Vdoc - Pub - An Invitation To Formal Reasoning The Logic of Terms

An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
The logic of terms
FRED SOMMERS
Harry A. Wolfson Professor of Philosophy,
Emeritus, Brandeis University
GEORGE ENGLEBRETSEN
Bishop's University
Ash gate
Aldershot • Burlington USA • Singapore • Sydney
© Fred Sommers and George Englebretsen 2000
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Sommers, Fred, 1923-
An invitation to formal reasoning : the logic of terms
1. Logic 2. Reasoning 3. Language and logic
I. Title II. Englebretsen, George
160
Library of Congress Control Number: 00-132808
ISBN 0 7546 1366 6
Printed and bound by Athenaeum Press, Ltd ..

Gateshead, Tyne & Wear.
Contents
Preface x
Chapter 1 Reasoning
1. Introduction 1
2. The Form of an Argument 4
3. A Word About the Form of Statements 4
4. The Form of Singular Statements 5
5. Terms and Statements 7
6. Symbolizing Compound Statements 9
7. A Word About Validity 11
8. How Material Expressions are Meaningful 13
9. Terms 13
10. Some Terms are 'Vacuous' 14
11. Statement Meaning 17
12. Truth and Correspondence to Facts 19
13. Propositions 20
14. 'States of Affairs' 21
15. The facts and the FACTS 22
16. What Statements Denote 22
17. Summary and Discussion on the Meaning of Statements 23
Chapter 2 Picturing Propositions

1. State Diagrams 25
2. Representing Singular Propositions 28
3. Entailments 30
4. Negative Entailments 33
5. STATES and states 35
6. Positive and Negative 'Valence' 36
7. The Limitations of State Diagrams 36
8. The Statement Use of Sentences 38
9. Truth Relations 39
10. Logical Syntax 40
v
VI An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
11. Term Way vs. Predicate Way

12. Some Useful Terminology
13. Subjects and Predicates
Chapter 3 The Language of Logic (I)

1. Introduction
2. Writing 'Y some X' as an Algebraic Expression
3. Affirmation (+) and Denial (-)
4. Binary and Unary Uses of a Sign
5. Positive and Negative Valence
6. Contrary Terms and Sentences
7. 'Every'
8. Why Some Equal Sentences are not Logically Equivalent
9. E-forms and A-forms
10. Transcribing Affirmative Statements
11. How to Tell the Valence ofE-form Statements
12. Negative Valence= Universal Quantity
13. The Law of Commutation in E-form
14. 'Every' in E-form Transcriptions
15. 'Isn't'
16. The General Conditions ofEquivalence
17. The General Form of Statements
18. The Logical Law of Commutation Applied to Compound
Terms
19. The Logical Law of Association
20. Derivations
21. More on Regimenting Sentences
22. Uniquely Denoting Terms and Singular Statements
23. Identities
Chapter 4 The Language of Logic (II)

1. Compound Statements
2. 'If... then'
3. More on Transcription
4. 'Or'
5. Representing Internal Structures
6. The General Form of Compound Statements
7. Direct Transcriptions
Contents vn
8. Relational Statements 88
9. A Word About Pairing 89
10. Subject/Predicate; Predicate/Subject 91
11. 'Dyadic Normal Fonns' 92
12. Commuting Relational Terms 93
13. Immediate Inferences from Relational Statements 95
14. Obversion 96
15. The Passive Transformation 97
16. Simplification 98
17. Pronouns and Proterms 99
Appendix to Chapter 4
18. Bounded Denotation 102
19. Terms in their Contexts 103
20. Rules for Using Markers 106
Chapter 5 Syllogistic
1. Validity 109
2. Inference 114
3. Enthymemes 118
4. Why REGAL Works 122
5. Inconsistent Conjunctions: The Tell-tale Characteristics 124
6. Equivalent Conjunctions 127
7. How This is Related to REGAL 128
8. Syllogisms with Singular Statements 129
9. The Laws ofldentity 130
10. Proofs ofThese Laws 131
11. The Matrix Method for Drawing Conclusions 133
12. Venn Diagrams 135
Chapter 6 Relational Syllogisms

1. Introduction 139
2. Applying the Dictum to Relational Arguments 140
3. Distributed Terms 141
4. Applying DDO 143
5. Indirect Proofs for Relational Arguments 147
6. Transforming Arguments 148
7. Annotating a ProofofValidity 150
8. Arguing with Pronominal Sentences 151
viii An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
9. Distributed Proterms 158
Chapter 7 Statement Logic

1. Introduction 163
2. Contradictions 165
3. Tautology 166
4. Inconsistent Statements 167
5. Contingent Statements 167
6. Direct Proofs 168
7. Rules of Statement Logic Used in Proofs 169
8. Disjunctive Normal Forms (DNF) 175
9. Inconsistency and Validity 176
10. Graphic Representation of Compound Statements 178
11. Regimenting Statements for Treeing ·183
12. Large Trees 185
13. Drawing Conclusions 192
14. Partial Disjunctions 193
15. Using the Tree Method for Annotated Proofs 199
16. Statement Logic as a Special Branch of Syllogistic Logic 201
17. Venn Diagrams for the Singleton Universe of Propositional
Logic 209
Chapter 8 Modem Predicate Logic

1. Syntax 213
2. MPL: The Predicate Way 214
3. General Sentences in MPL 215
4. The Logical Language of MPL 216
5. Singular Sentences in MPL 220
6. How the Logical Syntax ofMPL is 'Ontologically Explicit' 222
7. Dyadic Normal Forms 224
8. Translating Pronominalizations 227
9. Preparing the TFL Bridge 229
10. Identity in MPL 230
11. Logical Reckoning in MPL 232
12. Transformation Rules 233
13. Rules oflnference 235
14. Literal Formulas 237
15. Reckoning in MPL 240
Contents IX
16. Canonical Normal Forms (CNF) 241

17. Indirect Proofs in MPL 242
18. Relational MPL Arguments 244
19. Identity Arguments in MPL 249
Rules, Laws and Principles 253
A Note on Further Reading 259

Preface
It seems to be a fairly widely held belief among contemporary teachers of logic

that one must introduce logic via the propositional, and then predicate,
calculus. In particular, one would not, even if he or she believed otherwise,
properly or fairly serve novice students by offering them instead something like
syllogistic logic. Nonetheless, we intend to do just that here: introduce the
subject of formal logic by way of a system that is 'like syllogistic logic'. Our
system, like old-fashioned, traditional syllogistic, is a term logic. Our version
of logic ('term-functor logic', TFL) shares with Aristotle's syllogistic the
insight that the logical forms of statements that are involved in inferences as
premises or conclusions can be construed as the result of connecting pairs of
terms by means of a logical copula (functor). This insight contrasts markedly
with that which informs today's standard formal logic ('modern predicate
logic', MPL). That version of logic is due to the work of the great nineteenth
century innovator in logic, Gottlob Frege. His insight concerning the logical
form of statements was inspired by the language of mathematics. It construes
the logical form of statements as the result of functions (incomplete
expressions like 'the square root of. .. ' or ' .. .loves ... ') being completed by the
insertion of the appropriate arguments (name-like expressions such as '2'or
'Romeo' and 'Juliet'). This difference between TFL and MPL is important
because formal logic takes the validity or invalidity of inferences to depend
completely on the forms of the statements making up those inferences. Formal
logic rests on a theory of logical form (syntax).
A second important difference between TFL and MPL is this. Most
of the time when inferences are made we need to pay attention to the forms of
the statements involved. But sometimes, especially when most or all of those
statements are compounds of simpler statements, we can ignore the particular
forms of the statements and concentrate instead on the arrangements of simple
statements used to form the compounds and, ultimately, the inference itself.
The calculus ofMPL which accounts for these kinds of inferences is called
'propositional'. Modern logicians take the logic of unanalyzed statements, the
propositional calculus, to be the foundation of all of MPL. This is why
X
Preface Xl
teachers today begin the introduction of fonnal logic with the propositional
calculus. When Aristotle invented syllogistic, indeed the whole field offormal
logic, in the fourth century B.C. he dealt first and foremost with the logic of
terms, the logic of inferences that depend for their validity on the arrangement
ofterms within their statements. The logic of propositions was only developed
later by Stoic logicians, and then, many centuries later, again by Frege.
Following an inspiration by the great seventeenth century polymath Leibniz,
TFL incorporates the logic of propositions into the logic of terms by
construing entire statements, or propositions, as themselves nothing more than
complex terms. So, where MPL sees propositional logic as 'foundational', or
primary logic, TFL takes the logic of terms as primary.
As it happens, some version ofTFL, either Aristotle's syllogistic or,
later, the Scholastic logicians' revised traditional syllogistic, dominated the
field offonnallogic until the end of the nineteenth century. Yet even by the
beginning of that century logicians had come to agree that traditional
syllogistic logic was inadequate for the analysis of a wide variety of inferences.
When Frege built MPL he offered logicians a system of logic far more
powerful than any system that had gone before it. The power of MPL (its
ability to offer analyses of a wide variety of kinds of inference) coupled with
Frege's claim that the logic could serve as the foundation of mathematics (by
the late nineteenth century mathematicians had become quite worried about the
foundations of their field), insured that it would displace the old logic in short
order. Today the hegemony ofMPL is almost complete. Still, there is a price
to be paid. MPL is indeed powerful, but it is not simple and the logical forms
which it ascribes to statements are remote from their natural language forms.
Traditional formal logic lacked the scope enjoyed by MPL by not being able
to analyze a number of types of inference. Yet it did at least enjoy the double
advantage of (i) being simple to learn and use and (ii) construing the logical
forms of statements as close to their natural language forms. Clearly a system
of fonnal logic which has the power of MPL and the simplicity and
naturalness of traditional logic would provide the best ofboth logical worlds.
Beginning in the late 1960s Fred Sommers set himself the task of
developing a system offormallogic (viz., TFL) that was powerful, natural and
simple. The challenge faced by Sommers in accomplishing this was threefold.
The first was to extend the power of term logic by incorporating into it the
kinds of inferences beyond the powers oftraditionallogic. Those inferences
were of three types: inferences involving statements with relational
expressions, inferences involving statements with singular terms, and
xii An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
inferences involving unanalyzed statements. The second challenge was to offer

a theory oflogical form, or syntax, that was natural in the way that the syntax
ofMPL was not. The third challenge was to provide a symbolic algorithm (a
system of symbols along with rules for manipulating them) much simpler than
the one employed by MPL (viz., 'the first-order predicate calculus with
identity'). During the past three decades Sommers has perfected just such a
system of formal logic. TFL is at least as powerful as MPL, and it is far
simpler and more natural.
The most important factor accounting for the difficulty in learning and
using MPL is its theory of logical form. By requiring statements to be
analyzed as functions completed by arguments it achieves its great power,
construing singular, general, relational, and compound sentences in a uniform
manner. Predicates (like 'is wise' or 'runs'), quantifiers (like 'some' and
'every'), relational expressions (like 'loves' or 'taught'), and 'sentential
connectives' (like 'and', 'only if, or 'not') are all taken to be function
expressions. Proper names ('Socrates', 'Romeo'), personal pronouns ('it',
'they', 'he', 'her', etc.), and entire sentences are all taken to be arguments.
Thus the following sentences can be given a uniform function/argument(s)
analysis.
(1) Socrates is wise

(2) Some philosopher is wise
(3) Romeo loves Juliet
(4) It is cold and it is wet
Symbolically, predicates are symbolized by uppercase letters, proper names

