IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v.

COMELEC and CIRILO

ROY MONTEJO, G.R. No 119976, 18 September 1995, EN BANC

Digest by: Iris May G. Godoy, EH 201

Principle in sum:

“For political purposes the concepts of residence and

domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence
for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.”

FACTS:

1. 24 August 1994 - petitioner filed a cancellation of

registration in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila
so she can register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

2. 28 January 28, 1995 - petitioner registered as a voter at

Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Thereafter, filed her
COC on 8 March 8, 1995 for the First District
Representative of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had
been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency
where she sought to be elected.

3. 3 March 1995 Congressman Cirilo Montejo the incumbent

representative of the 1st District filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with COMELEC alleging
that the petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates
for the House of Representatives and prayed that "an order
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
the certificate of candidacy.
 4. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected COC"
wherein her answer in the original COC in item 8 - “Seven
Months” changed to "since childhood."

5. 24 April 1995 COMELEC's Second Division cancelled her

certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy
on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte"

6. 11 May 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing

petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass
show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
COMELEC reversed itself the same day and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes.

ISSUES:

1. The sole issue for resolution is whether petitioner had

complied with the residency requirement of one year as
mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING:

1. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by

COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the past
four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to
an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte.

2. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence

qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
 speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile".

3. This court took the concept of domicile to mean an

individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.

4. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in

law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.
If a person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if
his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it
is residence.

5. SC: To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of

relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).

6. SC: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As

domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained,
it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
7. SC: So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does
not result in a loss or change of domicile.

8. SC: In the light of the principles just discussed, has

petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in
the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a

certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry
obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.

9. SC: “Having determined that petitioner possesses the

necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

xxx