EN BANC The prosecution’s version of the rapes as summarized by the
Solicitor General is as follows:
G.R. Nos. 148939-40             February 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
JOSEPH ORILLA, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision1 dated
7 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Alaminos City, Province of Pangasinan. Remilyn
Orilla, the 15-year old sister of appellant Joseph Orilla
("appellant"), accused appellant of raping her twice. The
criminal cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3219-
A and 3220-A. The trial court found appellant guilty of only
one crime of qualified rape and imposed on him the death
penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. Instead of dismissing
the second case, Criminal Case No. 3220-A, the trial court
considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
The Charge
The Amended Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3219-A
and 3220-A are identical. The allegations read:
That on or about the dawn of September 12, 1996 at Brgy.
Masidem, municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation,
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R.
ORILLA, younger sister of accused against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 2
Arraignment and Plea
On 3 January 1997, appellant assisted by his counsel de
officio, pleaded not guilty to the two charges.3
The Trial
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) Remilyn, the
complainant and sister of the appellant, (2) SPO1 Clarence
de Vera, a member of the Philippine National Police of Bani,
Pangasinan, who entered in the police blotter the complaint
of Remilyn, and (3) Dr. Lynette Valencerina-Caburnay ("Dr.
Valencerina-Caburnay"), a resident physician of the Western
Pangasinan District Hospital, who conducted the medico-
legal examination of Remilyn.
On September 12, 1996, around 3:00 o’clock in the morning,
fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one
of the rooms of their house located at Masidem, Bani,
Pangasinan when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy
weight pressing on her body and found appellant Joseph
Orilla on top of her. (p. 18, TSN, April 15, 1997)
Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked from waist down
(pp. 17-18, ibid). Appellant continuously pinned down
Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free
herself from appellant but her efforts proved futile. (p. 7,
TSN, April 15, 1997)
Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand
holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced Remilyn
Orilla’s legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Remilyn Orilla felt pain. She also felt "some warm matter
enter" her vagina (p. 8, ibid.). Appellant remained on top of
Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the
same "substance enter" her vagina (ibid.). With a knife
pointed at her, Remilyn Orilla was powerless. Appellant
warned her not to make a noise. Frightened, Remilyn Orilla
just kept silent. (pp. 8-9, 18-19, ibid.)
Around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of that same day,
Remilyn Orilla reported to her sister, Evelyn Catabay, what
appellant did to her. Immediately, they went to the Municipal
Hall of Bani to report the incident. Unfortunately, the
investigator assigned that day was absent. (p. 22, ibid.)
On September 19, 1996, around 2:30 in the afternoon,
Remilyn Orilla arrived at the Bani Police Station, Bani,
Pangasinan and executed her sworn statement relative to
the incident in question. She recounted the incident to SPO1
Clarence P. de Vera who entered the same in the Police
Blotter (p. 2, TSN, June 11, 1997).
Later, or around 3:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla and her
sister went to the Western Pangasinan District Hospital in
Alaminos, Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla was examined by Dr.
Lynette D. Valencerina whose findings are contained in the
Medico-Legal Certificate dated September 20, 1996 (Exhibit
A) which she issued:
MENSTRUAL HISTORY: Menarche at age 13 years old,
occurring monthly, of 3-7 days duration, consuming around 2
napkins per day not accompanied by hypoglycemia.
LMP – August 9-14, 1996
PMP – July 12-16, 1996
INTERNAL EXAMINATION: With old hymenal laceration at
3, 6 and 9 o’clock position vaginal introitous admits 2 fingers
with ease, Cervix close, uterus small;
(-) adnexeal mass/tenderness
(+) whitish vaginal discharge
Pregnancy Test – negative
Negative for the presence of spermatozoa
(p. 8, Record)
Accordingly, appellant was arrested. However, he escaped
while detained at the provincial jail. After a month of hiding,
appellant was re-arrested. (pp. 12-13, TSN, September 28,
1999).
On the other hand, Remilyn Orilla is now under the care of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (p. 12,
TSN, April 15, 1997).4
Version of the Defense
The defense presented three witnesses: (1) appellant, (2)
Crispin Orilla ("Crispin"), brother of appellant and Remilyn,
and (3) Beverly Cabuburac ("Beverly"), sister of appellant
and Remilyn.
Appellant and Remilyn are siblings. Remilyn is the youngest
in a brood of nine. The parents of appellant and Remilyn are
already dead. Remilyn was then staying in a house
commonly owned by the siblings in Barangay Masidem,
Bani, Pangasinan. Adjacent to Remilyn’s house is the house
of appellant where he and his own family lived.
Appellant claimed that from 2 August 1996 to 14 September
1996, he was in Sitio Olo, Barangay Masidem, Bani,
Pangasinan rushing the work on the dikes of a fishpond. He
was not able to go home to his house in Barangay Masidem
on 12 September 1996, the date the crimes charged
allegedly occurred.
Appellant’s house in Barangay Masidem is five to six meters
away from the house of Remilyn. However, the place where
appellant was staying in Sitio Olo is two kilometers away
from Barangay Masidem. One can negotiate the distance
between Sitio Olo and Barangay Masidem by walking.
However, one must cross a river before reaching Barangay
Masidem. A motorboat service is available to cross the river
and the ride can last for an hour. Crossing the river on foot
will take about three hours.
Appellant worked in the fishpond of Lindel Onofre who is
married to another sister of appellant. At the time appellant
was working in the fishpond, his companion was his brother,
Reneboy Orilla ("Reneboy"). The persons left in appellant’s
house while he was in Sitio Olo were his wife, five children
and his wife’s grandmother. When appellant left Barangay
Masidem on 2 August 1996 for Sitio Olo, the persons who
were with Remilyn in her house were Crispin, Beverly and
her three children.
Appellant described Remilyn as "matampuhin" or emotional.
Remilyn was always frowning and sometimes she would be
happy. When Remilyn would get irritable she would just
leave the house for weeks without telling appellant or their
other siblings where she was going. Appellant claimed that
he had a good relationship with Remilyn although he would
sometimes scold her because she would leave the house
without permission. Appellant does not know why Remilyn
accused him of rape. Appellant assumed that it was because
he often scolded Remilyn.
Crispin testified that on 11 September 1996, he and his
sister Beverly and her husband slept in the living room of
their house while Remilyn slept in the small room with
Beverly’s daughter. The next day, 12 September 1996,
Crispin woke up around 5:00 a.m. and noticed that Remilyn
was still asleep. During that time, his brother Joseph was
working in Barangay Ulo, Bani, Pangasinan.
Beverly testified that on 11 September 1996, she was in
Masidem with her children and her siblings, Crispin,
Reneboy, and Remilyn. At 6:00 a.m. of the next day, she,
together with her husband and children, left for Manila. She
denied having any knowledge that her brother Joseph raped
their sister Remilyn.
The Trial Court’s Judgment
The trial court ruled that Remilyn positively identified
appellant as the one who raped her. True, no electric light or
kerosene lamp lit the room where the rape took place.
However, since it was already 3:00 a.m., a ray of light from
the eastern horizon enabled Remilyn to recognize appellant.
When appellant threatened and ordered Remilyn not to
shout, or else he would kill her, Remilyn was able to
recognize appellant’s voice. The trial court concluded that
even if appellant attacked Remilyn during "the darkest
portion of the night,"5 appellant’s voice alone could have
made it known to Remilyn that her attacker was appellant,
her own brother.
The trial court rejected appellant’s defense of alibi. One can
negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo and Barangay
Masidem by riding passenger jeepneys and tricycles and by
riding a motorboat to cross the river. Appellant failed to
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
access to the place where the crime happened.
The trial court gave credence to Remilyn’s testimony
because her testimony was very "natural and convincing."6 In
contrast, the testimony of the defense witnesses failed to
convince the trial court. Defense witness Crispin’s demeanor
in court prompted the trial court to remark that he appeared
"crafty, cunning, unfair and unreliable."7 Beverly’s testimony
failed to support appellant’s alibi because she testified that
she left Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996 and she
learned of the rape only on her return sometime in January
of 1997.
The trial court held that the presence of old lacerations at 3,
6 and 9 o’clock vaginal positions indicates that Remilyn had
previous sexual experience contrary to Remilyn’s claim that
the rape was her first sexual experience. The trial court
nonetheless ruled that a woman who is unchaste or impure
could still be raped.
Thus, the trial court held appellant guilty of qualified rape in
Criminal Case No. 3219-A. The trial court ruled that since
Remilyn was only 15 years old at the time appellant raped
her, the death penalty must be imposed on appellant, the
victim’s brother. Appellant committed only one count of rape
because while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s
vagina, the first and second ejaculations occurred during
"one single body connection."8 The trial court considered
Criminal Case No. 3220-A involving the second count of
rape as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
The judgment of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal
Case No. 3219-A and considering that the offended party is
under 18 years of age, and the offender is the brother of the
victim (relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree)
the accused is therefore sentenced to suffer the SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH by lethal injection but in the event that
upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court,
that the penalty of Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion
Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that accused
should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30)
years and that he is further condemned to pay in favor of the
offended party in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱100,000.00) as civil indemnity.
That Criminal Case No. 3220-A is considered merely as a
qualifying circumstance in the imposition of the death
penalty, as the Court submits the view that there is only one
crime of rape committed although there were two
ejaculations done on the person of the offended party.
The Provincial Warden of the Province of Pangasinan at
Lingayen is ordered to commit the living body of the accused
to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City within a period
of three (3) days from receipt of this Decision considering
that in the past the accused have (sic) tendency to escape
his Jailer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The Issues
Appellant submits for our review the following assignment of
errors:
I two feet13 also make it possible for light to pass through the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
COMPLAINANT’S DUBIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF
APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ALLEGED
RAPE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE
COMPLAINANT’S DOUBTFUL IDENTIFICATION OF
APPELLANT AS THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3220-A AS A "QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE" IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY AGAINST THE APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 3219-A, SINCE THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON
HIM THE DEATH PENALTY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE INFROMATION NEVER ALLEGED THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF COMPLAINANT’S AGE, AND THE
EXACT DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY ANENT THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP. 10
The Court’s Ruling
Appellant is guilty of rape as charged in Criminal Case No.
3219-A but the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, not
death. Since appellant committed only one count of rape,
Criminal Case No. 3220-A must be dismissed.
Appellant insists that it was impossible for Remilyn to have
identified the person who raped her because the room where
the crime took place was pitch black, as it had no window
and no source of light. Appellant asks the Court to take
judicial notice of the fact that on 12 September 1996, a
Thursday, the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines
was at 5:45 a.m., or a good two hours and forty-five minutes
from 3:00 a.m. Appellant argues that if the rape took place at
3:00 a.m., then there could have been no early morning
sunlight to aid Remilyn in identifying appellant.
We are not persuaded. Crispin, the brother of Remilyn and
appellant and a witness for the defense, testified that the wall
of the house where the rape happened was made of buri11
and the flooring of the house was made of "splitted (sic)
bamboo."12 Buri is a leaf that is dried and woven together to
form panels used as walls in the construction of houses. A
panel of buri is not compact as it has small holes in it
allowing light to filter through the woven material. The slats
on the floor and the elevation of the floor from the ground by
floor.
While the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines on
12 September 1996 was at 5:45 a.m. and not at 3:00 a.m.,
what is controlling is Remilyn’s declaration that the "horizon
coming from the east" enabled her to identify appellant.
Remilyn categorically declared that "there was a little light,
sir, that is why I recognized him."14 Remilyn’s declaration that
there was a "little light" is consistent with her statement that
the room was not fully illuminated but the amount of light that
sneaked through her room was sufficient to enable her to
recognize her own brother.
The time mentioned by Remilyn, that is 3:00 a.m., is at most
an estimate. We must bear in mind that appellant roused
Remilyn from sleep when he forced himself on her. Remilyn
could not have known the exact time as appellant’s act
abruptly and rudely awakened her. Remilyn’s estimate of the
time while not precise tends to strengthen the impression
that her testimony is unrehearsed. Moreover, no one expects
rape victims to remember with precision every detail of the
crime. A mis-estimation of time is too immaterial to discredit
the testimony of a witness especially where time is not an
essential element or has no substantial bearing on the fact of
the commission of the offense.15 What is decisive in a rape
charge is the complainant’s positive identification of the
accused as the malefactor.16
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in declaring that
Remilyn identified him through his voice. Appellant maintains
that Remilyn was not able to identify him at all. Appellant’s
contention is without basis. Remilyn’s testimony is as
follows:
Q: And during the time that the accused
was on top of you, what did you do, if
any?
A: I cannot move and fight because he
threatened me not to shout, sir.
Q: And what was the word of the
accused when he threatened you?
A: He told me not to shout and move
and according to him he will kill me, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
Q: And because of those threatened
words of the accused you mean to
inform the Honorable Court that you did
not shout for help?
A: No, sir, because I was afraid.17
Based on the foregoing testimony, there was nothing to
prevent the trial court from properly concluding that Remilyn
identified appellant through voice recognition. A person’s
voice is an acceptable means of identification where there is
proof that the witness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for a number of years.18 Appellant is
no stranger to Remilyn for she had known him with much
familiarity. Appellant is Remilyn’s own brother. Thus, when
appellant threatened Remilyn not to shout and move, or else
he would kill her, the trial court logically inferred that Remilyn
recognized appellant through his voice.
We have thoroughly examined the transcript of the
testimonies of the witnesses and we agree with the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. The
trial court was meticulous in judging the witnesses’
credibility. The trial court even took note of the witnesses’
demeanor in court. Unless appellant can show that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise
affect the result of the case, the Court will not disturb the trial
court’s findings on appeal.19 None of the grounds to overturn
the trial court’s ruling on the witnesses’ credibility is present
in this case.
Remilyn’s narration of how appellant ravished her meets the
test of credibility. When a woman says that the accused
raped her, in effect, she says all that is necessary to show
that the accused raped her, and if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the court may convict the accused on that
basis.20
Remilyn had no reason to fabricate the serious charges
against her own brother whose life could hang in the balance
in case he is found guilty of qualified rape. With the filing of
the criminal cases, Remilyn had to face the ire of her other
siblings, two of whom have even testified against her.
Remilyn is now under the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
An incestuous sexual assault is a psycho-social deviance
that inflicts a stigma, not only on the victim but also on their
whole family.21 Even in ordinary rape cases, the sole
testimony of a credible victim may seal the fate of the
rapist.22
Appellant failed to establish convincingly his alibi. The
distance between Sitio Olo, where appellant claimed he was,
and Barangay Masidem, where the rape happened, is only
two kilometers. Appellant himself admitted that public
vehicles were available to transport passengers from Sitio
Olo to Barangay Masidem, including a motorboat that could
ferry the passengers to Barrio Masidem in just about an
hour. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have
gone to Barangay Masidem on the day he committed the
rape. None of his witnesses could even corroborate his alibi.
Appellant’s alibi and denial cannot prevail over Remilyn’s
positive and categorical testimony. Alibi is an inherently
weak defense and courts must receive it with caution
because one can easily fabricate an alibi.23 For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused show he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime.24 The accused must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.25 Appellant failed to
do this. Moreover, appellant’s escape from detention does
not help his cause since escape is evidence of guilt.26
We must correct the trial court’s opinion that prior to the
rape, Remilyn already had past sexual experience because
her hymen had healed lacerations. The trial court reached
this conclusion despite Remilyn’s assertion that she had no
sexual experience at all before the rape and despite the
absence of such a finding by Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay, the
medico- legal who examined Remilyn.
Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay conducted Remilyn’s physical
examination on 19 September 1996 or seven days after the
rape. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay was not certain what exactly
caused the healed lacerations. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay
testified that an object, probably a penis, could have caused
the lacerations, or even a fall could have caused them.27
Dr.Valencerina-Caburnay did not attribute the healed
lacerations to a sexual experience prior to the rape.
The presence of old lacerations per se does not imply that
the lacerations were the result of previous sexual experience
and not by the rape.28 Thus, the trial court had no basis in
ruling that Remilyn was no longer a virgin when appellant
raped her. The trial court must be careful not to cast
aspersions on the reputation of a woman, especially so when
she is still a minor.
The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn’s hymen does
not prove that appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken
hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape.29 In addition, a medical
examination and a medical certificate are merely
corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of
a rape case.30 The credible disclosure of a minor that the
accused raped her is the most important proof of the sexual
abuse.31
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman against her will.32 Remilyn’s straightforward narration
on how appellant forcibly ravished her proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of rape
as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. However, appellant
committed only one count of rape. Remilyn’s own account of
the rape proves this, thus:
Q: And after accused pointed you (sic)
knife, can you tell the Court what else
did he do after that?
A: He had sexual intercourse with me to
(sic) times at the same time, sir.
COURT:
Q: Two times at the same time?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
Q: And when he had sexual intercourse
with you for two times as you said on
that same day, what was your feeling
when he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
A: It is painful, sir, and I felt some warm
matter to my vagina.
Q: And can you tell the Honorable Court
how long was the accused stayed (sic)
on top of you before he ejaculated into
your vagina?
A: About thirty (30) minutes, sir.
xxx
Q: Now, you said that the accused was
on top of you for at least a period of
thirty minutes, do you mean to inform
the Honorable Court that the two sexual
intercourse that he allegedly committed
on your person, he stayed on top of you
for a period of thirty minutes, is that what
you mean?
Q: And for the first time that he
ejaculated a warm substance inside
your vagina, did accused get out on top
of you?
A: No, sir.
COURT:
Q: You mean to tell the Court that it is a
case of double shoot in the sense that
after ejaculating he is still on top of you
but then after that he did it again while
he was still on top of your body?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.33
Remilyn testified that appellant’s penis penetrated her
genitalia. At that point, appellant had already consummated
the rape. The mere introduction of the penis into the labia
majora of the victim’s genitalia engenders the crime of
rape.34 Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into
the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the
victim’s genitalia that consummates rape.35
Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he
consummated the rape. Appellant did not withdraw his penis
to insert it again into the vagina or to "touch" the labia majora
or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is
not the number of times that appellant ejaculated but the
penetration or "touching" that determines the consummation
of the sexual act.36 Thus, appellant committed only one count
of rape.
The trial court erred when it did not dismiss outright Criminal
Case No. 3220-A and instead considered it as a qualifying
circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty
in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. In short, the trial court
considered the second ejaculation by the accused as a
qualifying circumstance to raise the penalty to death. This
has no basis in law.
Article 33537 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 765938 ("RA 7659") was the
law then applicable at the time of the rape. RA 7659 provides
for the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the carnal
knowledge of a woman procured through force or
intimidation and without any other attendant circumstance.
The death penalty is imposed if the victim is under eighteen
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. When the information specifically
alleges the twin qualifying circumstances of relationship and
minority of the victim, and the prosecution proves the same
in court, the imposable penalty is no longer reclusion
perpetua but death.39
The trial court convicted appellant of qualified rape in
Criminal Case No. 3219-A because appellant is Remilyn’s
brother and she was a minor being only 15 years old at the
time that appellant raped her. A reading of the Amended
Information, however, does not justify the elevation of the
crime of simple rape to qualified rape.
The prosecution went through the trouble of amending the
Information to allege that Remilyn is the "younger sister" of
appellant to emphasize the qualified nature of the rape.
However, the Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s
minor age. The prosecution’s failure to allege specifically
Remilyn’s minor age prevents the transformation of the crime
to its qualified form.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the
crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he
must be tried.40 The information must allege every element of
the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his
defense.41 The law assumes that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.42 Since the Amended Information failed to inform
appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified
rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape and
the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death.
The Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty based on the twin circumstances
of relationship and minority considering that the Amended
Information failed to allege specifically Remilyn’s age. What
justifies the imposition of the death penalty, the Solicitor
General argues, is the fact that appellant used a knife in
committing the rape and appellant perpetrated the rape
against his own sister. According to the Solicitor General,
Article 335 as amended by RA 7659 provides that the use of
a deadly weapon in the commission of rape results in the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the presence
of an aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of
the higher penalty of death. The Solicitor General points out
that relationship in this case is an aggravating circumstance
based on Article 1543 of the Revised Penal Code as applied
in People v. Baldino.44
Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the
Amended Information that he was "armed with a knife" does
not comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the
Amended Information that the accused was "armed with a
knife" is not in any way equivalent to "use of a deadly
weapon." The "knife" could simply be a "butter knife," a
harmless knife. Appellant opines that the Amended
Information should have stated that accused was "armed
with a deadly knife, which is a deadly weapon."
We have held in several cases that the allegation "armed
with a knife" is sufficient to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him.45 The prosecution also proved
during the trial appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn
testified that she was not able to shout because appellant
pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.46
We, however, do not agree with the Solicitor General’s
opinion that relationship should be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the
death penalty. People v. Baldino, the case invoked by the
Solicitor General, appreciated relationship as an aggravating
circumstance but only for the purpose of assessing
exemplary damages against the accused and not for the
purpose of imposing the death penalty. Two recent cases,
People v. Sagarino47 and People v. Umbaña,48 squarely
address the issue raised by the Solicitor General.
In People v. Sagarino49 and People v. Umbaña,50 the
information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon
and the prosecution proved the same. The information also
specifically alleged relationship between the accused and
the victim, and the prosecution proved the same: son and
mother in People v. Sagarino, and father and daughter in
People v. Umbaña. However, these two cases did not
impose the death penalty. People v. Umbaña repeated our
explanation in People v. Sagarino. We quote this pertinent
portion in People v. Umbaña:
We agree with appellant that People vs. Sagarino finds
application in the case at bar. We there stated:
We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed on
appellant. Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, which amended
article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua when the rape was committed with
force and intimidation. But the imposable penalty becomes
reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon. Such is the situation in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and 98-552 because the use of a
knife or a bladed weapon by appellant in the consummation
of the two rapes has been alleged and proved.
However, we are unable to sustain the death penalty
imposed on appellant in both cases. As provided in Section 8
of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective
December 1, 2000, but applicable to these cases now, the
complaint or information must not only state the designation
of the offense given by statute and aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, but also "specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances." But here the
informations against appellant in both cases show no
specification of circumstances that aggravate the offenses
charged. Note that the close relationship between the victim
and the offender (mother and son) is alleged, but nothing is
stated in the informations concerning pertinent
circumstances (such as disregard of the filial respect due the
victim by reason of her age, sex and rank) that could
aggravate the crimes and justify imposing the death
sentence. Thus, absent any aggravating circumstance
specifically alleged and proved in the two rape cases, the
penalty imposable on appellant for each offense is not death
but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states the specific
aggravating/qualifying circumstances. Other than the use of
a deadly weapon, which is already taken into account to
raise the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, not one of
