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Journal of Applied Psychology © 2016 American Psychological Association

2016, Vol. 101, No. 8, 1067–1081 0021-9010/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000115

Examining the Effects of Turnover Intentions on Organizational


Citizenship Behaviors and Deviance Behaviors: A Psychological
Contract Approach

Ke Michael Mai Aleksander P. J. Ellis


National University of Singapore University of Arizona

Jessica Siegel Christian Christopher O. L. H. Porter


University of North Carolina Indiana University
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Although turnover intentions are considered the most proximal antecedent of organizational exit, there
is often temporal separation between thinking about leaving and actual exit. Using field data from 2
diverse samples of working adults, we explore a causal model of the effects of turnover intentions on
employee behavior while they remain with the organization, focusing specifically on organizational
citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and deviance behaviors (DBs). Utilizing expectancy theory as an explan-
atory framework, we argue that turnover intentions result in high levels of transactional contract
orientation and low levels of relational contract orientation, which in turn lead to a decrease in the
incidence of OCBs and an increase in the incidence of DBs. We first used a pilot study to investigate the
direction of causality between turnover intentions and psychological contract orientations. Then, in Study
1, we tested our mediated model using a sample of employees from a large drug retailing chain. In Study
2, we expanded our model by arguing that the mediated effects are much stronger when the organization
is deemed responsible for potential exit. We then tested our full model using a sample of employees from
a large state-owned telecommunications corporation in China. Across both studies, results were generally
consistent and supportive of our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for future
theory, research, and practice regarding the management of both the turnover process and discretionary
behaviors at work.

Keywords: turnover intentions, psychological contracts, citizenship behaviors, deviance behaviors

Turnover continues to garner attention from practitioners and Not surprisingly, researchers have focused efforts on predicting
scholars alike who recognize the significant costs associated with turnover, often using intent to leave as the criterion (see Hom,
employee exit (Hom, 2011). Costs following employee exit are Mitchell, Lee, & Griffeth, 2012). However, as Hom and Kinicki
multifaceted and include recruiting and training replacements (Al- (2001) and Lee and Mitchell (1994) recognize, there are many
len, Bryant, & Vardaman, 2010) as well as dealing with increased intervening factors between the formation of turnover intentions
accident rates (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005) and poor customer and actual exit. For example, when employment opportunities are
service (Hancock, Allen, Bosco, McDaniel, & Pierce, 2013). scarce, employees have few options besides remaining with their
These issues are particularly problematic in certain industries such current employer. We argue that this has significant implications
as retail, where turnover rates reach almost 50% annually (Young, for organizations while employees stay.
2004). Turnover intentions represent a significant cognitive shift for
employees as they begin to detach from the organization (Burris,
Detert, & Chiaburu, 2008). Their ‘relationship’ with the organiza-
This article was published Online First April 14, 2016. tion changes, which may alter the way employees view discretion-
Ke Michael Mai, Department of Management & Organisation, NUS ary behaviors that “shape the organizational, social, and psycho-
Business School, National University of Singapore; Aleksander P. J. Ellis, logical context” (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997, p. 100) but are
Department of Management and Organizations, University of Arizona; “outside the rubric of task performance” (Dalal, 2005, p. 1241).
Jessica Siegel Christian, Department of Organizational Behavior, Kenan– These types of behaviors are important as they can enhance orga-
Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina; Christopher nizational functioning (e.g., Organ, 1988) or damage an organiza-
O. L. H. Porter, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.
tion’s legitimate interests (e.g., Sackett & DeVore, 2001).
This research was supported by funding from the Center for Leadership
Ethics at the Eller College of Management, The University of Arizona.
There is some evidence linking turnover intentions with discre-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ke Mi- tionary behaviors at work. For example, studies have reported a
chael Mai, Department of Management & Organisation, NUS Business negative relationship between turnover intentions and organiza-
School, National University of Singapore, Mochtar Riady Building, 15 tional citizenship behaviors (OCBs; e.g., Aryee & Chay, 2001;
Kent Ridge Drive, Singapore 119245. E-mail: kemike.mai@gmail.com Burris et al., 2008), defined as “performance that supports the

1067
1068 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

social and psychological environment in which task performance over intentions on OCBs and DBs when the organization is seen as
takes place” (Organ, 1997, p. 95), and a positive relationship responsible for the potential exit.
between turnover intentions and deviance behaviors (DBs; e.g., The current research makes four important contributions to the
Greenbaum, Mawritz, Mayer, & Priesemuth, 2013; Richards & turnover literature. First, unlike previous work (e.g., Holtom,
Schat, 2011), defined as behaviors that are voluntary, violate Mitchell, Lee, & Eberly, 2008; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, &
organizational norms, and threaten the well-being of the organi- Meglino, 1979), we focus on turnover intentions as a predictor
zation and/or its members (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson rather than an outcome, and suggest that there are implications
& Bennett, 1995). However, the majority of the aforementioned (and costs) to turnover intentions beyond organizational exit. Sec-
studies were cross-sectional in nature and turnover intentions were ond, we utilize expectancy theory as an explanatory framework to
typically examined as an outcome variable (see Burris et al., 2008, build a model that better explicates the process, highlighting the
as a notable exception). We believe, as do Hom et al. (2012), that role of psychological contract orientations. This extends past work
the issue would benefit from closer scrutiny to determine the that has been primarily atheoretical and correlational in nature and
process by which turnover intentions impact employee behavior. adds to our understanding of the implications associated with
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Therefore, the purpose of this manuscript is to build on past thinking about leaving. Third, we build on the psychological
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

cross-sectional research to develop a causal model linking turnover contracts and turnover literature, which has primarily focused on
intentions and discretionary behaviors at work. the effects of contract violations on turnover (e.g., Turnley &
Based on expectancy theory, we believe that turnover intentions Feldman, 1999), by suggesting that psychological contract orien-
affect the strength of employees’ psychological contract orienta- tations may add to the multifaceted role of psychological contracts
tions, or the set of beliefs they hold regarding their relationship in the turnover process. Finally, we add to the turnover literature
with their organizations (Rousseau, 1995). Psychological contract by capturing employees’ potential reason for organizational exit,
orientations can be transactional, or short-term and economic in emphasizing the role of perceived organizational responsibility.
nature, and relational, or long-term and socioemotional in nature
(e.g., Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). We argue that turnover in-
Turnover Intentions and Psychological Contracts
tentions motivate employees to hold strong transactional, and weak
relational, psychological contract orientations because the value A psychological contract represents an employee’s perception
assigned to each type of contract changes when employees begin of a reciprocal obligation between themselves and the organization
to detach from the organization. This then translates into less of a (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1995). Psychological
willingness to engage in OCBs and more of a willingness to contracts contain transactional and relational components and em-
engage in DBs (see Figure 1). ployees can orient to one or both components. Transactional con-
In Study 1, we test the mediated model described above. Then, tract orientations focus on “specific, short-term, and monetizable
in Study 2, we replicate and build upon our original mediated obligations entailing limited involvement of the parties” (Morrison
model. Although we expect that turnover intentions will affect & Robinson, 1997, p. 229). Employees with strong transactional
psychological contract orientations, we recognize that an employ- contract orientations focus on economic exchange, where obliga-
ee’s reasons for leaving can vary widely, potentially influencing tions are clearly defined and employees presume immediate com-
effect sizes. Given our focus on relational and transactional con- pensation for their contributions.
tract orientations and the fact that we are interested in the potential Relational contract orientations focus on “broad, open-ended,
reasons for leaving, we argue that distinguishing whether or not the and long-term obligations . . . based on the exchange of not only
organization is seen as responsible represents a relevant and pow- monetizable elements (e.g., pay for service) but also socioemo-
erful approach. Specifically, we suggest that the effects of turnover tional elements such as loyalty and support” (Morrison & Robin-
intentions on psychological contract orientations are significantly son, 1997, p. 229). A strong relational contract orientation focuses
strengthened when the organization is perceived as bearing pri- more on social exchange and is less instrumental in nature (Mill-
mary responsibility. As a result, our mediated model is moderated ward & Hopkins, 1998). Social exchange relationships involve
by perceived organizational responsibility, such that psychological interdependencies between parties that are not necessarily based
contract orientation is more likely to mediate the effects of turn- on specific economic obligations (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).

