and collapse of the insured
property. These terms are usually defined as follows.
• Breakdown is defined as “the actual breaking, distortion or burning out of any part of the insured
property, while in use, arising from mechanical or electrical defects causing sudden stoppage which
necessitates repair or replacement before it can resume normal working”.
• Explosion is defined as “the sudden and violent rendering of the pressure plant, by force of
internal fluid pressure causing bodily displacement of any part of the pressure plant together with
forcible ejection of the contents”.
• Collapse is defined as “the sudden and dangerous distortion of any part of the pressure plant
caused by crushing stress by force of steam or other fluid pressure”. For any damage to equipment
insured in this way, the amount payable is normally calculated on the basis of reinstatement of the
insured property or other property destroyed or damaged.
Reinstatement is defined in two ways:

• Where the insured property is destroyed “its replacement by similar plant of a condition equal to,
but not better than, its condition when new”.
• Where the insured property is damaged “the repair of the damaged portion to a condition
substantially the same as, but not better or more extensive, than its condition when new”.
A typical insurance policy of this type would not normally cover:

• The agreed excess amount
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• Loss or damage by fire or theft etc

• The cost of maintenance or rectification of faulty workmanship
• The cost of rectification of:
a) wear and tear, erosion, corrosion or other deterioration caused by, or naturally resulting from,
ordinary work use or exposure
b) Gradually developing flaws or fractures which do not necessitate immediate stoppage
• Consequential losses
• Psychological impact of a vessel failure on both employees and customers and the loss of
stakeholder confidence.
Insurance policies do not generally cover the repair and rectification of damage due to progressive
deterioration. Where damage leads to sudden breakdown, such as a leak or more catastrophic
failure, the insurance indemnity may depend on whether the damage was sudden and unforeseen, or
naturally resulting from ordinary work use, and the way in which the equipment was being
managed. It is a normal condition of insurance policies that the insured shall take all reasonable
precautions to safeguard the insured property against loss or damage. They shall maintain it in an
efficient condition and take all reasonable steps to ensure that all Government and other regulations
relating to the operation and use of the insured property are observed. Under these circumstances,
most ageing mechanisms arising naturally from ordinary work use and exposure should be
foreseeable; the courts are unlikely to accept the argument of sudden and unforeseen breakdown
and accept insurance claims on this basis. Whatever the circumstances, insurance cannot normally
provide protection against liabilities when there is prosecution and conviction under health and
safety law.
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4.3 Integrity Management Organisation and resources

The Integrity Management activities tend to cross many boundaries (Operations - Area Maintenance
- Central Workshop - Specialists - Contractors - etc.). Roles, Responsibilities and Authorities should
be documented, including aspects such as supervision, monitoring. Interfaces should be covered by
agreements, which may take various forms (e.g. mutually agreed service departments’ plans;
service level agreements; reliability contracts). There should be a spirit of good co-operation
amongst the plant departments, resulting in a joint ownership of targets and priorities.
Risk and Reliability Management (RCM, RBI, SIL), likewise, involves many different disciplines.
For proper focus and adequate speed of implementation, a special organisational structure should be
set up (i.e. steering committee and task forces with formally appointed members). For this key area
of plant performance, a Reliability Focal Point should be appointed to ensure common
understanding and - approach.
A single “Management Representative” for the Integrity Management system should be identified,
even if there is no Engineering Manager position in the Plant Management Team.
Inspection roles should be identified for all disciplines (Mechanical, Civil, Electrical, and
Instrumentation) and there should be an inspectable items database for each of the disciplines. The
reporting line for the inspectors should be independent from the asset owner (e.g. the PU or the
plant manager); the inspectors’ primary concern is asset integrity (i.e. not cost or margin
generation); they should therefore have a “dotted line” to a member of the Plant Management Team,
to ensure that a channel is available for voicing major (persistent) concerns directly to a sufficiently
senior level in the plant.
Maintenance and Inspection personnel should be regularly exposed to practices in other parts of the
plant and in other refineries, e.g. through temporary assignments or cross-postings.
The Plant should have a maintenance management system, being the exclusive channel for
submitting and managing work requests. Recurring (time-based) tasks should be initiated by the
system; work requests should be challenged; work should be prioritised and planned; resources
allocated, etc.
Job completion and repair details should be entered in the system. Performance indicators should be
readily retrievable, both for the execution of maintenance work and for the performance of the plant
or specified equipment. The maintenance management system should be transparently linked to the
Enterprise Resource system (e.g. SAP or JDE) if not part of it.
Equipment design data, historic inspection results, inspection schemes, future inspection
requirements and Risk Based Inspection data should be kept in one system (rather than partly paper-
based, partly PC-based and partly accommodated in the maintenance management system)
Documents and data should be well-protected against fire- and other loss.
Warehouse inventory (spare parts and consumables) should be readily retrievable; “maintenance”
should be involved in setting minimum and maximum stock levels as well as in re-ordering
decisions for insurance spares.
Compliance with statutory/legal requirements on professional competencies should be monitored

regularly. Some countries require national Competence Certificates or Professional Registration for
engineers and Inspectors; others may require certification by Standards Bodies.
4. 3.1 Roles and responsibility

Owners, users and management
As an owner, user or manager of equipment containing hazardous fluids or pressure, you have an
overriding responsibility to your employees, contractors, other site residents, the general public, and
to the environment for ensuring:
• Health and Safety.
• Minimum impact of operations outside the site.
These responsibilities are effected in terms of:
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• Major Accident Hazards.

• Control of Hazardous Chemicals and Dangerous Substances.
• Safe and reliable operation and maintenance of plant and equipment.
• Avoidance of nuisance from operations.
• Minimising waste and discharges.
Failure to comply with health and safety and environmental regulations in these areas can lead to
companies and individuals being prosecuted. Enterprises also have responsibility to stakeholders for
maintaining production. Directors and senior managers are ultimately responsible and have a
particular obligation to:
• Identify and understand the risks.
• Put in place appropriate strategies to manage the risks.
• Set suitable policies, processes and procedures for equipment and operations.
• Delegate agreed responsibilities to competent people and organisations.
• Ensure competency by provide appropriate training and experience.
• Provide adequate resources in terms of time, money, equipment and information.
• Lead communications, co-operation and the management of change.
• Check implementation, close out actions and audit performance.
These obligations are consistent with the principles of a Safety Management Systems. The role of
the relevant directors and senior management is likely to include the following activities, depending
on the nature of the equipment and hazard of products being contained:
• Identification of high hazard installations, plant, systems and equipment.
• Assessment of the major hazards, hazard management policies/methods.
• Setting of Key Performance Targets (KPTs) and Indicators (KPIs) - metrics for measuring and
assessing aspects relating to health and safety, reliability, criticality to business etc.
• Assessment of potential impact of failures on employees, business and neighbours.
• Justification of continued ‘License to Operate’.
• Investigation of failures and incidents, and information in the public domain.
• Analysis of production impacts / losses from failures and unavailability.
• Authorising improvements as required for continued operation.
• Auditing the management of equipment regularly, to ensure compliance with policies, and
implementation of processes and procedures.
In undertaking these activities, there is benefit in involving experienced independent people as well
as staff from the plant operations, maintenance and supervisory teams. Some companies appoint a
separate Engineering Authority responsible to the Board for asset integrity.
Operators, Maintainers and Supervisors

Many corporate responsibilities for equipment are often devolved to a range of roles in Operations,
Maintenance and Site Supervision. Sometimes these roles are out-sourced to separate contracted
individuals and organisations. Those ultimately responsible for health and safety have an obligation
to set clear requirements and performance standards to operators, maintainers and supervisors, and
provide them with the resources to deliver. Operators, maintainers and supervisors, in turn, have the
responsibility to comply with the requirements and standards, and to inform those devolving
responsibility when compliance is not possible or the resources inadequate.
Operators, maintainers and supervisors will interpret and implement the policies that have been set,
and their performance can be measured against Key Performance Indicators on integrity, leakage
and releases, reliability and costs. Monitoring equipment performance can be via feedback using
operation and maintenance reports, failure and incident reports and modification forms. Depending
on the nature of the equipment and the hazards of the products being contained, the role of
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operators, maintainers and supervisors in respect of the management of ageing includes some or all
of the following:-
(a) Communicating within the management hierarchy (both up and down)
Simple, clear and relevant information exchange – written and verbal.
(b) Control of equipment
 Maintaining a Site Asset Register (or equivalent database) containing key information about
equipment (name, location, function, duty, design envelope, maintenance and inspection
policy, manufacturer, age).
 Maintenance and protection of equipment records against accidental or deliberate disposal
or corruption. Reorganisation, downsizing, change of record system and change of company
ownership are likely times for information to be ‘lost’.
 Periodic auditing of equipment to confirm that technical information in the Equipment
Records is valid and up to date. Data on modifications should log whether the modification
was completed and successful, or was abandoned.
(b) Production of equipment condition indicators
 Collating operating data, condition monitoring and inspection reports.
 Reporting containment failures with sufficient investigation to identify the causes and those
related to equipment deterioration in a form that can identify trends.
 Analysing evidence indicative of deterioration.
 Reviewing whether the current monitoring / inspection regime is still appropriate.
 Giving particular attention to equipment that is approaching ‘end of life’ and which could be
of concern for safety, or for the costs of replacement/major repair.
 For critical items at high hazard installations, this could be an annual report stating the
known or predicted condition of all the key equipment.
(c) Reviewing comparative equipment performance
 Comparison of major plant items (individually) and minor plant items (by area or type)
considering data on availability, maintenance, trips/failures.
 Trending of data by review of previous years (with corrections for changes in business or
operating targets).
 Analysis of significance of changes.
(d) Setting of requirements for inspection and maintenance
 Setting maintenance and inspection policy, standards and targets.
 Agreeing qualification and experience levels (e.g. for fitters, welders etc.) and formal
qualification to recognised standards for inspectors and NDT technicians.
(e) Verification of inspection and maintenance
 Assessing and ensuring competency and relevant training.
 Auditing for completion, timing, effectiveness, accuracy of reporting, cost effectiveness, and
relevance to future activities.
 Determining future resource/subcontract policy to ensure cost-effectiveness.
 Periodic review of inspection and/or maintenance records to establish if approach, methods
and frequency are still valid.
Plant Inspectors, Asset Managers/Technicians and Competent Persons

Where there is a need for equipment to be examined, there is a role for someone to specify and
control the scope, nature, frequency and conduct of examinations consistent with the identified
risks, failure modes and damage mechanisms. In many organisations this role carries the title of
Plant Inspector, while in others, particularly those dealing with non-VUP equipment; it may be
Asset Manager or Asset Technician. For pressure systems, VUP regulations require a Competent
Person, normally accredited to Authorised Inspection Agency and affiliated to a corporate body, in
this role. All those performing this role should have a suitable degree of independence from the
operating functions of the company so as to be able to give an impartial assessment of the condition
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of equipment without conflict of interests.

Depending on the role, these activities may include the following:
• Verification of design and manufacturing integrity.
• Identification of any specific health and safety issues relating to the examinations.
• Providing guidance as to how the plant should be prepared for examination.
• Identification of the anticipated damage mechanisms.
• Establishing the scope and nature of the examination required, including the examination and
testing of any protective devices.
• Determination of the date of the next examination and periodicity between them.
• Preparation and/or approval, and review/revision of written schemes of examination.
• Identification and assessment of the signs of damage.
• Sentencing of defects found during the examinations.
• Determination and approval of suitable repair procedures.
• Production of suitable report of any examination carried out.
Plant Inspectors, Asset Managers/Technicians, and Competent Persons are responsible for all
aspects of plant examination, including inspection supplemented by NDT techniques. There is an
important distinction between this role and that of the NDT Technician: the NDT Technician is only
responsible for applying the NDT technique specified in the procedure and reporting the NDT
results.
4.3.2 Human factors

Competencies required
Managing equipment requires a range of competencies. Competence is both having and
demonstrating the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to do a specific task within a
particular context. Employers need to have sufficient knowledge to appreciate and employ the range
of competencies required, and to maintain adequate control. Depending on the size of organisation
and the type of equipment, the key competencies may be contained in-house, or accessed from sub-
contractors and consultants.
The key competencies required to manage equipment containing hazardous and/or pressurized
fluids include the following:
• Education and training in technical and mechanical engineering.
• Understanding of the relevant regulatory requirements and any approved code of practice and
guidance for the equipment
• Knowledge of design and construction codes and practices.
• Familiarity with the equipment concerned, together with the detail of the design and materials of
construction, and the operation and maintenance requirements.
• Understanding of the metallurgical issues for the construction materials and the effect of
environment so as to predict and/or prevent potential damage mechanisms.
• The necessary skills for operating and caring for the equipment.
• The knowledge and ability to plan inspection and maintenance to ensure safety.
• Experience of plant inspection, inspection techniques and NDT, and knowledge of their
applications and limitations.
• The knowledge and ability to undertake routine maintenance tasks and to know when to refer to
specialist contractors.
• Experience of welding, both practical skills and welding engineering.
• An appreciation of fitness-for-service assessment.
• The management skills for organising and ensuring necessary actions take place.
• Teamwork skills and understanding the roles of others.
• The communications skills to ensure that everybody knows what is happening.
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The team of managers, supervisors and technicians that is responsible for the equipment must have
these competencies and be organised in a way that utilises them in the roles they undertake. In many
situations, the Competent Person, as required by the OHS Act and VUP Regulations, will have
many of the key competencies. Duty Holders should not rely solely on the Competent Person, but
should take an active part in bearing responsibility through staff employed or contracted to their
own organisations. In a non-regulatory sense, the Responsible Person is someone with the necessary
authority and competence to be responsible for containment equipment. It is now common good
practice for organisations to define the responsibilities of the different roles within an organisational
structure. This leads to a statement of the competencies required for particular jobs and roles at all
levels of responsibility, from technicians to managers.
Certification to ISO quality standards of organisations operating hazardous equipment is now

expected. Pressure systems and chemical containment engineering require a range of competencies
from the technical to the graduate professional. Ensuring the right blend of practical experience and
engineering know-how is the key to successful management. Creating an underlying Key
Competencies List for both Technicians and Managers focuses the mind on whether to train-up or
buy-in what is needed.
Supply issues
The skills and experience that are relied upon for the management of ageing equipment are
becoming increasingly scarce in the workforce. There is no longer a steady supply of boiler
engineers and other skilled workers from industries such as coal mining, shipyards and merchant
shipping. New graduates entering in engineering industry can also be scarce, and those that do, lack
the necessary experience and continuity. There can be a wide gap in age and experience between
established experienced staff and their newly recruited colleagues. A lifetime’s knowledge that has
been built up by one person can be easily lost upon retirement. It is therefore necessary for you to
consider how to retain corporate memory and skills about key equipment.
Transfer of experience – succession planning

A wise organisation plans for the transfer of skills and knowledge to allow for staff development
and turnover. Specific recruitment and training strategies may be needed to develop these skills
from less experienced staff. At other times, the skills and knowledge gap can be filled by hiring
appropriate people or from subcontractors. Succession planning is particularly important; the in-
house knowledge upon which integrity management relies may have to be transferred several times.
This just reinforces the requirement to identify what skills and competencies are needed, and
arrange training – it is unreasonable to expect to recruit someone with exactly the profile and
experience you need (unless you are prepared to pay highly for it).
Managing established workforces

