Case digested by: Eloisa Joyce Militar

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION V. IAC

G.R. No. 65295 March 10, 1987
FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-
dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation, where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. He had just
crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights
were turned off. When he switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly
saw a Ford dump truck some 2 ½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It
was later found out that he did not a curfew pass that night.
The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by
the company’ driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand
side of the lane that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the
oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street,
partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were
there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck,
front or rear. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was
scheduled to be used the next morning.
Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the
left, but it was too late. His car smashed into the truck. Dionisio suffered
physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, “a nervous breakdown”
and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionision filed an action for damages
against Carbonel and Phoenix.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s
own negligence in driving at a high speed without curfew pass and
headlights, and while intoxicated. It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine:
Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio,
having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone
The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the collision was brought by respondent’s own negligence.
RULING:
NO. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate
cause of the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked.
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was
the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in
other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's
car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence.
The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of
heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on
the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject
to mitigation by the courts.
The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to
what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
doctrine was applied by Common Law because they had a rule that
contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent
plaintiff. But in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which
rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court
in this case stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of
Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on
contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what
is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character
and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would
come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a man must. respond for
the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Thus,
the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because the court thinks that
it is not applicable in our jurisdiction.