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A Review of Explosion Prevention and Pro
A Review of Explosion Prevention and Pro
A Review of Explosion Prevention and Pro
00
# 2005 Institution of Chemical Engineers
www.icheme.org/journals Trans IChemE, Part B, January 2005
doi: 10.1205/psep.04023 Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 83(B1): 1–17
REVIEW PAPER
I
deally, explosion risk is identified and prevented at an early stage of process design,
forming a key part of the inherently safer design (ISD) approach. However, in practice,
explosion risk often cannot be eliminated completely. Reliable preventive and protective
systems must therefore be applied, as part of the now widely applied barrier or independent
layer of protection approach (LOPA) to process design. Doing this requires a comprehensive
knowledge of available systems. However, such a comprehensive overview of the various
systems does not yet exist. This paper provides such an overview. The commercially available
explosion prevention and mitigative systems applicable to gas, dust, mist and hybrid (gas-
aerosol) explosions are discussed, including basic principles and proper application for
single and combined systems, for confined installations. Limitations of the applicability as
well as limitations of the research-base of the various systems are also discussed.
1
2 PEKALSKI et al.
Table 1. Examples of some major disasters in the chemical process industries (Explosion Group of Delft University of Technology: www.dct.tudelft.Nl/
Part/explosion).
In designing a chemical process or improving safety in Sometimes after applying the above-mentioned approaches,
an existing installation, one should not start by simply the risk is estimated by techniques like Risk Matrix, the
applying the commercially available safety systems DOW method, Fault Tree Analysis, etc. If it is too high
described in this paper. The concept of safety should be to be acceptable, safety systems should be considered and
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 3
properly applied. Risks should then be re-estimated to dimensions of the equipment are larger than the detection
check for acceptability. In this process financial aspects size range of a single detector (especially applicable for
are, of course, also important. Methods for considering optical detectors).
these in terms of, for example, an economic cost –benefit Active systems work in the following sequence to provide
analysis, are presented elsewhere (Pasman et al., 2003). successful action: detection, initiation of a given device(s),
This article reviews explosion safety systems for and appropriate action. The successful operation of the active
enclosed apparatus. Safety systems for mitigating risks of systems depends on the correct and very quick functioning of
vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) are not considered. each of these operations. Examples are hot spot detecting and
Generally, safety systems can be categorized as: extinguishing systems, explosion suppression, etc.
preventive/protective systems and/or active/passive
systems.
Detectors
Detectors can be divided into static and dynamic detec-
PREVENTIVE AND PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
tors. The static detector works in the binary mode: acti-
It is very important to be aware of the difference between vation occurs if the set threshold value is exceeded. If
preventive and protective systems. In general, preventive oscillations in the process are possible, the detector may
systems, depending on the design purpose, sometimes cause false alarms. The dynamic detector acquires and ana-
reduce the probability, but more commonly eliminate the lyses incoming data of the process condition. The detector
possibility for occurrence of an unwanted event, like an may initially run in a learn-mode through which process
explosion. This means, in other words, that the possibility data (e.g. maximum measured static and dynamic pressures
of flame propagation (thus explosion) is eliminated. There- and their duration times, light intensities during normal
fore this approach is always the most highly recommended. process) can be measured and incorporated into the
However, for some processes, preventive systems cannot be memory. Through evaluation of this gathered information,
applied, e.g. a fuel –air mixture that has a very low mini- the threshold values are automatically tuned to the process
mum ignition energy, and is present in a process that conditions with the highest accuracy for proper and error-
cannot be fully enclosed, thus precluding inerting. free operation. The activation takes place after exceeding
In contrast, the protective system allows an explosion to an adjusted set sequence, e.g. three adjacent points have
occur, but reduces the adverse effects of the event. This sequentially higher values than the triggering value and
means that an explosion can occur, but it is either contained the increase rate is too high for normal process operation.
(e.g. explosion-proof equipment, explosion isolation, This type of detector is recommended for processes sub-
explosion suppression, flame arresters) or controlled (e.g. jected to significant variations in pressure or operating at
venting, flameless vents), thus protecting the equipment subambient conditions.
from being severely damaged or destroyed. In order to minimize false alarms and spurious trips, it is
The presented safety systems are applicable for gas, common practice to use two, or more, static pressure detec-
vapour, dust and hybrid explosions. Only flame arresters tors positioned in different places and operated in an ‘and’
are not applicable for dust due to fouling by the particles. mode. The selected sensor type must be able to withstand
Considering devices that prevent explosion propagation, and properly operate in the process environment (corrosion,
only flame arresters are applicable to both deflagrations dust deposition, variation in temperature), meet with elec-
and detonations. All other systems are restricted only for trical safety classifications and to be able to distinguish
use against deflagrations. the early combustion reaction of an incipient explosion
from normal possible oscillations in process conditions. A
variety of detectors types may be used: optical—UV, IR,
Active Systems
UV/IR, IR/IR (detection of two narrow bands), multi-
Active systems consist of detector(s), control unit and band IR; pressure based, such as piezoelectric or piezoresis-
acting device(s). By means of the detector(s) (or sensors), tive; or thermal-based, such as thermoelectric.
certain process parameters are continuously measured, Optical detectors: in choosing a proper optical detector
and the signals are analysed by the control unit. If a one should keep in mind electromagnetic bands emitted
given threshold value is exceeded, for example as caused by a flame. The flame radiation spectral patterns are charac-
by an incipient explosion, the active system intervenes in teristic for the burning substance. For instance, a hydrogen
an active way in order to restrict the effects of the begin- flame generates a large amount of UV radiation with very
ning explosion. This is achieved by initiating a particular little IR, while a coal fire generates little UV and a large
action in an installed device specific to the given situation. amount of IR radiation.
