Middendrop - Left-Right and The Libertarianism-Authoritarianism Dimensions

Models for Predicting the Dutch Vote along the Left-Right and the Libertarianism-
Authoritarianism Dimensions
Author(s): Cees P. Middendorp
Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.
10, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 279-308
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601076
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PoliticalScienceReview(1989), Vol. 10, No. 4, 279-308
International
Models for Predicting the Dutch Vote

along the Left-Right and the
Libertarianism-Authoritarianism Dimensions
CEES P. MIDDENDORP
ABSTRACT. There are two "fundamental dimensions of ideological contro-

versy" in The Netherlands which are stable through the period 1970-85:
socio-economic left-right, with egalitarian implications, and
libertarianism-authoritarianism with the underlying value of freedom. Both
dimensions are "belief systems" based on highly interrelated attitude scales,
and both are "sustained" by stable philosophical dimensions: socialism and
liberalism for the left-right dimension, conservatism and authoritarianism
for the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. The ordering of political
parties by means of average scores of their supporters is different on each
dimension. Then, obviously, two sets of causal models can be developed,
with party preference along each dimension as the dependent variable. The
models developed in this study contain social characteristics (age,
education, income, class and religion), philosophical dimensions, ideologi-
cal dimensions and, in addition, left-right and progressive-conservative
self-identifications. The left-right vote is best predicted by left-right self-
identification followed by a mixture of other determinants of about equal
strength: left-right ideological position, socialism, liberalism, conservatism,
religion, social class and income. The authoritarian vote is predominantly
determined by religion, followed at some distance by left-right self-
identification, libertarian-authoritarian ideology, conservatism, socialism,
left-right ideological position and social class. Income and liberalism do
not play an important role here. Age and educational level have negligible
effects as predictors of either vote. The role of ideology as a determinant of
the vote in a European context is contrasted with American evidence and
the content validity of ideological self-identification in terms of left-right is
questioned.
It has been consistently shown in the past two decades that the "ideological space"
in which the Dutch electorate can be positioned is two-dimensional,'which implies that
Dutch voters, once so positioned by means of average scores by party supporters on
the two dimensions, can be ordered in two different ways. Thus, to predict the Dutch
vote by means of causal models, we have the choice of two possible orderings of the
0192-5121/89/04 0279-30 $03.00 ? 1989 International Political Science Association
280 Modelsfor PredictingtheDutchVote
supporters of the parties. Each ideological dimension can, separately or combined,

be considered a predictor of the vote. When the parties, on the basis of mean scores
of their voters, are ordered along one dimension, this particularideological dimension
will, of course, predict the vote best, but since the two dimensions (left-right and
libertarian-authoritarian) are positively related andsince the two party-orderingsare
strongly related (see below), each ideological dimension has a particular predictive
effect on the vote-whatever the dimension along which the supportersof the parties
are ordered.
Each ideological dimension is sustained by or rooted in a more abstract
philosophical basis. It has been shown that these philosophical roots of the two
ideological dimensions also show a stable structure, which is four-dimensional.They
can be seen as fundamental (causal) to the ideological stands of Dutch voters.2
It is assumed in the causal models dealt with in this article that the background
of ideological stands is formed by the electorate's social characteristics, such as its
educational level, age, income, social class and religion. The philosophical and
ideological variables interpretthe effects of social characteristics and add explained
variance. In addition, I consider the predicting effect on the vote of ideological self-
identification of voters in terms of left-right and progressive-conservative. It seems
to me that how people consider themselves is dependent on their actual ideological
stands (rather than vice versa), but that self-identificationsmay play an additional
predictive role in voting behavior.
In summary, I develop causal models in order to predict the Dutch vote in which
social background variables are considered determinants of "philosophical stands"
backing up ideological orientations as defined in substantial ("belief system") terms.
Finally, ideological self-identificationsare introduced as additional predictors of the
vote. The central theme of this article is that, in such causal models, the answer to
the question of which factors predict the vote best is dependent on the criterion
(ideological dimension) according to which the supportersof the parties are ordered.
As mentioned above, there are two basic criteria along which parties can be ordered,
each of which yields its own set of major predictors of that vote. Left-right self-
identification seems to play a double role in this: as shown below, it is related to both
substantial ideological dimensions.
First, I outline the way in which the Dutch ideological space has been
conceptualized; then I rank-orderthe supportersof the parties along each dimension
and investigate their determinants in causal models.
The Two-Dimensional Ideological Space of the Dutch Electorate

A brief visit to the American scene seems a good place to begin. Although the concept
of "ideology" has been dealt with firmly and fruitfullyin the United States,4 its role
as a determinant of the vote has hardly been considered seriously by researchers
dealing with election studies. As is well known, there are basically two traditions in
American voting studies: one is that of the Columbia School, which relates voting to
social characteristics such as social class, income, religion and region; the other is
that of the Michigan School, with its emphasis on party identification, issues and
candidates. It is within the tradition of this school that issues rather than ideology
(belief systems) were taken up as determinants of the vote, since Converse (1964)
CEES P. MIDDENDORP 281
showed that the electorate in the United States did not hold consistent issue stands
in terms of a liberal-conservative dimension.5
Even though Nie (1974) later showed that consistency in issue positions along a
liberal-conservative dimension had to an appreciable extent emerged during the
1960s,6 the liberal-conservative dimension as an ideological determinant of the vote
remained of minor importance in American election studies, probably because the
two major American parties are not consistently and sharply opposed to each other
ideologically.7
In The Netherlands, and in Western Europe generally, the situation is quite
different. There are usually more than two parties which are divided ideologically to
a large extent, as indicated by their very nomenclature. In Western Europe, most
political parties are labeled either socialist (or social-democratic), liberal, conserva-
tive or Christian Democratic, with radical parties (Communists for example) on the
extreme left and sometimes fascists or other such groups operating under various
names on the right (as in Italy).8 The political culture offers Western European
electorates an ideological frame of reference which is much more varied and broader
than in the United States. Hence these electorates may be more capable than the
American electorate of organizing their beliefs along consistent ideological lines. That
the Dutch electorate can do so has been shown in a series of studies between 1970
and 1985. I report briefly on the design of these studies, and then present some results
based on the most recent data.9
Theoretical Framework: The Conceptual Model

The original study aimed at conceptualizing the so-called "progressive-
conservative"antithesis. This antithesis was considered to be ideological, that is, one
involving a system of general ideas about man and society, centered on one or a few
fundamental values and manifested historically as a doctrine adhered to by, because
reflecting the interests of, particular groups and/or social categories, specifically
social classes.10 From this perspective, applying it to the Western European scene,
it was clear from the start that only conservatismcould be defined in those terms as
an ideology. 1
An ideal-type conceptual model of conservative philosophy was designed, based
on an extensive analysis of the literature. The model is a hierarchical, loosely knit
network of expressions involving general views about the nature of man, the nature
of society, the general relationship between man and society, on the implementation
of social change, the family, on authority and democracy, on social classes and private
property, and on the general role of government, in particular in the socio-economic
realm.12
The Basic PhilosophicalDimensions

The conceptual model was firstly operationalized in a directway: 25 parts of the model
were directly translated into bipolar statements, one pole representing the conserva-
tive point of view, one the progressive point of view (cf. Berkowitz and Wolkon, 1964).
In the four surveys mentioned above, based on large representative samples from
the Dutch electorate, carried out in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 (see note 9), these 25
items formed a stable four-dimensional structure in terms of orthogonally and
282 Modelsfor PredictingtheDutch Vote
Table 1. Structure
of thePhilosophical
Domain,1985"
Variablenames,left-handpoleb Gen. Auth. Lib. Socialism