these circumstances was alleged or proved in the case at
bar. Hence, the penalty imposable is only reclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis ours)
The "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship mentioned
in People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaña must be
alleged in the information and duly proven in the trial. In the
present case, the Amended Information did not allege the
"circumstances pertinent" to the relationship of appellant and
Remilyn and the prosecution did not prove these
circumstances during the trial.
The "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship cited in
People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaña are aggravating
circumstances listed in paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerates the aggravating circumstances. Unlike mitigating
circumstances under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
Article 14 does not include circumstances "similar in nature"
or analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 21 of
Article 14. The term "aggravating circumstances" is strictly
construed, not only because what is involved is a criminal
statute, but also because its application could result in the
imposition of the death penalty. The list of aggravating
circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
thus exclusive51 for the purpose of raising a crime to its
qualified form.
Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those
which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime
and other conditions attending its commission. They are
relationship, intoxication, and degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken
into consideration when the offended party is the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of
the offender.
Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken
into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to
the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions
attending its commission. Based on a strict interpretation,
alternative circumstances are thus not aggravating
circumstances per se.
The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is
mitigating and when it is aggravating. 52 Jurisprudence
considers relationship as an aggravating circumstance in
crimes against chastity.53 However, rape is no longer a crime
against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against
persons.54 The determination of whether an alternative
circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the death
penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law
must declare unequivocally an attendant circumstance as
qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The
Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may
only be imposed for crimes defined as heinous by
Congress.55 Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a
crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by
Congress.
When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly
weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of two
indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. To
determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. It provides that:
ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed
of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
xxx
Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will
be applied when in the commission of rape there is present
one aggravating circumstance. We hold that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the
graver penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated
in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is only
relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is
not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty
is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there
was "lingering doubt" whether the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be considered an aggravating
circumstance to justify such an award. People v. Catubig56
settled the "lingering doubt" in this manner:
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the
perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the
criminal liability aspect), as well as to justify an award of
exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability aspect),
moored on the greater perversity of the offender manifested
in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1)
the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission, (3)
the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the
personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party
or both. There are various types of aggravating
circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying.
Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code.
"Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those
which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime
and other conditions attending its commission. They are
relationship, intoxication, and degree of instruction and
education of the offender."
"The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken
into consideration when the offended party is the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of
the offender."
As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes
against chastity, such as rape and acts of lasciviousness,
whether the offender is a higher or a lower degree relative of
the offended party.
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is
to be imposed in rape cases "when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim." The Court has since held
that the circumstances enumerated by the amendatory law
are to be regarded as special qualifying (aggravating)
circumstances. Somehow doubts linger on whether
relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for
exemplary damages where it is used to qualify rape as a
heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as
would subject the offender to the penalty of death.
Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a
specific rule, preferring instead to treat the issue on a case to
case basis.
In People vs. Fundano, People vs. Ramos, People vs.
Medina, People vs. Dimapilis, People vs. Calayca, People
vs. Tabion, People vs. Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and
People vs. Nuñez, along with still other cases, the Court has
almost invariably appreciated relationship as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance in simple rape and thereby
imposed exemplary damages upon the offender whether or
not the offense has been committed prior to or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. Exceptionally, as in
People vs. Decena, People vs. Perez, and People vs.
Ambray, the Court has denied the award of exemplary
damages following the effectivity of that law. In qualified rape
cases, such as in People vs. Magdato, People vs. Arizapa,
and People vs. Alicante, the Court decreed the payment of
exemplary damages to the offended party but it did not so do
as in People vs. Alba, People vs. Mengote, and People vs.
Maglente.
It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice
stance and provide, for the guidance of the bar and the
bench, a kind of standard on the matter.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent
to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud
or gross fraud- that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive
or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person
to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil
Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of
an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift
to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended
for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Catubig, we held that the alternative
circumstance of relationship serves as basis for an award of
exemplary damages because the term "aggravating
circumstances" must be understood in its broad or generic
sense. However, this interpretation is only applicable to the
civil aspect, not the criminal aspect of rape, which involves
the imposition of the proper penalty. When the penalty to be
imposed on the accused is teetering between reclusion
perpetua and death, the term "aggravating circumstance" in
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be understood in
the strictest sense. The "aggravating circumstance" that
would spell the difference between life and death for the
accused must be that specifically listed in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Death is an irrevocable penalty. Thus, the rule on strict
interpretation of criminal statutes applies with greater force
when the law defines the offense as a heinous crime
punishable by death.
However, we resort to the strict interpretation of the term
"aggravating circumstance" only for the purpose of imposing
the death penalty. When the penalty to be imposed is a
range of penalties where the maximum penalty is death and
the appreciation of an aggravating circumstance would call
for the imposition of the maximum penalty, which is death,
the term "aggravating circumstance" must be strictly
construed. The aggravating circumstance sufficient to justify
the imposition of the death penalty must not only be duly
alleged and proven it must be one of those enumerated in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code or that specified by
law. In all other cases where the maximum penalty is not
death, the term "aggravating circumstance" must be
interpreted in its broad or generic sense so as to include the
alternative circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code.
We cannot consider dwelling as a generic aggravating
circumstance because the Amended Information did not
allege dwelling. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which applies retroactively in this case, now
explicitly mandates that the information must state in
ordinary and concise language the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.57 When the law or rules specify
certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense or
qualify an offense to warrant a greater penalty, the
information must allege such circumstances and the
prosecution must prove the same to justify the imposition of
the increased penalty.58
Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of
exemplary damages to Remilyn of ₱25,000. 59 Remilyn is
also entitled to ₱50,000 moral damages and ₱50,000 civil
indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of moral
damages to a rape victim without need of proof because
from the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.60 Such
award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which
case law also automatically awards upon proof of the
commission of the crime by the offender.61
The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of
appellant’s crime that it was moved to include this proposal
in the dispositive portion of its decision:
xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the
Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death is not
imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable
Court recommends that accused should not be granted
pardon within the period of thirty (30) years.
Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full
condemnation. However, the recommendation by the trial
court is improper.62 It is the President’s prerogative whether
or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution.63
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, is
AFFIRMED insofar as it finds appellant Joseph Orilla
GUILTY of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A
with the MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the amount of civil
indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000. In addition, appellant is
further ordered to pay Remilyn Orilla ₱50,000 moral
damages and ₱25,000 exemplary damages. Criminal Case
No. 3220-A is dismissed. The provision recommending the
disqualification of appellant from executive clemency is
deleted. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of J. Callejo, Sr.
Callejo, Sr., J., see dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I concur with the majority opinion in finding the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death. However, I dissent from the majority
opinion sentencing the appellant to reclusion perpetua
simply and merely because the alternative aggravating
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code is not one of the aggravating circumstances
listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The opinion of
the majority that only those aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code are
covered by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code has no
legal basis.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is not the repository of
all the aggravating circumstance covered by Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. Absent any provision in Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, excluding the alternative
aggravating circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code from the application thereof, such alternative
aggravating circumstances must be considered in graduating
the penalty for quasi-heinous crimes. It cannot be argued
that simply because Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
does not contain any provision similar to Article 13,
paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, no other
aggravating circumstances exist in the Revised Penal Code.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code must be considered in
relation to and not independent of Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code. Indeed, under Article 10, paragraph 1 of the
Spanish Penal Code, relationship is listed as an alternative
aggravating circumstance:
Son circunstancias agravantes:
1. Ser el agraviado cόnyuge o
ascendiente, desdendiente, hermano
legitimo, natural o adoptivo, o afin en
mismos grados del ofensor.
Esta circunstancia la tomarán en considęracion los tribunals
para aplicarla como agravante o atenuante, según la
naturaleza y los efectos del delito. 1
Article 10 of the Spanish Penal Code enumerates the
aggravating circumstances including alternative
circumstances. Article 81 of the Spanish Penal Code which
is Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code applies to all the
circumstances enumerated in Article 10 of the Spanish Penal
Code.
The Philippines did not adopt, in toto, in the Revised Penal
Code, Spanish Article 10 of the Spanish Penal Code but
deviated from it by providing for a separate provision for
alternative circumstances, which is Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code, precisely because: (a) aside from relationship,
intoxication and lack of intention are considered either
aggravating or mitigating as alternative circumstances; (b)
there is a need to specify therein when such circumstances
are aggravating or mitigating. The Philippines did not adopt
the rather vague basis in Article 10, paragraph 1 of the
Spanish Penal Code for determining whether relationship is
aggravating or mitigating – the nature and effects of the
felony charged. Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code was
never intended to exclude the alternative aggravating
circumstances listed therein from the application of Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code but to complement the latter
provision.
I disagree with the submission of the ponente that "the
aggravating circumstance is strictly interpreted against the
prosecution only for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty" implying that the law may be liberally construed for
the prosecution for the purpose of imposing lower penalties.
Such as elastic application of the law, to my mind, has no
legal basis. Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code mandates the Court to impose the greater penalty, in
this case, the death penalty, when in the commission of the
deed there is present an aggravating circumstance. The use
of the word "shall" in the law demonstrates the mandatory
nature of the duty of the Court.
I vote to sentence the appellant to suffer the death penalty
as mandated by law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175528               September 30, 2009
PO3 BENITO SOMBILON, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This resolves the petition for review which seeks to annul
and set aside the following rulings of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A. C.R. No. 27729: a) the Decision 1 dated July 28,
2005 which affirmed with modification the decision2 dated
May 13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
(RTC), convicting petitioner of acts of lasciviousness; and b)
the Resolution3 dated September 22, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision.
The facts found during trial, as succinctly stated by the CA,
are as follows:
The facts found during the trial reveal that on or about
August 15, 1998, AAA, a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was
investigated by Appellant at the Calinan Police Station,
Davao City in connection with a complaint for Theft filed by a
certain Aileen Dagoc.
AAA alleged that Appellant, in conducting the investigation,
took her inside a room and locked it. She testified that the
room had no window but had a cot, a table, and a clothesline
where some clothes were hanged. She claimed that
Appellant pointed a gun at her, with the end of the barrel
touching her forehead and pushed her with it, causing her
head to violently bang against the wall, and asked her: "Did
you steal the necklace?" She answered that she did not.
Appellant then took an electric wire from a drawer and
inserted its male plug to a socket. She was ordered to place
her two hands on top of the table where her fingers were
electrocuted with the end of the wire. She was again asked
the same question, which she kept answering in the
negative. Subsequently, she was asked: "Dalaga ka na ba?’
(Are you a woman now?), and was told: "I am single too."
Simultaneously, she was touched all over her body including
her breasts, her belly, and her private parts. She was also
kissed on her cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual
advances but Appellant prevailed. She claimed that they
were inside the room for more than one (1) hour.
Thereafter, they went out of the room where Appellant
announced to P03 Danilo Mendez and Aileen Dagoc that
she had already admitted having stolen the necklace. Pale,
AAA was trembling and crying; her hair disheveled, her
dress wet. She also had bruises on her forehead.
The police officers allowed AAA and her mother to go home
on the condition that they would pay the value of the
necklace. Because of AAA’s condition, AAA’s mother
brought her daughter to the Medical Clinic of St. Luke where
AAA was examined by Dr. Manuel Garcia, Sr. 4 Dr. Garcia
gave AAA a tranquilizer to calm down the latter who was
trembling and incoherent. 5 At first, AAA could not answer the
doctor when she was asked what happened to her. Later,
upon regaining her composure, she revealed that she was
electrocuted and sexually molested by petitioner. 6 The
Medical Certificate7 issued by Dr. Garcia disclosed the
following injuries:
1. Slight contusion over occiput region.
2. Slight contusion over center area of forehead.
3. Multiple slight contusions of fingers of bilateral
hands.
4. Multiple slight contusions of bilateral breast
areas.
5. Slight body tremors.
Diagnosis: Slight Physical Injuries
In an Information8 dated August 23, 1999, petitioner was
charged with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness committed
as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, under Art. 336, in relation to
Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the instance of the
complainant AAA, who is 15 years old, whose affidavit is
hereto attached to form part of this Information. The crime is
committed as follows:
That on or about August 14, 1998, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, motivated by lewd
design, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously upon the person
of AAA, by then and there embracing, mashing the breast,
and touching the private part, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial
ensued thereafter.
On May 13, 2003, after trial on the merits, the RTC rendered
a decision finding petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness
with the aggravating circumstance of petitioner’s taking
advantage of his public position and sentenced him to six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to five (5) years, four
(4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional,
as maximum. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
For the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered, finding
accused P03 Benito Sombilon, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, under Article
366 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
from Six (6) months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum to Five
(5) years, Four (4) months and Twenty-one (21) days of
Prision Correccional, as maximum and directed to pay
private complainant AAA the following:
a.) by way of moral Damages, the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00); and
b.) by way of Exemplary Damages, the amount of
ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00).9
From the above decision, petitioner interposed an appeal to
the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40419.
On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered the herein challenged
Decision affirming with modification the RTC’s judgment of
conviction. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position which was adequately
established during the trial, the CA increased the maximum
penalty imposed against petitioner to its maximum period of
six years of prision correccional. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br.
8, Davao City in Criminal Case No. 43, 810-99 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant P03 Benito
Sombilon, as found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under
article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto
mayor as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as
maximum. Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the victim,
AAA, the amount of Php10,000.00 as moral damages and
another Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, with the following
allegations:
I lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ACCUSED IS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
II
ASSUMING BUT NOT ADMITTING, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
APPRECIATION OF THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS
PUBLIC POSITION FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE IN THE
INFORMATION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.11
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming his
conviction for acts of lasciviousness. Even as he admits
having merely touched the victim, petitioner argues that the
act of touching did not constitute lewdness. At most, he
could only be convicted of unjust vexation. Petitioner likewise
asserts that while the victim was being touched, the latter
tried to cover her body with her arms. Lastly petitioner posits
that the police station does not favor the perpetration of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Petitioner’s contention deserves scant consideration.
The crime of acts of lasciviousness as punished under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.- Any person who shall
commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness
under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following essential elements: (1)
that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when
the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age.12
In the case of Amployo v. People, 13 the Court expounded on
the definition of the term lewd, thus:
The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent
or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude
sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or
unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out
such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd
designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves
and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not
a precise definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez we had
already lamented that –
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule
specifically establishing just what conduct makes one
amenable to the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code.
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be
determined from the circumstances of each case. It may be
quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts
are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in
another case to say just where the line of demarcation lies
between such conduct and the amorous advances of an
ardent lover.
Undoubtedly, petitioner committed acts which fall within the
above described lascivious conduct. It cannot be viewed as
mere unjust vexation as petitioner would have the Court do.
The intention of petitioner was intended neither to merely
annoy or irritate the victim nor to force her to confess the
theft. He could have easily achieved that when he
electrocuted the latter. Petitioner intended to gratify his
sexual desires.
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner’s
acts of kissing the victim, fondling her breasts and touching
her private parts constitute lascivious conduct intended to
quench his salacious desire. Petitioner’s lewd intent was
betrayed when he asked AAA, "Dalaga ka na ba?" as a
prelude to his lustful advances on the victim, and thereafter
conveyed to her that "I am single too." We quote with
approval the CA’s ratiocination:
Undeniably, appellant committed lewd acts against AAA.
"Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a
wanton manner. The evidence shows that appellant
committed lewd acts against AAA when he touched her "all
over her body" which includes mashing her breasts, touching
her private parts, and kissing her on the cheek. These acts
were clearly done with lewd designs as appellant even
previously asked AAA, as if it was a prelude for things to
come, "Dalaga ka na ba?" and thereafter conveyed to her
that "he is single too."14
The fact that the victim tried to cover her body with her arms
does not negate petitioner’s lascivious conduct. Petitioner
succeeded in fondling the victim’s breasts intense enough to
cause multiple slight contusions of bilateral breast areas.
As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner employed force and
intimidation against AAA:
Moreover, appellant employed force and intimidation when
he committed these acts on AAA. In fact, as found by the
trial court, appellant pointed a gun at the forehead of AAA as
evidenced by the bruises on her forehead. Further, the
medical Certificate shows that AAA suffered slight physical
injuries which include "multiple slight contusion of bilateral
breast areas" which supports AAA’s claim.15
In People v. Victor,16 the Court held that in cases of acts of
lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation be
irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free
exercise of the will of the offended party. Here, the victim
was locked inside a windowless room together with her
aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a grown
man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint,
what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old
when she was subjected to such atrocity.
Petitioner’s assertion that the locus criminis i.e., the police
station makes it unlikely for him to commit the crime of acts
of lasciviousness is specious. The presence of other
policemen on duty and of the victim’s mother outside the
room where the incident took place does not render
commission of the offense impossible. It has been shown
that there was a room in the precinct which, except for two
doors which could be locked, was totally enclosed. 17 During
the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, petitioner and
AAA were the only persons inside the room. Lust, as we
have often held, is no respecter of either place or time.18
As to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position, petitioner points out that
said circumstance was not alleged in the information. The
Solicitor General shares the same view.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. — The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well
as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically
alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they
cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even,
if they are subsequently proved during trial. 19 A reading of
the Information shows that there was no allegation of any
aggravating circumstance.
In People v. Buayaban, 20 the crime was committed and the
Information was filed in 1990. Still, the Court gave the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactive application since it
benefited the accused and disregarded the generic
aggravating circumstance of band because it was not
alleged in the Information. The Court explained, viz:
Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint
must state the designation of the offense given by the statute
and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating
circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held in People
vs. Nerio Suela that the use of the word "must" in said
Section 9 indicates that the requirement is mandatory and
therefore, the failure to comply with sec. 9, Rule 110, means
that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at
the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such
circumstances are not stated in the information.
In this case, we cannot properly appreciate the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of band in the commission of the
crime since there was no allegation in the information that
"more than three armed malefactors acted together in the
commission of the crime.
Here, the crime was committed in 1998, the generic
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public
position was not alleged in the information. As such, it
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Consequently, the penalty imposed must be modified.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law21 (ISL) states
that (i)n imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed SO ORDERED.
by the Code for the offense. Under Article 366 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision
correccional. Since no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense in this
case, the penalty should be applied in its medium period, the
duration of which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two months, as maximum. The
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree which is arresto mayor, with the duration of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months.1avvphi1