For example, in case of explosion isolation, a fast acting UV detectors respond to wavelengths between 0.185 and
valve is closed. The control unit may activate more than 0.245 mm. These have a very fast response time and detect
one acting device. These actions are only possible through flames within 3– 4 ms. They are not greatly affected by
activation of the device by a signal coming from the control deposition of ice on the lens, but can be affected by depos-
unit. The action of the control unit is initiated by a signal its of grease and oil. Welding operations, lightning, X-rays,
coming from the detector(s), indicating a value of process high solar radiation and hot refractory surfaces well above
parameter that is above a certain threshold value (e.g. press- 16008C can cause false alarms. Smoke and some com-
ure). A single detector or a set may be installed in the pound’s vapours, typically those with unsaturated bonds,
equipment. The set of detectors is used to improve may cause signal attenuation.
reliability of the system and to prevent false alarms and IR detectors respond to wavelengths between 4.1 and
spurious trips. More detectors are always necessary if the 4.6 mm. The response time is also very short (milliseconds).
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
4 PEKALSKI et al.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 5
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
6 PEKALSKI et al.
gas is added to the vessel at a calculated flow rate for Rules of thumb relating the LOC in air at ambient con-
the run of the process so that a safe level of oxygen may ditions to nitrogen and carbon dioxide are given below
be assumed to be present in the vessel. To be safe, this (Schofield, 1988):
flow rate is usually higher than that calculated.
(2) Pressurization inerting—after an initial purge of the N0 ¼ C0 2
vessel, a positive pressure of inert gas is maintained
to prevent diffusion of oxygen. It is measured by N0 ¼ 1:3 C0 6:3 (NFPA 1979=A)
means of a pressure sensor instead of an oxygen con-
centration sensor. where N0 is the LOC for nitrogen and C0 is the LOC for
(3) ICS—this method is an active method and is based carbon dioxide, both by percentage volume.
on continuously measuring the oxygen concentration. If the oxygen concentration is continuously measured,
When the oxygen concentration increases, approaching a safety margin of 2% below the LOC is recommended
the LOC value, more inert gas is added to reach the (NFPA, 2002). This safety margin compensates for concen-
pre-set safe concentration level of oxygen. tration fluctuations throughout the enclosures and compen-
sates for monitoring inaccuracy. In case of protection of
The first two methods are not sufficiently safe, because the large plant volumes, the presence of extended hot surfaces,
most important factor—the oxygen concentration—is not very reactive flammable mixtures and more extreme
monitored. Therefore only the third method is recom- operational conditions (temperature or pressure), a greater
mended. For this method, leakage of oxygen into the enclo- margin of safety is recommended. A brief characterisation
sure (under pressure operations) or lack of uniformity of the of the most common inert gases is given in Table 4.
concentration should be considered. Therefore, usually It is worth realizing that in some situations it is not econ-
many measuring points are installed throughout the pro- omically justified to reduce the oxygen concentration below
tected part of the installation. the LOC. However, by reducing the oxygen concentra-
Common LOC values for typical organic dusts at tion, both the explosion severity [(dP/dt)max, Pmax] and
ambient conditions are in the range 8– 15% O2 with explosion sensitivity (e.g. MIE, LEL, UEL) of a flammable
carbon dioxide, and 6– 13% O2 with nitrogen. Generally mixture are significantly reduced. An advantage of this is
a greater amount of nitrogen than carbon dioxide is that an explosion can be contained more easily, e.g. by smal-
required due to the lower molar heat capacity of nitrogen ler venting area, less suppressant agent, longer response
compared with carbon dioxide. For metal dusts, the LOC time, etc.
is considerably lower, in the range of 4% vol O2 (Bart- Inerting is applicable to an enclosed plant, especially one
knecht, 1981). A detailed discussion of LOC values that handles strongly reactive mixtures (St 3 class) or mix-
was given by Going (2000). He showed that the LOC tures that have low minimum ignition energy.
value is affected by the ignition energy of the pyrotechnic Typical processes for which inerting is used are: confined
igniter. The stronger the ignition energy, the lower the reactors, mixers, pulverizers, mills, grinders, driers, ovens,
LOC value. The reported LOC value for aluminium filters, screens, cyclones, dust collectors, hoppers, silos,
dust is 8.5% O2, and this is much higher than values pneumatic conveyors, screw conveyors, mass conveyors,
reported by Bartknecht. bucket elevators, etc.