Cons. Cons.
246C The customs and traditions of society are of 0.61d

indispensable value to mankind.
247 The maintenance of law and order is essential 0.69
to the sound development of society.
268 When a social institution has been in existence 0.57
over a long period of time, it is probably of
value to mankind.
267 By living according to the customs and 0.64
traditions of society, man is best able to fully
develop himself.
248 Social change should be introduced only when 0.64
proven to be necessary.
250 Social change should above all aim at restoring 0.64
the past heritage, some of which has been lost
in modern times.
249 When implementing social change, one should 0.44
above all be guided by the lessons of history.
263 All social groups can live together in harmony 0.42 0.39
without having to change social relations.
253 Human needs are generally best satisfied in a 0.41 0.37
capitalist society.
269 The origin of most social abuses, such as war 0.36
and poverty, lies mainly in human nature.
270 The organization of society is far too complex 0.67
to be improved upon by man and his ideas.
265 It is necessary that a small group of able men 0.40 0.64
exercise authority in order to realize a sound
society.
266 Complete democracy is impossible because 0.63
people have such varying abilities.
257 From an economic point of view the existing 0.44 0.45
social relations are inevitable.
254 A great deal of government interferencecan 0.70
only lead to bureaucracy and economic
stagnation.
255 Private enterprise is essential to economic 0.77
growth.
252 If freedom of enterprise is resticted, other 0.60
freedoms will also disappear.
Table 1. (cont.)
Variablenames,left-handpoleb Gen. Auth. Lib. Socialism

Cons. Cons.
258 Government care from the cradle to the grave 0.42 0.60
leads to a slack way of life.
259 Most people are only prepared to exert 0.37 0.45
themselves when this results in a higher salary.
260 Existing social differences between people are 0.72
caused mainly by unequal opportunities for
self-improvement.
264 The freedom of many people is limited by 0.65
existing authority.
261 The existence of social classes is unjust. 0.68
262 The most important social antagonism is still 0.65
that between the social classes.
256 In a society based on private enterprise, usually 0.47
insufficient attention is paid to necessary public
services.
251 A better society can be realized only through 0.34
radical change of the present social structure.
aObliquefactor structurein SPSSX-PA1.Explainedvarianceis 41.1 percent.Correlationsbetween

factorsare:
2 3 4
1 0.29 0.28 -0.22
2 0.23 -0.01
3 -0.17
Bothconservativefactorsand liberalismarepositivelyassociated,thoughnot veryhighly(thesamefactors
appearin an orthogonalvarimax-rotation); thesefactorsare associatednegativelywith socialism,except
for authoritarianconservatism(-0.01).
bThe items are bipolarin order to give people additionalinformationper response(becauseof the
complicatednatureof the items)andin an attemptto preventresponseset whichis likelyto emergein case
of "difficult"items.Fortheformulations of the anti-conservative,
anti-liberalandanti-socialistpolesof the
items, see Middendorp(1978a: 162-6). For the formulationsof the items in Dutch, see Middendorp
(1978b:196-9).
'Positionof the item in orderof presentation(variablenumber);the Englishtranslationof the original
Dutch variesslightlyfromthat given in previouspublications.
dGenerallyonly loadingsof 0.35 or higherare presentedin the table (the exceptionis item 251). The
completesets of loadingsare availableupon requestfromthe author.
obliquely rotated factors. The oblique factor structure for the latest survey (1985) is
shown in Table 1. (The actual bipolar items are represented there by means of their
left-hand pole.)
The first factor is called general conservatism:on the conservative side there are items
on the value of traditions and customs, law and order, long-established institutions,
and a particularly prudent orientation towards conscious social change.
The second factor splits off from the first one and is called authoritarian
conservatism:
items on authority to be carried out by an elite, the impossibility of having both full
democracy and fundamental social improvement.
The third factor is called liberalismin terms of the classical economic variety:
freedom for free enterprise and opposition to government interference.13
The fourth factor is called socialism,with items on inequality of opportunity,
opposition to authority, the injustice of the existence of social classes and opposition
to free enterprise.
This four-dimensional philosophical structure-the four factors being slightly
related to each other'4-is the theoretical foundation for the basic two-dimensional
ideological structure of political attitudes in the Dutch electorate, presented below.
A stable structure such as that presented in Table 1 must come as a surprise to
many American scholars involved in work on belief systems and ideology. The Dutch
electorate may not be capable of integrating its abstract beliefs on man and society
in oneprogressive-conservative antithesis,15which was the theoretical starting-point
of the research project, but obviously it is capable of organizing its beliefs along the
lines of the major ideological/philosophical orientations manifested in this country
and Western Europe generally. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine how
this multidimensionalintegration of abstract beliefs can come about in the electorate,
but it certainly provides the philosophical foundation for the more parsimonioustwo-
dimensional ideological structure to which I now turn.16
The Two FundamentalDimensionsof Ideological Controversy

Analysis of the theoretical model described above (conservatism as an ideology)
yielded two basic values underlying many model elements, as well as two spheres to
which these values could and should be applied.17Application of the value of equality
to the socio-economic sphere formed the starting-point for selection of a broad set of
attitudes reflecting this value application, involving the means to reach the goal of
greater socio-economic equality: government policies. Eleven attitude scales were
designed to measure the realm, such as: attitude towards social welfare, attitude
towards government aid to education, government income policies, tax policies,
direct government interference and militant trade unions.
Application of the value of freedom to the non-economic sphere yielded another
ten attitude scales in the political and semi-political realms, such as: towards "having
a say" by people in particular institutions and local community affairs, freedom of
political expression, aid to developing countries, internationalist orientation, family
relations, including abortion and euthanasia, child-rearing practices and male-
female roles, as well as tolerance towards particular minority groups, such as
homosexuals.18
The two sets of attitudes-together with the four philosophical dimensions and a
short F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950)-were submitted to factor analyses at the four
points in time mentioned above. Again, I report here only on the latest survey (1985),
which is typical for the other years as well (the structure is stable for the last 15-20
years). The results are presented in Table 2. The Dutch electorate shows a consistent
and stable two-dimensional ideological structure. There are clearly two sets of
integrated attitudes which are only slightly correlated.19
CEESP. MIDDENDORP 285
Table 2. Structure
of theIdeologicalDomain,1985a
Scalenamesb Left- Libertarian-

Right Authoritarianc
1. Attitude towards equality of income, property, status. 0.73

2. Attitude towards government interference for equality of 0.71
income and property.
3. Attitude towards social legislation. 0.49
4. Attitude towards government aid to education. 0.53
5. Attitude towards government income policies. 0.73
6. Attitude towards government tax policies for higher 0.57
income groups.
7. Attitude towards government tax policies for lower 0.39
income groups
8. Attitude towards direct government interference in the 0.54
economy.
9. Attitude towards militant trade union policies. 0.56
10. Attitude towards non-economic government 0.37 0.42
interference.
11. Attitude towards "having a say"; democratization at 0.57 0.44
institutional and local government levels.
12. Attitude towards freedom of political expression. 0.66
13. Attitude towards aid to developing countries. 0.55
14. Internationalism versus nationalism. 0.62
15. Tolerance towards criminals. 0.44
16. Family traditionalism.d 0.52
17. Authoritarianism in relations between parents and 0.74
children
18. Conventionalism regarding male-female roles. 0.54
19. Tolerance towards homosexuals. 0.51
aOblique factor structure in SPSSX-PA1: explained variance is 35.2 percent; correlation between factors
is 0.19; only loadings of 0.35 or higher are given in the table.
bAll scales are constructed according to Mokken's (1971) method. Details about cutting points,
difficulties, items used and their exact formulation, as well as about the handling of missing data are
available upon request (see also Middendrop, 1978a, 1978b). The English translation of the original Dutch
questions varies slightly from that of previous publications.
CSocialism loads highly on the left-right dimension, positively;liberalism does so negatively.Both
conservatism dimensions plus a short version of the F-scale load positively on libertarianism-
authoritarianism (these factorial solutions are available on request). The ideological dimensions have been
measured only on the basis of added weighted scores for the attitude scales, with a slight overlap: scales 10
and 11 are in both measurements. Thus, there are 11 scales and 34 items in the left-right dimensions, and
10 scales and 39 items in the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. Weighting of the scale scores was on the
basis of factor loading (average over 15 years) and standard deviation of the scale scores (idem).
Correlation between measured factors is 0.34.
dScores for "Family traditionalism," "Authoritarian parent-child relationship" and "Conventionalism
regarding male-female roles" have been reversed. Family traditionalism includes items on abortion,
euthanasia, kindergartens, and birth control and divorce.
One set centers around the value of equality in the socio-economic realm, brought
about by means of government policies, supported by socialist ideas and opposed by
liberal philosophy-this is called the socio-economic left-right dimension.
The second factor represents a traditionalist-conservative orientation versus what
might be called libertarianism, with consistent loadings for both conservative
philosophical dimensions mentioned above and a high loading for the short F-scale.
Since this scale has the highest positive loading, together with "authoritarian parent-
child relations," the dimension might be considered one of authoritarianism
(involving a positive attitude towards authority and traditional ways of life, including
nationalism, and a punitive attitude towards deviant minorities and opposition to
freedom of political expression) versus libertarianism. (Note that the scale on "having
a say" in the workplace, schools and the local community is more strongly associated
with egalitarian left-right attitudes than with libertarian-authoritarian ones.)20
These results are not only at variance with those of Converse (1964) and Nie
(1974), as mentioned above, but also with those of other researchers on the structure
of mass belief systems, such as Eysenck (1954, 1971) and Kerlinger (1967, 1984).
Eysenck (1954) found a two-dimensional structure, one dimension being labeled
"radicalism-conservatism," the other "tough-tendermindedness." Eysenck's results
are hardly comparable to the findings reported here, because they lack rationales for
item selection, the sampling of universes, analytical procedures and measurements
(see Middendorp, 1978a: 67-71). Kerlinger (1967, 1984) consistently finds two
dimensions labeled "liberal" (in the American sense) and "conservative." He makes
no distinction between economic and non-economic liberalism-conservatism and
relates his results to the "ideological superstructure" of American political culture.
The average citizen is not capable of integrating his ideas along bothdimensions. He
chooses one along which his ideas can consistently be ordered (either a positive or
negative attitude); his responses to the stimuli in the other set of attitudes are
essentially random. Hence, two dimensions emerge: a liberal one and a conservative
one.
In the present study there is a clear distinction between socio-economic egalitarian
attitudes-with a prominent role for government-and non-economic libertarian
attitudes, both sustained by their "philosophical" underpinnings. Both dimensions
are stable and valid, according to mean positions of supporters of the various parties
on them.
Implications of the Two-dimensional Ideological Space of the Dutch