by appropriate lowercase initials, pronouns by lowercase letters at the end of
the alphabet, unanalyzed propositions by lowercase letters near the middle of
the alphabet, and quantifiers by special symbols incorporating the pronouns
for which those quantifiers serve as grammatical antecedents. Function
expressions are written to the left of their arguments. Finally, parentheses are
used as punctuations to ease the reading of formulas. The sentences above are
usually formulated by 'translating' them into the standard symbolic notation.
Thus:
(1.1) Ws
(2.1) (Ex)(Px & Wx)
(3.1) Lrj
Preface xiii
(4.1) c & w
These formulas are unnatural, and the more complex a statement is the farther
its logical form is from its natural language form. A sentence such as 'Every
dog has a master' is first paraphrased as 'Each thing, call it x, is such that if
it is a dog then there exists at least one thing, call it y, such that it is a master
and x has it'. This is finally formulated as: (x)(Dx => (Ey)(My & Hxy)).
Almost any teacher of MPL today will admit that the most difficult thing
students must learn is this process oftranslation. Simple English sentences are
paraphrased into sentences saturated with pronouns and sentential connectives,
which had no place in the original.
TFL requires only the minimum of'regimentation' (paraphrasing into
a standard pattern) before symbolization. Translation is replaced by
'transcription'. This is because the TFL syntax of pairs of connected terms
is close to the grammatical form of most natural language statements. The
symbolic language of TFL is exceptionally easy to learn. All simple terms,
singular, general, relational, are marked by upper-case letters. Unanalyzed
propositions are symbolized by lowercase letters. All terms are either simple
or complex. All complex terms are pairs of connected terms. All unanalyzed
statements are complex terms. All terms are either positive or negative. All
statements are affirmed or denied. All term-pairs are connected by positive or
negative functors. Plus and minus signs(+/-) are used for all of these. As in
arithmetic or algebra, positive signs are often suppressed (compare:
'+3+(+4)=+7', read 'positive 3 added to positive 4 equal positive 7', which is
normally written as '3+4=7', and read as '3 plus 4 equals 7'). Examples of
positive/negative simple terms are 'wise/non-wise' (written: '+W/-W'),
'happy/unhappy' ('+H/-H'), and 'massive/massless' ('+M/-M'). Connective
functors are patrs. of pIuses and mmuses
. (vtz.,
. ' +... + ' , ' +... -' , ' -... - ' , an d ' -
... +'). The first ofthese indicates the quantity(+ for 'some', 'at least one',
etc.; - for 'all', 'every', etc.). The second part of the connective functor
indicates the copula (e.g., 'is', 'are', 'was', 'isn't', 'ain't'). Singular terms are
marked with an asterisk,*. They have 'wild' quantity; they are indifferently
+ or-, (written '±'). Parentheses are used to group pairs of connected terms.
Our sample sentences above would be formulated in TFL as follows.
(1.2) ±S*+W
(2.2) +P+W
(3.2) ±R*+(L±J*)
xiv An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
(4.2) +c+w
Note that unanalyzed statements (as in 4) are connected by the same functors
as other term pairs. This is because such functors only represent relations
with given formal features. Thus, for example, the+ ... + functor is symmetric,
but not reflexive or transitive. These are just the features that guarantee the
validity of such inferences as 'Some philosopher is wise, therefore some wise
(person) is a philosopher' and 'It is cold and it is wet, so it is wet and it is
cold'. From the point of view of 'formal' logic, only these formal features are
of interest.
Another source ofdifficulty for beginning students ofMPL is the large
variety of rules required to adequately construct proofs of valid inferences. In
addition to rules for the propositional calculus, there are rules for eliminating
and for introducing each ofthe quantifiers and for manipulating identities. The
relative naturalness of TFL' s syntax has already given it a degree of
simplicity, which is now augmented by its algorithm for proofs. Since all
formative expressions are plus or minus signs, it is easy to show that proof
amounts to addition and subtraction (this turns out to be the 'cancelling of
middle terms' familiar in traditional syllogistic).
The present text book is intended as a tool for the introduction ofTFL
to the beginning student of logic. It also includes a final chapter introducing
standard MPL. One of the important advantages of coming to formal logic
through TFL is that it makes the subsequent learning ofMPL so much easier.
For TFL provides 'bridging formulas' that ease the usually difficult translation
process that takes natural language statements into MPL formulas. The text
contains several exercise sections and a summary of the main rules, laws and
principles ofTFL. It is designed so that it could be used for self-teaching. But
it is also designed to be used in classrooms as an introductory text for a one-
semester course in formal logic. For those going on to do more mathematical
logic it is an appropriate and (because of the bridging formulas) useful first
text. For the more philosophically oriented it contains extensive discussions
of important issues at the intersections of semantics, metaphysics,
epistemology and logic. There has been much enthusiasm is recent years for
either the replacement or supplementation of courses in formal logic with
courses in informal logic. Much of this enthusiasm is due to disenchantment
with MPL, which is seen as remote from the ways in which we naturally and
ordinarily use our reason and language. In addition, as students arrive at
colleges and universities in larger numbers, with a greater variety of
Preface xv
educational backgrounds and abilities, more of them are enrolled in

introductory logic courses. The rigours of standard mathematical logic are
often beyond the capabilities or interests of many such students. Thus there
is often pressure to 'soften' the blow. We are convinced that mathematical
logic ought to be taught, and taught with the appropriate high degree of formal
rigour. We also believe that those who seek an account of reason which is
more natural and simpler than the one embodied in MPL are right to do so.
But one need not abandon formal logic to achieve this end. TFL represents a
system of logic which is at once formal, rigorous, powerful, effective, natural
and simple.
Just as Sommers is the author of TFL, he is the true author of this
text. It is a sign not only of his innate generosity but of his deep conviction
that logic is more important than any logician that he freely shares his ideas
with no concern for personal renown and little sense of proprietorship.
Sommers began work on the text in the early 1980s and has thoroughly revised
it several times in light of critical suggestions by myself and others, and as the
result of his use of the material in the teaching of introductory logic courses
over several years at Brandeis University. With less patience and judgment,
I have urged completion and publication from the beginning. I have taught
MPL for three decades. I have also used much of the material here in the
teaching of introductory logic courses during the past few years. I have made
use of that experience as well as the results of my own research in logic over
the past quarter century to make some minor modifications and additions to the
text.
There are several people who have been instrumental over the past
several years in helping to clarify the ideas in this book, offering critical
commentaries, providing useful suggestions, or patiently listening to one or
both of the authors go on and on about terms. In addition to the many students
who have served as guinea pigs through those years, particular mention must
be made of Michael Pakaluk, Graeme Hunter, Thomas Hood, Aris Noah,
Philip Peterson, Lome Szabolcsi, George Kennard, William Purdy, Wallace
Murphree and David Kelley.
Note for Instructors:
Some of the material presented in this text deals either with semantic issues or
philosophical issues often deemed beyond the scope of a purely technical
course in symbolic logic. The instructor who wishes to present a streamlined
xvi An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
approach can safely ignore several sections of the text devoted to those less
technical topics. For such a course, we would recommend the omission of the
following sections: Chapter 1, sections 8 through 17; Chapter 2, sections 1
through 7; all of Chapter 4; Chapter 6, sections 8 and 9 are optional; Chapter
7, sections 16 and 17.
George Englebretsen
Lennoxville, Quebec
1 Reasoning
1. Introduction
A normal adult possesses information stored in memory in the form of

statements like 'Socrates taught Plato', 'Frenchmen eat frog legs', 'my brother
is taller than I am' and so forth. Some of the statements in our memory are
false but most are true. In any case our ability to retrieve information from the
stock of statements we believe to be true is useful to us in countless ways. A
good memory is a distinct advantage in life. But just as important is our ability
to reason with the information we have. We reason by using one or more of
the stored statements as premises to derive another statement, a conclusion,
which may not previously have been thought of but which may now be added
to the store of information in our possession. Logic is the science that studies
reasoning. It shows how to reason well and how to distinguish bad reasoning
from good reasoning. A unit of reasoning is called an argument or inference.
An argument consists of one or more premises together with the conclusion
that has been drawn from them. Any argument is either valid or invalid.
When an argument is valid, its conclusion is said to follow from or to be
entailed by its premises.
As an example of arguing from a single premise to a conclusion,
suppose that, knowing of your interest in women's achievements, a friend asks
you whether any woman has been a British Prime Minister. Let us say that
your memory contains the statement
(S 1) Some Prime Minister was a woman.
Applying your reasoning capability you will take S 1 as a premise and

immediately (perhaps even automatically and unconsciously) derive the
conclusion:
(S2) Some woman was a Prime Minister.
1
2 An Invitation to Formal Reasoning
Let us call your argument 'A 1':
AI: S 1. Some Prime Minister was a woman.

I S2. some woman was a Prime Minister.
(The forward stroke sign should be read as 'therefore' or 'hence'.) You offer
S2 to your friend as the answer to his question. Note that S2 may not actually
have been in your memory. However, since S2 is entailed by Sl, you can now
add it to your store of information.
Al is an example of immediate inference. In immediate inference the
conclusion is drawn from a single premise. Reasoning like this takes place very
quickly, and usually without the conscious application of a technique for
deriving conclusions from premises. But a great deal of reasoning is done
carefully and reflectively and in many cases by deliberately using a method
that has to be learned. Consider an example taken from a book on logic written
by Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland. Carroll asks the reader
to draw a conclusion from the following premises:
(1) Babies are illogical.

(2) Nobody is despised who can manage a crocodile.
(3) Illogical persons are despised.
Here one must reflect a bit before coming up with the conclusion Carroll has
in mind:
(4) No baby can manage a crocodile.
The whole sequence of four statements is an argument. The first three

statements are its premises. The fourth is its conclusion.
The next Carroll example is more complicated; in solving it we are
well advised not to rely on our unaided wits; it is the sort of problem that is
best approached with a logical method or technique for solving just this sort
of problem.
(1) Everything not absolutely ugly, may be kept in a drawing-room.

(2) Nothing that is encrusted with salt is ever quite dry.
(3) Nothing should be kept in a drawing room unless it is free from damp.
(4) Bathing-machines are always kept near the sea.
(5) Nothing that is made of mother-of-pearl can be absolutely ugly.
Reasoning 3
(6) Whatever is kept near the sea gets encrusted with salt.
Here mere reflection may get one confused and we are better off not relying on
our wits but on a mechanical procedure for drawing conclusions from
premises. We will later learn how to do this example by representing the six
premises as algebraic expressions that can be added like numbers to derive the
conclusion in a mechanical way. By using this technique you will be able to do
examples that look fairly complicated very quickly and surely.
When one applies the algebraic method to the six premises given by Carroll,
one derives the conclusion:
(7) No bathing-machine is made of mother of pearl.
(This too is Carroll's conclusion; he arrives at it by using a method quite

similar to ours.)
For the moment we have no method for drawing conclusions from
premises. So we shall leave Carroll's droll arguments for later consideration.
In learning logic, as in other fields of exact knowledge, we are better advised
to begin by attending first to simple easy-to-follow examples. So let us look
again at the simple example of reasoning, AI, where we moved from SI as
premise to S2 as the conclusion. AI is a typical example of how we use a truth
that we have stored in memory to derive a new truth that we have not (yet)
stored. Now it may seem that the move from S I to S2 is trivial. In fact, even
in so simple a case as AI, the practical value of being able to infer a new truth
from the truths we have at our immediate disposal is enormous. Thus suppose
you did not know whether either S I or S2 is true. To find out about S I one
need only take a casual glance at the biographies of the British Prime
Ministers. There are only nine of these and the biographies are publicly
available. Anyone taking the trouble to do this will quickly discover that at
least one of them (viz., Margaret Thatcher) is a woman. Having learned that
S I is true we should now infer the truth of S2 as well. In this way we get to
know about S2 indirectly. We get to S2 by deriving it from Sl.
But suppose we were somehow incapal1le of reasoning in the manner
of AI. We should then be forced to approach the question of the truth of S2
directly, in the same way we learned about the truth Sl. A direct approach
would require us to examine the biographies of all woman to see whether any
woman was a Prime Minister. Of course this is a practical impossibility. In
effect, if we were unable to reason in the manner of AI, we could not arrive
at the truth of S2 at all. Clearly the only sensible and practical way ofleaming
that S2 is true is indirectly: by way of inferring S2 from S 1. And in fact that

is how we do it: S 1 is our starting point and anyone who knows that S1 is true
will unconsciously and immediately infer S2 from S 1.
2. The Form of an Argument
S 1 and S2 are converses of one another. Our confidence in the move from S 1
to its converse, S2, is due to the confidence we have in the general pattern of
reasoning where we move from one statement taken as premise to its converse.
Conversion is a valid form or pattern of reasoning. Let us call this pattern F 1.
F1: someXisaY
I some Y is an X
(Here again, the stroke sign is read as 'hence' or 'therefore.') F1 is also the
pattern of the following argument:
A2: S3 Some member of the Armed Services Committee is a Southerner.

I S4 Some Southerner is a member of the Armed Services Committee.
A2, like A1, is of form F1 and we have confidence in any argument of that
form. F 1 is an abstract pattern of reasoning and any argument that fits this
form is called an instance of this pattern. Thus A1 and A2 are instances ofF 1
and so is A3:
A3 some farmer is a noncitizen

I some noncitizen is a farmer
3. A Word About the Form of Statements
Every argument consists of two or more statements (a conclusion and one or

more premises). Each statement within the argument has a form and the
argument as a whole has a form. To reveal the form of a statement we simply
replace its terms by 'place holder' letters like 'X' and 'Y'. A place holder
letter does not stand for a term; it merely occupies the places that a term or
Reasoning 5
letter that stands for a term occupies. For example, by putting 'X' in place of
'ape' and 'Y' in place of 'genius' we show that 'some ape is a genius' has the
form 'some X is a Y'. If we do this systematically to each statement of an
argument, the form of the whole argument stands revealed. For example, the
arguments Al, A2, and A3 are then revealed as all being instances of the
argument form F 1.
The form of the following argument
every cat is a feline

no feline is a herbivore
I no cat is a herbivore
is:
every X is a Y
no Yis aZ
I no X is aZ
Another instance of an argument of this form is
every Greek is a philosopher

no philosopher is a vampire
I no Greek is a vampire
4. The Form of Singular Statements
In a statement like 'A president of the United States slept here' the expression
'president of the United States' is being used as a general term. There are
many presidents. And when 'president' is used as a general term, it may denote
many individuals. But in some uses it denotes no more than one individual.
So used 'president' is a uniquely denoting term (UDT). An example is
'President' as it occurs in 'The President is tired'. Proper names are almost
always used in a uniquely denoting way. Thus 'Garbo' in 'Garbo was lonely'
is a UDT. On the other hand, it is not a UDT in 'Roseanne Barr is no Garbo'.
We refer to UDTs as singular terms. A statement whose subject term is
singular (e.g., 'Garbo is beautiful', 'The President is tired') is called a
singular statement. Statements with general terms in subject position

(e.g., 'some presidents are funny') are general statements. In a statement like
'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' both terms are singular. Such statements
are called 'identities'.
The difference between a singular and a general statement is semantic;
it lies solely in the difference in the terms and not in the forms of the
statements. Consider the two sentences
i) Garbo was laughing.

