HARRIS VS NEW YORK

Facts. Petitioner Harris was charged with selling in heroin to an undercover officer on two
occasions. Petitioner took the stand in his own defense but denied the offense, and he claimed
he sold the officer two bags of baking powder. On cross-examination the prosecution used
contradicting statements made by Petitioner to police shortly after his arrest. The contradicting
statements were made before Petitioner received his Miranda warnings.
Issue. Was the prosecution improperly allowed to use the statements to impeach Petitioner’s
testimony since the statements were made without Miranda warnings?

Held. Chief Justice Burger issued the opinion for the United States Supreme Court in holding
that Petitioner was allowed to be impeached using his conflicting statements.

Dissent. Justice Black dissented without comment.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall issued an opinion arguing that the
Court’s ruling supports police officers who don’t follow the law by not properly giving Miranda
warnings. He notes that police may be encouraged to interrogate without proper warnings
because while the prosecution may not be able to use the statements in its direct case, it may
be allowed to do so if the defendant chooses to testify.

Discussion. The Court found that a defendant should not be allowed to commit perjury, and if
impeachment evidence is available and admissible for that purpose, then the lack of Miranda
warning should not prevent it. If Petitioner’s statement had been to a third party instead of
police, there would have been little question as to the admissibility.
MIRANDA vs ARIZONA

In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that detained criminal suspects, prior to
police questioning, must be informed of their constitutional right to an attorney and against self-
incrimination. The case began with the 1963 arrest of Phoenix resident Ernesto Miranda, who
was charged with rape, kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda was not informed of his rights prior to
the police interrogation. During the two-hour interrogation, Miranda allegedly confessed to
committing the crimes, which the police apparently recorded. Miranda, who had not finished
ninth grade and had a history of mental instability, had no counsel present. At trial, the
prosecution's case consisted solely of his confession. Miranda was convicted of both rape and
kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison. He appealed to the Arizona Supreme
Court, claiming that the police had unconstitutionally obtained his confession. The court
disagreed, however, and upheld the conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which reviewed the case in 1966.

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ruled that the
prosecution could not introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a criminal trial because the
police had failed to first inform Miranda of his right to an attorney and against self-incrimination.
The police duty to give these warnings is compelled by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment,
which gives a criminal suspect the right to refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney.

The Court maintained that the defendant's right against self-incrimination has long been part of
Anglo-American law as a means to equalize the vulnerability inherent in being detained. Such a
position, unchecked, can often lead to government abuse. For example, the Court cited the
continued high incidence of police violence designed to compel confessions from a suspect.
This and other forms of intimidation, maintained the Court, deprive criminal suspects of their
basic liberties and can lead to false confessions. The defendant's right to an attorney is an
equally fundamental right, because the presence of an attorney in interrogations, according to
Chief Justice Warren, enables "the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell
his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogations
process."

Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the Court ruled, "dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings," "no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice."

Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread ignorance of the law, the Court devised
statements that the police are required to tell a defendant who is being detained and
interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda Rights" begin with "the right to remain silent," and
continue with the statement that "anything said can and will be used against [the defendant] in a
court of law." The police are further compelled to inform the suspect of his or her right to an
attorney and allow for (or, if necessary, provide for) a defendant's attorney who can accompany
him during interrogations. Because none of these rights was afforded to Ernesto Miranda and
his "confession" was thus unconstitutionally admitted at trial, his conviction was reversed.
Miranda was later retried and convicted without the admission of his confession.

Miranda v. Arizona, in creating the "Miranda Rights" we take for granted today, reconciled the
increasing police powers of the state with the basic rights of individuals. Miranda remains good
law today.
New York vs Quarles
Respondent Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession
of a weapon. The trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement made by
respondent, because the statement was obtained by police before they read respondent his
“Miranda rights”. That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals.
We granted certiorari, 461 US 942, 77 L Ed 2d 1299, 103 S Ct 2118 (1983), and we now
reverse. We conclude that under the circumstances involved in this case, overriding
considerations of public safety justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings
before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 am, Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal
Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, N.Y., when a young woman approached their car. She
told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was
wearing a black jacket with the name “Big Ben” printed in yellow letters on the back. She told
the officers that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the
man was carrying a gun.

The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while
Office Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted respondent, who matched
the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing
the officer, respondent turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued
him with a drawn gun. When respondent turned the corner at the end of the aisle, Officer Kraft
lost sight of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of respondent, ordered him to
stop and put his hands over his head.

Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft was
the first to reach respondent. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder
holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun
was. Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, “[t]he gun is
over there.” Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38-caliber revolver from one of the
cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed
card. Respondent indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without an attorney
present. Officer Kraft then asked respondent if he owned the gun and where he had purchased
it. Respondent answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Fla.

In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal possession of a weapon, the judge
excluded the statement, “the gun is over there,” and the gun because the officer had not given
respondent the warnings required by our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 L Ed
2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974 (1966), before
asking him where the gun was located. The judge excluded the other statements about
respondent’s ownership of the gun and the place of purchase, as evidence tainted by the prior
Miranda violation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed without
opinion. 85 App Div 2d 936, 447 NYS2d 84 (1981).
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed by a 4-3 vote. 58 NY2d 664, 444
NE2d 984 (1982). It concluded that respondent was in “custody” within the meaning of Miranda
during all questioning and rejected the State’s argument that the exigencies of the situation
justified Officer Kraft’s failure to read respondent his Miranda rights until after he had located the
gun. The court declined to recognize an exigency exception to the usual requirements of
Miranda because it found no indication from Officer Kraft’s testimony at the suppression hearing
that his subjective motivation in asking the question was to protect his own safety or the safety
of the public. 58 NY2d, at 666, 444 NE2d, at 985. For the reasons which follow, we believe that
this case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to
adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.
*****

We hold that on these facts there is a “public safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the
availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers
involved.

*****

The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were confronted with the
immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to
believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket,
with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public
safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.

*****

We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public
safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination. We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable
position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for
them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever
probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their
ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.

*****

We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in excluding the statement, “the gun is over
there,” and the gun because of the officer’s failure to read respondent his Miranda rights before
attempting to locate the weapon. Accordingly we hold that it also erred in excluding the
subsequent statements as illegal fruits of a Miranda violation. We therefore reverse and remand
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

In New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, a woman reported to police officers that she had
been raped by a man, gave a physical description of the man, and said that she had just seen
him enter a nearby supermarket carrying a gun. ( New York v. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp.
651-652.) The officers apprehended the defendant and, upon finding no gun on him, asked the
defendant where the gun was. ( Id. at p. 652.) The defendant told the officers where the gun
was and pointed out where he had left it. (Ibid.) The officers found the gun. (Ibid.)

The woman flagged down police and reported to them that she had just been raped and that her
gun-carrying assailant fled into a supermarket. (467 US at 651-652.) A police officer
apprehended the alleged attacker and, upon discovering his empty shoulder holster, asked him
where the gun was--without providing the suspect Miranda warnings. The attacker, already
handcuffed, nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and said, "the gun is over there." (Id.
at 652.) The officer then asked him other questions concerning the purchase and ownership of
the gun, which the perpetrator answered. (Id.)

The trial court excluded evidence of the gun and the defendant's statement about the gun
because the officers had not given the defendant warnings required by Miranda before asking
about the gun. ( New York v. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 652-653.) The United States
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the facts of the case warranted "a
'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's
answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not
depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved." ( Id. at pp. 655-656.)

The defendant, who had been identified as an armed rapist, was pursued through a market by
police and apprehended. The defendant was frisked and an empty shoulder holster was found.
After the defendant was handcuffed, but before he was informed of his Miranda rights, the
arresting officer asked him where the gun was. The defendant said, " 'the gun is over there,' "
indicating some nearby empty cartons. ( Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 651-652.)

The Supreme Court held that where police questioning is prompted by a legitimate concern for
public safety, statements made by defendants who are subjected to such questioning are not
subject to exclusion under Miranda. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
requiring Miranda warnings in such situations could deter defendants from responding and
thereby place the public at risk. ( Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 657-658.)Before reciting the
Miranda warnings, the police asked the defendant where the gun was located, and the
defendant showed them. After the police retrieved the weapon, they advised the defendant of
his Miranda rights. The defendant claimed his statement directing the police to the gun, elicited
prior to the Miranda warnings, was the product of custodial interrogation violative of Miranda
and therefore inadmissible. The trial court agreed and excluded the defendant's statement
directing the police to the gun, also excluding the gun itself and subsequent statements as
illegal fruits of the Miranda violation.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rationale of Miranda
does not require its application in circumstances where police officers must ask questions
reasonably prompted by public safety. The court concluded that 'the need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination', but held
that the exception for such a situation must be circumscribed by the exigency that justifies the
exception, thus authorizing the police to engage in questioning only to the extent 'necessary to
secure their own safety or the safety of the public . . . .'"
The United States Supreme Court held that "there is a 'public safety' exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence," regardless of the officer's actual motivation for making inquiries.