Carbon dioxide † Readily available, effective—higher oxygen levels † Some metal dusts react violently (e.g. aluminium,
(mol %) are permissible compared with nitrogen copper, magnesium, silicon) at high temperature
† Moderate cost † Fast flow of carbon dioxide can generate
considerable electrostatic charge
Nitrogen † Readily available † Less effective (mol%) than carbon dioxide
† Moderate cost † Some metal dusts react (e.g. aluminium, chromium,
magnesium, titanium, zirconium) at high temperature
Flue gases † Often readily available † Requires additional equipment to cool the gas,
remove contaminants, monitor or remove
combustible vapours, remove incandescent material
† Available at low cost † May react with dust
† Storage of flue gas may not be practical, so that
adequate quantities may not always be available,
for example, during a furnace shutdown
Argon or helium † Unlikely to contaminate products or react with them † Expensive
Water vapour † Readily available † May condense, so that the space becomes flammable
again
† Low cost † May react with some agents forming hydrogen—
explosive
Halons † Effective inert gas † May be expensive
† Environmentally harmful (destroys ozone layer), no
longer manufactured and nowadays forbidden
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 7
The advantages of the inerting method are as follows: a mechanically weaker area, called the venting area, in
the possibility of explosion and fire can be completely the wall of the protected enclosure. The weaker area is
eliminated; it can be used for different shapes of enclo- opened by an explosion overpressure at a carefully desi-
sures; high strength of enclosure is not necessary and fire gned pressure (Pstat). Through the venting area, burned
is prevented. Disadvantages are: process equipment must and unburned substances escape quickly enough to prevent
be enclosed; suffocation of personnel is possible; it is less a greater pressure rise than the enclosure can withstand
effective for non-oxygen combustible agents (e.g. ethylene (Pdes). Owing to the overpressure release, the maximum
oxide, acetylene); and costs are relatively high, especially pressure in the enclosure reaches a value not higher than
for large systems that require large amounts of inerting Pred, which is well below the pressure that the equipment
agent. can withstand (Pdes). The operational principle of venting
is presented in Figure 2. It must be stressed that after the
Dangers of inerting: inerting introduces an additional opening of, for example, a venting panel, the panel remains
serious safety risk: asphyxiation or suffocation of person- open, and for further proper operation of a process, the pro-
nel due to reduced oxygen concentrations in air. In the tected enclosure must in some way be re-closed. Com-
chemical industry during the period 1960 –1978, at least monly a bursting indicator (electric, magnetic or optical)
seven people were killed by nitrogen (Kletz, 1980). The can indicate the opening of a venting device.
problem is that human beings do not experience any warn- Essential for the proper functioning of the venting device
ing signals on exposure to a high nitrogen concentration. is a sufficiently large vent area. If it is too small, the press-
Nitrogen is odourless, and people exposed to too low ure generated in the enclosure (Pred) can reach values
concentrations of oxygen may simply suddenly lose con- higher than the strength of the protected vessel (Pdes),
sciousness and die. In the case of nitrogen, the effects resulting in destruction of the protected equipment. Com-
of reduced oxygen concentrations on humans are shown in prehensive guidelines for designing of venting devices are
Table 5. Eckhoff (1991) cites 17 –18 vol% of oxygen as the given in NFPA 68 and VDI 3676 (National Fire Protection
value below which humans suffer serious respiratory Association, 2002; Pressure venting of dust explosions,
problems. 1995). Attention must be paid to some phenomena which
It is recommended to use simple warning instruments for can adversely affect the proper operation of the venting
oxygen concentration detection equipped with an alarm device, like dust fouling, polymerization, ice build-up or
signal if the oxygen concentration drops below a safe corrosion.
value. Of course the same problems arise from use of One of the disadvantages of venting is the flame jet
other inert gases. formed during the pressure release process, which can
harm people in the vicinity of the flame cloud, especially
with indoor applications. This problem may be overcome
Explosion Protection Systems either by application of ducts through which the overpres-
sure is released or by flame-quenching devices. The
Explosion protection systems can be categorized as presence of a duct, however, causes higher flow resistance,
follows: thus higher Pred in the enclosure. In order to eliminate this,
. venting (e.g. bursting discs, venting panels, explosion a larger vent area is required.
doors); The flame-quenching device consists of a bursting disc,
. explosion suppression; which isolates the protected enclosure, and a flame arrester
. explosion isolation; located close to the bursting disc. The bursting disc pre-
. flame arresters (for deflagrations and/or detonations); vents material exchange with surroundings and fouling of
. containment (explosion pressure-resistant equipment,
pressure shock-resistant equipment);
. barricades, barriers, separation by distance;
. use of combinations of mitigation (prevention and pro-
tection) systems.
Venting
Venting is a passive system. It is intended to prevent
destruction of an enclosure due to overpressure caused by
an explosion (Pmax). The method relies on the creation of
16–21 No detectable effects Figure 2. Illustration of pressure rise in vented and unvented equipment
12–16 Increased respiration, slight reduction of during explosion. Pmax, maximum explosion pressure generated in
coordination unvented enclosure; Pdes, maximum pressure the protected enclosure can
10–12 Loss of ability to think clearly withstand; Pred, maximum pressure which is allowed to be generated in
,10 Loss of consciousness, death the enclosure during explosion; Pstat, pressure at which a venting device
opens (venting pressure).
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
8 PEKALSKI et al.
the flame arrester. During an explosion, the bursting disc and it does not stop explosion development (Chatrathi and
ruptures, and the flame is quenched during passage through DeGood, 1991). The VDI 3676 regulation states that Pred
the flame arrester. Since during the release process the must not exceed 2 barg. This 2 barg value gives an idea of
flame arrester introduces an additional flow resistance, a the maximum necessary strength of the enclosure. Protected
larger venting area is needed, in order to obtain the same vessels might have a volume within the range of 0.1–
Pred. The flame quench devices are certified for use in 10000 m3. The generated explosion overpressure should be
volumes up to 1000 m3, and dust classes including Kst 3 below 12 barg and the Kst below 800 bar m s21.
dusts (Kst . 300 bar m s21).