Figure 1. Hypothesized model. OCBs ⫽ organizational citizenship behaviors; DBs ⫽ deviance behaviors.
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, OCBS, AND DEVIANCE BEHAVIORS 1069

Employees can (and do) hold both types of contract orientations, In sum, based on our arguments, employees who intend to leave
as, conceptually, each focuses on different components of the will evidence strengthened concerns over contracts that are trans-
employment relationship (Millward & Hopkins, 1998). Although actional in nature and weakened concerns over contracts that are
research has found that measures of relational and transactional relational in nature.
contract orientation are significantly related to one another (e.g., A number of studies offer empirical support for our conceptual
Alcover, Martínez-Íñigo, & Chambel, 2012; Millward & Hopkins, arguments. Chambel and Castanheira (2007), utilizing a sample of
1998), they are conceptually and empirically distinct (e.g., Alcover temporary workers from two organizations, found that when work-
et al., 2012; Dabos & Rousseau, 2004). ers preferred their temporary status and had no motivation to
According to Shore and Tetrick (1994), employees who look to develop a more long-term relationship with the organization, they
build their career with an organization are more likely to establish held a stronger economic and weaker socioemotional relationship
extensive, relational relationships with their organization, whereas with the organization. Rousseau (1990) surveyed a group of former
employees with shorter term goals are more likely to prefer rela- MBA students entering organizations and found that psychological
tionships based on economic exchange. As a result, we believe that contracts were largely determined by the type of relationships
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the two types of psychological contract orientations will be af- these employees expected to have with their organizations. Those
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

fected when an individual thinks about leaving the organization. who viewed their job as simply a stepping stone to another job
Our arguments are based on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), developed strong transactional contracts with the organization.
which suggests that an employee’s intended effort will be based on Those who were interested in a long-term relationship with the
three factors: (a) valence, or the attractiveness of an outcome; (b) organization developed strong relational contracts. Further support
instrumentality, or the probability that performance will result in comes from Millward and Hopkins (1998), who found that em-
desired rewards; and (c) expectancy, or the probability that effort ployees with permanent employment contracts held strong rela-
will lead to the desired performance level. We argue that valence tional contracts whereas employees with temporary employment
and instrumentality perceptions are particularly relevant in the contracts held strong transactional contracts with the organization.
relationship between turnover intentions and psychological con- Others provide more direct, albeit cross-sectional, support, finding
tract orientations. Combined, valence and instrumentality deter- that turnover intentions are negatively related to relational contract
mine the value of a certain course of action (Diefendorff & orientation and positively related to transactional contract orienta-
Chandler, 2011). tion (Alcover et al., 2012; Christian & Ellis, 2014).
Regarding relational contracts, loyalty, support, affiliation, and Therefore, based on the arguments above and the available
long-term connections typically represent needs that are high in evidence, we hypothesize the following:
valence (Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, for employees who are
Hypothesis 1: Turnover intentions will (a) negatively affect
thinking about leaving, these types of outcomes are no longer as
relational psychological contract orientation and (b) positively
important. In addition, relational contracts are based on the long-
affect transactional psychological contract orientation.
term social exchange of economic and socioemotional outcomes
such as development and advancement opportunities, promotions,
Psychological Contracts, OCBs, and Deviance
and pay raises (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). For employees
thinking about leaving the organization, the probability that they Employees’ focus on relational and transactional contract ori-
will reap rewards gleaned from long-term relationships is signifi- entations will then be reflected in the degree to which they engage
cantly reduced. It is unclear whether the relationships they estab- in discretionary behaviors, specifically OCBs and DBs. OCBs
lish will pay off before they exit the organization, no matter how represent “performance that supports the social and psychological
well they perform. Given low levels of valence and instrumental- environment in which task performance takes place” (Organ, 1997,
ity, the value of relational contracts will be minimal and employees p. 95). Employees feel a relational obligation to engage in OCBs
will likely choose to orient away from relational obligations. This because their actions will benefit their coworkers and the organi-
argument is in line with research on psychological attachment in zation (Lavelle et al., 2009). Because relational contracts are
the workplace. Psychologically attached employees feel a need to embedded in webs of social concerns and focus on interpersonal
reciprocate, in accordance with a social exchange perceptive, with relationships (Rousseau & Parks, 1993), Rousseau (1995, 2004)
the entity that created these feelings (Meyer & Allen, 1991). On argued that a strong relational contract orientation leads employees
the other hand, psychological detachment, which has been equated to engage in OCBs. When employees have positive relationships
with high turnover intentions (e.g., Burris et al., 2008), creates a within their organization, they follow the norm of reciprocity
separation between employees and their engagement in the orga- whereby individuals are motivated to respond to others in kind
nization. (Gouldner, 1960). Often these types of reciprocal exchange rela-
Regarding transactional contracts, it makes rational sense for tionships develop into a self-reinforcing cycle (Cropanzano &
employees who are thinking about leaving to shift attention, re- Mitchell, 2005). This idea has been consistently supported by
sources, and effort toward short-term obligations, which represent research demonstrating the positive effects of social exchange
a more likely pathway leading to desired rewards and away from relationships on OCBs (e.g., Van Dyne, Graham, & Dienesch,
long-term obligations. Employees have a natural preference for a 1994) and by Van Dyne and Ang (1998), who found a strong
sure gain versus a gamble because they perceive that the expected positive relationship between relational psychological contract ori-
utility is higher (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In other words, entation and the incidence of OCBs among a sample of service
valence and instrumentality will be perceived to be much higher employees in Singapore.
with transactional rather than relational contract obligations and Employees with a strong transactional contract orientation, on
employees will direct their energy toward the higher-value target. the other hand, tend to engage in behavior that is in alignment with
1070 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

the terms of the contract. Transactional contracts signal that em- Hypothesis 2: Relational psychological contract orientation
ployees keep their relationships with their organizations at arms’ will mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the incidence
length (Rousseau, 2004). Employees focus primarily on clearly of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs. Specifically, turnover intentions are
defined expectations, reducing the likelihood that they will engage expected to negatively relate to relational psychological con-
in discretionary behaviors that result in little to no immediate tract orientation, which is in turn expected to positively relate
economic returns. Research supports these arguments. For exam- to OCBs and negatively relate to DBs.
ple, transactional contract orientation was negatively related to the
number of unpaid extra hours worked per week among a sample of Hypothesis 3: Transactional psychological contract orienta-
UK service employees (Millward & Hopkins, 1998). tion will mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the
DBs refers to behaviors that are voluntary and violate normative incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs. Specifically, turnover
behavior, such as damaging company property or acting rudely to intentions are expected to positively relate to transactional
coworkers (e.g., Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Like OCBs, DBs are psychological contract orientation, which is in turn expected
to negatively relate to OCBs and positively relate to DBs.
discretionary and the link between deviant acts and the potential
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loss of valued financial incentives is often unclear. However,