Applying the ISL, the proper penalty would be imprisonment

of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
maximum.22

As to the damages awarded, Article 2230 of the Civil Code

provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Since the generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of public position was not alleged in the
Information against petitioner it cannot be appreciated in the
imposition of the penalty. But as regards the award of
exemplary damages, in the case of People v. Catubig, 23 the
Court declined retroactive application of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:

The retroactive application of procedural rules, nevertheless,

cannot adversely affect the rights of the private offended
party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said
rules. Thus, in the case at bar, although relationship has not
been alleged in the information, the offense having been
committed, however, prior to the effectivity of the new rules,
the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains
unaffected thereby.

Thus, in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement, the

Court affirms the CA’s award of exemplary damages to the
victim in the amount of ₱10,000.00.

With regard to the awarded moral damages in the amount of

₱10,000.00, the same should be increased to ₱30,000.00. In
People v. Solmoro24 we declared that upon a finding of guilt
of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, the amount of
₱30,000.00 as moral damages may be further awarded to
the victim in the same way that moral damages are awarded
to victims of rape even without need of proof because it is
assumed that they suffered moral injury. Considering the
immeasurable pain and anguish that the victim had to suffer
in the hands of the petitioner; the trauma that she had to
endure even after the incident; and the sexual perversity of
petitioner, who is a police officer, the award of moral
damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the

Decision dated July 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding
petitioner P03 Benito Sombilon GUILTY of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code is AFFIRMED with Modification that he is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to
pay the victim the amount of ₱30,000 as moral damages and
₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 182551               July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the Decision1 dated August 21,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00282, which modified the Decision2 dated November 3,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4232. In the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan
y Lamsin was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) separate counts of murder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged
with the crime of double murder in an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the
Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years
old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use
of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided
himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe
Lagera:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking
wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound,
head[,] which wounds caused the death of Felipe Lagera y
Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately thereafter.3
When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Trial, thereafter,
ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V.
Profetana, Municipal Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte; (2)
Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim
Felipe Lagera and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.;5 (3)
Adoracion Lagera, the wife of Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma
Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother of Ranil
Tagpis, Jr.
Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem
examination on the body of the victim Felipe Lagera on
November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three
hacking wounds, the first of which was located at his right
arm and was about 23x2x4 centimeters. The said wound
was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp instrument
such as a bolo. The second wound was located at Felipe’s
"nose maxillary area,"6 measuring 13 centimeters, with an
inverted C shape. The second wound was not fatal and
could have been caused by a sharp-edged instrument like a
bolo. The third wound was located at Felipe’s left arm and
was measured as 9x1x1.5 centimeters. The said wound was
fatal and could have likewise been caused by a sharp-edged
instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded that the causes of death
of Felipe were hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and
multiple hacking wounds. She also conducted a post-mortem
examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the
aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil
sustained a hacking wound at the "fronto-temporal area"7
with a skull fracture. In the case of Ranil, the cause of death
was "hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss
secondary to [the] hacking wound to the head." 8 The
instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.9
Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in
question. She pointed to the accused-appellant as the "Bata
Endong"10 (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and
brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while
Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right
shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the accused-appellant,
the former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the
direction of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the ground.
Carmela said that she saw that a long bolo was used in the
killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe also
owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he
was attacked. She was then inside the house with Felipe and
her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was
sitting about four meters away when the hacking incident
occurred indoors.11
On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the
incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the house
and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench.
Felipe was also there near the bench and he was carrying
Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the accused-
appellant came inside the house in a sudden manner,
Carmela answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil
was indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-appellant
entered the house. She said that no fight or altercation
occurred between Felipe and the accused-appellant. After
Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran outside of the house.
Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the house.12
Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6,
2002, she was at the house of a certain Justiniano Rance.
After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told
her to go home because Felipe had been hacked. She ran
towards the direction of her house. When she got there, she
saw the lifeless body of Felipe sprawled on the ground. She
then went inside the house and found her daughter, Alma
Tagpis, cuddling the body of Ranil whose head was
wounded. She told Alma to look for a motor vehicle to bring
the child to the hospital. She also found out that the other
two children, Carmela and Jericho, hid when they saw Felipe
being hacked. When she asked them who went to their
house, Carmela told her that it was the accused-appellant
who entered their house and hacked the victims.13
Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6,
2002, she was in Brgy. Sogod, having their palay (unhusked
rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and
proceeded to the house of her father, Felipe, where she left
her children. She then met a person looking for her mother
who was about to tell the latter that Felipe was hacked.
When she rushed to Felipe’s house, she saw him lying in the
grassy place, wounded and motionless. She asked Felipe
who hacked him, but he was not able to answer anymore.
She went inside the house and saw blood on the floor and
the feet of her son Ranil. Thinking that the killer was still
inside, she went to the back of the house and pulled a slot of
board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing the
body of Ranil, she took him and ran towards the road. She
was able to bring Ranil to the hospital, but the doctor already
pronounced him dead. Her other two children, Carmela and
Jericho, soon arrived at the hospital with the police. When
she asked them who killed Felipe, Carmela answered that it
was the accused-appellant.14
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following
documentary evidence, to wit: (1) Exhibit A – the Post-
mortem Examination Report on Felipe;15 (2) Exhibit B – the
sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds
sustained by Felipe;16 (3) Exhibit C – the Certificate of Death
of Felipe;17 (4) Exhibit D – the Post-mortem Examination
Report on Ranil;18 (5) Exhibit E – the sketch of the human
anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Ranil;19 and (6)
Exhibit F – the Certificate of Death of Ranil.20
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following
witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond Rance, the stepson of the
accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal,21 the barangay
chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; (3) Arnulfo
Alberca, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the accused-appellant
Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.
Raymond Rance testified that his mother’s name is Marites
Rance. The accused-appellant is not his biological father but
the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He
narrated that on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe
Lagera inside their house. Felipe placed himself on top of
Raymond’s mother, who was lying down. Raymond and his
younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their mother
and they were awakened. His mother kept pushing Felipe
away and she eventually succeeded in driving him out. In the
evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00 p.m., Raymond
recounted that he saw Felipe’s son, Artemio alias Timboy,
inside their house. Timboy was able to go upstairs and kept
trying to place himself on top of Raymond’s mother. The
latter got mad and pushed Timboy away. She even pushed
him down the stairs. The accused-appellant was working in
Manila when the aforesaid incidents happened. Raymond
said that his mother thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently,
he saw the accused-appellant at the house of a certain
Bernie, several days after the accused-appellant arrived in
Leyte. He told the accused-appellant about the incidents
involving Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002,
Raymond and the accused were already living in the same
house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left their
house after they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was
going to call the latter’s mother. Raymond testified that the
accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of his
family. He also stated that the accused-appellant seldom
drank liquor and even if he did get drunk, he did not cause
any trouble.22
Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the
accused-appellant surrendered to him. The latter came to
him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant)
fought with Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human
rights action officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod,
Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused-appellant to the police
station. Afterwards, the police officers came to his place and
he accompanied them to the house of Felipe. 23
Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness
stand to prove that the voluntary surrender of the accused-
appellant was entered into the records of the police blotter.
He was asked to read in open court the Police Blotter Entry
No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact
of voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant. His
testimony was no longer presented, however, since the
prosecution already admitted the contents of the blotter.24
The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara,
Leyte from Manila on August 15, 2002. He went to the house
of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he
learned that his wife went to Manila and his brother was
taking care of his two children and his stepson, Raymond.
On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his
friend, Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latter’s
mother went to Manila and he was told that, while he was
still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house
and tried to place themselves on top of his wife. He then said
that he harbored ill feelings towards the said men but he was
able to control the same for the sake of his children. On
November 6, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house
of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a call to his wife
who was in Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since
he was using the same to cut cassava stems in his farm.
When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was
sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the
accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily
so he first sought shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The
latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After
staying there and drinking for half an hour, the accused-
appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he remembered
that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe
Lagera.25
The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached
the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding chickens. When
Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he
confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife.
Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-appellant had a
bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted to
start a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and
responded that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he
(Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his wife.
Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken
cage at him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. The
accused-appellant then drew his long bolo and hacked
Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter was
already turning and about to run to the house. He also went
inside the house since Felipe might get hold of a weapon.
When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a
second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child
Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered
suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore
such that the blow landed on Ranil. When he saw that he hit aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate. Moreover,
the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on what defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil
Felipe, which landed on the right side of the latter’s neck. Tagpis, Jr. put up against the armed and superior strength of
Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and the accused, but to leave his fate to God.
hacked him again, which blow hit the victim’s upper left arm.
At that time, Felipe was already on the yard of his house and
The circumstance that the attack was sudden and
was about to run towards the road. He then left and
unexpected and the victims, unarmed, were caught totally
surrendered to the barangay chairperson. 26
unprepared to defend themselves qualifies the crime
committed as murder. x x x.
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said
that he was a bit tipsy when he proceeded to Felipe’s house,
After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan
but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after
immediately went to the house of Brgy. Chairman, Renerio
the first hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he
Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to
had no intention to back out because he was thinking that
surrender, because he killed Felipe Lagera and Ramil
the victim might get a gun and use the same against him.
Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his Brgy. Human
The accused-appellant also asserted that when he was
Rights Action Officer, Ricky Irlandez and his Chief Tanod,
about to deliver the second hacking blow, Felipe
Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of
simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and
Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender was
used him to shield the blow. There was a long bolo nearby
corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who
but Felipe was not able to take hold of the same because the
presented to Court the police blotter, under entry No. 5885,
accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted that he had
dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.
a plan to kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the
latter’s house on the day of the attack, he had no intention to
kill him.27 Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the
authorities showed his intent to submit himself
unconditionally to them, to save the authorities from trouble
The defense also presented the following documentary
and expenses that they would incur for his capture. For this
evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 – the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885
reason, he has complied with the requisites of voluntary
dated November 6, 2002;28 and (2) Exhibit 2 – the Civil
surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.] x x x.
Marriage Contract of Rosendo Rebucan and Marites
Rance.29
From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating
circumstances of admission and voluntary surrender credited
On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision,
to the accused are not sufficient to offset the aggravating
convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of double
circumstances of: a) evident premeditation; b) treachery
murder. The trial court elucidated thus:
(alevosia); c) dwelling – the crime was committed at the
house of the victim; d) intoxication – the accused fueled
[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the commission
of the accused] was sexually abused by the father and son of the crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and f) minority, in
Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to avenge his wife’s so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is concerned,
sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as
Felipe did not wither, instead it became stronger, that on the amended. x x x.
6th of November 2002, he armed himself with a sharp long
bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy. Canlampay,
xxxx
Carigara, Leyte where the victim live[d]. Fueled by hatred
and the spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with
his compadre "Enok", he decided to execute his evil deeds In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially
by going to the house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of established the quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the
buying kerosene and once inside the house hacked and accused beyond reasonable doubt.30
wounded the victim, Felipe Lagera who was then holding in
his arm his grandson, one and half years 1 ½ old, Ramil
The RTC, thus, decreed:
Tagpis, Jr.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6,

The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and further
victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a
amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court
premeditated decision and executed with treachery.
found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER
xxxx charged under the information and sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to
the heirs of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the
There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (₱75,000.00) Pesos for
Carmela Tagpis that the victim, Felipe was holding in his
each victim and moral damages in the amount of Seventy-
arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his
Five Thousand (₱75,000.00) Pesos to each; and
house, when the accused entered, and without any warning
or provocation coming from the victim, the accused
immediately delivered several hacking blows on the victim Pay the Cost.31 (Emphases ours.)
giving no regard to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera.
With this precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed
The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic
has no opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful
review and the same was docketed as G.R. No. 161706. 32
The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
briefs.33 In our Resolution34 dated July 19, 2005, we ordered ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
appropriate disposition, pursuant to our ruling in People v. OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A
Mateo.35 Before the appellate court, the case was docketed GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE
as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on III

August 21, 2007, modifying the judgment of the RTC. The
appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
accused-appellant resulted in two separate crimes of murder
INTOXICATION AS A MITIGATING
as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the
CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE
existence of a complex crime of double murder. The Court of
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing
of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. With IV
respect to the ensuant mitigating circumstances, the Court of
Appeals credited the circumstance of voluntary surrender in
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
favor of the accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation
ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
of intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave offense and
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate
DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
court also ruled that the same was attended by the
STRENGTH AND MINORITY.41
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, the Court of
Appeals disposed of the case as follows: The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but
denies that the crime was committed with treachery and
evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
the presence of treachery given that there was no
Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. As modified,
eyewitness who categorically stated that the accused-
accused-appellant is hereby adjudged guilty beyond
appellant attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder for the deaths
them of the means to defend themselves. He brushed aside
of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is hereby
the testimony of Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she was not
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
in a position to say that there was no altercation between
each count of murder he has committed.
him and Felipe, which could have put the latter on guard.
The prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the accused-
The award of civil indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000.00 for appellant intentionally waited for the time when Felipe would
each victim; the award of moral damages is likewise reduced be defenseless before initiating the attack. The fact that he
to ₱50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary damages voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairperson and the
in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of each police and admitted the killings supposedly showed that it
victim.36 was not intentional and he did not consciously adopt the
method of attack upon the two victims. The accused-
appellant similarly rejects the finding of the RTC that there
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the
was evident premeditation on his part since the prosecution
above decision. In a Resolution38 dated February 6, 2008,
failed to prove that he deliberately planned the killing of
the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the case be
Felipe.
forwarded to this Court.

The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the

On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and
incident, he was still unable to control his anger as he just
required the parties to file their respective supplemental
recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by
briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice.39
Felipe and the latter’s son, Timboy. He also avers that he
Thereafter, both parties manifested that they were adopting
was a bit intoxicated when the crime took place so that he
the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals and will no
was not in total control of himself. He claims that he is not a
longer file their respective supplemental briefs.40
habitual drinker and that he merely consumed the alcohol
prior to the incident in order to appease his friend. He
The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of likewise argues that the aggravating circumstance of
errors: dwelling should not have been appreciated inasmuch as the
same was not alleged in the information. Moreover, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
I
cannot be appreciated since he did not deliberately harm or
attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and the death of the latter was
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY accidental. The accused-appellant prays that he should only
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND circumstances of voluntary surrender, immediate vindication
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE of a grave offense and intoxication.
CRIME OF MURDER.
The appeal lacks merit.
II
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an Q: Do you have a brother named Ranil
accused person, the prosecution must establish his guilt Tagpis, Jr?
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
A: Yes sir.
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.42 Ultimately, what the Q: Where is he now?
law simply requires is that any proof against the accused
must survive the test of reason for it is only when the
A: He is dead.
conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime is the
person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction. 43 A
finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s Q: Do you know the circumstance of his
own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of death?
evidence for the defense.44
A: Yes sir.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution
established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were
attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder. Q: Why did he die?

According to Article 24845 of the Revised Penal Code, as A: Because he was hacked by Bata
amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of Endong.
murder if the same was committed with the attendant
circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the Q: Do you know also your grandfather
situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246.46 Felipe Lagera, Jr?
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and A: Yes sir.
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might Q: Where is he now?
make.47 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the A: He is dead also.
attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the
victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend Q: Why did he die?
themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
defend themselves or to retaliate. 48 A: Because he was hacked by Bata
Endong.

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the

testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of Q: Is the person your Bata Endong here
treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant in the court room who hacked your
carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this brother and your grandfather?
regard, we reiterate the established doctrine articulated in
People v. De Guzman49 that: A: Yes sir.

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily COURT INTERPRETER:
on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the
stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin Witness pointing to a person when
line between fact and prevarication that will determine the asked of his name identified himself as
guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be Rosendo Rebucan.
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by
the reviewing court. x x x.50 xxxx

Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not Q: What instrument did the accused use
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining in killing your [brother and] your
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the grandfather?
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted.51 A: Long bolo, sundang.

Carmela testified as follows: Q: Were you able to see that long bolo?

PROS. TORREVILLAS: A: Yes sir.

xxxx
Q: Was your grandfather armed that
time?
A: He has his own bolo but he placed it
on the holder of the long bolo.
Q: Was that long bolo used by your
grandfather?
A: No sir.
xxxx
Q: How far were you to the incident,
when this hacking incident happened?
A: (witness indicating a distance of
about 4 meters).
xxxx
COURT:
Cross.
ATTY. DICO:
Q: You stated awhile ago that your
brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil] and you
and your papo Felipe were at the house
of your papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You mean to say that there were no
other persons present in that house
other than you four (4)?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: So, you were playing that toy camera
inside the room of your papo Felipe?
A: No sir, I was playing then at the side
of the chicken cage.
Q: Is that chicken cage was inside or
outside the house of your papo Felipe’s
house?
A: Inside the house of my grandfather.
xxxx
Q: Was your brother Ranil carried by
your grandfather Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
He was carried by his right arm.
Q: So, you mean to say that your uncle
Endo went inside, it was so sudden?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Because it was sudden, you were not
able to do anything, what did you do?
A: I then cried at that time.
xxxx
Q: But you are sure that when your
uncle Endo entered as you said that
your brother Ramil was carried by your
papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did your uncle Endo and your papo
Felipe fight or was there an altercation?
A: No sir.52
As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly
and categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as the
person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated
that the attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation
between the accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any
provocation, the accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal
hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected
assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any
opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was
carrying his grandson Ranil, the child unfortunately suffered
the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of
Ranil, the trial court likewise correctly appreciated the
existence of treachery. The said circumstance may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in
any manner put up defense against the attack or become
aware of it.53 Furthermore, the killing of a child is
characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is
not shown. For the weakness of the victim due to his tender
years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.54
Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture
on the matter, i.e., that the attack was preceded by a fight
between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be
persuaded by the accused-appellant’s version of the events
in question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the testimony of
children of sound mind is "more correct and truthful than that
of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are likely
to be more observant of incidents which take place within
their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely
more correct in detail than that of older persons." 55 In the
instant case, Carmela was cross-examined by the defense
counsel but she remained steadfast and consistent in her
statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to
distrust the testimony of Carmela.
Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only
contradicts that of Carmela, but some portions thereof do not
also conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the
trial court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of
the human anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit
B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three
hacking wounds that were found on his right arm, at his
"nose maxillary area"56 and on his left arm. On the other
hand, the accused-appellant testified that he delivered four
hacking blows on Felipe, the three of which landed on the
left side of the victim’s abdomen, the right side of his neck
and on his upper left arm. When confronted on the said
apparently conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did
not offer any explanation.57
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals vis-à-vis the nature of crimes committed,
we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant
should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder,
not the complex crime of double murder.

Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a
prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the Court
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
killings of Felipe and Ranil to murder.
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court’s and the period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The
Court of Appeals’ appreciation of the aggravating first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The
premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as second is known as complex crime proper, or when an
clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following offense is a necessary means for committing the other.61
elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he
The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time,
that the instant case falls under any of the two classes of
between determination and execution, to allow himself to
complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.58 It is not enough
clearly and indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and
that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but
Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from the
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts
accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela did
evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be
not contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater
considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance
degree, it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was
must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident
committed as a necessary means for committing and/or
premeditation."59 In the case at bar, the evidence of the
facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the factual
prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident
milieu of the case at bar excludes the application of Article
premeditation since the testimonies they presented pertained
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant should
to the period of the actual commission of the crime and the
be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of murder.
events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed to
In the past, when two crimes have been improperly
adduce any evidence that tended to establish the exact
designated as a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the
moment when the accused-appellant devised a plan to kill
conviction of the accused for the component crimes
Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry out
separately instead of the complex crime.62
the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he
carried out his plan.
In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that the
Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, dwelling,
appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal
minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of
liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender
superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders
absorbed in the latter.60 On the other hand, dwelling, minority
himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and
and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating
(3) the surrender is voluntary. 63 To be sufficient, the
circumstances in the instant case considering that the same
surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner
were not alleged and/or specified in the information that was
clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender
filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised Rules of
unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense
a generic aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated
that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
by the Court unless alleged in the information. This
capturing them.64 The accused-appellant has duly
requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to
established in this case that, after the attack on Felipe and
wit:
Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay
chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this
information shall state the designation of the offense given circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial.
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
We reject, however, the accused-appellant’s contention that
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a
grave offense.
The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the intoxication of the offender shall be taken
into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if
the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. The Court finds that the accused-appellant is
not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication
since his own testimony failed to substantiate his claim of
drunkenness during the incident in question. During his
cross-examination, the accused-appellant himself positively
stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not drunk when he
proceeded to the house of Felipe. 65 He cannot, therefore, be
allowed to make a contrary assertion on appeal and pray for
the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis
thereof.
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be
appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code requires that the act be "committed in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees." The
established rule is that there can be no immediate
vindication of a grave offense when the accused had
sufficient time to recover his equanimity.66 In the case at bar,
the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe
and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave
offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He
testified that he learned of the same from his stepson,
Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on
November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the
attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our
mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time
within which the accused-appellant could have regained his
composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating
circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-
appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the
crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the prosecution failed to prove
the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in both
the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the
presence of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender was properly established in both instances, Article
63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code67 mandates that
the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a
crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.68
The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reduced the aforesaid
amounts to ₱50,000.00 and further awarded the amount of
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.69 Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the
court for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the
victim by reason of the latter’s death. The purpose for
making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim
but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.70 The
award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is provided
under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall
be paid to the offended party.
In People v. Dalisay,71 the Court clarified that "[b]eing
corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes
an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded,
Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of
the award."72
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. The
award of exemplary damages is, however, increased to
₱30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence.
As held in People v. Combate, 73 when the circumstances
surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded
are ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further
orders the award of ₱25,000.00 temperate damages to the
heirs of the two victims in this case. The award of
₱25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder
cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224
of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as
it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven. 74
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with
MODIFICATION the Decision dated August 21, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The
accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found
GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe
Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The
accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the
respective heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil
Tagpis, Jr. the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each
victim, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate
of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the
Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24,
1971, in the Municipality of
Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a
double-bladed dagger, with
evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to
kill, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab
PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
while the latter was in the
performance of his official
duties, inflicting upon him stab
wounds on the different parts
of his body which directly
caused his death.
Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached
appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a
PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had
a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana
appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw
his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed
appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt.
Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside
the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana
and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three
companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971). After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed
appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out
a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote
thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked
appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to
do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him.
Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that
they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up,
appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and
with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest
and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp.
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov.
22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three
companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast
Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who
were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1
1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt.
Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police
Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be
taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than
any of them in going near the combatants and embraced
and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter
wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the
municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30,
1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan.
20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the
latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he
expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds
inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of
the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the following findings,
which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 "
(pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads as follows:

Postmortem findings.
Contrary to law

General:
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean
the following facts:
Fairly developed and
nourished male subject in
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the rigor mortis with postmortem
deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier lividity over the dependent
Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo portions of the body. Pupils
Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was are dilated. Finger and toe tips
having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market are pale. There is an
(pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, exploratory laparotomy
1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, incision at the abdomen,
they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm.
appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their left of the anterior midline,
attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. with eighteen (18) stitches
Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier applied. There are surgical
incisions at the left and right
abdomen, measuring 2 cm.
long, 9 cm. from the anterior
midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5
cm. from the anterior midline
with two (2) stitches applied
and a rubber drain sticking out
of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest,
measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5
cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm.
deep, directed posterior wards
and slightly upwards, passing
superficially between muscles
and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest,
measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9
cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5.
cm. deep, directed posterior
wards, downwards and to the
left, lacerating the muscles at
the 4th intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen,
measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just
left of the anterior midline, 96
cm. above the heel 11 cm.
deep, directed posterior
wards, upwards and to the
left, perforating the greater
curvature of the stomach and
the gastric vessels, grazing
the liver, perforating the
diaphragm and infero-medial
border of the lower lobe of the
right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right
scapular region, measuring 2
by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm.
above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior
aspect of the distal third of the
left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5
cm., just medial to its anterior
midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior
aspect of the proximal
phalange of the right index
finger, measuring 1 by 0.2
cm., just medial to its posterior
midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood
and blood clots accumulated
in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures
applied at a lacerated wound
at the greater curvature of the
stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in
the unaffected organs
internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-
respiratory arrest due to
severe shock and
intrathoracic hemorrhage as a
result of multiple stab wounds
of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels,
liver, diaphragm and lower
lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand,
maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the
accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the market
place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They
had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside
(pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the
accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his
left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt.
Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused
and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt.
Masana approached him and asked him whether he was
Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt.
Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The
accused accepted the invitation so the two moved over to
the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the
accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry.
In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the
accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC.
The accused informed the officer that he had not reported
any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then
asked the accused for his identification card as a member of
the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his
ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that
he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the
Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID
was fake, and after the accused insisted that it was genuine,
Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the
latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his
refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad
and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to
me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to
surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a
gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its
handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his
head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the
accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of
the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer
two or three times and then pushed him away from him and
ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender to the
authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the
Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked
him why his head and face were bloody and he answered
that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp.
86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked
somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal
building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang,
Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic
was just across the street where the municipal building is
located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he
was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the
Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was
detained for two days before he was picked up by the
Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the
121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n.,
Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15,
1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
I
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven
by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence
(People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza,
13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66;
People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80
Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs.
Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification,
the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even
if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48,
57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25
SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66;
People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs.
Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7
2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having
admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the accused
must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of
legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the
deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed unlawful
aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the
handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his
(accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the
deceased because the same was his and he also spent
money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his
(deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of
the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased
to the extent of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol
and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the
accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had
earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of
authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to
use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or
subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to
comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the
offender. Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact
to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the
incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of
fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan.
20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was
the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the
deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to
heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he
might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms.
Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who
initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of
the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the
deceased before he parried the third blow. This claim is
belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked
the accused to show the scar produced by the injuries
inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus
—
Court
Q Where
is that
scar?
(Witness
showing
his right
side of
the head
to the
Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7,
1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused
corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical findings,
Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch,
parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2
inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid
area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed
person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that
before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and
the accused were facing each other. If that was the case,
and considering that the deceased was, according to the
accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why was the
accused hit on the right side of his head and and on his right
ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that
it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of
his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the
latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the scar
but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted.
Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other, and it
appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n.,
Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the
other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right,
side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore,
reject such claim for being improbable, the same being
contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state
witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried
with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force
that appellant bumped his head on the edge of the table
causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was
murder because "it was established by the prosecution that
during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without
giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the
latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal
wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such
a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on
an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it
impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before the
fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14,
Appellee's brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the
cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo
(43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or
treachery is belied by the following testimony of Virgilio Fidel,
star witness for the prosecution:

When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of

COURT
Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal building from the
scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the
authorities, he claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Q What is
Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his the truth?
(Masana's) gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa
where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the
A The
municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he
truth is
was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all
that when
this time, he did not give any written statement, much less
I saw that
inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt.
Floro
Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the
Rodil
lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he
stabbed
claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of
Lt.
the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp.
Guillermo
44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in
Masana,
self-defense, he would surely have so informed the Chief of
Masana
Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief
parried
of Police, who allegedly asked him why his head and face
him and
were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not
his head
tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the
(Rodil's
deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made
head)
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971
bumped
aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long
on the
after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim
edge of a
does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an
afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward table; that
is why he
testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
sustained
and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both
an injury
disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as
and blood
peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to any
oozed
motive that would impel them to distort the truth, must be
from his
afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
head (pp.
8-9, t.s.n.,
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that Jan. 20,
same day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the 1972;
testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present emphasis
during the incident between the appellant and the victim and supplied).
that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the
knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
municipal building.

ATTY.
II
MUÑOZ

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or

Q You
murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of
said that
authority?
Floro
Rodil's Masana
head was might
bumped have
on the been
edge of a strong in
table and parrying.
you saw
blood
xxx xxx xxx
oozing
from his
head, is Q When
that the head
correct? of Rodil
bumped
on the
A Yes,
table, was
sir.
Lt.
Masana
Q Who already
bumped stabbed?
the head
of Rodil
A It could
on the
be that he
table?
was
already
A When stabbed
Masana or he was
parried not yet
his stab stabbed.
with his
hands he
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
accidental
1972; emphasis supplied].
ly
bumped
his head After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the
on the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses,
table. WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were
indeed face to face when the stabbing took place. As such
the attack was not treacherous because the victim was able
Q Is it not
to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the
a fact that
force he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the
Floro
accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing
Rodil is
injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In
much
short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the
bigger
moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself
than Lt.
suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas,
Masana
et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show
that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as
A Yes, to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the same
sir. time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or
retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the
case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it
Q You
show that the accused employed means directly and
mean, by
specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself.
simple
On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within
parrying,
striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were
Floro
police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation
Rodil was
between the accused and the victim about the confiscation
pushed to
by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the
the extent
moment when the victim was about to stand up, the accused
that he
drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in
bumped
the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the
his head
attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance
on the
of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of
table?
evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in
the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed,
A The but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it
force of qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so
Lt. because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code,
alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any wilfully, unlawfully and
of the crimes against the person, employing means, feloniously assault Miss Ester
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend Gonzales, a public school
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to teacher in the school bonding
himself arising from the defense which the offended party of Lian, duly qualified and
might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code]. appointed as such and while
in the performance of her
official duties or on the
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant
occasion therefor, by then and
knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told
there pulling his dagger,
him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot
embraced and kissed. and
be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault
repeatedly trying to embrace
upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason
and kiss the said teacher,
that the information does not allege the fact that the accused
Miss Ester Gonzales. That the
then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim
crime was committed with the
was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply
aggravating circumstances of
alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo
having committed it inside the
Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official
school building and during
duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
school classes.
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of
the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition
of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the Contrary to law.
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such
knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the
And the ruling of the Court was:
information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the
required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating Direct assault is committed 'by
circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the any person or persons who,
victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, without a public uprising, ...
could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt shall attack, employ force, or
or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the seriously intimidate or resist
Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the any person in authority or any
respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." of his agents, while engaged
(par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code). in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such
performance' (See Art. 148,
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the
Revised Penal Code).
person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a By express provision of law
person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People (Com. Act No. 578, now part
vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 of Article 152 of the Revised
Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]). Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1978),
"teachers, professors, and
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29,
persons charged with the
1967), it was held that failure to expressly alleged in the
supervision of public or duly
information that the accused had knowledge that the person
recognized private schools,
attacked was a person in authority does not render the
colleges and universities shall
information defective so long as there are facts alleged
be deemed persons in
therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew
authority, in applying the
that the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the
provisions of article 148." This
information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority
special classification is
reads as follows:
obviously intended to give
teachers protection, dignity,
The undersigned Assistant and respect while in the
Provincial Fiscal accuses performance of their official
Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of duties. The lower court,
Assault upon a Person in however, dismissed the
Authority, committed as information on the ground that
follows: there is no express allegation
in the information that the
accused had knowledge that
That on or about the 29th day
the person attacked was a
of August, 1960, in Barrio
person in authority. This is
Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
clearly erroneous.
Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Complainant was a teacher.
Court, the abovenamed The information sufficiently
accused did then and there alleges that the accused knew
 that fact, since she was in her
classroom and engaged in the
performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she
was so by specific provision of
law. It matters not that such
knowledge on his part is not
expressly alleged,
complainant's status as a
person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance thereof could not
excuse non- compliance on
his part (Article 3, Civil Code).
This article applies to all kinds
of domestic laws, whether civil
or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc,
74 Phil 15) and whether
substantive or remedial
(Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and
necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68
SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault
reads:
That on or about the 17th day
of January, 1974, at Barrio
Languyin, Municipality of
Potillo, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, Ernesto Busto,
Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande
and Jose Astjada each of
whom was armed with a piece
of wood, except Paulo
Coraide conspiring and
confederating together and
mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, box and strike
with said pieces of wood one
Rufino Camonias a
councilman of barrio Languyin
of said municipality, duly
elected and qualified as such
while said councilman was
engaged in the actual
performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is
the lack of allegation in the
complaint or in the information
that the offended party was an
agent of a person in authority
and that such fact was known
to the accused. The absence
of such allegation is fatal in
this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not
a petition for review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid
information against the accused, for the following
considerations:
The Solicitor General in his
comment of November 4,
1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the
accused herein is not on the
merits. There is want of
factual finding upon which
their conviction or acquittal
could have been based.'
It need only be observed that
contrary to the fiscal's
contention, the information
was deficient in that it did not
allege an essential element of
the crime of direct assault that
the accused had knowledge
of or knew the position of
authority held by the person
attacked, viz. that of a barrio
councilman (and hence the
agent of a person in authority
under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No.
1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35
Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77
Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's
Revised Penal Code, 10th
Ed., p. 225].
What was held in People vs.
Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123,
cited by the fiscal is that it is
sufficient that the information
alleged that the accused
knew the position of authority,
held by the offended party, in
that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the
performance of her official
duties, and that it is not
necessary to allege further
that the accused also knew
that such position was that of
a person in authority, since
'this is a matter of law' thus:
Complain
ant was a
teacher.
The
informatio
n
sufficientl
y alleges
that the
accused
knew that
fact, since Zulueta, 1
she was Phil, 254)
in her for
classroo reasons
m and of
engaged expedien
in the cy, policy
performa and
nce of her necessity.
duties. He
therefore
Since the 'decision' of
knew that
acquittal was really a mere
she was a
dismissal of the information
person in
for failure to charge an
authority,
offense and was not a
as she
decision on the merits with
was so by
factual findings as per the trial
specific
judge's own disavowal it is
provision
patent that the fiscal's proper
of law. It
course is not the present
matters
petition but the refiling of a
not that
valid information against
such
respondents-accused, as
knowledg
herein indicated.
e on `his
part is not
expressly ACCORDINGLY, the petition
alleged, is dismissed without prejudice
complain to the refiling of a valid
ant's information against
status as respondents-accused as
a person hereinabove indicated
in (emphasis supplied).
authority
being a
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of
matter of
Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case; because the
law and
information in the former is strikingly similar to the
not of
information in the latter and does not allege facts from which
fact,
inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the
ignorance
person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in
whereof
authority.
could not
excuse
non- The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be
complianc appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt.
e on his Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused
part who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and
(Article 3, therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
Civil
Code).
This The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning,
article and as such, refers to a high social position or standing as a
applies to grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New
all kinds International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged,
of p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or
domestic station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said
laws, officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others
whether (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A.
civil or Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the
penal (De designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in
Luna vs. order to fix his relative position in reference to other officers
Linatoc, in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of
74 Phil. command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments
15) and as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law
whether Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official
substantiv standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale
e or of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or
remedial scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and
(Zulueta Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
vs.
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his
corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30,
1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel
Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk
therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13,
1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling,
7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706,
709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de
Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police
by the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero
88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of
the Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace (People
vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish
consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs.
Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an army
general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court
of Appeals, those "generally considered of high station in life,
on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to
be respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in
social condition between the offender and the offended
party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present"
(Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946
Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C.
lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is
patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime
of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to
public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of
assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused
of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely
murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the
Civil Service Commission, was charged with and convicted
of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel
transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were
charged with and convicted of murder for the death of Army
Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries
inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused
and convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of
District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of
the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police Department
was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to,
public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case
at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that
Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he
was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the
incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who
embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the
dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal
building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even
then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that
he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of
police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the
incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al.
(19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317),
and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that
the term public authority refers to a person in authority and
that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there
is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified
by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in
authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of
the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of
the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why
the phrase public authority should comprehend only persons
in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term
"persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article
14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in
Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a
different meaning for the term public authority, which may
however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain,
barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority
or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now
considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs.
People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer
(People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a
municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26,
1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public
authority or a person in authority; for he is vested with
jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is
specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend
violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than
the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who
are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although
specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided
cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of
police heads and supervises the entire police force in the
municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire
territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than
and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio,
to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the
teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the appellant should therefore be condemned
to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the
penalty prescribed for homicide.

WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY
OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE
OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK,
APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO
SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL
AS MAXIMUM.

THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS

HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,

concur.

Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its
SUPREME COURT Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
Manila which follows:

EN BANC PREMISES CONSIDERED,

We find that the guilt of the
accused Amado Daniel has
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and he
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, should accordingly suffer the
vs. penalty for the crime herein
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant. charged.

Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant. We find, however, that the

sentence imposed the
accused in the judgment
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor appealed from is not in
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon accordance with law.
for appellee.

