12
COMMUNICATION: THE MISSING LINK IN THE CHALLENGER DISASTER
Vanessa Dean Arnold
The
On January 28, 1986, the explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger surprised the entire world. In the
aftermath of this highly publicized event, questions
were raised as to why the tragedy occurred. A
presidential commission popularly known as the
&dquo;Rogers’ Commission,&dquo; concluded that the launch
should never have been approved by management in
the first place. Three of the Rogers’ Commission’s
recommendations specifically addressed communica-
tion problems. One problem was the lack of effective
communication between the decision-makers-non-
technical people-and the technicians and engineers
who were painfully aware of operational problems as
the Challenger project progressed. The second
problem addressed by the Commission was the lack
of a formal communication channel which resulted in
&dquo;management isolation.&dquo; The third problem was at-
tributed to &dquo;selective listening.&dquo;
The communication problems inherent in the
Challenger project are worth considering by business
communication teachers and practitioners as well as
by communication consultants.
REPORTING TECHNICAL
INFORMATION
While proper channels of communication are avail-
able to relay information up and down an organiza-
tion, this does not guarantee that communication
occurs. For example, an engineer may inform an
upper level manager of safety problems, but these
problems may become lost in the maze of technical
jargon which the nontechnical manager may not un-
derstand. If the problem is defined in terms of sophis-
ticated equations with technical explanations, a
manager may become confused and ignore the
problem altogether, perhaps not wanting to admit to
a lack of knowledge in the specific area. Moreover,
documentation by technicians may be worded as to
lead managers to a false sense of confidence that
problems have been solved or do not exist. In the case
of the space shuttle, documentation of the infamous
0-ring, which was a key factor in the Challenger ex-
plosion, was listed as &dquo;closed&dquo; in the safety review
reports. This led managers to think that the problems
with this component were solved when in fact it
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John C. Malley
University of Mississippi
meant that further testing for safety was required.2
This confusion in word meaning between nontechni-
cal managers and technical personnel diminished the
narrow margin of safety present on the launch pad.
It is clear from the report that there was no stand-
ardization of documented data which would produce
clear communication between the decision-makers
and the engineers. This lack of communication caused
management to miscalculate the significance of the 0-
ring problem and illustrates the difficulties that arise
in communication when technical personnel do not
tailor their writing to their audience. In this instance
(as in many others) the receivers of the report as-
signed their own definition to the information they
received and made decisions based on their inter-
pretation.
MANAGEMENT ISOLATION
The second communication problem addressed by
the Rogers’ Commission was caused by &dquo;management
isolation.&dquo; This isolation was intensified by the ac-
tions of the project managers who often directed their
reports to center directors at the Johnson, Kennedy,
and Marshall Space Flight Centers rather than to the
program manager who had the authority to order the
launch. In the Commission’s opinion, the isolation
was especially serious at the Marshall Center, result-
ing in the program manager and other key decision-
makers not receiving crucial information regarding
the poor performance of the joint design. For instance,
the Marshall Center had information that the joint
design was performing poorly, but this was never
brought to the program manager’s direct attention.3
The formal communication channel that should exist
in all organizations simply was not present in this
complex organization.
SELECTIVE LISTENING
Testimony during the investigation of the Chal-
lenger disaster revealed that Morton Thiokol en-
gineers, designers of the booster rockets, warned
NASA officials that the launch pad was too cold to go
ahead with the mission. The recommendation not to
launch-to which a number of Morton Thiokol en-

gineers agreed-was overruled by a management
team that consisted of several vice presidents at
NASA, including the engineering vice president who
was told to &dquo;take off his engineering hat and put on
his management hat.&dquo;4 This &dquo;group think&dquo; decision
was a fatal blow to Challenger and its crew. The tech-
nicians knew of the impending danger but their warn-
ings were ignored by decision makers. They chose not
to listen.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
An analysis of the communication problems which
led to the Challenger accident can provide much in-
formation on what not to do as well as what to do, not
only for NASA, but for any organization where there
is a mix of technical and nontechnical personnel who
must communicate with each other. It is always
easier to criticize decisions made on Friday, on the fol-
lowing Monday. But it is also easier to see the
problems in retrospect and take steps to prevent
recurrence. The following suggestions could lead to
more effective communication policies in organiza-
tions where technical personnel must communicate
with nontechnical decision-makers. Moreover, it is
believed that they have pedagogical value as well.
Standardize Technical Language
Too often technicians submit reports that are long,
complicated documents that few managers have the
desire or knowledge to read. The purpose of technical
reports is to provide information that will help
receivers make a decision. Hence, the singular pur-
pose of all technical writing is to provide facts, or
opinions based on facts. The need for definition al-
ways arises when complex technical terms are intro-
duced. Far too often an assumption is made that the
members of the audience a writer is addressing will
be familiar with technical terms, when, in fact, these
terms often do not appear in dictionaries intended for
general use. Therefore, technical personnel should
never forget that the fundamental purpose of techni-
cal writing is to explain something-usually some-
thing that is intensely complex-and that messages
should be adapted to the needs of a stipulated
audience. Technical personnel are extremely proud of
the complex knowledge and skills they possess-and
rightly so~ut they must use this knowledge to logi-
cally translate complex ideas to management.