This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

unlike OCBs which benefit the organization, DBs harm the orga- Pilot Study
nization (Dalal, 2005). We argue that a strong relational contract
Before testing our causal model, we utilized a separate sample
orientation will reduce the incidence of DBs. According to social
to test possible bidirectional effects between employees’ turnover
bonding theory (see Aday, 1990), the strength of an employee’s
intentions and psychological contract orientation using a longitu-
bond with other actors or entities constrains their behavioral op-
dinal, cross-lagged panel design. Participants completed the same
tions. When employees are ‘close to’ their coworkers and their
measures—turnover intentions and psychological contracts—at
organization, become intimately involved with organizational ac-
two separate points in time, which allowed us to test the causal
tivities, and risk losing established relationships due to negative
effects of each variable on the other while controlling for existing
sanctions, they are less likely to engage in DBs (Hirschi, 1969;
levels of either variable (see Colquitt & Rodell, 2011).
Hollinger, 1986).
Similar conclusions can be reached using Jones’s (1991) ethical
decision making model, which suggests that unethical behavior is Method
determined largely by the moral intensity of the issue. According Procedure and participants. To generate cross-lagged data,
to Jones, moral intensity is driven by proximity, which refers to we recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
“the feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or physi- (mTurk; see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Of the 200
cal) that the moral agent has for victims (beneficiaries) of the evil individuals who completed the survey at Time 1, 133 (67%)
(beneficial) act in question” (p. 376). A number of studies have responded at Time 2 (one month later). According to demographic
supported the influence of proximity on unethical behavior, going data collected at Time 1, participants (59% male; mean age ⫽
back to the classic Milgram (1974) studies that showed how 33.21 years [SD ⫽ 9.78]; 77% full-time employees) came from a
psychological distance can increase participants’ willingness to diverse set of occupations and were employed in a variety of
inflict physical pain. For example, Chiou, Huang, and Lee (2005) industries including sales and services (33.8%), administrative
found that perceived proximity to a band reduced consumers’ specialization (5.5%), business and finance (16.9%), computer
willingness to purchase pirated music. Although unethical behav- related (16.4%), and education (9.5%). Respondents at Time 2 and
ior and deviance behaviors are not interchangeable constructs (see nonrespondents did not significantly differ in terms of turnover
Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010), the conceptual argu- intentions, F(1,199) ⫽ .00, ns1; relational psychological contract
ments inherent in Jones’ theory cross the two domains. In support, orientation, F(1,199) ⫽ 1.34, ns; transactional psychological con-
Luksyte, Spitzmueller, and Maynard (2011) reported a significant tract orientation, F(1,199) ⫽ .01, ns; age, F(1,199) ⫽ 2.83, ns; sex,
negative correlation between relational contract orientation and F(1,199) ⫽ 2.64, ns; or tenure, F(1,199) ⫽ .95, ns—all of which were
deviance. measured at Time 1.
Although Luksyte et al. (2011) reported a nonsignificant (albeit Measures. Turnover intentions were measured using a five
positive) correlation between transactional contract orientation and item scale developed by Colarelli (1984) and adapted by Chen,
deviance, our arguments suggest that transactional contract orien- Ployhart, Thomas, Anderson, and Bliese (2011) on a 5-point Likert
tation may also predict DBs. Employees with a strong transactional scale. The same scale is also used in Study 2.2 Cronbach’s alpha
contract orientation likely focus exclusively on explicit obligations was .96 for both Time 1 and Time 2. The two types of psycho-
to their organizations. The only valued outcomes are those that are logical contracts were measured using an abbreviated 18-item
clearly defined, and there is less constraint on how they might
otherwise act. These employees also have a very short-term per- 1
In all studies, p values above .05 were treated as nonsignificant.
spective in terms of their relationships and are less concerned with 2
The measure of turnover intentions utilized in the Pilot Study and
sanctions or punishments that may not occur for some time (e.g., Study 2 has been used frequently in the literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2011;
receiving a verbal warning for showing up late to work). Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994). We recognize that the measure may
In sum, we have argued that turnover intentions will affect the capture both thoughts of quitting and turnover intentions. However, based
on meta-analytic evidence (Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia, & Griffeth,
strength of relational and transactional contract orientations, which 1992) which found that measures of thoughts of quitting strongly relate to
will then affect the incidence of OCBs and DBs at work, leading measures of turnover intentions (corrected mean r ⫽ .69), we aggregated
to the following hypotheses: the items into one measure of turnover intentions.
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, OCBS, AND DEVIANCE BEHAVIORS 1071

version originally developed by Millward and Hopkins (1998) and across time, allowing us to examine relationships between our
adapted by Raja, Johns, and Ntalianis (2004) on 5-point Likert variables of interest.
scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). The same Structural model. The cross-lagged structural model pro-
scales are also used in Studies 1 and 2. Cronbach’s alpha was .86 vided a satisfactory model fit to the data, ␹2(120) ⫽ 2841.46,
(Time 1) and .87 (Time 2) for transactional contract orientation p ⬍ .01; SRMR ⫽ .08; CFI ⫽ .95; AIC ⫽ 5441.23. After
and .94 (Time 1) and .93 (Time 2) for relational contract orienta- controlling for the stability of turnover intentions (␤ ⫽ .99, p ⬍
tion. .01), relational contract orientation (␤ ⫽ .73, p ⬍ .01), and
Analysis strategy. Cross-lagged structural equation modeling transactional contract orientation (␤ ⫽ .75, p ⬍ .01), neither of
(SEM) with Mplus version 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) was the lagged effects of Time 1 relational contract orientation (␤ ⫽
used to test causal order. We followed a two-step procedure. First, .04, ns) or Time 1 transactional contract orientation (␤ ⫽ ⫺.07,
we tested measurement equivalence across time for turnover in- ns) on Time 2 turnover intentions were significant. The lagged
tentions and the two types of psychological contracts to ensure the effect of Time 1 turnover intentions on both relational contract
meaning of the constructs did not change across time. We then orientation (␤ ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .05) and transactional contract ori-
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examined the structural model. entation (␤ ⫽ ⫺.19, p ⬍ .01) were significant. Therefore, our
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Time 1 synchronous correlations were modeled by allowing the results supported the proposition that turnover intentions pre-
exogenous latent variables to covary. Time 2 synchronous corre- dict psychological contract orientation and allowed us to more
lations were modeled by allowing the disturbance terms for the confidently move forward with a test of our causal model.
endogenous latent variables to covary. Each Time 1 latent variable
had a causal effect on its Time 2 counterpart, and Time 1 turnover Study 1
intentions had a cross-lagged effect on Time 2 psychological
contracts, and vice versa. Following recommendations (e.g.,
Method
Epitropaki & Martin, 2005), we controlled for stability effects.
Cross-lagged effects can then be used to draw inferences about Sample description. The sample consisted of 60 employees
causal direction. from a large drug retailing chain. Nineteen store locations in the
Given our focus on relationships between latent variables, we Southwestern United States participated. Eighty-five percent of the
used item parcels to reduce the sample-size-to-parameter ratio and sample were female, and 56% were White. Mean age was 43.18
produce more reliable latent variables by reducing random errors years (SD ⫽ 13.41), and average tenure was approximately 8 years
associated with individual items, both of which help to generate (SD ⫽ 4.38).
stable estimates in the structural model (Little, Cunningham, Sha- Procedure. We obtained support from the two district man-
har, & Widaman, 2002). Following Landis, Beal, and Tesluk agers who oversaw the 19 locations and who encouraged employ-
(2000), we randomly assigned items to parcels as this yields ees to participate. Employees were introduced to the study in the
comparable fit to more complex methods. Model fit was assessed following ways: (a) paper postings on bulletin boards in break
using the comparative fit index (CFI) and standardized root-mean- rooms and (b) an announcement made by the store managers.
square residual (SRMR). CFI values .95 or above and SRMR Employees were told that they could get a check for $30 for
values lower than .10 indicate satisfactory model fit (Hu & completing three surveys (approximately 30 min total) over the
Bentler, 1999). course of several weeks (this was significantly higher than the
typical hourly wage of approximately $10 an hour). The employ-
ees were also told that all data would be kept completely confi-
Results
dential and would not be shared with their employer or manager.
Measurement equivalence. We followed the approach sug- Data were collected using paper and pencil versions of the surveys
gested by Vandenberg and Lance (2000), and conducted multi- that were hand delivered to each store. Employees had 48 hours to
group confirmatory analysis to examine the measurement equiva- fill out each survey and mail them using prepaid return envelopes.
lence of turnover intentions and both types of psychological At Time 1, the first survey (measuring turnover intentions and
contract orientations across two different points in time. We first the control variables) was distributed. Two weeks later, at Time 2,
conducted an omnibus test for equality of covariance matrices in the second survey (measuring relational and transactional contract
which the variances and covariances among the turnover intention orientation) was distributed. Two weeks after receiving the second
items were constrained to be identical across the two different time survey, at Time 3, the third survey (measuring OCBs and DBs)
points. The model provided a good fit to the data, ␹2(45) ⫽ was distributed. The spacing of the surveys was done in order to
2738.06, p ⬍ .01; SRMR ⫽ .05; CFI ⫽ .95, indicating a lack of reduce potential common methods effects (see Podsakoff, MacK-
measurement variance for turnover intentions. This also precluded enzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Employees’ personal e-mail ad-
additional tests for measurement invariance (ME/I; Vandenberg & dresses and dates of birth were collected to match the data over
Lance, 2000). The omnibus tests for both relational and transac- time. In terms of response rate, 94 employees completed Survey 1,
tional contract orientation measures showed good model fit, 67 employees completed Survey 2, and 60 employees completed
␹2(153) ⫽ 3081.97, p ⬍ .01; SRMR ⫽ .05; CFI ⫽ .95 for all three surveys (for a total response rate of approximately 30%;
relational contract orientation and ␹2(153) ⫽ 1936.09, p ⬍ .01; response rate was similar across locations). Respondents at Time 2
SRMR ⫽ .07; CFI ⫽ .94 for transactional contract orientation. and nonrespondents did not significantly differ in terms of turn-
These results indicate a lack of measurement variance for each of over intentions, F(1,93) ⫽ 1.04, ns; age, F(1,93) ⫽ 1.05, ns; sex,
the two psychological contract orientations. Overall, the ME/I tests F(1,93) ⫽ 2.95, ns; or tenure, F(1,93) ⫽ .83, ns—all of which were
indicate that the meaning of the three constructs stayed the same measured at Time 1. Respondents at Time 3 and nonrespondents
1072 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