Republic Act No. 4111, which

took effect on June 20, 1964,
amended Article 335 of the
MUÑOZ PALMA, J: Revised Penal Code,
providing that —
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old The crime
Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape
of rape alleged to have been committed as follows: shall be
punished
by
That on or about the 20th day reclusion
of September, 1965, in the perpetua.
City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the Wheneve
herein accused, armed with a r the
sharp instrument and by crime of
means of force and rape is
intimidation, did then and committe
there willfully, unlawfully and d with the
feloniously have carnal use of a
knowledge of the deadly
undersignedcomplaint, weapon
against her will, and in her or by two
own room situated at No. 25 or more
Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, persons,
Baguio City. the
penalty
shall be
That in the commission of the reclusion
crime, the aggravating perpetua
circumstance that it was to death.
committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, the latter
not having givenprovocation Under Section 17 of Chapter
for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
record) (Republic Act No. 296, as
amended) —
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte,
after due trial rendered its decision on May 30, 1966, finding The Supreme Court shall
the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more have exclusive jurisdiction to
than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion review, revise, reverse, modify
temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) or affirm on appeal, as the law
DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1 or rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts as herein
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been provided, in —
denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the case
was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
 (1) All criminal cases involving case had been brought before
offenses for which the penalty it on appeal.
imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which
evoked different, and We may say, strong reactions from the
WHEREFORE, We hereby Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall
certify this case to the not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the
Supreme Court for Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of
appropriate further facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed
proceedings pursuant to law. 2 upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so
as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals
the case was certified to this Court and in a Resolution of From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief
March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3 Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the following pertinent
portions:
Preliminary question —
The jurisdiction of this Court
predicated upon the opinion of
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary
the Court of Appeals, as
question which strikes at the very root of a long standing
provided in the above-quoted
practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so
provisions of the law, must of
since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
necessity defend upon the
correctness of that opi nion
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in There is nothing in the law
a criminal case where the offense is punishable by reclusion precluding this Court from
perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with exercising ing its authority to
findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without pass upon such question
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the which concerns its own
appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of jurisdiction. And in order that
the Rules of Court?5 this Court may exercise its
power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, its order f certification such
expresses the view that for this Court to acquire jurisdiction findings of facts as are
over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed necessary to support its
on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or conclusion that either life
death as the facts warranted. imprisonment or death is the
penalty to be imposed. This is
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this indeed covered by Rule 52,
Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that the section 3, which provides th
dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is where a court to which an
in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests appeal has been taken has no
jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal. appellate jurisdiction over lic
case and it certifies the same
to the proper court, it must do
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a so "with a specific and clear
case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals statement of grounds
without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was therefor." the requirement of
"on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill with and specific grounds is
this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the precisely a device to prevent
Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by erroneous transmissions of
tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper jurisdiction from a lower to a
procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying superior court.
cases to this Court under Section 145-K of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52
which read: Furthermore, the words "shall
refrain from entering judgment
thereon" appearing in the
Whenever in any criminal provision above quoted, are
cases submitted to a division sufficient indication that the
the said division should be of Court of Appeals, at the time
the opinion that the penalty of of certifying the case to this
death or life imprisonment Court, had already examined
should be imposed, the said the evidence and was ready
Court shall refrain from to render judgment on the
entering judgment thereon merits, but having found from
and shall forthwith certify the the facts established by proof
case to the Supreme Court for that the penalty to be imposed
final determination, as if the is either death or life
 imprisonment, instead of
entering judgment thereon , it
certifies the case to the
Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the
Certification is the only ground
for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not
only conclusions of law but
also findings of fact, the latter
being more important than the
former for they supply the real
basis for determining
jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be
compared with cases coming
directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life
imprisonment or death penalty
is imposed, for in such cases,
if we assume jurisdiction even
where the judgment appears
to be erroneous on its face, it
is because the Court of First
Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by
rendering judgment on the
merits containing both findings
of fact and conclusions of law,
and under such circumstance
it is more practical for the
administration of the law that
this Court should exercise its
appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and
correcting all errors both of
fact and of law that might
have been committed by the
trial court. But here, the Court
of Appeals is refraining from
rendering judgment on the
merits and is refusing to
complete the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction because
it believes that such
jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it
proceeds to transfer the case
to this Court. lt is in that
transfer that we believe we
may intervene in order to
prevent an erroneous transfer,
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 145-K of the
Administrative Code is merely
a method designed to make
effective the appellate
jurisdiction of both the Court
of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to
the law of jurisdiction (section
138, Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3
and 259), offenses, for which
the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the
same occurrence or
committed on the same
occasion, come within the
appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and the
remaining offenses fall within
the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so
hold, therefore, that in a case
like this, the Court of Appeals,
in certifying it to this Court,
must state its findings of fact
necessary to support its
conclusion that the penalty to
be imposed is either life
imprisonment or death. While
this Court will not review the
findings of fact, it will pass
upon the correctness of the
legal conclusions derived
therefrom. And if this Court
finds the conclusions to be
correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds them to
be wrong, the case will be
returned to the Court of
Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra,
emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court
considered that there was substantial compliance with the
law as the order of certification made reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose
brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant the
conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon
the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and
Briones concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred
with the principle that the Court of Appeals is bound to make
its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine
whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that
portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was
of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to
the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and
dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it was
necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to
state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life
imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented
from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be
returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this
Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion,
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to
decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice
Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon
who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice
Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further
than that ruled in Ramos — that is, for the Court of Appeals
not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but
also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or
death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our
appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the
letter and spirit of the law which confers on the Supreme
Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and
impose the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where
the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases
in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."9
This jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not
be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National
Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn
provides that the foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of
jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given
to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of
Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should
be imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
x x x           x x x          x x x
rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that
reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the
crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation
considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to
impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering
judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as
the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8,
Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of
judgment" presupposes a final judgment — final in the sense
that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or
appellate court within the reglementary period. A judgment in
a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. 12 It is only
then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or
recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12,
second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of Appeals
from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be
entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court when the decision being
certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished
from appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is
a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is
simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final
determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of
facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive
and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness
of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v.
Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the
offense committed.

Whenever in any criminal
case submitted to a division
the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of
death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said
court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon
and shall forthwith certify the
case to the Supreme Court for
final determination, as if the
case had been brought before
it on appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule
cited does not charge the
appellate court with the duty
of imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or death.
All that the Rule requires is
that should the Court of
Appeals be of the opinion that
death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, it "shall
refrain from entering judgment
thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering
judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase
shall refrain from rendering judgment " there would be no
cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent
of the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the
Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible
contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its
implementation under the phraseology used. It is incumbent
upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was
conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the
prosecution consists solely of the testimony of the offended
party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the
time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on
the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape
duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in
the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this
case is Margarita Paleng who
was born on November 20,
1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon).
She is a native of
Balangabang Tublay,
Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12,
Id.) At the time of the incident
in question on September 20,
1965, complainant was
temporarily boarding at a
house located at Pinsao
Guisad Baguio City, as she
was then a first year high
school student at the Baguio
Eastern High School (pp. 3,
12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at
about three o'clock in the
afternoon, she had just arrived
in the City from Tublay in a
Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon).
Because it was then raining
and the bus was parked
several meters away from the
bus station, she waited inside
the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After
about three minutes of
waiting, the accused came
and started molesting her by
inquiring her name and getting
hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24,
Id.). But she did not allow him
to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.).
She called the attention of the
bus driver and the conductor
about the actuation of the
accused, but it seemed that
the former were also afraid of
him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the
bus and went to ride in a jeep
parked some 100 meters
away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The
accused closely followed her
(p. 4, Id.). When the jeep
started to go, the accused
also rode and sat beside her
(p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached
Guisad, she alighted on the
road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten
meters (p. 5, Id.). The
accused also alighted and
again he tried to carry her bag
(p. 5, Id.). Although he was
not allowed to carry her bag,
her was adamant in following
her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house,
she opened the door and was
about to close it when the
accused dashed in and closed
the door behind him (pp. 31-
32, Id.). When she entered
her room, the accused went in
(p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger
eight inches long and
threatened her: "If you will
talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.).
Margarita was stunned into
silence because of her fear (p.
i Id.). Thereupon, the accused
held her hair with his left hand
and forced her Lo lie down in
bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed
his left hand with a
handkerchief in Margarita's
mouth, at the same time
holding the dagger and her
neck with his right hand (pp.
7-8, Id.). She was forcibly
made to the down and, at this
moment, the accused
removed the buttons of his
pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put
down the dagger on tile bed
(p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to
extricate herself from the
accused was to no avail assile
was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall
and weighed about 95 to 100
pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the
accused was 5 ft. and 7
inches tall and weighed about
126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.).
He then held his penis (pp. 8.
36, Id.), used his thigh to
separate the legs of Margarita
(p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to
remove her panty (p. 36, Id.).
He nonetheless guided his
penis and inserted it inside the
vagina of the complainant
after prying open the part of
her panty covering her private
parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he
succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of the offended
party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she
recovered, he was already
gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her
father came to visit her. She
confided to him the terrible
misfortune which befell her
(pp. 9-10, Id.). She was
immediately brought to the
Baguio General Hospital
where she was examined (p.
10, Id.). Then they proceeded
to the Police Department. The
Chief of Police accompanied
them to the Health Center
where she was again
examined by Dr. Perfecto O.
Micu who thereafter submitted
his medical report (Exh. C; p.
3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.).
Margarita and her father gave
their respective statements
before the police authorities
(Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11,
t.s.n.). She signed her criminal
complaint prepared by the
Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh.
A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp.
2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called
to the witness stand and he testified on the physical
examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng
on September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the
report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type
with healing lacerations at
6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00
o'clock positions in the face of
a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of
the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00
o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and
hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and
vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative
for spermatozoa and for gram
negative intra or extra-cellular
diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI
record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further
declared that the condition of the hymen revealed that
Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident
complained of, and that the number of lacerations and
contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of
force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita
were acquainted with each other since 1963, and there were
occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident
of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with
the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he
had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred
inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would
marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint
against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent
reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial court
which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter
had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified
the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the
complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-year
old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that
could only bring down on her and her family shame and
humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity
among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It
cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this
nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing
experience of submitting to a physical examination of her
body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in
court for the hearing where she has to unravel lewd and
hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to
forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego
all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the
situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of
speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because
appellant had not married the girl although he promised to
marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965,
Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and was
not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal
impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the
complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay
who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit
to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that
Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract the
attention of other people before she reached her boarding
house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were
people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the
market place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl
took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the
neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters
away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek
help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well
aware all the time from the moment she saw the appellate
inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or
raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to
hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and
the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two
did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked
from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw
appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was
following her. To a question propounded by His Honor
whether she suspected that appellant was following her,
Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the
street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular
moment the appellant was not doing anything against her.
And when Margarita reached the boarding house there were
no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her
room and it was at that particular moment when appellant
barged into the room before she could close the door. In
short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the
forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-
inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that
— some may manifest an aggressive or violent attitude of
confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others,
like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful
attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer
any resistance to the acts of the accused at the time the
latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the
medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital
injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress
and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and
destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward and
positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer
in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet
21 and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in
accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance.
Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, As to the N.B.I. lie detector
and weighed around 95 lbs.21 test report, the Court does not
put much faith and credit on it.
It is well known that the same
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but
is not conclusive. Its efficacy
be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result,
depends upon the time, place
all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is
and circumstances when
beside the point. 22
taken and the nature of the
subject. If subject is hard and
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is the circumstances, as in this
sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. instant, were not conducive to
Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old affect the subject emotionally,
girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior the test will fail. The subject
physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of had nothing more to fear
rape the Court held: because the trial was over. He
was not confronted by the
victim or other persons whom
It is a doctrine well he had a reason to fear.
established by the courts that Naturally, his reaction to the
in order to consider the questions propounded was
existence of the crime of rape normal and unaffected and
it is not necessary that the the apparatus could not detect
force employed in it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
accomplishing it be so great
or of such character as could
not be resisted; it is only To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape
necessary that the force used with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
by the guilty party be sufficient circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the
to consummate the purpose offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a
which he had in view. (4 Phil. bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all
434, 437 citing Judgment May intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in
14, 1878, Supreme Court of Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under
Spain. The Villarosa doctrine the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or
has been followed in dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place
numerous cases involving the is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect
crime of rape and one of the and uphold.
latest is People v. Equec,
1977, per Justice Enrique
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death
Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a
relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of
parties and their relation to each other. 23
conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as charged,
and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the perpetua and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by
victim and the latter submits herself against her will because way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand
of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.
Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and
with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for
Decision Modified.
help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance
Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant
was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24 SO ORDERED.

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty.

Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in 1965 was
the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily
submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of
Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in
appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the
questions propounded to him one of which was whether he
forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with
him and the reply was "No". 25

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and

conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision the
following:
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that
proof beyond reasonable doubt has been
adduced; it is also essential that the accused
has been duly afforded his fundamental rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty
before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape
under a criminal complaint, which read:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by
her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas,
of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994,
in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
while armed with a knife and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Paraaque, Metro Manila
August 8, 1994
(SGD) MANUEL P. BERMAS
Complainant
Assisted by:
(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother1cräläwvirtualibräry
Evidence was adduced during trial by the
parties at the conclusion of which the lower
court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G.
Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May
1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged and sentencing him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the
case has reached this Court by way of
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22
of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as
An Act To Impose Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other
Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes,
which took effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, gave an account, rather
briefly, of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela
Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was
lying down on a wooden bed inside their house
at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8,
Paraaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN, Oct. 19,
1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed
the victim's shorts and panty, placed himself
above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and
conducted coital movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.).
After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire,
he threatened the victim with death if she
reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically
examined at the NBI, which yielded the
following findings:
"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of
extragenital physical injuries noted on the body
of the subject at the time of examination; 2.
Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice
wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average sized,
adult, Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any hymenal
laceration."2cräläwvirtualibräry
The defense proffered the testimony of the
accused, who denied the charge, and that of his
married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who
attributed the accusation made by her younger
sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The
trial court gave a summary of the testimony
given by the accused and his daughter
Luzviminda; viz:
The accused vehemently denied that he has
ever committed the crime of rape on her
daughter, the complainant. He told the Court
that he could not do such a thing because he
loves so much his daughter and his other
children. In fact, he said that he even
performed the dual role of a father and a
mother to his children since the time of his
separation from his wife. The accused further
told the Court that in charging him of the crime
of rape, the complainant might have been
motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the
numerous scoldings that she has received from
him on account of her frequent coming home
late at night. The accused stressed that he
knew of no other reason as to why his
daughter, the complainant, would ever charge
him of the crime of rape except probably in
retaliation for being admonished by him
whenever she comes home late in the night.
The married daughter of the accused, who
testified in his behalf, denied that the
complainant was raped by the accused. She
said that the complainant did not come home in
the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a
liar. She told the Court that the concoction by
the complainant of the rape story is probably
due to the resentment by the latter of the
frequent scoldings that she has been receiving
from the accused. She further added that she
was told by the previous household employer of
the complainant that the latter is a liar. She
went on to testify further that she does not
believe that the accused, who is her father,
raped the complainant, who is her younger
sister.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995,
found the case of the prosecution against the
accused as having been duly established and so
ruled out the defense theory of denial and
supposed ill-will on the part of private
complainant that allegedly had motivated the
filing of the complaint against her father. The
court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the
DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant
in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and to pay the costs.
4
"SO ORDERED." cräläwvirtualibräry
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel
Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in
collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force), detailed several errors allegedly
committed by the court a quo; thus:
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS.
A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND
VIGILANT COUNSEL
1. The trial court did not observe the correct
selection process in appointing the accused's
counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to
the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the
information on the ground of illegal arrest;
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the
information on the ground of invalid filing of
the information;
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary
investigation;
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained
change in the case number;
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the
accused;
b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de
officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the
accused.
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND
FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS
INVALID.
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE
WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT."5cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court, after a painstaking review of the
records, finds merit in the appeal enough to
warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994
Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age,
assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas,
executed a sworn statement before SPO1
Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Paraaque Police
Station, stating, in sum, that she had been
raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her
own father, in 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03
August 1994, particularly the subject matter of
the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, duly
signed and filed conformably with Section 7,
Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second
Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to
the effect that the accused had waived his right
to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03
October 1994, the accused was brought before
the trial court without counsel. The court
thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C.
Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be
the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith
pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19
October 1994. The prosecution placed
complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness
stand. She testified on direct examination with
hardly any participation by defense counsel
who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-
examination and then asked the court to be
relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court
would allow me and my paero besides me,
would accede to my request that I be relieved
as counsel de officio because I could not also
give justice to the accused because as a lady
lawyer . . . if my paero here and if this
Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT:
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless
and the defenseless. That is your sworn duty,
Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN:
That is why I am asking this Honorable
Court."6cräläwvirtualibräry
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty.
Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel
de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately
allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it
should be quite evident, however, that he
barely had time, to prepare therefor. On this
score, defense counsel Fernandez& Kasilag-
Villanueva in the instant appeal would later
point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney
recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be
appointed as defense counsel de oficio. And so
the trial court appointed him.
Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess
before he began his cross examination,
presumably to prepare. But a ten minute
preparation to cross examine the complainant
upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict
on the accused who stands to be meted the
death penalty if found guilty, is far too
inadequate. He could not possibly have
familiarized himself with the records and
surrounding circumstances of the case, read
the complaint, the statement of the
complainant, the medico-legal report, memos
of the police, transcripts and other relevant
documents and confer with the accused and his
witnesses, all in ten
minutes.7cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after
the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was
scheduled for 12 December 1994; it was later
reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was
called on 09 January 1995, the following
transpired:
COURT:
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT:
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is
supposed to be the turn of the defense to
present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already
rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this
case and considering that the accused is under
detention ... it seems he cannot comply with his
obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS:
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present
its evidence in this case. In view of the fact
that the defense counsel is not interested
anymore in defending the accused because last
time he moved for the continuance of the
hearing of this case and since this time he did
not appear, he is unduly delaying the
proceedings of this case and considering the
accused here is under detention, I think it
would be better if the Court appoints another
lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is
not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio
has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court to
defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby
constrained to appoint another counsel de
officio to handle the defense of the accused.
For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is
hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for
accused Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas.8cräläwvirtualibräry
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to
16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty.
Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself
asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but
later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de
officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer
from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to give
her my responsibility as counsel de officio
considering that the lawyer from the PAO ...
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was
not around. If the Court will allow us to be
relieved from our responsibility as appointed
counsel de officio of the accused ...
COURT:
You want to be relieved of your responsibility
as appointed counsel de officio? As an officer of
the Court you don't want to handle the defense
of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME:
I will be withdrawing my previous
manifestation that I be relieved of my
responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT:
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME:
Yes, Your Honor.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first
to be put at the witness stand. He denied the
accusation against him. The next witness to be
presented was his married daughter who
corroborated her fathers claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took
over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one
reason or another, had ceased to appear for
and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most
regrettably, that accused-appellant has not
properly and effectively been accorded the
right to counsel. So important is the right to
counsel that it has been enshrined in our
fundamental law and its precursor laws.
Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935
Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused
has already been recognized under General
Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that
a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is
entitled to counsel at every stage of the
proceedings,1010 and that if he is unable to
employ counsel, the court must assign one to
defend him.1111 The 1935 Constitution has no
less been expressive in declaring, in Article III,
Section 17, thereof, that -
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia,
the right to counsel under the 1973
Constitution, essentially, has remained
unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a
worthwhile innovation that has been
introduced is the provision from which
prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of
the right to counsel as early as the stage of
custodial interrogation can be deemed to be
predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and
14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states
- aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
xxx
Sec. 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which
declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it
is a right of the accused at the trial to be
present in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in
the defense of an accused in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly. 1212
Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado, 1313
explained:
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given an opportunity to
be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of the law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is
for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it so
implemented that under our rules of procedure
it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he
so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."1414cräläwvirtualibräry
In William vs. Kaiser,1515 the United States
Supreme Court, through the late Justice
Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused
needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of
overzealous prosecutors, of the laws
complexity or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment. An accused must be given the
right to be represented by counsel for, unless
so represented, there is great danger that any
defense presented in his behalf will be as
inadequate considering the legal perquisites
and skills needed in the court proceedings. 1616
The right to counsel proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard
before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a persons basic rights;
it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.
The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the
trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind
of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance
by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.1717
It is never enough that accused be simply
informed of his right to counsel; he should also
be asked whether he wants to avail himself of
one and should be told that he can hire a
counsel of his own choice if he so desires or
that one can be provided to him at his
request.1818 Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The
court, considering the gravity of the offense
and the difficulty of the questions that may
arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only
such members of the bar in good standing who,
by reason of their experience and ability may
adequately defend the accused. But in localities
where such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for
probity and ability, to defend the accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his
utmost.1919 A mere pro-forma appointment of
de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect
the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation.2020 The exacting demands
expected of a lawyer should be no less than
stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He
must take the case not as a burden but as an
opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation
of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this
responsibility except only for the most
compelling and cogent reasons.2121
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the
court a quo for trial on the basis of the
complaint, aforequoted, under which he was
arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby
appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public
Attorney's Office, Paraaque, Roberto Gomez
and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED
for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as
members of the Bar and are warned that any
similar infraction shall be dealt with most
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R.