Another disadvantage of the venting method is the open
area of the protected equipment after an explosion. Repla- Explosion suppression
cing the venting panels may create some practical problems, Explosion suppression systems are active systems and
especially in places which are difficult to reach, like the roofs are designed to detect and stop an explosion at the incipi-
of long silos. For such applications, a useful solution is an ent stage of combustion (typically it takes 30 –100 ms
explosion door, presented in Figure 3. The explosion door before a destructive pressure rise is reached). This is
functions exactly like venting devices, but closes automati- accomplished by very rapidly discharging a suppressant
cally after the explosion overpressure is vented. agent onto the combustion reaction before it significantly
However, the self-closing feature introduces an additional develops and destroys or deforms process equipment by
danger—the possibility of implosion. The pressure rise further pressure increase. The operating concept of
resulting from the explosion is caused mainly by the temp- explosion suppression is very similar to the venting con-
erature rise and subsequent expansion of the hot gases in cept presented in Figure 2.
the enclosure. After the venting, the explosion door re- The time between the moment of an explosion detection
closes automatically. The gases in the enclosure cool and the moment a suppressant agent has been dispersed into
down due to the heat loss to the walls of the enclosure. the equipment is typically below 50 ms. The most time-
The gas volume in the closed vessel decreases, causing a consuming step in the entire sequence (detection, initiation
vacuum, so that the outside atmospheric pressure can and action) is the dispersion process of the suppressant
crush the enclosure. To avoid such situations, explosion agent from the container. The cross section of the suppres-
doors should be equipped with vacuum breakers through sant container is given in Figure 4. The control system
which air can re-enter the enclosure, equalizing the internal activates the pyrotechnic initiator (1), which generates
pressure to the atmospheric pressure. a pressure pulse. The primary bursting disc (2) ruptures
The explosion opening pressure (Pstat) may be pre-set and allows the pressure pulse to trigger the opening
from 0.01 bar to higher values. Similarly to the above-men- sequence. The main bursting disc (3) bursts and nearly
tioned case, the presence of a door introduces additional instantaneously provides an unrestricted flow path for the
flow resistance, decreasing the efficient venting area. The pressurised suppressant agent (4), which is dispersed into
efficiency of the explosion doors with respect to the venting the enclosure. The gas pressure in the suppressant container
area of a venting panel can be more than 90% (depending should be compressed up to about 60 bar to ensure effective
on explosion door type). Standardized size diameters are suppression (Bartknecht 1981; Swift 1988).
up to 1500 mm, 1.77 m2 nominal, but after deduction for Commonly used suppression agents are powders, like
the efficiency factor, 1.55 m2. monoammonium phosphate (MAP), sodium or potassium
Venting is usually the simplest and cheapest means of pro- bicarbonate (NaHCO3, KHCO3), sodium chloride, cryolites,
tecting processes and is thus very often applied. However, it fluorides and rock dust; liquids, e.g. water, have been used
should not be used for situations in which an environmen- in the past, halogenated hydrocarbons (halons) or gases
tally toxic material may be released to the surroundings. e.g. helium, nitrogen and carbon dioxide. The powder
Also it has to be pointed out that, although venting protects
an enclosure against the high pressure generated by the
explosion, it does not necessarily prevent the explosion
from being propagated through piping into other vessels,
Figure 3. Operation scheme of an explosion door (Silo-Thorwesten). Figure 4. Cross section of the suppressant container (Fike).
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 9
suppressants, MAP and sodium or potassium bicarbonate, Explosion suppression can be applied for closed and
are the most commonly used due to their explosion suppres- open units. Typical operations where explosion suppression
sion efficiency. Water is effective against certain hydrophilic can be used are spray dryers, coal handling, dust filtration/
dusts, but not for all dusts. Extensive trials have been under- collectors, vapour recovery, material size reduction, grain
taken to validate the effectiveness of a suppressant agent and food handling, etc.
against both gas and dust explosions. Halons, in spite of The maximum pressure (Pred) of a well-suppressed
their high effectiveness, are banned due to their harmful explosion is in the range 0.2 – 0.4 barg, typically 0.3 barg.
impact on the stratospheric ozone layer. It is therefore a good protection system for equipment
The interaction between the flame and the suppressant with low strength. The maximum volume of the protected
agent consists of one or more of the following three mech- vessel can be up to 1000 m3 (Moore, 1986). Explosion sup-
anisms: chemical interaction, oxygen concentration pression systems currently available on the market are suit-
reduction and/or heat sink. The first mechanism (chemical) able for process temperatures up to 2008C. Successful
makes use of the fact that, when an organic substance or protection for some enclosures against dust explosions is
a hydrocarbon burns, a complex series of chemical reac- possible if the Kst does not exceed 300 bar m s21 and
tions occurs before the final combustion products are against gas explosions if the Kg does not exceed
formed. The most important reaction steps at the incipient 75 bar m s21 (Bartknecht, 1981). However, Moore (1986)
stage of flame formation are those that result in a higher investigated the possibility of suppressing explosions of
rate of radical formation than radical destruction (chain aluminium powder in the Kst range 300– 600 bar m s21
branching reactions) and lead to establishment and growth (St 3 class). Swift (1988) also reported successful suppres-
of the flame. When halon molecules enter the flame zone, sion of propane/air mixtures (Kg of 450 bar m/s21) and
they thermally decompose, liberating free halogen atoms. some St 3 class dusts. Chatrathi and Going (2000) demon-
These react with the free radicals, thus terminating strated successful explosion suppressions against metal
the chain branching reactions. This process reduces the powders like aluminium (Kst of 300) and hybrid mixtures
rate of flame propagation or even extinguishes the flame of propane cornstarch with Kst of 504 bar m s21.