did not significantly differ in terms of relational contract orienta- dence resulting from district (n ⫽ 2) and location (n ⫽ 19)
tion, F(1,65) ⫽ .01, ns, or transactional contract orientation, groupings. We found that the between-store and between-district
F(1,65) ⫽ .39, ns, which were measured at Time 2. variance was not significantly different from zero, indicating that
the variance attributable to each higher level did not explain a
significant amount of variance in our individual-level outcome
Measures
variables. We therefore used ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
Turnover intentions. Turnover intentions were measured us- sion to test our hypotheses (Gelman & Hill, 2007).4
ing a two-item scale developed by Hom, Griffeth, and Sellaro
(1984) and adapted by Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, and Erez
(2001). Items were “How strongly do you feel about leaving the Results
organization within the next 12 months?” and “How likely is it that Descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal consistency re-
you will leave the organization in the next 12 months?” Respon- liabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in Table 1. Before
dents used 5-point scales (1 ⫽ not at all strongly to 5 ⫽ very testing our hypotheses, we assessed the discriminant validity of our
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strongly and 1 ⫽ not at all likely to 5 ⫽ very likely, respectively). measurement model using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). To
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Relational and transactional psychological contract deal with the relatively small sample size, we relied on the rec-
orientation. The two types of psychological contracts were mea- ommendations of Marsh and Hau (1999) and used item parcels,
sured using an abbreviated 18-item version originally developed which are less likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic wording and
by Millward and Hopkins (1998) and adapted by Raja et al. (2004). method effects associated with individual items and are more
Raja et al. (2004) found that the measure correlates highly with likely to meet the typical assumptions of normality in maximum-
other measures of contract orientation. Sample items included “I likelihood approaches to CFA. Each latent variable, besides turn-
work only the hours set out in my contract and no more” and “My over intentions, used three item parcels. Results indicated that the
loyalty to the organization is contract specific” (transactional) and hypothesized five-factor model fit the data reasonably well, with
“To me working for this organization is like being a member of a ␹2(df ⫽ 67) ⫽ 112.20, p ⬍ .01; CFI ⫽ .92, SRMR ⫽ .09.
family” and “I feel this company reciprocates the effort put in by Furthermore, the hypothesized five-factor model also fit the data
its employees” (relational). Respondents used a 5-point Likert better than the best fitting four-factor model, with situational
scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). constraints and negative affect loading on one factor, ⌬␹2(4) ⫽
OCBs. We measured OCBs using Podsakoff and MacKen- 17.34, p ⬍ .01; the best fitting three-factor model, ⌬␹2(7) ⫽ 64.14,
zie’s (1994) 14-item Organizational Citizenship Behavior scale p ⬍ .01; the best fitting two-factor model, ⌬␹2(9) ⫽ 82.82, p ⬍
focused on the last two weeks at work. Sample items included “I .01; and a one-factor model, ⌬␹2(10) ⫽ 139.66, p ⬍ .01.
am willing to give my time to help coworkers who have work- Test of hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted that turnover in-
related problems” and “I attend functions that are not required but tentions would negatively affect relational contract orientation and
help the company image.” Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale positively affect transactional contract orientation. After entering
(1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). the control variables, results from regression analyses indicated
DBs. DBs were measured using the 19-item version of Ben- that turnover intentions significantly predicted relational contract
nett and Robinson’s (2000) scale. Respondents rated how often orientation (B ⫽ ⫺.40, SE ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .01, Cohen’s f2 ⫽ .45) and
they had engaged in a list of behaviors in the past two weeks from transactional contract orientation (B ⫽ .26, SE ⫽ .08, p ⬍ .01,
1 (never) to 5 (often). Following Lee and Allen’s (2002) recom- Cohen’s f2 ⫽ .64). Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.
mendation, we dropped two items that exhibited zero variance (all We should note that these results are also included in our tests of
participants responded “never”): “Falsified a receipt to get reim- indirect effects in Table 2.
bursed for more money than you spent on business expenses” and To test our mediation hypotheses, we adopted Preacher and
“Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job.”3 Hayes’s (2004, 2008) bootstrapping application with 10,000 resa-
Control variables. Sex, negative affect, and tenure were mea- mples as recommended by MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams
sured as control variables. Sex has been shown to relate to DBs (2004). Table 2 presents the regression coefficients of both indirect
(e.g., Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Negative affect in the and direct paths, as well as the 95% confidence interval (CI)
workplace has been shown to relate to DBs (e.g., Dalal, 2005). We around the indirect effect for each test of mediation. Effects are
utilized the 10-item negative affectivity scale from the Positive and considered significant when the bootstrapped 95% CI around the
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, indirect effect does not contain zero.
1988). Respondents used 5-point scales (1 ⫽ very slightly or not at Hypothesis 2 predicted that relational contract orientation would
all to 5 ⫽ very much) to indicate how they generally felt at work mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the incidence of (a)
using 10 adjectives that describe negative affect (e.g., afraid, OCBs and (b) DBs. Results supported the significance of the
ashamed, scared). Tenure was also included because contract dy- indirect effect of turnover intentions on OCBs, 95% CI
namics can change over the course of an individual’s career (e.g., [⫺.30, ⫺.06], and DBs, 95% CI [.01, .10], through relational
Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994).
Analysis strategy. Although we developed our model at the
3
individual level of analysis, each employee was embedded in one The results remained the same with all items included.
4
store and each store was embedded in one of two districts, calling Additionally, due to the relatively small sample size, we conducted an
outlier test based on the casewise statistics (i.e., standardized scores of
into question whether the individual-level data are independent. residuals and Mahalanobis distances; Ben-Gal, 2005) to ensure that ob-
Therefore, following McClean, Burris, and Detert (2013), we served effects were not due to outliers or influential cases, and no such
employed multilevel analyses to explicitly model the nonindepen- cases were detected.
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, OCBS, AND DEVIANCE BEHAVIORS 1073