Concerns over the supply of technical staff are reduced if the industry culture is for low staff
turnover. An established workforce is often as effective as a younger one, having more experience,
team commitment and stability. Management that reinforces these attributes will benefit and gain a
return. Maintaining the team atmosphere and minimising change, giving employees the assurance
that they will be looked after in retirement or when the equipment is decommissioned will engender
continuing loyalty.
Specified competencies
There may be a need, particularly where the maintenance of high-hazard equipment is outsourced,
for a formal means of defining and controlling the skills of contract personnel. These require the
contractor to buy into a system of training and validation, such that only appropriate personnel work
on specified plant.
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Technical Support for Inspection and Maintenance

A larger knowledge pool is required to help deal with question like “is this an age-related
problem?” and “what do other people with this kit do that works?” The vendor may no longer exist,
or have the skills to support older plant. In these circumstances it may be necessary to get advice
from a specialist consultant.
Training, Competency and Certification Of Skilled Personnel (Including NDT And Welding)
A good training policy will have many sources of continuing professional development. Some will
involve mentoring and on-the-job coaching and changes. Other sources include formal training
courses, seminars and workshops.
Significant experience and professional development can be passed on by giving new and less
experienced staff the chance to work with, and learn from, the more experienced colleagues. More
experienced staff need to value the development of younger colleagues, who in turn need to
appreciate that they have a lot yet to learn that has not been taught in college or university.
Mentoring can and should be very valuable, but there is also benefit in learning the correct approach
while away from work pressures. Training courses and team workshops need to be part of an active
company, since they may not occur organically. Where new, infrequent or complex maintenance
tasks are involved, learning, re-learning or practice under classroom conditions are encouraged
before the job is done. Of particular relevance for ageing equipment are the formal requirements for
the training and certification of inspection and NDT and welding personnel.
(a) Inspectors and NDT personnel

Carrying out an inspection to identify damage requires the engagement of competent inspection and
NDT personnel. Both the plant inspector, who has a general responsibility for examination and the
specification of individual inspections, and the NDT operative, who has skill in one or more NDT
techniques, have a role to play. A competent individual will have an appropriate educational
background and the required level of training and experience and, in the case of the NDT operative,
someone who holds appropriate certification at the right level.
For plant inspectors or engineer surveyors engaged as Competent Persons in the inspection of
pressure systems under the regulations, there is Approved Code of Practice. The attributes required
for the individual and specialist services and the organisation depend on the size and complexity of
the system. They range from individuals having adequate knowledge and experience with
reasonable support in the case of minor systems, to having at least one senior engineer of Chartered
Engineer status in each relevant discipline backed by a full range of services for major systems.
UKAS2 accreditation to ISO/IEC 17020:2004] is an indication of the competence of an inspection
department, organisation or self employed person. It is appropriate to apply similar principles for
inspectors of non-PSSR equipment. Commercial courses for Plant Inspectors are available, although
formal personal certification is not established. It is important, therefore, that the employers of these
individuals, often insurance companies/inspection bodies, operate an in-house system of
competency assessment in line with ISO 9000 requirements and industry best practice. Third party
certification schemes for NDT operatives that comply with BS EN 473 are available. These include
the Personnel Certification in NDT (PCN) scheme (provided by the British Institute of NDT) and
the Certification Scheme for Welding and Inspection Personnel (CSWIP) (provided by The
Welding Institute). Certification is available, usually at three levels3, in all the main NDT
techniques including some of the more specialist techniques such as TOFD and phased array.
Visual examination is covered under PCN and in courses for Plant Inspectors.
For companies employing their own NDT personnel, second party certification, for specific
inspections, could be preferred. This form of certification is usually administered in accordance
with the American Society for NDT (ASNT) recommended practice No. SNT-TC-1A This specifies
49
experience, training and examination requirements for certification, which the company carries out.
Further guidance is available from EEMUA regarding competency requirements for inspection
personnel
This focus on personnel competency is very necessary. The inspector/operative are the most
influential part of the inspection system (the combination of procedure, equipment and Personnel)
determining how successful (or reliable) the inspection will be in meeting its planned objectives. An
ineffective inspection does not provide assurance.
Even with the engagement of competent inspector and NDT personnel, operational factors can
significantly affect human performance and impact inspection reliability. These factors include the
adverse effects on performance of inspection where:
• Access to the component is poor or the level of working is uncomfortable.
• The external environment is ‘hostile’ (e.g. due to high/low temperature, noise, poor lighting,
fumes, confined space, wet, radioactivity).
• There is time or management pressure.
Guidance is available from HSE in the form of a series of NDT Best and Recommended Practice
Documents, which address some of the human factor issues and recommend ways in which these
issues can be mitigated. Extensive studies have been made into the affects that human factors have
on inspection performance. Relevant publications provide further information.
(b) Welding personnel

Formal training is available for all levels of personnel involved when equipment is welded. The
importance of good welder training is illustrated in Appendix 2. Increasingly, the European
Welding Federation (EWF) Diploma qualifications are being sought for demonstrating competence
in Welding Engineering to an appropriate level. The diploma can be taken at one of three levels:
Specialist, Technologist or Engineer depending on the level of responsibility. The diploma course
covers the knowledge required to write appropriate welding procedures and to plan and manage
welded repairs, as well as explaining the different welding processes, the issues associated with
welding different alloys, and design and fabrication of welded structures. Practical welder and
welding operator training is also important and is carried out for a number of reasons, including:
• To develop a new weld procedure and approval.
• To obtain welder approval to nationally and internationally recognised standards.
• To demonstrate the practical competence of welders.
• For improved weld quality with a minimum level of workmanship defects, reduced overwelding,
and less distortion.
• For multi-skilling, so that an individual welder can handle a greater variety of work.
• For compliance with legislation, e.g. Pressure Equipment Directive (PED).
• To promote the company's (or welders') credibility.
• To achieve increased output from individual welders.
Welders with an aptitude for organisation or management may be suitable for the role of welding
foreman/supervisor or welding inspectors. These tasks require further qualification such as that
available through the CSWIP scheme (Certification Scheme for Welding and Inspection Personnel).
This scheme provides a mark of competence for a wide range of people engaged in welding and/or
inspection related jobs in building, operating, inspecting and repairing high integrity welded plant.
Welding high integrity equipment should be undertaken according to written welding procedures
that are qualified to standards such as BS EN 15614:2004 (which has superseded BE EN 288), or
ASME IX. BS EN 15614 uses methods such as mechanical testing of test welds to demonstrate the
quality and approval of the procedure. The welders can also be qualified on the basis of such test
welds, using the equivalent welder qualification standard such as BS EN 287-1:2004.
Demonstration and Recognition Of Competency

Competencies may be demonstrated by proven experience or by having suitable technical
qualifications, dependent on the level appropriate for technicians, supervisors and managers.
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Certification is important. Many companies offer training courses appropriate to the management of
pressure systems, tanks and related plant. Other sources of formal training are offered by
accreditation institutions. Skills that people have should be recognised and documented, for
example, by ‘Skills Passports’. Many contracting organisations issue their staff with Skills
Passports confirming training, competencies, and practical experience. These are useful when they
enable the purchaser of services to have greater confidence in the abilities of the people employed.
These are of more limited value if they only apply to a few employers / sites, or if there is doubt
about the independence of the accreditation. People (whether staff or contract) will only develop
and retain specialist skills if they receive some appropriate individual recognition for their efforts.
Combinations of financial reward and continuous, congenial work may provide the incentive.
Extending the knowledge and skills of the workforce is simply good management.
Management of Communication, Maintenance, Inspection And Technolog

(a) Communications
Teamwork and communication are important for the efficient and effective management of
equipment. A culture where it is easy to ask questions and point out problems will probably suffer
fewer ageing-related equipment failures that one with a fixed hierarchy and less communication.
Management encouragement for staff to learn beyond what is strictly necessary to fulfill their role
will produce a more flexible and understanding organisation. Face-to-face contact is always
valuable, and sometimes irreplaceable in analysis of problems and in producing effective time-
conscious solutions. Verbal descriptions of problems can be wildly misleading. On-line data, even if
only at a summary level, can help to eliminate unsuitable lines of enquiry and identify potential
solutions. Access to drawings, particularly if offsite specialist technical support engineers can also
see them, gives a better chance of understanding the failure before dismantling the equipment. With
ageing equipment, the vendor cannot necessarily be relied on for drawings or advice.
(b) Human Factors in Maintenance

Human error is always a concern within maintenance. Modern equipment designs have evolved to
give supposedly easier, cheaper, and quicker maintenance, and certainly some design errors have
been corrected and make far less demand on brute force and fitting skills. Be aware that equipment
which has been dismantled a number of times has the risk that maintenance errors may have been
compounded to exceed original tolerances or allowances.
(c) Management of NDT service providers

It is increasingly common for plant owners/users to subcontract the management and site execution
of NDT activities to an NDT service provider. While this approach can have advantages, problems
can occur if the NDT provider is not properly instructed. Good management of NDT service
providers by the equipment owner/user and, in the case of Pressure Systems), the Competent
Person, lays the foundations for effective NDT. Larger companies often have an in-house inspection
team or individual inspector who can plan examinations and specify and monitor the work of the
NDT service provider. Where there is no one suitably qualified for this role in-house, companies
can use independent inspection consultants or inspectors from Competent Person organisations. It is
beneficial to retain a degree of independence from the NDT service provider, but to take their views
into account. Issues could include whether optimum NDT technique has been selected, or whether a
particular technique and procedure has been qualified for the application. Those managing NDT
service providers need to be suitably qualified and experienced to undertake the role for the
equipment under scrutiny and the NDT techniques proposed. A formal NDT qualification may be
required in some circumstances. Sufficient knowledge of the equipment is needed for the inspector
to draw attention to geometric features, possible damage, and aspects of access and safety.
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When selecting an NDT service provider, look for one who operates a quality management system
to a recognised standard (e.g. ISO 9000), and who is a member of the Service Inspection Group.
Prior experience of the type of equipment and the techniques proposed is an important attribute.
Experience has shown that NDT contracts based on time and materials with a limited liability
produce a more effective inspection than those based on fixed price. In either case a target time
limit may be set, but bonuses for completion within time must be linked to adequate controls over
quality.
(d) Dealing with advancing technology

You should be aware of some of the pitfalls relating to advancing technology. Modern
manufacturing methods have generally reduced tolerances significantly. While metric and imperial
tolerances are basically the same, there is a risk of a ‘remembered’ imperial tolerance being
incorrectly converted into metric. The imperial trained user will not recognise that the measurement
is nonsense. Ageing equipment may be difficult to dismantle, e.g. due to corroded or distorted
joints, lack of drawings, lack of special tools. There is no universal replacement for original
asbestos jointing; judgement is required to select the best replacement, which may not give the same
results as the original. Re-engineering may be required to recover damaged joint faces and fit
modern gaskets. New skills and knowledge in the workforce may be required. Equipment needing
skills that are now rare or becoming obsolete presents another challenge. There may not be formal
training available on ‘obsolete’ skills. Examples include the inspection and repair of riveted boilers.
Where particular techniques (e.g. packing glands, working on cast iron pipe) are required in order to
continue to operate ageing equipment, deliberate effort is needed to retain and maintain the
capability to apply these archaic methods. These things cannot be outsourced, except perhaps to
specialists. Beware the single expert tradesman – what do you do when they retire?
4.4 Standards, procedures

Key controlled documents comprise:
 International and National Industry Standards; Group Standards (the requirement is for access -
copies are not necessarily required)
 the plant’s own engineering standards (if any)
 Equipment design documents and maintenance manuals
 Equipment inspection and repair history
 schemes of examination (specifying which inspection techniques to be used on a piece of
equipment, including exact locations)
 Shut down Management System (including scoping process with “Scope challenges”, approval
process with explicit acceptance of risks related to items excluded, one integrated s/d plan,
contracting of work, pre-shutdown readiness review, s/d organisation, “domestic” aspects, post-
mortem review, etc.)
 Procedure for (weekly/daily) planning of day-to-day maintenance work, including allocation of
(own + contractor) resources and a priority system related to plant equipment criticality
 Maintenance procedures and work instructions and also for permit to work procedure where
applicable
 A list of temporary and non-standard repairs, including expiry dates for such repairs. (may be
combined with the plant change procedure; level of scrutiny should be the same as for permanent
changes).
It should be ensured that all procedures, etc. are readily retrievable, well-communicated, well-
understood and well-implemented.
Traceability of (Instrument) standards should be maintained, where required.
4.4.1 Systems for knowledge management and retention

Asset Registers
52
In order to track the existence and whereabouts of equipment at complex plants, it is helpful to
maintain an asset register. This need not be a vastly detailed document, but a summary list of
equipment items with a few key details (e.g. location, function, duty, number of items, remaining
life, financial value, decommissioning date) held and regularly updated at site and plant level.
Examples have been seen of companies paying to maintain and inspect equipment that is no longer
in service, or even on site.
Equipment Record System and Maintenance Log

An equipment record system and a maintenance log containing information specific to each item of
equipment is essential. In a modern plant these may well be computerised, or a combination of
paper and electronic records. It is important to consider the security of the records against
fire/accidental loss and to have a back-up system if appropriate.
Paper records have the advantage of being easy to browse, and to spread out on a table for
discussion (perhaps out of hours, when the computers may be locked up). Records clearly filed by
plant, section, equipment, date, purpose (inspection, spares, repair procedure, etc.) are more easily
managed. Many computerised records systems are now available, often with scheduling capability
and with a link to the asset register.
The record system should contain full details about the equipment. Design and manufacturing
information should include design drawings, material mill and test certificates, welding and NDT
specifications and reports, installation and commissioning tests, and quality assurance documents.
Ideally, it should contain the operating instructions, and the duty and service history, which need to
be regularly updated. It needs to include a record of maintenance, replacement parts, and inspection
reports. Repairs and modifications also need to be recorded. These latter items may be held in a
maintenance log separate from the equipment records. If computerised, it should be possible to view
all the maintenance actions for a whole plant section or single item of equipment. This helps to
identify costs, problem areas, and recurrent problems (worthy of investigation by Root Cause
Analysis etc.). The way data is recorded and accessed will vary for differing types of plant and one
method will not be appropriate in all cases. The objective is to record data in such way as to
differentiate between 20 new seals on one pump, and 20 new seals over several pumps.
A maintenance log need not be onerous or exhaustive. A brief statement of actions is normally all
that is needed. Records should be in date order, accessible, and difficult to erase or remove without
good reason (for this reason a loose-leaf folder is unsuitable). Fine detail (e.g. reports, parts lists,
invoices) can go in the equipment record system.
4.4.2 Dealing with Backlogs of Maintenance and Postponement of Inspection