Electorate
From a unidimensional progressive-conservative perspective, relatively many people
are obviously "progressive" in one sense (e.g. left-wing socio-economically) but not
in the other sense (e.g. libertarian in a non-economic way) and vice versa. This
finding must have implications for the positions of particular groups and categories
within the ideological space. If the two-dimensionality is politically meaningful, then
we must be capable of locating major groups which have progressive positions (on
average) in one sense (e.g. libertarian) but conservative ones (e.g. right-wing) in the
other sense, and vice versa.
That the major Dutch political parties, as assessed on the basis of the average
positions of their supporters, are not ordered in the same manner along the two
0
P GPV
SGP
(Calvinist
fundamentalists)
Christian-Democrat
LabourI
(PvdA)
Liberals
(VVD)
Communists 0 Democrats 66
(CPN) (D66)
(PPR) I
(Small left-wing) /
a /Libertarian
Pacifist socialists
(PSP)
Figure 1. Mean Scoresfor Party Adherentsin the Two-Dimensional Spaceof the
DutchElectoratein 1985 (U is a major party; D is a smaller party).
ideological dimensions is shown in Figure 1.21 The small left-wing and right-wing
parties (Communists, Pacifistic Socialists and Radicals on the left, religious
fundamentalists on the right) are progressive and conservative in both the socio-
economic left-right sense and the libertarian-authoritarian sense. However, the
Democrats, who are only moderately left-wing compared to the Labour party, are
more libertarian than that party (again, in terms of mean scores of voters). In
particular, the Liberal party (VVD) in The Netherlands is relatively right-wing
socio-economically (more so than the Christian Democrats), but at the same time its
voters are generally less authoritarian than the Christian Democrats.
The major parties (Labour, Christian Democrats and Liberals) can be disting-
uished from one another (in this order) along the left-right socio-economic
dimension; at the same time it can be seen that their ordering along the other
dimension (libertarian-authoritarian) is different, running from Labour via Liberal
to Christian Democrat. This means that the libertarian-authoritarian dimension
forms an alternative and an additional possibility for predicting the Dutch vote in
terms of causal models.
How well we can predict the vote and which factors will prove to be its best
predictors will depend on how the parties are ordered. We see later how well the vote
can thus be predicted when the parties are ordered along the left-right dimension
as compared to the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, and which factors are the
best predictors of the vote in both instances.
Table 3. Relationsbetween Variables,
Background Ideological andVotingBehaviorin theDutch
Dimensions
Electorate,1985a
2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Subjective Social Class (SES) 0.08 0.35 -0.13 0.22 0.33 0.13
2. Religious involvement (church 0.22 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.50
attendance)
3. Left-right ideological position 0.34 0.49 0.58 0.44
4. Libertarian-authoritarian ideological 0.47 0.40 0.50
position
5. Left-right self-identification 0.69 0.60
6. Vote intention ordered along the 0.79
left-right dimension
7. Vote intention ordered along the
libertarian-authoritarian dimension
aCorrelationsare product moment (Pearson) correlations.Vote intention along the left-right dimension
is as follows:
(1) (extreme left-wing), PSP (Pacifist Socialists), CPN (Communists) and PPR (Radicals, originatingfrom
religious background);(2) Democrats ("ProgressiveLiberals");PvdA (Labour Party); (4) CDA (Christian
Democrats); (5) VVD (Liberals); (6) SGP, GPV (FundamentalistCalvinist Religious). Ordering is based
upon mean scores of party supporters over the 15-year period under study. Voting intention along the
libertarian-authoritarian dimension, on the same basis, includes a reversal of the positions of Christian
Democrats and the Liberals and a reversal of the positions of the Labour party vis-a-vis the Democrats.
Still, as can be seen in the table, the correlationbetween the two orderings remains very high (0.79). Note
the high correlations between left-right ideological identification and both ideological "position"
dimensions (0.49 and 0.47, respectively) and the high correlation of this variable to both orderings of the
vote (0.69 and 0.60, respectively). Moreover, it is positively and relativelystrongly related to both class and
religion (0.22 and 0.35, respectively). Correlations available from the author.
The two major ideological dimensions are moderately positively related to each
other when measured, as they are here, by weighted added scores (r = 0.34); the
factors in oblique rotation are more weakly related (0.19). Relations between the
major variables included in the models are presented in Table 3.22
Left-right ideological position is most strongly related to voting along the left-
right dimension (r = 0.58) and libertarianism-authoritarianism most strongly to
voting along that dimension (r = 0.50); that should not surprise us. But due to the
fact that (a) both ideological dimensions are correlated (0.34) and (b) both voting
patterns are strongly related (0.79), both ideological dimensions also determine the
vote, to some extent, when parties are ordered along the "other" dimension. Left-
right is also a predictor of the libertarian-authoritarian vote (r = 0.44) and
authoritarianism predicts the left-right vote to some appreciable extent (r = 0.40).
This legitimizes the inclusion of both ideological dimensions in models predicting the
vote as ordered along each dimension. As regards left-right self-identification, Table
3 shows that it is more strongly related to religion (0.35) than to social class (0.22),
as strongly related to left-right ideological position (0.49) as to libertarianism-
authoritarianism (0.47), but more strongly related to left-right voting than to
authoritarian voting (0.69 vs. 0.60). This pattern is remarkable since religion is more
GEES P. MIDDENDORP 289
strongly related to the authoritarian vote than to the left-right vote (0.50 vs. 0.36).
This seems to imply that left-right self-identification strongly interprets the effect of
religion on the left-right vote. (I return to the meaning of left-right self-identification
later.)
Causal Models Explaining the Dutch Vote along the Two Ideological
Dimensions
The models are dealt with as follows.23 First, I show to what extent voting can be
predicted in terms of a number of social characteristics of the electorate: alongside
subjective class and religion, educational level, age and income are included in the
analysis.
Second, I show to what extent the vote can be predicted in terms of voters'
positions along ideological dimensions and along dimensions representing the
philosophical "background" of ideological dimensions, that is, socialism, liberalism
and two conservatisms.
Third, both models are integrated, and I show to what extent the vote (parties
ordered along either of the two ideological dimensions) can be predicted from social
characteristics of the electorate "through" the philosophical backing of ideological
dimensions and the ideological dimensions themselves.
Finally, I discuss an additional predictor of the vote in The Netherlands, namely
left-right ideological self-identification, and contrast its effect on voting and its
operating as an interpreting variable to that of progressive-conservative self-
identification.
and Voting
Social Characteristics
As shown in Figure 1, the left-right vote means that the parties are ordered from left
to right as follows: (1) small left-wing parties (CPN, PSP, PPR), (2) Labour party,
(3) Democrats, (4) Christian Democrats, (5) Liberals, (6) small fundamentalist
religious parties. For the libertarian-authoritarian vote, the order is (1) small left-
wing parties, (2) Democrats, (3) Labour Party, (4) Liberals, (5) Christian
Democrats, (6) small religious fundamentalist parties (see also Table 3, note 1).
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show two models which explain the vote in terms of social
characteristics: educational level and age as external variables, subjective class and
income and religion as interpreting variables.24For 1985, 24 percent of the left-right
vote can be explained by social characteristics. Religion, income and class all have
about the same total effect on voting: religion has the strongest direct effect-slightly
more than social class, which has an effect through religion as well. Thus, even in
terms of the left-right vote, religion has a dominant effect as a determinant of the
vote.
It should not be surprising, then, that religion has by far the strongest effect on
the libertarian-authoritarian vote, class and income lagging far behind. The
libertarian-authoritarian vote can be explained a little better than the left-right vote
(28 percent of the variance explained). Educational level and age have negligible
effects on voting generally: whether the vote is according to the left-right criterion
or along libertarianism-authoritarianism.
290 Models for Predicting the Dutch Vote
Subjective
0.38 socialclass
(SES)
Educational
level 0.2296 10.41
~-0.25
J-0.25 "^ \ ~ Income
Income,. Left-Right
0.15 vote
Age 033
^-
\-0.10 Religious
iinvolvement
0.1>8- (religion)
Explainedvariance = 24%. x2= 5.03, d.f. 3, p = 0.17 .