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Sex (T1) 0.15 0.36 —


2. Job tenure (T1) 94.62 88.76 ⫺.32ⴱ —
3. Negative affect (T1) 1.45 0.56 ⫺.13 ⫺.04 (.87)
4. Turnover intentions (T1) 2.24 1.26 ⫺.26ⴱ ⫺.19 .54ⴱⴱ (.86)
5. Transactional contract orientation (T2) 2.53 0.75 .01 ⫺.05 .48ⴱⴱ .51ⴱⴱ (.86)
6. Relational contract orientation (T2) 3.54 0.93 .12 ⫺.03 ⫺.49ⴱⴱ ⫺.61ⴱⴱ ⫺.60ⴱⴱ (.94)
7. OCBs (T3) 3.79 0.56 ⫺.04 ⫺.14 ⫺.21 ⫺.15 ⫺.37ⴱⴱ .50ⴱⴱ (.84)
8. DBs (T3) 1.19 0.27 .03 .03 .37ⴱⴱ .25 .48ⴱⴱ ⫺.48ⴱⴱ ⫺.56ⴱⴱ (.84)
Note. N ⫽ 60. Internal consistency reliabilities (coefficients alphas) are on the diagonal. For sex, 1 ⫽ male; 0 ⫽ female. OCBs ⫽ organizational
citizenship behaviors; DBs ⫽ deviance behaviors; T1 ⫽ Time 1; T2 ⫽ Time 2; T3 ⫽ Time 3.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.


p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

contract orientation, with significant increases in explained vari- eight motivational forces that determine why people stay or leave,
ance, ⌬R2 ⫽ .22, p ⬍ .01 and ⌬R2 ⫽ .12, p ⬍ .01, respectively. including alternative and contractual forces.
Therefore, Hypotheses 2a and 2b were both supported. However, given the fact that we are interested in predicting the
Hypothesis 3 predicted that transactional contract orientation discretionary behavior of employees who continue to remain with
would mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the incidence their organizations, previous classification schemes developed by
of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs. Results supported the significance of the Maertz, Lee, Mitchell, and others are less applicable. Instead, we
indirect effect of turnover intentions on OCBs, 95% CI are interested in the hypothetical, perceived causes of potential
[⫺.20, ⫺.01], and DBs, 95% CI [.01, .09], through transactional employee exit. That is, if employees were to leave their organiza-
contract orientation, with significant increases in explained vari- tion, what would be the primary driving force? Lee and Mitchell
ance, ⌬R2 ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .05 and ⌬R2 ⫽ .11, p ⬍ .01, respectively. (1994) argued that people are acutely aware of the reason behind
Therefore, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported.5 a potential change in employment, particularly as a large portion
experience a specific shock (Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel, &
Discussion Hill, 1999). We suggest that turnover intentions have the potential
to be much more problematic when the organization is deemed
Based on the results of Study 1 (in conjunction with the Pilot
responsible.
Study), our mediated model linking turnover intentions, OCBs,
We adopt the perspective of Salancik and Meindl (1984), who
and DBs through relational and transactional psychological con-
examined whether CEOs blamed their firms’ performances on
tract orientations was supported. Employees who were thinking
factors that were under the organization’s control. Like Salancik
about leaving the organization evidenced a weaker relational ori-
and Meindl, we believe that employees can view their organiza-
entation and a stronger transactional orientation, which then re-
sulted in less OCBs and more DBs. Clearly there are important tions as responsible for pushing them out when, for example, they
implications regarding turnover intentions beyond organizational believe that they receive inadequate pay or endure an abusive
exit and Study 1 helps to build an initial causal model depicting the supervisor. Or, employees can absolve the organization of any
effects of turnover intentions on OCBs and DBs. In Study 2, we modicum of responsibility when, for example, an employee grad-
replicate and extend our original mediated model. uates from a Ph.D. program or discovers they are pregnant - both
of which may represent reasons for leaving an employer. This clear
demarcation between factors that the organization is perceived to
Study 2
be and not to be responsible for can have significant ramifications
Our first three hypotheses remain unchanged. However, Study 2 in terms of the relationship between turnover intentions and psy-
expands our original model by examining perceived organizational chological contract orientations. If an employee perceives that the
responsibility as a moderator of the effects of turnover intentions organization is not responsible for the potential reason for their
on psychological contract orientations. departure, they are less apt to blame the organization (Morrison &
Robinson, 1997), reducing the potential impact of turnover inten-
The Role of Perceived Organizational Responsibility tions on psychological contract orientations. Beliefs about their
relationship with their organization are less likely to change when
Although scholars have historically tended to focus on attitudes the cause is not believed to be under the organization’s control. If,
and alternatives as the primary reasons for organizational exit, the
last two decades of theory and research on turnover has been
5
greatly influenced by Lee and Mitchell’s (1994) unfolding model In both Study 1 and 2, we sought to further verify causal ordering by
of turnover. The model highlights the significant role of shocks, or examining turnover intentions as a mediator of the effects of relational and
transactional contract orientation on OCBs and DBs. None of the indirect
jarring events, in the turnover decision-making process. Building effects reached significance, further supporting contract orientation as a
on the unfolding model, Maertz and colleagues (Maertz & Cam- mediator of the effects of turnover intentions on OCBs and DBs. Full
pion, 2004; Maertz & Griffeth, 2004) developed a taxonomy of results are available from the first author upon request.
1074 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

Table 2
Results Regarding Hypothesized Indirect Effects for Studies 1 and 2

Study 1a Study 2b
RCO TCO RCO TCO
D.V. mediator OCBs DBs OCBs DBs OCBs DBs OCBs DBs

Indirect effect
Bootstrap estimate (a ⫻ b path) ⫺.15 .05 ⫺.07 .03 ⫺.05 .12 ⫺.12 .12
Bootstrap SE .06 .02 .05 .02 .06 .05 .06 .05
LL 95% CI ⫺.30 .01 ⫺.20 .01 ⫺.17 .03 ⫺.26 .04
UL 95% CI ⫺.06 .10 ⫺.01 .09 .06 .22 ⫺.02 .22
Direct effect
I.V. on mediator (a path) ⫺.40ⴱⴱ ⫺.40ⴱⴱ .26ⴱⴱ .26ⴱⴱ ⫺.64ⴱⴱ ⫺.64ⴱⴱ .37ⴱⴱ .37ⴱⴱ
Mediator on D.V. (b path) .37ⴱⴱ ⫺.11ⴱⴱ ⫺.28ⴱ .13ⴱⴱ .07 ⫺.18ⴱⴱ ⫺.34ⴱ .31ⴱⴱ
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I.V. on D.V. (c= path) .09 ⫺.02 .01 ⫺.01 ⫺.17 ⫺.05 ⫺.09 ⫺.05
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Note. N ⫽ 60 for Study 1; N ⫽ 130 for Study 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size ⫽ 10,000. I.V. ⫽ independent
variable; D.V. ⫽ dependent variable; OCBs ⫽ organizational citizenship behaviors; DBs ⫽ deviance behaviors; RCO ⫽ relational contract orientation;
TCO ⫽ transactional contract orientation; LL ⫽ lower limit; CI ⫽ confidence interval; UL ⫽ upper limit.
a
Sex, tenure, and negative affect were used as control variables in Study 1. b Sex, tenure, employment type, negative affect, and organizational
commitment were used as control variables in Study 2.