altogether. The second mechanism occurs when inerting Going and Snoeys (2002) concluded that metal dust
agents reduce the oxidizer (e.g. oxygen concentration) to deflagrations can be suppressed to less than 1 barg, pro-
a level below which flame propagation is possible. The vided that a fast responding suppression system, sufficient
third mechanism (physical), thermal, occurs when a sup- concentration of suppressant and low detection overpres-
pressant agent (e.g. water) acts as a heat sink, thus reducing sure are available or can be achieved.
the temperature in the flame zone so that combustion is It should be emphasized that, while the Kst value relates
suppressed. Hamins (1998) concluded that CF3Br acts to conditions of high turbulence, the Kg value relates to
12% in a physical and 88% in a chemical manner, while zero turbulence. Since explosion severity is extremely
NaHCO3 action was estimated to be 47% physical. dependent on turbulence levels, using explosion suppres-
Eckhoff (1991) distinguishes three different suppression sion in systems in which gases can explode requires careful
strategies: consideration of the turbulence level. This is especially true
for highly reactive gases (e.g. hydrogen, ethylene, acety-
(1) local suppression—detection of initial explosion,
lene) at or near their stoichiometric compositions.
identification of its location and activation of appropri-
The time available for action of a suppressant system
ate suppressers in order to prevent flame propagation
increases as the vessel volume increases [(dP/dt)max
beyond the explosion kernel;
decrease] and decreases as the reactivity of the fuel being
(2) advance ‘inerting’—detection of explosion, identifi-
processed increases. However, if the vessel volume incre-
cation of its location activation of appropriate suppres-
ases, more suppressant and faster injection are required.
sers and establishment of suppressant barriers to
The choice of agent, the quantity of agent, total discharging
prevent the explosion from spreading to other process
time, location of system components, and other system
units;
parameters must be carefully considered for each appli-
(3) total suppression—detection of explosion and deluging
cation, taking into account the flame speed.
of the entire system with suppressant to ensure that the
Advantages of explosion suppression systems are:
explosion is totally suppressed.
protection possibility of low strength equipment; no release
The proper choice of the type and quantity of suppression of burnt or unburned products into surroundings (important
agent, number of suppression containers, their location, dis- for toxic and environmentally damaging products); indoor
charge time and reaction time are crucial for effective application is feasible; and provision of fire protection.
explosion suppression and has been the subject of much Disadvantages are: cost; replacement of the suppression
research (Moore, 1986; Eckhoff, 1991; Going and container after its action; requirement of regular main-
Snoeys, 2002; Richmond et al., 1978; Kordylewski and tenance; and necessity for a reliable electric power
Amrogowicz, 1992; Hamins, 1998; Chatrathi and Going, source. Note that recently explosion suppression systems
2000). Chatrathi and Going (2000) introduced the concept have been developed that require no pyrotechnic or explo-
of a minimum inerting concentration as a concentration sive parts, thus requiring less maintenance. Instead a gas-
below which explosion propagation is possible, but above generating system similar to an airbag is used (www.
this concentration explosion propagation is not possible. stuvex.com/suppression.html).
In spite of its name, this parameter seems to be more appli-
cable for explosion suppression systems than inerting sys-
tems, and is similar to the critical amount of suppression Explosion isolation: Explosion isolation systems are
agent, as defined by Moore (1986). intended to prevent an explosion from propagating through
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
10 PEKALSKI et al.
pipes, ducts, etc. into other sections of an otherwise pro- times the value of the side-on detonation pressure.
tected installation. Therefore the explosion effect is limited This so-called ‘reflected pressure’ can create overpressure
to that part of the equipment where an explosion has taken peaks of up to ca. 200 bar for gas mixtures initially at
place. The rest of the installation is thus fully isolated from only 1 bara. During overdriven detonation, for a very short
the initial explosion and is in this way protected. Since this period of time (about 1 ms), very high overpressures may
method does not prevent against explosion development, be generated, even up to about 150 bar in case of initially
additional protection methods should be applied to atmospheric pressure.
minimize the overpressure generated by an explosion. The rate of flame propagation depends on many factors
Explosion isolation is commonly used in combination that can be described as chemical/physical and engineering
with explosion suppression or venting systems. related. The reactivity of a flammable mixture (defined by
In case of weak ignition sources (not generating shock the laminar burning velocity for undisturbed flames and
waves), initiated in quiescent mixtures, at the initial by turbulent burning velocity for turbulently propagating
stage of the explosion development the flame zone propa- flames) is determined mainly by fuel type, fuel composition
gates at the speed of the laminar burning velocity, which and type of oxidizer (air, oxygen-enriched air or pure
is in the range of 35 –325 cm s21 for the most sensitive oxygen). The reactivity of a flammable mixture has a
composition of flammable gases. Then, due to expansion direct effect on flame propagation and consequently on
of the hot gases and increased turbulence, the flame all phenomena associated with deflagration to detonation
speed accelerates. Flame propagation in a pipeline can transition. The higher the mixture reactivity, the shorter
be divided into four stages: deflagration, rapid (overdri- the run-up distance is, and the more severe the explosion.