ii) Children were laughing.
Though (i) is singular and (ii) is general, they have the same form. 'Garbo
was laughing' has the form 'Some X* is Y' while 'Children were laughing' has
the form 'some X is Y'. (We mark UDT occurrence by affixing a star to ·the
letter.) From a strictly logical point of view 'Garbo was laughing' should be
'some Garbo was laughing'. In practice that is not done. For we know that
whenever 'some Garbo is P' is true, 'every Garbo is P' will also be true (there
being only one person who is Garbo). Since 'some Garbo is P' entails 'every
Garbo is P' we do not bother to use either 'some ' or 'every' before 'Garbo'.
Generally, whenever N* is a proper name, we use the form 'N* is P' and not
'some N* is P'. Nevertheless, for the purpose of seeing how singular
sentences function inside of arguments, their form must be made explicit. As
speakers ofEnglish we are content to say 'Garbo is laughing'; as logicians we
need to represent this as 'some Garbo* is laughing' a statement that entails
'every Garbo* is laughing'.
******************************************************************
Exercises:
I. What is the form of the following arguments? (use X,Y Z)

1. All geographers are patriots. /All patriots are geographers.
2. No geographers are logicians. /No logicians are geographers.
3. Some nonvoters are citizens. /Some citizens are nonvoters.
4. All citizens are patriots, Some natives are citizens. /Some natives
are patriots.
5. Bill Clinton is the President. I The President is Bill Clinton. (hint:
The premise has the form 'some X* is Y*'.)
Reasoning 7
6. Only Garbo is laughing. (hint: Only X is Y can be construed as 'no

non-X is Y'. Remember too that 'Garbo' is a UDT.)
II. Give two instances for each of the following argument forms.
1. no X is Y I no Y is X
2. some X is Y I some Y is X
3. all X are Y, no Yare Z I no X are Z
4. every Y is non-X* I no non-X* is Y
******************************************************************
5. Terms and Statements
Every statement consists of two kinds of components. Elementary statements

consist of terms and expressions that join them, called term connectives. For
example, 'some women are farmers' consists of the terms 'women' and
'farmer' and the term connective 'some ... are .. .'. Compound statements
consist of component statements and expressions that join them called
statement connectives. For example the compound statement 'if every person
is mortal then some accidents will be fatal' has as its components the two
elementary statements, 'every person is mortal' and 'some accidents will be
fatal' joined by the statement connective 'if.. then .. '.
The terms of an elementary statement are its 'material' components;
they carry its matter or content. The term connective is the 'formative'
component; it determines the form of the statement. An elementary· statement
is either universal or particular in form. For example, 'every logician is a
charmer', is universal, being ofthe form 'every X is Y'. 'Some logician is a
charmer', which is ofthe form 'some X is Y', is a particular statement.
In a compound statement, the component statements are the material
elements and the statement connective that joins them is the formative element.
Statements of the form 'ifx then y' are called 'conditionals'; those of the form
'x andy' are called 'conjunctions'.
(The distinction between material and formative components was first
drawn by medieval logicians; they called material expressions 'categorematic',
contrasting them to the formative expressions, which they called
'syncategorematic'. Medieval logicians also used the vowels 'a' and 'i' to
represent the term connectives in universal and particular statements. Thus a
statement of form 'every X is Y' was represented as 'YaX' while 'some X is

Y' was represented as 'YiX' .)
In the case of some arguments, called propositional arguments, the
material elements are whole statements and the formative elements are
'statement connectives'. In dealing with propositional arguments we may
ignore the internal form and content of the component statements. The
following is an example of a propositional argument:
A4: some roses are red and no violets are yellow

I no violets are yellow and some roses are red
Let 'p' stand for 'some roses are red' and let 'q' stand for 'no violets are
yellow'. Herethestatements, 'p' and 'q', arethematerialelements. They are
joined by the statement connective 'and'. Al may be represented as 'p and q
lq and p'. We call 'p' and 'q' 'statement letters' . Unlike term letters, which
are formulated using upper case letters, statement letters make use of lower
case.
The form of A4 is
F4: xandy
ly andx
where x and y stand for any two statements. Clearly any propositional
argument of the form F4 is valid no matter what statements we substitute for
x andy. Thus the following instance ofF4 is valid:
A5: some barbers are not Greeks and some Greeks are not barbers
I some Greeks are not barbers and some barbers are not Greeks
Let 'r' be the statement 'some barbers are not Greeks' and 's' be the statement
'some Greeks are not barbers'. Then we may represent A5 as
'r and s I s and r'.
The statements in A5 are different in form and content from the
statements in A4. But that does not matter since those differences play no part
in the argument which is concerned simply with the move from a conjunction
of the form 'x and y' to one of the form 'y and x'. Paying no attention to the
internal form of the statements involved, we recognize that A4 and A5 are
Reasoning 9
instances of the same general form: x andy I y and x. And any instance ofF4
is valid.
Another example of an argument whose validity is not due to the
internal form of its component statements is
A6: if there is smoke then there is fire

I if there is no fire then there is no smoke
A6 is an instance of the general form:
F2: ifx then y

I if not y then not x
Here too we may replace x and y by any two statements of whatever internal
form and content and the result will be a valid argument. Statements of form
'x andy' and 'ifx then y' are called compound statements since they contain
two or more component statements joined together by 'and' or 'if... then' or
some other formative statement connective. Arguments involving compound
statements are the subject of a special branch of logic called Statement Logic
(also called Propositional Logic).
When the components statements are joined by 'and', the compound
statement is called a conjunction and the two components are called
'conjuncts'; an example is 'roses are red and violets are blue'. Suppose that
'p' and 'q' stand for the respective conjuncts. Then one common way to write
'roses are red and violets are blue' in logical language is to use a symbol to
stand for the English word 'and'. Thus we may use '&' to represent 'and'
and then represent the conjunction as 'p&q'. But another way is to use
algebraic operators like '+' for the statement connective. We should then
represent the conjunction as 'p+q'. The algebraic way is called a
'transcription' of the English sentence. We shall later find that the algebraic
way oftranscribing English sentences makes it especially easy to 'reckon' with
them logically.
6. Symbolizing Compound Statements
We have been using upper case letters to stand for terms. We shall always use
lower cases letters to stand for whole statement. For example, we may let 'p'
stands for 'Socrates was executed', 'q' for 'Plato died in his sleep' and 'r' for
'Aristotle went into exile'. We may then form compound statements which
have the elementary statements 'p', 'q' and 'r' as components. For example,
we may use 'p', 'q' and 'r' to form such compound statements as 'p and q'
(symbolically written 'p & q'), 'ifp then q' (which we symbolize as 'p => q'),
'p or q' (symbolized as 'p v q', 'We then read 'p & (q v r)' as 'p and q orr'
and we write 'ifp then (q and r)' as 'p => (q & r)'. In symbolically representing
any compound statement we adhere to the convention of using lower case
letters to represent the component statements.
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
Using the symbols'-' for 'not,'&' for 'and','=>' for 'ifthen", 'v' for 'or' we
represent some common propositional statements thus:
notp -p
pandq p&q
ifp then q p=>q
p orq pvq
rand (p orq) r&(pvq)
(randp)orq (r&p)vq
ifp and q then r (p&q)=>r
if not p then q -p ;:) q
Using the above symbols for the statement connectives, represent the following
compound statements in the language of 'symbolic logic':
1. not-p orr
2. ifp then not-r
3. p ornot-p
4. q and (ifr then s)
5. s or not(q and r)
6. if not either p or q then r
7. p or not (q and r)
8. not (p and (q or not-r))
9. (not-p and q) or not-r
10. p and (a and (rands))
Reasoning 11
11. if neither p nor q then not r

12. not (if p then not q) and either p or r
******************************************************************
7. A Word About Validity
An argument whose conclusion follows from its premises is called valid. When
an argument is valid and its premises are true its conclusion must also be true.
Whether an argument is valid or not, depends on its form. Most forms of
argument are invalid. When an argument form is valid, none ofits instances
have true premises and a false conclusion. When an argument form is
invalid, it will be possible to find an argument of that form that has true
premises but a false conclusion. An argument whose premises are true and
whose conclusion is false is clearly invalid. Producing one invalid instance
shows that all instances of that form are invalid. F1, above, is an example of
a valid argument form: it has no invalid instances. But consider
F3: some X is not a Y

I some Y is not an X
Now it might seem to us that F3 is a valid argument form. But if it

is a valid argument form then we should never be able to find an argument of
form F3 whose premise is true but whose conclusion is false. If we can find
but a single invalid instance ofF3, that would be conclusive evidence that all
arguments of form F3 are invalid. So we look for an invalid instance and after
some thought we could come up with the following argument:
A7: some horse isn't a colt

I some colt isn't a horse
The conclusion of A7 is false even though its premise is true. So A7 is invalid.

But A7 is an instance of F3. And this shows that F3 is an invalid argument
form. We call A7 a 'refuting instance' ofF3. Once we find a single refuting
instance of an argument form we immediately lose confidence in all of its
instances. For example, the following argument, A8, is also invalid:
AS: some Greek is not a philosopher

I some philosopher is not a Greek
Admittedly, AS looks like a good argument. But appearances are deceptive; the
conclusion of AS does not follow from its premise. It is after all logically
possible for its premise to be true and its conclusion false. For we may imagine
a period in history when no one but a Greek is a philosopher, in which case
'some philosopher is not a Greek' is false even though 'some Greek is not a
philosopher' is true. But we need not bother to imagine this. For we know that
AS is invalid since it is an instance ofF3 and the validity ofF3 was refuted by
A7.
Thus F3 and Fl are different. Unlike F3, Fl is a valid form of
argument and all of its instances are valid. And this means that given any two
statements of form 'some X is a Y' and 'some Y is an X', we may be sure that
if one of them is true so is the other. In other words we can never find an
instance Fl whose premise is true and whose conclusion is false. Let us look
also at a third argument form:
F5: no X is a Y
/no Yis an X
F5, like Fl, is a valid argument form: no matter what terms we choose for X
and Y, no matter what situations we imagine, we shall never find a refuting
instance of form F3. In this respect F5 is like Fl and unlike F3. But now the
question arises: what makes us so sure that Fl and F5 are valid forms? How
do we know that we could 'never' find refuting instances for Fl or F5? After
all, F3 also looked like a good way to reason yet we found it to be invalid.
Why should we have more confidence in Fl and F5?
We here touch on some fundamental issues in logic. Some statements
entail one another, so that if one is true the other must also be true. What are
statements, and how are they tied in this way? One approach to logic is by
way of the concept of truth. 'What is truth?' When a statement is true, what
is it about the world that makes it true? To answer such questions we must
explain how the terms in a statement are related to things in the world and how
the statement itself is related to the world as a whole.
Reasoning 13
8. How Material Expressions are Meaningful
A statement that has whole statements (represented by lower case letters) as

its components is compound and these component statements are its material
elements. The material elements of an elementary statement are its terms.
Terms and statements are the two basic kinds of material expressions.
A material expression (a term or a statement) is meaningful in three
ways:
1. It expresses a sense or characterization.

