A n y th in g Goes

A uthor(s): Denise R ussell

Source: Social S tudies o f Science, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Aug., 1983), pp. 437-464
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 DISCUSS/ON PAPER

• ABSTRACT

'Anything goes': what positions are captured by this slogan within epistemo/ogy?
Are any of these positions defensible? This paper attempts to answer these two
questions, in particular as they bear on the work of Paul Feyerabend. The paper
conc/udes with some tentative suggestions about the links between Feyerabend's
epistemo/ogy and current sociology of know/edge.

Anything Goes

Denise Russell

Philosophy of Science has made a considerable advance this century

in combating a narrow empiricism. Yet the positive alternatives put
up to replace empiricism are by no means thoroughly worked out
or even clarified to any great extent. Outside of philosophy of
Science, reference is made to particular alternatives, for example,
by way of appeals to Kuhn,1Lakatos2or Feyerabend,3and a variety
of positions (some of which are incompatible) are held to be
Kuhnian.4 The conceptual lack of clarity within philosophy
becomes compounded when taken over into other disciplines.
Feyerabend is seen by many as presenting the most recent and
sustained alternative to empiricism within philosophy of Science.
‘Anything goes’ is thought to be a key concept in his philosophy. A
little investigation reveáis that this slogan has been used to capture
a variety of positions in discussions by and about Feyerabend.
Some of these positions contain interesting and valuable insights;
some are clearly indefensibie. The main task of this paper is to

Social Studies o f Science (SAGE, London, Beverly Hills and New Delhi),
Vol. 13 (1983), 437-64
isolate some of the views which have gone under the ñame of
‘anything goes\ and to make a few tentative suggestions about the
defensibility of those which refer to central epistemological issues.
The positions to be discussed are most clearly understood as
responses to the following questions:
1. Are there any rational criteria that distinguish some
theories5 as superior to others?
2. What methodology should be used to discover and/or
justify theories?
3. How is theory change to be explained?6
After looking into these responses, social/political interpretations
of ‘anything goes’ will be briefly considered. The main purpose
here is to expose the distinction between these interpretations and
the epistemological issues. I will then attempt to show how this
clarification of an anti-empiricist set of positions within philosophy
of Science may link in with some of the concerns in current
sociology of knowledge — for example, ‘the empirical programme
in relativisnT outlined by Collins,7 and the debate between Gieryn
and his opponents over the proper concerns of sociology of
knowledge.8

Epistemological Interpretations of ‘Anything Goes’

1. Are there any rational criteria that distinguish some theories as

superior to others?

This question concerns theory appraisal, the possibility or

otherwise of providing standards of theory evaluation. Numerous
criteria have been proposed to perform this task — for example,
confirmability, falsifiability, simplicity, fertility and explanatory
power.
In the first place, there are well-known difficulties in applying
such notions to theories, but supposing that such difficulties can be
overeóme, the next hurdle is to justify the claim that one (or a small
selection) of these notions provides the rational criterion or criteria
of theory evaluation: that is to say, the question, ‘why is it rational
to assess theories on this basis and not on some other one?’ has to
be faced. Increasingly, it is being acknowledged that no satisfactory
answer to the latter question can be given. When ‘truth’ was still in
vogue, it seemed clear that the true theory was to be rationally
 preferred to the false theory. Gradual awareness of the difficulties
of using the concept of ‘truth’ in a judgement as to the worth of a
theory has led to the present State where it is no longer fashionable
to talk about truth. However, if the proposed rational criteria such
as confirmability, explanatory power, and so on, are not
considered to be guides to the truth, then it is difficult to justify the
claim that they are the rational basis for theory evaluation. To give
a positive answer to question (1), it seems that one must draw, even
if covertly, on the admittedly out-moded notion of truth or stand
dogmatically behind a notion (or set of notions) which cannot be
shown to provide a better basis for theory evaluation than other
notions. Neither of these alternatives is appealing.
If one despairs of the task of providing rational criteria of theory
evaluation then two responses are possible. The position that every
theory is just as good as any other could be accepted, or one could
say that, although there are no criteria of theory evaluation that
command our rational assent, it is still possible to rank theories
according to various valúes. Such valúes may stem from an
individual or a group preference. Perhaps, for example, there is an
individual who prefers theories which can easily be converted into
rhyming slang. Group preferences for particular valúes as the basis
for theory evaluation may reveal themselves within particular fields
of activity — for instance, Science. Some of the valúes that opérate
here may be: accuracy, consistency, simplicity, and the like.9
Notions that had previously been regarded as forming the basis of a
rational criterion of appraisal do not have to be rejected in this
account. However, their status is changed. They are regarded as
valúes, which are not significantly different from other notions
which may be given evaluative forcé: for example, whether or not a
theory, when read out, sounds easy on the ear, or whether or not a
theory can be translated into Sanskrit with ease. We may have a
strong repulsión to the latter and a strong preference for the
notions of factual adequacy and their ilk, but this does not mean
that the two sets of notions cannot be regarded as simply different
valúes.
A negative answer to question (1), together with the view that
distinctions between theories can only be made on the basis of
valúes, and the view that every theory is just as good as any other,
have all been referred to by the slogan, ‘anything goes’. I have
already suggested that there do not appear to be good grounds for
thinking that a positive answer to question (1) will be defensible.
Are the two alternative responses equally indefensibie? It is clearly
the case that theory evaluation goes on all the time, so a position
which fails to take account of this practice is fairly implausible. The
view that each theory is as good as any other is in this weak
position. But if it is granted that theories are evaluated, and yet it is
denied that they are evaluated on the basis of rational criteria, it
seems that we are led into the position that they are evaluated on
the basis of valúes. So long as one allows that such valúes may
inelude what had previously been understood as rational criteria
(that is, so long as reason is allowed in, albeit with a changed
status), this view seems to be quite unproblematic.
Let us turn now to Feyerabend’s position on this question. He
very often runs together the question of theory appraisal with the
question of methodology. He uses the expression ‘anything goes’ to
sum up the negative claim that there are no rational criteria of
theory evaluation10 and the positive points that fluid value-laden
standards are used to evalúate theories,11 and that a plurality of
methodologies, involving a new relation between reason and
practice, is most conducive to progress.12 I will return to the
methodological point in the next section.
In ‘Marxist Fairytales from Australia’, Feyerabend asserts that
‘No system of rules and standards is ever safe and the scientist who
proceeds into the unknown may viólate any such system, however
“ rational” . This is the polemical meaning of the phrase, “ anything
goes” .’13 ‘Anything goes’ is presented as a ‘jocular summary’ of
the predicament of the rationalist who searches for a universal
standard. It serves as a universal standard even though it is ‘empty,
useless and pretty ridiculous’.14 The positive meaning of ‘anything
goes’ resides in Feyerabend’s ideas about method, and also in the
view that valúes may form the basis for theory choice.15
Feyerabend rejeets the view that any theory is as good as any
other.16 He agrees that theories are evaluated. This is at least part of
the thrust of his epistemological anarcho-dadaism:17 ‘the
epistemological anarchist has no compunction to defend the most
trite, or the most outrageous statement’.18 The valúes used to assess
theories need not remain stable: ‘the epistemological anarchist . ..
has no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversión against,
any institution or any ideology’.19
Looking to some of Feyerabend’s commentators, it emerges that a
few have taken his use of the slogan ‘anything goes’ to refer to
question (1), though almost invariably responses to (1) are confused
with responses to (2). As Feyerabend usually runs the two questions
together it is not surprising that the commentators do too.20
Hellman, in his review of Against Method, equates ‘anything
goes’ with ‘intellectual anarchism’, which he understands as ‘the
only principie that takes no account of historical context, that “ can
be defended under all circumstances” and can be stated in twenty-
five words or less’.21 The ‘cereal-box requirement’ is added ‘to help
Feyerabend’.22 Apart from the poor attempt at a joke, this
understanding of the slogan captures part of the negative response
to question (1) discussed above.
When some of Feyerabend’s commentators talk about his
irrationality — for instance, when Rossi says that Feyerabend’s
aim is to show the ‘substantial irrationality of the scientific
venture’,23 and Finocchiaro calis Feyerabend ‘the alleged apostle of
irrationalism’24 — I presume that this is a short-hand way of stating
a negative answer to question (1), but such a mode of expression is
too vague to have very much substance. When Counihan says that
‘there is no way of evaluating any knowledge claims in
Feyerabend’s discourse because of its irrationalist assumptions’,25
it is clear that the issue is question (1). It is, however, unclear what
Feyerabend’s ‘irrationalist assumptions’ are supposed to be.26
Bhaskar, in an article on Feyerabend and Bachelard, claims that
Feyerabend’s answer to the question, ‘What grounds have we for
rationally choosing between theories?’ is sceptical: ‘we have no
grounds or warrant: anything goes [in Science]’.27 Feyerabend’s
‘theoretical anarchism’ embodies the claim that ‘there are neither
criteria for choosing between theories within Science ñor criteria for
choosing between Science and other forms of life’.28 This is much
stronger than the position I have attributed to Feyerabend. It
contains a significant omission: the word ‘rational’ before each
occurrence of the word ‘criteria’. If this is included then it opens
the way for the use of other bases of theory choice which do not
have the status of ‘rational criteria’.
Hattiangadi, in his review of Against Method, reads the ‘anything
goes’ slogan in part as asserting that ‘there are no external and/or
universal intellectual standards’.29 This looks simply like a negative
response to question (1); however, in Hattiangadi’s exposition, it
slides into the much stronger claim that there are no circumstances in
which rules or standards can be applied, which amounts to
acceptance of the view that each theory is as good as any other.
Hattiangadi fails to consider the view that standards, though not
fixed or universal, may opérate as valúes guiding theory choice.
Kulka also says of Feyerabend that he ‘rejects all rational standards
[and] renounces any discrimination between ideas’,30 insinuating
that the two phrases are equivalent. He lists some possible meanings
of ‘anything goes’ and assesses their credibility; for example, ‘If we
take the principie “ anything goes’’ to imply the maxim “ do not
select’’ or “ do not discriminate between theories’’, then not only has
it been refuted by history, but it is impossible’.31 Noting that
Feyerabend rejects this interpretation, Kulka insists that he is
‘strongly inclined to believe’ that what Feyerabend means by
‘anything goes’ is ‘do not select’.32 Kulka repeats Hattiangadi’s
mistake of thinking that a negative response to question (1) must
lead one into the implausible view that each theory is on a par with
any other. He fails to see that there may be grounds for selection
even if ‘rational criteria’ do not exist. Worrall does not make this
mistake. In his review of Against Method, he States that
Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchist ‘may defend any theory,
any approach to knowledge that he likes to suit whatever purposes
(of a non-epistemological kind) that he may have’.33 He goes on to
say that Feyerabend opposes reason absolutely,34yet surely Worrall
is mistaken here. If any approach to knowledge may be defended,
then reason may be defended. If anything goes, reason goes too.35 So
there is a confusión in Worrall’s review. Some other commentators
agree that the epistemological anarchist can consistently appraise
theories. McMullin claims such appraisal will be ‘a chaotic and
wilful affair’.36 While this phrase does not actually misrepresent the
position, it certainly presents it in a way that would make rationalists
eringe. Koertge gives a more sympathetic presentation when she says
that Feyerabend criticizes the idea ‘that Science is (or ought to be)
governed by immutable standards and methods’.37
To summarize this section, if ‘anything goes’ amounts to a
rejection of the view that there are rational criteria of theory
appraisal together with the assertion that appraisal still goes on
with valúes forming the basis, then it is a reasonably defensible
position (with reason here taken as a valué). I also believe that it
captures part of Feyerabend’s use of the slogan, despite the variety
of contrary interpretations given by Feyerabend’s commentators.
If ‘anything goes’ is taken to mean that every theory is just as good
as any other, then it is an unattractive position (this time I have
chosen a different notion as the basis of my evaluation), and I do
not believe that it is one which Feyerabend holds, despite the
counter-assertion by many commentators.

