1.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. MARICELLE M.

CORTES, Respondent.
FACTS:On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) issued Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information
Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of
respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the
legality of the respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G.
Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on
nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct
and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.
On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed
Chairperson Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is
covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari
is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere
member of the Commission En Banc.
Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied.
Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition for review on November 24, 2008 before the
CSC.
On March 2, 2010 the CSC issued Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed
the nepotic character of respondent Cortes’ appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010.
Consequently, CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Ma. Victoria V. Cardona terminated
respondent’s services effective August 4, 2010. On August 16, 2010, respondent Cortes filed a
Petition for Review with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA).
On August 11, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullified Resolution
10-0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes
be reinstated to her position as IO V in the CHR. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in
the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism. NO
RULING:
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority
referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the
individual Commissioners who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending
official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.3 Clearly, the prohibition against
nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil
service and the efficiency of its personnel.4
Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by
the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to
the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition
meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law,
can never have relatives to speak of.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's
abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil
sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality
and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
2. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014.
FACTS:
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as
a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60
days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter
promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to
no avail.
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the prosecution, it was
established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy but admitted obtaining a
loan from Balajadia for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the
same receipt was used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see. RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. CA affirmed with modification the indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2
months of prison correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prison mayor, as maximum,
plus 1 year for each additional 10,000 pesos or a total of 7 years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if unsold, or
remit the proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under one of the elements of Estafa under
Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC? (YES)
2. Whether or not there is a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
(excessive fines) that the courts continue to impose against property committed today –
especially in estafa. (RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as
follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
RULING:
1. According to the petitioner the last element of estafa, which is, that there is a demand
by the offended party on the offender, was not proven. The Court disagrees, as no
specific type of proof is required to show there was demand. Demand need not be
formal; it maybe verbal. Should a written demand be necessary, the law should have
stated so.
2. Legislature pegged these penalties to the value of money and property in 1932 when
the RPC was enacted. There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the court continues to impose on crime against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money 80
years ago in 1932. The court however cannot modify the range of penalties because
that would constitute juridical legislation. As the Constitution vests the power to enact
laws on the legislature, the courts cannot arrogate the power to enlarge the scope of the
crime, introduce matters that the legislature clearly did not intend, redefine a crime in a
manner that does not hew to the statutory language, or modify the penalty to conform to
the courts' notion (out of the innumerable number of notions) of justice and fairness.
However, this does not render the whole situation without remedy. The framers of the
RPC anticipated this matter by including Art. 5, which is the duty of the court in
connection with acts, which should be repressed, but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties.
Chief Justice, Sereno: Concur with the ponencia in affirming the conviction of petitioner
but votes to apply the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing
subject of the offense. The current penalty imposed has remained untouched for 83
years.
Justice Brion: Concur with the conclusion that Lito Corpuz is guilty of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt. Modifying the penalties (as proposed by some justices) is not judicial
interpretation but it is judicial legislation that is unconstitutional and illegal breach of the
doctrine ofseparate powers.
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC (INTERPRETATION OF WORDS & PHRASES):
The Court should resort to the canons of statutory construction only when the statute is
ambiguous. However, in the present case as the meaning of the penalties imposed is
clear and needs neither construction nor interpretation. The language of the penalty
clauses of Article 315 of the RPC is plain and clear; no reservation, condition or
qualification, particularly on the need for adjustment for inflation, can be read from the
law, whether by express provision or by implication. The clear legislative intention to
penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as enumerated in the law, therefore,
should be deemed complete – Article 315 embodies all that the legislature intended
when the law was crafted.
As the words of Article 315 are clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter
them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the law or from
legislative history, i.e., to remedy the perceived grossly unfair practice of continuing to
impose on persons found guilty of estafa the penalties that the RPC Commission
pegged on the value of money and property in 1930.
3. Mercado v. People, G.R. No. 149375, November 26, 2002.
FACTS:
 Marvin Mercado, Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile
Bertumen were charged and convicted of violation of RA 6538 or the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, Sentenced to12 years to 17 years of Reclusion
Temporal.
 Marvin Mercado assails and argues that the court of appeals having increased
the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of 17 years and 4
months to 30 years, should have certified the case to the Supreme Court as the
penalty of 30 years is already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph
of Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 rules of criminal procedure.
 The Court of Appeals denied the prayer of the petitioner because the provision of
Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied on by the petitioner, is only applicable when the penalty
imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty. Hence,
the penalty imposed by the appellate court on the accused was clearly in
accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua
for the purposes of Sec 13, Rule 124.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court of appeals was correct in ruling for the conviction of the
accused
2. Whether the court of appeals, having increased the penalty imposed by the court
a quo to a prison term of 17 years and 4 months to 30 years, should have
certified the case to the Supreme Court as the penalty of 30 years is already
reclusion perpetua pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, rule 124