Total effects:
Educationallevel= 0.09
Age = 0.08
SES= 0.31
Income= 0.28
Religion= 0.33
Figure 2.1. Social Characteristicsas Determinants of the Left-Right Vote, 1985.
Subjective
8 socialclass
0.3- (SES)
Educational
level ~ -- 0.41
0.29
-0.25 Libertarian-
Incoe -0.7
Authoritarian
vote
Age \
^^^>_ \o.0.14 /
?o\10 Religious
018 - involvement
(religion)
Explainedvariance=28%..x? = 6.08, d.f.= 3, p =0.11
Totaleffects:
Educationallevel = -0.10
Age = -0.10
SES 0.22
Income= 0.14
Religion= 0.47
Figure 2.2. Social Characteristicsas Determinants of the Authoritarian-Libertarian Vote, 1985.
Philosophies, Ideologies and Voting

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent two models in which the four philosophical dimensions
(socialism, liberalism, conservatism and authoritarian conservatism) and left-right
and libertarianism-authoritarianism are used to predict the vote along the two
GEES P. MIDDENDORP 291
0.16-- - Left-Rightvote
0.11 t
General
n
Authoritarian
/
conservatism
Explained variance 44% x2 =6.25, d.f. = 7,p=0.10.
Totaleffects:
Socialism= 0.35 Left-Right ideological position = 0.39
Liberalism= 0.27 Libertairian-Authoritarian ideologicalposition= 0.14
Generalconservatism= 0.16
conservatism= 0.06
Authoritarian
andIdeologicalDeterminants
Figure 3.1. Philosophical of theLeft-RightVote,1985.
Note. Not shown in figure: Y2X4=0.08. For correlations between independent

variables see Table 1, note b. Alternative models with reversed or reciprocal relations
between left-right ideological position and authoritarianism-libertarianism are
possible and available on request. See text for a rationale of the choice for this model.
Socialism
-0 38
Left-Right ---0.11..
Liberalism ' 2 ideological--_._r_a
0.29 position 024 bertarian-
0.16 A 0.16 0.18 Authoritarian
_ \l vote
i 20
General 0.33 Libertarian-
conservatism 0 Authoritarian
0.23
ideological
position
Authoritarian
conservatism
Explainedvariance=37%/o = 10.19, d.f. = 5
Totaleffects:
Socialism= 0.27 Left-Rightideological position= 0.24
Liberalism 0.07 Libertarian-Authoritarianideologicalposition= 0.34
Generalconservatism= 0.29
Authoritarianconservatism 0.08
Figure 3.2. Philosophical and Ideological Determinants of the
Vote,1985. (See note to Figure 3.1.)
Authoritarian-Libertarian
ideological dimensions. Not surprisingly, left-right ideology, socialism and liberal-

ism, in that order, predict the left-right vote best in 1985; much better than social
characteristics(see Figure 2.1). Conservatism (in particular,authoritarianconservat-
ism) plays a minor role in predicting the left-right vote, as does authoritarianism.
In total, 44 percent of the variance is explained.
The philosophies and the two ideologies explain the libertarian-authoritarianvote
less well: 37 percent is explained mainly by libertarianism-authoritarianism,
conservatism and socialism and left-right ideology. The effect of liberalism is
negligible. Authoritarian conservatism plays only a minor role.
Thus, philosophies and ideologies explain the left-right vote better than the
libertarian-authoritarian vote, although left-right ideology and socialism help to
explain the libertarian-authoritarian vote more than conservatism and authorita-
rianism help to explain the left-right vote.25 It should be noted that socialism and
liberalism continue to have directeffects on the left-right vote; not all their effects on
the vote go through left-right ideology. The same applies to conservatismregarding
the authoritarianvote: only a relatively small part of the total effect on the vote goes
through the ideological libertarian-authoritarian dimension. Abstract philosophies
prove to be substantial determinantsof the vote; their effectsare predominantlydirect
in nature. The effect of the major philosophies on the vote is interpreted for about
40-50 percent by ideology.
Already we can see emerging differential patterns of determinants and causal
chains for the vote ordered along the two ideological lines. Religion, class and income
are determinants of similar strength of the left-right vote, but religion is by far the
majordeterminantof the authoritarianvote. Left-right and socialism (and liberalism
to a lesser extent) are the major determinants of the left-right vote in the sphere of
philosophies and ideologies, whereas conservatism and authoritarianismplay only a
relatively minor role there.
Regarding the authoritarian vote, authoritarianism and conservatism are the
strongest determinants, but here the role of left-right and socialism is also relatively
substantial, whereas liberalism has virtually no effect.
Social Characteristics,Philosophies,Ideologiesand Voting

In these models, the effects of social characteristicsand philosophical and ideological
stands are combined.26 As shown above, philosophies and ideologies explain the
Dutch vote much better than social characteristics,such as social class and religion.
The combined effect of both sets of variables is represented in Figure 4.27
In 1985, 50 percent of the left-right vote is explained by social characteristics,
philosophical dimensions and ideological dimensions. Left-right ideology and
religion have the strongest effect (of about the same magnitude) on left-right voting.
Income, social class and the three major philosophical dimensions also have a
substantial effect of about the same magnitude, income having an effect largely
through social class. The effect of left-right ideology on the left-right vote is thus
put into its proper context; it is comparable to the direct and indirect (total) effect
of religion and only slightly stronger than the effects of class and the three
philosophies. Religion-partly through the philosophies of conservatism and
socialism (see Figure 4.1)-is a stronger predictor of the left-right vote than social
class and income (see Table 3). It is even a somewhat stronger predictor than the
\ \/ Lib
\
0.30 Au
015 ide
'\ X < pos
ge
Age
0.19 0.14 2
0.18 Religion 0.24-'- General conservatism
Explainedvariance=50% x2 = 13.85,d.f. 12,p=0.31.