2. It denotes something to which the characterization applies.
3. It signifies a characteristic, property or attribute.
9. Terms
We first discuss terms. (1) The term 'farmer', for example, expresses the
description or characterization, BEING A FARMER. We call BEING A
FARMER the sense or expressive meaning of 'farmer'. {2) 'In a sentence
like 'a farmer was going into the bam' the term 'farmer' denotes an individual
to whom the characterization BEING A FARMER applies. (3) 'Farmer'
signifies the characteristic or attribute, being a farmer, that any farmer
possesses. The attribute signified by a term is called its 'significance'. For
example, being wise or wisdom is the significance of 'wise'.
Note the distinction between the characterization that describes a
thing and the characteristic that the thing itself possesses when we correctly
describe it. We adopt the practice of writing the characterization in upper case
letters and the characteristic in lower case letters. We say that a term
expresses a characterization and that it signifies a characteristic. For
example, the term 'wise', will be said to express the characterization BEING
WISE and to signify the corresponding characteristic of being wise or wisdom.
The characterization BEING WISE is said to be 'true of any individual that
possesses the characteristic ofwisdom.
A term denotes a thing only if the characterization it expresses is true
of that thing. In the statement 'someone wise advised me' the term 'wise',
which expresses BEING WISE, denotes an individual that possesses the
characteristic (being wise, wisdom) that 'wise' signifies. The characterization,
BEING WISE, and the characteristic, being wise, correspond to one another.
Let '[wise]' represent the characterization BEING WISE and let '<wise>'
represent the characteristic of wisdom that any wise person possesses. Then
'wise' expresses [wise] and signifies <wise> and what 'wise' expresses
corresponds to what it signifies. Also [wise] correctly describes (is true of)
whoever is wise. And generally, if'#' is a term, the characteristic ,<#>, that
a #-thing possesses is said to correspond to the characterization, [#], that
characterizes (is true of) the #-thing.
10. Some Terms are 'Vacuous'
A term like 'mermaid', 'flying saucer' or 'woman who will love living on
Pluto' does not fail to express a characterization. But it may fail to denote.
Terms that fail to denote are called vacuous. Consider the term 'mermaid! in
the statement 'a mermaid lives in the bay'. The sense or expressive meaning
of 'mermaid' is BEING A MERMAID. The characterization expressed does
not characterize anyone since no one possesses the characteristic of being a
mermaid. Thus 'mermaid' fails to denote anyone or anything.
Proper name terms are usually not vacuous. But some do express
characterizations that characterize no one. There is an ancient tradition that
a hero called Theseus founded the city of Athens. Suppose that Theseus was
only a legendary figure and that no such person as Theseus ever existed. In
that case no one ever possessed the characteristic of being Theseus and
'Theseus' fails to denote anyone. All the same, 'Theseus' has a sense; it
expresses the characterization of BEING THESEUS, a characterization that
is not true of anyone but which nevertheless is the expressive meaning of
'Theseus'.
A vacuous term such as 'Theseus' or 'mermaid' is analogous to a
statue of Theseus or a picture of a mermaid. The term 'mermaid' denotes no
one. Similarly, the picture does not portray a mermaid (in the sense of
'portray' that a photo taken of a bridesmaid at my cousin's wedding is a
portait of the bridesmaid). Nevertheless, the mermaid picture (like the term
'mermaid') is representational. We all understand what the picture means; as
it were, the picture 'expresses'BEING A MERMAID. Similarly, the
expressive meaning of the term 'mermaid' is understood by most speakers of
English. In that sense what 'mermaid' means is something public and
objective. We all 'grasp' it. (Considered as an object of understanding that
we all grasp, the sense of a term is called a 'concept'.) We may put the matter
Reasoning 15
this way: The characterization expressed by any term (even one that is
vacuous) exists as a 'concept'. Thus every meaningful term expresses a sense
(or concept) and no term is expressively vacuous. (This doctrine, that concepts
exist, is called Conceptual Realism.)
No meaningful term is expressively vacuous. What about
signification? Can a term be vacuous by signifying nothing? Some persons
are kind, others are cruel. But nobody is perfect. So there is kindness and there
is cruelty but no perfection. If nobody is perfect, nothing possesses the
characteristic of being perfect. What is the status of a characteristic like
<perfect> that nobody possesses? There is an ancient dispute about
characteristics that nothing possesses. Some philosophers and logicians, called
Platonic Realists, follow Plato in holding that a characteristic <X> exists even
if there are no X -things so that nothing or no one possesses <X>. Others
(among them, the authors of this text who are Conceptual Realists but not
Platonic Realists) deny this. They hold that a term like 'mermaid' or 'perfect'
expresses a characterization but it fails to signify any characteristic. For there
is no such thing as perfection and no such characteristic as being a mermaid.
(On the other hand, there are such things as BEING A MERMAID and
BEING PERFECT. For example, these meanings are expressed by the two
terms in 'no mermaid is perfect'.) According to this view (which we shall
'officially' adopt) a term, 'T', will always express a sense or characterization,
[T], but ifthere are noT-things, then there will be no characteristic <T> for
'T' to signify. Thus 'mermaid' is expressively meaningful; it expresses
BEING A MERMAID but it lacks both denotation and significance. We noted
earlier that when a term lacks denotation we call it 'vacuous'. The non-
Platonist philosopher believes that 'mermaid' is doubly vacuous: not only
does it fail to denote, it also fails to signify.
Using the square brackets for the characterizations and the angle
brackets for the characteristics, we summarize the above account of the
meaning of terms.
If 'T' is a term, then

1. 'T' expresses [T] or BEING T.
If there are T -things then
2. 'T' denotes T things,
3. 'T' signifies <T>, the attribute ofT-ness or being T,
4. [T] corresponds to <T>.
5. [T] characterizes (is true of) some T thing
If nothing is T, then 'T' is doubly vacuous because
6. 'T' fails to denote aT thing.

7. 'T' fails to signify, (there being no such thing as <T>).
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Give the sense and significance of the following terms:

Examples:
'pious (person)'
sense: BEING (A) PIOUS (PERSON),
significance: being pious, piety
'logician'
sense: BEING A LOGICIAN
significance: being a logician
1. bridesmaid
2. red (thing)
3. unmarried
ll. Repeat example I, using the bracket notation for the sense and significance
of terms.
Example:
'pious'
sense: [pious]
significance: <pious>
Ill. Which of the following terms lacks denotation and significance?

bridesmaid
mermaid
sea cow
sea squirrel
N. To what attributes, if any, do the following characterizations correpond?

BEING A BACHELOR
BEING A MARRIED BACHELOR
BEING A MERMAID
******************************************************************
Reasoning 17
11. Statement Meaning
Statements and terms are the two basic kinds of material expressions. Terms
are used for characterizing things in the world. Statements are used for
characterizing the world itself. We use lower case letters to represent
statements. Like a term, a statement, 's', has three modes of meaning: (1) it
expresses a sense or characterization, [s]. (What a statement expresses is
called a proposition); (2) it denotes the world characterized by the proposition
it expresses and (3) it signifies a characteristic of the world. (The
characteristic, <s>, signified by a statement is called afact.)
By definition, a statement is an utterance that is being used for saying
something. And 'what is said' or expressed is a proposition. The proposition
expressed may or may not characterize the world. If it does, the proposition is
called true. If it does not, the proposition is false.
Calling a statement true is a convenient shorthand way of saying that
it expresses a true proposition. Not all utterances are statements but no
utterance that is a statement can fail to express a proposition. Since every
statement expresses a proposition that is either true or false, every statement
is itself said to be true or false.
How is the world characterized? What are its characteristics? We
may think of the world as a collection or totality of things. (Here 'thing' is
used in its widest sense to apply to whatever may be said to be present in the
world including such things as London, The President of the United States,
snow, hurricanes, pollution, wisdom, democracies and friendship.) Any
totality, be it large or small, finite or infinite, is basically characterized by what
is present in it and by what is absent from it. We may speak of such
characterizations as 'existential'. Consider the collection of things now lying
on your desk. Assume that the constituents of this little totality include a pen,
ink, a lamp, a notebook and nothing else. Among the infinity of things not in
this totality are horses, mermaids, envelopes, screwdrivers, etc. Suppose we
call a totality ' {Q} ish' if it has a Q thing as a constituent and 'un {Q} ish' if it
has no Q constituent. We may then existentially characterize the totality of
things on your desk by saying that it is {pen} ish, {ink} ish, {lamp} ish and
{notebook} ish. But negative characterizations are also true of it: for example,
the little totality can be characteritzed negatively by saying that it is
un {horse} ish, un {screwdriver} ish, etc.
Any statement is a truth claim. Looking into a drawer I say 'there is
no screwdriver', thereby claiming that the little totality under consideration,
whose constituents are the objects in the drawer, is un {srewdriver} ish. We call
the totality of things under consideration when a given statement is made or

when a given argument is presented 'the domain of the claim' (DC). Logicians
sometimes refer to the DC as 'the universe of discourse'. Very often the
totality under consideration is the whole world. For example, in asserting
'some women are farmers' one expresses the characterization SOME
WOMEN BEING FARMERS or BEING {WOMAN FARMER}ISH,
claiming (correctly) that this characterizes the contemporaneous world. In
what follows we shall assume that the DC of a statement is the world. Here
are some existential characterizations (propositions) that are true of the world
at this time:
BEING {WOMAN FARMER} ISH (that some women are farmers)

BEING {ELK} ISH (that there are elks)
BEING UN{ELF}ISH (that there are no elves)
BEING UN{MERMAID}ISH (that there are no mermaids)
If we use the bracket notation to represent what a statement expresses, then a

statement, 's', expresses the proposition [s]. For example, 'some women are
farmers' expresses the proposition [some women are farmers] and 'there are
no mermaids' expresses [there are no mermaids]. Using the convention of
upper case letters for representing characterizations, we can also write
'BEING {ELK}ISH' as 'THE EXISTENCE OF ELKS' and 'BEING
{MERMAID} ISH' as 'THE EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS'. As it happens
that there are mermaids does not correctly characterize the world. Note that
our upper case convention does not extend to the form 'that s'. Thus we say
that 'there are elks' expresses the proposition that there are elks. Equivalently
we could say it expresses the proposition BEING {ELK} ISH, THERE BEING
ELKS, THE EXISTENCE OF ELKS.
To every true characterization there corresponds a characteristic ofthe
world. Consider the statement, 'there are elks'. This statement expresses the
true proposition that there are elks, a proposition that is true of the world
because of the presence of elks, an existential characteristic of the world. In
general, a totality that has a Q constituent has the characteristic of
{Q}ishness. That is to say, the existence (or presence) of a Q thing
({Q}ishness) is a (constitutive or 'existential') characteristic ofthe totality.
If the world is Q-ish, then BEING {Q}ISH (the proposition expressed by
'there are Q things') corresponds to being Q-ish or {Q}ishness (a world
characteristic). Consider 'there are no K things'. If the totality is un {K} ish,
then it is characterized by the nonexistence ofK things (by un{K}ishness, by
Reasoning 19
being un{K}ish). The proposition that there are no K things then corresponds
to the un{K}ishness of the world.
Un{elf}ishness (the nonexistence of elves) is a negative existential
characteristic ofthe world; {elk}ishness (the existence of elks) is a positive
existential characteristic of the world. A more familiar term for a positive or
negative world characteristic is 'fact'. The existence of elks ( {elk}ishness) is
a positive fact; the nonexistence of elves (un{elf}ishness) is a negative fact.
12. Truth and Correspondence to Facts
The world's existential characteristics constitute the facts. Facts are what
make true propositions true. A world characterization is true (or true of the
world) if it corresponds to a characteristic of the world. Each of the above
characterizations corresponds to an existential characteristic of the world. For
example, the existence of women farmers ( {women farmer} ishness), is the fact
that corresponds to and confers truth on such characterizations as SOME
WOMEN BEING FARMERS, BEING {WOMAN FARMER}ISH, THE
EXISTENCE OF WOMEN FARMERS, THERE BEING WOMEN
FARMERS, {WOMEN FARMER}ISHNESS, and that there are women
farmers, which are all different but equivalent expressions standing for [some
women are farmers], the proposition expressed by 'some women are farmers'.
A statement that expresses a true proposition is true. Since [some women are
farmers] corresponds to <some women are farmers>, it is a true proposition
and the statement expressing it is a true statement. A proposition (and the
statement that expresses it) is false if the proposition does not correspond to
any characteristic of the world. For example, SOME THING BEING AN
ELF is a false characterization that does not correspond to any fact, there
being no such fact as {elf}ishness.
Among the world's existential characteristics (facts) are the following:
the existence of horses; {horse} ishness, being {horse} ish

the nonexistence of elves; un {elf} ishness, being un {elf} ish
the existence of women farmers; {woman farmer}ishness
the existence of elks; {elk} ishness
the nonexistence of mermaids; un{mermaid}ishness
Using the angle bracket notation for the facts that are characteristics
of the world, we represent the fact signified by 'there are elks' by '<there are
elks>' and the fact signified by 'there are no elves' by '<there are no elves>'.
This negative fact, <there are no elves> corresponds to the proposition that
there are no elves, making it true.
******************************************************************
Exercises:
What fact makes the following true:
1. that there are no mermaids

answer: the nonexistence of mermaids
2. THERE BEING RICH BACHELORS

answer: ?
3. that some even number is prime

answer: the existence of
4. [Bertrand Russell did not write Waverly]

answer:< ? >
5. that no pope is female
answer: the nonexistence of ?
******************************************************************
13. Propositions
Generally, any statement 's' expresses as its sense the proposition that s.
(which we symbolically represent as '[s]'). The form 'that s' is so common a
way oftalking about the sense of's' that we continue to use lower case letters
for it. For example, in asserting 'some women are farmers' we claim that
SOME WOMEN BEING FARMERS obtains, (is a true characterization of
the world). Equivalently we are claiming truth for the proposition that some
women are farmers. As it happens, the existence of women farmers is a fact;
[some women are farmers] corresponds to the fact <some women are fanners>.
So [some women are farmers] is a true proposition.
Reasoning 21
Just as the proposition, [s], expressed by a statement 's' can be spoken

of in different ways, so the fact, <s>, that 's' signifies, can be spoken of in
different ways. Here are some of the ways we may speak of the fact that some
women are farmers.
some women being farmers

the existence of women farmers
{woman farmer} ishness
the state of affairs in which some women are farmers
All these phrases are equivalent ways of talking about one and the same fact:
the existence of women farmers.
We have now shown how to answer the question: What is there about
the world that makes a true statement true? Consider any statement of form
'some thing is a Q thing'. Ifthe world is characterized by {Q}ishness, the
statement signifies a fact that corresponds to its sense. That fact --the existence
of a Q thing-makes the statement true. If the world is un{Q}ish, the statement
is false; in that case un {Q} ishness is a fact and the contradictory statement 'no
thing is a Q thing' is true.
Consider again the true statement 'there are no mermaids'. This
statement expresses the true negative proposition that there are no mermaids.
Equivalently, we may think of the proposition expressed as a STATE OF
AFFAIRS: THE NONEXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS. The proposition is true
(the STATE obtains) because un{mermaid}ishness, a negative existential
characteristic of the world is a fact. This fact, which is signified by 'there are
no mermaids', makes the proposition true. And that in tum means that the
statement expressing it is true.
14. 'States of Affairs'
We commonly speak of a statement as expressing a 'state of affairs'. Here one

should distinguish between STATES that are expressed and the states that are
signified. What a statement expresses is a proposition or STATE OF
AFFAIRS, what it signifies, if anything, is a fact or state of affairs (lower
case). False statements express STATES but they do not signify states. For
example, THE EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS is the STATE OF AFFAIRS
expressed by 'there are mermaids'. But there is no such state of affairs as the
existence of mermaids. So THE EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS does not
obtain. (A STATE that corresponds to a state characterizes the world and is

said to 'obtain'.)
15. The facts and the FACTS
Here again we distinguish between an upper and lower case meaning of a key
word. In its primary meaning the word 'fact' denotes an existential
characteristic of the world but 'fact' is also often used as a synonym for 'true
proposition' or STATE OF AFFAIRS that obtains. Taken as a synonym for
'true proposition' the word 'fact' should be written in upper case. For
example, that some farmers are women is a true proposition; we may call this
proposition a FACT. FACTS are true of the world. That there are mermaids
(The EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS) is not a FACT. On the other hand; the
NONEXISTENCE of MERMAIDS, that there are no mermaids, is a FACT
or true proposition. The nonexistence of mermaids is a fact (lower case). This
fact is a negative existential characteristic of the world. FACTS correspond
to, are made true by, facts.
16. What Statements Denote
Suppose I am at the zoo and say 'that elk keeps staring at me'. The
nonvacuous term 'elk' signifies the characteristic of being an elk and it
denotes something that has the characteristic signified. Just as non-vacuous
terms denote what they characterize so do true statements. A true statement
such as 'there are elks' signifies a (positive, existential) characteristic of the
world ( {elk} ishness) and it too denotes something that has the signified
characteristic. Since it is the world that possesses the characteristic of
{elk} ishness, the statement 'there are elks' denotes the world. A true negative
statement such as 'there are no elves' signifies a (negative existential)
characteristic of the world (its un{elf}ishness) and it too denotes what has the
signified characteristic. Thus 'there are elks' and 'there are no elves' signify
different facts but both denote one and the same world. The false statement
'there are elves' expresses a characterization ({ELF} ISHNESS) but, like the
vacuous term, 'elf', the statement denotes nothing and signifies nothing.
True statements signify positive or negative facts. Facts differ from
one another. All true statements denote one and the same world. As for false
statements, they have expressive meaning but apart from that they are vacuous.
Reasoning 23
17. Summary and Discussion on the Meaning of Statements
If 's' is a statement then