In summary, if nontechnical managers and techni-
cal personnel do not have a common language or jar-
gon with which to work, then crucial misunder-
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13
standings can At the minimum, there needs to
occur.
be some standardization of technical language so that
nontechnical managers understand the risks as-
sociated with each step in a decision process. The con-
sequences of not doing so can be enormous.
Practice Effective Listening
It has often been said that one of the greatest faults
of managers is their lack of willingness to listen. In
programs involving design or product improvement
there has to be participation. This means establishing
a two-way communication system where information
is actually drawn from the people involved. And when
this is the case, management must be prepared to be
displeased by some of what it hears. It is the nature
of two-way communication that what each side says
is not necessarily palatable to the other. A manager
who has a reputation for &dquo;killing the messenger&dquo; will
not get the kind of feedback needed for wise decision-
making.
Furthermore, managers must avoid selective lis-
tening. In selective listening receivers block out new
information, especially when it conflicts with what
they want to believe. In order to overcome this be-
havior, managers must make a conscious decision to
listen.
Implement an Information System
In organizations that use technical personnel to
design projects, there is a potential communication
&dquo;gap&dquo; between technicians and nontechnical
managers who have the responsibility of monitoring
and making decisions about the project. Closing this
potential gap involves communicating useful infor-
mation clearly. Information systems are available
today which can provide a wide assortment of infor-
mation to support the decision-making process.
Proficiency in this area could help reduce the com-
munication gap between technicians and nontechni-
cal managers. However, these systems are limited in
that they do not explain the risks associated with
decisions. They can, however provide supporting in-
formation.
Information systems used to support a decision-
maker should involve humans as information proces-
sors as well as computerized data bases. While data
bases provide a source of data which is easily accessed
and processed to give managers information on per-
tinent physical and financial aspects of a project,
managers must know whom to consult for assistance.
Face-to-face meetings between technicians and
managers are especially important when technology
 14
and management are two separate entities. To be suc-
cessful, an overall systems view should incorporate
all aspects of a project and recognize its complexity.
Therefore, there must be provision for possible
misunderstandings and the exclusion or omission of
critical information. And-most important-it should
be clearly understood that an information system is
no substitute for clear, concise, and relevant face-to-
face communication.
Develop Effective Communication
Decision makers have no greater responsibility
than to improve the environment for and efficiency of
communication in their organizations. The working
climate must allow communication to thrive with
maximum success. The increasing specialization of
work means that nontechnical decision-makers and
technicians do not necessarily speak in the same lan-
guage. Consequently, decision-makers who wish to
become better communicators must accomplish two
tasks. First, they must improve their messages-the
information they wish to transmit. Second, they must
seek to improve their own understanding of what
other individuals are trying to communicate to them.
When possible, nontechnical managers respon-
sible for making decisions concerning technical mat-
ters should be trained in the elementary skills
associated with a particular project. Such training
could involve basic terminology, design techniques
used by technicians and other relevant subjects.
Managers could then better understand the informa-
tion communicated to them by technical personnel.
This could result in better decisions regarding tech-
nical and safety considerations.
In addition, all key personnel connected with a par-
ticular project should be trained in both technical and
managerial topics. This would permit these in-
dividuals to serve as interpreters or &dquo;links&dquo; for both
upward and downward communication within the
system to ensure that meaningful communication is
NOTES
Report to the President by the Presidential Commission
1 Kolcum, E.H., Morton Thiokol engineers testify NASA
on theSpace Shuttle Challenger Accident. Government
Printing Office, 1986.
Covault, C. 0-ring documentation misled managers.
2 Borman, Ernest G. Symbolic Convergence Theory: A
Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 24, 1986, 26.
Hunsaker, J.L. and Law, J.S. Disaster in flight 51-L.
3 -
In
dustrial Management. September-October 1986, 12.
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occurring. Among their tasks would be to make sure
that all relevant information is relayed to the
decision-maker and that any decision would take into
account technical feasibility as well as physical
limitation. In this manner, safe, sensible decisions
could be made and carried out with the knowledge of
everyone concerned.
CONCLUSION
This article takes the position that effective com-
munication is a necessary ingredient for the success-
ful completion of technical or engineering projects. It
is obvious from an analysis of the communication
practices of individuals involved with the Challenger
project that ineffective upward communication from
technical personnel to upper-level managers can lead
to bad decisions. When decision-makers do not under-
stand information provided by technical personnel,
and when they practice &dquo;selective listening&dquo;, a com-
munication &dquo;gap&dquo; occurs which may be detrimental to
a project. Hence, the need for a good communication
structure within organization. Effective structur-
an
ing could involve standardizing technical language,
practicing active listening, closing information gaps,
and, in some instances, implementing an information
system.
Further, it is essential that nontechnical managers
have some knowledge of the technical fields which
they manage. In like manner, technicians and en-
gineers should keep in mind that most of what they
do will eventually have to be presented-either oral-
ly or in some written form-to decision-makers who
do not have a comprehensive technical background.
Clearly, closing the communication gap between
technical personnel and nontechnical managers will
require changes in attitudes and behavior.Fortunate-
ly, these changes involve competencies that both
groups have or could develop within a short period of
time.
4
rejected warnings on launch. Aviation Week and Space
Technology, March 3, 1986, 18, 19.
5
communication formulation. Journal of Communication.
Fall 1985, 128-38.