Totaleffec:ts:
Educati?onallevel= 0.10 SES= 0.27 Socialism= 0.27 Left-Rightideologicalpositio
Age 0.11 Income= 0.24 Liberalism 0.24 Libertarian-Authoritarian
Religion 0.35 Conservatism:0.26 ideological position
Figure 4.1. TheEffectsof Social Characteristics,

PhilosophicalDimensionsandIdeologicalDime
1985.
Note. Some coefficients below 0.10 are not shown here. Details are available on request from th
with reciprocal relations between the philosophical and ideological dimensions have been tested an
Details are available on request.
philosophies of socialism and liberalism. On the other hand, conservatism is also a

reasonable predictor of the left-right vote, an effect caused partly by the postulated
indirect effects of conservatism through liberalism and socialism. The effect of social
class on left-right voting goes partly through both religion and conservatism,
alongside its indirect effect through socialism and left-right ideology. Thus, the class
and religion effects on the left-right vote go partly through socialist and conservative
philosophical stands. Religion and class continue having a relatively weak directeffect
on the left-right vote of about the same strength (0.15, 0.16), but the indirect effects
of religion through conservatism and authoritarianism are somewhat stronger than
the indirect effects of class through socialism and left-right (both religion and class
have some additional indirect effects as well; see Figure 4.1). About half the total
effects of class and religion on the left-right vote is interpreted by the philosophical
and ideological positions of the voters.
The same set of variables can be used to explain the libertarian-authoritarian vote
(see Figure 4.2). The libertarian-authoritarian ideological position explains the vote
much less well than religion (LISREL coefficients are 0.47 for religion and 0.31 for
authoritarianism). The total amount of explained variance is somewhat lower than
in the case of the left-right vote (46 versus 50 percent). Income and liberalism in
particular play lesser roles; the effect of class is almost as strong here as in the case
of the left-right vote, and socialism and conservatism also play similar roles
compared to the left-right vote.
Most remarkable perhaps is the strong direct effect of religion on the vote. It is
stronger than the direct effect of libertarian-authoritarian ideology. The indirect
effect of religion goes mainly through conservatism and authoritarianism. The effect
of class on the authoritarian vote is much weaker than the religion effect (0.22) and
almost completely indirect (direct effect is 0.05).
In summary, the model explains 50 percent of the left-right vote and 46 percent
of the libertarian-authoritarian vote. Left-right ideology and religion are the two
strongest determinants of the left-right vote, with about 50 percent of the religious
effect being indirect, mainly through conservatism and authoritarianism but also
through socialism and left-right ideology. Thus, for religion, these effects are
interpreted for about 50 percent by philosophical and/or ideological stands. (Only
the conservatism effect on the left-right vote is mainly indirect, i.e. through liberalism
and socialism.) Social class, income and the three philosophies (socialism, liberalism
and conservatism) also have a substantial influence.
The libertarian-authoritarian vote can be explained more parsimoniously in terms
of direct effects. Here the strongest direct effect by far as well as the strongest total
effect is that of religion. Authoritarianism and conservatism have medium effects;
left-right, and socialism as well as social class all have substantial effects but these
effects are clearly much weaker than the overwhelming religion effect. Contrary to
what was the case regarding the left-right vote, the effects of liberalism and income
are now much lower and almost negligible. Two-thirds of the religion effect is direct;
the rest goes mainly through conservatism and authoritarianism. Socialism and
liberalism have weaker effects on the authoritarian vote as compared to the left-right
vote (as do social class and income), but the effect of conservatism is equally strong
in both cases. Left-right ideology is as strongly related to the left-right vote as
libertarianism-authoritarianism to the authoritarian vote.
The difference is that, in the case of left-right, many variables have about the same
Explained variance=46% x= 25.12,d.f. =16,p=0.07.
Total effects:
Educationol level- -0.05 SES= 0.22 Socialism= -0.20 Left-Right ideological
Age= 0.12 Income= 0.10 Liberalism= 0.08 position = 0.20
Religion= 0.47 Conservatism= 0.27 Libertarian-Authoritarian
ideological position= 0.31
Figure 4.2. The Effects of Social Characteristics, Philosophical Dimensions and Ideological Dim
Authoritarian-Libertarian Vote, 1985.
Note. Some coefficients below 0.10 are not shown in the figure. Alternative models with reciprocal r
philosophical and ideological dimensions have been tested and yielded similar results. Data are available on
author.
or slightly weaker effects on the vote as compared to left-right ideology, whereas, in
the case of the authoritarianvote, the religious effect is much stronger than the effect
of libertarian-authoritarian ideology. Only conservatism has a similar effect
compared to authoritarianism due to the fact that two indirect effects through
liberalism and socialism are postulated. The effects of class and socialism are weaker;
those of income and liberalism are negligible.
The Role of Left-Right and Progressive-Conservative

Self-Identificaton
So far no attention has been paid to people's awareness of their ideological stands.
Voting "ideologically" would require that people to some extent be aware of their
ideological position and vote from that perspective for a party perceived as being
closest to their own position.28
During the last few years, some studies in The Netherlands have taken the position
that left-right self-identification is a major determinant of left-right voting
behavior.29Left-right self-identificationis considered the Europeansubstitute for the
well-known American concept of party identification, the latter concept being, it is
argued, less suitable to the European context where, typically, many parties have a
clearer ideological focus and background than do the two dominant American
parties.30
In view of the fact that the ideological space of the Dutch electorate is clearly and
stably two-dimensional, as shown above, it remains to be seen what people "mean"
when they consider themselves as either left-wing or right-wing. And what about the
meaning of terms such as "progressive" and "conservative"?Are the terms "left-
wing" and "right-wing"predominantlyassociated with our socio-economicleft-right
dimension rather than with the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, and is the
opposite true for terms like "progressive"and "conservative"?Or have the terms left
and right, as used by the electorate, a broader meaning than a socio-economic
egalitarian one?
Figure 5 plots the mean positions in the two-dimensionalideological space for those
considering themselves to be to some extent left or right and those considering
themselves either progressive or conservative.
Left-right ideological identification is as strongly associated with socio-economic
left-right ideology as with libertarian-authoritarian ideology (Pearson correlations
are 0.49 and 0.47 respectively), whereas progressive versus conservative ideological
identification is more strongly related to the libertarian-authoritarian ideological
position than to the socio-economic left-right dimension (Pearson correlations are
0.41 versus 0.21). Thus, when people consider themselves to be "progressive,"they
associate the term predominantly with libertarianism (and conservative with
authoritarianism); but when they consider themselves to be "left-wing" they
associate this either with socio-economic egalitarianism in government policies or
libertarianism,or both. The reverse applies to those who identify themselves as right-
wing.
In terms of ideological space, the self-assigned labels "left" and "right" do not
seem to have a particularmeaning. The plots in Figure 5 illustrate that the positions
of people considering themselves either left or right are "in the middle of nowhere"
Authoritarian
/ 9Extreme conservatives
/ \ Moderate Extremelyright-wing
/ \ conservatives
Moderatelyright-wing
Left-wing Right-wing
Moderatelylef
Moderately progressive
Extremely left-wing Extremely

progressive
Libertarian
Figure 5. MeanPositionsin theIdeologicalSpaceof ThoseConsideringThemselves
to be Left-wingor Right-wing,Progressive
or Conservative,
1985.
in terms of ideological stands which have a firm basis in content and substantial
meaning.
Nevertheless, just because the terms left and right can be associated (for the
electorate) with bothmajor ideological dimensions, awareness of this association can
add extra predictive power to models attempting to predict and explain both the left-
right and the libertarian-authoritarian vote. The explanatory power of the model
explaining the left-right vote is increased by 10 percent when the left-right self-
identification variable is included in the model as the "last chain to voting." It
absorbs many direct effects of all determinants of the left-right vote (about one-third)
and has the strongest direct and total effect on the vote. Left-right ideological
position, social class and religion come second, followed by income and the three
philosophies (socialism, liberalism and conservatism). Only left-right ideology
continues to have a direct effect on the left-right vote of any magnitude (0.18). All
other direct effects are diminished to levels around 0.10 or lower.
For the libertarian-authoritarian vote, the role of left-right ideological identifica-
tion is also substantial, but not nearly as dominant as for left-right voting. Religion
remains the strongest determinant of the authoritarian vote, followed by left-right
self-identification, conservatism and libertarianism-authoritarianism. Left-right
ideology, socialism and social class have weaker but still substantial effects. Here it
can be seen that left-right self-identification has about the same effect on the
authoritarian vote as authoritarian ideology (0.32 vs. 0.29), whereas, regarding the
left-right vote, this effect was clearly stronger than that of left-right ideology (0.43
vs. 0.32). Although left-right self-identification is as strongly related to left-right
ideology as to libertarianism-authoritarianism,its relation to the left-right vote is