1. 's' expresses [s] (the proposition that s)
If [s] is true of the world, then <s>, a fact, is an existential
characteristic of the world and
2. 's' signifies <s>,
3. [s] corresponds to <s>,
4. [s] 'obtains', is true, is a FACT,
5. 's' denotes the world,
6. 's' is true.
If there is no such fact as <s> then
1* [s] does not correspond to any fact,
2* [s] does not obtain, is false, is not a FACT,
3* 's' does not denote the world,
4 * 's' does not signify a fact,
5* 's' is false.
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
I. What proposition or STATE OF AFFAIRS is expressed by each of the

following statements? What fact or state (if any) does it signify? What, if
anything does it denote? (The answers to (1) and (2) are given by way of
illustration.)
1. no senator is a citizen:
expresses TilE NONEXISTENCE OF SENATORS WHO ARE CITIZENS
claiming that it obtains. But it fails to signify a fact. (An equally good answer
is: ( 1) expresses the proposition that there are no senators who are citizens but
this proposition does not correspond to any state of affairs and so ( 1) is false
and it does not denote the world.
2. some waiters are not friendly:

expresses the proposition that some waiters are not friendly. (Equivalently it
expresses SOME WAITERS NOT BEING FRIENDLY (a FACT) or THE
EXISTENCE OF UNFRIENDLY WAlTERS.) It signifies a well known fact,
the existence of unfriendly waiters. (Another technically correct answer is: (2)
expresses [some waiters are not friendly], a true proposition that corresponds
to <some waiters are not friendly>, the fact signified by (2). THE PRESENCE
OF UNFRIENDLY WAlTERS correctly characterizes (is true of) the world
so the statement expressing this FACT denotes the world.)
3. not a creature was stirring

4. some mammals lay eggs.
5. some birds do not fly.
6. no bird is immortal
II. Which of the following statements denote the world?

1. There are no elves.
2. Some citizens are not farmers.
3. All women are citizens.
4. Elvis lives.
5. The France is a republic.
III. Which ofthe following is incorrect?

1. Any statement is a truth claim made with respect to a specific
domain, called the domain of the claim (DC).
2. A statement's' signifies <s>, only if <s> is an existential
characteristic of the DC of 's'.
3. If's' is a true statement, then [s] corresponds to the world.
4. A statement, 's' denotes its DC, if and only if <s> is a fact.
5. A statement, 's,' denotes its DC if and only if[s] is true of its DC.
6. A fact is a property of the world.
7. FACTS are true propositions.
8. FACTS correspond to facts.
9. Vacuous statements are meaningless.
10. That some dogs are not friendly is a negative FACT.
11. That no dogs are friendly is a negative FACT.
12. False statements are not vacuous.
*******************************************************************
2 Picturing Propositions
1. State Diagrams
The propositions expressed by statements are STATES OF AFFAIRS. In

what follows we sometimes use 'STOA' or 'STATE' as an abbreviated way
ofwriting 'STATE OF AFFAIRS'. A STOAmay or may not be a FACT. A
STOA or proposition is true (obtains, is a FACT) if it corresponds to a fact
and false if it does not. Calling a statement true (or false) is just a convenient
way of saying that the proposition it expresses is true (or false).
John Venn, a nineteenth century logician, introduced a way of
depicting simple propositions or STOAs by means of diagrams. The two Venn
Diagrams below show how to represent two STATES the world could be in
with respect to the presence or absence of mermaids.
Figure 1
Figure 2
mermaids
25
A square figure represents all the things in the domain. Any things inside the
circle are mermaids. Any things outside are nonmermaids. By placing a cross
inside the circle labeled 'mermaids' we indicate that the circle is not empty.
Thus the first diagram represents the positive STATE OF AFFAIRS: SOME
THINGS BEING MERMAIDS or THE EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS. In
the second diagram the mermaid circle is shaded. By shading the circle we
signify that it is empty. Figure 2 represents the negative STATE OF
AFFAIRS: the NONEXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS.
Figure 2 represents a STOA that is a FACT. Figure 1 represents a
STOA that is not a FACT. The two statements that express the depicted
STATES are:
1. there are mermaids (Figure 1)

2. there are no mermaids (Figure 2)
(1) claims that the EXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS corresponds to a fact.

(2) claims that the NONEXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS corresponds to a fact.
What (1) claims is false; there is no such fact as the existence of mermaids. (2)
is true; the nonexistence of mermaids is a fact.
Logicians are particularly interested in the STATES expressed by
certain basic statements. Let 'S' and 'P' be two terms. Then the STATE,
expressed by 'someS is P' is THE EXISTENCE OF AN SP THING:
Figure 3 [someS is P)
The STATE expressed by 'noS is P' is THE NONEXISTENCE OF AN SP

THING:
Picturing Propositions 27
Figure 4 [noS is P]
The STATE expressed by 'every Sis P' is THE NONEXISTENCE OF AN

S(-P) TIUNG:
Figure 5 [every S is P]
The STATE expressed by 'someS is not P' is THE EXISTENCE OF AN S(-

P)TIDNG:
Figure 6 [someS is not P]
Because 'no S is P' contradicts 'some S is P' Figure 4 is shaded (indicating

absence) where Figure 3 shows occupancy or presence. Similarly the Figure
for 'every S is P' shows absence where that for 'some S is not P' shows
presence.
Note that 'noS is notP' expresses the same STATE as 'every Sis P'.
For example, 'no senator is not pragmatic' claims that the world is
characterizedbyTHEREBEINGNONONPRAGMATICSENATORS. The
same claim is made by 'every senator is pragmatic'; both statements express
the STOA depicted by shading the S(-P) segment (figure 5), depicting the
absence of anything that is S and non-P.
2. Representing Singular Propositions
A statement that has a proper name or other uniquely denoting term in subject
position is called singular. Examples of singular statements are:
Socrates is wise. S* is W
Garbo is beautiful. G* is B
The President is tired. P* is T
Bigfoot is hairy. B* isH
As we saw in the first chapter, a singular term letter is affixed with a star to
indicate that the term it stands for is a uniquely denoting term (UDT), i.e., a
term that applies to no more than one individual. Note that 'president' in the
phrase 'The president' is represented by a starred letter. In the context of a
phrase ofthe form 'the S', the term'S' is a UDT and so we star it.
The singular statement 'Bigfoot exists' expresses the singular
proposition: THE EXISTENCE OF BIGFOOT:
Figure 7
B*()
All things other than Bigfoot are outside the circle. The circle represents a set
of things which, if it is occupied, has only one thing in it, Bigfoot. The cross
indicates that the set of things that are Bigfoot is not empty, thus the diagram
represents the claim that some thing is Bigfoot, that Bigfoot exists.
The corresponding negative proposition expressed by 'Bigfoot does
not exist' would then be represented thus:
Figure 8
The shading indicates that nothing is Bigfoot.

From a logical point of view, a singular statement, 'N* is P' has the
form 'some X* is Y' since it claims existence. For example, 'Bigfoot is hairy'
claims that the world is characterized by the presence of a hairy creature
known as Bigfoot. However, since there is no more than one Bigfoot, 'some
Bigfoot* is hairy' entails 'every Bigfoot* is hairy'. The STATE expressed by
'Bigfoot is hairy' is a STATE of absence as well as presence:
Figure 9 [(some/every Bigfoot* is hairy]
H
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
Represent the propositions expressed by the following statements by means of

Venn diagrams:
1. There are Eskimo senators.

2. There are no women moonwalkers.
3. No one is perfect.
4. Socrates is wise.
5. All humans are mortal.
6. There is no such person as the present King of France.
(hint use 'K*' for 'present King of France' and treat the statement as 'The K*
does not exist' or as 'Nothing is K*'. ·
7. Russell was a genius.
8. Some actors are not rich.
9. Some who are rich are not actors.
10. Every fool is unwise.
******************************************************************
3. Entailments
We noted earlier that the truth of any statement claiming THE EXISTENCE
OF SOMETHING THAT IS BOTH X AND Y entails the truth of its
converse. In other words if the proposition expressed by 'some X is Y' is true,
then the proposition expressed by 'some Y is X' must also be true. And again,
to say that one statement entails another is a convenient way of saying that the
proposition expressed by the first statement entails the proposition expressed
by the second. We now turn to the task of explaining how one true proposition
can entail the truth of another proposition.
Consider again the statement
s3 some citizen is a farmer
We represent the STATE expressed by s3 (that is, the STATE [s3]) by:
Figure 10
c F
Figure 10 depicts the EXISTENCE OF A CITIZEN FARMER and s3 is true

if [s3], the STATE depicted, characterizes the world. (As it happens, the
existence of citizens who are also farmers is a fact. Thus [s3] is a true
proposition and so the statement, s3, that expresses this proposition, is true.)
Now consider
s4 some farmer is a citizen
The STOA expressed by s4 is [s4], depicted in Figure 11
Figure 11
c
i.e., the EXISTENCE OF A FARMER WHO IS ALSO A CITIZEN. It is

clear that the two Venn Diagrams are like two photos of the same state taken
from different angles. It is clear, in other words, that the state that makes [s4]
true is the very same state that makes [s3] true. Putting 'X' for 'citizen' and
'Y' for 'farmer' we see generally that any two statements of the form 'some
X is a Y' and 'some Y is an X' will express one and the same STATE OF
AFFAIRS. This being so, it will never be possible for one ofthese statements
to be true and the other false. For if the STATE in question obtains, both will
be true and ifthe STATE does not obtain both will be false. In this way the
mutual entailment that holds between s3 and s4 is represented by the Venn
diagrams that picture [s3] and [s4] as a single STATE.
Consider also the two statements:
s5 no senator is an albino
s6 no albino is a senator
The following Venn Diagrams depict in different ways the single negative
STATE expressed by s5 and s6.
Figure 12
In general, any two statements of the form 'no X is Y' and 'no Y is X'
express one and the same (negative) STATE OF AFFAIRS, which makes it
impossible for one to be true and the other false. When two statements express
one and the same STATE OF AFFAIRS they mutually entail each other and
we call them logically equivalent.
Sometimes we have entailment one way but not the other way.
Consider for example the following little argument:
s7 some farmer is a citizen and a poet

s8 /some farmer is a citizen
The two statements are not logically equivalent: [s7] entails [s8] but [s8] does
not entail [s7]. We can see why by looking at the diagrams of the STATES
each statement expresses.
Figure 13 Figure 14
F c
The diagram on the left represents [s7], the STOA expressed by s7: The
EXISTENCE OF A FARMER-CITIZEN-POET. The diagram on the right
represents [s8], the STOA expressed by s8: the EXISTENCE OF A
FARMER-CITIZEN.
Note that the EXISTENCE OF A FARMER-CITIZEN, represented
in diagram 14 by an 'x' in the overlap of the two circles is already shown in
the diagram for 13 as part of the STATE which is the EXISTENCE OF A
FARMER-CITIZEN-POET. For in diagram 13 we already have an x in the
overlap of the 'farmer' and 'citizen' circles. Thus, if the EXISTENCE OF A
FARMER CITIZEN-POET is a FACT, so is the EXISTENCE OF A
FARMER-CITIZEN. But the converse does not hold: diagram 14 could
represent a FACT even if Diagram 13 did not. For it could be the case that
there is no farmer-citizen who is also a poet.
The STATES depicted in the two diagrams are positive; the diagrams
show that one of the STATES of EXISTENCE is included in the other,
thereby grounding the entailment of one proposition by the other. More
generally, if S 1 and S2 are any two statements and the STATE, [S 1] includes
the STATE [S2], then Sl entails S2.
4. Negative Entailments
A relation of entailment may hold between statements expressing negative

STATES, STATES OF NONEXISTENCE. Ifthere are no mermaids, there
are no flute-playing mermaids: the NONEXISTENCE OF MERMAIDS
excludes the EXISTENCE OF FLUTE-PLAYING MERMAIDS ('includes'
the NONEXISTENCE OF FLUTE-PLAYING MERMAIDS). And that is
why 'nothing is a mermaid' will entail 'nothing is a flute-playing mermaid'.
Note that the STATE diagram for the premise in which the mermaid area is
empty already shows the smaller area for flute-playing mermaids to be empty.
Figure 15
[s9] [slO]
Here, as in the case of s7 and s8, we have an entailment in one directi<>n.