All process equipment will generate maintenance actions as it ages (e.g. painting, small leak repair,
bolt tightening). These actions will be reported as requiring attention, but not all of them will be of
equal importance. It can be difficult to monitor and progress all actions (particularly small items) in
a busy working environment, and backlogs commonly arise.
Possible reasons for backlogs include:
• Longer intervals between shutdowns limits opportunity for maintenance.
• Less people available, maybe due to downsizing.
• A computerised maintenance system does not “forget” non-essential jobs, as may have been the
case in a manual system.
• Open access to originators to input work requests.
The number and length of time overdue of maintenance actions may be a good indication of the
level of management control. In the first instance, it is valuable to have an understanding of the
reasons for these actions being generated as a mechanism for preventing failure and improving
work processes and equipment effectiveness. There is a need to have an understanding of the
53
frequency and effect of past maintenance and repairs to help set priorities. This will allow a focus
on the actions that most contribute to sustaining equipment integrity. The methods used by
companies to manage maintenance actions are varied, but are generally based on a number of
simple principles. These may be applied in any organisation to a degree that is appropriate to the
inherent hazards and complexity of the equipment. These methods are being developed further in
European collaborative projects, such as RIMAP (Risk Based Inspection and Maintenance
Practices). A first step is to evaluate the severity of the damage found or the potential damage being
addressed by the maintenance action and to categorise its importance. For example, using a numeric
scale, a small paint defect could be 1 while a hazardous leak could be 5. An appropriate timescale
for action can then be set for different types of damage, from immediate to 6 or 12 months to longer
term. It is also important to consider solutions that prevent recurrence rather than simple “fixes”. In
the process of prioritisation, it is suggested that the consequences of further degradation or suffering
a failure are taken into account. The impact on other items of equipment needs to be considered. (A
common example is small water leak that runs onto associated equipment and results in corrosion.
This can be severe if it enters insulation or runs under a tank).
When the work is assigned there should be a periodic review of maintenance work-lists and set
targets for work outstanding. This will reflect the changes that may occur in the requirements (e.g.
priority or other activities / opportunities for completion). The work that is recorded in the
maintenance system should have defined authorisation levels, for empowerment of individuals to
edit, delete or authorise the tasks. Control over maintenance backlogs can be regained by a
combination of appropriate rescheduling, increasing and focusing resource and management. For
non-pressure equipment there needs to be an internal management system for postponing inspection
or repair schedules that must recognise the requirements of the relevant regulations (VUP, MHI,
etc). For pressure systems under VUP, there are legal requirements controlling the postponement of
examinations and repairs, as specified by the Competent Person. With an appropriate technically
justified case, postponement is a valuable method of managing work schedules
Computerised Systems
Control is required over the input of data and it is often best to get a dedicated person to do this, or
restrict input access. The computer system should be able to log who inputs or edits safety or
business critical data, and retain pre-change data until the change is validated. Any widely
accessible computer system tends to collect corruptions of data. Appointing an owner who is
responsible for policing the quality and quantity of data on the system is a good idea. Open read-
only access (to non-sensitive data) is preferred so information can be made widely available. These
measures can ensure that data is input in a thorough and consistent way, and that the data is
structured to allow easy retrieval of information by a non-specialist. Information from these sources
is of most value where it gives a coherent description of the equipment in service. This allows
trends and patterns associated with the equipment to be identified. Beware of having too much
reliance on computer generated data if this prevents and inhibits proactive management.
It has been noted that the agreement to replace a maintenance log is often managed as a
commercial activity and the value of history or description fields in databases is not recognised.
Where these factors do not align within the new system, it is often viewed as an additional
(unnecessary) expense to make the transfer. The loss of the valuable technical history may equate to
several times the ‘transfer savings’. If the link between a location, item serial number and the
history record is broken or corrupted because of a badly planned transfer to a new computer system,
the information becomes useless. Worse, the problem may not be recognized until it is too late or
too expensive to recover. This may also happen as a result of movements of ‘common items’ for
several locations. These should also be recorded. The original system set up under a particular
management system may not be applicable today. When the system is updated or replaced, data can
be lost or corrupted. Valuable history data may be too expensive to convert into a new format. Data
backup may be poor, with the potential to lose large amounts of irreplaceable data. The system in
54
place should match today’s needs while giving secure access (e.g. via CD or computer server) to a
store of relevant historical data, particularly equipment drawings and inspection data.
4.4.3 Management of Changes in Duty, Modifications, Repairs and Ownership

(a) Inventory control and changes in duty
As each piece of equipment is utilised, it is useful to record regularly on the maintenance log the
duty and time of service, and when equipment is removed from service for maintenance and
examination. Some of this information may also need to be included in the Equipment Records and
Asset Register. This will assist with maintenance and integrity management. It is particularly
important where equipment duty, service or conditions are changed or vary over time. The
information will be useful in determining potential deterioration mechanisms, Remaining life, and
in knowing where the equipment is available. When equipment is returned to stock without
replacement, there will be a progressive reduction in the equipment available, and local variations in
condition will occur as time progresses.
(b) Modifications and repairs

When a piece of equipment is modified, there should always be a record of the changes made within
the equipment record system. This is frequently well defined for pressure equipment, but may be
overlooked or limited for other items. It is recommended that design changes made to equipment
are transferred from the maintenance system as part of on-going repair and maintenance procedure.
There is a need for proper specifications of repairs and a record of changes in the equipment as a
result of repairs. There are many cases where control of repair is not well specified, particularly for
non-pressure equipment. During maintenance, equipment is often removed and replaced, for return
to stores for ‘assessment and repair’. After a shutdown, the repair is simply described as ‘strip and
inspect’ or ‘refurbish to original’. This leaves a great deal of potential for work to be undertaken
without due consideration of the duty and fitness for-service.
(c) Changes in Ownership

The most radical impact on Knowledge Management may come when a company changes hands
and the new owner replaces the entire maintenance department or decides to impose a new
‘company standard’ computer system.
Control and Instrumentation Systems

Modern control systems evolve at a faster rate than the hardware that they support. Thus a site with
several plants may have several generations of control system, some of which may be retro-fits.
Each system requires appropriate software, spares and programming skills. It may be quite difficult
for a technician to work on different systems over a short time span without making mistakes. Each
system should have a Change Control and Recording system. Modern automation systems provide
opportunities for data recording and trending of performance. These are valuable tools for assessing
equipment. However, as instrumentation ages, it is more likely to give inaccurate or false data, due
either to deterioration of measuring elements, or errors in set-up and calibration. Matching
replacement parts may not be available, leading to re-use of substandard parts. Trending from older
instrumentation may be suspect.
Planning For Process Events

It is helpful to have a system in which credible process events (e.g. pressure/temperature transients,
contamination, trips etc.) that can have an impact on condition of the equipment are identified in
advance, and to have a planned response. The effects (beneficial or detrimental) on operations and
plant integrity of some maintenance actions (e.g. filter changes, cleans, grade changes, maintenance
campaigns, changes to materials etc.) can also be considered in the same way. Good knowledge in
these areas is often of considerable benefit to the business, and can justify the work required to set
up and maintain the information in a formal system.
55
Failure Investigation, Root Cause Analysis and Feedback

There is considerable value in understanding the root causes of failure as a means of preventing
future problems. The causes are almost always a combination of factors relating to the design,
operation, maintenance and environment in which the item is working. In order to have an effective
improvement process, which can eliminate or reduce failures, a process of root cause analysis is
recommended to analyse and identify the reasons for failure and suggest measures that may prevent
repetition. A system is required to feedback the results of a failure investigation to those who need
to act on it.
Obsolescence or Retirement of Equipment

Contingency planning can save time when obsolete equipment needs to be repaired or replaced.
Some manufacturing processes are simply not used any more, and there are frequently great
difficulties with defining how to repair such an item. There may be no relevant modern design code,
although the original code of construction may provide some guidance. The materials and geometry
of older equipment may be completely unsuitable for welding, and the general deterioration of the
equipment may increase the difficulties in making a repair. Inspection of welded repairs to older
steels using methods such as ultrasonic testing may be difficult. Identifying where specialist advice
or services can be obtained in advance can save time later. An alternative solution may be a new
unit to replace the function of the original, or an evaluation of the requirements to see if the
function is still needed. In a process plant there are always a number of items of equipment, which
are capable of performing a number of different duties in a plant. Typical examples are motors,
pumps, valves or heat exchangers. The suitability of replacement equipment for a different
application should always be assessed and recorded according to an appropriate procedure.
4.5 Implement, monitor, correct

Adequate daily supervision and monitoring of on-going maintenance work should be arranged by
the responsible line manager.
Progress of inspection plans and the various maintenance plans (shutdown, RCM, RBI, SIL
development; bad actor investigations) should be reviewed periodically, e.g. monthly, jointly by the
responsible line manager and the relevant operations manager. Other plans as mentioned in section
2 should be reviewed periodically by the relevant line manager(s).
Reported incidents and their follow-up (including progress of investigations) should be regularly
monitored, e.g. monthly.
The following Key performance indicators should be monitored (this is not meant to be an
exhaustive or prescriptive list):
4.5.1 Leading indicator:

 % of lubrication tasks carried out on time
 % of inspections (mechanical, instrumentation, electrical, civil) carried out as per plan
 hit rate (i.e. % of expected defects actually found during a shutdown)
 % of planned/programmed maintenance activities carried out as per plan
 number and severity of excursion outside the plant design envelope (operating window)
 steam - and cooling water quality
 number of plant cool-downs (for refractory-protected equipment)
 average number of years of experience in current role (for own and contractor personnel) for
critical positions
 compliance audits completed
4.5.2 Lagging indicators
56
 plant availability
 maintenance index
 at equipment level: meantime between failures (MTBF); mean time between repairs
these statistics should be kept for all equipment impacting on plant availability and all
conventional instruments.
 miss rate (i.e. shutdown tasks removed from the shutdown scope, but causing plant availability
problems subsequently)
 % of day-to-day maintenance pre-planned; % of work executed as planned;
% “top-priority” work orders; backlog in maintenance work.
 volume/cost of maintenance work; actual cost against budget; maintenance index (by Benchmark
definitions)
 maintenance productivity
 maintenance quality (e.g. % returned to workshop within x weeks)
 contractor manpower on site
 contractor manpower turn-over
 loss of containment (i.e. leaks)
 number of maintenance/inspection related incidents & severity
 fail-to-danger cases identified (instrumented protection, relief valve pre-overhaul tests, etc.)
 number and severity of inspection/relief valve/safeguarding checks overdue
 number and severity of inspection recommendations not yet remedied
4.6 Review and improve

The Plant Management Representative for Integrity Management should gather evidence regarding
the performance of the Management System e.g. through summaries of:
 Developments in the plant’s benchmarked position
 Implementation of Maintenance and Inspection plans
 Longer term trends in KPI performance and root causes
 Integrity Management competence - own and contractors’
 Effectiveness of key interfaces in the plant (team work)
 Level of co-operation with other plants in the region; joint actions; mutual challenge.
 Use made of the Technical Service Agreements with Technology and Engineering solution
providers
 The wisdom of maintaining own engineering standards (if applicable)
 Internal/external audit findings
 the need for independent Reviews (such as Technical Plant Safety Reviews -consider: recent
level of changes, competence of the designers/implementers, and the accuracy of keeping related
documents up-to-date).
Actual- and expected changes in the business environment should be summarised, and the
associated implications/risks should be addressed.
With such data available, the Integrity Management System should be reviewed by the Plant
Management at least once per year and assessed whether it continues to be fit-for-purpose; its
implementation continues to be effective and its current level of documentation continues to be
adequate.
The aim of the review is to foster continuous improvement; it may initiate changes in any of the
elements of the Management System, described in the earlier sections.
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APPENDIX 4A: CASE STUDY- An Integrity and maintenance plan for a batch chemical
plant
The plant manufactures a wide range of similar organic chemicals, some of which are soluble in
water and some not. A process flow diagram is shown in Figure 4a.1. The plant is made up of six
reaction streams, three making soluble products and three insoluble products. Each reaction stream
is devoted to its own range of chemicals and is not interchangeable. The finishing streams are also
divided into those processing soluble products and those processing insoluble products. The
finishing streams are only interchangeable within these groupings. A plant path is a complete path
through the plant from the reaction process to packaging.
Figure 4A.1: Process flow diagram for batch chemical Plant
A typical reaction stream, outlining the inter-relationship of the units, is shown in Figure x2. The
reaction process operates on a 48-hour batch cycle while the finishing process operates on a 168-
hour semi-continuous cycle (see Figure 4A.1). A number of reaction cycles are necessary before
enough chemical is stored to allow a finishing process to begin.
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Figure 4A.2: Process flow chart of a reaction stream
In addition to the main product flows, the plant is supported by a full range of chemical and
engineering services, i.e. primary chemical supply, intermediate chemical supply, salt, flake ice (not
shown). The reaction streams are computer controlled and the rest of the plant is remotely
controlled so the plant can be operated by a small production staff.
Below is some brief information on some of the typical units making up the plant. The units
selected are from the reaction stream since it is this part of the plant that causes the main
maintenance problems.
Reaction Unit3
10000 gallon mild-steel rubber-lined vessel built in ring sections.
Agitation System DC variable-speed motor. Worm reduction gear box. Mild-steel rubber-lined
paddle agitator.
Weigh vessel system Mild-steel rubber-lined vessel (300 gal)—not shown. Weighing mechanism.
Weigh scale instrumentation.
Pumping System 1 (re-circulation and filter press feed). DC variable speed motor. Mono pump.
Pump protection instrumentation. Mild-steel rubber- lined pipework. GRP/PVC lined pipework.
Valves and fittings.
Pumping System 2 (filter press feed) As for Pumping System 1
Instrumentation and Controls DP cell (level). Thermocouple in tantalum- clad pocket. Steam
injection posts (temperature). pH probe (chemical)
The main work is associated with the pumps, pipework and reactor rubber lining. Considerable
information is available on pumps, motors, gear- boxes, etc., but only limited information on the
failure and deterioration characteristics of the rubber lining. It appears from the information at hand
that the rubber lining has a life which can vary from 6 to 10 years and the only method of
monitoring the deterioration is by a combination of visual examination and touch. The time to
commencement of deterioration and the deterioration rate are also uncertain but it is known that the
rate of deterioration is slow and the lead time exceeds one year.
A lining inspection/repair takes 4 days and a replacement 8 days.
59
Reaction Units 1 and 2