p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

for example, family issues force an employee to exit the organi- contract orientations, and demographic information at Time 1.
zation, he or she would be less likely to dissolve socioemotional Direct supervisors provided the rating of OCBs and DBs for each
ties in favor of more economic concerns. This also has implica- subordinate two weeks later at Time 2. To increase respondent
tions for the mediational role of psychological contract orientation candidness and reduce their evaluation apprehension, we ensured
in the relationship between turnover intentions, OCBs, and DBs. the confidentiality of individual responses. The opportunity to
Our arguments are derived partly from the justice literature, participate in our study was first announced, and then surveys were
where this idea has been translated into research focusing on distributed via e-mail.
accountability and whether or not an entity is deemed responsible A total of 149 employees responded to the survey and 41 direct
for an event (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). When responsibility is supervisors provided ratings at Time 2 (response rates of 74.5% and
placed on the entity, employees’ reactions can be quite severe as 95.6%, respectively). Employees’ and supervisors’ cell phone num-
they sever their relationship and look to restore perceptions of bers were collected and matched by HR, enabling us to create 130
fairness through retaliation against the entity (Skarlicki & Folger, matched data points. Participants were all marketing and sales per-
1997; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999). sonnel. Seventy-nine percent of the participants were female, mean
In sum, the above arguments lead us to the following set of age was 31.6 years (SD ⫽ 5.68), and average tenure was 6.4 years.6
hypotheses: Measures. All the materials were presented in Chinese. Two
Hypothesis 4: The indirect effect of turnover intentions on the independent billingual researchers translated the items from Eng-
incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs, as mediated by relational lish into Chinese and then back-translated the items into English
psychological contract orientation, will be strongest when the (Brislin, 1986). Turnover intentions were measured using the same
organization is perceived to be responsible for potential exit. scale from the Pilot Study. Relational and transactional contract
orientations were measured using the same scales as in Study 1
Hypothesis 5: The indirect effect of turnover intentions on the and the Pilot Study.
incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs, as mediated by transac- OCBs. OCBs during the past two weeks were measured
tional psychological contract orientation, will be strongest using Williams and Anderson’s (1991) 14-item scale. Sample
when the organization is perceived to be responsible for items included “I go out of my way to help new employees” and
potential exit. “I adhere to informal rules devised to maintain order.” Re-
sponses were provided on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽ strongly
Method disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). The same measure has also
been used in previous research in China (e.g., Lam, Liang,
Sample description and procedure. Sample 2 consisted of a
Ashford, & Lee, 2015).
final sample of 130 employees of a large state-owned telecommu-
nications corporation. Fifteen branch offices located in Southeast
China participated. After receiving consent from the district man- 6
For Study 2, we collected a second sample of data from 177 working
ager who oversaw all branch offices in that area, we developed and adults with full-time or part-time jobs in the United States using Amazon
administered separate questionnaires to employees and their direct Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Three surveys completed at 2-week intervals
measured turnover intentions and perceived organizational responsibility
supervisors at two time points. Each employee was invited to (Survey 1), psychological contract orientations (Survey 2), and OCBs and
complete an online survey containing items tapping turnover in- DBs (Survey 3). Results were consistent with our hypotheses. Results are
tentions, perceived organizational responsibility, psychological available from the first author upon request.
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, OCBS, AND DEVIANCE BEHAVIORS 1075

DBs. We again used Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) work- Results


place deviance measure to assess the incidence of DBs over the
Descriptive statistics, correlations, and internal consistency re-
past two weeks. After consulting with senior managers, four
liabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in Table 3.7,8
items were eliminated from the original 19-item scale because
Hypothesis 1 predicted that turnover intentions would (a) neg-
they were inapplicable (i.e., “Taken property from work with-
atively affect relational psychological contract orientation and (b)
out permission,” “Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on
positively affect transactional psychological contract orientation,
the job,” “Dragged out work in order to get overtime,” and
respectively. After entering the control variables, results from
“Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you
regression analyses indicated that turnover intentions significantly
spent on business expenses”). In addition, based on managers’
predicted relational contract orientation (B ⫽ ⫺.64, SE ⫽ .10, p ⬍
suggestions, we added two items (i.e., “Surfed non-work related .01, Cohen’s f2 ⫽ .45) and transactional contract orientation (B ⫽
websites” and “Intentionally missed assigned deadlines”) to .37, SE ⫽ .07, p ⬍ .01, Cohen’s f2 ⫽ .45), supporting Hypothesis
help the measure better fit the sample. A 5-point scale was 1a and 1b.
adopted (1 ⫽ never to 5 ⫽ often).
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that relational psychological contract


Perceived organizational responsibility. We utilized a mea-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