More often than not, we have no entailment either way. We noted above that
statements of form 'some X isn't Y' and 'some Y isn't X' are not equivalent
and that neither entails the other. For example, an argument using either sl1,
'some farmer isn't a citizen', or s12, 'some citizen isn't a farmer', as premise
with the other as conclusion is invalid. These statements express different
STATES OF AFFAIRS neither of which includes the other. Here are the
respective diagrams:
figure 16 figure 17
[sll] [s12]
F F
As the diagrams show, the STOAS expressed by s11 and s12 are distinct;
neither is included in the other. So there is no entailment in either direction.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Examine the following Venn diagrams. What proposition does each graphically
represent? What proposition does it entail? (Explain how the entailed
proposition, the conclusion, is depicted in the diagram that depicts the
premise.)
c F c F
******************************************************************
5. STATES and states
STATES that obtain correspond to states of affairs. For example the

EXISTENCE OF A MILLIONAIRE WHO IS A FARMER AND A
PHILOSOPHER obtains (is a FACT) because it corresponds to a fact: the
existence of a millionaire who is a fanner and a philosopher. This fact includes
another fact: the existence of a philosopher who is a millionaire. Thus, just as
STATES include or exclude other STATES, so the corresponding states
include or exclude other states. The nonexistence ofmennaids excludes the
existence of unhappy mennaids so that 'there are no mermaids' entails the
falsity of 'there are unhappy mennaids'. Equivalently we may say that the
nonexistence ofmennaids includes the nonexistence of unhappy mennaids. so
that 'there are no mennaids' entails 'there are no unhappy mennaids'. The
existence of rich bridesmaids includes the existence of bridesmaids.
6. Positive and Negative 'Valence'
In a Venn diagram the STOA expressed by a statement claiming absence

(nonexistence) is represented by shading; the STOA expressed by a statement
that claims presence is depicted as unshaded and marked by a cross. Let us
call any statement that claims presence 'positive in valence' and any statement
that claims absence 'negative in valence'. Venn diagrams graphically show that
two logically equivalent statements express one and the same STATE OF
AFFAIRS. Now ifthat STATE is a STATE of presence, the two statements
that express it will be positive in valence. If it is a STATE of absence the two
statements expressing it will be negative in valence. In effect when two
statements are logically equivalent, both statements must be positive in valence
or else both must be negative; thus no statement claiming presence can
possibly be equivalent to a statement that claims absence. To put this P<?int
another way: when two statements are equivalent they must be 'covalent' and
not 'divalent'. (Equivalent statements must be 'equi' in 'valence'.)
7. The Limitations of State Diagrams
Venn Diagrams are useful for explaining how one statement may entail another
by showing in a graphic way how one STATE OF AFFAIRS may include or
exclude another. However, not all STATES can be represented graphically
and the actual use of Venn diagrams for logical purposes is rather limited. As
students of logic we want to learn how to infer conclusions from given
premises. And we want techniques for checking the validity of a wide range of
arguments. For example, we might wish to see whether an argument like 'every
noncitizen is an alien, hence, anyone who arrests a non-alien arrests a citizen'
is valid. (It is.) For arguments of this kind the method of checking validity by
means of state diagrams will not work. Nor is it practical for solving long
arguments like the second of the two Lewis Carroll examples given in Chapter
1. Indeed, the use of state diagrams quickly becomes impractical as soon as we
leave the simplest sorts of cases. In the next chapter we shall introduce an
algebraic way of representing statements that will prove very useful for the
wider purposes of logic.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Let F= farmer, G =gentleman, S =spy.

I. Draw Venn diagrams depicting the STATE OF AFFAIRS EXPRESSED
by each of the following statements:
1. no F is an S
2. some G is an F and an S
3. noS is G
4. some Fare not G
5. some nonF is a nonS
6. no nonF is both F and S
7. every Sis a G but not an F
8. whatever is an S is not a G
9. no nonG is an F
10. all S are both F and nonG
II. Using the forms 'the existence of X' and the 'the nonexistence of X', what
facts are signified by each of the following true statements?
1. no animal is a mermaid
2. some bridesmaid is a spy
3. no farmer is a patriot and a spy
4. some farmer is a gentleman and a patriot
5. some farmer is a noncitizen
6. no farmer is a mermaid
7. every gentleman is a nonspy
8. all spies are gentlemen
9. some farmer who is a spy is a noncitizen
10. no bridesmaid is a mermaid
What is the valence of each statement in exercises I and II?
*******************************************************************
8. The Statement Use of Sentences
A sentence being used to make a truth claim is a statement. But a sentence

may be used in different ways. Consider 'The door will be shut'. Taken simply
as a piece of language this sentence is a well formed grammatical part of
English. But in the mouth of a speaker it takes on a special character. A
speaker may use it to give an order to the hearer. So used the sentence is a
command. This use of a sentence is typically marked by an exclamation sign
or by the manner of its utterance by the speaker. But the same sentence may
be used to make a promise to the hearer, giving assurance that the door will be
shut. Or it may be used as a question. Here the tone may indicate that the
speaker wants information from the hearer about the future position of the
door. A fourth use is to convey information. The speaker is predicting that the
door will be shut. So used, the sentence is a statement. In any of th~se
different uses the sentence expresses the same STATE OF AFFAIRS: Spoken
imperatively, 'the door will be shut' is an order to the hearer to act so that the
STATE will obtain. Spoken as a promise, the speaker is assuring the hearer
that he will so act. Spoken as a question, the speaker is seeking information
about the STATE: will it or won't it obtain? Spoken assertively, the speaker
is making a truth claim, a (true or false) prediction that the STATE of
AFFAIRS will obtain.
A statement, then, is an asserted sentence, an utterance claiming that
the proposition or STATE OF AFFAIRS expressed corresponds to a fact, is
true of the world. In none of the other uses do we characterize the success or
failure ofthe speaker's utterance as either true or false. A command is obeyed
or disobeyed but it is not either true or false. A question is answered or not
answered, appropriate or inappropriate, but it makes no literal sense to speak
of a true or a false question. A promise is kept or not kept but it is not literally
correct to characterize a promise as either true or false (though we may say it
was seriously or casually made; a totally insincere or 'false' promise is not
really a promise at all, just as a false pearl is not really a pearl at all). Only
a statement is a truth claim; only a statement can be characterized as
succeeding or failing to be true or false. Logic is exclusively concerned with
statements because only statements claim truth for the propositions they
express and so only statements are evaluated as being true or false. Logicians
speak of a statement's 'truth value'; it has the value True if it is true and the
value False if it is false.
9. Truth Relations
One may accept or reject a truth claim. If you accept a statement as true, then
you are rationally committed to accept certain other statements as true. For
example, anyone who accepts 'some farmer is a gentleman and a scholar' as
true is rationally committed to accept 'some scholar is a farmer and a
gentleman' and 'some gentleman is a scholar' as true. In accepting the first
statement you accept the claim that the EXISTENCE OF A SCHOLAR WHO
IS A GENTLEMAN AND A FARMER is a FACT. But if that STATE
obtains so does the EXISTENCE OF A SCHOLAR WHO IS A FARMER
AND A GENTLEMAN and so does THE EXISTENCE OF A
GENTLEMAN WHO IS A FARMER. You cannot rationally accept the first
claim and reject the other two. Thus, truth has consequences. Logic studies the
consequences of truth claims.
The study of how statements are truth related to one another is central
to logic. It can be approached in two ways. We have so far approached the
question 'semantically'. Semantics studies the relation of statements to the
propositions they express and to the states of affairs or facts that make them
true or false, and it studies the relation of STATES OF AFFAIRS to one
another. For example, in our study of Venn diagrams we noted how some
STOAS include or exclude other STOAS. Such studies belong to semantics.
A second approach to truth relations focuses on the formal, or 'syntactical',
structure of a sentence. For example, we noted earlier that where S2 is the
grammatical converse of S 1 they will always have the same truth value. (That
is, we learned that any two sentences of the forms 'some X is Y' and some Y
is X' are true together or false together.) This second approach is syntactical
and in its way it is as fruitful an approach as the semantic one. lndeed the
semantic and syntactic approaches complement each other and it is now time
to focus attention on the form or syntax of the sentences that figure in
arguments. Our topic for the remainder of this chapter and for the next two
chapters is Syntax or more precisely, since our concern is with statements
bearing truth values, Logical Syntax. Logical Syntax is the study of the form
and the composition of the statement-sentences that we evaluate as being true
or false.
10. Logical Syntax
Syntax or sentence structure is of special concern to grammarians and to

logicians. The logician's concern with sentence structure differs from the
linguist's or grammarian's in two ways.
In the first place the logician restricts himself to sentence forms that
are appropriate to statements. In practice the exclusive concern with statement-
sentences restricts the logician to the consideration ofelementary sentences that
are declarative or indicative in fonn. For example, a sentence of the form
'some X is a Y' is declarative and of logical interest while 'Is any X a Y?' is
not declarative; it is neither true nor false and so of no interest to the logician.
Thus the logician is interested in sentences that make statements, not in
sentences used to express questions (or prayers or commands).
In the second place the logician's interest in the structure of a sentep.ce
is qualified by his concern with the role that the sentence plays in reasoning.
This special concern forces the logician to analyze its form in a manner that is
markedly different from the way a linguist analyzes the form of the sentence.
Unlike the linguist, the logician must not only attend to the form of the
individual sentence; he must also keep an eye on other sentences to which it is
truth related (e.g., as premise to conclusion or as conclusion to premise).
Analyzing a sentence syntactically is called 'parsing'. To appreciate the
difference between the way a linguist approaches the task of syntactic analysis
and the way a logician approaches it let us consider two simple sentences that
are truth related and observe each at his job. The sentences are:
some horse speaks French

some speaker of French is a horse
These sentences mutually entail one another. (An inference using either one as
premise and the other as conclusion is valid.) The logician must bear this in
mind when he comes to parse them. But the linguist need not take this into
consideration and his way of parsing the sentences will not necessarily reflect
a concern with their truth relations.
The linguist parses a sentence by first dividing it into two parts: a
Noun Phrase subject and Verb Phrase predicate. Thus 'some horse speaks
French' has 'some horse' as its noun phrase (NP) and 'speaks French' as its
verb phrase (VP). (The NPNP analysis is indicated by the stroke sign that is
placed between the NP and the VP: some horse/speaks French.) A similar
analysis is given to 'some speaker of French is a horse', whose Noun Phrase
subject is 'some speaker of French' and whose Verb Phrase predicate is 'is a
horse' ('some speaker of French/is a horse').
We do not here need to go into more detail about linguistic syntax. For
right at the outset the logician will find this mode of analysis unsatisfactory.
This is not to say that he denies that an NPIVP analysis may legitimately be
given to any sentence. But for his purposes such an analysis is inadequate. For
it is the job of Logic to explain why 'some horse speaks French, hence some
speaker of French is a horse' is a valid inference. In any such explanation the
logician will need to refer to expressions in the premise that are repeated in the
conclusion. But ifwe adopt the NPIVP mode of analysis, the expressions in the
premise of the inference are significantly different from the expressions that
appear in the conclusion. Where the premise contains 'speaks French' and
'some horse', the conclusion has 'speaker of French' and 'is a horse'. Thus the
linguist's NPIVP mode of analysis does not make clear the pattern of validity
that is instanced by this inference.
Now this complaint will not impress the linguist. For he will counter
by pointing out that it is his job to parse each sentence separately to bring out
its grammatical form; it is not his job to parse them in a manner that brings out
the form of an argument in which one is a premise and the other is the
conclusion. More generally the linguist may wish to deny that syntactic
analysis must attend to the truth relations of the sentences being analyzed. If
we accept his denial we may accept the view that the NPIVP analysis is a
legitimate way of parsing sentences. If however we require that any syntactic
analysis must also help us to see how sentences are logically related to each
other, then we shall demand a parsing of a sentence that is sensitive to the way
it is logically related to other sentences. In any case the logician cannot rest
content with the NPIVP style of syntactic analysis; he must aim for a 'logical
syntax' that parses sentences in a logically revealing way.
The logician approaches the two sentences with the idea of parsing
each one in a way that exposes the pattern of inference in which one is the
premise and the other is the conclusion. Thus he is dealing with the form of the
inference as well as the form of the individual sentence that enters into it as a
premise or conclusion. Indeed the two tasks are one. A syntactic analysis of
sentences that clarifies the inferences in which they play a role is an analysis
of their 'logical syntax'. In dealing with the structure of any sentence, the
logician is out to make its logical syntax explicit.
How does the logician analyze the two sentences? To see the how and
why of his analysis we note that the pattern of the inference in which we move
from the premise 'some horse speaks French' to 'some speaker of French is a
horse' involves a change of order in two expressions. In explaining why this
inference is valid we want to say that the form of both sentences is the same,
only that in the conclusion the order of two expressions contained in the
premise has been switched. The trouble with the NPNP analysis was that it
did not bring to the fore the two material expressions that have been switched
about in the conclusion. For example, the premise contains 'speaks French',
which, speaking strictly, is not found in the conclusion (which has 'speaker of
French'). Moreover, superficially at least, the forms of 'some horse speaks
French' and 'some speaker of French is a horse' seem different. Thus the
linguist's NPNP analysis does not meet the following two conditions that the
logician here demands:
1. The two sentences must have the same structure.