somewhat stronger than that to the authoritarianvote (0.69 vs. 0.60). This means
that left-right self-identificationis the best predictor of the left-right vote onlyand
not the best predictor of the authoritarian vote. The best predictor of the latter is
religion. It dearly depends on the ordering of the parties whether left-right self-
identification is in fact the best predictor of the Dutch vote (as claimed by Van der
Eijk and Niem6ller, 1987). For the authoritarian vote, left-right self-identification,
although associated in terms of ideological stands with both ideological dimensions
to the same extent, plays a secondary role behindthe religious factor, at the same level
as the effect of authoritarianideology. This contrasts with the left-right vote, where
left-right self-identificationclearly has a strongereffect on the vote compared to the
left-right ideological position. But there the effect of social class on the left-right
vote is weaker (though substantial: 0.32) than the religion effect in the case of the
authoritarian vote (0.47). In addition, most of the class effect is indirect, whereas
most of the religion effect continues to be direct. The directeffect of religion on the
authoritarianvote is almost as strong as the totaleffect of left-right self-identification
(0.27 vs. 0.32).
There are many determinantsof left-right self-identification,the major ones being
the two ideological dimensions (left-right and libertarianism-authoritarianism),but
religion and class and the philosophies of socialism and conservatismalso play a role,
directly or indirectly. Left-right self-identificationadds 10 percent predictive power
for the vote to models which include only background variables, philosophies and
ideologies, and it is itself determined by a great variety of variables. Whether one
considers oneself left-wing or right-wing is obviously dependent on many key social
characteristics (religion, class), at least two major philosophical stands (socialism,
conservatism) and both major ideological positions (left-right and libertarianism-
authoritarianism),which add up to a relatively strong predictive power of the vote,
in particular the left-right vote. Finally, I consider the other ideological self-
identification measure: progressiveness versus conservatism. Progressive-
conservativeself-identificationplays only a minor role in predicting the authoritarian
vote, compared to left-right self-identification.It has a direct and total effect of only
0.12, compared to 0.47 for religion, 0.29 for authoritarian ideology, and more than
0.20 for social class and left-right ideology as well as for socialism. Compared to the
model in Figure 4.2 (not including measures of self-identification),the latter variable
adds almost nothing to explaining and predicting the vote along the libertarian-
authoritarian dimension. Its only determinant is a moderate relationship to
libertarian-authoritarianideology.
Discussion and Conclusion

Dutch political culture appears dominated by two fundamental dimensions of
ideological controversy: socio-economic egalitarian left-right and non-economic
libertarianism-authoritarianism. These dimensions are measured on the basis of
attitude scale scores, and are validated as truly ideological because they are backed
up by "philosophical" dimensions empirically derived from an ideal-type conceptual
model of the progressive-conservative antithesis. Socialism is negatively and
liberalism is positively associated with the left-right dimension; conservatism and

the short F-scale are positively associated with the libertarian-authoritarian
dimension.
The mean scores of the supporters of the major Dutch political parties on these
two ideological dimensions show a differentrank order (see Figure 1): Dutch Liberals
are more right-wing socio-economically than Christian Democrats, but the latter are
on average more authoritarian than the Liberals. In addition, the moderate left
(Democrats) is generally more libertarian than Labour, which is more left-wing than
the Democrats.
In a multiparty system like that of The Netherlands, one has to have a meaningful
criterion for ordering the political parties in order to be able to predict the vote in
terms of causal models. One criterion seems to be the ideological postures of
supporters of the parties. When there are two ideological postures, there are two
orderings of the parties, yielding an at least ordinal dependent variable.
In this article, I have attempted to predict the Dutch vote using both ideological
dimensions as criteria to order the parties. In addition to the obvious determinants
of the vote such as the philosophical and ideological dimensions, I have used several
background characteristics such as education and age, subjective social class, income
and religion (mainly church attendance).
The background variables alone, mainly religion and social class, explained about
25 percent of the vote. Religion dominated prediction of the authoritarian vote, an
ideological dimension most strongly related to religion. Religion and class predicted
almost evenly the left-right vote (0.33 vs. 0.31) and income also had a relatively
strong effect (0.28).
Philosophies and ideologies are better predictors of the vote than background
variables: 44 percent of the left-right vote can be predicted by philosophical and
ideological dimensions, with left-right ideology and the philosophy of socialism as
major determinants, followed by liberalism. Thirty-seven percent of the authoritarian
vote can be predicted by the same determinants, but now with authoritarianism and
conservative philosophy as the major determinants, followed by socialism and left-
right ideology. Left-right ideology and the philosophy of socialism are major
predictors of the authoritarian vote as well, whereas authoritarian ideology and
conservatism play very minor roles in predicting the left-right vote. Liberalism
predicts only the left-right vote.
The more inclusive models (social background variables plus philosophies and
ideologies) show that the left-right vote is not only well predicted by left-right
ideology, but even slightly betterby religion and slightly less by class and income and
all three major philosophical stands. There is a great variety of determinants of the
left-right vote, all of about equal strength in terms of total effects, with left-right
ideology and religion slightly stronger than class, income and the philosophies. For
most of these determinants the effects are half direct and half indirect. Authoritarian
ideology does not play an important role as determinant of the left-right vote.
Regarding the authoritarian vote, the picture is quite different. Here is a clear
hierarchy in effects on voting of various determinants. The effect of religion is
outstanding in strength, much stronger than the effect of authoritarian ideology,
which is slightly stronger than the effect of conservatism. Class, socialism and left-
right ideology play even more minor roles. Liberalism and income have negligible
effects.
6.1 Left-Right vote
0.50 -
,(A 0.40 -
0
<De 0.30
I-
Bu
1?
0 0.20
0.10
II I I I I I0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I I I I
0.00
Educ. Age SES Inc. Rel. Soc. Lib. Cons. L-R Lib.- L-R
level Pos. Auth. Ident.
Pos.
6.2 Libertarian-Authoritarian
vote
0.50-
U)
c- 0.40 -
0
0.30
0
I- 0.20
0.10-
I 1 I I I I I I I I I
0.00
Educ. Age SES Inc. Rel Soc. Lib. Cons. L-R Lib.- L-R
level Pos. Auth. Ident.
Pos.
Figure 6. GraphicRepresentationsof the Strengthsof the Total Effectsof Social
on the
Philosophies,Ideologiesand Left-Right Self-identification
Characteristics,
Left-RightandtheLibertarian-Authoritarian Vote,1985. (Entries on the vertical
axis indicate the product-moment coefficients.)
The total effects of the variables in the two models are graphically represented in
Figure 6. It can easily be seen that the picture in Figure 6.1 is quite different from
that in Figure 6.2. In the former, there are quite a lot of effects of about the same
magnitude, without one dominant factor. Only education and age have negligible
effects; authoritarianism has a very weak effect but the others are all substantial, with
few outstanding. The picture in Figure 6.2 is much less smooth. The effect of religion
is outstanding; the effects of liberalism and income have decreased compared to their
effects on left-right voting. Perhaps the most remarkable is that class, socialism and
left-right ideology continue to have a substantial effect on the authoritarian vote and
vice versa, conservatism and religion continue to have a substantial effect on the left-
right vote (authoritarianism less so), whereas the effect of conservatism is somewhat
"constructed" due to postulated indirect effects through socialism and liberalism.
Thus, although class, left-right ideology and socialism have their strongest effect on
GEESP. MIDDENDORP 301
the left-right vote, their effect on the authoritarian vote continues to be substantial.
Vice versa, this is so for conservatism and in particular religion, but notso for income
and liberalism, which have a substantial effect only on the left-right vote.
The role of left-right self-identification is different within each of the two final
models. In predicting the left-right vote, its effect is outstanding; it clearly has the
strongest effect-stronger than those of left-right ideology and religion. In predicting
the authoritarian vote, its effect, on the contrary, is only moderate compared to the
religion effect, and similar to the authoritarianism and conservatism effects.
The effects of class, socialism and conservatism vary moderately with the
dependent variable. The differential strengths of both ideological factors-in their
ability to predict the vote along "their" dimension-is as expected. What may be a
surprise is the outstanding strength of the religion effect in predicting the
authoritarian vote and its relative strength in predicting the left-right vote, together
with left-right ideology.
If there is one "best predictor" of the Dutch vote, it is the religious factor which,
as we have seen (Table 3), is associated moderately positively with both ideological
dimensions and (even more so) with both the left-right and libertarian-authoritarian
ordering of the parties. Class does not have such a strong and consistent relationship
to these variables; its weak relationship to libertarian-authoritarian ideology is even
negativecompared to the weak positiverelation to the authoritarian vote. Religion is
inspired by both major ideological orientations and is therefore a major determinant
of the vote ordered along either dimension.
The same is true, to some extent, for left-right self-identification. The position of
this variable is remarkable:
(a) it is more strongly related to religion than to class (0.35 vs. 0.22);
(b) it is as strongly related to left-right ideology and to libertarian-authoritarian
ideology (0.49 vs. 0.47);
(c) it is somewhat more strongly related to the left-right vote than to the
authoritarian vote; and
(d) although left-right self-identification has a stronger directassociation to the
authoritarian vote than religion, the latter variable clearly has a stronger total
effect on that vote than left-right self-identification.
Which factors have the strongest predictive effect in the context of causal models
depends on the ordering of the vote: left-right self-identification for the left-right
vote; religion for the authoritarian vote.
I suggested earlier that these strong effects come about by the strong relationship
of these variables to the two major dimensions of the Dutch electorate's ideological
space: left-right and libertarian-authoritarian. By tapping elements from both
ideological dimensions-and the philosophies backing them-religion and left-right
self-identification can acquire a strong predictive power of the vote whether the
parties are ordered from left to right or from libertarian to authoritarian.
Whereas religion is a "behavioral" variable (church attendance), left-right self-
identification is a subjective rating. Some questions about the latter's content validity
are then in order.
This has been shown above in Figure 5. Left-right self-identification seems to lack
a particular content-validity. In addition to this, the manner in which the effects of
both ideological dimensions on the respective votes are interpreted by left-right self-
7.1 Left-Right vote
Left-Right ideological
position
0.31
0.37
0.34 Left-Right Left-Right vote
0.3 self-identification 0.51
-.-
, 0.34, 0.05
Libertarian-Authoritarian
ideological position s
Explained variance= 56%. x2= O, d.f. =O,p=100.