2. What methodology should be used to discover and/or justify

theories?

This methodological question is usefully kept distinct from the

question about rational criteria of theory evaluation. A positive
answer to (1) need not entail anything about methodology. For
example, it could be consistently maintained that a notion of
fertility could perform the role of a rational criterion of theory
evaluation but also that the notion does not provide scientists or
others with a method to follow. For instance, Lakatos asserts of his
‘methodology’, that it

...o n ly appraises fully articulated theories (or research programmes) but it

presumes to give advice to the scientist neither about how to arrive at good
theories ñor even about which of two rival programmes he should work on. My
‘methodological rules’ explain the rationale of the acceptance of Einstein’s
theory over Newton’s, but they neither command ñor advise the scientist to work
38
in the Einsteinian and not in the Newtonian programme.

Conversely, it could be consistently maintained that a variety of

methods is useful to discover and justify theories without it being
the case that any of these methods is strong enough to provide a
rational criterion of theory evaluation. While the ‘rational criteria’,
if they exist, function as abstract standards, methodological
prescriptions should be guides to practice. It is not surprising then
that big differences may arise.
For some purposes, it is necessary to distinguish the discovery
and justification of theories, but such a distinction has little
relevance to issues discussed here. Only occasionally will it be
useful to consider discovery separately from justification, or vice
versa.
A variety of responses to question (2) have attracted the label
‘anything goes’. Given the number of these responses, I will discuss
the question of the defensibility of each position as it is mentioned.

(a) Anything goes = Science proceeds counter-inductively

This interpretation occurs in Hargreaves’s review of Against
Method: ‘Science proceeds “ counter-inductively” , or in his
[Feyerabend’s] words, it proceeds according to the principie of
“ anything goes” .’39 Later on in the review, Hargreaves claims that
‘What he [Feyerabend] is doing, of course, is merely substituting
one set of rules (“ anything goes” , “ counter-induction” , etc.) for
another set he dislikes (naive falsificationism, sophisticated
falsificationism, etc.)’.40 So, in one breath, ‘counter-induction’ is
taken to be equivalent to ‘anything goes’; in the next, these two are
sepárate rules.
Counter-induction is the term used for the procedure of drawing
generalizations which are inconsistent with well-established
theories or well-established ‘facts’.41 That Science proceeds only by
counter-induction is a ridiculous view. Although counter-induction
may have been used in some specific episodes (perhaps, for
instance, in Galileo’s defence of the Copernican theory, which was
inconsistent both with the well-established Aristotelian theory and
with well-established facts — for instance, the fact that the earth is
stationary), it is certainly not the only method used in Science.42 If
Science proceeds by ‘the rule of anything goes’ (which is not
identified with counter-induction) then further information is
required to assess this position.
Papineau claims that ‘for Feyerabend, appeals to “ established
facts” can only restrict scientific practice. Instead he recommends
epistemological anarchism’: “ Anything goes!” \ 43 which Feyera­
bend supports by appeal to case studies which show that ack-
nowledged advances were in conflict with obvious ‘facts’ when first
introduced.44 It appears then as though Papineau also mistakenly
interprets ‘anything goes’ as ‘science proceeds counter-inductively’.