2. We must be able to identify two expressions in the premises that ~re
repeated in reverse order in the conclusion.
An analysis of the structure of the two sentences that meets both of

these demands will reveal their logical syntax. It is, however, possible to meet
these demands for a logical syntax in two different ways, one taking terms or
nominals as the repeated expressions and the other taking predicates or verbs
as the repeated expressions. It is perhaps not surprising that different logicians
have shown decided preferences for one way or the other. In explaining the two
alternatives we shall continue to use our two sentences by way of illustration.
One mode of analysis, called the Term Way, identifies the repeated
expressions as the two terms, 'horse' and 'speaker of French', and construes
both sentences as having the form 'some.. .is a .. .' where the blanks indicate
where the two terms (nouns or noun phrases) belong. Now 'some horse speaks
French' is not explicitly of form 'some .. .is a .. .', nor does it contain the term
'speaker of French'. The terminist logicians (as we shall call them) deal with
both of these points by construing 'some horse speaks French' as having the
structure of 'some horse is a speaker of French'. In effect, the terminist
rewrites, or logically regiments the inference in a way that brings out the
logical form of both sentences. He does this by replacing the original premise
by a paraphrase that explicitly has the favored two term structure. The
conclusion is already of this form and the whole inference now reads: 'some
horse is a speaker of French, hence some speaker of French is a horse'. In this
form, both sentences are parsed in a manner that meets the requirements of a
logically adequate syntactic analysis; i.e., one that attends to the form of the
inference in which they figure as well as attending to the form of each as a
separate sentence. According to the Term Way, when properly formulated, or
regimented, the inference looks like this:
( 1) some horse is a speaker of French

/some speaker of French is a horse
The pattern of the inference is
some X is a Y
(hence) some Y is an X
The terminist version of logical syntax was favored by Aristotle, the

fourth-century B.C. inventor offormallogic, and adopted by most logicians as
the standard way of regimenting sentences that enter into deductive reasoning.
It requires us to construe every simple sentence as having two nominal
expressions, called terms connected by an expression such as 'some .. .is .. .' or
'every .. .is a .. .' or variants such as 'some ... are .. .', 'some ... will be .. .', 'a .. .is
a ... ', 'all ... are ... ', and so forth. The NPNP analysis is not consistent with this.
Thus any phrase of form 'some X' is a Noun Phrase and any phrase of form
'is a Y' is a Verb Phrase. But the terminist maintains that Noun and Verb
Phrases are essentially of this special form each containing a term. Logically
speaking, the Noun Phrase always consists of a word of quantity such as
'some' or 'all' followed by a nominal term and the Verb Phrase consists of a
word of quality such as 'are' or 'were' followed by a second nominal term. In
a proper paraphrase, the term in the 'Verb Phrase' must be interchangeable
with the term in the 'Noun Phrase'. For example, 'children laughed' is
construed by the terminist as 'some children were laughers' since this way of
construing it gives us two nominal expressions as terms that can be
interchanged (thereby allowing the inference to 'some laughers were
children').
11. Term Way vs. Predicate Way
In the nineteenth century another version of logical syntax was introduced by

the great German logician, Gottlob Frege. This new version, which has gained
wide acceptance among contemporary logicians, is called the 'Predicate Way'.
According to the Predicate Way the two material expressions that are
interchanged in our little inference are not the terms 'horse' and 'speaker of
French' but the Verb Phrase predicates 'is a horse' and 'speaks French'.
Logicians who favor the Predicate Way reconstrue the premise as 'something
is such that it is a horse and it speaks French'. And they reconstrue the
conclusion as 'something is such that it speaks French and it is a horse'. Using
predicate verb phrases is an alternative way of satisfying the requirement that
a logically adequate syntactic analysis of the premise and conclusion must
construe them both as having the same form while identifying two expressions
whose order in the premise is reversed in the conclusion. According to
logicians who favor the Predicate Way, the expressions in question are not
terms but predicates. And the pattern of inference is
something is such that it X's andY's

(hence) something is such that it Y's and X's
where 'X's' and 'Y's' hold the place of predicates. Following the Predicate
Way, (1) is an instance ofthat pattern:
something is such that it is a horse and it speaks French

I something is such that it speaks French and it is a horse
The present book develops the classical terminist approach to logical

syntax. The style oflogic that adopts the term syntax is called Term Logic. In
Chapter 8 we will be taking a closer look at the rival predicate approach. We
will there compare Term Logic to Predicate Logic and show how they are
related to one another. These two classical ways of doing logic are both
legitimate and equally powerful from a formal standpoint. But the Term Way
is closer to the syntax of a natural language like English, Spanish or French.
Consider the fact that the Predicate Way construes an elementary sentence like
'some ape is black' as 'something is such that it is an ape and it is black', a
sentence that contains the conjunctive form 'it is an ape and it is black' and the
pronoun 'it'. These are complexities not found in Term Logic. In the next
chapter we shall introduce a notation for representing sentence in Term Logic
that is very much simpler than the notation currently used to represent
sentences in Predicate Logic. Moreover, the actual working oflogical proofs
in Term Logic is easier than it is in Predicate Logic. We have therefore chosen
Term Logic for our working logic. Historically too, term logic came first. We
shall not neglect Predicate Logic. But we shall treat it as an alternative system
and defer its study to the time we have a thorough understanding of Term
Logic. At that point Predicate Logic becomes much easier to understand.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Regiment the following sentences terrninistically.

(The first two examples are for purposes of illustration.)
1. children were laughing
(Acceptable answers: some children were laughing persons; some
children were laughers.)
2. whales are mammalian
(Acceptable answers: all whales are mammalian animals; every
whale is a mammal.)
3. some Greeks are wise
4. all human beings die
5. some cats are tri-colored
6. no horse speaks French
7. someone is talking
8. all fish swim
9. some mammals do not swim
10. whatever speaks French is a person
II. Regiment examples 1, 3, and 5 in the 'predicate way'.
*******************************************************************
12. Some Useful Terminology
The words 'some' and 'every' are called words of 'quantity'. Statements of
form 'some X is Y' are called 'particular in quantity' because they speak of
some X's but not of all X's. For example, 'some farmer is a citizen' is
particular in quantity since, in it, the term 'farmer' denotes some farmer or
farmers but not necessarily all farmers. By contrast, a statement of form 'every
X is Y', which speaks of all the X's, is 'universal in quantity.' For example,
'every farmer is a citizen' is said to be universal in quantity.
Sentences of from 'some X is Y' and 'every X is Y' are said to be
affirmative. 'Some X is Y' is called a particular affirmation, 'every X is Y'
is called a universal affirmation, despite the fact that its valence is negative.
(Its Venn diagram is shaded.)
Denying a sentence changes its quantity. Thus 'no X is y' which is the
denial of 'some X is Y' is a universal sentence and 'some X is not Y' (or 'not
every x is Y'), which is the denial of 'every X is Y', is a particular sentence.
13. Subjects and Predicates
In sentences ofthe form 'some/every X is a Y' the phrases 'some X' and
'every X' are called subjects. For example, 'some farmer' is a particular
subject; 'every farmer' is a universal subject. The phrase 'is (a) Y' is called the
predicate of the sentence. For example, 'is a citizen' and 'is a noncitizen' are
predicates. In' some (every) X is a Y', 'X' is called the subject term andY is
called the predicate term.
Very often the terms of a sentence are not at the surface and we m~st
rephrase the sentence to bring out its two-term structure. For example, in
'some farmer drinks' the predicate 'drinks' is not a term and we regiment the
sentence as 'some farmer is a drinker'. We then identify 'drinker' as the
predicate term. We similarly regimented 'some horse speaks French' as 'some
horse is a speaker of French' to bring out its logical form, which is 'some X
is a Y'. This gave us the nominals 'horse' and 'speaker of French' as the two
terms of the sentence.
*****************************************************************
Exercises:
Regiment the following sentences and identify a) their subject terms, and b)
their predicate terms.
i) only members were present

ii) whoever errs is mortal
iii) birds always have feathers
iv) dogs sometimes bite
v) Tom doesn't eat meat
vi) dogs never lay eggs
vii) a fish swims
viii) a spider doesn't swim
ix) one who listens learns
x) the guests were all women
Regiment and then identify the subjects and predicates of:
10 every citizen is a farmer

20 the whale is a manunal
3 the whale is hungry
0
4 children were laughing

0
50 frogs are amphibians

60 bats are not birds
7 no whale is a fish
0
8 no whale lays eggs

0
9 a frog leaps
0
100 a bird lays eggs
********************************************************************
3 The Language of Logic (I)
1. Introduction
Any argument consists of statements. In this chapter and the next we will be
learning how to represent statements in a way that makes it easy to manipulate
them, 'adding them up' to arrive at conclusions. Our task here is similar to the
task we once had of learning 'the language of mathematics'. As a first step
we learned how to represent numbers like seven hundred and thirty-one and
nine thousand six hundred and ninety-eight as 731 and 9,698. Using arabic
notation made it easy for us to add these numbers in a mechanical way to get
10,429 as the sum. Analogously we will be learning a logical language, in
which we represent statements in a notation that permits us to 'reckon' with
them to derive conclusions from them in a mechanical way. Particular
affirmations like 'some farmer is a citizen' and 'Tom is a citizen' have a very
simple structure so we begin with them.
The particular affirmation 'some farmer is a citizen' has the form
'some X is a Y' with 'X' as the subject term and 'Y' as the predicate term.
The claim is that BEING A CITIZEN characterizes some farmer. We
abbreviate 'BEING A Y characterizes (an) X' as 'Y some X'. We use term
letters to stand for the terms. For example, the abbreviated form for 'BEING
A CITIZEN characterizes some farmer' is 'C some F'; the abbreviated form
for 'BEING A CITIZEN characterizes Tom' is 'C some T*'.
The formula 'Y some X' will be called an 'A-form' to remind us that
Aristotle was the first to introduce paraphrases that placed the predicate term
on the left and the subject term on the right thereby reversing the natural
English order of terms in a sentence. Aristotle's own paraphrase for 'some X
is Y' was 'Y belongs to some X'. His paraphrase for 'every X is Y' was 'Y
belongs to every X'. We shall speak of 'every' and 'some' as 'term
connectives'. Thus 'every' is the term connective in the sentence 'Y every X'
and 'some' is the term connective in 'Y some X'.
A-form sentences are not natural to English speakers; in the next
section we shall recapitulate our discussion for sentences that follow natural
English order (E-form sentences). For the present, however, we find A-forms
useful; by paraphrasing the E-form sentence 'some X is Y' as 'Y some X',
49
the A-form brings out the characterizing role of the predicate term, the
denotative role of the subject term and the connecting role of the formative
expression '(belongs to) some'. Moreover the A-form has the virtue of placing
the term connective, '(belongs to) some', '(belongs to) every', entirely between
the terms that it connects and this suggests that we could represent the sentence
in an algebraic way.
2. Writing 'Y some X' as an Algebraic Expression
We will in fact represent 'Y some X' as 'Y+X', thereby transcribing 'some'
as a plus sign. We noted earlier that 'some X is a Y' is equivalent to its
converse 'some Y is an X'. The equivalence of 'Y some X' to 'X some Y'
shows that 'some' does indeed behave in a plus-like manner. Using the A-form
the equivalence of converses can be stated as 'Y some X = X some Y'. But
now, representing 'some' as a plus sign, we can formulate the equivalence as
a simple algebraic equation:
Y+X=X+Y
3. Affirmation(+) and Denial(-)
Recognizing the plus-like character of 'some' is the first step in algebraic

notation. We now proceed to add to our algebraic notation. Some statements
are prefixed by a sign of negative judgment. For example, in 'not a creature
was stirring' the word 'not' is a sign of negative judgment, or denial. The A-
form of this sentence is 'not: stirring some creature', which algebraically
transcribes as '-(S+C)'. In this formula the external minus sign represents the
word 'not' or the phrase 'it is not the case that'. Note that the affirmative
statement 'a creature was stirring' lacks an explicit expression of positive
judgment (affirmation); however we assume the sentence to be implicitly
prefixed by 'it is the case that' or 'yes'. Transcribing the unspoken sign of
affirmation by a plus sign we could represent 'yes: a creature was stirring' as
'+(S+C)'. In general then, an affirmation has the form '+(Y+X)'; a denial has
the form '-(Y+X)'.
The Language of Logic (!) 51
4. Binary and Unary Uses of a Sign
Note that in '+(Y+X)' the plus sign plays two quite different roles. Coming
between the terms, it plays the 'binary' role of connecting, or 'adding', two
elements. Coming before the whole sentence it plays a 'unary' role of
qualifying that sentence as positive. The difference between the binary and
unary uses of a sign can be seen if we attend to an arithmetical expression like
'-( 12-5)'. Coming between two numbers, the minus sign operates on them
both simultaneously; its role in '12-5' being that of a binary subtraction
operator. But in its initial occurrence in,' -( .... )', it is a unary operator; it is
like the minus sign in '-7', where the minus sign operates on a single number
to transform it into a negative number.
The following illustrates how we transcribe sentences in algebraic
form. We give theE-form (English Form) and then the A-form along with its
algebraic transcription:
E-form A-form A-form transcription

some X is non-Y non-Y some X +((-Y)+X)
nonon-X is Y not: Y some non-X -(Y+(-X))
no X is non-Y not: non-Y some X -((-Y)+X)
some non-Xis non-Y non-Y some non-X +(( -Y)+(-X))
5. Positive and Negative Valence
We speak of the positive or negative character of a statement as its 'valence'.

