G.R. No.
169202               March 5, 2010 This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 of the 27 May 2005 Decision2 and 2
August 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President,
which in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying
petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement
passport.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza"
as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her
middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner,
whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a
request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement
passport.
Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III,
representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo
Siason expressing a similar request.
On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota,
denied the request, stating thus:
This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms.
Maria Virginia V. Remo who is applying for renewal of her passport using her
maiden name.
married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport
Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert
to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce
and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these
conditions.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was
denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000.5
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the
President.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal6 and ruled
that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine
Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that
only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a
married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office
of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and
special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates
of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for
reconsideration.7
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and
affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the
resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the order dated October 28, 2004 of the
Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution dated 2 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil
Code9 and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.10 The Court of Appeals held that for
passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances
when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use
of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's
marriage to Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce
decree has been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her
maiden name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her
husband’s surname in her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of
Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert
to her maiden name in the replacement passport. 1avvphi1
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her
husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is
his wife, such as "Mrs."
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision
indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive
rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court.11
In Yasin,12 petitioner therein filed with the Shari’a District Court a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution of her marriage by
divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. In ruling in favor of
petitioner therein, the Court explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial
authority to use her husband’s name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her
husband’s full name or by adding her husband’s surname to her maiden first
name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the
marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the
husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee
need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name as use of her former husband’s is optional and not
obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code).
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her but only her civil
status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of
the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.13 She
is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article
370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status.
Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent.14
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who
opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her
from using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable
precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in
Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already
married to another woman, petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting. Another
point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a
replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of
the dissolution of one’s marriage.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision
in this case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport shall be
issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or
whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the
certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or
certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by
the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce
decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant
may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce
is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239
"limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the
use of her maiden name in her passport." These instances are death of
husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly,
Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239
provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage;
b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of
marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a
subsequent marriage of his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside
of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married
woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.15 This prohibition, according to
petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370
of the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239, including its
implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the
DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to
use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husband's surname.16
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do
so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.17
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the
cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death
of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance
of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA
8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must
prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general
law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a
special law prevails over a general law,18 thus:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will
control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.19
Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the
rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions
of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each
shall be effective.20 For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws
must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconcilable with the latter act.21 This petitioner failed to establish.
1avvphi1
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in
the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use
her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she
first applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to
use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and
now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present
request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert
to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name
and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents,22 cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport
issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at will.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the
passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also
mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport
and travel documents proceeding from it23 as a Philippine passport remains
at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a
possessor of the passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be
surrendered to any person or entity other than the government or its
representative.24
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to
travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government
to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely
and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s competence to
regulate any amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of
unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant
case.25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision
and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87710.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206248               February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing
the July 24, 2012 Decision  and March 5, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of
1 2
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio)
for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was
at that time already married to someone else.  Out of this illicit relationship, two
3
sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
October 13, 1999).  The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
4
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the
children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that
the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."  Thus, the
6
court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
[Antonio’s] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x
x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the
other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to
cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the
aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and
causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of
said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with
[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande
and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the
parties’ minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande
who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from
Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday
to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto
[Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed
minors outside of the country, without the written consent of the other
and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of
₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for
[Grande].  (Emphasis supplied.)
7
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion
was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010  for
8
being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on
the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children.  In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
9
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar
of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the
surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective
certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace
Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody
of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may
only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00
per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.  Since respondent
10
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their
children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child"
clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." 11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it
is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor
children.  Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
12
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent
and natural right of parents over their children. 13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as
it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion
was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the
consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname
by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the
core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased
as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255  which now
14
reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided,
the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of
the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court  is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more:
15
a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is
there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to
that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit
and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal
meaning free from any interpretation.  Respondent’s position that the court can
16
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not
order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,  which states:
21

compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion  upon the illegitimate children.
17
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting 7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the 7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Republic,  for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
18
Birth or in a separate document.
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it
serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child
using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by
Republic,  this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even
19

the following documents:

allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father
or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second
only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation xxxx
considering his circumstances.