orientation would mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the


sure of perceived organizational responsibility by adapting items incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs. The results of the bootstrap-
from previous research (e.g., Burton, Taylor, & Barber, 2014; ping analysis (with 10,000 iterations) supported the significance of
Jackson & LePine, 2003) and created a 3-item scale to assess the indirect effect of turnover intentions on DBs, 95% CI [.03, .22],
participants’ perceptions of organizational responsibility. Partici- through relational contract orientation. However, results indicated
pants indicated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the that the indirect effect of turnover intentions on OCBs, through
following statements: relational contract orientation, was not significant as the 95%
confidence intervals included zero, (⫺.17, .06). Thus, Hypothesis
If I were to leave this company, (a) my organization would have
2 was partially supported.
caused me to think about turnover, (b) my turnover would be due to
something about my organization, (c) the cause of my turnover would
Hypothesis 3 predicted that transactional psychological contract
be something my organization can control. orientation would mediate the effects of turnover intentions on the
incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs. Results indicated that the
A 5-point Likert-type response scale was adopted (1 ⫽ strongly indirect effect of turnover intentions on OCBs, through transac-
disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). We averaged the three items to tional contract orientation, was also significant, 95% CI
form a composite measure (with higher numbers indicating higher [⫺.25, ⫺.02]. Results again supported the significance of the
perceived organizational responsibility). indirect effect of turnover intentions on DBs, 95% CI [.04, .22],
We ran a CFA with all the variables rated by employees (turn- through transactional contract orientation. Therefore, Hypothesis 3
over intentions, transactional and relational contract orientation, was supported.
and perceived organizational responsibility). Supporting the dis- Hypothesis 4 predicted that the indirect effect of turnover in-
criminant validity of the scales we adopted, a four-factor model tentions on the incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs, as mediated by
with all items loading on the appropriate construct fit the data relational psychological contract orientation, would be strongest
reasonably well, with ␹2(df ⫽ 293, N ⫽ 149) ⫽ 535.36, p ⬍ .01, when the organization was deemed responsible for potential exit.
RMSEA ⫽ .07, SRMR ⫽ .07, CFI ⫽ .92. Moreover, the four- To test moderated mediation we used Model 7 in SPSS PROCESS
factor model fit the data significantly better than competing mod- (Hayes, 2013). After entering the controls and direct effects, the
els, including a one-factor solution with all items loading on a interaction between turnover intentions and perceived organiza-
tional responsibility significantly affected transactional contract
single factor, ⌬␹2(6) ⫽ 2057.84, p ⬍ .01, a two-factor solution
orientation (B ⫽ ⫺.21, SE ⫽ .10, p ⬍ .05) and transactional
with turnover intentions and perceived organizational responsibil-
contract orientation (B ⫽ .14, SE ⫽ .07, p ⬍ .05), with significant
ity loading on one factor and the two types of psychological
increases in explained variance, ⌬R2 ⫽ .02, p ⬍ .05 and ⌬R2 ⫽
contract orientations loading on the other factor, ⌬␹2(5) ⫽ 498.53,
.02, p ⬍ .05, respectively. As shown in Figure 2, both slopes of the
p ⬍ .01, a two-factor solution with all items except the ones that
effect of turnover intentions on relational contract orientation were
measure perceived organizational responsibility loading on the
significant, but the effect was larger when the organization was
same factor, ⌬␹2(5) ⫽ 1853.22, p ⬍ .01, and a three-factor
deemed responsible for potential exit, simple slope ⫽ ⫺.81, SE ⫽
solution with transactional and relational contract orientation load-
.13 t ⫽ ⫺6.41, p ⬍ .01, than when it was not, simple
ing on the same factor, ⌬␹2 (3) ⫽ 292.16, p ⬍ .01. slope ⫽ ⫺.51, SE ⫽ .11, t ⫽ ⫺4.41, p ⬍ .01, as indicated by a
Control variables. We again controlled for sex, negative af-
fect over the past two weeks, and tenure using the same scales as
7
reported in Study 1 and Sample 1. In addition, we also controlled Similar to Study 1, although each employee was embedded in a branch
for organizational commitment because it can strongly affect turn- office, we found that the between-office variance was not significantly
different from zero, and therefore used ordinary least squares (OLS)
over intentions (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, regression to test our hypotheses.
2002). We utilized the 4-item scale developed by Klein, Cooper, 8
Although turnover intentions were not significantly correlated with
Molloy, and Swanson (2014). Sample items included “How com- OCBs or DBs in either study, the relationship between turnover intentions
and OCBs (r ⫽ ⫺.15) was similar to the average correlation coefficient
mitted are you to this organization?” and “To what extent do you
reported in a recent meta-analysis (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, &
care about this organization?” Respondents used 5-point scales Blume, 2009). We believe that the difference in significance is primarily a
(1 ⫽ not at all to 5 ⫽ extremely). result of sample size, which is an even more paramount issue with DBs.
1076 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. Sex 0.21 0.41 —


2. Job tenure 6.36 4.49 ⫺.04 —
3. Negative affect 1.71 0.51 ⫺.06 ⫺.06 (.82)
4. Organizational commitment 4.09 0.85 ⫺.06 .16 ⫺.30ⴱⴱ (.95)
5. Turnover intentions 1.96 0.73 ⫺.13 ⫺.16 .49ⴱⴱ ⫺.38ⴱⴱ (.90)
6. Perceived organizational responsibility 2.94 0.71 ⫺.17ⴱ .02 .11 ⫺.06 .08 (.86)
7. Transactional contract orientation 2.48 0.54 .04 ⫺.11 .17 ⫺.22ⴱ .46ⴱⴱ .17 (.82)
8. Relational contract orientation 3.39 0.94 .02 .00 ⫺.39ⴱⴱ .52ⴱⴱ ⫺.62ⴱⴱ ⫺.04 ⫺.55ⴱⴱ (.96)
9. OCBs 3.82 0.71 ⫺.04 ⫺.06 ⫺.01 .04 ⫺.15 .08 ⫺.27ⴱⴱ .14 (.93)
10. DBs 1.58 0.52 .01 .00 ⫺.06 ⫺.08 .06 ⫺.09 .28ⴱⴱ ⫺.21ⴱ ⫺.56ⴱⴱ (.90)
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Note. N ⫽ 130. Internal consistency reliabilities (coefficients alphas) are on the diagonal. For sex, 0 ⫽ female; 1 ⫽ male. OCBs ⫽ organizational
citizenship behaviors; DBs ⫽ deviance behaviors.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.


p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

significant interaction (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). Simi- intentions on OCBs through relational contract orientation was not
larly, as shown in Figure 3, the effect of turnover intentions on significant when the organization was deemed responsible for
transactional contract orientation was larger when the organization potential exit, coefficient ⫽ ⫺.06, Boot SE ⫽ .07, 95% CI [⫺.20,
was deemed responsible for potential exit, simple slope ⫽ .48, .07], or when it was not, coefficient ⫽ ⫺.04, Boot SE ⫽ .05, 95%
SE ⫽ .09, t ⫽ 5.47, p ⬍ .01, than when it was not, simple slope ⫽ CI [⫺.14, .05]. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was partially supported.
.29, SE ⫽ .08, t ⫽ 3.57, p ⬍ .01. Hypothesis 5 predicted that the indirect effect of turnover
Evidence of moderated mediation exists if the estimates of the intentions on the incidence of (a) OCBs and (b) DBs, as
indirect effects transmitted through the mediator variable are sig- mediated by transactional psychological contract orientation,
nificantly different across levels of the moderator variable as would be strongest when the organization was deemed respon-
indicated by a significant interaction (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, sible for potential exit. Results indicated a significant interac-
2007). Therefore, using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013), we further
tive effect between turnover intentions and perceived organiza-
estimated the conditional indirect effect of turnover intentions on
tional responsibility on transactional contract orientation, t ⫽
OCBs and DBs through relational contract orientation when the
2.00, p ⬍ .05. Results showed that the indirect effect of turn-
organization was and was not deemed responsible for potential exit
over intentions on OCB through transactional contract orienta-
using unstandardized coefficients and bootstrapping with 10,000
resamples to place 95% confidence intervals around estimates of tion was significantly stronger when the organization was
the indirect effects. Results indicated a significant interactive ef- deemed responsible for potential exit, coefficient ⫽ ⫺.16, Boot
fect between turnover intentions and perceived organizational re- SE ⫽ .08, 95% CI [.34, ⫺.02], than when it was not, coeffi-
sponsibility on relational contract orientation, t ⫽ ⫺2.08, p ⬍ .05. cient ⫽ ⫺.10, Boot SE ⫽ .05, 95% CI [⫺.22, ⫺.02]. The
Results showed that the indirect effect of turnover intentions on indirect effect of turnover intentions on DBs through transac-
DBs through relational contract orientation was significantly stron- tional contract orientation was significantly stronger when the
ger when the organization was deemed responsible for potential organization was deemed responsible for potential exit, coeffi-
exit, coefficient ⫽ .15, Boot SE ⫽ .06, 95% CI [.04, .28], than cient ⫽ .15, Boot SE ⫽ .06, 95% CI [.04, .28], than when it was
when it was not, coefficient ⫽ .09, Boot SE ⫽ .04, 95% CI [.02, not, coefficient ⫽ .09, Boot SE ⫽ .04, 95% CI [.03, .19]. Thus,
.19]. However, results indicated that the indirect effect of turnover Hypotheses 5 was supported.

4.5
Relational Psychological Contract

Low Perceived
4 Organizational Responsibility

3.5 High Preceived


Orientation

Organizational Responsibility
3

2.5

1.5

1
Low High
Turnover Intentions

Figure 2. The effects of the interaction between turnover intentions and perceived organizational responsibility
on on relational psychological contract orientation (Study 2).
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, OCBS, AND DEVIANCE BEHAVIORS 1077

4.5

Transactional Psychological Contract


Low Perceived
4 Organizational Responsibility

High Preceived
3.5 Organizational Responsibility

Orientation
3

2.5

1.5

1
Low High
Turnover Intentions
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Figure 3. The effects of the interaction between turnover intentions and perceived organizational responsibility
on transactional psychological contract orientation (Study 2).