1500 gals’ mild-steel, glass-lined with welded jacket.
Agitation System. AC motor. Worm reduction gear box Agitator Gland
Agitator (stainless steel anchor)
Weigh Vessel System As for Reaction U nit 3.
Pumping Systems (Cooland recirculation) AC Motor, Centrifugal pump, pipework. valves and
fittings.
Instrumentation and Controls Temperature dip pipes. steam injector posts
These vessels are considered as pressurised vessels due to the steam injection and are subject to a
two-year pressure vessel inspection. Other maintenance is associated with pumps, valves, motors,
pipework and the glass lining. The glass lining fails randomly and the approach of failure is not
monitorable. The lining is repairable with tantalum plugs, requiring 2½ days off-line. After
numerous repairs over many years the vessels are replaced, requiring 8 days off-line. The rate of
lining failure is low.
The existing policy is to perform essential lubrication on an on-line basis and to shut down the plant
(one plant path at a time) for about 7 days each year. In addition, there is a considerable level of
unavailability due to unexpected corrective work. The 7-day shutdown is used for internal
inspection of the vessels, replacement of certain valves on a rotational basis and overhaul of the
pumps as necessary. The shutdown is also used for rehabilitation work, and for the implementation
of modification work. It may be extended to allow for the replacement of vessels or vessel sections.
The six-step method of determining an alternative plan will again be used.
Step 1
The plant is operated on a full-time basis, i.e. 168 hours per week, 51 weeks per year. During the
Christmas period the plant is not used by production but the chemicals are held in process to
minimise the effect of the holiday loss. The production plan is complex because of the many
products manufactured, but there is a balance throughout the plant which means there is little, or no,
spare capacity on the finishing stream if all the reaction streams are in use. A simulation model of
the plant has been built to study multi-product schedules and this can also be used for examining the
scheduling of maintenance. Therefore there are no production windows for long-term maintenance
scheduling. The existing one-week shut down is an agreed maintenance shutdown.
Closer investigation shows that over any monthly period all the units in a plant path become
available for maintenance, at short notice, for periods of between 2—8 hours. These random
production windows’ occur because of the batch nature of the process and the various washing-out
procedures that are required between different products. Such windows can he used for small off-
line jobs if there is good communication between production and maintenance.
At this point it is worthwhile to consider how the batch nature of the process influences the
scheduling of the major off-line maintenance. Because of the short cycle time of the reaction
process (48 hours) each reaction stream has to he considered as a whole when major maintenance
work needs to he carried out. In other words, if one reaction unit is taken off-line for one day, then
the whole reaction stream is taken off-line. This is not the case with the units in the finishing stream
because the cycle times are much longer. Thus, if a reaction stream is taken off—line for, say, three
days, this maintenance window moves down the finishing stream by unit—the ’knock-on’ principle.
The inter-changeability between finishing streams makes the scheduling of maintenance in this
window a straight forward exercise.
60
Figure 4A.3(a): Classification of reactor items
Figure 4A.3(b): Classification of reactor items
Figure 4A.3(c): Classification of reactor items
Since there is little inter-changeability between reaction streams, and no spare capacity in a normal
sales market, failure of the plant means a downtime cost of approximately RXX per hr. The existing
maintenance plan has already been outlined.
61
Step 2
An example of a detailed classification for a reactor is given in Figure 4A.3.
Step 3
Analysis of effective procedures is well illustrated by an examination in this respect of the chemical
reactors.
Example (a) Reaction Unit (3) (including Preparation Unit)
The main maintenance needed on these vessels is the repair (4 days) or replacement (8 days) of the
rubber lining. This is subject to permeation by chemicals which can eventually deteriorate to failure.
Since the deterioration can be accelerated by accidental damage it has been found that the life of the
rubber can vary from about 6 to 10 years. The deterioration rate of the rubber is slow and can give
about a year’s notice of failure. It is important not to allow the rubber to deteriorate too far for the
following reasons. If the steel vessel is penetrated there is considerable risk to safety as well as a
long and expensive repair. Early detection of rubber deterioration involves only a repair lasting 4
days rather than a replacement lasting 5 days. Extensive deterioration can contaminate the product
causing a diminution in customer confidence in product quality.
The range of procedures to be considered is as follows:
(a) Operate to failure.
(b) Fixed-time internal inspection (a combination of visual inspection and touch to detect rubber
degradation).
(c) Fixed-time external visual inspection (through the manhole via fibre optics or television).
(d) Electro-chemical monitoring.
(e) Product sampling for contamination (at levels below the unacceptable (product level).
From what has been said above option (a) is clearly not acceptable. Option (d) relies on penetration
of the rubber to allow a current to flow and again this is not acceptable other than as a safety device
to give warning of such penetration. Option (e) has been investigated hut rejected because of the
high rate of deterioration once contamination has begun. This again could be used as a device to
shut down a reaction unit but each batch would require to be sampled. The choice is between
external and internal inspection. There are clear advantages in external inspection because of the
time taken to isolate and wash the reactor before internal inspection can take place. However
external inspection is limited to visual inspection, via optical aids since it is impossible to see or
touch enough of the lining area from the manhole. Fibre optics have been tried out hut are of limited
use due to their small field of vision. Television proved better but was not considered sufficiently
effective without the back-up of ‘touch’. External inspection is still being investigated but in the
meantime fixed-time- internal inspection and repair or replace on-condition remains the selected
procedure. Using the limited data available the best period of inspection appears to be 12-monthly,
but this can be reviewed as more data is collected.
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TABLE 4A.1 Extract from maintenance procedure listing for batch chemical plant (Reaction
Vessel)
Item Timing On- Periodi Time & Initial On-line or Perio Time & Secondary action
line city labour maintenance Off-line dicity labour
or action
Off-
line
React Fixed OFF 12 M 3 days Repair as OFF 2Y 1 days Replace
ion time at 2 fitters necessary continuatio 2 men In-situ
vessel visual agreed n of 8 days
- inspect. shutdo inspection 4 fitters
rubbe and wn shutdown 2 men
r touch
lining
Example (b) Reaction Units 1 and 2

These present a different problem because they are glass-lined and the lining fails randomly
following rapid deterioration—in other words, there is no inspection technique to detect the
approach of failure. Electro chemical techniques can be used to detect failure of the lining and
prevent steel penetration. The best procedure would appear to be operate-to-glass- lining failure and
repair as necessary.
TABLE 4A.2 Extract from maintenance procedure listing for batch chemical plant (Reaction
Units 1)
Item Timing On-line Periodi Time & Initial On-line Perio Time & Secondary
or Off- city labour maintenance or Off- dicity labour action
line action line
Reaction Operate ON Contin Operat Repair OFF 2Y 2 days Replace
Vessel- to Monito uous or lining as on 2 fitters vessel on
glass failure- ring of monitor necessary failure condition
lining indicated glass ing Contract
by lining labour
electro- to
monitori failures
ng
This is an example of the need to give careful thought to a corrective maintenance policy to ensure
that the repair is done as quickly as possible and that other opportunity maintenance is carried out as
necessary during the shutdown.
Similar reasoning is used to establish the best procedures for the other items in a plant path.
Steps 4 and 5
Due to the complex structure of the plant and the batch nature of the process the approach
previously outlined required modification. In this case it is useful to list the identified maintenance
procedures for the whole plant against the stream and unit to which they belong. Table Y1 shows
part of a list, the maintenance procedures for a Reaction Unit. From the full listing the work can he
further sub-divided and extracted as necessary for scheduling into on-line maintenance, window-
maintenance (off-line work of less than 8 hours duration) and shutdown work (off-line work of
more than 8 hours duration).
On-line maintenance is classified by area, trade and frequency and is scheduled over the year. The
production department is not involved in this scheduling. Such work is often planned through the
use of simple check lists.
Window maintenance is clustered at unit level and scheduled into weekly loads (with considerable
tolerance) over a complete year. A bar chart is often used. The short-term scheduling and work
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planning requires close liaison between production and maintenance at first line supervision level.
Such work is often planned via the use of multi-trade job packages which include the job methods,
tools, requirement and drawings.
Shutdown work involves the major off-line maintenance work which is scheduled for a complete
plant path by utilising the knock-on section-by- section shutdowns. In order to operate such a
schedule a maintenance plan for each major section, or unit of plant must be established. A
maintenance plan for a reaction stream is shown in Table Y2. It can he seen that the plan is based
on the annual inspection and repair of the rubber lining of Reaction Unit 3. The remaining work is
fitted into this maintenance window on an opportunity basis.
The periodicity of shutdown for a complete plant path is based on the plant section or unit with the
shortest maintenance period—in this case the annual shutdown of the reaction stream. The
shutdown work for a plant path is therefore scheduled annually and starts with, say, a 4-day
shutdown on a reaction stream. The maintenance work on the remaining plant sections and units is
carried out as the window is knocked-on down the path. The plant is made up of six plant paths and
in order to spread the maintenance load evenly over the year (to minimise the use of contract
labour) there should be a major shutdown of a plant path every two months; the flexibility of the
finishing stream aids this scheduling.
Step 6
From the point of view of corrective maintenance it is important to identify those units that are
either operated to failure or those that, in spite of preventive actions, might still fail unexpectedly
and cause serious disruption. Repair and replacement techniques for such units (e.g. the glass-lined
reactor) must he studied for effectiveness, job method and organisation.
Summary
The general observations made about the plan -in particular those made about the economics of the
plan, apply in this case. This example also illustrates the approach to determining a maintenance
plan for a large complex plant where there are random production windows and batch production.
The main thrust of the plan involves three inter-related schedules:
i) An on-line maintenance schedule (based on plant area);
ii) A production window schedule (based on units);
iii) A plant path shutdown schedule.
Where there is evidence of a high level of unexpected failure, the plan might be better based on
operate-to-failure and opportunity maintenance. However, such a plan is difficult and expensive to
operate and it is the author’s opinion that such a predicament should not be allowed to develop—the
cause of unexpected failure should be designed out. In this case only the glass-lined reactors present
such a problem and the failure incidence is low. This can therefore be tolerated and advantages
taken (where possible) of the resultant occasional outage.
The final point is more general. The distinction is made between a maintenance plan and
replacement strategy. It was pointed out that replacement strategy was reserved for the replacement
of major units or sometimes of the plant itself (e.g. a paper machine, a bus, a chemical reactor).
Many factors other than maintenance costs and availability levels affect replacement strategy, e.g.
obsolescence, product demand, tax structure. The life of the chemical reactor was long (up to 25
years) and relatively little historical information was available on maintenance resource costs and
unavailability levels. Thus, it was impossible to have a static strategy of replacement every ‘X’
years. Such replacement decisions must take into consideration the trend in maintenance resource
costs, unavailability levels and the various other factors mentioned above.
An economic replacement period needs therefore be calculated. It is felt that in future even these
decisions will have to respond to economic dynamics.
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TABLE 4A.3 Extract from maintenance procedure listing for batch chemical plant (Reaction Unit 1)
Item Timing On-Line or Periodicity Time and Initial On-line or Expected Time and Secondary Maintenance
Off-line Labour Maintenance Off-line Periodicity Labour Action
Action
Reaction Operate to ON Continuous Operator Repair lining as OFF 2Y 1 Day Replace vessel on
vessel glass failure indicated monitoring necessary (R) 2 Fitters condition-contract
lining by Electro labour
monitoring
Steel casing Statutory OFF 2Y 2 Days Repair jacket OFF 4Y 2 Days Replace vessel on
(pressure Inspection 2 Fitters and joints as (WO) 2 Fitters condition
vessel) 1 Inspector necessary
Agitation
system
AC motor SPM trend ON 2M Mins. Replace motor OFF 4Y 1 Hr. Recondition motor
bearings monitoring 1 Inspector on condition (R) 1 Fitter
Grease Fixed-time ON 2M Mins. - - - 1 Electrician -

lubrication 1 Greaser
Gearbox SPM trend ON 2M Mins. Replace box on OFF 4Y 4 Hrs. Recondition gearbox
bearings monitoring 1 Inspector condition (R) 2 Fitters
2 Riggers
Oil Fixed time OFF 2M Mins. - - - - -
lubrication Greaser
Gears Lubrication, oil OFF 2M Mins. Replace box on OFF ? 4 Hrs. Recondition gearbox
trend monitoring 1 Inspector condition 2 Fitters
2 Riggers
Gland Visual ON 1M Mins. Adjust gland ON 6M 1 Fitter Repack gland on
Inspection 1 Inspector mins. condition
Weigh vessel Visual condition OFF 6M 1 Hr. Calibrate OFF 1Y 30 mins. Recondition mechanism
system checking 2 Inspectors mechanism 1 Inspector on condition
weighing
mechanism
Powder feeder Visual condition OFF 6M 1Hr. Calibrate OFF 1Y 30 mins. Recondition mechanism
1 Inspector mechanism 1 Inspector on condition
Hydraulic Lubrication, oil OFF 2M Mins. Replace drive OFF 3Y 1 Hr. Recondition drive unit
drive trend monitoring 1 Inspector unit 1 Fitter
Valves Type A Fixed time OFF 2Y 1 Hr. Recondition valves
(5 off) replacement 1 Fitter
Type B(10 off) Fixed time OFF 5Y 1 Hr.1 Fitter Recondition valves
replacement
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TABLE 4A.4 Maintenance plan for the Shutdown work on a reaction stream
Item Timing On-Line or Periodicity Time and Initial On-line Expected Time and Secondary
Off-line Labour Maintenance or Off- Periodicity Labour Maintenance Action
Action line
Rubber lining Fixed time OFF Y 3 Days Repair lining as OFF 2Y 1 add. Day Replace in situ on
(Unit 3) visual Insp. & Agreed* 2 Fitters necessary (4 Days total) condition
touch Shutdown 2 Fitters
Rubber lining Fixed time OFF Y at agreed 3 Days Repair lining as OFF 2Y 1 Day Replace in situ on
(preparation visual Insp. & shutdown of 2 Fitters necessary 2 Fitters condition
unit) touch Unit 3
Steel casing Statutory OFF 2Y at agreed 2 Days Repair jacket OFF 4Y 2 Days Replace vessel on
(Unit 1) Inspection shutdown of 2 Fitters and joints as 2 Fitters condition
Unit 3 1 Inspector necessary
Steel casing Statutory OFF 2Y at agreed 2 Days Repair jacket OFF 4Y 2 Days Replace vessel on
(Unit 2) Inspection shutdown of 2 Fitters and joints as 2 Fitters condition
Unit 3 1 Inspector necessary
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5. ASSET DEGRADATION
5.1 Types of degradation

Damage to material can be categorised into four main types:
• Wall thinning.
• Stress-driven damage, cracking and fracture.
• Physical deformation.
• Metallurgical / environmental damage.
These are described below. Some types of damage can result from several initiating mechanisms.
Some initiating mechanisms can result in different types of damage depending on the
circumstances. It is therefore difficult to separate the damage type from the mechanism that
produces it and knowledge of both is required.
Ageing: The effect where a component suffers some form of material deterioration and damage
(usually, but not necessarily, associated with time in service) with an increasing likelihood of failure
over the lifetime.
Ageing damage: Within this report, ‘ageing damage’ is term referring generically to types of
progressive material damage that could eventually cause equipment failure. Examples of ageing
damage are outlined in Section 3.2, including wall thinning due to corrosion etc, cracking, and
metallurgical changes. When metallurgical ageing is meant (for example, strain ageing) the term
‘metallurgical ageing’ is used to differentiate this.
Corrosion: Degradation of material due to interaction with the environment leading to a loss of
material and/or desirable properties of the material. Corrosion can be general, occur over a wide
area, or be localised.
Creep: Continuous permanent deformation of a metal or other material at a load below the yield
stress. In metals creep is usually a high temperature phenomenon, while plastics may creep at
ambient temperatures.
CUI: Corrosion under insulation. A common corrosion problem associated with older equipment,
where moisture trapped within insulation and lagging can cause corrosion of the metal surface
underneath.
Damage: A detrimental macroscopic change in the condition of the equipment which can be a
symptom of increasing risk of failure or ageing, for instance, dents, gouges, cracking, bulging,
thinning.
Defect: A metallurgical imperfection. The term “defect” can be considered narrower than “flaw”
and refers to imperfections that may be cause for rejection or failure of a weld or component. See
also “Flaw” under “Fitness for Service”.
Degradation: Detrimental change in the material, e.g. corrosion, fatigue, embrittlement, hydrogen
attack, and creep (before manifestation of a flaw).
Deterioration: A detrimental change from design or as-manufactured condition influencing the

ability of the item to perform the required function.
Erosion: The mechanical removal of material from a surface as a result of relative motion or impact
from solids, liquids or vapour. This can be accelerated by the additional effect of corrosion on a
surface, and this is known as erosion-corrosion.
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Fatigue: Cracking under the influence of fluctuating stresses. These cyclic stresses can occur due to
variations in pressure, temperature or other applied loads, and fatigue cracks often occur at stress
concentrations. Fatigue crack propagation can continue until the flaw reaches a critical size that
results in secondary failure. When fatigue develops with the combined effect of corrosion it is
known as corrosion-fatigue.
Hydrogen attack: The reaction of dissolved hydrogen with carbides in ferritic steels resulting in
decarburisation and porosity.
Hydrogen blistering/cracking effects: Dissolved atomic hydrogen recombines at inclusions in

steels and results in surface blistering or internal cracking (known as Hydrogen (Pressure) Induced
Cracking, or HIC/HPIC). When a residual or applied stress is present arrays of internal cracks can
combine, which in conjunction with the low ductility, can lead to fracture. This is known as Stress
Oriented Hydrogen Induced Cracking or SOHIC.
Hydrogen embrittlement: Loss of ductility in steel and some other alloys due to the presence of
atomic hydrogen, often as a result of hydrogen being absorbed by the metal from a suitable
environment. This can cause stress corrosion cracking, disbonding of clad corrosion resistant alloy
layers, and fabrication hydrogen cracks.
Strain age embrittlement: A loss of ductility (and rise in strength) caused when a low carbon steel
is metallurgical aged under sustained stress, time and temperature following plastic deformation
(e.g. a dent). The degree of embrittlement also depends on the concentration of elements such as
carbon and nitrogen in the steel.
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC): Cracking due to the conjoint action of tensile stresses, and
corrosion, neither of which would cause cracking on their own.
Temper embrittlement: Embrittlement of alloy steels caused by holding within, or cooling slowly
through temperatures just below the transformation range, typically in excess of 500°C.
5.2 General degradation mechanisms – all industries