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,  We gave due deference to the
20

choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would
best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be
taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right
to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF
[Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a
private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule
7.1.2.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of 7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a
of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the separate instrument duly notarized.
trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. xxxx
176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized
by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s 8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child
in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in
the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten
document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth
and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is
hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,  We held:
22
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or
repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former
that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.  What is more,
23
this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and
declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
bodies  when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.  Section 5(5),
24 25
Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be
known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."  However, since these
26
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.  A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
27
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED,
the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace
Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody
of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights  at least twice a week, and may
28
only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00
per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be
chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 250520, May 05, 2021
FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, THE CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, AND ALL
INTERESTED PERSONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the August 28, 2019 Decision 2 (Assailed
Decision) and the November 20, 2019 Resolution3 (Assailed
Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA), First Division, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 111884. The CA affirmed the April 30, 2018 Decision 4 and
July 20, 2018 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 225,
Quezon City, in Spec. Proc. No. R QZN-17-04454,6 which denied
petitioner's Rule 103 petition for change of name from "Francis Luigi
G. Santos" to "Francis Luigi G. Revilla."
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos (petitioner) filed a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court seeking to
change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of
Live Birth.7 He alleged that sometime in 1991, his parents, Lovely
Maria T. Guzman (Lovely Guzman) and Jose Marie Bautista, Jr. also
known as Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr. (Bong Revilla), met and engaged
in an intimate relationship.9 He was later born in Quezon City on
January 9, 1992 as "Francis Luigi Guzman." 10
Lovely Guzman and Bong Revilla were never married as the latter
was already married to Lani Mercado.11 Thus, petitioner's Certificate
of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was
marked as unknown.12 However, on April 24, 1996, Bong Revilla
executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment recognizing petitioner as
his son.13
In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos (Patrick
Santos), who, in turn, legally adopted petitioner. Thus, petitioner's
name was changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G.
Santos."14
Although petitioner lived with his mother, he grew up close to Bong
Revilla and the latter's wife and children and was treated by the
family as a legitimate son.15 He also claimed that he used the name
"Luigi Revilla" when he entered show business.16 Thus, he filed the
instant petition in order to "avoid confusion," "to show [his] sincere
and genuine desire to associate himself to [Bong Revilla] and to the
Revillas,"17 and to ensure that his records show his true identity as
Bong Revilla's son.18
On June 19, 2017, the RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance and directed that the Order be (1)
published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive
weeks, (2) sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, and the Philippine Statistics Office, 19 and (3) posted
in three public places where petitioner resides. 20
The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed its opposition
and sought the dismissal of the petition claiming that there was no
compelling reason to justify the change sought. 21
The Ruling of the RTC
In its April 30, 2018 Decision,22 the RTC denied the petition and held
that a change of name was not a matter of right and could be
granted only for compelling reasons.23 In the instant case, the RTC
held that petitioner failed to show that there was any valid or
justifiable ground for change of name. In fact, the RTC held that
allowing petitioner to use the surname "Revilla" rather than "Santos"
would create further confusion, given that he had already been
legally adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001.24 As an adopted child, the
RTC held that petitioner was bound to use the surname "Santos" as
adoption legally severs the legal tie between the adoptee and his or
her biological parents.25
The RTC further noted that there was no reason to grant the change
sought, given that petitioner has never legally used the name
"Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in 1996, he has used
the name "Santos" for all documentary purposes since his
adoption,26 and he only began using the surname "Revilla" when he
entered show business. There could thus be no confusion as to his
real identity as the name "Luigi Revilla" was a mere screen name,
which may be different from his legal name.27
The Ruling of the CA
In the Assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and
held that allowing a change of name would create more confusion as
to petitioner's status and filiation given that he had already been
legally adopted by Patrick Santos. It was of no moment therefore
that he is the biological son of Bong Revilla as the Family Code and
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 855228 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
provide that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopting
parents.29
The CA further stated that the corrections sought involved
substantial amendments to petitioner's birth certificate, as allowing a
change in surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would constitute a
change in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." As such, the
CA held that petitioner should have availed himself of the adversarial
proceeding under Rule 108 for cancellation and/or correction of
entries rather than the summary proceeding under Rule 103 for
change of name.30 Further, as petitioner failed to implead both his
biological father and his adoptive father, the CA held that the
proceedings were void under Section 3, Rule 108 for failure to
implead indispensable parties.31
Petitioner thus filed the instant Petition claiming, among others, that
(1) the CA erred in ruling that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies
and that the proceedings were void for failure to implead
indispensable parties,32 and (2) that a change of name from "Santos"
to "Revilla" may be allowed under the law by way of exception to the
mandatory provisions on the use of surnames.33
In its Comment,34 the OSG alleged that the CA did not err (1) in
denying the appeal for petitioner's failure to comply with the
requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court 35 and (2) in ruling
that petitioner has not shown any proper or reasonable cause which
may justify the change of his surname.36
Issues
Whether the CA erred (1) in holding that Rule 108 rather than Rule
103 applies and (2) in denying the petition to change petitioner's
surname from "Santos" to "Revilla".
