Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Proxy Wars
Proxy Wars
anraarer/arianIa
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otticers
Challenges to
Security, Sovereignty & National Interests
National Inte
NOA
Wars
Pakistan Affairs oflicora
Actors of Proxy 3. The resolve and ability of the home NOYA
Psbtcados
of proxy war
inchude: sical presence ol external army to resist the
Actors
military armed rebelli
ellion.
For s u c c e s s , criteria ia 1, 2,
and 4 should be as action by foreign
a
Major Power
Proxies should be as low as possible. high as possible, while countr ntry.
criterion 3
Host Country Effects of Proxy
War
.
Successful Proxy War
Human Rights' violations
A successful proxy war is able to either Violation of International Law
of the host country,
or Worsening of the conflict
Disaffiliate a part of a territory
in the host country. Civil disturbance and chaos
Initiate regime change
Strain relations
between law
he host country and the powers
Elements of Proxy War
Continuously disturbed and order
situation in the abetting proxies
include:
Lack of FDI to the host country host country
Elements of proxy war
Folowing four major criteria are important for ascertaining the naly, Pakistani forces were lined up along the entire Durand line to offer physical
of the
on-going proxy war: prospects of succes>
rt o the mujahideen, impart physical training and logistics in execung r e e
1. The numerical size of the rebel a u d stood a s a solid front to dissuade a Russian invasion of Pakistan, while
2. army. st
The volume of external aid and anding as a threat of possibly intervening in Afghanistan should the staton calt
the rebels. military assistance actually proviaea to in this long-drawn battle
that
nat American blessings. This requisite 4 was present
eventually saw success by the rebels.
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uitorta 1nteres Pakistan Affairs
NUA
Challenges
to Security,
S o v e r e l g l
Baluchistan
Interests Hence,
an armed rebellion
arm in
Baluchistan
ICars4
NOA
Insurgency
in rebels.
P a k i s t a n
that
Pakistan
Pakistan
can easily snrug and
may not tbe rnore than
exist:
forget. So, a bee sting
Proxy War in
B a l u c h i s t a n
for
achicve.
Requisite 1 is hard
proxy
war
to
for Requisite 2
grounds
Brecding deprivation
sense
of
P r o v
Developmental
i n c i a l
Poor social indicators Thus, by the Indian army opening its guns all along the 1,850-mile Indo-Pak border,
facilities and stepping up weapon suppiies to the Bauch Liberation Army (BLA), much as it
Lack of education did to the Mukti Bahini, India can hope to tie down Pakistani forces on its Eastern
Poverty front, while military installations in Baluchistan can be torched by rebels and
Smuggling by naval missile ships. For the fourth requisite to
Easy availability of narcotics,
arms and ammunition bombarded Indian gunships and
Pakistan. The British and
materialize in Baluchistan simply dont seem to exist, and Pakistan's will to retain
Baluchistan is the main site
of India's proxy w a r in Baluchistan is strong.
have interest in creating an independent Baluchistan, not to
Americans also strong
interest because Baluchistan is predominantly
Shia, like Iran.
mention lIran's Nuclear Program of Pakistan
initiated clandestine action with the CIA to
The British SIS (or MI6) consequently
American troops displaced the Taliban from
foment rebellion in Baluchistan once The South Asian region
action.
power Afghanistan. Hence requisite 2 went into received an immediate
the Western powers attention of the WePaksitat val eat gias3. esen go
The numerical size of the rebels was relatively small when
two brigades, and international community
started, but that got built to some 4-6,000 rebels, about the size of when India and Pakistan
enough to cause turmoil, blow up army depots, harass military convoys, and launch
to the conducted nuclear their
surprise attacks at military bases. Let's apply the four principal requisites tests in May 1998. The main
otherchoite
proxy war in Baluchistan.
concern of the international
Requisite 1 community was the
introduction of nuclear
First, there arc an insufficient number of Baluch rebels available who fight lor
independence. The total rebel strength is still not estimated at more than 5,00 weapons into the India-
armed fighters
- perhaps as low as 2,000. This number is much too small to sustau Pakistan existing deep nuclear weapons ste
a responsible
an cffective armed
uprising. In comparison, the Pakistani army is 450,000 Sros Ooted traditional hostility. Pakistan, being hostile intentions.
ánd so Pakistan can
veloped nuclear weapons capability
solely to deter India s
very casily suppress any armed rebellion
by 2,000 Ba
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