General Discussion Our results add to the turnover literature in several ways. First,
by focusing on behaviors other than actual turnover, our research
Scholars have amassed an impressive amount of research fo- represents an attempt to conceptualize turnover decision processes
cused on predicting turnover (see Hom, 2011), due to its signifi-
as the dynamic processes that scholars have long discussed, but to
cant and multifaceted costs (e.g., Cascio, 2000). However, our
date, have yet to fully explore (Hom, 2011). Our study unpacks the
central thesis is that, for companies and industries with high
relationship between turnover intentions, OCBs, and DBs, which
turnover rates (e.g., retail; Cascio, 2006), problems can arise while
had been identified primarily in cross-sectional research, and
employees think about leaving but still remain with the organiza-
builds a causal model depicting how turnover intentions alter the
tion. This is particularly the case in settings in which turnover rates
behavior of employees.
likely fail to accurately capture, and may severely underestimate,
Second, we expand the role of psychological contract theory in
the number of employees who are thinking of leaving the organi-
the turnover process. Research has typically focused on contract
zation at a given point in time. Problems occur because, although
violations and how such events may precipitate turnover intentions
turnover intentions may signal the beginning of the end of an
and employee exit (see Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo,
employment relationship, there are a number of situations in which
2007). However, based on our results (particularly our Pilot
the desire to leave an organization does not actually lead to
immediate exit. For example, limited job mobility represents an Study), psychological contract orientation seems to more accu-
obvious situational constraint that might prevent those who desire rately represent an outcome rather than a predictor of turnover
to leave an organization from actually doing so. Indeed, turnover intentions and determines whether employees will engage in OCBs
intentions are only moderately related to actual turnover, clearly and DBs. Interestingly, this suggests that employees may emotion-
indicating that intentions to leave an organization do not equate to ally distance themselves from others at work when they believe
leaving (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000). that their employment tenure is limited. In line with cognitive
To better understand the problems associated with staying while dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), employees may attempt to
thinking about leaving, we built and tested a causal model linking reconcile the incompatible nature of being a member of an orga-
turnover intentions with transactional and relational contract ori- nization and thinking about leaving by changing the psychological
entations, which were then expected to influence the incidence of contracts they value.
OCBs and DBs. Using expectancy theory as our explanatory However, in Study 2, we did not find support for relational
framework, we argued that when employees are thinking about contract orientation as a mediator of the relationship between
leaving, they are motivated to focus more attention on short-term turnover intentions and OCBs, because relational contract orien-
economic and instrumental exchanges and less attention on longer- tation did not significantly affect OCBs. Our results, or lack
term social exchange relationships, resulting in a strong transac- thereof, may reflect the fact that “the prevailing paradigms for
tional contract orientation and a weak relational contract orienta- collective economic and social arrangements differ substantially in
tion, which then affect discretionary behaviors at work by [the United States and China]” (Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004, p.
increasing DBs and decreasing OCBs. Results were largely con- 243). Specifically, researchers argue that, in China, OCBs are not
sistent with our arguments. However, the effects of turnover in- as heavily driven by social exchange relationships. Rather, em-
tentions on psychological contract orientation differed depending ployees tend to engage in OCBs based on their perceived role
on perceived organizational responsibility for potential exit. We within the organization (Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997). As we noted
found that these effects were much stronger when turnover inten- earlier, relational contracts are more indicative of social exchange
tions were thought to be caused by issues under the organization’s relationships than transactional contracts (Millward & Hopkins,
control. As a result, the mediated effects of turnover intentions on 1998), which may have accounted for the discrepancy in results
OCBs and DBs through psychological contract orientation primar- between the United States and China samples. Future research
ily occurred when the organization was deemed responsible for could examine moderators such as traditionality, which “reflects
potential exit. the hierarchical nature of Chinese society based on the principles
1078 MAI, ELLIS, CHRISTIAN, AND PORTER

of wu-lun” (Farh et al., 1997, p. 425). For employees with less on OCBs and DBs. No significant indirect effects were found, sug-
traditional values, the effects of relational contract orientation on gesting that our hypothesized causal ordering is appropriate. Further-
OCBs may be much stronger. more, despite controlling for organizational commitment in our
Third, we developed a unique approach to examining the potential model, we cannot completely rule-out the influence of other attitudi-
cause of exit and our results suggest that distinguishing between nal or perceptual variables, such as job satisfaction and perceived
causes that are perceived to be or not to be the organization’s respon- organizational support. Controlling for multiple attitudinal variables
sibility can significantly impact the behavior of employees thinking may reduce effect sizes.
about leaving. However, it would be interesting for future research to Finally, we utilized expectancy theory as an explanatory frame-
expand our findings by adding subclassifications based on, for exam- work to better explicate the relationship between turnover intentions
ple, whether or not the cause is expected to remain stable over time. and psychological contract orientations. We note that we did not
We would expect that the mediated effects of turnover intentions on directly measure any of the components of expectancy theory; an
OCBs and DBs would be strongest when the organization is deemed issue that bears investigation in future research. One approach could
responsible and the situation is unlikely to change in the future. be to identify several behavioral alternatives that reflect relational and
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Finally, researchers point out that there are often benefits to turn- transactional contract orientations and then have employees rate the
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

over, particularly if marginal performers leave (Maertz & Campion, motivational force, or the multiplicative function of expectancy and
1998). Our results suggest that, even for employees whom the orga- valence, of each option (see Tubbs, Boehne, & Dahl, 1993). Although
nization might want to let go, there are negative consequences to the there are issues with testing expectancy judgments using a between-
turnover process that need to be carefully managed. person approach (see Diefendorff & Chandler, 2011), we would
For organizations, our results suggest that there are reasons for expect that turnover intentions would influence the level of motiva-
reducing turnover intentions beyond organizational exit; reasons that tional force attached to certain behavioral options, which would then
have far-reaching financial implications. One method of reducing affect the strength of employees’ psychological contract orientations.
turnover intentions is by promoting job embeddedness, which cap-
tures the informal and formal links to others in the organization or Conclusion
community, perceived sacrifice of benefits lost by exit, and fit with
Our study offers a unique perspective on turnover in organizations
the job and organization (Mitchell & Lee, 2001). Increased job em-
by developing a model depicting how turnover intentions affect em-
beddedness can be accomplished through efforts in recruitment, se-
ployees’ behavior before they leave. Employees who are thinking
lection, socialization, and other HR activities (see Hom, 2011). For
about leaving tend to hold strong transactional contract orientations
example, as described by Eberly, Holtom, Lee, and Mitchell (2009),
and weak relational contract orientations, which leads to decreased
NRG systems in Vermont rewards its employees for purchasing
OCBs and increased DBs. This is particularly problematic when the
“green” technology (e.g., Toyota Priuses) up to $2,300 a year. Or,
organization is perceived to be responsible for potential exit. Results
managers can use peer referrals to hire employees with previously
from two studies consistently supported our hypotheses, suggesting
established ties to the organization. Another method may involve
that turnover intentions can be problematic for organizations not only
closely monitoring job attitudes such as satisfaction and commitment
in terms of replacement costs, but also in terms of stimulating the
through the use of validated measures. However, these recommenda-
wrong kind of behavior among employees; findings that have impli-
tions are contingent upon data indicating (perhaps through exit inter-
cations for scholars and practitioners alike.
views) that employees are leaving for reasons that are perceived to be
under the organization’s control. If the organization is not deemed
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