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has partial merit. Contrary to the position of the CA,
petitioner correctly availed of a Rule 103 proceeding to effect the
desired change. However, the Court agrees with the CA, as well as
the RTC, that petitioner failed to prove that there was any
compelling reason to justify the change sought.
Petitioner
correctly
availed of a
Rule 103  
petition for
change of
name
Republic v. Hernandez37 (Hernandez) discussed the nature of Rule
103 petitions for change of name in this wise:
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with
the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the
regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to
change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring the name to be changed or by some other person in
his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least
three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of
name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and
place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the
Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of
the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that
the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish
a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
xxx
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is
a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified,
and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is
both of personal as well as public interest that every person must
have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or
proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism,
to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family
name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in
the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in
the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once
the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article
376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate:
no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purpose of
identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be
changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change
of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is
the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier
mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem,
impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the
requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a
privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of
the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences
of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons
are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name,
that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth
certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper
and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify
such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as
being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation
or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.38 (Underscoring supplied)
Rule 103 petitions for change of name based on the foregoing
jurisprudential grounds is a separate and distinct remedy from that
provided under Rule 108, which involves cancellations and
corrections of entries in the civil registry.39 The Court explained the
difference between Rule 103 and Rule 108 in Republic v.
Mercadera,40 as follows:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given
name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil
Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special
proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to,
the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person
avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known." When granted, a person's identity and interactions are
affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing
with him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent
fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court
decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which
requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the
State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but
the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely
bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of
one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status.
However, "there could be instances where the change applied for
may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire
certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties
might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in
requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant x x x."
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the
correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to
Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to
"acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before,
only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the
entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. x x x
xxx
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above stated views were adopted
by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided
the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the
clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an
order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a
party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x." "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not
be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying
an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In
short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or
mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution.
xxx
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent,
confusion over the scope and application of [Rule] 103 and Rule 108.
Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by the
corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of
both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to
categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion
that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with
respect to alterations in a person's registered name can effectively
clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful
evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as
a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed
for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103
must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of
one's name under Rule 103 can be granted only on grounds provided
by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must
be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the
person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name.
To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there
must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.
Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled
name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit
Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by
way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other
entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected
using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about
the facts recorded therein."41 (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Notably, the foregoing rules were modified by the enactment of R.A.
9048,42 which amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code and
vested primary jurisdiction over the correction of certain clerical or
typographical errors and changes of first name with the civil
registrar.43 In 2012, R.A. 1017244 expanded the coverage of the
summary administrative procedure provided under R.A. 9048 to
include clerical corrections in the day and/or month in the date of
birth, or in the sex of the person, where it is patently clear that
there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry.45 Presently therefore, when an entry falls within the coverage
of R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A. 10172, a person may only avail of
the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule
108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is first filed
and later denied.46 Failure to comply with the administrative
procedure generally renders the petition dismissible for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to comply with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.47
The Court, in Bartolome v. Republic,48 summarized the rules as
follows:
1. A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct
clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to
change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of birth,
and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear
that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first
file a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding
provided under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172. A person may
only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or
Rule 108 in the aforementioned entries after the petition in the
administrative proceedings is filed and later denied.
2. A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to
change both his or her first name and surname may file a petition
for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential
grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present.
3. A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries
in the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries under Rule 108. As discussed in Lee v. Court of Appeals and
more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan, R.A. 9048 "removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register."49 (Underscoring in the
original; emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner correctly
availed himself of the remedy under Rule 103 in order to change his
surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." Contrary to the findings of the
CA, Rule 108 is inapplicable as petitioner does not allege or identify
any erroneous entry that requires substantial rectification or
cancellation.