(b) Anything goes = methodologicalpluralism

Any method which seems appropriate and suits one’s purposes
should be used. Standard procedures such as induction and
falsificationism may sometimes be appropriate. On other occasions,
counter-induction or the retention of falsified theories may be
appropriate. The range of methods should not be restricted to these
so-called ‘rational’ methods, or to these methods and their
negations. Immersing oneself in another form of life, for instance,
could be a type of anthropological methodology which may provide
greater insights than the more ‘logical’ methods. Propaganda,
rhetoric, and so on, may also perform a useful function in the
justification of theories. A strong defence of this position occurs in
Feyerabend’s major work, Against Method.45 He points out that
Galileo, one of our most acclaimed scientists, did
not follow a fixed set of methodological rules, but used many
methods both ‘rational’ (for example, induction)46 and deductive
logic47 and ‘non-rational’ (for example, propaganda and trickery).
Feyerabend argües that such freedom from methodological con-
straints was essential to effect a break with the oíd (Aristotelian)
system of thought, and he makes a strong case for the general point
that a fixed methodology is more likely to impede progress
(however that is understood) than a fluid, opportunistic one.48
Tibbetts, Broad, Koertge and Chalmers are commentators on
Feyerabend who give this interpretation of ‘anything goes’.49
Indirectly Bhaskar does too when he asserts that ‘for Feyerabend,
then, Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise. No unique aim
or method characterises it’.50 According to Counihan, ‘Feyerabend
proposes a non-restrictive pluralism . .. with the slogan “ anything
goes” ’,51 but Counihan is very unclear as to how such pluralism
should be described. Radnitzky and Naess claim that Feyerabend’s
thesis concerning the restricted validity of methodological rules is
fully correct but not new.52 Naess notes that ‘much of the social and
historical research carried out by the left-wing opposition has
practically all the features which Feyerabend finds lacking in what
he calis “ science” : researchers have little respect for pedantic
methodology; they believe implicitly in “ anything goes” ’.53
More than most commentators, John Krige stresses the
methodological pluralist aspects of Feyerabend’s use of the phrase
‘anything goes’.54 Methodological pluralism is regarded as a
contribution to a new conception of rationality: if knowledge is to
grow, we need to be more flexible, imaginative and innovative than
conventional methodologies allow.55

(c) Anything goes = methodologies should guide, and be guided

by practice
The adoption of a particular method (for example, induction or
counter-induction) may clearly act as a guide to practice.
Observations are carried out and a generalization which is
supported by the observations is made in the first case; a
generalization which is contradicted by the observations is made in
the second. But how can practice guide methodology? A simple
example could be as follows. Suppose you are presented with a
mechanical puzzle and no methodology for its solution
immediately comes to mind. After you have played around with the
puzzle for a while you may hit upon a successful strategy for a
solution; a methodology has emerged from the practice rather than
being imposed upon it. The emerging methodology is of valué in
discovering a theory about the solution of the puzzle. Involvement
in a practice may also give rise to a method which is useful in the
justification of a theory. This is what lies behind Feyerabend’s
claim that ‘We can say today that Galileo was on the right track,
for his persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly
cosmology has, by now, created the material needed to defend it’.56
The fruitful interplay between methodology and practice is a key
element in Feyerabend’s writings.57 Most commentators do not
mention it, or suggest that it is a minor aspect of his view.58
Feyerabend presents a very clear statement on this matter in his
‘Reply to Hellman’s Review’. It runs as follows:

I regard each piece of research both as a potential instance of the application for
a rule and as a test case o f the rule: we may permit the rule to guide our research,
i.e. to exelude some actions and to mold others, but we may also permit our
research to suspend the rule, or to regard it as inapplicable even though all
known conditions demand its application. In making the latter decisión we are
not guided by any clear insight into the limitations of the rule.. . . We are guided,
rather, by the vague hope that working without the rule, or on the basis of a
contrary rule, we shall eventually find a new kind of rationality which will
provide a rational justification for the whole procedure: reasons for suspending a
rule, or for replacing it by different rules may be found only after a perfectly
reasonable rule has been suspended, or replaced by its opposite for a long
tim e.. . . a researcher is an inventor of new theories, new instruments, new
principies of research as well as new forms of rationality that may be introduced
against all rhyme and reason because rhyme and reason may be found only after
one has moved a considerable distance without them. This is also what is meant
by the slogan ‘anything goes’.

While this position looks as though it might open the way to new
and exciting possibilities (as it may well have done in the hands of
Galileo and the Presocratics), it also has inherent dangers. It could
lead to a quagmire, where all rules are kept in suspensión and where
an unsuccessful theory is dogmatically supported. Any time limit
on the suspensión of rules would be arbitrary. With hindsight we
do have a chance of deciding whether or not methodological rules
were suspended or replaced, and whether or not this had good
results,60 although sorting out this factor from other factors which
affect the results could be problematic. It would be futile to hope
that a super-rule could be devised to tell us when it is permissible to
suspend or replace rules and when it is not. More case studies have
to be done in order to determine whether the dual function of rules
(guiding and being guided by practice) suggested by Feyerabend, is
a desirable one. In order to support the conclusión that it is
desirable, some response to the above problem will have to be given
too. Perhaps the response may simply be that some objectionable
sloppiness has to be tolerated in order to leave the way open for
fruitful inventiveness; but at the outset, this is an unattractive
position.

(d) Anything goes = all methodological rules are useless

Agassi says that ‘Feyerabend is against all rules and all regulations,
against Law-and-order of any sort. Anything goes, he says.’61
Koertge implies that Feyerabend holds this position when she says
that he did not convince her that all methodological rules are
useless.62 Gellner asserts that one of Feyerabend’s theses is that ‘all
methodological doctrines or principies are false’,63 but he seems to
mean that they are useless, as he goes on to say that Feyerabend
uses ‘the view of the irrelevance of methodologies to the actual
progress of Science . .. to support the view that anything goes’.64
Hattiangadi takes Feyerabend to be arguing against the use of
methodological rules in all instances65 in a similar manner to Kulka,
when he summarizes Feyerabend’s philosophy as follows: ‘since
there can be no perfect methodology, all methodologies are useless
and therefore “ anything goes’’ ’.66 Hellman States Feyerabend’s
conclusión as follows: ‘any set of methodological rules (which
actually rule anything out) should be conceded to be worthless by
the rationalist, i.e. anything goes’.67 Even Kuhn, who has much in
common with Feyerabend, says that ‘Feyerabend does not want to
impro ve methodology . .. but to do away with it.. .. Any gap in a
particular methodological argument is for him a sign of the
impossibility of the entire enterprise.’68
The discussion in (b) and (c) above tells clearly against this
interpretation. Although the title of the book Against Method must
be partly to blame, it is puzzling why so many commentators have
read Feyerabend this way. It is also so clearly an indefensibie
position. A case study revealing the use of one methodological rule
in one episode would be enough to refute the claim that all
methodological rules are useless.
In summary, in response to the methodological question,
‘anything goes’ has been taken to express diverse positions. The
view that all methodologies have their limitations, yet may some-
times be useful, seems eminently sound, and it is ably defended by
Feyerabend in Against Method. The view which stresses interac-
tions between methodologies and practices looks interesting but it
needs further clarification and support. Naess69 and Feyerabend
have gone some way towards fulfilling these needs, but neither has
done enough to persuade me that it is defensible.
If methodological pluralism is defended, then the view that
Science proceeds counter-inductively and the view that all
methodological rules are useless, are both undermined.