No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March 1999,
this Court has said:

We cannot right finis to this discussion without

making known our displeasure over the manner
by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their
duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest
disinterest on the plight of their client.

xxx

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve
his client with utmost dedication, competence
and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
this regard renders him administratively liable.
Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed
defense lawyers did not protect, much less
uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.
Instead, they haphazardly performed their
function as counsel de oficio to the detriment
and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno,
however guilty he might have been found to be
after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise
Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to
adhere closely and faithfully to the tenets
espoused in the Code of Professional
Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any
similar act in the future will be severely
sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct

the remand of the case to the court a quo for
new trial.
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20Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. L-No. 5292            August 28, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Ramon Diokno for defendant.

TORRES, J.:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway
of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris.
Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man,
ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named
Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to
enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The
Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime
escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former
died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and
proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year,
sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case
has been submitted to this court for review.

From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403
of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked,
receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to start for
the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him
by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee
from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack the
violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances
enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for the greatest punishment.

When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had
died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had
directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a
lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty
woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal
and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was
seated in front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin
that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further
stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the crime in question has been
unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible
exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that
account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under any consideration be
accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the
very people who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can
never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the
punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken
into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime
has already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him
by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be
rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge
that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he
was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit.
Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he might be caught and
punished in the act of committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to
comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which,
under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by
wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did
not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse
deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered,
does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the
perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect
nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received
the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise,
premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter
might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime
was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan
to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime,
once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision
on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also
different from the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his
criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the
victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent
death of a human being without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the
concurrent circumstances.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is
our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be
executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be
sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma. Rosario Quetulio Losa for
plaintiff-appellee.

Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock in the morning of June 9,
1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora
Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the
ground at the base of the coconut tree.

His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance of about twenty-five meters,
she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of
the coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away from him.

She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known
Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other
malefactors.

Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired
at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse
of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was
prostrate, he was already dead.

On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his own nipa hut which was about
ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out
of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado
Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he
was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to flee to her hut when Sangalang and his companions
fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut and went to see her dead husband, who was
lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his
children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to
the chief of police who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.

The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body,
fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).

On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police. They executed sworn
statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio
Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she knew those persons because from time to time they used to
pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed
on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in
the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been
apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral
damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.

The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He
declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.

As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos
which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The
next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He
and Mendoza then went to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the
evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.

In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's
brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five
armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects
the ever recurring conflict in criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.

The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even
visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police
and when he was summoned at the preliminary investigation.

Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which
are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be
attributed to deficiencies in observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and confusing questions during cross-
examination, or to the defective translation of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit
falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350).

The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to
them, among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.

The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were
impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .

Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution. He made a spirited defense
of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.

The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He was not expecting to be
assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed
a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The
qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16], Revised Penal
Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., took no take part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 82, convicting1 accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating circumstances and
sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:

That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent. 2

When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Trial
thereupon ensued.

The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision under review, thus:

The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified
that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a physical examination and medico genital
examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower
jaw or on the mandibular area left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia majora and
minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a normal appearance as a result of
several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit A).

The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who testified that on August 26, 1995
at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man
whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his
hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything.
Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing
the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was
told to undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her.
Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the
mans penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into her
anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up. All these acts of the man hurt her.
After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After the man had finished
inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as
he was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that lahat ng
nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his penis and fingers into
her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the
man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke.
She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and
ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that she
killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she was raped.
They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to be accused
Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened to her to the police; and
was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal Officer for examination.

On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as housemaid, she went to her
friends house named Patrick because she brought mongo and because she and Patricks wife Inday, are friends, arriving in
the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle
Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patricks house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she
saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and
son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In
entering the house were she slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her
because they were sleeping and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid
because she was boxed on her chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the
garage, which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also undressed himself.
While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack
him if he is my sweetheart.

The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police Station who testified that she
came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was
brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the
Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she conducted an investigation. Based
on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26,
1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to
go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was
told to undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where
suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape
Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because they were sweethearts.

Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI Village, Municipality of Makati,
fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma together with many other laborers, somebody told him that his wife
was waiting for him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua;
and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda
Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in partner for
almost a year came out, in an angry mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was
late. He explained that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he will call her by
phone or write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the
neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita
went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the vacant house, it was closed, so
they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was surprised why
Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez
concocted the story of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.

On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General Romeo Icarma (the house
where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In
February 1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita
became sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only
meet during Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he used to call then at her telephone numbers which
are 6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each other at Gen. Icarmas place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when
the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place because they were told
to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away from the house of Gen.
Icarma, Nita came, looking for him. Because Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to
the house of Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy
Abella told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascuas place, he met
Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who
were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablons house, he brought
Nita to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and ashamed to stay at Ablons
house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablons place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go
back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if anything
happens to her, her daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to Gen. Icarmas
house because it is crowded and the Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They went to the
Colonels house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying banig, pillow and blanket, and did not
notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the
house on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife. When hacked, he just said aray.
The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen
knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonels house because he went to another house, where
he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military Police. He
did not leave the colonels house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at
5:00 in the morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand
and pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file a
complaint against Nita for hacking him.3

In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, penalized
by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of
P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.4

Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the imposition of the death penalty
decreed by the trial court; he contends that -

I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.5
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have been previously reviewed by
the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people, each testifying on the same incident but making a clearly
discordant testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to have
taken place, extreme care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the accused. The
doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses
and, in the usual words of similar import employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court
which has heard the evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or misappreciated
which if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case. 6 Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such
exceptive instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case.

Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and by this Court as well, of
what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 oclock
midnight?

A At Fort Bonifacio.

Q What city or municipality?

A I do not know but it must be here sir.

Q Meaning Makati City?

A Yes sir.

Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?

A I was sleeping in my friends residence.

Court:

Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?

A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.

Q Why were you there at that time?

A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my friend sir.

Court: Proceed fiscal:

Pros. Manola:

Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati City do you
recall of any unusual incident that happened?

A There was sir.

Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?

A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a man who entered the house
where I was sleeping.

Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.

Q What else happened after that?

A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I will not obey him he will be
going to kill me sir.

Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?

A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.

Q Did you climb over the fence?

A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.

Q Were you able to go over the fence?

A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.

Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?

A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.

Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?

A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off my clothes he embraced me
and kissed me sir.

Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?

A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.

Q Did you obey him?

A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.

Court:

Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for you to undress?

A Yes sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that vacant house and to undress why
did you follow this instruction?

A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.

Q Why do you say that he might kill you?

A He like to rape me sir.

Court:

Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?

A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.

Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?

A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.

Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?

A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis to my vagina sir.

Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.

Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my private parts going it and out sir.

Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.

Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according to you lie down after he put
his fingers inside your private part?

A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.

Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?

A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.

Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?

A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want me to tell it to anybody
because he have raped many.

Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be able to recognize him?

A Yes sir I could recognize him.

Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?

Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked his name answered as
Rolando Alfanta.

Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando Alfanta uttered the words lahat
nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?

A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in the chest sir.

Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.

Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?

A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the soldiers were.

Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?

A Yes sir.

Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?

A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.

Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you you have killed a person what
happened next?

A We went to the person who raped me sir.

Q And did you see him there?

A Yes sir.

Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?

A The soldiers sir.

Q Did you find this person who raped you?

A Yes sir.

Q What was he doing?

A He was lying down sir.

Q What happened after that?

A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.

Q Who brought him to the hospital?

A The ambulance of the soldier.

Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with what you have just narrated or
told or testified to this afternoon?

A I could remember.

Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?

A Yes sir.

Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office consisting of two pages kindly go over it
and tell us if you recognize this statement?

A Yes sir I could recognize this.

Q Is that your statement

A Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx.

Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see this bolo again would you be
able to recognize it again?

A Yes sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is presented by the policeman who is
in custody of this bolo.

Court:

Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the accused did you bring it also?

A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.

Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?

A Yes sir.

Q How did you ask for help?

A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.

Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?

A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.

Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?

A None sir.

Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part?

A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.

Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?

A He forced that to insert it.

Q Forced it to where?

A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.

Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?

A Yes sir I feel it sir.

Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?

A I do not know him.

Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?

A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house of my friends where I was
sleeping.

Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?

A Only me sir.

Prosecutor Manola:

Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the knife how many times have
you stabbed him with the knife?

A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.

Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you hacked him how many
times have you hacked him?

A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill me.

Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.

Court: Cross-examination.

Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

Court: Proceed.

Atty. Manalo:

Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?

A One of their children so there were three and I was one.

Q Were you sleeping in one room?

A I was sleeping in the sala sir.

Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?

A It was closed but it was not locked.

xxx xxx xxx.

Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could already at the house of your
employer?
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.

Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your friend?

A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.

Q By the way what time did you go there?

A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.

Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?

A 6:30 sir.

Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt?

A Yes sir.

Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place isnt?

A Three rides sir.

Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping at the time the place where
you were sleeping or the place of the room where the owner of the house were sleeping?

A First it is the sala where he passed.

Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed in that door like a wood?

A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.

Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?

A Patrick sir.

Q And how are you related to Patrick?

A His wife is my friend sir.

Q What is the name of his wife?

A Inday sir.

Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your friend Inday did you not shout
when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?

A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he placed his hands on my mouth
sir.

Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you boxed by the accused on the
chest?

A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.

Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
A Yes sir.

Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her mouth.

Q Was it strong?

A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.

Note: Witness holding on his left chin.

Q How about on the chest?

Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.

A It was not too strong sir.

Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?

A Yes sir.

Q Where?

A I fell on the ground down.

Q Where were you boxed by the accused?

A Outside sir of the house.

Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q And you followed him?

A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was afraid because he was holding a
bolo sir.

Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?

A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.

Q Was it lighted the place?

A None sir.

Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?

A Near sir.

Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?

A Yes sir.

Q How big?

Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.

Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.

Court: Answer

A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.

Atty. Manalo:

Q And then you lie down?

A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.

Q Was he still holding the bolo?

A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.

Q How did you see him?

A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he was holding the bolo.

Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.

A When I cried he was on top of me sir.

Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?

A He was molesting me sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?

A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.

Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?

A I saw him that he was passing.

Q Where were you at the time?

A I was seating by the window sir.7

The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and relatively free from any serious
flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial court has erred in
giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence adduced to show that the
complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court
repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test of credibility, 8 for it is said that no woman in her right mind
will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant to the
prosecution of the case, unless the story were true.9

Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been lived-in partner for almost a
year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain Air Force officer,
accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to
negate any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where the victim was
sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto
Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son) who could have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door
of the house was purposely left unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when the
victim was made to climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.

The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy, often resorted to as a last ditch
effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or
any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant and the complainant. The
latter testified:

Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?

A No sir.

Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?

A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?

Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because your sweetheart was then
womanizing?

Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.

Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.

Court: Answer.

A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.

Atty. Manalo:

Q Really?

A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir. 10

It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty reasons. The trial court
was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:

This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for such a claim
defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the
manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate
the outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in stabbing and hacking
him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way she did. 11

Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the house where victim was
sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close to midnight when the incident occurred, and the
other occupants of the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-
appellant immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill her
if she dared refuse to yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into
submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect the victim to act
with equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat made by accused-
appellant.12

The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted accused-appellant to have a chance
to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle was properly ruled
out by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.

Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb a fence, it should be enough
to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the intruder who was, in fact, just
behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done any much
better since she was all the time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy.

Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. 13 The law defines nights
as being from sunset to sunrise.14 By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is
specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime
by insuring the offenders immunity from capture.15 As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so
considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information. 16 The Court entertains no doubt that
appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being
recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed
his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world. 17 The Court has long held that this aggravating
circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure
impunity from his illegal act.18

With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina, appellant ordered
her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again
and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People v. Saylan,19 where
this Court said:

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
superior, female inferior, but also the same position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no
ignominy because The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this position is not novel and has repeatedly
and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is
performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.20

Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance any means employed or
circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said, 21 "pertains
to the moral order [and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.

The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.22

In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his criminal
objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of
rape23 for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the offense fall under the
jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In People v. Garcia,24 the Court
declared:

One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, but
Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the
death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is
committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime of rape with homicide. The
first two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they
increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances which affect only the period
of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments
of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.

xxx xxx xxx.

Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If
the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances, (People v.
Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People v. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People v. Fuertes, G.R.
No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People v. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA
309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People v. Domondon, 60
Phil. 729 [1934]; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. 25

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the
law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty therein imposed from death to
reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted
by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 148939-40             February 13, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
JOSEPH ORILLA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision1 dated 7 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 54,
Alaminos City, Province of Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla, the 15-year old sister of appellant Joseph Orilla ("appellant"), accused appellant of
raping her twice. The criminal cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A. The trial court found appellant guilty of only
one crime of qualified rape and imposed on him the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. Instead of dismissing the second case,
Criminal Case No. 3220-A, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal
Case No. 3219-A.

The Charge

The Amended Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A are identical. The allegations read:

That on or about the dawn of September 12, 1996 at Brgy. Masidem, municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 2

Arraignment and Plea

On 3 January 1997, appellant assisted by his counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the two charges. 3

The Trial

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) Remilyn, the complainant and sister of the appellant, (2) SPO1 Clarence de Vera, a member
of the Philippine National Police of Bani, Pangasinan, who entered in the police blotter the complaint of Remilyn, and (3) Dr. Lynette
Valencerina-Caburnay ("Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay"), a resident physician of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital, who conducted the
medico-legal examination of Remilyn.

The prosecution’s version of the rapes as summarized by the Solicitor General is as follows:

On September 12, 1996, around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms of
their house located at Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body and found
appellant Joseph Orilla on top of her. (p. 18, TSN, April 15, 1997)
Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked from waist down (pp. 17-18, ibid). Appellant continuously pinned down Remilyn Orilla’s body with
his own. She struggled to free herself from appellant but her efforts proved futile. (p. 7, TSN, April 15, 1997)

Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced Remilyn Orilla’s legs apart and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Remilyn Orilla felt pain. She also felt "some warm matter enter" her vagina (p. 8, ibid.). Appellant remained
on top of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same "substance enter" her vagina (ibid.). With a knife pointed at her,
Remilyn Orilla was powerless. Appellant warned her not to make a noise. Frightened, Remilyn Orilla just kept silent. (pp. 8-9, 18-19, ibid.)

Around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of that same day, Remilyn Orilla reported to her sister, Evelyn Catabay, what appellant did to her.
Immediately, they went to the Municipal Hall of Bani to report the incident. Unfortunately, the investigator assigned that day was absent. (p.
22, ibid.)

On September 19, 1996, around 2:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla arrived at the Bani Police Station, Bani, Pangasinan and executed her
sworn statement relative to the incident in question. She recounted the incident to SPO1 Clarence P. de Vera who entered the same in the
Police Blotter (p. 2, TSN, June 11, 1997).

Later, or around 3:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla and her sister went to the Western Pangasinan District Hospital in Alaminos,
Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla was examined by Dr. Lynette D. Valencerina whose findings are contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate dated
September 20, 1996 (Exhibit A) which she issued:

MENSTRUAL HISTORY: Menarche at age 13 years old, occurring monthly, of 3-7 days duration, consuming around 2 napkins per day not
accompanied by hypoglycemia.

LMP – August 9-14, 1996

PMP – July 12-16, 1996

INTERNAL EXAMINATION: With old hymenal laceration at 3, 6 and 9 o’clock position vaginal introitous admits 2 fingers with ease, Cervix
close, uterus small;

(-) adnexeal mass/tenderness

(+) whitish vaginal discharge

Pregnancy Test – negative

Negative for the presence of spermatozoa

(p. 8, Record)

Accordingly, appellant was arrested. However, he escaped while detained at the provincial jail. After a month of hiding, appellant was re-
arrested. (pp. 12-13, TSN, September 28, 1999).

On the other hand, Remilyn Orilla is now under the care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (p. 12, TSN, April 15, 1997). 4

Version of the Defense

The defense presented three witnesses: (1) appellant, (2) Crispin Orilla ("Crispin"), brother of appellant and Remilyn, and (3) Beverly
Cabuburac ("Beverly"), sister of appellant and Remilyn.

Appellant and Remilyn are siblings. Remilyn is the youngest in a brood of nine. The parents of appellant and Remilyn are already dead.
Remilyn was then staying in a house commonly owned by the siblings in Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan. Adjacent to Remilyn’s
house is the house of appellant where he and his own family lived.

Appellant claimed that from 2 August 1996 to 14 September 1996, he was in Sitio Olo, Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan rushing the
work on the dikes of a fishpond. He was not able to go home to his house in Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996, the date the crimes
charged allegedly occurred.

Appellant’s house in Barangay Masidem is five to six meters away from the house of Remilyn. However, the place where appellant was
staying in Sitio Olo is two kilometers away from Barangay Masidem. One can negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo and Barangay
Masidem by walking. However, one must cross a river before reaching Barangay Masidem. A motorboat service is available to cross the
river and the ride can last for an hour. Crossing the river on foot will take about three hours.

Appellant worked in the fishpond of Lindel Onofre who is married to another sister of appellant. At the time appellant was working in the
fishpond, his companion was his brother, Reneboy Orilla ("Reneboy"). The persons left in appellant’s house while he was in Sitio Olo were
his wife, five children and his wife’s grandmother. When appellant left Barangay Masidem on 2 August 1996 for Sitio Olo, the persons who
were with Remilyn in her house were Crispin, Beverly and her three children.

Appellant described Remilyn as "matampuhin" or emotional. Remilyn was always frowning and sometimes she would be happy. When
Remilyn would get irritable she would just leave the house for weeks without telling appellant or their other siblings where she was going.
Appellant claimed that he had a good relationship with Remilyn although he would sometimes scold her because she would leave the house
without permission. Appellant does not know why Remilyn accused him of rape. Appellant assumed that it was because he often scolded
Remilyn.

Crispin testified that on 11 September 1996, he and his sister Beverly and her husband slept in the living room of their house while Remilyn
slept in the small room with Beverly’s daughter. The next day, 12 September 1996, Crispin woke up around 5:00 a.m. and noticed that
Remilyn was still asleep. During that time, his brother Joseph was working in Barangay Ulo, Bani, Pangasinan.

Beverly testified that on 11 September 1996, she was in Masidem with her children and her siblings, Crispin, Reneboy, and Remilyn. At 6:00
a.m. of the next day, she, together with her husband and children, left for Manila. She denied having any knowledge that her brother Joseph
raped their sister Remilyn.

The Trial Court’s Judgment

The trial court ruled that Remilyn positively identified appellant as the one who raped her. True, no electric light or kerosene lamp lit the room
where the rape took place. However, since it was already 3:00 a.m., a ray of light from the eastern horizon enabled Remilyn to recognize
appellant. When appellant threatened and ordered Remilyn not to shout, or else he would kill her, Remilyn was able to recognize appellant’s
voice. The trial court concluded that even if appellant attacked Remilyn during "the darkest portion of the night," 5 appellant’s voice alone
could have made it known to Remilyn that her attacker was appellant, her own brother.