It is a threshold principle that the nature of a proceeding is
determined by the allegations in the petition and the ultimate reliefs
sought. In the instant case, it is apparent that petitioner does not
seek to correct any clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate
or to effect any changes in his status as an adopted child of Patrick
Santos.50 As such, neither Rule 108 nor R.A. 9048 as amended
applies. Rather, the petition is unequivocal that petitioner merely
desires to change and replace his surname "Santos" with the
surname "Revilla" in accordance with Hernandez in order to "avoid
confusion,"51 "to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to associate
himself to [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, and to show that
he accepts and embraces his true identity." 52 He alleges that while
he grew up close to his biological father and his family and was
purportedly publicly known as "Bong Revilla's son,"53 "there is
nothing in his name that would associate him and identify him as
one of the Revillas."54 These allegations show that petitioner
ultimately seeks to "alter the 'designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known'" 55 and
not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections. Thus, he properly
availed himself of the procedure prescribed under Rule 103.
In this regard, the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner should
have availed himself of the adversarial proceeding under Rule l 08
instead of the "summary proceeding" under Rule 103 56 as allowing
petitioner to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would
constitute a change in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." 57
First. While a change in status may legally result in a change of
name, such as in marriages, annulments, legitimations, or
adoptions, et al., the reverse is not equally true. In Yu v.
Republic,58 the Court already held that a change of surname under
Rule 103 does not necessarily result in a change of petitioner's
status, i.e., from legitimate to illegitimate, viz.:
x x x [A] change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by
itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or
in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new
family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not
alter one's legal capacity, civil status[,] or citizenship. What is
altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words
by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears
as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large
in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur.
596). x x x
To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for
may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire
certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties
might be erroneously impressed on the public mind. But this is
precisely the purpose of the judicial application to determine
whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of
name. As held by this Court in several cases, in which pertinently
enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow x x x. 59
Indeed, petitioner cannot change his status as an adopted child of
Patrick Santos to an "illegitimate" child of Bong Revilla by the mere
expedient of changing his name as an adoption may only be
rescinded in accordance with law.60 In any event, petitioner was
unequivocal that he does not seek to change his status or to rescind
his adoption:
x x x [H]e is an adoptee of Patrick Santos and an illegitimate son of
Bong Revilla. He seeks to alter his last name from "Santos" to
"Revilla", the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known to avoid
confusion. Changing Luigi's last name from "Santos" to "Revilla" will
not affect his civil status, as the decision in the matter of his
adoption is included and registered in the official record file of OLC-
QC. He does not seek to change his status from legitimate to
illegitimate. Patrick Santos remains to be the named father in his
birth certificate, being his adoptive father. 61 (Underscoring in the
original omitted; underscoring supplied)
Second. Contrary to the statement of the CA, both Rule 108 and
Rule 103 involve substantial matters and require adversarial
proceedings. As explained, "[a] change of one's name under Rule
103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to
justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To
assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must
be adversarial proceedings."62 It is an action in rem which requires
publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State,
through the OSG, and all other interested parties to oppose the
petition.63
In relation thereto, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that
the instant proceedings were void under Section 3,64 Rule 108 as
petitioner failed to implead both his adoptive father and his
biological father as indispensable parties. Notably, while Rule 108
expressly requires that the petitioner implead all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected, no such requirement
appears in Rule 103. The relevant sections provide:
RULE 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTRY

xxx
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
RULE 103
CHANGE OF NAME
xxx
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form
and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at
least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper
of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not he within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the
last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing
and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of
the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name
of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)
Notably, unlike Rule 108, Rule 103 only requires that the order
reciting the purpose of the petition and the date and place of the
hearing be published and that any interested person be allowed to
appear and oppose the petition.65 By virtue of the publication, "all
interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein."66
In sum, the Court holds that petitioner correctly availed himself of a
Rule 103 petition. Further, the failure to implead petitioner's
biological father and adoptive father did not render the proceedings
void as said requirement does not apply to Rule 103.
However, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that petitioner
failed to prove that there is any compelling reason to justify a
change of surname from "Santos" to "Revilla".