3. How is theory change to be explained?

The question of theory change differs from the first two questions.
Belief in the existence or non-existence of rational criteria of theory
evaluation does not determine what account should be given of
theory change. In the latter case, it is clear that no constraints are
put upon an account of theory change. In the former, it may
appear as though the rational criteria must play at least some role in
such an account. However, it could be quite consistently
maintained that the best theories are those which have the highest
degree of confirmability, falsifiability or whatever, yet there are all
sorts of ‘non-rational’ pressures which determine what theories
actually get accepted, and it is these factors which play the key role
in theory change. For the same reason methodological issues may
be quite distinct from the mechanisms of theory change. A fluid,
open methodology is compatible with widely diverse accounts of
theory change, but a rigid methodology is too, as methods for
discovering or justifying theories may have little impact against
other forces which are instrumental in bringing about theory
change — for example, the State of the economy, the dominant
interests in the society, the influence of particular pressure groups,
and the like.
The issue of theory change is more historical than
epistemological. It is closer to questions such as, ‘Why did one
government replace another?’ than it is to questions such as (1) and
(2) above, which are centrally epistemological. If it is thought that
an account of progress of theories (or of governments) can be
given, then that will be something overlaid on top of the basic
account of theory change (or governmental change). I am not going
to discuss the question of progress.
 If a position on theory change can be captured by the slogan
‘anything goes’, what would that mean? Bhaskar takes it to mean
simply that no account can be given: ‘the prescription “ anything
goes” is based on the idea (theory) that “ anything has gone” in the
history of Science’.70
Counihan takes it to mean that change will come about solely as
a result of the aims and intentions of indivuduals.71 The aims or
intentions are ‘a given, beyond specifically social determination’.72
P.F. Broad thinks that Feyerabend would explain theory change by
uncovering the use of particular techniques of persuasión.73 Krige
takes ‘anything goes’ to be a plea for theories not to change but for
the simultaneous development of many theories: ‘ “ anything goes”
means in practice that everything stays\1A
Feyerabend has left the way clear for this diversity of
interpretations. He in fact says very little on this question, and
there is some inconsistency in what he does say. The dominant view
that emerges from Against Method is that theories change as a
result of decisions and actions which are influenced by complex
social and material conditions.75 The implication is that no general
account can be given. The conditions specific to each case of theory
change would need to be uncovered in order to explain that
particular event.76 This position is hardly characterized by
‘anything goes’, as it emphasizes the restrictions that influence the
acceptance of one theory over others.
When discussing the change from one incommensurable theory
to another, Feyerabend suggests that the change may be based
simply on subjective wishes.77 This comment gives weight to
Counihan’s interpretation, but if in some cases ‘physical,
physiological, sociological [and] historical constraints are
operative’,78 there is no reason to think that in other cases our
wishes float freely above these factors. That theory change could
just be accountable in terms of subjective wishes is naive and
insupportable, true only in the land of dreams. The other ‘anything
goes’ positions on theory change are not supported by authors who
describe them, and they are mistakenly attributed to Feyerabend.
None of these positions seems worth developing.
This concludes the discussion of the epistemological
interpretations of ‘anything goes’. I will turn now, briefly, to some
social/political interpretations, simply to clarify what these
interpretations are and by so doing, I hope to reveal their
independence from the defensible epistemological interpretations
of ‘anything goes\ Here also I think that it is helpful to uncover
positions by way of questions.

Social/Political Interpretations of ‘Anything Goes’

How should education proceed?

Feyerabend talks of ‘anything goes’ in education in the following

sense: ‘the educational principies of a democracy should in
principie teach any subject’.79

What traditions should be allowed (or encouraged) to develop?

Feyerabend’s answer is: a plurality, with no one tradition (e.g.

Science) dominating the rest.80 This could be taken as a further
meaning of the slogan ‘anything goes\81 In a recent paper he
labels this view, ‘democratic relativism’.82

What is the best political theory?

Feyerabend does not offer a political theory, though he explicitly

rejects political anarchism,83 and supports some of the liberal
principies advocated by J.S. Mili in his essay, ‘On Liberty’.84
Despite this, some commentators insist that as Feyerabend says
‘anything goes’, he must accept political anarchism.85 Others draw
the opposite conclusión, arguing that his politics must be
conservad ve:

Dadaists who believe that ‘anything goes’ leave the establishment alone. They
do not oppose it with a view to eliminating it and replacing it with their
preferred form of life. Yet this is precisely what happens during revolutionary,
discontinuous transitions; Feyerabend’s espousal of Dadaism amounts to a
rejection of revolution then.86

Chalmers agrees that ‘anything goes’, if it means that individuáis

should follow their own inclinations, is a conservative position. If
adopted it would be liable ‘to lead to a situation in which those
who already have access to power will keep it’.87
 While it is true that Feyerabend is opposed to elimination of
forms of life, he is opposed to the domination of one form of life
over others, as is presently the case in the West. To this extent he is
not in favour of leaving the establishment alone or maintaining the
status quo.

How should we act?

When urged by critics to confront this question, Feyerabend does

not give a general reply, but explains that he acts in an ‘anything
goes’ manner partly because he follows his interests and his
interests are changeable, and partly because he believes that Science
and other forms of life will benefit from adaptive and inventive
people, as opposed to rigid imitators.88 Elsewhere he speaks against
total licence and in favour of a strong pólice forcé to prevent
various subsocieties from interfering with each other. .. ‘But as
regards the nature of these societies, “ anything goes” ’.89

What should we valué?

Agassi and Hargreaves claim that if ‘anything goes’ then there are
no valúes.90 This may be so, yet Feyerabend does not say that
‘anything goes’ as regards valúes. The latter play a key role in both
Against Method and Science in a Free Society. Curthoys and
Suchting pose the following question about Feyerabend: ‘How can
an ultra-anarchist have any over-riding valué other than the
rejection of all over-riding valúes?’91 How indeed; but Feyerabend
does not cali himself an ‘ultra-anarchist’, and he adheres to the
overriding valúes of individual and collective freedom of both
thought and action.92 It is these basic valúes which provide one of
the underpinnings of Feyerabend’s epistemology: ‘The attempt to
increase liberty, to lead a full and rewarding life, and the
corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man
entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and all
rigid traditions’.93
In short, Feyerabend’s responses to these social/political
questions contain a few, not very well worked out suggestions
about how Western societies could be improved, and some
indications of his personal preferences. There is nothing here which
purports to be a general theory, yet it is precisely the responses to
these questions which have aroused the crides the most, diverting
attention away from the more central epistemological issues, which
are much more fully clarified and defended by Feyerabend.

A Musical Interlude

The tone of many of the criticisms reminds me of the words of the

oíd song.

. . . In olden days a glimpse of stocking

was looked on as something shocking,
now heaven know s...

Against Method is ‘elusive in its vacillation betwen the trite and the
absurd’.94

. . . Good authors too who once knew better words

now only use four letter words,
writing prose . . .

‘Has he [Feyerabend] . .. gone off his rocker? Or is it all an

elabórate joke?’95

.. . The world’s gone mad today. ..

An ‘árdele’ by Duerr in Inquiry, entitled ‘In Defence of Paul

Feyerabend’, consists of a verse from Brandt’s poem, ‘The Ship of
Fools’, and an illustration of a fool with cap and bells.96

. . .And good’s bad to d a y ...

‘I was incensed by . .. [Feyerabend’s] disregard to [sic] Galileo’s

conscientious devotion, good faith, and high standards.’97

.. .And black’s white to d a y ...