Total effects:
Left-Right ideological position= 0.50
Libertarian-Authoritarianideologicalposition = 0.23
Left-Right ideological self-identification= 0.51
7.2 Libertarian-Authoritarian vote
Left-Right ideological
position
*4~ -----
=---~ _00.16
0.37 Left-Right Libertarian-
0.34 self-identification 0.40 Authoritarianvote
t 0.34 ___-----0.26
Libertarian-Authoritarian/
ideological position
Explained variance=44%. 2=O, d.f. =0,p=1.00.

Total effects=
Left-Right ideological position = 0.31
Libertarian-Authoritarian ideological position=0.40
Left-Right ideological self-identification 0.40
Figure 7. Left-Right IdeologicalPosition, Libertarianism-Authoritarianism

and
as Determinantsof the Left-Right Voteand the
Left-Right Self-Identification
Libertarian-Authoritarian
Vote.
Note. For left-right ideological position and libertarian-authoritarian ideological

position and their effect on the respective votes, and the effect of left-right
self-identificationon the vote, see Table 3.
identification is shown in Figure 7, which represents the effects of these variables on

the left-right and authoritarian vote in separate specified models (compare this to
the models in Figure 3). In Figure 7, it can be seen that left-right self-identification
has the strongest direct effect on the left-right vote, but that the total effects of left-
right ideology and left-right self-identification are evenly strong (0.50 vs. 0.51).
About 40 per cent of the effect of the left-right ideological position goes through left-
right self-identification. Authoritarian ideology has a very weak direct effect on the
left-right vote and its total effect is about half that of the other variables.
Regarding the authoritarian vote, the picture is similar. Less variance is explained
by the ideological dimensions (56 percent for the left-right vote; 44 percent for the
authoritarian vote), but in this case left-right self-identification also has the strongest
direct effect on the authoritarian vote (note that religion is not included in the
models), but authoritarian ideology has as strong a total effect on the authoritarian
vote as left-right self-identification (both 0.40).
Regarding both orderings of the parties in the simplified models of Figure 7, left-
right self-identification has as strong a total effect on the vote as each respective
ideological dimension. Left-right self-identification contributes independently to the
prediction of the vote to the same extent on each respective ideological positional
dimension.
Left-right ideological position and left-right self-identification are better able to
predict the left-right vote than libertarianism-authoritarianism and left-right self-
identification are to predict the authoritarian vote. But we have already seen that,
in the latter case, religion in particular is a much stronger additional and even
dominant predictor of the vote, compared to the role of social class in predicting the
left-right vote. On the other hand, socialism and liberalism, especially the latter,
predict the left-right vote better than conservatism does the authoritarian vote.
The ordering of parties is a minimal requirement for the construction of causal
models; in fact, the dependent variable has to be measured at interval level. If the
construction of causal models is not a research objective, other techniques are
available for predicting the vote which do not require any particular measurement
level for the dependent variable over and above the nominal one. If we wish only to
predict the vote, discriminantanalysis can provide data in terms of "functions" and
predictive power using the party vote as a nominal dependent variable.
Notes
1. The series of studies contains four surveys, based on samples of the Dutch electorate,
carried out in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985. Reports of the first three surveys in the series
available in English are Middendorp (1978a, b, 1982) and a book in English is also being
prepared.
2. See Middendorp (1978a) for development of this rationale. The philosophies behind the
attitudinal dimensions partly validate them as ideologies (see below, Table 2, note c; see
also Peffley and Hurwitz, 1986, for a comparable approach).
3. Regarding these antitheses, compare the American "Liberal-Conservative" antithesis in
e.g. Conover and Feldman (1981) and Levitin and Miller (1979).
4. Well-known American studies on the concept of ideology are Apter (1964), Barnes (1966),
Bluhm (1974), Huntingdon (1957), Minar (1961), Mullins (1972), Shklar (1966) and
Zeitlin (1968).
5. Neither the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) nor the Michigan School (Campbell
et al., 1960) paid much attention to ideological determinants of the vote in the USA (see
also Converse, 1964; and Nie, 1974).
6. Controversy remained about the validity of Nie's (1974) findings (see e.g. Asher, 1974;
Bishop et al., 1978; Conover and Feldman, 1984; Erikson, 1979; Sullivan et al., 1978).
7. American political culture seems to be relatively homogeneous in the basically liberal
tradition (see e.g. Hartz, 1955; McGovern and Collier, 1957; Rossiter, 1962). Liberal-
conservative self-identificationhas been introduced later by e.g. Levitin and Miller (1979;
see also Conover and Feldman, 1981).
8. Note that I use the terms left and right here in a "common sense" manner, i.e. not specified
and defined in terms of beliefs, attitudes or ideology.
9. See Note 1. The series of studies is based on large samples from the Dutch electorate aged
17-70 [n = 1905 (1970); 1803 (1975); 1859 (1980) and 1791 (1985)]. Fieldworkwas done
mainly by the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) in cooperation with the Social
and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture
(WVC). Grants were received from The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement
of Pure Research (ZWO) for the 1970, 1980 and 1985 studies.
10. See Middendorp (1978a: 102-8), where the historical background of the concept is
sketched in and alternative definitions are dealt with.
11. See Middendorp (1978a: 108-51). Note that the "progressive"opposition to conservatism
has varied through history. First liberalism,then socialismopposed conservativevarieties of
political thought. Conservatism was never prominent in The Netherlands, where
liberalism was inspired by conservatismfrom the beginning, the liberal bourgeoisiehaving
been the dominant social stratum since the 17th century (for more details see, in particular,
Middendorp, 1978a: 122-4).
12. See Middendorp (1978a: 134-41). Specific selected literature from which the model was
derived includes: Huntingdon (1957), Kendall and Carey (1964), Kirk (1964), Lenski
(1966), Mannheim (1953), McClosky (1958), Rossiter (1962) and Zeitlin (1968).
13. Note that the meaning here of "liberalism" is unlike that generally used in the USA. It
is, rather the conservative variety of liberalism of the Republican party, which is generally
considered "conservative"in the USA (see Free and Cantril, 1967; McGovern and Collier,
1957; Rossiter, 1962).
14. See Table 1, note a.
15. The Dutch political elite (Members of Parliament) is in fact capable of doing so. It can
also integrate the two ideological dimensions presented below (see Middendorp, 1978a:
204, 244).
16. Rationales for explaining the multidimensional structure at the mass level versus the
unidimensional one in the political elite can be derived from Kerlinger's (1967, 1984)
theory of the criteriality of attitudinal referents, extended to Western European ideology
(see Middendorp and De Vries, 1981).
17. See Middendorp (1978a: 148-51).
18. Application of the value of freedom to the socio-economic realm is contained in the
philosophy of liberalism in the continental Western European socio-economic sense; this
is negatively related to egalitarian socio-economic attitudes. "Equality" applied to non-
economic realms is equivalent to freedom in that sphere, that is, equality meaning "of
equal value." The series of left-right attitude scales contains 34 items (all scales according