ven) deflagration, overdriven detonation and stable detona- Additionally the following engineering factors influence
tion. In the first stage the flame speed is typically in the flame propagation processes: pipe diameter, pipe length
range 0.5 –100 m s21, in the second one it is in the and roughness, piping geometry (bends, elbows, their pos-
range 100– 300 m s21. In both cases the flame speed is ition and distance from an ignition source), initial pressure
subsonic, and heat and mass transfer govern the flame and temperature.
propagation mechanism. Since a pressure wave travels The influence of pipe diameter on flame speed and the
faster (i.e. at sonic velocity, ca. 330 m s21) than the flame run-up distance has been studied by several researchers
front, the pressure wave propagates ahead of the flame (Steen and Schample, 1983; Chatrathi, et al. 2001;
(reaction) front. The propagating pressure wave pre- Bartknecht, 1981; Lindstedt and Michels, 1988; Chatrathi
compresses the unburned fuel – air mixture. When the and Going, 1996; Pineau, 1987). Bartknecht (1981)
flame front accelerates the compression ratio increases, reported that, within the diameter range of 4 –16 inches,
and at a certain moment the pre-compressed fuel – air the flame speed increases with the pipe diameter. Chatrathi,
mixture self-ignites causing liberation of large amounts et al. 1996; 2001) found that, for methane, ethylene, pro-
of energy and the creation of a shock wave. This leads pane and hydrogen, this dependence also refers to pipe
to extremely high flame speed velocities (claimed to be diameters as small as 2 inches and that beyond 6 inches
up to 20,000 m s21 (Chatrathi et al., 2001) for a very the dependence is significant. The run-up distance depends
short period of time (milliseconds). Subsequently the on the above-mentioned factors. In a straight pipe at stan-
flame front decelerates to values defined by the reactivity dard conditions and with air used as oxidiser, the DDT
of the mixture, typically to a value in the range 1500– occurs typically at L/D (length to diameter) ratio of 70.
2500 m s21 (for hydrocarbon –air mixtures). This fourth The larger the pipe diameter, the shorter the run-up
stage is called stable detonation. At this stage the flame distance. The shortest L/D ratio found is 37, reported for
propagates by a shock compression mechanism. This tran- stoichiometric hydrogen – air mixtures for a 6 inch pipe
sition is called the deflagration to detonation transition diameter.
(DDT ), and the distance from the ignition source is Chatrathi et al. (2001) also investigated the influence of
called the run-up distance. the position of pipe bends on the run-up distance. In several
Pressures generated in these four stages differ greatly. In cases he noticed that the flame accelerates immediately
general, overpressure is the sum of static and dynamic after the bend. However, these faster flame speeds were
pressure. The static pressure is determined by the explosion not sustained and decreased to the velocities observed for
temperature (which causes thermal expansion of the gases straight pipeline geometry. Bend position relative to the
formed) and the number of gas molecules formed in the ignition source is critical. Depending on the mixture reac-
post-explosion mixture. In a constant volume system, typi- tivity and the bend position, the presence of the bend sig-
cal overpressures generated by deflagrations are ca. 7– 10 nificantly shortens the run up distance.
times the initial pressure in case of fuel – air mixture. Special attention must be paid to pressure piling. In
The dynamic pressure depends strongly on the flame pressure piling the pressure in an adjoining piece of equip-
front velocity. For velocities below ca. 200 m s21 it is ment is increased prior to the arrival of the flame. A typical
negligible. However, for faster flame fronts it is significant situation of pressure pilling is the case of two vessels of
component in the explosion overpressure. In case of stable different size interconnected by a pipeline. If an explosion
detonations, a typical detonation overpressure exerted on is initiated in the bigger vessel, its development causes sub-
the tube walls is about 20 – 25 times the initial pressure stantial pressure increase in the smaller vessel. This press-
(the so called ‘side-on pressure’). In the case of a perpen- ure increase is caused by unburned gas being forced into the
dicular collision between a detonation wave and a flat adjoining vessel due to the explosion process in the first
object, however, the entire gas momentum is decelerated vessel. This increased initial pressure, the turbulence
to zero and reversed in direction upon impact, causing induced by the flow into the adjoining vessel, and the
a huge increase of pressure on the object of up to eight ignition by means of a flame jet from the larger vessel,
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EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 11
results in a much more severe explosion in the smaller valves, some parts, like the driving force (explosive charge
vessel than that which occurred in the larger one. or pressurised cartridge), and a shock absorber have to be
The explosion isolation systems might be both active replaced. The replacement operation is, however, short—
(chemical, physical barriers) and passive (e.g. backflash typically less than an hour.
interrupters, ventex valve, rotary lock, etc.). In some Passive explosion isolation systems (e.g. backflash inter-
cases a combination between active and passive systems rupter, Ventex valve, rotary lock, etc.): the proper action of
gives efficient results. However, such a solution may be a these devices is based on the phenomenon that, in the case
complex (Going and Snoeys, 2003). of deflagrations, a pressure wave propagates ahead of
The operation principle of chemical barriers is the same the propagating flame front. Owing to application of
as for explosion suppression systems. The suppressant different methods, various design concepts exist. In the
agent is dispersed into the duct in front of the flame case of the backflash interrupter, the pressure wave opens
zone. The suppressant agent interacts with the flame, extin- the bursting disc (Figure 5), and the flame is released
guishing it and thus preventing the flame from spreading from of the pipe through the formed opening. For the
into other units. The discharge time may be very short or Ventex valve (Figure 6), in the case of explosion, the gen-
long to prolong protection in the system. The chemical bar- erated pressure wave initiates closure of the movable
rier is typically activated at the same time as the explosion internal valve popper that is suspended in central position
suppression system by the same control unit. It should be by two springs.