The trial court rejected appellant’s defense of alibi. One can negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo and Barangay Masidem by riding
passenger jeepneys and tricycles and by riding a motorboat to cross the river. Appellant failed to demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have access to the place where the crime happened.

The trial court gave credence to Remilyn’s testimony because her testimony was very "natural and convincing." 6 In contrast, the testimony of
the defense witnesses failed to convince the trial court. Defense witness Crispin’s demeanor in court prompted the trial court to remark that
he appeared "crafty, cunning, unfair and unreliable."7 Beverly’s testimony failed to support appellant’s alibi because she testified that she left
Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996 and she learned of the rape only on her return sometime in January of 1997.

The trial court held that the presence of old lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o’clock vaginal positions indicates that Remilyn had previous sexual
experience contrary to Remilyn’s claim that the rape was her first sexual experience. The trial court nonetheless ruled that a woman who is
unchaste or impure could still be raped.

Thus, the trial court held appellant guilty of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. The trial court ruled that since Remilyn was only 15
years old at the time appellant raped her, the death penalty must be imposed on appellant, the victim’s brother. Appellant committed only
one count of rape because while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and second ejaculations occurred during "one single
body connection."8 The trial court considered Criminal Case No. 3220-A involving the second count of rape as a qualifying circumstance for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.

The judgment of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case No. 3219-A and considering that the offended party is under 18 years of age, and the offender
is the brother of the victim (relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree) the accused is therefore sentenced to suffer the SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH by lethal injection but in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of
Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within
the period of thirty (30) years and that he is further condemned to pay in favor of the offended party in the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000.00) as civil indemnity.

That Criminal Case No. 3220-A is considered merely as a qualifying circumstance in the imposition of the death penalty, as the Court
submits the view that there is only one crime of rape committed although there were two ejaculations done on the person of the offended
party.

The Provincial Warden of the Province of Pangasinan at Lingayen is ordered to commit the living body of the accused to the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City within a period of three (3) days from receipt of this Decision considering that in the past the accused have
(sic) tendency to escape his Jailer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.9

The Issues

Appellant submits for our review the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE COMPLAINANT’S
DUBIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE COMPLAINANT’S DOUBTFUL
IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AS THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 3220-A AS A "QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE" IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AGAINST THE APPELLANT IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3219-A, SINCE THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON HIM THE DEATH
PENALTY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INFROMATION NEVER ALLEGED THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
COMPLAINANT’S AGE, AND THE EXACT DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY ANENT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
RELATIONSHIP.10

The Court’s Ruling

Appellant is guilty of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A but the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death. Since appellant
committed only one count of rape, Criminal Case No. 3220-A must be dismissed.

Appellant insists that it was impossible for Remilyn to have identified the person who raped her because the room where the crime took
place was pitch black, as it had no window and no source of light. Appellant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that on 12
September 1996, a Thursday, the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines was at 5:45 a.m., or a good two hours and forty-five minutes
from 3:00 a.m. Appellant argues that if the rape took place at 3:00 a.m., then there could have been no early morning sunlight to aid Remilyn
in identifying appellant.

We are not persuaded. Crispin, the brother of Remilyn and appellant and a witness for the defense, testified that the wall of the house where
the rape happened was made of buri11 and the flooring of the house was made of "splitted (sic) bamboo." 12 Buri is a leaf that is dried and
woven together to form panels used as walls in the construction of houses. A panel of buri is not compact as it has small holes in it allowing
light to filter through the woven material. The slats on the floor and the elevation of the floor from the ground by two feet 13 also make it
possible for light to pass through the floor.

While the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines on 12 September 1996 was at 5:45 a.m. and not at 3:00 a.m., what is controlling is
Remilyn’s declaration that the "horizon coming from the east" enabled her to identify appellant. Remilyn categorically declared that "there
was a little light, sir, that is why I recognized him."14 Remilyn’s declaration that there was a "little light" is consistent with her statement that
the room was not fully illuminated but the amount of light that sneaked through her room was sufficient to enable her to recognize her own
brother.

The time mentioned by Remilyn, that is 3:00 a.m., is at most an estimate. We must bear in mind that appellant roused Remilyn from sleep
when he forced himself on her. Remilyn could not have known the exact time as appellant’s act abruptly and rudely awakened her. Remilyn’s
estimate of the time while not precise tends to strengthen the impression that her testimony is unrehearsed. Moreover, no one expects rape
victims to remember with precision every detail of the crime. A mis-estimation of time is too immaterial to discredit the testimony of a witness
especially where time is not an essential element or has no substantial bearing on the fact of the commission of the offense. 15 What is
decisive in a rape charge is the complainant’s positive identification of the accused as the malefactor. 16
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in declaring that Remilyn identified him through his voice. Appellant maintains that Remilyn was not
able to identify him at all. Appellant’s contention is without basis. Remilyn’s testimony is as follows:

Q: And during the time that the accused was on top of you, what did you do, if any?

A: I cannot move and fight because he threatened me not to shout, sir.

Q: And what was the word of the accused when he threatened you?

A: He told me not to shout and move and according to him he will kill me, sir.

PROS. RABINA:

Q: And because of those threatened words of the accused you mean to inform the Honorable Court that you did not
shout for help?

A: No, sir, because I was afraid.17

Based on the foregoing testimony, there was nothing to prevent the trial court from properly concluding that Remilyn identified appellant
through voice recognition. A person’s voice is an acceptable means of identification where there is proof that the witness and the accused
knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.18 Appellant is no stranger to Remilyn for she had known him with much
familiarity. Appellant is Remilyn’s own brother. Thus, when appellant threatened Remilyn not to shout and move, or else he would kill her, the
trial court logically inferred that Remilyn recognized appellant through his voice.

We have thoroughly examined the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses and we agree with the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses. The trial court was meticulous in judging the witnesses’ credibility. The trial court even took note of the witnesses’
demeanor in court. Unless appellant can show that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s findings on appeal. 19 None of
the grounds to overturn the trial court’s ruling on the witnesses’ credibility is present in this case.

Remilyn’s narration of how appellant ravished her meets the test of credibility. When a woman says that the accused raped her, in effect, she
says all that is necessary to show that the accused raped her, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the court may convict the
accused on that basis.20

Remilyn had no reason to fabricate the serious charges against her own brother whose life could hang in the balance in case he is found
guilty of qualified rape. With the filing of the criminal cases, Remilyn had to face the ire of her other siblings, two of whom have even testified
against her. Remilyn is now under the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Lingayen, Pangasinan. An
incestuous sexual assault is a psycho-social deviance that inflicts a stigma, not only on the victim but also on their whole family. 21 Even in
ordinary rape cases, the sole testimony of a credible victim may seal the fate of the rapist. 22

Appellant failed to establish convincingly his alibi. The distance between Sitio Olo, where appellant claimed he was, and Barangay Masidem,
where the rape happened, is only two kilometers. Appellant himself admitted that public vehicles were available to transport passengers from
Sitio Olo to Barangay Masidem, including a motorboat that could ferry the passengers to Barrio Masidem in just about an hour. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have gone to Barangay Masidem on the day he committed the rape. None of his witnesses could even
corroborate his alibi.

Appellant’s alibi and denial cannot prevail over Remilyn’s positive and categorical testimony. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts
must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. 23 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused show he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime.24 The accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 25 Appellant failed to do this. Moreover, appellant’s escape
from detention does not help his cause since escape is evidence of guilt.26

We must correct the trial court’s opinion that prior to the rape, Remilyn already had past sexual experience because her hymen had healed
lacerations. The trial court reached this conclusion despite Remilyn’s assertion that she had no sexual experience at all before the rape and
despite the absence of such a finding by Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay, the medico- legal who examined Remilyn.

Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay conducted Remilyn’s physical examination on 19 September 1996 or seven days after the rape. Dr. Valencerina-
Caburnay was not certain what exactly caused the healed lacerations. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay testified that an object, probably a penis,
could have caused the lacerations, or even a fall could have caused them.27 Dr.Valencerina-Caburnay did not attribute the healed lacerations
to a sexual experience prior to the rape.

The presence of old lacerations per se does not imply that the lacerations were the result of previous sexual experience and not by the
rape.28 Thus, the trial court had no basis in ruling that Remilyn was no longer a virgin when appellant raped her. The trial court must be
careful not to cast aspersions on the reputation of a woman, especially so when she is still a minor.

The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn’s hymen does not prove that appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape.29 In addition, a medical examination and a medical certificate are
merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.30 The credible disclosure of a minor that the accused
raped her is the most important proof of the sexual abuse.31

The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will.32 Remilyn’s straightforward narration on how appellant
forcibly ravished her proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
However, appellant committed only one count of rape. Remilyn’s own account of the rape proves this, thus:

Q: And after accused pointed you (sic) knife, can you tell the Court what else did he do after that?

A: He had sexual intercourse with me to (sic) times at the same time, sir.

COURT:

Q: Two times at the same time?

WITNESS

A: Yes, sir.

PROS. RABINA:

Q: And when he had sexual intercourse with you for two times as you said on that same day, what was your feeling
when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A: It is painful, sir, and I felt some warm matter to my vagina.

Q: And can you tell the Honorable Court how long was the accused stayed (sic) on top of you before he ejaculated into
your vagina?

A: About thirty (30) minutes, sir.

xxx

Q: Now, you said that the accused was on top of you for at least a period of thirty minutes, do you mean to inform the
Honorable Court that the two sexual intercourse that he allegedly committed on your person, he stayed on top of you for
a period of thirty minutes, is that what you mean?

Q: And for the first time that he ejaculated a warm substance inside your vagina, did accused get out on top of you?

A: No, sir.

COURT:

Q: You mean to tell the Court that it is a case of double shoot in the sense that after ejaculating he is still on top of you
but then after that he did it again while he was still on top of your body?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, sir.33

Remilyn testified that appellant’s penis penetrated her genitalia. At that point, appellant had already consummated the rape. The mere
introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia engenders the crime of rape. 34 Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of
the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia that consummates rape. 35

Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape. Appellant did not withdraw his penis to insert it again into the
vagina or to "touch" the labia majora or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not the number of times that appellant
ejaculated but the penetration or "touching" that determines the consummation of the sexual act. 36 Thus, appellant committed only one count
of rape.

The trial court erred when it did not dismiss outright Criminal Case No. 3220-A and instead considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the
purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. In short, the trial court considered the second ejaculation by the
accused as a qualifying circumstance to raise the penalty to death. This has no basis in law.

Article 33537 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 765938 ("RA 7659") was the law then applicable at
the time of the rape. RA 7659 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the carnal knowledge of a woman procured through force or
intimidation and without any other attendant circumstance. The death penalty is imposed if the victim is under eighteen years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. When the information specifically alleges the twin qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority of
the victim, and the prosecution proves the same in court, the imposable penalty is no longer reclusion perpetua but death. 39

The trial court convicted appellant of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A because appellant is Remilyn’s brother and she was a minor
being only 15 years old at the time that appellant raped her. A reading of the Amended Information, however, does not justify the elevation of
the crime of simple rape to qualified rape.

The prosecution went through the trouble of amending the Information to allege that Remilyn is the "younger sister" of appellant to
emphasize the qualified nature of the rape. However, the Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The prosecution’s failure
to allege specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its qualified form.

The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. 40
The information must allege every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his defense. 41 The law assumes that
the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 42 Since the Amended Information failed to inform
appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape and the proper penalty
is reclusion perpetua and not death.

The Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty based on the twin circumstances of relationship and
minority considering that the Amended Information failed to allege specifically Remilyn’s age. What justifies the imposition of the death
penalty, the Solicitor General argues, is the fact that appellant used a knife in committing the rape and appellant perpetrated the rape against
his own sister. According to the Solicitor General, Article 335 as amended by RA 7659 provides that the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of rape results in the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of death. The Solicitor General points out that
relationship in this case is an aggravating circumstance based on Article 1543 of the Revised Penal Code as applied in People v. Baldino.44

Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information that he was "armed with a knife" does not comply with
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the Amended Information that the accused
was "armed with a knife" is not in any way equivalent to "use of a deadly weapon." The "knife" could simply be a "butter knife," a harmless
knife. Appellant opines that the Amended Information should have stated that accused was "armed with a deadly knife, which is a deadly
weapon."

We have held in several cases that the allegation "armed with a knife" is sufficient to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him.45 The prosecution also proved during the trial appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she was not able to
shout because appellant pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.46

We, however, do not agree with the Solicitor General’s opinion that relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty. People v. Baldino, the case invoked by the Solicitor General, appreciated relationship as an
aggravating circumstance but only for the purpose of assessing exemplary damages against the accused and not for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty. Two recent cases, People v. Sagarino47 and People v. Umbaña,48 squarely address the issue raised by the
Solicitor General.

In People v. Sagarino49 and People v. Umbaña,50 the information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon and the prosecution proved
the same. The information also specifically alleged relationship between the accused and the victim, and the prosecution proved the same:
son and mother in People v. Sagarino, and father and daughter in People v. Umbaña. However, these two cases did not impose the death
penalty. People v. Umbaña repeated our explanation in People v. Sagarino. We quote this pertinent portion in People v. Umbaña:

We agree with appellant that People vs. Sagarino finds application in the case at bar. We there stated:

We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed on appellant. Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, which amended article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the rape was committed with force and intimidation. But the imposable
penalty becomes reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Such is the situation in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and 98-552 because the use of a knife or a bladed weapon by appellant in the consummation of the two rapes
has been alleged and proved.
However, we are unable to sustain the death penalty imposed on appellant in both cases. As provided in Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, but applicable to these cases now, the complaint or information must not only state the
designation of the offense given by statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, but also "specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." But here the informations against appellant in both cases show no specification of circumstances that aggravate
the offenses charged. Note that the close relationship between the victim and the offender (mother and son) is alleged, but nothing is stated
in the informations concerning pertinent circumstances (such as disregard of the filial respect due the victim by reason of her age, sex and
rank) that could aggravate the crimes and justify imposing the death sentence. Thus, absent any aggravating circumstance specifically
alleged and proved in the two rape cases, the penalty imposable on appellant for each offense is not death but only the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states the specific aggravating/qualifying circumstances. Other than the use of a deadly weapon,
which is already taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, not one of these circumstances was alleged or proved
in the case at bar. Hence, the penalty imposable is only reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis ours)

The "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship mentioned in People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaña must be alleged in the information
and duly proven in the trial. In the present case, the Amended Information did not allege the "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship of
appellant and Remilyn and the prosecution did not prove these circumstances during the trial.

The "circumstances pertinent" to the relationship cited in People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaña are aggravating circumstances listed in
paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the aggravating circumstances.
Unlike mitigating circumstances under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, Article 14 does not include circumstances "similar in nature" or
analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 21 of Article 14. The term "aggravating circumstances" is strictly construed, not only
because what is involved is a criminal statute, but also because its application could result in the imposition of the death penalty. The list of
aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive51 for the purpose of raising a crime to its qualified form.

Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code:

Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according
to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and degree of
instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant,
legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.

Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects
of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative circumstances are thus not
aggravating circumstances per se.

The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating. 52 Jurisprudence considers relationship as
an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity. 53 However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a
crime against persons.54 The determination of whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty cannot
be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare unequivocally an attendant circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the
death penalty. The Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for crimes defined as heinous by Congress. 55
Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by Congress.

When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of two indivisible penalties of
reclusion perpetua to death. To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that:

ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.— In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

xxx

Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is present one aggravating
circumstance. We hold that the aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty of death must be
that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and
it is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there was "lingering doubt" whether the alternative circumstance of relationship
should be considered an aggravating circumstance to justify such an award. People v. Catubig 56 settled the "lingering doubt" in this manner:

The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as
well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity of the offender
manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission, (3) the
means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or both. There are various
types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code.

"Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according
to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and degree of
instruction and education of the offender."

"The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender."

As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against chastity, such as rape and acts of lasciviousness, whether the offender is a
higher or a lower degree relative of the offended party.

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is to be imposed in rape
cases "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The Court has since held that the
circumstances enumerated by the amendatory law are to be regarded as special qualifying (aggravating) circumstances. Somehow doubts
linger on whether relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages where it is used to qualify rape as a
heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as would subject the offender to the penalty of death. Heretofore, the Court has not
categorically laid down a specific rule, preferring instead to treat the issue on a case to case basis.

In People vs. Fundano, People vs. Ramos, People vs. Medina, People vs. Dimapilis, People vs. Calayca, People vs. Tabion, People vs.
Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and People vs. Nuñez, along with still other cases, the Court has almost invariably appreciated relationship as an
ordinary aggravating circumstance in simple rape and thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the offender whether or not the offense
has been committed prior to or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. Exceptionally, as in People vs. Decena, People vs. Perez, and
People vs. Ambray, the Court has denied the award of exemplary damages following the effectivity of that law. In qualified rape cases, such
as in People vs. Magdato, People vs. Arizapa, and People vs. Alicante, the Court decreed the payment of exemplary damages to the
offended party but it did not so do as in People vs. Alba, People vs. Mengote, and People vs. Maglente.

It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice stance and provide, for the guidance of the bar and the bench, a kind of standard on
the matter.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong
doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as
a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused
by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud- that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Catubig, we held that the alternative circumstance of relationship serves as basis for an award of exemplary damages because
the term "aggravating circumstances" must be understood in its broad or generic sense. However, this interpretation is only applicable to the
civil aspect, not the criminal aspect of rape, which involves the imposition of the proper penalty. When the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term "aggravating circumstance" in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
must be understood in the strictest sense. The "aggravating circumstance" that would spell the difference between life and death for the
accused must be that specifically listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Death is an irrevocable penalty. Thus, the rule on strict interpretation of criminal statutes applies with greater force when the law defines the
offense as a heinous crime punishable by death.

However, we resort to the strict interpretation of the term "aggravating circumstance" only for the purpose of imposing the death penalty.
When the penalty to be imposed is a range of penalties where the maximum penalty is death and the appreciation of an aggravating
circumstance would call for the imposition of the maximum penalty, which is death, the term "aggravating circumstance" must be strictly
construed. The aggravating circumstance sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty must not only be duly alleged and proven it
must be one of those enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code or that specified by law. In all other cases where the maximum
penalty is not death, the term "aggravating circumstance" must be interpreted in its broad or generic sense so as to include the alternative
circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

We cannot consider dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance because the Amended Information did not allege dwelling. The 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which applies retroactively in this case, now explicitly mandates that the information must state in
ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. 57 When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense or qualify an offense to warrant a greater penalty, the information must allege such circumstances and the prosecution
must prove the same to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.58

Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of exemplary damages to Remilyn of ₱25,000. 59 Remilyn is also entitled to ₱50,000
moral damages and ₱50,000 civil indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof
because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 60 Such award is
separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically awards upon proof of the commission of the crime by the
offender.61

The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of appellant’s crime that it was moved to include this proposal in the dispositive portion of its
decision:

xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion
Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30) years.

Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full condemnation. However, the recommendation by the trial court is improper. 62 It
is the President’s prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. 63

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, is AFFIRMED insofar
as it finds appellant Joseph Orilla GUILTY of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A with the MODIFICATION that the death
sentence imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the amount of civil indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000. In addition, appellant is further
ordered to pay Remilyn Orilla ₱50,000 moral damages and ₱25,000 exemplary damages. Criminal Case No. 3220-A is dismissed. The
provision recommending the disqualification of appellant from executive clemency is deleted. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of J. Callejo, Sr.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano Buenaflor.