Mechanical and Metallurgical Failure Mechanisms: Graphitization, Softening (Spheroidization),
Temper Embrittlement, Strain Aging, 457°C Embrittlement, Sigma Phase Embrittlement, Brittle
Fracture, Creep / Stress Rupture, Thermal Fatigue, Short Term Overheating – Stress Rupture,
Steam Blanketing, Dissimilar Metal Weld (DMW) Cracking, Thermal Shock, Erosion / Erosion-
Corrosion, Cavitation, Mechanical Fatigue, Vibration-Induced Fatigue, Refractory Degradation,
Reheat Cracking
Uniform or Localized Loss of Thickness: Galvanic Corrosion, Atmospheric Corrosion, Corrosion

Under Insulation (CUI), Cooling Water Corrosion, Boiler Water Condensate Corrosion, CO2
Corrosion, Flue Gas Dew Point Corrosion, Microbiologically Induced Corrosion (MIC), Soil
Corrosion, Caustic Corrosion, Dealloying, Graphitic Corrosion
High Temperature Corrosion: Oxidation, Sulfidation, Carburization, Decarburization, Metal

Dusting, Fuel Ash Corrosion, Nitriding
Environment – Assisted Cracking: Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (CI–SCC), Corrosion

Fatigue, Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking (Caustic Embrittlement), Ammonia Stress Corrosion
Cracking, Liquid Metal Embrittlement (LME), Hydrogen Embrittlement (HE)
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5.3 Degradation mechanisms- refining, petrochemical, chemical

Uniform or Localized Loss in Thickness Phenomena: Amine Corrosion, Ammonium Bisulfide
Corrosion (Alkaline Sour Water), Ammonium Chloride Corrosion, Hydrochloric Acid (HCl)
Corrosion, High Temp H2/H2S Corrosion, Hydrofluoric (HF) Acid Corrosion, Naphthenic Acid
Corrosion (NAC), Phenol (Carbonic Acid) Corrosion, Phosphoric Acid Corrosion, Sour Water
Corrosion (Acidic), Sulfuric Acid Corrosion
Environment–Assisted Cracking: Polythionic Acid Stress Corrosion Cracking (PASCC), Amine

Stress Corrosion Cracking, Wet H2S Damage (Blistering / HIC / SOHIC / SCC), Hydrogen Stress
Cracking – HF, Carbonate Stress Corrosion Cracking
Other Mechanisms: High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA), Titanium Hydriding,
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6. DETECTION OF AGING AND DEGRADATION
6.1 Degradation rate and the accumulation of damage

By its nature, industrial equipment containing hazardous and/or pressurised fluids is exposed to
conditions of stress and environment that ultimately will degrade the material fabric from its initial
state. Damage will accumulate until the equipment reaches a state in which it is judged to be no
longer fit-for-service. Unless repaired or re-rated, the equipment may be said to have reached the
end of its life. As damage accumulates, failure becomes increasingly probable, and if not withdrawn
from service, failure of some kind will eventually occur. The type of equipment and characteristics
of duty can significantly influence the life. It is not unusual for machines with moving parts to
degrade rapidly and to have very limited tolerance to damage and deviations from the design
conditions in terms of human error or variations in process conditions. Static equipment, such as
process vessels and pipes, tend to have much greater tolerance, and under benign conditions, can
remain in-service for many years. In general, machines in the chemical process industries have
proportionally more failures early in life than static equipment. There is, however, too much
variation in the causes and rate of damage accumulation, to be specific, and the life of different
items can vary markedly. Even when new, or after repairs, equipment may already contain
manufacturing and installation defects that can be the seed for an increased rate of degradation
during service. Welding defects, crevices and poor fit-up and alignment of components are typical.
Because items of equipment can be individually fabricated, often with manual welding processes,
there can be distinct variations in quality between items of nominally the same construction. These
variations are much reduced where there is good quality assurance and quality control during
fabrication.
When equipment is new and first exposed to its service conditions, it may experience an initially
greater rate of change than later in life. Bolted joints may leak and require tightening as seals and
gaskets bed-in, valves and pumps may be stiff until wear ensures optimum running. As plant is
brought on-line for the first time, there may be a greater risk of operating transients. Typical
measures of damage are the number and size of cracks, or the loss in wall thickness. Rates of
degradation can be highly variable and non-linear depending on the degradation mechanism and the
local conditions. While wall thickness loss due to corrosion may proceed at a constant rate (but not
always), the number and size of creep and fatigue cracks and local corrosion tend to accelerate with
time. There can, however, be circumstances where the rate of degradation slows or even stops.
Corroding areas can build up a layer of oxide that inhibits further attack. Fatigue cracks can stop
growing for a while if subjected to an overload. The manner of operation, maintenance, inspection
and repairs can strongly influence the rate of degradation. Invasive work can introduce
contaminants into the system, and increase the rate of degradation, both temporarily and in the
longer term. Appropriate inspection, maintenance and repairs of damaged areas can reduce both the
amount and rate of damage, while unnecessary work has little gain. Typically, accumulated damage
and degradation rate rise with time, and hence the probability that an individual component will fail
from this accumulated damage normally rises over time. However, this probability of failure can be
altered by appropriate inspection, maintenance, and repair of damaged areas. The risk of failure
then oscillates between the maximum and minimum operating risk levels, with the periodicity
decreasing as maintenance, inspection and repair become more frequent later in life Figure 6.1
shows a model (bathtub) curve for the probability of failure from degradation for a large population
of equipment rather than a single item. In these figures, the life is shown in Stages, which are
explained in Section 6.4.
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6.2 Failures modes, patterns and condition monitoring

Failure Modes
A failure mode is a qualitative description of how an item can fail. In its most simple form it
consists of a failure descriptor and a component name, e.g. seized bearing, blocked filter, ruptured
casing, etc. Table 6.1 lists some recommended failure descriptors for a number of failure categories.
Table 6.1 : Typical failure mode descriptors

Category Failure Descriptor
Wear Mechanisms Worn, Corroded, Eroded, Seized
Mechanical Failure Internal/External leakage, Seized, Loose, Disconnected,
Mechanisms Fouled, Contaminated, Plugged, Choked , Blocked
Structural, Material or Buckled, Bent, Broken, Ruptured, Cracked, Failed to start on
System Integrity demand.
Control System Integrity Malfunctioned, Failed
Abnormal Instrument Erratic output, Drift, Out of calibration, Tripped, Overheated,
Readings
Failure Patterns
In addition to the identification of dominant failure modes, it is also important to identify and record
the pertaining failure pattern. The failure pattern can be visualised by a curve of the conditional
probability of failure as a function of operating age. The conditional probability of failure is defined
as the probability that an item will fail during a particular age interval, given that it survives to enter
that interval. In modern reliability techniques most failure patterns can be categorised into one of
the six most distinct failure patterns as depicted in Figure 6.1. Pattern 1 is the traditional bathtub
curve. For the purpose of integrity management only 2 distinct categories are considered: age-
related and non-age-related (random) failure patterns. Failures that are externally caused should be
considered as random failures.
age-related non-age-related
CPoF
CPoF
1 4
Time Tim e
2 5
CPoF
CPoF
Time
Time
CPoF
3 6
CPoF
Time Tim e
Figure 6.1 : Six main patterns of failure. Illustrated by conditional probability of failure
(CPoF) as function of time.
Identification of failure pattern is important because it will determine if and what kind of proactive
maintenance should be selected. For instance, time based maintenance is not effective at all if the
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failure mode is non-age-related. As a guide the failure pattern selection logic as depicted in
Figure 6.2 can be applied.
CPoF
Time
Yes
Are failures a combination No Do a high percentage Yes

of early life, random of failures occur at a
CPoF
and late life ? reasonably consistent age ?
No
Yes Time
Do more failures occur Yes

Are failures caused shortly after installation
CPoF
by wear elements ? repair or overhaul ?
No
No No
Time
Are failures caused Yes Do failures increase steadily Yes

by environmental, chemical with time, but without a
or stress reaction ? discernable sudden increase ?
No
CPoF
Are failures mostly Yes
random with only a
few early life failures ? Time
No
Do more failures occur No
CPoF
shortly after installation
repair or overhaul ?
Time
Yes
CPoF
Time
Figure 6.2: Failure pattern selection logic
6.3 Failure development

Although many failure modes are not age-related, most of them give some sort of warning that they
are in the process of occurring or are about to occur. If evidence can be found that something is in
the final stage of failure, it may be possible to take action to prevent it from failing completely
and/or to avoid the consequences.
Figure 6.3 illustrates what happens in the final stages of failure. It is called the P-F curve, because it
shows how a failure starts, deteriorates to the point at which it can be detected (known as potential
failure ‘P’) and then, if it is not detected and corrected, continues to deteriorate until it reaches the
point of functional failure (‘F’). Condition-based maintenance entails monitoring for potential
failures, so that actions can be taken to prevent the functional failure or to avoid the consequences
of the functional failure.
The P-F interval is the interval between occurrence of a potential failure and its decay into a
functional failure. It is also known as the warning period, the lead time to failure or the failure
development period. If we want to detect the potential failure before it becomes a functional failure,
the interval between monitoring checks must be less than the P-F interval. For different failure
modes, it varies from fractions of a second to several years,
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P P-F interval
Condition
Time
Figure 6.3: The P-F curve
6.4 The four stages of equipment life

For the purposes of lifecycle management, it may be helpful to consider an item of equipment as
having four Stages in its life, each with certain characteristics and having a different management,
inspection and maintenance strategy. These Stages may be considered as:
• Stage 1: Post Commissioning (‘Initial’).
• Stage 2: Risk-Based (‘Maturity’).
• Stage 3: Deterministic (‘Ageing’).
• Stage 4: Monitored (‘Terminal’).
The four Stages relate to the amount of accumulated damage, the rate of degradation and the
margins before fitness-for-service is compromised. These may correlate to the age of the
equipment, and it would be normal for equipment to move progressively from Stage 1 to Stage 4 as
it gets older, but this is not necessarily always the case. Some Stages may not apply to some types
of equipment, and sometimes equipment can be moved back a Stage with appropriate justification.
There are no fixed periods or clear demarcations between the Stages. It is matter of judgement from
the particular circumstances at which Stage the equipment lies and the best management strategy.
The time that equipment may be considered to be in a particular Stage can vary markedly from one
item to another depending on the operating environment and life history. The Stage within the
lifecycle can be determined and controlled from finding out about the degradation mechanisms,
undertaking assessment, monitoring, maintenance, repairs and refurbishment.
Stage 1: Post Commissioning (‘Initial’)

As equipment is put into service there may be a relatively higher rate of damage accumulation and
issues requiring attention. There are two main causes. The first is where experiencing service
conditions for the first time reveals an inherent weakness or fault in the design, materials or
fabrication. Typical faults include incorrect dimensions, faulty material, welding procedures and
fabrication defects that have not been identified from manufacturing NDT, or the effect of loads and
environments that were not foreseen. Under these circumstances, rapid degradation of the
equipment early in life is possible and it can progress quickly through the different Stages. Many of
these issues can be eliminated with appropriate quality assurance and control.
The second cause of early life adjustments arises from bedding-in effects that the equipment may
experience as it enters service. These can be as a result of large installation stresses or damage from
mal-handling during installation. They can also be due to variations in service conditions as the
equipment experiences ‘shake-down’ and loads redistribute themselves throughout the structure.
Other non-critical symptoms of the ‘Initial’ Stage may be leaking valves, bolts or seals that are not
73

fitted or bedded perfectly. Most of these problems can be managed through routine maintenance.
Stage 1 integrity issues can be identified and addressed at the first comprehensive examination. The
timing of the first examination can be determined from a thorough assessment of the factors that
might threaten integrity early in life. These factors include the stability of all process conditions,
quality of construction and fabrication inspection. Where the process conditions are stable and a
good fingerprint examination (prior to service) has been made, a risk assessment may be able to
justify a longer period before the first examination than that recommended in industry guidance.
Stage 2: Risk-Based (‘Maturity’)

After the equipment has passed through the early-life problems of ‘Post Commissioning’, it enters
the second Stage. The ‘Maturity’ Stage is when the equipment is predictable, reliable and is
assumed to have a low and relatively stable rate of damage accumulation and few issues requiring
attention. It is operating comfortably within its design limits. Examination and inspection,
maintenance and NDT are generally to confirm the basis for these assumptions, and their scope and
periodicity can be risk-based.
Stage 3: Deterministic (‘Ageing’)

By this Stage the equipment has accumulated some damage and the rate of degradation is
increasing. Signs of damage and other indicators of ageing are starting to appear (see Section 3.3).
In this Stage it becomes more important to determine quantitatively (hence ‘deterministic’) the
extent and rate of damage and to make an estimate of Remaining life. A more proactive approach to
equipment management, inspection and NDT is required. Design margins may be eroded and the
emphasis shifts towards fitness-for-service and Remaining life assessment of specific damaged
areas.
Lack of knowledge can be just as much be a problem and can put equipment into Stage 3.
Knowledge of the equipment’s history may have been lost, perhaps as a result of the equipment
being second-hand, or changes to the process for which the equipment is used, or from changes in
personnel, record keeping and other human factors. It may now no longer be possible to predict the
current condition or future service life of the equipment from design or risk-based considerations.
Second hand equipment is assumed to be directly in Stage 3 unless there are sufficient historical
evidence and records to demonstrate a lower risk.
Stage 4: Monitored (‘Terminal’)

As accumulated damage to equipment become increasingly severe, it becomes clear that the
equipment will ultimately need to be repaired, refurbished, decommissioned or replaced. The rate of
degradation has become increasing rapidly and is not easy to predict. In this final ‘Terminal’ Stage
of the equipment’s life, the main emphasis is on guaranteeing adequate safety between
examinations while keeping the equipment in service as long as possible. Stage 4 can be managed
through making more use of on-line monitoring of the damaged areas, or by more frequent NDT to
monitor the sizes of flaws until they reach the maximum tolerable size, or by repairing unacceptable
flaws. A reduction of the severity of the duty, for example reducing the pressure rating of the
equipment may be another option to maximise the usefulness before decommissioning. However,
by Stage 4 no guarantees can be made about future service life beyond the next examination.
6.5 Inspection and non-destructive testing