stressed that with chemical barriers some problems arise The performance of these devices is questionable if an
if the duct is connected to a large vessel from which insufficient pressure difference across these devices is gen-
flame propagation starts. Combustion in this large volume erated. This may occur if an ignition source is too close or
creates a large amount of gases that flow from the vessel a flammable mixture is insufficiently reactive (e.g. concen-
through the duct. This flow can be so large that the suppres- tration close to the flammability limit). To ensure proper
sant agent is simply swept out of the system by the flow operation, typically the velocities of the flame front should
before the flame arrives, which of course renders the be greater than 20 m s21 and/or the pressure difference
system ineffective. If the barrier is triggered by the pressure higher than 0.1 bar. Recent work by Going and
detector, the suppressant agent could be swept out of Snoeys (2003) illustrated a successful application of the
the system by the induced flow. This problem can be backflash interrupter for flame propagation for a very
prevented by venting the explosion, thus preventing the for- reactive mixture, i.e. propane in pure oxygen, even with
mation of large amounts of gases which otherwise would deflagration to detonation transition.
have flowed through the duct. Another approach is to use Other passive isolation devices are the rotary lock
an additional time lag in activating the chemical barrier; (Figure 7) and the screw conveyor, which are applied
this allows the gases to flow out so that the suppressant is widely for carrying out dust operations (dosing and trans-
effectively used to extinguish the flame. port) safely. The operating principle of these devices is a
For systems in which piping and ducts interconnect var- heat sink, which reduces the temperature in the flame
ious units to one another, it should also be mentioned that zone, so that heat release by the combustion reaction is smal-
pressure piling could cause problems due to the increased ler than heat loss. As a result the flame is quenched. In order
pressures and turbulence thus generated. to ensure a successful isolation of the flame front, the rotary
Physical barriers are fast acting valves that provide lock should be designed using the concept of maximum
a mechanical barrier against the flame front of an explosion. experimental safe gap (MESG) for dust explosions, analo-
The mechanical barrier is a fast-acting metal gate which is gously to the MESG for gas explosions, as is employed in
activated to assume a closed position, thus blocking the the design of flame arresters (Siwek, 1989).
cross section of a duct. The closing of the fast-acting valve
is driven by compressed gas (typically pressurised nitrogen
in the range 10– 40 bar) or by means of an electro-magnetic
valve. The action is initiated by a signal from the control
unit. The closing time strongly depends on the diameter of
the pipe and varies from 10 ms for a 50 mm diameter up
to 67 ms for a diameter of 650 mm. Such valves are suitable
for process temperatures up to 2008C.
Explosion isolation valves must be sufficiently strong to
withstand the high pressure of an explosion. For deflagra-
tions starting at, or below, atmospheric pressure, pressure
resistance to 10 –20 barg is sufficient. For detonations, gen-
erated overpressures are so high (particularly due to
reflected pressures) that application of an isolation valves
alone is currently not a reliable solution. However, in com-
bination with other systems (venting, explosion suppres-
sion) whose actions reduces the pressure reaching the
valve, such a solution is practicable (Going and Snoeys,
2003).
After every action, the fast-acting valves (e.g. gate
valve, butterfly valve, louvre and throttle valve) must be
re-opened. In case of explosive charge or pressure-actuated Figure 5. Backflash interrupter (Fike).
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
12 PEKALSKI et al.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
EXPLOSION PREVENTION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS 13
(2) Depending on the pressure wave, flame arresters can be able to withstand 2 h of endurance burn without
withstand: flashback for a deflagration and detonation. The
. Detonation flame arrester—a detonation flame Canadian Standards Association (CSA) requires
arrester must be able to withstand the mechanical 3 h of endurance burn (AIChE, 1993).
effects of shock waves (very high pressure, high . Short-burning time flame arrester—this type of
kinetic energy) and additionally be able to quench flame arrester is not intended to prevent a flashback
flames. It must be able to stop both deflagrations in case of flame stabilization on the flame arrester.
and detonations. Several authors (Howard, 1982;
Roussakins and Lapp, 1991; Roussakins and Advantages of flame arresters are: they are an easy and
Lapp, 1989) pointed out that it is not necessarily reliable way of eliminating flame propagation; they can
easier to quench a deflagration than a detonation. be used several times; and they are a passive device. Disad-
Flame arresters may quench a detonation but not vantages are: the pressure drop; they do not protect against
necessarily a deflagration. Thus, for example, a the development of an explosion inside a vessel; and they
flame arrester intended for in-line service should require some maintenance.
be tested over the entire range of flame propagation Flame arresters are used mainly in three situations in
phenomena. This includes deflagration, overdriven which flame propagation is possible:
detonation (DDT), and stable detonation. In order (1) An explosion occurring in one part of a system and pro-
to be reliable, the test conditions should meet the pagating into another part through connecting piping.
process conditions. (2) A fire or explosion occurring in an open area contain-
. Deflagration flame arrester—this type of flame ing a flammable atmosphere and propagating into the
arrester is less robust than the detonation flame inside of a vessel containing an explosive atmosphere
arrester and is able to quench only deflagrations. (e.g. to hydrocarbon storage tank via its vent).