The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:

On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur, between the
hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice
the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a sharp bladed and
pointed instrument about two feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end, about one and one-half
inches in width, (Exhibit "C") while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of the
store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he died
instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in
his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches below left axilla, a
little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of
left lung, pericardium, penetrating the ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung
and exit to the right chest. One inch opening.

2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm

CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage.

After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the seashore of the barrio,
and on finding Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with
both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the
head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay
prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the
chest above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at
the back, of one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained
eight wounds, which were specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated February
17, 1970, as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the nipple, running
to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch
opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues, pericardium the auricles of the
heart, the left lung towards the right side of back.
 2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep three-fourth (3/4) inch
long penetrating the skin and the sternum.

3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and one-half (1-1/2)
inches deep.

4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.

5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and bone of anterior side.

6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.

7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back near spinal column.

8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin and bone.

CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage from the
heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and wound
Number Three (3), (Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two victims Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same street of Barrio
Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not preceded
or precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).

Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two victims had a misunderstanding
with the accused while fishing along Sagnay River. During this occasion it appears that the accused requested
Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request
was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused against the victims. From this
time on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And although on
several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the
friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to Mariano
Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He consistently refused to associate since then with the two victim
especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were made by Amado Payago, a neighbor,
inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead, defendant when intoxicated
or drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a fight and announce his evil intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp.
50-53, session November 22, 1971.)

Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the accused. That after killing the two
victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan
Chavez, Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by laid peace officers for him to surrender. When brought to the
Police headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by
him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and recovered
the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he Chief of Police was still stained with human
blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who was he owner of said
bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor.
however, when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. 1

For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under two (2) separate informations, with the
crime of murder attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly.

The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He also
denied holding a grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said
that while they were drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a fist fight, which they had soon
forgotten. 2

His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a percentage. for the fishery
commission. When he refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-headed. He went home, taking his things along
with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and prepared to go
out to sea again. While he was standing in the yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable,
Tomas Carable, Abelardo Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and
Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened next: "I defend myself but inspite of that I
was hit on my upper arm. Then after that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was hit on my lower jaw. (Witness pointing to the
bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that bolo from him."
"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to take hold of his hands and I was able to grab the bolo.
After I have taken the bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of the group except Mariano
Buenaflor run away after seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo
then immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and when he has wounded he run away and when he was running away I run after
him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away so I run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he reach home he will get
that gun and he might shoot me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.

The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:

Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot give credence to the testimony
and story of the accused, and his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-
defense does not find support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8) men headed by
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing him one after another while others
were throwing stones at him; that he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo which he succeeded in
wresting from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he killed said Mariano Buenaflor
after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a desperate man without evidentiary support. His testimony on these
points, and that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are simply incredible not only because they are inherently
improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear inconsistencies on contradictions against each
other. For, conceding in gratia argumenti that he was really ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him
while others throwing stones at him, and two of whom were armed with a bolo, and that he was all alone
fighting them and yet he did not suffer any physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight
(8) persons to contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he should come out of the
melee unscathed.

The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every piece of evidence presented by
the defense and has relaxed all technical rules of evidence in favor of the accused in search for evidentiary
support of his claim of self-defense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the bitterness
attached to an adverse decision, the Court has earnestly searched in vain for facts upon which to lay the basis
at least of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the ugly and unpleasant
task of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their concocted story is so apparent and self-
evident to need further elucidation. This is demonstrated by the record. They simply cannot stand, as basis of
belief. Moreover, the Court feels very much intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding that many people
witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the accused had more sufficient time to
look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in the barrio, during the long period that this
case has been pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any witness to testify in his favor,
other than his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, whose testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is
naturally very vulnerable to grave doubt and suspicion for coming from a biased source. Could this mean lack
of public sympathy because the horrible act was in truth committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public
condemnation? Be it as it may, this unpleasant circumstance has no bearing or influence in the painful
decision of this case. What impelled and compelled this Court in making this painful decision, much to his
dislike, are the bare and incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence presented indicating
beyond per adventure of doubt the stark reality which shows that there exist that moral certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-
24339, June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on the compelling
and irresistible facts born out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, and intoxication with no mitigating circumstance. The
accused and his only witness, Nemesio Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or thrice, but
many times, placing the Court in quandary and confused what theory or testimony is to be believed and
considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and diametrically opposed statements. Considering
the manner and tenor they were given, - the accused and his only witness changing stand in every turn,
leaves no room for doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted and fabricated as a desperate
attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6

In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel de
oficio merely claims that the accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as charged; and prays for the modification of
the judgment and the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano.

(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, are all
indicative of E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.

The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully Planned by the offender, when he prepared
beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had sufficient time dispassionately to consider
and accept the consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof
of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to
his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the
killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was
hatched or what time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial court merely concluded that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor
was premeditated because "the accused has been nursing the evil design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence of
the incident on February 18, 1970, when both of them refused the request of the accused to have his boat towed by the motor boat
belonging to Mariano Buenaflor while fishing along Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal killings, said accused refused
consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking spree where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;" "in fact, no less
than ten attempts made by witness Amado Payago inviting the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that "on the
contrary, it has been established that whenever the accused was drunk, he announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter of fact
he challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."

The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the aforementioned
incident merely established the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9

The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever he was drunk and announces his intention to kill the latter
does not reveal a persistence of a criminal design since there is no showing that in between the utterances of the threats and the
consummation of the crime, the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing.

As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked persistence to
accomplish that plan, the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.

(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the commission of the crime.

The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua from behind, a
method which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim
may put up. His testimony reads, as follows:

Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice whether there
is anything unusual incident that happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please relate it?

A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run after
Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.

Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno
Camano?

A More or less 12 to 15 meters.

Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno Camano?

A He was walking to his house.

Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the time that
Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?

A From behind sir.

Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what happened to

Godofredo Pascua?

A He fell down and keep on turning.

Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua fell down?

A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10

His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy report, 11
showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3) inches long and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a
little bit posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple with a
one (1) inch opening. If the deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by counsel for the accused, the entrance
wound would have been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the back. The trial court, therefore, did not
commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo Pascua was assaulted from behind.

With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked while in a kneeling position, with his arms on top of the gate of
the fence surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was hacked on the head, causing him to fall to the ground, and then
successively hacked and stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until he died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and
lethal, such as to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any defense.

(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the lower court appreciated in
fixing the penalty, is absorbed in treachery.

This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery. 13

(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Counsel argues thusly:

As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted that there was no proof that the
accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from his house
he allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is about 30 meters away. The prosecution did not
present any police report or doctor's certification that accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the
killing. Moreover, it was not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly became drunk to facilitate
the commission of the offense.

If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it affected accused's
mental facilities such that it diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend fully
the consequences of his acts. 14

There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to
the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. 16 A habitual
drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that
it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a potential
evildoer. 17

The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk
every now and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:

Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are already in good
terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?

A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against Godofredo Pascua.

Q And how did you come to know about this plan?

A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.

Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not towed, could you
remember how many times more or less did you hear him speak about his plan before the
stabbing incident?

A Whenever he is drunk.

Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard him?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q About five times?

FISCAL CLEDERA:
 Already answered.

A Whenever he is drunk.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?

A I cannot estimate, sir.

Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been an altercation
between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was this altercation about?

A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was refused by
Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano
Buenaflor.

Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this Buenaflor?

A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor immediately prior to
the incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A In his house.

Q When you saw him where were you?

A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our window.

Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that you can see
from your house?

A More or less 30 meters.

Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?

A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are arriving far from
our house.

Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the accused was
drunk when this incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident immediately prior
that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the accused and the victim

A None, sir.
 ATTY. TRIA:

Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

No, sir. 18

The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of the
commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."

The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 19 the Court
said:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death,
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution." It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."

The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two cases. The offense being
attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the
minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant, as above indicated, the judgment appealed from should be,
as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against the said appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not when demanded by
the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not when demanded by
the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 34917           September 7, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.

Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the illegal
importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:

The lower court erred:

1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the
administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs
secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from service.

2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge
of the customs secret service."

3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect
himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from
the service.

4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and
utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.

5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other prosecution witnesses were
testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow
the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising
customs secret service agent of Cebu.

6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.

8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant
Uy Se Tieng.

9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.

10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing
each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption of innocence which
has not been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.

The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a
shipment of opium.

About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe, he
called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short conversation,
asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs
took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive
shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office
to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he
had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very
night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused
informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that
the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.

At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera Filipina —
a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date
Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that
Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.

Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed the latter that the
Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the
shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the
ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.

The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one of his
men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to
require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had
the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se
Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the
P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the
owner, and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the
Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the
capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon
Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation
he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer
available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the
evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and
concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the
ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not,
saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he
might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was,
and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10
o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila,
named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter
answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to
deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the
accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu
answered: "Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the
opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good business, because
opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that
Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at
Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been
hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1),
and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to
the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest
him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters
relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and then
went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden
away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.

In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the owner
of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only
thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those
— " pointing towards the customhouse.

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the opium
from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal
of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and
the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that
Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's
store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him
unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he
went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's
proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the
night of December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally
promised to pay him that amount.

The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial judge to
permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government,
from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the
others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not
permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the
means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.

With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the Government, from the court room
during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus
Juris, 842).

Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since they
contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken
down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.

As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the testimony given by the
witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who
gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the
accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin
Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own statement
made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully
imported.

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this,
and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a
person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the
offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country
through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure
the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are
summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act
was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that
an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies
the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was
made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the latter
contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them that he would
remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him
out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There
is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the
culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to
catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its
importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5728            August 11, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant.

P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated the provisions of
Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of P250, Philippine
currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day, and to pay the costs. He
appealed.

The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This witness
testified that the first time he ever saw the accused was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the month of April, 1909; that at the time, while
two or three men were sitting together in the said salon, he heard the accused say that he on some occasions like to smoke opium; that a
few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked sometimes;
that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he then asked the accused what opportunities he had for smoking opium,
and the accused replied, "good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium." On the invitation of the accused he
looked him up that night and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the Chinamen were afraid, and
asked the witness to see him the following night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again said that he could not find a suitable
place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that time they went together to a certain house in the barrio of Tulay, where a
certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said court) had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the
accused gave the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for
smoking he took the pipe and the pan containing the opium and went directly to the justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the
arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.

The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going under the name of Lockwood, came to his
house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the
town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman
(the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until
he became acquainted in town; that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and after being there about twenty
minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and
received the reply that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and that they probably would
not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the
accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the
witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving
the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was
arrested about forty minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's
house.

The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands made by Smith,
did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.
The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman, testified that when he
made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together before they went to the justice of the peace
where the preliminary investigation was held.

Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an examination of the accused about an hour and
a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused was strong, robust man, and a man presenting
no appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court whether or not he could state positively if the accused had used any opium
on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that he did not use any opium on that day."

The court below in its decision said:

I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of opium. The
accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical condition, and from a casual examination of his person no one would accuse
him of being a habitual user of opium.

The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his
possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the
house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.

On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same purpose,
engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself
and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to
the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the
opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited
paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a
violation of the law within itself.

But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the statements made by
the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same
offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is
employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which
would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be
rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive
testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and
certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or
induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be understood that we
base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own
testimony.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and
the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation
of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The information reads:

That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged
in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by
one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong
City.

On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the
buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit,
SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1
Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan
District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one
thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was
then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. 4 The team rode in two
cars and headed for the target area.

At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard
and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit,
the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03
Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him.
Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. 6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's"
house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked
"Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic
wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
"Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried
marijuana leaves.

Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was
only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried
marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory.9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter,
testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared
and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers,
accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in
their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of
"Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.

Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door
and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the
door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was
but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house,
three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box.
Turning towards them, Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. P03 Manlangit ordered him and
Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.

Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that
he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's
wife.11

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal,
Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and
Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest
son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left
the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun
for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water
when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her
house. She found out later that the man was P03 Manlangit.

Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first
time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She
said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and that her husband never
returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were
found in her person.12

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an
"organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.

According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4
of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the
penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act
No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons

collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the
commission of any crime.

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @
"Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI
for destruction in accordance with law.
 Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional
Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.

SO ORDERED. 13

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES,
INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM
APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS
FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. 14

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE
POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.

II

THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH
DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE
AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH
IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME,
NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;
and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace
officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. 16 Entrapment has received judicial
sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. 17

Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use
of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. 18 Entrapment sprouted from the
doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 19 It also
took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that
they might otherwise resist.20
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to
commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. 21 The classic definition of
entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept:
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the officers." 23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or
fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design
in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of
the law enforcement officer.24

It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law.
Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an
otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. 25 Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. 26
Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting
as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in
the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be
convicted.27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. 29
It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a defense, American
federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine
whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of
mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits,
his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the
crime.33 The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and
reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 35 If the accused was found to
have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used
an unduly persuasive inducement. 36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in
the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. 39
The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to
commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law
enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; 41 for
purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such
as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44
Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm
but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime
"cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement
improprieties.45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the
accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are
considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. 46

Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an
"anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit,
badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. 47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the
more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his
past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate
inducements.48 On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's
predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct
of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was
a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50

Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United States now combine both the
"subjective" and "objective"51 In Cruz v. State,52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be
determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca
v. State,54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully
assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police
exceeded the standards of proper investigation. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.

As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In
United States v. Phelps,56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR
personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We
accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both
of them could smoke this drug.57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v. Abella,59 we acquitted
the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a
merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there
was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to
convict the accused.60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the
part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from
Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did
not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of
Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. 62

It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis
instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,64 we held:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the
act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy
solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free
from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was
formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies
the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the
plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an
illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are
cases holding the contrary. 65

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,66 the appellate court declared
that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People v. Tan Tiong,68 the Court of Appeals
further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. 69

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.70 Entrapment, we further
held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. 71

It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine
jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an
absolutory cause.72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps
has been followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying
the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and
admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's
previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the
state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal
record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it has
become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience designed
to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.78 They are not the
traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful
and immoral. 79 Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public order. 80
Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. 81 These
offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the
public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary,
therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals,
but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an
undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons. 82

Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse.
Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from
these persons who deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever
noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help
maintain law and order is not an inspiring one. 83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law
enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire
to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where we
observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting
provincial hicks.85 The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the
hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court
to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. 86 Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of
the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Barraza,87

[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest,
illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common
motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister
sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,' justifies the employment of
illegal means. 88

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by
the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and
the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of
the criminal law through lawless enforcement. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest
an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 91

We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and
adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 92 The manner by which
the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and
the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure
that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If
there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts
should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the
validity of the defense of inducement.1âwphi1.nêt

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-
arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the
marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended
when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.

PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-
examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up
security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court
because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. 93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, 94 or there are
reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, 95 or that only the informant was the poseur-
buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, 96 the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative
of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. 97 There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. 98

The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract
from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case
at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and
delivered the marijuana.

Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3
Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered
from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11)
bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks,
however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:

ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:

Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?

A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana
brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.

Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

 PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now
dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed
to him by Jun?

COURT So be it.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item
from the box showed to him and brought in front of him.

COURT Noted.

Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.

Q Point to the court, where are those markings?

A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.

PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.

Q Whose signature is that?

ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the
fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?

PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your
Honor, despite reconsideration.

COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has
done to the court.

ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.

A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.

COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"

A Yes, your Honor.

Q What makes you so sure?

A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.

Q What are you sure of?

A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

Q What makes you so sure?

A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before
we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be
marked as Exhibit "D?"

COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."

Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and
figures on this plastic?

A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."

Q How about this one?

A I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."

A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these
markings, sir.

PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. . .

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it
appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want
to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.

COURT Noted. The court saw it.

Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL"
be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"

COURT Tag it. Mark it.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to
you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.

Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun
the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the
house of Neneth, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 99

The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto
Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as
weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 100
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give
them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money
and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in
"buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and
the pusher. 101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. 102

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx 103

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked
bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 111

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana
and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the
arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows
otherwise:

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to
you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.

Q How about, the other items that you were able to recover?
 ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that
question.

COURT There is. Answer.

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun
the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the
house of Neneth, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?

A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust
money, sir.

Q You mentioned "him?"

A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her,
sir.

Q And what happened?

A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 112

SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

A To arrest her, sir.

Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth
was there?

A Yes, sir.

Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?

A I saw her outside, sir.

Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?

A She was 'sa bandang poso.'

Q Carrying a baby?

A No, sir.

Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her
outside the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?

A No, sir.

Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing
her daily chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.

Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit
approached her?

A PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her?

A Yes, sir.

Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was
taking place, you were just in the side lines?

A I was just watching, sir.

Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely
according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?

A P03 Manlangit, sir.

Q Manlangit got the marijuana?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the money from Aling Neneth?

A I don't know, sir.

Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUTOR:

There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there 's no testimony on that.

ATTY. VALDEZ:

I was asking him precisely.

PROSECUTOR:

No basis.

COURT:

Sustained.

Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the
records, the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's
right?
 A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the
one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?

A I saw it, sir.

Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is
that what you are trying to tell the Court?

A No, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ:

I am through with this witness, your Honor. 113

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of
Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to
flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on
her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests
without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion."115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 117

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however,
declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the
marked money was.118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom
he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused
in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, 119 with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy.
Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing.
If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person
arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. 120

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the
trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. 121 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 122 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in
a position from which he can particularly view the area. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. 124 The object must be open to eye and
hand125 and its discovery inadvertent.126

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without
a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. 127 In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. 128 It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.129

PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
ATTY. VALDEZ:

So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?

A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q This carton, according to you was under a table?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?

A Yes, sir.

Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?

A It was open, sir. Not like that.

COURT

Go down there. Show to the court.

INTERPRETER

Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.

A Like this, sir.

PROSECUTOR

Can we describe it?

ATTY. VALDEZ

Yes.

PROSECUTOR

One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.

COURT

Noted.

Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q And got hold of this carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

A I asked her, what's this. . .

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he
asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.

Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it
not [sic]?

A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.

Q Who got hold of this?

A I was the one, sir.

Q You were the one who got this?

A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was
already retrieved by Badua?

A Yes, sir.

Q You went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not have any search warrant?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs.
Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not
know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q How far was this from the door?

A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

Q Under the table according to you?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q Somewhere here?

A It's far, sir.

PROSECUTOR

May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

A Here, sir.

Q What you see is a carton?

A Yes, sir, with plastic.

Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?

A Yes, sir.

Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is all that you saw?

A Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR

For the record, your Honor. . .

Q You were only able to verify according to you . . .

PRESECUTOR

Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it . . .

ATTY. VALDEZ

That's a piece of plastic.

PROSECUTOR

By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic.

ATTY. VALDEZ

What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?

PROSECUTOR

With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic
may be big or a small one, for record purposes.

COURT

Leave that to the court.

PROSECUTOR

Leave that to the court.

 Q The only reason according to you, you were able to . . . Look at this, no even Superman
. . . I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And
according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?

A Yes, sir.

Q Siopao?

A Yes, sir.

Q Canned goods?

A Yes, sir.

Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . .

Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly
be.

A It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ

I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information.
Let the prosecutor do that for you.

COURT

Continue. Next question.

xxx xxx xxx 130

P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria.
The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led
them to her.131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said
house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open
and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and
marked the said contents. 132 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it
had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless
and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in
old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color. 133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that
the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents.134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana
was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.136

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a
finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,139 viz:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less
 evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. 140

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the
"sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as
evidence in court.141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he
received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit,
the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with
accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower
penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.142

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D
is reversed and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.

21