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Korea 2
Korea 2
Korea 2
NSC-68
Early in 1950a beleaguered Truman, haunted by the Soviet bomb, the
KEY TERMS
establishment of the People's Republic of China and McCarthy, commissioned
ational Security Council the National Security Council (NSC) to produce a planning paper. He
Establishedin 1947 to wanted this paper to summarise where the United States stood in relationto
co-ordinate US government Communism and in which direction it should move.
external
work on internal and
security; members included NSC-68 was a classic Cold War document in that it described a polarised world'
President, in which the enslaved (in Communist countries) faced the free (in countriessuch
the President,Vice
Secretary of State, Secretary as the USA).This 68th planning paper of the NSC (hence 'NSC-68') claimed
the chiefsof
of Defence, and that the USSRhad a 'fanatic faith' and that its leaders wanted total dominati0n
the CIA andICS. of Europe and Asia. The paper recommended:
Conventional forces
Soldiers, sailors and so on, as e the development of a hydrogen bomb even more powerful than the atomic
opposed to nuclear or high- bombs dropped on Japan, so that the United States could resist Communist
tech weaponry. attempts at world domination
• the build-up of American conventional forces in order to defend the nation's
shores and enable the USA to fight limitecl wars abroad
e higher taxes to finance the struggle
e alliances to gain help for the United States
e the mobilisation of the American public in order to create a Cold War
consensus.
The recommendations of NSC-68 make it easy to see why the United Stateswas
ready to intervene in Korea.
page 20).Japan was only 100 miles from South Korea and within
Acheson's
defence perimeter. The safety of Japan would be jeopardised in the
face of a
Communist Korean peninsula with Communism apparently on the march.
The Defence Department told Truman that Japan was vital for the defence of
the West against Communism and in June 1950,several of Truman's leading
advisers said Communist control of South Korean airbases would greatly
threaten Japanese security.
US world domination?
Fromthe viewpoint of the Communists (and of a few Western historians),
theAmerican entry into the Korean War was part of the US attempt at world
domination.Some Western historians attribute US actions to ambitions to
mouldothernations in their own image (see page 15) or to ensure a capitalist-
dominated world economy (see page 57).
Uspolicytoward
China and Taiwan in 1950
WhenTruman sent
American forces to Korea, he also dispatched the US 7th
FleettotheTaiwan
Strait. His stationing of the fleet between mainland China
andTaiwanwas
motivated by the US fear that a Chinese Communist
ofTaiwanor
an aggressive move
takeover
CommunistChina by Jiang Jieshi would threaten US security, but
theChinese naturally interpreted it as reinjection of the United States into
civilwar Chinese
dismay,General fears were confirmed when, to state Department
30Julyand MacArthur made a high-profile visit to Taiwan to see Jiang
publiclypraised on
him. Secretary of state Dean Acheson
had declared
o 50 100 mls East
China
Sea
Matsu
O 100 200 km
US 7th
Fleet.
aircraft
Carriers
Formosa
People's Republic (Taiwan)
of China Strait
Quemoy
Little
(Formosa)
O Quemoy Taiwan
US 7th Fleet-
aircraft carriers
South China
Sea
on 10 July 1950 that the US war aim in Korea was simply to restore the status
quo by evicting North Korea from South Korea. However, the British criticised
the dispatch of the 7th Fleet as constituting a US extension of the KoreanWar
to China. Britain pointed out that the combination of the fleet deploymentand
MacArthur's public support for Jiang suggested that the US aimed at something
more than the restoration of the Korean status quo. At the very least it suggested
that America aimed to defend Jiang and perhaps even to promote his aggression
against the People's Republic of China.
US public opinion
A second great risk that Truman took in entering the Korean War was a hostile
public reaction. Initially, the war had considerable popular support. Pollsshowed
three-quarters of Americans approved of aiding South Korea. Second WorldWar
hero General Dwight D. Eisenhower (see page 101)said, 'We'll have a dozen
Koreas soon if we don't take a firm stand.' Members of Congress stood up and
cheered when Truman's decision to send in troops was announced and whenhe
asked them for $10 billion in July 1950. A Christian Science Monitor reporter said'
'Never before have I felt such a sense of relief and unity pass through thecity
[Washington].'
Despite the cheers in Congress, Truman
asked Senator Tom Connally, head
of the influential Senate Foreign neededa
Relations Committee, whether he
congressionaldeclaration of war. Senator Connally thought not, even though
Trumanpointed out it was stipulated by the US Constitution. Connally said:
Ifa burglar breaks into your house, you can shoot at him without going down to the
policestation and getting permission. You might run into a long debate by Congress,
whichwould tie your hands completely. You have the right to do so as Commander
in Chiefand under the IIN Charter.
Subsequently,however, when the war went badly, Truman's failure to get a
congressionaldeclaration of war caused him great political difficulties, and gave
hisopponentsthe opportunity to call the Korean War 'Truman's war'.
MacArthur
KEY TERMS
Anotherrisk in entering the Korean War lay in the appointment of General
DouglasMacArthur to command the US/UN/ROK forces in Korea. US/UN/ROK The forces
MacArthur'smilitary record and success in Japan made him seem the logical of the Unred States, Unted
Nations and Republic of
choice,but he was potentially problematic. John Foster Dulles (see page 105),
Korea (South Korea) that
theleadingRepublicanspokesman on foreign affairs, warned Truman that the opposed North Korea in the
UNcommanderwould need tact —not MacArthur's strong point. JCS Chairman Korean War
OmarBradleyconsidered MacArthur domineering, vain and arrogant
Bunco man A con man.
(MacArthur was convinced that he understood what he called the 'mind of the
Oriental'betterthan anyone else and he surrounded himself with sycophants Orthodox viewpoint
andfriendlymembers of the press who he could be sure would take flattering Historians who see the
Korean War as a war of
picturesofhim). Truman himself had reservations: in his diary in 1945, he Communist aggression and
describedMacArthuras 'Mr Prima Donna, Brass Hat', a 'play actor and bunco blame the Soviets for the
man'. Cold War have the orthodox
viewpoint.
Fromthefirst, there were major tensions between MacArthur and Truman.
Trumanbelievedin containmentand wanted a limited, defensive war in South
Koreain order to forestall Soviet or Chinese intervention; MacArthur wanted to
goalloutin North Korea and, later, against
Communist China.
Keydebate
Who or what caused the
Forroughlytwo decades Korean War?
after the end of the Korean War, American historians
demonstrated
relativelylittle interest in what some christened 'the forgotten
War',
'thewar beforeVietnam'
or 'the unknownwar'. Subsequently, the war
generated
considerabledebate —although far
less than the Vietnam War.
Wasit a war
of Communist aggression?
For years,
the traditionalorthodox
esternhistorians viewpoint on the Korean war among
was that it was a war of
Stalin's).
Not surprisingly, Communist aggression (especially
Trumanand this was the viewpoint presented by President
secretary of state
Dean Acheson in their memoirs.
Summarydiagram: Causes of stalemate 1951—3
POWs
Stalin's
Eisenhower death
Military negotiators
policies in Asia. Rhee held on to power until 1960, when he was driven out by a