(3) Depending on burning time: (3) An explosion occurring inside a vessel or enclosure and
. Long-burning time flame arrester—this flame propagating to an unenclosed area containing a flam-
arrester has to quench a flame stabilized on it and mable atmosphere (e.g. explosion occurring in hydro-
additionally protect the system against a flashback. carbon storage tank and propagating to an outside
As a result of the combustion reaction, heat pene- flammable atmosphere via the tank vent, e.g. during
trates the flame arrester and the quenching element filling operations).
is rapidly heated. This affects the temperature gradi-
ent between flame and metal and decreases the Flame arresters are used in many industries, such as pet-
heat removal efficiency. If the temperature reaches roleum, chemical, sewage treatment, pulp and paper, and
a critical value, the flame can penetrate the flame nuclear power generation (Lapp and Werneburg, 1995).
arrester. The risk of a stabilized flame on the flame It should be stressed that flame arresters should be used
arrester only exists if there is a continuous flow of only in those operating conditions (pressure, temperature,
the combustible mixture through the device and oxygen concentration and flow) which meet their working
the velocity of the flame is higher than the velocity specifications. In the case of so-called ‘dry flame arresters’,
of the flow. According to the United States Coast (metal) corrosion may enlarge the gaps in the arresting
Guard (1993), a long-burning flame arrester has to matrix and destroy the effectiveness of the arrester.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
14 PEKALSKI et al.
Ignition avoidance Ignition is avoided Prevention, passive Relatively cheap Not suitable for Should be always
gases/vapours or applied for
sensitive dusts combustible
(MIE , 10 mJ) atmospheres
Hot spots detection Hot spots are detected Prevention, active Good experience with Requires regular Mostly applied for
and extinguishing and extinguished certain powder maintenance and mixtures
systems before ignition can handling external power containing dusts or
occur equipment source powders
Multiple use after Proper design is
action critical
Combustible Concentration of Prevention, active Highly effective for Not suitable for Homogeneity of the
concentration combustibles is homogenous certain highly mixtures must be
control maintained outside mixtures (gases reactive gases (e.g. carefully evaluated
of explosive region and vapours) acetylene, ethylene
oxide)
Not suitable for
inhomogeneous
mixtures (e.g.
dusts)
Inerting Concentration of Prevention, active Highly effective for May be relatively Concentration of
oxidizing agent is any combustible expensive for large gases needed to
maintained below fuel systems ensure inert
the limiting If partly applied it May require noble operation depend
oxidizer substantially gas, e.g. argon for on chosen inerting
concentration— reduces explosion highly reactive gas
value needed to severity powders Leakage of air to the
allow explosion Operation may pose prevented unit
propagation risk of must be avoided
asphyxiation to For highly reactive
personnel gases (e.g. ethylene
oxide) mixture-
homogeneity must
be evaluated
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17
Venting Allows rapid escape of Protection, passive Well accepted and thoroughly Not suitable for toxic During release flame jets and
explosion gases, thus described in substances and/or blast waves may be
preventing excessive internationally accepted extremely reactive created causing thread for
pressure build-up guidelines mixtures near by personnel
Relatively cheap Must be regularly checked Proper design is critical
Applicable to large volumes May cause secondary
15
16 PEKALSKI et al.
separation distances, the calculations are often complex. application but also against the theoretical backdrop of
This method is also commonly applied for estimating explosion phenomena. Limitations of the applicability as
blast wave characteristics (Pmax and positive phase dura- well as limitations of the research-base of the various
tion) resulting from explosions as a function of (separation) systems are also discussed. Simplified results are briefly
distance (CCPS, 1994). Selected references for safe summarized in two tables.
separation distances include the National Fire Protection The basic goal of this discussion is to give readers both
Association regulation NFPA 30 59A and AIChE, (IRI, practical knowledge and fundamental insight required for a
1990; Mecklenburgh, 1985). proper and optimal choice of systems. However, explosion
behaviour is highly complex. It is therefore emphasized
that in practice expert knowledge relevant to a specific
CHOOSING PROPER EXPLOSION
industrial situation is necessary for proper and optimal
MITIGATION SYSTEM
choice, installation and maintenance.
Choosing a proper explosion prevention and/or explo-
sion protection system is a complex and difficult task. It
is probably for this reason that relatively little literature REFERENCES
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Verlag, Düsseldorf) p. 135. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Mecklenburgh, J.C., 1985, Process Plant Layout (Wiley, New York).
Mill, R.C., 1992, Human factors in process operations, a report of the About 80 companies producing safety systems were contacted in
human factor study group to the loss prevention working party of order to collect a comprehensive overview of the safety systems available
EFCE (IchemE, Rugby), pp 165 –171. on the market. The authors wish to thank all contacted companies for their
Moore, P.E., 1986, Suppression of Dust Explosions, IMechE/IChemE. feedback and information on their products, especially Dr John Going
Seminar, London 15 October. from Fike Corporation for his valuable remarks. A number of companies
Nelson, D.P., 1996, Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineer- provided figures presented in the article. Relevant company names are
ing Principles for Oil, Gas, Chemical, and Related Facilities (Noyes, then mentioned in brackets. Financial support of this work by the European
London), Chap. 6. Union within the ‘SAFEKINEX’ Project EVG1-CT-2002-00072 is grate-
National Fire Protection Association, 2002, Venting of Deflagrations, fully acknowledged.
NFPA 68.
National Fire Protection Association, 2002, Standard on Explosion Pre- The manuscript was received 28 January 2004 and accepted for
vention Systems, NFPA 69. publication after revision 12 July 2004.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2005, 83(B1): 1–17