to Mokken, 1971). The series of scales in "libertarianism-authoritarianism"contains 39
items, again all of the Mokken/Guttman type. There is a slight overlap in measurement
by two of the scales, which contributes to a modest correlation between the factors.
19. The correlationbetween the two factors is 0.19. In actual measurementbased on weighted
added scores, the correlation between the dimensions increases to 0.34 (see Table 2).
20. The position of this scale has changed through time in this respect; originally, in 1970, it
was closer to the libertarian-authoritariandimension.
21. On the Dutch party system, see Daalder (1955, 1966), Daalder and Irwin (1974) and
Daalder and Mair (1983).
22. The ideological dimensions are measured by means of weighted added scores, the
weighting being based on average factor loadings and standard deviations of the scales
over the period 1970-85 in the dimensions. The philosophies and the short F-scale
(Adorno et al., 1950) are not included in the measurement of the ideologies. Details of
measurement of social characteristics are available from the author. Social class and
religion are, of course, the two major social background characteristics explaining the
Dutch vote in the "pillarized" system, which was dominant until the end of the 1960s. To
what extent ideologies also played a role in determining voting behavior in The
Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s is unknown due to lack of data. For the 1970s and
1980s we can assess the combined effects of both background, variables and ideologies on
the vote (see e.g. Lijphart, 1968).
The data in Table 3 also provide evidence by means of which we can put the well-
known concept of working-class conservatism into perspective (see e.g. Lipset, 1959;
Lipsitz, 1965; Miller and Riesman, 1961). First, working-class conservatism applies to
only one progressive-conservatism dimension: libertarianism-authoritarianism. Second,
it has been shown before that the working class is more authoritarian due to low levels of
education, whose effect on authoritarianism is interpreted partly by anomia (see Adorno
et al., 1950; Middendorp, 1978a: 260-4; Middendorp and Meloen, 1988; and Seeman,
1959).
23. The models have been tested using LISREL-VI (see J6reskog and S6rbom, 1983; Saris
and Stronkhorst, 1984). Although the number of observations is large (n = 1791; see Note
9), significance levels have been maintained at the 0.05 level; coefficients <0.10 have not
been "drawn" in the figures. The author is aware of the fact that "fitting" models are not
necessarily the only possible models.
24. Details of the measurements of the variables are available from the author. Religion is
mainly church attendance.
25. The direction of the causal order between left-right and libertarian-authoritarian is not
obvious, therefore both directions have been tested in the models. The most elegant,
parsimonious models were obtained when left-right was allowed to have both a direct and
an indirect effect (via authoritarianism) on the left-right vote, and vice versa for
authoritarianism (via left-right) on the authoritarian vote, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
26. In the combined models, authoritarian conservatism is ignored due to its minor effect on
the vote (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
27. The model in Figure 4 has the following "chosen characteristics":
(a) For the left-right vote, an indirect effect of left-right ideology on the vote through
authoritarianism is postulated; for the authoritarian vote, the reverse causality is assumed
(see Note 25). Models with a reciprocal relationship between these variables show similar
results.
(b) It is postulated that conservatism is prior to liberalism and (anti)socialism. This is
based upon historical analysis: conservatism gradually tended to "incorporate" classical
economic liberal ideas-when the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe proved to be
irreversible and industrial entrepreneurs became part of the established order and ruling
elites-and also inspired much of the opposition to the rise of socialism, in particular
revolutionary Marxism. Due to these more or less arbitrary choices, the total effect of
conservatism on the left-right vote is increased (cf. Figure 3) by means of the indirect
effects of conservatism on the vote through liberalism and socialism. Alternative models
with correlations between the philosophies (and ideologies) are similar and available from
the author.
28. Some maintain that a certain amount of consciousness of the ideology is a necessary
defining characteristic of an ideological stand (e.g. Barnes, 1966; Putnam, 1971). I do not
share that point of view.
29. See Van der Eijk and Niemoller (1983, 1987). For critical notes regarding this position,
see Van Deth (1986), Van Doom et al. (1984) and Maas et al. (1984). In the American
context, left-right is rarely used as an ideological label.
30. See Budge et al. (1976) and Thomassen (1975). For the decline of party identification in
the United States, see e.g. Abramson (1976; see also Cain and Ferejohn, 1981; Van der
Eijk and Niem6ller, 1983; and Shively, 1980).
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Note
Biographical
CEESP. MIDDENDORP is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science,
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, since 1980. Previously, he was Director of the Dutch
National Data Archive (Steinmetz Archives), Amsterdam. ADDRESS:Department of
Political Science, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotter-
dam, The Netherlands.

Middendrop - Left-Right and The Libertarianism-Authoritarianism Dimensions

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Middendrop - Left-Right and The Libertarianism-Authoritarianism Dimensions

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Models for Predicting the Dutch Vote along the Left-Right and the Libertarianism-

Models for Predicting the Dutch Vote

ABSTRACT. There are two "fundamental dimensions of ideological contro-

supporters of the parties. Each ideological dimension can, separately or combined,

The Two-Dimensional Ideological Space of the Dutch Electorate

Theoretical Framework: The Conceptual Model

The Basic PhilosophicalDimensions

Variablenames,left-handpoleb Gen. Auth. Lib. Socialism

246C The customs and traditions of society are of 0.61d

Variablenames,left-handpoleb Gen. Auth. Lib. Socialism

aObliquefactor structurein SPSSX-PA1.Explainedvarianceis 41.1 percent.Correlationsbetween

The Two FundamentalDimensionsof Ideological Controversy

Scalenamesb Left- Libertarian-

1. Attitude towards equality of income, property, status. 0.73

Implications of the Two-dimensional Ideological Space of the Dutch

Explainedvariance = 24%. x2= 5.03, d.f. 3, p = 0.17 .

Philosophies, Ideologies and Voting

Note. Not shown in figure: Y2X4=0.08. For correlations between independent

ideological dimensions. Not surprisingly, left-right ideology, socialism and liberal-

Social Characteristics,Philosophies,Ideologiesand Voting

0.18 Religion 0.24-'- General conservatism

Explainedvariance=50% x2 = 13.85,d.f. 12,p=0.31.

Figure 4.1. TheEffectsof Social Characteristics,

philosophies of socialism and liberalism. On the other hand, conservatism is also a

The Role of Left-Right and Progressive-Conservative

Extremely left-wing Extremely

ideology as to libertarianism-authoritarianism,its relation to the left-right vote is

Discussion and Conclusion

liberalism is positively associated with the left-right dimension; conservatism and

Explained variance= 56%. x2= O, d.f. =O,p=100.

7.2 Libertarian-Authoritarian vote

Explained variance=44%. 2=O, d.f. =0,p=1.00.

Figure 7. Left-Right IdeologicalPosition, Libertarianism-Authoritarianism

Note. For left-right ideological position and libertarian-authoritarian ideological

identification is shown in Figure 7, which represents the effects of these variables on

Huntington, S. P. (1957). "Conservatism as an ideology." AmericanPolitical ScienceReview

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