Approach to Inspection Strategy over the Four Stages Of Equipment Life
Inspection for damage is a key activity for all equipment containing hazardous fluids and/or
pressure where the maintenance of containment integrity is vital for continued safe operation. This
is particularly so as equipment deteriorates, but inspection is important at all stages of the life cycle.
The approach to inspection will depend on the Stage of equipment life that has been reached. Early
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in life (Stages 1 and 2) the approach to inspection is generally confirmatory. Later in life, (Stages 3
and 4) a more deterministic, quantitative, approach is advisable.
Before equipment enters service, it is good practice to have drawn up a scheme of future
examination designed to detect damage due to potential deterioration mechanisms in the areas
where they are most likely to occur and cause danger. The scheme needs to schedule the first
thorough examination after entering service and subsequent examinations as far as these can be
foreseen. It should be noted that where there are many, often complex, components within a plant,
the approach to the focusing of the inspection effort is best based on an assessment of component
criticality. This should be part of an on-going risk assessment throughout the life of the equipment.
Stage 1 - Confirmatory - first thorough (finger-print/benchmark) inspection

When equipment is in its Post-commissioning (‘Initial’) Stage, the most likely faults arise from
major shortcomings in the material, design or manufacturing, or from installation, commissioning
or early operation errors. New equipment does not preclude the possibility of pre-mature damage.
During this stage, it is good practice to carry out a thorough ‘fingerprint/benchmark’ inspection.
This should be able to confirm the expected integrity of the equipment and to identify any problem
areas.
The timing of the first in-service inspections may be determined from either a risk assessment or
industry recommendations. They should be of a form that will allow comparison with results from
in-service inspections carried out during the later stages of life. For example, it might be important
to measure the original wall thickness of parts expected to corrode in-service, the absence of defects
in certain welds where fatigue could occur, or the size of any detected manufacturing defects that
might be expected to grow. The nature of the inspection is confirmatory. Inspection is carried out to
confirm what is expected about equipment condition (from the design assumptions and inspections
during construction). Routine inspection methods/techniques and generic inspection procedures are
generally used. For inspection personnel, recognised third party certification/‘in-house’
programmes of training and examination, covering the appropriate inspection methods/techniques,
will usually be all that is required. Inspection performance requirements will, in general, be less
demanding than for the later stages of service life. Examples of confirmatory inspection include:
• Manual ultrasonic thickness measurements to confirm wall thickness;
• Magnetic particle inspection to confirm the absence of surface cracks in a weld;
• Visual examination to confirm the absence of physical damage or obvious flaws.
These types of inspection will normally be part of the scheduled inspection programme. For
pressure equipment falling under VUP regulations, they will be detailed in the Written Scheme of
Examination. The use of more advanced techniques may be appropriate for specific components.
Stage 2 - Confirmatory - risk-based inspection

As the equipment enters Stage 2 (Risk-based, or ‘Maturity’), most of the initial (unexpected)
integrity issues should have been dealt with and the equipment should be in its most stable
operating regime. The first thorough inspection will have set a baseline for the condition. It may
now be possible to extend inspection intervals through a risk-based analysis of degradation, failure
likelihood and consequences. HSE Research Report 363/2001 – Best practice for risk-based
Inspection as a Part of Plant Integrity Management gives guidance on this process.
When inspections are made, the nature of these is still confirmatory as no damage or defects will
generally be expected. Routine inspection methods/techniques may still be used with generic
inspection procedures, but good inspectors will be alert for the unexpected at potential trouble spots.
Monitoring of operating parameters may be appropriate to confirm expectations that the equipment
remains within the design envelope, particularly if the operating environment is variable or
uncertain.
75

Stage 3 - Deterministic - quantitative Inspection

As the equipment starts to enter Stage 3 (Deterministic, or ‘Ageing’), damage and the likelihood of
equipment failure increase. During this stage a more deterministic approach to inspection is
appropriate. This approach to inspection is carried out when there is insufficient knowledge or prior
experience to support integrity, when the evidence of deterioration starts to increase, or when a
previous integrity issue has arisen in the item or a similar item of equipment. The prime objectives
of a deterministic inspection are:
a) To detect the onset of damage.
b) To determine the current condition quantitatively.
c) To determine the extent of damage that has occurred, and
d) To determine the current rate of ageing.
This information will be needed to assess fitness-for-service, residual life and to set a future
inspection strategy. Here, inspection has become a major part of the integrity case for the equipment
and greater confidence is needed in its capability and delivery.
Deterministic inspection uses inspection methods/techniques that are, in general, more advanced,
and inspection procedures that are more specific and thorough than those used during the
confirmatory phase. Inspection performance requirements may demand much more accurate sizing
and location of defects (with high confidence) for fitness-for-service assessment purposes. With
regard to inspection personnel, individual qualification on a representative test piece may be
required to ensure that high reliability can be achieved. Examples of deterministic inspection in
Stage 3 include, semi/fully-automatic ultrasonic weld inspection to determine the extent of fatigue
damage, or eddy current inspection to determine the extent of stress corrosion cracking in a stainless
steel vessel. These types of inspection would probably not be part of the scheduled inspection and
maintenance programme. Where ageing is active, repeat inspections at an appropriate frequency
may be required to determine the rate of degradation.
Stage 4 - Deterministic - monitoring Inspection

As the end of equipment life approaches (‘Terminal’), the equipment will be in a potential or actual
damaged condition. A lot of reliance, therefore, will need to be placed on inspection data to justify
continued operation. During this stage of equipment life, inspection should be routinely
deterministic supported by regular component monitoring.
Here the objective is to ensure that a suitable minimum safety margin exists between the current
equipment condition and a limiting condition beyond which the equipment may be potentially
unsafe. During this stage, inspection and monitoring may tend to be more frequent and the accuracy
of measurement is even more of a key requirement. For components approaching the minimum
safety margin, continuous/on-line monitoring may be appropriate.
6.5.1 General Remarks on Detection and Sizing of Defects and Damage

NDT can be used to measure the extent of wall thinning, cracking and other defects and damage
indicative of ageing equipment. The use of quantitative NDT techniques such as Manual Ultrasonic
Testing, Corrosion Mapping, Time of Flight Diffraction (TOFD) and Phased Array must be
considered in the context of issues concerning technique capability and inspection reliability. NDT
methods suitable for particular types of damage are to be covered in future modules.
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7. STRATEGIES TO CONSIDER WHEN DEGRADATION IS DETECTED
Once the existence, extent and mechanism of damage in a component of equipment have been
established, a range of options is available. These include:
 Scrap and decommission the equipment, with or without replacement.
 Remove the damage, with or without a repair.
 Repair the component, temporarily or permanently, with or without removing the damage.
 Analyse the margin between the component condition and minimum code specification.
 Undertake a fitness-for-service and/or Remaining life assessment (if defect size data exists).
 Change operating practices, de-rate the duty, or make favourable modifications to process
conditions or chemistry.
 Monitor the component to ensure that the extent and rate of the damage do not change
sufficiently to compromise safety limits.
Several of these actions may be needed to manage the problem; they are not mutually exclusive.
The course of actions needed will usually depend on the nature of the damage, economic factors
associated with the operation and repair/replacement of the equipment and the costs of assessment
and monitoring. It may be necessary to use appropriate expertise to assess the situation and decide
what to do. In many situations, an initial assessment of fitness-for-service can indicate the most cost
effective and safest course to take.
7.1 When to assess Fitness-For-Service and Remaining Life

Fitness-for-service (FFS) assessment (also known as Engineering Critical Assessment or ECA) is a
reevaluation of the structural integrity of an item of equipment for further service, taking into
account damage and deviations from design basis. The assessment of fitness-for-service and
Remaining life can be made at any stage once the type, scale and rate of the deterioration
mechanisms have been identified or postulated. Fitness-for-service assessment can be carried out:
• During design.
• During service before damage has been detected.
• Once damage has been detected.
During design or before damage has been detected in service, it is necessary to postulate the
occurrence of damage, and its subsequent evolution, using, for example, NDT reporting levels,
existing test data or experience. When damage is detected in service, the actual scale of the damage
as measured from NDT can be used. The rate of damage accumulation may be estimated from
measurements repeated over a period of time, but be aware that historic trends are not always a
good indication of future behaviour. At all stages, the objectives of carrying out a FFS assessment
are to determine whether the equipment is safe in its current condition, and if so, what is its
predicted lifetime given that further damage may occur, and to install a suitable inspection and
monitoring programme.
If a FFS assessment has been carried out in the past, it is important to consider whether the results
are still valid. It may be that the assessment procedure used previously has been revised or
superseded, so that the same assessment carried out to current standards might give different results.
Materials properties can also change over time due to mechanisms such as hydrogen embrittlement
or temper embrittlement in steels. Therefore, although the recommendations of the original
assessment would have been valid at the time, they may no longer be justifiable, even if none of the
operating conditions have changed.
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Assessment of Remaining Life

The Remaining life of a piece of equipment can calculated from a number of sources of
information, which are listed below. Although some calculations will be relatively simple and code-
defined, there are also FFS procedures which can be more complex, and require specialist advice. In
certain cases, knowledge-based judgements will be acceptable for estimating the equipment’s
remaining life. Some of the key factors for assessing the Remaining life include:
• Original design life (specified in years or number of operating cycles).
• Current equipment age and condition.
• How long ago the damage initated and how fast it is accumulating.
• Rate of degradation (whether constant, variable, or exponential).
• Expected operating regime and degradation mechanisms.
• Changes in material properties.
• Fatigue life (based on the S-N design or fracture mechanics).
Corrosion life (determined from the corrosion rate, allowance and thickness limit).
• Limits determined from design or fitness-for-service assessment.
• Safety margins.
Choice of FFS Procedure

The use of fitness-for-service assessment is now well established, although there is still a degree of
reluctance to rely on it among some companies and regulators. The reasons for this are not clear.
Users may gain confidence from the endorsement of FFS procedures by the American Petroleum
Institute and British Standards Institution.
For non-nuclear equipment, API 579 and BS 7910 are the most commonly used procedures for FFS
assessment. Both are recognised as safe and representing best practice, although they may not
always give the same results. In many applications both API 579 and BS 7910 will be suitable. The
choice may depend on company policy, or the attitude of the regulating authority, and access to the
necessary data and sources of information, training and support.
BS 7910 is published by British Standards for application to metallic structures across a range of
industries. From its origins in PD 6493, BS 7910 is strongly orientated towards the assessment of
defects in and around welds, and its most detailed procedures are for the assessment of fracture,
fatigue and creep crack growth. Other failure modes, such as environmental cracking, and locally
thinned areas due to corrosion in pipes and pressures vessels, are covered at a guidance level. The
American Petroleum Institute prepared API 579 specifically for assessing equipment in the refining
and petrochemicals sectors designed to ASME codes. The procedures and supporting data relate to
ASME design specifications and materials and are consistent with the design philosophy in terms of
allowable stresses and factors of safety. A wide range of defect and damage types typically found
during in-service inspection of plant and petrochemical equipment are covered, with corrosion and
thinned areas given prominence. Other defects covered by API 579 include general metal loss, local
metal loss and gouges, pitting corrosion, blisters and laminations, weld misalignment, dents and
shell distortions, crack-like flaws, creep damage and fire damage. If used appropriately, the API 579
procedures have relevance for assessing types of equipment outside its intended scope, but it is the
user’s responsibility for their correct application on a case by case basis.
7.2 Considerations for Repair and/or Modification

It is often necessary to make repairs and/or modifications to equipment during service. The
important factors to consider at the outset are the chances of achieving a satisfactory result and the
life expectancy (temporary or permanent) of the repair/modification. Once these are understood, the
system must be considered for re-validation to determine the influence of the change to the
equipment and its ability to perform its duty. When making repairs to existing equipment, there is
the potential for further damage to be introduced. This can be a result of factors such as:
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• Constraints of access for fit-up/welding.

• Restraint of existing structure resulting in high residual stress.
• Presence of contamination.
• Older materials being more difficult to weld than current materials.
• Restrictions on preheat.
• Uncontrolled cooling rates.
• Constraints on post weld heat treatment.
• Potentially poor surface finish.
• Creation of stress-raisers
• Dimensional tolerances and alignment after repair.
• Material compatibility.
• Balance in rotating equipment.
These factors may be difficult to assess and expert assistance is strongly advised to ensure that safe
repairs are made. There can also be a financial benefit from this advice. In many cases experience
has shown that expert assistance has optimised the repair process, reduced the risks of failure (or
defects) at inspection, and minimised the time taken for the repair. It is good practice to use an
approved Design Specification to ensure the repair method is suitable. In cases where the
Specification is no longer applied, then a modern ‘equivalent’ design can be used.
This will frequently require some professional judgement to ensure it is appropriate for the duty.
This helps avoid both over and under specification. Examples of particular areas of concern in these
cases are:
• Classification of flanges.
• Use of appropriate weld configurations.
• Accurate data on defect size or orientation for fitness-for-service review.
• Accurate thickness data for pressure rating.
• Use of actual material property data to reduce conservatism from specifications.
7.3 De-rating as an Alternative to Repair

A repair is not necessarily the most cost effective method of dealing with damage to equipment.
Consideration can also be given to the possibility of making fitness-for-service and operating
assessments to justify changes to the operating conditions of the equipment, which would then
preclude the need for any repair or replacement. This approach can be used in circumstances where
a temporary solution is required. For example, where general thinning is experienced in a vessel,
using shell plate thickness calculations, the thinning may be unacceptable at the stated safe
operating limit, whereas it may be considered acceptable at a lower pressure. Considers de-rating on
grounds of fitness-for-service.
7.4 Reasons for Making Repairs

It is important to understand the reasons for making repairs. Firstly to prevent recurrence of the
original cause, and secondly to ensure the repair will be resistant and will not introduce any further
damage. Evaluation of these factors can make a contribution to improvement in reliability and
reduction in costs, as well as complying with legislation.
Specifying a Repair
The general principle in specifying a repair or modification is to ensure that there is nothing that
gives rise to danger, or otherwise impairs the operation of any protective device or facility for
inspection. For pressure systems, regulations places these responsibilities on the employer of the
person carrying out that repair or modification. You can apply these principles for
repairs/modifications to other types of equipment containing hazardous fluids.
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Employers of those making temporary or permanent repairs to equipment containing pressure or

hazardous fluids are advised to take account of the following aspects before work begins:
• The original design specification.
• The duty for which the system will be used post repair.
• The effects the repair may have on the integrity of the system.
• Whether the protective devices remain adequate.
• Whether the written scheme of examination remains suitable.
• Whether repair welding on live plant would create a hazard, e.g. hot tapping.
Where substantial repairs are to be made, the Competent Person (for pressure systems) or other
independent adviser should be consulted before the work begins. Companies are also recommended
to consider the impact on the business operation and reputation in the event of further problems. At
the commencement of any repair or modification it is important to determine the technical and
regulatory requirements of the design and fabrication in relation to the risk. These can be simple or
complex depending on the type of equipment. While technical requirements for repairs and
modifications to pressure systems are often well understood, those for equipment in ‘hazardous
systems’ that are covered by other regulations, for example MHI, may need to determine on a case-
by-case basis.
Typical technical requirements are:

• Repairs/modifications should be designed and fabricated to ensure the equipment complies with
appropriate code requirements. These may be the original code or a suitable current specification.
• Adequate allowance must be made for the inspection of the repair/modification.
• Mitigation measures may be required where the repair/modification is considered to introduce a
higher level of risk. For instance, rotating equipment may need to be designed to protect against
high-energy failures, or storage tanks or pipelines may need protection to guard against potential
large containment losses.
Once the technical requirements are clear, then the following constraints on the repair operation
should be considered.
• The material of construction.
• Suitability for fabrication and/or welding.
• Location and access limitations.
• Welding requirements and heat treatment.
• Ability to inspect the final result.
• Post repair cleaning and/or risk of contamination.
Assistance from a Materials Engineer at this stage can help the process to achieve the technical
requirements, and lead to efficient and cost effective implementation.
Removal of Flaws
When surface and near surface flaws are found, the most common alternative to fitness-for-service
assessment is to remove the flawed material by grinding. Grinding out a flaw is a straightforward
solution, but it is important to grind out sufficient material to ensure that the entire flaw has been
removed, as a small remnant of a flaw could initiate further damage. After any grinding you should
determine whether the wall thickness remaining is adequate.
Grinding is a skilled operation and appropriate training is needed to ensure that operators can
machine a smooth profile groove. Care must be taken to avoid machining in sharp features, which
may provide sites for initiating fracture, fatigue or corrosion, and to avoid smearing the surface,
which can mask a defect. Incorrect grinding can introduce residual stresses and/or regions of high
surface hardness. Confirmation that a flaw has been removed requires a surface NDT method such
as magnetic particle inspection (MPI) or dye penetrant inspection.
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If the material remaining after grinding a smooth profile groove is greater than the minimum design
thickness for the part, no further action may be necessary other than to reinstate any surface coating.
When a flaw is ground out to a depth resulting in a wall thickness below the minimum design
thickness, the region may be treatable as a locally thinned area. Fitness-for-service assessment
procedures (e.g. BS 7910 or API 579) can then be used to justify whether the remaining thickness is
adequate for further service.
A weld repair to reinstate removed material is an option if the remaining wall thickness after
grinding is not adequate, or simply to restore the thickness to the design condition. This can be
become costly since qualification of the repair weld procedure and the welder would normally be
required, and it also has the risk of introducing further flaws. When making a weld repair, care must
be taken with the welding parameters to avoid excessive HAZ hardness, since often PWHT is not
possible. Specialist techniques are available (such as the temper bead technique) to carefully control
the repair weld heat input and to offset the disadvantages of a lack of PWHT. Sometimes it is best
to cut out completely the area containing the damage. Care must be taken that the machining does
not produce excessive heat, flaws or residual stresses. The opening can then be covered with a patch
plate or blanked nozzle, suitably designed to ensure the opening is adequately reinforced.
7.5 Repair Methods for Temporary or Permanent Repairs

(a) Temporary repairs
Leakage from damaged pipes and other equipment can be prevented or sealed using proprietary
composite plugs, overwraps, clips, clamps etc. The products available range from wraps and bands
to clamps and pressure containing boxes, some capable of carrying axial load. Where pipe sections
are removed, mechanical connectors are available to link the ends. All these repairs should be
considered temporary, unless a technical review has determined the repair is safe to make
permanent. The period in which a repair may be left in place will depend on circumstances,
experience and, where appropriate, agreement between the Duty Holder and the Inspecting
Authority. In special cases, repairs may be in place for several years. Whenever temporary repairs
or modifications are made, it is important to document the work carried out, future inspection
requirements, and the period in which the repair/modification may remain in service.
It is important to monitor the evolution of the damage to the equipment under the repair and
deterioration of the repair materials. While current NDT techniques are limited in this respect, it
may be necessary to remove and reinstate the repair. A process to identify vulnerable repairs and to
assess and monitor their condition in order to prevent secondary failure is strongly advised.
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(b) Permanent (welded) repairs

Permanent repairs/modifications introduce new parts and welds, and can change the original design
intent of an item. In order to plan and perform these, appropriately qualified and experienced
personnel are essential. Where welding is concerned, the key factors are:
• Development of the welding procedure.
• Welding positions and access restrictions (fixed equipment).
• Weld metal type.
• Weld preparation and profile.
• Influence on parent material in the heat affected zone.
• Application of purge gases.
• Qualification of the procedure and the welder for the repair situation.
• Access and ventilation (particularly confined spaces).
• Influence of weather conditions.
• Location (e.g. working at height, hazard to live equipment).
• Cleanliness of equipment/weld preparation.
• Minimisation of residual stresses and need for PWHT.
Temporary repairs are often a source of trouble; they may very easily become permanent even if not
suitable for long term service. There is also a risk that such repairs are done in a hurry, without full
assessment of implications. Within the scope of the repair, additional work may be needed to
overcome changes that have occurred to the material while it has been in-service to improve weld
reliability. Typically this may be pre-heating, hydrogen diffusion (bake-out) treatment, or weld
overlay.
Weld repairs to older equipment have a greater potential to contain a range of defects. Different
NDT techniques and procedures from those applied when the item was new may be needed to
overcome, for example, the limits of access or to accommodate a change of weld design or
arrangement of fillet or butt welds. Older steels (containing high levels of sulphur and phosphorous)
are more susceptible to lamellar tearing when stressed in the though-thickness direction, such as
when attachments are fillet welded to plate. As a component ages, deteriorates and is repeatedly
repaired, the judgement for continued service and monitored service life may require a more
thorough mapping of defects and their size.
Revalidation after Repairs

After temporary or permanent repairs are made, it is good practice to revalidate the equipment to
ensure that the repairs have been carried out as specified and have not had any detrimental effect on
integrity. Revalidation also needs to consider any effect of the repairs on the equipment or system
as a whole. For example, repairs might necessitate a change to the operating regime or to the written
scheme of examination, or the introduction of monitoring.
7.6 General Considerations

At the time of manufacture, pressure equipment normally has a validated design for a prescribed set
of defined operating conditions. On the other hand, non-–pressure equipment, as used for the
containment of chemicals (e.g. storage tanks, hold vessels, mixers etc.) may be in service with very
limited documentation of design conditions or defined operating limits. Changes to the operating
regimes of both these types of equipment, or to their physical structure, commonly occur over the
many years that equipment is in service.
Changes to operating regimes may involve:

• Changes in temperature.
• Changes in pressure.
• Changes in flow rates.
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• Modification of process chemistry/environment.

• Modification to product density.
• Changes to system loading (e.g. pipe re-routing/hangers etc.).
Any of these may result in conditions outside the original design envelope or the conditions under
which satisfactory operations have been demonstrated. For mechanical equipment (e.g. pumps,
centrifuges etc.) there may be other factors, for example, the speed of operation or the load carried.
In addition, changes to drives, coupling, available spares or lubricants may alter dynamic loads, and
ultimately affect integrity.
These changes may be considered as step changes imposed on equipment through the operating
regime. There is real experience that subtle incremental changes to operating conditions can
progressively also move an operating regime outside design conditions. This has been shown to
happen with both pressure equipment and other types. In addition to these, changes occur to the
physical structure of the equipment itself through repairs and modifications and deterioration. In all
these cases, the equipment needs to be revalidated.
There are opportunities to review the adequacy of the design of the equipment at various stages
during is well established when carrying out formal ‘risk based’ or ‘criticality reviews’ that are
driven by a particular objective, for example, shut down optimisation and planning. These
opportunities apply mainly to pressure equipment. For other types of equipment, it is more likely
that these items are not reviewed for changes, as there is often no formal requirement to do so.
It is always good practice to revalidate the design adequacy of equipment whenever such changes
occur for all types of equipment, and to make such reviews on a regular basis. It can be a formal
process for equipment within pressure systems when the approval of the Competent Person is
required.
Key points for consideration in the re-validation process for different changes are highlighted in the
following Sections.
After Physical Modification and/or Repair

The design of modifications to equipment should normally be carried out to comply with the
original design code. Fabrication procedures, on the other hand, are best done to the standards of the
equivalent modern code. In addition to considering the requirements of these codes on the design,
there are likely to be other factors to take into account.
• The access and geometry of the equipment may limit or change the type of welding process that is
possible from that originally used. This can affect the quality of the finished welds.
• Pre-heat and post weld heat treatment may be impossible or limited, leading to different properties
in the finished weld to those achieved during first manufacture.
• Materials used for the construction of modifications/repairs may vary from the original
specification, due to evolution of steel making practices and availability. For, example, stainless
steel is available in standard and low carbon grades, but may be dual certified. Low carbon grades
would not be appropriate for high temperature service.
• It may not be possible to conduct NDT to the same technique, procedure or standard as the
original code (e.g. due to access limitations)
Even though the modification/repair may comply with the design codes, consideration is needed of
the effect of the change on structural integrity, and on flow and temperature distributions. For
example, fitting a branch to repair a corroded shell may adversely alter flow patterns within the
equipment, whereas a weld overlay would not. Weld overlays are not currently covered within
pressure vessel design codes, but are a useful repair method when carefully applied.
Following modifications or repairs, a reference to the changes should be made in the equipment
records system or the maintenance log. The records should contain as relevant:
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• A reference number and drawing of the completed modification/repair.

• The design code and construction category used.
• Design loads (including local, cyclic, dead and imposed, dynamic and wind loading).
• The calculated design stress, minimum thickness, corrosion allowance.
• Pressure-temperature combinations for which the modification/ repair are suitable.
• Materials of construction including supports, attachments and gaskets.
• Heat treatment charts.
• NDT reports.
• Quality assurance documents (e.g. welder approvals, weld procedures etc.).
Changes in Design Codes

There is normally no reason to re-validate equipment as a result of changes to design codes. There
are, however, some situations where revalidation of equipment should be considered, often as a
result of industry experience or legislative change. Typical examples are:
• Modification of the Nelson Curves for steels in hydrogen service.
• Change in gasket materials.
• Equipment in critical applications designed to early codes without the requirement for fatigue
analysis may need to be revalidated for fatigue.
• Notification of the causes of major failures.
If you are uncertain as to the impact of changes in design codes or industry experience on your
equipment, then it is advisable to seek specialist support.
Change in Operating Conditions

It is often necessary to operate existing equipment under new operating conditions. For example,
this could be operating cryogenic vessels at a lower temperature than the original design
temperature, operating high temperature plant at an even higher temperature. Using storage
equipment for containment of different substances may mean that a different chemical or corrosive
environment will be experienced, or a different hydrostatic head developed. When equipment
changes its service conditions, you should regard it as having a higher risk of damage until service
experience or assessment shows otherwise. Damage from previous service may increase at an
accelerating rate under the new conditions. The reason(s) for changing the service conditions should
be taken into account when considering the risk.
Assessment for Low Temperature Conditions (Generally Below 0°C)

Ferritic steels show a transition from ductile to brittle behaviour as the temperature drops or the
thickness increases. A material that may be ductile and show adequate toughness at one temperature
could show a significantly lower toughness and brittle behaviour at a lower temperature. This is
why it is important, when fabricating from ferritic steels, to carry out impact or fracture toughness
testing or at or below the lowest anticipated service temperature. Materials such as austenitic
stainless steel or aluminium, do not show this transition behaviour and generally maintain their
toughness at low temperature. Revalidation for low temperature conditions could be due to a
proposed change in operating conditions to lower temperatures. However, it can also be necessary
to re-assess existing conditions
Increase in the Operating Temperature

When a change is proposed to equipment that would increase its maximum operating temperature it
is necessary to revalidate with respect to its strength and susceptibility to creep. If inspection has
shown that the equipment is free from significant defects, and a good measurement of the current
wall thickness is available, then it is appropriate to revalidate the equipment for the increased
temperature according to the original code of construction. It must also be considered that a higher
temperature may take the equipment into a region susceptible to SCC or hydrogen attack (see
Section 4.2.12).
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Codes such as BS 1500, BS 1515, BS PD 5500 and ASME VIII provide tables of allowable design
stress for standard specifications of materials at temperatures under the creep regime. An
assessment of the adequacy of the current wall thickness of the relevant parts (making appropriate
allowance for any predicted loss in thickness during the remaining life of the equipment) relative to
the minimum required wall thickness calculated the code formulae would be all that is needed.
Where a design stress at the relevant temperature is not available or insufficient, then it is possible
to use a value derived from tensile testing of actual parent and weld material. If original material is
not available, there are methods to remove small samples of material from lower stressed areas from
which miniature tensile specimens can be obtained. Alternatively, it is also possible to use
correlations to extrapolate the tensile properties to higher temperatures.
Where the increase in temperature would take the material into a regime where creep effects could
be significant, a more detailed consideration is needed. This would require a rigorous review of the
materials and standard of the equipment’s original construction and its current condition, the
suitability of the material for creep service, and an assessment of creep life. Such considerations are
beyond the scope of this report.
Changes to Pressure and Applied Loads

Revalidation of the design is required when a proposal is made to increase the loading on equipment
beyond the design condition. The proposed change may be an increase in design pressure, self-
weight or contents, or additional forces and moments imposed by changes to attached piping and
supports or operating temperatures. If inspection has shown that the equipment is free from
significant defects, and a good measurement of the current wall thickness is available, then it is
appropriate to revalidate the equipment according to the original code of construction.
Revalidation should assess the adequacy of the existing wall thickness (making appropriate
allowance for any further loss in thickness during the remaining life of the equipment) by
calculation of the minimum required wall thickness under the new loading. Where design pressure
has increased, a new hydrostatic test may be appropriate. The effect of increasing the pressure in a
single vessel on other parts of the system also needs to be considered.
Any change in pressure (increase or decrease) needs to be accompanied by changes to the settings
of safety valves and other protective systems.
Changing Contents and Environment

Revalidation of equipment is required when a change to the fluid or the environment (internal or
external) is proposed. The continued suitability of the materials and welds must be reviewed.
Materials selected with one purpose in mind may not be suited to another. For example,
petrochemical equipment procured with sweet oil service in mind may not be suitable for sour feed.
A stainless steel vessel intended for inland use may not be suitable in a coastal environment. A
relaxation of water chemistry controls on boiler systems may expose systems designed for certain
specified water chemistry to attack. Changes to the fluid and environment may affect the corrosion
allowance within the design and the anticipated design life; it may necessitate shorter inspection
intervals until favourable experience has been obtained. Changing contents to more hazardous
substances may affect the risk assessment and the commensurate integrity measures. If there is
insufficient in-house expertise, then it is prudent to employ a qualified materials engineer to
undertake the review.
Changing Operational Mode

Changes to operating mode could include higher cyclic loads, thermal shock, different flow
conditions, valve closure times, depressurisation times etc. Where these changes lie outside the
design basis and existing experience, revalidation of the equipment is required. Depending on
circumstances, the revalidation could involve a reassessment of the fatigue life, or the effect of peak
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pressures and/or minimum temperatures in the system, or local yielding.
Revalidation of Second Hand Equipment, Reuse, and Equipment from Storage

From time to time a user of plant may wish to purchase and use second hand equipment or to use
equipment taken from storage or another duty. All of these should be undertaken with extreme
caution, especially if the original design and manufacturing records are not available. Most
equipment is designed and manufactured with a certain use in mind, and changes to that use may
not lie within the original design intent.
It is important to establish the known life of the equipment and to identify any gaps in service
history and potential ageing damage. Equipment that has been bought second-hand may not have
previous service records. The availability of such records ought to be a consideration when
purchasing second hand equipment.
Before further service, a thorough and detailed inspection is needed to determine the current
condition and any damage during previous use or storage. Sometimes welding onto old or
contaminated steel may be necessary before the equipment can be put back into service, and care
must be taken. Design analysis and re-verification is needed where the proposed use lies outside the
original design basis or when there is damage from previous service. From this, new safe operating
limits and design life can established and recorded on a new plate and documentation on the
equipment
Responding To Industry Experience and Learning from Incidents