‘.. . if clowning is the only permissible strategy (“ anything goes” ),

as Feyerabend delights to repeat. .. ’98

.. .And day’s night to d a y ...

‘. . . what distinguishes him [Feyerabend] from all other views in
the spectrum of views in philosophy of Science is that he is against
intellectual standarás. This above all is what his readers find most
outrageous.’99

. . . When most guys today

who women prize today
are just silly gigilos...

‘As far as my former pupil Feyerabend is concerned I cannot

recall any writing of mine in which I took any notice of any
writing of his.’100
A nice oíd song, sung very well by Frank, but now it is time to
leave it behind. ‘Anything goes’ is a catchy title, but as we have
seen, it catches too much. What is of valué must be sorted out
from the rest.

Philosophy of Science and Sociology of Knowledge

Sociologists vary in their opinión of the philosophical enterprise.

Some appear to grant to philosophy the role of arbiter in debates
about epistemology within sociology.101 Others view philosophy of
Science as having reached a dead-end and sociology as offering the
chance of escape:

[T]he empirical, i.e. sociological, programme of relativism offers a new way of

formulating and researching the problem concerning how the scientific
community builds its generalizations out of interactions with nature. It offers a
way out of the cul-de-sac of modern philosophy of Science.102

A third position within sociology is represented by Mulkay and

Bloor. They regard philosophy of Science and sociology of
knowledge as closely related and fruitfully interacting without one
dictating to the other.103 I favour the latter view, and in the rest of
this section I will attempt to provide a brief exemplification of it.
In many recent discussions within the sociology of knowledge,
certain epistemological views are tagged with the label ‘relativist’.
Feyerabend is regarded as the main defender of relativism within
philosophy of Science, so one question that may be raised is: does
Feyerabend’s epistemology throw any light on relativism within
the sociology of knowledge? If we move beyond the loose slogan
‘anything goes’, the following theses emerge as central to
Feyerabend’s epistemology:
A. There are no rational criteria of theory appraisal but
appraisal still goes on with valúes forming the basis. Reason is
one amongst other valúes that constitute this basis.104
B. (i) All methodologies have their limitations yet may
sometimes be useful. (ii) Methodologies should guide, and be
guided by practice.105
C. Theories are produced and changed as a result of
decisions and actions which are influenced by complex social
and material conditions.106
Relativism within sociology seems to have about as many
interpretations as there are authors writing about it, despite the
fact that Collins, introducing some empirical sociological studies
asserts:

This collection, it is hoped, in addition to its substantive contribution, will

reveal clearly the flourishing empirical programme associated with relativism
and thereby obviate the necessity for further defences and re-affirmations.107

It is hard to accept that such a stage has been reached when there
is not even agreement about what has been affirmed. The
following are a sample of some of the interpretations of relativism
within sociology of knowledge:

. . . an explicit relativism in which the natural world has a small or non-existent

role in the construction of scientific knowledge.108

Relativism in the literature of the sociology of knowledge has generally taken

the ‘everything is invalid’ form, and not the ‘everything is equally valid’
form .109

Cognitive relativism is the view that truth and logic are always formulated in
the framework of, and are relative to, a given thought-world with its own
language.110

‘Relativism is simply the opposite of absolutism’. . . ‘Methodological relativism’

is the view that ‘all beliefs are to be explained in the same way regardless of
how they are evaluated.’111

Total relativism is the view that each item of knowledge is just as good as any
other.112
 Epistemic relativism is not committed to the idea that there is no material world,
or that all knowledge claims are equally good or bad, or to the idea that meter
readings can be made to our liking. It is only committed to the idea that what we
make of physical resistances and of meter signáis is itself grounded in human
assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular historical
place and time.113

Given this diversity of interpretation it is no surprise that Collins,

the prime defender (or straw-man?)114 of relativism, appears
recently to be drawing back from the label.115 Also it is curious that
even with this diversity there appears to be little in the sociological
statements of relativism which has any cióse links with
Feyerabend’s epistemological relativism. Yet a large number of
current sociological projects for research and actual research have
very cióse links with Feyerabend’s epistemological theses. Barnes,
reflecting on his research project in Scientific Knowledge and
Sociological Theory notes:

Belief systems cannot be objectively ranked in terms of their proximity to reality

or their rationality. This is not to say that practical choices between belief
systems are at all difficult to make, or that I myself am not clear as to my own
preferences. It is merely that the extent to which such preferences can be
justified, or made compelling to others, is limited.116

This has very cióse affinities with Feyerabend’s epistemological

thesis (A).117
Collins describes the first two stages in the empirical programme
of relativism as follows: revealing the interpretative flexibility of
experimental data, and ‘describing mechanisms which limit
interpretative flexibility and thus allow controversies to come to an
end’.118 If the first stage is established then it is a short step to the
claim that the criteria of theory evaluation do not conform to any
rules of rationality — parí of thesis (A) above. According to
Collins, ‘one might say that this parí of the programme showed the
Quine-Duhem-Lakatos position to be more than an abstract, or
long-term account of Science. It uncovered the equivalent of this
philosophical and historical argument in the day-to-day activity of
contemporary laboratory Science’,119 and Collins associates
Feyerabend with the Quine-Duhem-Lakatos position.120
The research papers collected together in the Special Issue of
Social Studies o f Science121 do indeed go some way towards backing
up the ‘first stage’ of the programme and give some empirical
 support to Feyerabend’s first epistemological thesis. They also
give some substance to the ‘second stage’, and in describing the
mechanisms which limit interpretative flexibility certain valúes
which form the basis of theory appraisal are uncovered. These
empirical studies may then be regarded as relevant to (A) in this
sense as well. The valúes that appear to play a crucial role in
theory appraisal in these studies inelude: rhetoric,122 theoretical
coherence,123 and implausibility or ‘screwiness’ of alternad ves.124
David Edge’s work on quantitative and qualitative measures of
Communications in Science could be taken as arguing the case for
methodological pluralism (B[i] in the list of Feyerabend’s episte­
mological theses) in a specific area.125 A surprising and interesting
empirical finding on the interplay between methodologies and
practice, which is relevant to B[ii] above, is documented in
Harvey’s paper on certain experimental tests of quantum
theory.126 After an experimenter planned an experiment to test a
particular hypothesis, the plausibility of that hypothesis
increased. The mere activity of planning the experiment, prior to
the collection of any experimental data, had an effect on the
plausibility of the hypothesis. Harvey suggests that in this
instance plausibility plays a key role in the methodology used to
justify a particular position. Plausibility is here guiding practice
(rejection of alternative positions), and it is also guided by
practice (the activity of planning an experiment).
Feyerabend’s third epistemological thesis127 would probably
appear totally uncontentious to the sociologist of knowledge. Yet
with (A) and (B) behind us, (C) takes on a special meaning. If (A)
and (B) are accepted, then there is no basis for regarding Science
as in a unique and superior epistemological position to any other
tradition. Thus we should not expect accounts of theoretical
production and change, for theories within Science, to take a
radically different form from such accounts for theories within
other traditions. The recent debate between Gieryn, on the one
side, and Collins, Mulkay, Gilbert, Knorr-Cetina and Krohn,128
on the other, centres around this point (amongst others). Gieryn’s
complaint against these sociologists is that they are concerned to
reveal the similarity between Science and religión or Science and
the arts, and they are thus ‘ill-equipped’ to pursue the more
important question: ‘What makes Science unique, among culture-
producing institutions?’129 His opponents prefer not to view
Science as unique but instead as one social construction amongst
others. This clears the way for a broad conception of theory change
within Science. It is no longer solely accountable by factors internal
to Science. In a succinct summary of this approach, Edge States
that:

Whenever a scientist (or a research group) decides to develop a new technique, or

to pursue a fresh and unexpected phenomenon, or to adopt a perhaps
unfashionable theoretical approach, there is a (sociological or historical)
problem — each decisión brings together ‘cognitive’ (intellectual, technical,
cultural), and ‘social and historical’ factors. One task of the historian (or
sociologist) of Science is to explicate such decisions and to explore the
‘grounding’ of their rationality.130

Conclusión

Philosophy is moving away from the view that there are rational
criteria of theory appraisal. It is abandoning the hope of describing
(prescribing) a unique scientific method. Increasingly it is being
recognized that accounts of the production and change of scientific
theories need to draw on particular social and material conditions.
This drift in philosophy opens up a wide range of questions about
the social nature of Science where sociological research is relevant.
If Feyerabend’s epistemology is accepted, some of the questions
may take the following form: what valúes are used in theory
appraisal? Are these valúes linked to group allegiances? What
factors influence the adoption of particular methodologies over
others? Do ‘rational’ methodologies intermingle with ‘irrational’
ones? How is the interplay between methodologies and practice to
be studied as a social phenomenon? To what extern do social
factors influence theory change? As I have indicated, sociological
research is already proceeding along these lines, and it seems to
suggest some hope for a Feyerabendian position. It is my view that
sociological support for this position will have much greater
persuasive appeal than further abstract argumentaron within
philosophy. This is not to undervalue the use of philosophy to
sociology. It has had, and will continué to have, an important
influence in combating the constraints put upon sociology by a
narrow empiricism.131 Of course it may have been philosophy that
was originally responsible for the narrow empiricism — but that’s
another story.
 • NOTES