RULING:
1. As to the first issue, the CA is correct in ruling for the conviction of the accused
because the petitioner raised questions of facts which is not proper when the
case is already elevated to the Supreme Court. Findings of the fact of the trial
court, when affirmed by the court of appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court.
2. As to the second issue, Art. 27 of the revised penal code states that the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. Even
though 30 years falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a
single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The 30-
year period for Reclusion Perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of
sentence under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed by the
Petitioner is penalized under RA 6538 or the Anti Carnapping Act of 1972 which
is a special law and not under the Revised Penal code. Special laws have their
own penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from
nor refer to those in the Revised Penal Code.

4. People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974.

TOPIC: When judicial interpretation may be set aside
Facts:
 Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas, in Criminal Case
No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a
retroactive application of our ruling in People vs. Mapa.
 The accused admitted that on Sep. 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver
and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or
permit.
 He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no
license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
 The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made under Sec. 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
 The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority
 to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal based on the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang.

Issue:
 Whether or not appellant shall be acquitted based on our rulings in
Macarandang.

RULING:
 Yes. Judgement appealed from is reversed. Appellant is acquitted.
 The doctrine laid down in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm
in question and when he arraigned by the trial court.
 It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
 It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm despite the
absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
 Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable.

Short Analysis:
The case of People vs. Mapa expressly abandoned the Macarandang doctrine in 1967,
the court then expressly abandoned the decision in People vs. Mapa in deciding the
case in People vs. Jabinal because the court said that case was arraigned in
September 1964 and therefore the Macarandang doctrine still applies in the case of
People vs. Jabinal. It may seem unfair for Mapa because he was convicted and the
Macanrandang doctrine was not applied to his case. Therefore, the Supreme Court
may, in an appropriate case, change or overrule its previous construction. Judicial
rulings have no retroactive effect.

5. Phillippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) vs COMELEC G.R. No. 190529 –

April 29, 2010.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George “FGBF George” Duldulao, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Facts:
The COMELEC (respondent) delisted Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (Petitioner) a
party list organization or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution on the
ground that it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in the 2004 elections and did not participate in the
2007 elections, pursuant to Party-List Systems Act or RA No. 7941 Sec. 6 (8). Which states that:
 Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (8) It fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioner filed its motion on 3 asserting grounds: 1. that the assailed resolution gives the option
to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2. The SC’s ruling in the MINERO v
COMELEC cannot apply because, Minero prior to delisting was afforded opportunity to be
heard. 3. The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended in order to avoid
miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the Part-List
systems act.
This motion was denied for lack of merit, and the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court for
review.
Issue:
1. Whether there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
2. Whether PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
3. Whether the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

Ruling:
1. No. The PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a Party-List group in the coming May
2010 elections. The law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. “The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.”

The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

2. No. PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution
No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their
opposition. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
 The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. Hence, it was clear that that
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

3. No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant
in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the
rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and
strike it out from [the] ruling case law.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is
concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for
reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP).

6. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139,

August 5, 2014
Statutory Construction (Sc ruling cannot be undone by Congress through re-enacting a
provision previously declared unconstitutional)
Facts:
1. Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.
2. Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to
work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
3. Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed
Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately
report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for
immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997,
she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to
cover her plane ticket to Manila.
4. On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement
of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees
Issue:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.
Ruling:
Yes, Cabiles is entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary. The Court observe that
the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent. The Court reiterate our finding in Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed
overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. Along the same line, we held that the reinstated
clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their
monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.
Doctrine of this case:
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution.
Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is
null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. The Court
declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void