From time to time, new industry experience is gained. This may be as a result of publicised failures
or from research and development. Sometimes there is a spate of failures (e.g. shell boilers in the
1980’s), major incidents (e.g. see HSE report of incidents at BP Grangemouth), or new insights
(e.g. the PANI inspection trials) and understanding (e.g. effect of sour environments). Experience is
disseminated in a variety of ways. These can include HSE Safety Notices and site visits, industry
trade bodies (e.g. SAFed and EEMUA), Competent Persons, professional institute seminars (e.g.
IMechE, IChemE, The Welding Institute), journals and other publications (e.g. Engineering Failure
Analysis). Duty Holders are expected to maintain their awareness through these and other means,
and take appropriate action to safeguard their equipment when necessary. Organisations are
encouraged to keep up to date with current practices and codes, and to participate in research,
development and information sharing via organisations such as:
• Institution of Mechanical Engineers (Pressure Systems Group and Process Industries Division)
• Institution of Chemical Engineers.
• Institution of Plant Engineers.
• British Institute for NDT.
• The Welding Institute.
• Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining.
• The Energy Institute.
• Engineering Equipment and Materials Users’ Association.
• Safety Assessment Federation.
• Health and Safety Executive.
• UK Offshore Operators Association etc.
7.7 Review of schemes of examination and condition monitoring

Schemes of examination for equipment containing hazardous or pressurised fluids need to be
suitable to address the risks from damage in all circumstances, and therefore need regular review,
particularly as equipment ages. The Duty Holder for the equipment should therefore ensure that the
scheme is reviewed by a competent person (Competent Person) on a regular basis throughout the
lifetime of the plant. For pressure systems, this is a requirement by law under Pressure Vessel
regulations. It is a good practice to review the whole scheme of examination following each
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thorough inspection. This enables the results of the inspection of particular items of equipment to be
considered as part of the review process of the whole scheme. Damage detected in one location may
increase the possibility of it being present elsewhere. A change to the interval to the next inspection
of one item may be appropriate for other equipment. For pressure systems, the Competent Person
carrying out the examination of the pressure system is required to state on the report of examination
whether the existing scheme of examination remains suitable or should be modified, and to modify
the scheme if this is recommended.
7.7 Criteria for determining the end of equipment life

In recent years, increased competition within industry has driven the need for optimising the cost of
plant inspection and maintenance and repairs (IMR) and the decision of when best to replace
equipment. Commercial software tools for financial analysis have been developed to address this
need and to predict the optimum IMR and replacement strategy. These are of particular interest to
the oil and gas and power generation industries where fully quantitative financially based plant
optimization methods have a variety of applications. Financial assessments of costs need to take
account of the possibility that equipment will fail. Unplanned or forced shutdowns have financial
consequences in terms of lost production, while explosions, fires and releases can cause major plant
damage, casualties and off-site consequences that can significantly damage a company’s liability,
reputation and sales. Prudent replacement of equipment can improve reliability and reduce the risk
of failure, and, if undertaken at the right level and time, can bring about considerable cost savings.
The basic principles underlying methods of cost-risk optimisation of the replacement decision are
reasonably straightforward. The optimisation is of minimising the total service cost over the
equipment lifetime. Excluding initial purchase and direct operating costs, the main costs that have
to be considered are:
(a) The costs of inspection, maintenance and repairs.
(b) The expected value of the cost consequences of failure.
(c) The cost of replacement.
If there is just one failure mechanism giving rise to one set of financial consequences, the expected
value of the cost consequences of failure is simply the product of the probability of failure and the
cost of the consequences. Of course, there can be many types and forms of failure and each will
have a set of consequences. In this case the cumulative costs of failure at a given time is the
summation of the expected values of each failure–consequence scenario. Without adequate IMR,
the failure probability will undoubtedly increase as ageing and wear-out take place. Good practice is
to invest sufficiently in IMR so as to keep this probability under control. The costs of running
equipment therefore usually rise at an increasing rate.
The Best Time to Replace

If the equipment is to be replaced, when is the best time to do it?
This is the time when the total business costs of providing and safely maintaining the asset or
service are minimised over a defined period. It is intuitive that with continuously increasing
business costs over time, the costs in the first half of life are always less than in the second half.
Therefore, if the equipment is to be replaced once, and the costs of the replacement are the same as
the original, then the best time is half way through the required period of service. Is a single
replacement at this optimum time cost effective compared with running the original equipment
through to the required period of service? This depends on the replacement cost. A comparison of
the total service cost with and without replacement at the optimum time will provide an answer.
Even with one replacement, the total service life cost may be unacceptably high, particularly if the
risks of failure are high. In this case the possibility of replacing the equipment more than once
should be considered.
87

The analysis implies a number of simplifying assumptions. It assumes that the value of money
remains constant and that there is no interest on money not spent. In practice neither of these flow
and compound interest analysis. While these are in the domain of accountants, they do not alter the
underlying principle of the approach.
Obtaining the probability of failure for an item of equipment over time is not generally
straightforward. If historical data of the time to failure is available for the item under similar
conditions, then this may be used. It is also possible to use expert elicitation. These methods are
ideally suited for obtaining inexpensive preliminary engineering insights, and to identify any need
for more quantitative analysis. Generally, for single items of equipment, it is necessary to establish
a particular damage mechanism along with a failure criterion and then to formulate a damage
propagation model with statistically distributed engineering inputs. For example, the damage
mechanism could be corrosion and the failure criterion could be plastic collapse or through wall
penetration. In this case the input distributions could be the corrosion rate and the tensile properties.
Often the difficulty in this sort of planning knows how long a service life to assume. This will
depend on many factors outside the integrity of the equipment itself. The evolution of feed stock,
installations, products, markets and the supply chain are typical factors that may influence the
required service life. Asset management of the equipment therefore needs to be part of the overall
business planning process.
REFERENCE LIST
(1) Wintle, J.B, etal, HSE Research Report RR509 - Plant Ageing-management of equipment
containing hazardous fluid, HSE 2006
(2) Wintle, J.B, etal, HSE Research Report 363/2001 – Best practice for risk-based Inspection as a
Part of Plant Integrity Management. HSE, 2001
(3) Matthews, C., Handbook of Mechanical In-service Inspection, Professional Engineering
Publishing, London, 2004
(4) Pilborough, L., Inspection of Chemical Plants, Gulf Publishing Company, Houston
Texas, 1971
(5) Kelly, A., Maintenance Planning and Control, Butterworths, UK, 1984
(6) N Sukaih, Cape 2007, 9th INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM on ASSET MANAGEMENT
of AGED PLANT and MATERIALS: Assessment methods
88

PROCESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT MODULES
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, LEGISALTION AND SAFETY
MODULE 1: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF

PROCESS PLANT EQUIPMENT::
 Understanding your business, risks and reliability
 Business case for Asset integrity management
 Competence Requirements in the Changing world of integrity management
 Asset integrity management system- getting organized and staying organized!
 Forms of asset degradation
 Detecting ageing and degradation
 Strategies to consider when degradation is detected
MODULE 2: LEGISLATION AND SAFETY:
Part 1 Legislation
 Sources of our law
 Hierarchy of legislation- The OHS Act and Regulations
 Legal appointments
 Employer’s and mandator’s liability
 The reasonable man
 Reasonably practicable
 Risks- Principles and guidelines of reducing risks to ALARP
 Consideration of culpability
 Current and Proposed Vessel under Pressure Regulations
 The Professional engineering act
Part 2: Process safety
 General introduction to process safety
 Business case for process safety
 Getting organised: elements of process safety
 Process safety during the development and project lifecycle phase
 Process safety during the operational lifecycle phase
 Mechanical integrity and fitness-for-service and its role in process safety
PROCESS PLANT EQUIPMENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

MODULE 3A:
 Process Design of Plants
 Management of Change
 New Construction Requirements
 Interpretation of Engineering Drawings
 Introduction to Pressure vessel codes
 Pressure Vessel (PV)
 Piping and Pipeline
 Piping vibration assessment
89

MODULE 3B:
 Heat Exchanger Design/Construction
 Fired Steam Boiler & Fired Heater
 Leak sealing Devices
MODULE 3C:
 Storage Tank Design/Construction
 Mechanical Overpressure (and Under pressure) Protective Devices:
 Other Protective Devices
 Design of welds
MATERIALS AND WELDING TECHNOLOGY, CORROSION PROTECTION,

INSPECTION AND NON_DESTRUCTIVE TESTING
MODULE 4: MATERIALS AND WELDING TECHNOLOGY
MATERIALS
 Materials manufacture and properties
 Carbon Steels
 Low Alloy Steels
 Stainless Steels and Nickel Alloys
 Non-Ferrous Metals and Alloys
 Non-Metallic Materials
 Materials for High temperature service
 Materials for Corrosive service
 Materials or low temperature service
WELDING
Welding Process and Design
Welding Inspection and Quality
Welding Procedure Specifications Control (QC) WPS) and Welding Procedure Qualification
Records (WPQR)
 Welding Metallurgy and Heat Treatment of Carbon and Low Alloy Steel
 Welding Repairs and Modifications
 Welding on Live Equipment
 Review and approval of WPS
MODULE 5: CORROSION PROTECTION, INSPECTION AND NDT TECHNOLOGY
AND IN SERVICE INSPECTION
CORROSION AND PROTECTION

 Basic Corrosion Science
 Protective Coatings
 Cathodic Protection (CP)
 Corrosion Monitoring
 Water Treatment
INSPECTION AND NDT TECHNOLOGY
 Enhanced Visual and Physical Examination
 Pressure and Leak Testing
90

 Radiography
 Ultrasonics
 Crack Detection by Magnetic Particle(MPI) and
 Dye Penetrant (DP) Inspection
 Hardness Testing
 Specialised Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) Techniques
IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT INSPECTION
 Pressure Vessels and Reactors
 Heat Exchangers
 Piping and Pipelines
 Storage Tanks
 Relief Systems
 Boilers and Furnaces/Fired Heaters
 Lifting Attachments on Pressure Equipment
 Civil & Structural Items associated Equipment with Pressure Equipment and Storage Tanks
COMMUNICATION AND REPORTING
 Inspection Reporting
 Inspection Scheduling
 Inspection Data Management
 Maintenance Management Systems
 Overhaul Planning and Execution
 Information Technology
 External Communications
DEGRADATION, INSPECTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT

MODULE 6: DEGRADATION IN PROCESS EQUIPMENT, INSPECTION AND RISK
MANAGEMENT
GENERAL DEGRADATION MECHANISMS – ALL INDUSTRIES

 Mechanical and Metallurgical Failure Mechanisms
 Uniform or Localized Loss of Thickness
 High Temperature Corrosion
 Environment – Assisted Cracking
DEGRADATION MECHANISMS- REFINING, PETROCHEMICAL, CHEMICAL
 Uniform or Localized Loss in Thickness Phenomena
 Environment–Assisted Cracking
 Other Mechanisms
INSPECTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
 Hazard and Operability Studies
 Risk Based Inspection and Decision Making
 Fitness-for-Service Analysis
 Remaining Life Analysis of High Temperature Plant
 Quantified Risk Assessment
91

COURSE FACILITATOR: NAREN SUKAIH Pr Eng, C Eng, GCC
A seasoned Professional Engineer with technical, managerial and entrepreneurial, experience

spanning over 20 years and work experience in maintenance, projects & design sections of the
worlds’ largest synthetic fuel-from-coal petrochemical complex. He has also worked for one of the
largest multinational oil companies, in design/projects, operational support and equipment integrity
& reliability management at the largest crude oil refinery in Africa. For the past 10 years, he has
also been providing a consultancy covering the design, analysis and integrity assessment of
equipment for various process industries.
In addition, Mr Sukaih is a graduate mechanical engineer, and is registered with the Engineering
councils in South Africa and the UK, both as a Professional and Chartered Engineer respectively.
Having extensive involvement in small to large multi million rand projects which included plant
and equipment design, construction and commissioning makes him well positioned to install and
assess processing equipment and successfully start up and commission processing plant. Further
maintenance, and integrity assurance roles provide the basis for asset integrity management.
He as holds a Government Certificate of Competency (GCC) issued by the Department of Labour,

Having these credentials and appointed as Responsible person in terms of the General Machinery
Regulations (GMR2.1) in previous positions, therefore enables the assessment of safe operation,
maintenance of plant and equipment and personnel and process safety. Mr Sukaih is also a certified
as a Lead Auditor for the ISO 9000/14000 Quality Standards and environmental standards.
Mr Sukaih’s current job and consulting work and extensive experience, spans Technology
development, Plant design, operations and management, and business process development.
He is a member of the following organizations: SAIMECHE, IMechE (UK), ASME(USA) and is a

member of the Technical advisory committee to the DOL for the Vessel under pressure regulations.
He is also a member of the ECSA Standards Generating Group for NDT.
92

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The South African Institution of Mechanical Engineering

PROCESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR ASSETS!

No. DESCRIPTION PAGE

2. The business case for asset integrity management 23

3. Competency requirements in the changing world of asset integrity 27

4. Asset integrity management -getting organised 36

No. DESCRIPTION PAGE

6. Detection of aging and degradation 70

7. Strategies to consider when degradation is detected 77

Process Plant and Equipment Integrity Management modules 89

PROCESS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

1. UNDERSTANDING YOUR BUSINESS

1.1 What makes a business?

SUPPLIERS LOCAL & NATIONAL

Figure 1.1: Elements of a business

1.1.2 Six Steps to Success

1.2 Management and leadership

What does a well-managed company look like?

Figure 1.2: Business process

Simpler MS World Class High

Small, simple Large, complex Size and

Understanding the needs and characteristics of the post

Knowing and using the resources of the group

To improve your skills in giving information:

Controlling group performance

Setting the example

Counseling can be effective when a person is

The leader represents the post in two situations:

1.3 Business process cycle

1.3.1 Objectives, Risks

Figure 1.4: Business process cycle

1.3.2 Direction; Policies, Plans

1.3.3 Organisation, Resources

1.3.4 Standards, Procedures

1.3.5 Implement, Monitor, Correct

1.3.6 Review, Improve

1.4 Process plant management systems

Typical Process Plant Businesses process may comprise of the following:

Is the asset degrading as a Is the asset available for

Is the performance of the asset

Table 1.1: Degrees of development (reference: ISO9004-2000):

1.5 Lessons for high reliability organisations

auditing, identification of deficiencies and corrective action? Is the SMS documentation

1.5.2 Further lessons can be learnt from more recent incidents

Sasol Secunda – 2004

DuPont’s findings and recommendations

2. THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Shows Four Benefits:

Two quantitative benefits

2.2 What is Asset Integrity?

2.3 Benefits of asset integrity management

 Increases value of corporate image and brand

Risk Reduction - Benefits to your company

Risk Reduction - Effective Asset Integrity programs provide industry-wide benefits

– Reduction in capital budget

Sustained Value - Asset Integrity helps increase productivity:

Sustained Value - Production costs are reduced through