1. For example, P.J. Wyllie, The Way the Earth Works: An Introduction to the
New Global Geology (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1976), esp. Chapter 2. The
main presentation of Kuhn’s position occurs in: T.S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1970), and Kuhn, The
Essential Tensión: Selected Studies in the Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1977).
2. Some case studies couched in terms of Lakatos’s methodology of scientific
research programmes are collected together in C. Howson (ed.), Methodand Appraisal
in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science, 1800-1905
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). The clearest statement of Lakatos’s
position is I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth o f
Knowledge(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 91-196. M ostof Lakatos’s
papers have been collected and published in two volumes by John Worrall and Greg
Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
3. Collins cites Feyerabend as part of a philosophical development which lies
behind relativism within sociology: H.M. Collins, ‘Stages in the Empirical Progamme
of Relativism’, Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 11 (1981), note 1, 8. Feyerabend’s main
works are P. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline o f an Anarchistic Theory o f
Knowledge(London: New Left Books, 1975), and Feyerabend, Science in aFreeSociety
(London: New Left Books, 1978). Many of his key papers have been published in
Volumes 1 and 2 of his Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
4. See, for example, the interpretations given to Kuhn’s position in D. Palermo, ‘Is
a Scientific Revolution Taking Place in Psychology?’, Science Studies, Vol.l (1971),
135-55 and N. Warren, ‘Is a Scientific Revolution Taking Place in Psychology? —
Doubts and Reservations’, ibid., 407-13. A superficial disagreement about the
applicability of Kuhnian concepts masks a more fundamental disagreement about what
these concepts are.
5. The terms ‘framework’ or ‘cosmologies’ may replace the term ‘theories’ in
questions (1) to (3).
6. In ‘Scepticism in Recent Epistemology’, Methodology and Science, Vol. 14
(1981), 139-54,1 suggested ways to distinguish the question of theory choice (question 1)
from the question of theory change (question 3), and ways to distinguish both of these
questions from the ontological question of theoretical superiority/inferiority.
7. Collins, op.cit. note 3.
8. T.F. Gieryn, ‘Relativist/Constructivist Programmes in the Sociology of
Science: Redundance and Retreat’, Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 12 (1982), 279-97;
H.M. Collins, ‘Knowledge, Norms and Rules in the Sociology of Science’, ibid.,
299-309; M. Mulkay and G.N. Gilbert, ‘What is the Ultimate Question? Some Remarks
in Defence of the Analysis of Scientific Discourse’, ibid., 309-19; K.D. Knorr-Cetina,
‘The Constructivist Programme in the Sociology of Science: Retreats or Advances?’,
ibid., 320-24; R. Krohn, ‘On Gieryn on the “ Relativist/Constructivist” Programme in
the Sociology of Science: Naíveté and Reaction’, ibid., 325-28; Gieryn, ‘Not-Last
Words: Worn-Out Dichotomies in the Sociology of Science (Reply)’, ibid., 329-35.
9. See Kuhn, ‘Objectivity, Valué Judgement and Theory Choice’, in The Essential
Tensión, op.cit. note 1, 320-39, for a defence of this position.
10. Feyerabend, ‘Reason and Practice’, in Science in a Free Society, op. cit. note 3,40.
 11. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 189.
12. Feyerabend, ‘Reason and Practice’, op. cit. note 10, 13 and Sections 3 and 4;
Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 27-28 and 195 in particular (but all of
Against Method is relevant to this point). On the positive as well as negative aspects
of Feyerabend’s account, see especially his ‘Marxist Fairytales from Australia’, in
Science in a Free Society, op. cit. note 3, 162-69.
13. Feyerabend, ‘Marxist Fairytales . . op. cit. note 12, 165.
14. Feyerabend, ‘From Incompetent Professionalism to Professionalized
Incompetence — the Rise of a New Breed of Intellectuals’, in Science in a Free
Society, op. cit. note 3, 188.
15. Some hints about the valúes Feyerabend adopts are contained in Against
M ethod, op. cit. note 3, 175 and 215. For a much fuller and historical account of
this position see Feyerabend’s discussion of the role of reason in his Philosophical
Papers, Vol. 2, op. cit. note 3, Chapter 1.
16. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 189.
17. This dreadful word is introduced by Feyerabend in ‘Marxist Fairytales.. . ’,
op. cit. note 12, 163.
18. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 189.
19. Ibid.
20. N. Koertge, ‘Review of Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society', British
Journal fo r the Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 21 (1980), 385-90, is an exception. She
says that Worrall is too (386), but, at least in his ‘Review of Paul Feyerabend,
Against M ethod', Erkenntnis, Vol. 13 (1978), 279-95, he runs the two together when
he claims that Feyerabend opposes reason absolutely and asserts the superiority of
epistemological anarchism over other methodologies (280). Feyerabend’s consistent
misspelling of Worrall’s ñame is one of his weaker jokes: cf. ‘W orral’ in ‘Life at the
LSE?’, in Science in a Free Society, op. cit. note 3, 210, and ‘Wurril’ in ‘Rückblick’,
in H .P. Duerr (ed.), Versuchungen Aufsátze zur Philosophe Paul Feyerabends,
Zweiter Band (Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), 327.
21. G. Hellman, ‘Against Bad Method’, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 10 (1970),
190-91.
22. Ibid.
23. P. Rossi, ‘Hermeticism, Rationality and the Scientific Revolution’, in M.L.
Righini Bonelli and W.R. Shea (eds), Reason, Experiment and Mysticism in the
Scientific Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1975), 266.
24. M.A. Finocchiaro, ‘Review of I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Criticism and
the Growth o f Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 3
(1973), 361.
25. T. Counihan, ‘Epistemology and Science — Feyerabend and Lecourt’,
Economy and Society, Vol. 5 (1976), 84.
26. A very odd claim using the charge of irrationalism is made by P.F. Broad:
‘irrationalists, such as Feyerabend, usually say Science can only be learned by
“ intuition” , by actually doing it’: ‘Paul Feyerabend: Science and the Anarchist’,
Science, Vol. 206 (2 November 1979), 537.
27. R. Bhaskar, ‘Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophers of Science’,
New Left Review, Vol. 94 (1975), 45-46.
28. Ibid., 39. Counihan supports a similar interpretation, claiming that
Feyerabend asserts that ‘each different scientific theory is as good as another’,
op. cit. note 25, 82, as does Andersson, who says that Feyerabend cannot avoid the
conclusión that ‘all forms of life are equally good, from a theoretical point of view’;
G. Andersson, ‘Presuppositions, Problems, Progress’, in G. Radnitzky and
Andersson (eds), The Structure and Development o f Science (Dordrecht and
Boston, Mass.: D. Reidel, 1979), 6. Similarly, Musgrave says that epistemological
anarchism is the thesis ‘that any theory or research programme is as good as any
other’; A. Musgrave, ‘Evidential Support, Falsification, Heuristics, and
Anarchism’, in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds), Progress and Rationality in
Science (Dordrecht and Boston, Mass.: D. Reidel, 1978), 192, an interpretation
which he also put forward in Musgrave, ‘Method or Madness?’, in R.S. Cohén,
P.K. Feyerabend and M.W. Wartofsky (eds), Essays in Memory o f Imre Lakatos
(Dordrecht and Boston, Mass.: D. Reidel, 1976), 477, despite Feyerabend’s clear
rejection of this view in Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 189.
29. J.N. Hattiangadi, ‘The Crisis in Methodology: Feyerabend’, Philosophy o f
the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 (1977), 289.
30. T. Kulka, ‘How Far Does Anything Go? Comments on Feyerabend’s
Epistemological Anarchism’, Philosophy o f the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 (1977), 277.
31. Ibid., 280.
32. Ibid., 282.
33. Worrall, op. cit. note 20, 279.
34. Ibid., 280.
35. As Feyerabend points out in his reply to Kulka, ‘From Incompetent
Professionalism . . . ’, op. cit. note 14, 189.
36. E. McMullin, ‘Philosophy of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’, in
Radnitzky and Andersson (eds), Progress and Rationality in Science, op. cit. note
28, 238.
37. Koertge, op. cit. note 20, 386, emphasis added.
38. I. Lakatos, ‘Replies to Critics’, in R. Buck and R. Cohén (eds), Boston
Studies in the Philosophy o f Science, Vol. VIII (Dordrecht and Boston, Mass.: D.
Reidel, 1977), 174.
39. J. Hargreaves, ‘Review of Paul Feyerabend, Against Method , Telos, Vol.
27 (1976), 231.
40. Ibid., 235.
41. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 10.
42. See (b), below.
43. D. Papineau, For Science in the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan, 1978),
34.
44. Ibid.
45. Op. cit. note 3. For a statement of this interpretation of ‘anything goes’, see
Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society, op. cit. note 3, 164: ‘My intention is . . . to
expand the inventory of rules’. Along with traditional methodologies, he
recommends the use of ad hoc hypotheses, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 178 and
97; of pkirality of theories, 41; of counter-induction, Chapter 6; ‘backward
movements’, 153; connections with influential ideologies, 193; or other refuted
theories, 142; use of political forcé to revive theories that are ‘scientifically
untenable’, 50; skipping over difficulties, Appendix 2. He also says that ‘given any
rule . . . there are always circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore the
rule, but to adopt its opposite’, 23; ‘no method is regarded as indispensable’, 190.
On 193 of Against Method, he gives an example of the ‘anthropological method’,
and see 260 for some general comments on such a method. On 269, he says: ‘All
methodologies have their limitations and the only rule that survives is ‘‘anything
goes” ’: and on 23: ‘The only principie that does not inhibit progress is: anything
goes’. For adefenceof methodological pluralism see AgainstMethod, Chapters 1-16.
According to Feyerabend, Lakatos gives an unwitting defence of methodological
pluralism. See Feyerabend’s discussion of ‘anarchism in disguise’ in Against Method,
Chapter 16. Musgrave agrees: ‘ ‘‘Anything goes” is the position which Lakatos finally
adopts’; ‘Method or Madness?’, op. cit. note 28. In the context this claim is about