There is no
compelling
reason to
grant the
change of
surname
It has long been settled that "the State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification and
that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right x x
x."67 In In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of
Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang 68 (Wang), the others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be
Court held: without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least
at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5)
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court It is imprescriptible."69 (Underscoring supplied)
and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
To emphasize, the surname identifies the family to which a person
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent
belongs. While the first name may be freely selected by the parents
results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
for the child, the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by
making such determination being lodged in the courts.
law.70
xxx
This rule, however, is not absolute. Precisely, Article 376 of the Civil
Code as implemented by Rule 103 is a remedy allowed by way of
A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant
exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use
at this point. We quote, thus:
of surnames.71 To justify a change of name however, a person "must
show not only some proper or compelling reason x x x but also that
"x x x For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name." 72 The
designation by which he is known and called in the community in
following have been considered as valid grounds for change of
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
name: "(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or
public interest."73
proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper
name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, there can be no
distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is
question that petitioner, as the legally adopted child of Patrick
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
Santos, properly bears the surname "Santos". Notably, the Civil
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
Code provides:
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled
is fixed by law.
TITLE XIII
Use of Surnames (n)
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is
absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally
use the surname of the father.
ARTICLE 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. (Underscoring supplied)
Consistent therewith, Article 189 of the Family Code states that "the
adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopter."74 The Family Code
provisions on Adoption were superseded by R.A. 8552,75 which now
provides:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological
parent is the spouse .of the adopter, all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same
shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
(Underscoring supplied)
R.A. 8552 likewise states that upon adoption, "[a]n amended
certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required
by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the
child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her
surname."76 As held therefore in Republic v. Court of Appeals,77 it
may be inferred from the very wording of the law "that the use of
the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both
an obligation and a right."78 Upon issuance of the decree of adoption,
the change of the adoptee's surname shall follow that of the adopter
as a natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption, even
if not specifically prayed for.79
Although properly surnamed "Santos", petitioner prays that he be
allowed to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" to "avoid
confusion, x x x to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to
associate himself to [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, x x x to
show that he accepts and embraces his true identity," 80 and "to show
his true and genuine love to his biological father." 81 Unfortunately,
none of these reasons justify, in law, the desired change.
First. The Court agrees with the RTC that the use of the surname
"Revilla" would create further confusion rather than avoid it, given
that: (1) petitioner has never legally used the name "Revilla" despite
having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was legally adopted by
Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name "Santos" for all
documentary purposes since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly
known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by his peers as
"Luigi Santos"; (5) even after a change of surname, Patrick Santos
shall continue to be the father named in his birth certificate; and (5)
he only began using the surname "Revilla" when he entered show
business.82 The following factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, are binding on the Court:
"In the case at bar, the only reason advanced for the dropping of his
surname Santos to Revilla is to show his lineage and identity as
Revilla. However, the compelling reason how such change of name is
necessary to show his lineage as a Revilla is not clearly established.
As petitioner himself and his witnesses testified, he has been a (sic)
known as the son of Bong Revilla all his life and yet never used the
surname despite being acknowledged by his biological father in
1996. As testified on by his mother, it was never a secret that he
was (sic) the son of Bong Revilla, everybody knew he was (sic) a
Revilla. All of his mother's family, friends, co-parent in school know
him as Luigi Santos, son of Bong Revilla. He has been using Santos
since his adoption until college, then he started doing teleserye in
GMA that was when he started using Revilla. The other witness,
Bryan Revilla, even testified that petitioner has always been using
Santos for documentary purposes up to the present and it was only
when he entered show business that petitioner started using Revilla.
He also testified that petitioner is loved by both his parents, Bong
Revilla and Lani Mercado and that they always treat petitioner as
their brother. Hence, it is clear that the perceived confusion came
about when petitioner entered show business and started using the
surname Revilla as his screen name. From then on, he would
introduce himself as Luigi Revilla. And as testified on by petitioner,
not being able to use the surname Revilla makes him incomplete, he
however admitted that even if he use[s] the surname Santos, there
would be no confusion.
xxx
"There is no question that petitioner may file the instant petition, but
change of name is a privilege and not a right. And as such, he must
show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. In the case at hand, although petitioner did
not deny his legitimacy, he failed to show proper and reasonable
cause to justify the change sought or any compelling reason which
may justify the change. A petitioner's convenience can never be a
ground for a change of name x x x. Convenience cannot be
considered as one of, or a recognized ground for change of name." 83
Indeed, these factual circumstances starkly differ from meritorious
petitions for change of name where it was alleged and proved that
petitioners publicly used their requested names in legal documents
and/or school records since childhood and that a change would
indeed avoid confusion, among other reasons.84
Second. While petitioner may factually identify and associate with his
biological father and his family, he remains to be the legitimate son
of Patrick Santos by virtue of the adoption. The latter and not the
former is thus his true legal identity. It bears reiterating that
adoption:
x x x (1) sever[s] all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem[s] the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give[s] adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of
a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and
the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.85 (Underscoring supplied)
As adoption severs all legal ties between the adoptee and his or her
biological parents, there is no basis to allow petitioner to change his
name to "Revilla" simply because he is, biologically, the son of Bong
Revilla and wants to associate himself with the Revilla family.