methodology. Feyerabend also claims that ‘ ‘‘anything goes” is an obvious practical
consequence of such a “ critical rationalism” which Popper used to introduce by
saying that although he was a professor of scientific method, he could not act
accordingly, for ‘‘there is no scientific method” ’; Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, op.
cit. note 3, 21. This is contrary to the position that Popper later carne to adopt —
namely, that falsification is (or at least should be) the methodology of Science: see K.
Popper, The Logic o f Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1968).
46. McEvoy asserts, as though it is a criticism of Feyerabend, that Galileo used
induction as well as counter-induction: J.G. McEvoy, ‘A ‘‘Revolutionary”
Philosophy of Science: Feyerabend and the Degeneration of Critical Rationalism into
Sceptical FallibilishT, Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 42 (1975), 65.
47. Zahar is wrong in asserting that Feyerabend denies that deductive logic may
play a Creative role in the development of the empirical Sciences: E. Zahar, ‘Crucial
Experiments: A Case Study’, in Radnitzky and Andersson (eds), Progress and
Rationality in Science, op. cit. note 28, 73. And Joravsky misrepresents Feyerabend
when he says that Feyerabend seems to deny reality to methods that resist universal
abstraction: D. Joravsky, ‘Review of Paul Feyerabend, Against M ethod', New York
Review o f Books (28 June 1979), 38. All methods are in this position but they may still
be real (that is, useful on occasions).
48. Further specific examples of scientists who have operated as methodological
pluralists are given in Feyerabend, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, op. cit. note 3, 20.
49. P. Tibbetts, ‘Feyerabend’s Against M ethod: The Case for Methodological
Pluralism’, Philosophy o f the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 (1977), 263-75; Broad, op. cit.
note 26, 534-37; Koertge, op. cit. note 20, 386, and N. Koertge, ‘Towards a New
Theory of Scientific Inquiry’, in Radnitzky and Andersson (eds), Progress and
Rationality in Science, op. cit. note 28, 275; A. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called
Science?, Second Revised Edition, Chapter 12, Section 1 (Queensland: Queensland
University Press, 1982).
50. Bhaskar, op. cit. note 27, 40.
51. Counihan, op. cit. note 25, 75.
52. G. Radnitzky, ‘Popperian Philosophy of Science as an Antidote Against
Relativism’, in Cohén, Feyerabend and Wartofsky, op. cit. note 28, 519; A. Naess,
‘Why not Science for Anarchists too? A Reply to Feyerabend’, Inquiry, Vol. 18
(1975), 190.
53. Naess, op. cit. note 52, 190.
54. J. Krige, Science, Revolution and Discontinuity (Brighton, Sussex:
Harvester, 1980), 109-21.
55. Ibid., 120
56. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 26.
57. See ibid., Chapters 2 and 17; Feyerabend, ‘Reason and Practice’, op. cit. note
12; Feyerabend, ‘Marxist Fairytales.. . ’, op. cit. note 12, 163-73; P. Feyerabend,
‘Reply to Hellman’s Review’, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 10 (1970), 202-06;
and Feyerabend, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, op. cit. note 3, Chapters 1-5, 9, 10 and
11.
58. See, for example, W. Suchting, ‘Rising Up from Downunder’, Inquiry, Vol. 21
(1978), 347, and Koertge, op. cit. note 20, 388. Krige mentions this view but makes
nothing of it in his exposition of Feyerabend: op. cit. note 54,121. Naess is an exception.
He accepts the interpretation and the position, and provides some supporting examples:
Naess, op. cit. note 52, 183-94.
59. Feyerabend, ‘Reply to Hellman’s Review’, op. cit. note 57, 204.
60. No absolute standard of evaluation is required. See discussion on question (1),
above.
61. J. Agassi, ‘Review of P. Feyerabend, Against M eth o d , Philosophia, Vol. 6
(1976), 166.
62. Koertge, op. cit. note 20, 388.
63. E. Gellner, ‘Review of P. Feyerabend, Against Methocf, British Journalfo r the
Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 26 (1975), 333.
64. Ibid., 336.
65. Hattiangadi, op. cit. note 29, 301.
66. Ibid., 280.
67. Hellman, op. cit. note 21, 193.
68. T. Kuhn, ‘Review of C. Howson (ed.), Method and Appraisal in the Physical
Sciences’, British Journal fo r the Philosophy o f Science, Vol. 31 (1980), 191.
69. Op. cit. note 52, 183-94.
70. Op. cit. note 27, 45.
71. Op. cit. note 25, 105.
72. Ibid.
73. Op. cit. note 26, 535.
74. Op cit. note 54, 142.
75. Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 187, note 15, 193 and 259-60.
76. Feyerabend’s support for historical accounts of theory change over
‘systematic’ accounts lends weight to this interpretation of his position: see his
Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, op. cit. note 3, 141. For Kuhn, too, theory (or paradigm)
change cannot be explained by general principies but only by detailed historical study
of the specific theoretical and social conditions operative at the time of the change: see
Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, op. cit. note 1.
77. Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 285.
78. Ibid., 187.
79. Feyerabend, ‘Reply to Professor Agassi’, in Science in a Free Society, op. cit.
note 3, 134.
80. Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 196, and Science in a Free Society, op. cit.
note 3, Parts One and Two, and 132-38.
81. Feyerabend, ‘Reason and Practice’, op. cit. note 12, 39-40, and previous
discussion referred to there. Feyerabend is here stressing the ‘anything goes’ response
to questions (1) and (2), but it is possible also to draw out of this material an ‘anything
goes’ response to this question.
82. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, op. cit. note 3, 25-33.
83. Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 17 and 189; ‘Reply to Professor Agassi’, op.
cit. note 79, 126-27; and P. Feyerabend, ‘The Gong Show — Popperian Style’, in
Radnitzky and Andersson (eds), Progress and Rationality in Science, op. cit. note 28,
391.
84. Feyerabend, ‘Science in a Free Society’, in Science in a Free Society, op. cit.
 note 3, 86.
85. Agassi, op. cit. note 61, 170; J. Watkins, ‘Corroboration and the Problem
of Content-Comparison’, in Radnitzky and Andersson (eds), Progress and
Rationality in Science, op. cit. note 28, 343; and J. Curthoys and W. Suchting,
‘Feyerabend’s Discourse against Method: A Marxist Critique’, Inquiry, Vol. 20
(1977), 253, though the latter note that Feyerabend opposes violence.
86. Krige, op cit. note 54, 146.
87. Chalmers, op. cit. note 49, Chapter 12, Section 4.
88. Against M ethod, op. cit. note 3, 215.
89. ‘Reply to Professor Agassi’, op. cit. note 79, 134.
90. Agassi, op. cit. note 61, 166-68, and Hargreaves, op. cit. note 39, 235-36.
91. Curthoys and Suchting, op. cit. note 85, 340.
92. ‘Marxist Fairytales . . . ’, op. cit. note 12, 174-78.
93. Against Method, op. cit. note 3, 20.
94. G. Hellman, ‘Reply to Feyerabend: From Bad to Worse’, Metaphilosophy,
Vol. 10 (1979), 206.
95. Gellner, op. cit. note 63, 341.
96. H.P. Duerr, ‘ln Defence of Paul Feyerabend’, Inquiry, Vol. 17 (1975), 112.
97. Agassi, op. cit. note 61, 165-66.
98. Gellner, op. cit. note 63, 337.
99. Hattiangadi, op. cit. note 29, 290.
100. K. Popper, ‘Replies to My Critics’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy o f
Karl Popper, Book 11 (La Salle: Open Court, 1974), 1069. He has forgotten his
mention of Feyerabend’s suggestion to improve the pistón of a perpetuum mobile, a
refinement that Feyerabend made to Popper’s analysis of Szilard’s thought
experiment: see Popper, ‘Autobiography’, in ibid., 1789. How uncanny.
101. Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. note 8, 320.
102. Collins, op. cit. note 8, 305.
103. See, for instance, M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology o f Knowledge
(London: George Alien & Unwin, 1979), Chapter 2; and D. Bloor, Knowledge and
Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), ix.
104. See discussion of question (1), above, in section entitled ‘Epistemological
Interpretations of “ Anything Goes’’ ’.
105. See discussion of question (2), above, in section referred to in note 104.
106. See discussion of question (3), above, in section referred to in note 104.
107. Collins, op. cit. note 3, 4.
108. Ibid., 3. This position is affirmed in another article: ‘The natural world in
no way constrains what is believed to be’; H.M. Collins, ‘Son of Seven Sexes: The
Social Destruction of a Physical Phenomenon’, Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 11
(1981), 54.
109. B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 180.
110. Y. Elkana, ‘Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical
Relativism’, Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 312.
111. Bloor, op. cit. note 103, 142.
112. Gieryn, ‘Relativist/Constructivist Programmes . . . ’, op. cit. note 8, 295.
113. Knorr-Cetina, op. cit. note 8, 320-21.
114. Krohn, op. cit. note 8, 326.
115. Collins, op. cit. note 8, note 6, 306 and note 7, 307.
116. Barnes, op. cit. note 109, 154. This is cióse to Mulkay’s position: ‘Scientific
knowledge is . . . not certified by the application of generally agreed procedures of
verification’; op. cit. note 103, 59.
117. See above, this section.
118. Collins, op. cit. note 3, 4.
119. Ibid., note 6, 10.
120. Ibid., note 1, 8.
121. See, for example, Collins, ‘Son of Seven Sexes’, op. cit. note 108, 33-63; A.
Pickering, ‘Constraints on Controversy: The Case of the Magnetic Monopole’,
Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 11 (1981), 63-93; and B. Harvey, ‘Plausibility and the
Evaluation of Knowledge: A Case-Study of Experimental Quantum Mechanics’,
ibid., 95-130.
122. Collins, op. cit. note 108.
123. Pickering, op. cit. note 121.
124. Harvey, op. cit. note 121.
125. D. Edge, ‘Quantitative Measures of Communication in Science’, History o f
Science, Vol. 17 (1979), 102-34.
126. Harvey, op. cit. note 121.
127. See (C), above, this section.
128. See note 8, above.
129. Gieryn, ‘Relativist/Constructivist Programmes. . op. cit. note 8, 281.
130. Edge, op. cit. note 125, 115.
131. As Karin Knorr-Cetina notes: ‘there is still a battle to be fought in sociology
(and in other fields) against the standard empiricist account of Science’; Knorr-
Cetina, ‘Relativism — What Now?’, Social Studies o f Science, Vol. 12 (1982),
133-36, quote at 133.

Denise Russell is a Sénior Tutor in the

Department of General Philosophy, The
University of Sydney. Her doctoral
dissertation was on an extensión of
Feyerabend's epistemology. She has
published articles in the areas of
epistemology and philosophy of psychiatry.
Author's address: Department of General
Philosophy, The University of Sydney,
Sydney, New South Wales, 2006, Australia.