Finally, it bears emphasis that a change of name is a privilege and
not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. In Wang, the Court denied a petition to drop a minor's middle
name, even though the middle name would purportedly cause the
minor undue embarrassment and become an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. 86 The
Court noted that the only reason advanced by petitioner therein for
the dropping of his middle name was convenience and found this
justification to be amorphous and unmeritorious.87 Similarly, in Yu
Chi Han v. Republic88 (Yu Chi Han), petitioner sought to change his
name from "Yu Chi Han" to "Alejandro Go Yu," because he wanted to
avoid confusion and to embrace the Catholic faith after he was
baptized in accordance with Catholic rites. The Court denied the
petition and held that the confusion was mainly due to petitioner's
unauthorized use of a name other than his true name, which could
be easily remedied by simply asking his friends and business
associates to call him by his true name. 89
In the instant case, the Court finds that the reasons proffered do not
fall under any of the jurisprudential grounds for change of name.
They cannot even be considered as "akin to" any of the
aforementioned grounds. The mere fact that petitioner began using
a different name, i.e., "Luigi Revilla", when he joined show business
does not constitute a proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize a change of name.90 As in Yu Chi Han, any confusion
created by the use of said name is mainly due to the unauthorized
use of a name other than petitioner's true legal name. As in Wang,
convenience is not a recognized ground for change of name, which
may be allowed only for compelling reasons that must be alleged
and proved.91
The Court is aware that it has previously allowed an adopted child
named "Maximo Wong" to revert to "Maximo Alcala, Jr.," his name
prior to his adoption, even though the adoption was never rescinded.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong92 (Wong), the
Court held:
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil
Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of
the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change
of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than
the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a
status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by
which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been
defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son
or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and
privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive
parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The
welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination
of an application for adoption. On this part, there is unanimous
agreement.
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the
natural parents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's
person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal
consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same
manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in
lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions
as may be by statute imposed. More specifically under the present
state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
on the matter, relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
issue involved in this case:
"Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;" (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the
change of name would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of
the Civil Code and the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic that "one should
not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not permitted
to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to other
persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame
excuses.
While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and
concern, we find the same to be unfounded. We do not believe that
by reverting to his old name, private respondent would then be
using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law
prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does
not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other
surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the
requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its
conclusion, then there will never be any possibility or occasion for
any person, regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the
supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of
surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have
been the intendment of the law.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law
only by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil
Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surnames that may
be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed
only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound
discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may
avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify all
natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may,
under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition
the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or
logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an
adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much
less can it bar resort, to Rule 103. 93 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
While the Court agrees that any person, whether legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted, may petition the court for change of name
for compelling reasons,94 the factual circumstances in Wong wholly
differ from the case at bar.
In Wong, petitioner alleged and proved that he was severely
prejudiced by the use of the surname "Wong," which embarrassed
and isolated him from friends and relatives in view of a suggested
Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community. He alleged and proved that the continued use of
said surname hampered his business and social life,95viz.:
"The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
provide his best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In
granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-
22712, Nov. 25, 1965; Nacionales vs. Republic, L-18067, April 29,
1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843). In the present case, We
believe that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously
when it granted the petition.
"From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother
Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to
file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment
and ridicule his family name 'Wong' brings in his dealings with his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a
Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social
and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice
to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause
for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que
Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074).
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social
standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
injury to the interest of the State or of other persons (Calderon vs.
Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this
case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
other persons would result in the change of petitioner's
name.96 (Underscoring supplied)
No similar compelling reason was alleged nor proved in this case. A
sincere desire to associate oneself to a certain person or family,
without more, does not justify a change of surname. In view of the
foregoing, the Petition must be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
petition for change of name in Spec. Proc. No. R-QZN-17-04454
is DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.