A statement of the form '+(Y+X)' is positive in valence (or particular in
quantity) and it expresses EXISTENCE or PRESENCE. A statement of the
form '-(Y+X)' is negative in valence (or universal in quantity) and it expresses
NONEXISTENCE or ABSENCE. Statements of the same valence (or
quantity) are called covalent. Statements that differ in valence are called
divalent. (The reader should review section 6 of the preceding chapter.)
When two statements are equivalent they express one and the same
STATE OF AFFAIRS. The STOA they both express must either be positive
or negative. So divalent statements cannot possibly be equivalent. For, of two
divalent statements, one will signifY a positive STATE and the other a
negative STATE. Thus covalence is a necessary condition of equivalence.
Being able to represent logical equivalence algebraically is a distinct

advantage. More generally, our use of algebraic transcription reveals the
logical syntax of statements to us in a logically useful manner. It makes logical
reckoning easy; indeed, using only very simple High School algebra, we shall
soon be learning how to treat arguments as we treat sums, adding up premises
to derive conclusions.
Statements that differ only in their external signs are contradictory to
one another. For exaniple, 'a creature was stirring' and 'not a creature was
stirring' are contradictories and, generally, any two statements of the form
'+( ... )'and-( ... )' are contradictories. Contradictories are divalent.
When two statements are equivalent so are their contradictories. Thus
just as the equation
+(Y+X) = +(X+Y)
represents the equivalence
yes: some X is Y = yes: some Y is X

so the equation
-(Y+X) = -(X+Y)
represents the equivalence
no X is Y = no Y is X
6. Contrary Terms and Sentences
Terms that differ in sign are said to be logically contrary to one another. For
example, the terms 'citizen' and 'noncitizen' are logically contraries. If 'C'
represents 'citizen', '-C' represents 'noncitizen'. Two sentences that have
contrary predicate terms are called contrary to one another. Thus the following
pairs of sentences are contraries:
every farmer is a citizen; every farmer is a noncitizen

some farmer is a citizen; some farmer is a noncitizen
The Language ofLogic (!) 53
no fanner is a citizen; no fanner is a noncitizen
Generally, ' ... is a P' and ... is a non-P' are contraries.
7. 'Every'
We now consider the fonn 'Y every X' which is 'Aristotelian' for 'every X is
Y'. In dealing with statements of this fonn we take note of the following
equivalence:
El Y every X= not: non-Y some X
The statement on the right is 'Aristotelian' for 'it is not the case that some X
is nonY' which transcribes as '- ((- Y)+X)'. But what is the algebraic
transcription of 'Y every X'?
Note that both minus signs in '-((-Y)+X)' are unary signs. The
external minus sign operates on the sentence '(-Y)+X'. The internal minus
sign operates on the tenn 'Y'. But now suppose we simplify '- ((- Y)+X)' by
driving in the external sign. The result is 'Y- X', an expression that introduces
a new binary use of'-' standing for the tenn connective 'every'. We could
now express the equivalence between 'every X is Y' and no X is non-Y' as
the equation
E*l Y-X = -((- Y)+X)

whose left side is the transcription of 'Y every X'.
The equation suggests that 'every' in logic behaves like the binary
minus sign of High School algebra. But we shall have to check this out;
transcribing 'every' as a binary minus sign is justified only if 'every X is Y'
does logically behave as 'Y- X' in all cases where the word 'every' figures in
a pair oflogically equivalent statements. Let us look therefore at some more
equivalences involving 'every'. One such equivalence is:
E2 every X is Y = every nonY is nonX
[The reader is invited to check the correctness of this and other equivalences
by representing each side on Venn Diagrams. In the present instance the left
side signifies the nonexistence of things that are X but not Y; the right side
signifies the nonexistence of things that are nonY and non-nonX. Since
whatever is X is non-nonX, the Venn diagrams for both statements will be the
same: shading out the area that is X but not Y.] Transcribing 'every' as a
minus sign allows us to express E2 as an algebraic equation:
E*2 Y-X = (-X)-(-Y)
This gives us additional confidence in the minus-like character of

'every'. Another correct equivalence shows 'every' again behaving like a
minus sign.
E3 some X is Y = not every X is nonY

E*3 Y+X = -((- Y)- X)
And yet another:
E4 every non-Xis Y =every nonY is X

E*4 Y-(-X) = X-(-Y)
8. Why Some Equal Sentences are not Logically Equivalent
Looking at a sentence like 'Y- (-X)' one may be moved to ask why we cannot
simply equate it with 'Y+X' to give us the 'equivalence':
Y-(-X) =Y +X
every non-Xis Y =some X is Y
Though the two sentences in this algebraically correct equation are

algebraically equal, their divalence prevents them from being logically
equivalent. The sentence on the left is universal and negative in valence; it
expresses a STATE of absence. The sentence on the right is particular and
positive in valence; it expresses a STATE of presence. The covalence
condition imposes a significant constraint on logical algebra. In ordinary
arithmetic and algebra, 'two negatives make a positive' even when we are
canceling a unary negative sign by a binary one, as we do in equating
'12-(-5)' to '12+5'. But in logical reckoning, the cancellation of a unary
minus sign by a binary one is prohibited. Binary cancellation illegitimately
The Language ofLogic (I) 55
changes the valence of a sentence. In banning cancellation by a binary minus

sign, logical algebra is strikingly unlike the High School algebra with which
we are familiar. Students of logic who are using algebraic notation for their
logical language should take note of this difference.
Though a binary ('every') minus sign cannot cancel a unary ('not')
minus sign, the unary minus can cancel a binary or a unary minus sign. Thus
in E*3 '-((-Y)-X)' (read: 'not every X is nonY') may be simplified by
driving in the external unary sign to cancel both internal minus signs, thereby
changing '- Y' to 'Y' and changing the binary minus sign for 'every' to the
binary plus sign for 'some' to give us 'Y+X' (read: 'some X is Y').
9. E-forms and A-forms
The A-forms 'Y some X' and 'Y every X' differ from the more natural E-
forms 'some X is Y' and 'every X is Y' in three respects:
(1) The order of the terms is different. In the A-form the subject term
is on the right.
(2) TheE-form has the grammatical copula 'is' (or variants like 'are',
'will be', 'were', etc.). The A-form lacks the grammatical copula.
(3) In theE-form the words of quantity 'some' or 'every' come first
and not between the two terms.
All these differences are merely stylistic. It is obviously desirable to have a

way of transcribing sentences that follows the natural order of English. With
this in mind we introduce a convention of representing positive grammatical
copulas such as 'is' and 'are' as plus signs. We now transcribe 'some X is Y'
with two plus signs as '+X+Y', reading the .first plus sign as 'some' and the
second as 'is'. Similarly 'every X is Y' is transcribed as '-X+Y'. This mode
of transcription of'every X is Y' is formally less elegant than 'Y- X';'- X+Y'
uses two signs for the expression that joins the terms where 'Y- X' uses only
one. Also'- X+Y' obscures the binary character of 'every' as a minus sign.
But these disadvantages are quite outweighed by the gain of being able to
directly transcribe the E-form sentences into algebraic form: algebraic
transcription now follows English order in a direct, natural and linear way.
The following examples illustrate the way we transcribe E-forms in algebraic
notation:
(Jo/e use the sign'=>' as an abbreviation for 'transcribes as'.)
every X is Y => -X+Y

some X is Y ==> +X+Y
some X is non-Y => +X+(-Y)
not an X is a Y => -(+X+Y)
no X isY => -(+X+Y)
not every X is non-Y => -(-X+(-Y))
In the remainder of this chapter and for much of the next chapter, we
will be learning how to represent all E-form statements as algebraic
expressions. This will enable us to reckon with them in an algebraic manner.
For example we will learn how set down the premises of a Lewis Carroll
argument in algebraic form and to derive a conclusion from them by adding
them. And we will be learning how to check a given piece of reasoning in much
the way that we check the correctness of an example in a very simple kind of
algebra whose only operative signs are '+' and '- '.
10. Transcribing Affirmative Statements
If you say 'no farmer is a billionaire' and I disagree, I would probably express
my disagreement by saying 'some farmer is a billionaire'. I might, for
emphasis, say, 'it is the case that some farmer is a billionaire', but in most
normal contexts affirmation is not explicitly expressed. Nevertheless we shall
temporarily adopt a method of transcription that prefixes affirmations with an
explicit sign of positive judgment corresponding to the external 'no' or 'not'
of denial or negative judgment. Thus, just as we transcribe the sign of denial
in 'not a creature was stirring', rendering this as '-(+C+S)', so shall we
transcribe a (tacit, unspoken) sign of affirmation 'yes' (or 'it is the case that')
in representing 'a creature was stirring' as '+(+C + S)'. This method of
transcribing will be adopted for most of this chapter. Later we shall be able to
follow natural English usage by omitting signs of positive judgment,
transcribing 'a creature was stirring' as '+C+S'.
11. How to Tell the Valence ofE-form Statements
A statement of positive valence claims that something exists; a statement of

negative valence claims that something does not exist. When two statements,
S 1 and S2, are divalent one will express EXISTENCE, the other
NONEXISTENCE. For S 1 and S2 to be equivalent, they would both have to
express one and the same STATE OF AFFAIRS. It follows that divalent
statements S 1 and S2 cannot be equivalent and that covalence is a necessary
condition of equivalence.
We are often in the position of wanting to know whether two
statements are equivalent and one of the things we must know is whether they
are covalent. It is therefore important for us to be able to inspect a statement
and to determine-preferably at a glance-what its valence is. Fortunately there
is a simple way to do this:
Look at the judgment sign and then look at the sign

of quantity: if these signs differ, the valence is negative;
if they are the same, the valence is positive.
For example, since the first two signs of'+{- F +C)' {the transcription of' every
farmer is a citizen') differ, its valence is negative. By contrast, the valence of
'not every farmer is a citizen' is positive since the two initial signs of its
transcription, '- (- F +C)', are the same. (The statement signifies the existence
of an farmer that is a noncitizen.) Generally then, the valence of a universal
statement of the form 'every X is a Y' is negative; such statements signify the
nonexistence of anything that is both an X and a nonY. The valence of its
contradictory 'not every X is a Y' (=> -(- X+Y)) is positive; the initial signs
are the same. Statements of this form are positive in valence, being equivalent
to 'some X is non-Y' and claiming the existence of something that is X and
nonY.
12. Negative Valence= Universal Quantity
Our criterion shows that affirmative statements beginning with 'every' are
negative in valence. To see why consider the equivalence:
every X is a Y = not: some X is a nonY

+(-X+Y) == -(+X+(-Y))
The equivalence is between two statements, an affirmation and a denial. The

statement on the left is explicitly universal in being about every X. It is
affirmative, but since it is equivalent to the statement on the right (which
clearly claims the absence of any X that is nonY}, its valence must be negative.
What is the 'quantity' of the negative statement on the right? A moment's
reflection suggests that it is universal in quantity; it too speaks of all the Xs
(saying of each and every X that it does not fail to be a Y). In effect the
equation shows that 'no X is nonY' and 'every X is Y' have the same universal
quantity and the same negative valence. To call a statement universal (or
negative in valence) is thus tantamount to calling it negative in valence (or
universal in quantity). Conversely, to call a statement particular in quantity
(or positive in valence) is tantamount to calling it positive in valence (or
particular in quantity).
13. The Law of Commutation in E-form
The A-form equivalence '+(Y+X)=+(X+Y)' expresses the Logical Law of

Commutation (LLC). The same law can be expressed using E-form
transcriptions of 'some X is Y' and 'some Y is X':
LLC +{+X+ Y) = +{+ Y+A}
LLC is a law of logic. It tells us that any two statements of form

'+(+X+Y)' and '+(+Y+X)' signify one and the same state of affairs and it tells
us this by stating their logical equivalence in the form of a simple algebraic
equation in which the double plus functor (the term connective) represents
'some .. .is (a)'. If we change the sign on both sides ofthe equation we get
another equivalence:
-(+X+Y} = -(+Y+X)
no X is Y = no Y is X
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Transcribe each statement, inspect the first two signs and then say whether
the statement is positive or negative in valence.
1. Not every ape is grey.

2. No ape is green.
3. Whales are mammals.
4. Children were laughing.
5. It is the case that every ape is unreasonable.
6. Some unbelievers are happy.
7. All unbelievers are curious.
8. Not all dogs are faithful.
9. Babies cry.
10. It is not the case that some cats are friendly.
11. No unbelievers are laughing.
12. It is not the case that no ape is green.
******************************************************************
14. 'Every' in E-form Transcriptions
We saw earlier that 'every' in the A-fonn 'Y every X' transcribes as a minus
sign. It is easy to show that our method of showing the minus-like character
of 'every' carries over to the E-fonn 'Every X is Y.' We first transcribe the
equivalence of 'no X is nonY' to 'every X is Y' algebraically but without
transcribing 'every':
yes: every X is a Y = not: some X is a nonY

+(every X+ Y) =-(+X+(- Y))
Since the two sides of the equation are equivalent they must be algebraically
equal as well as covalent. Since the first two signs in the fonnula on the right
differ, they must differ in the fonnula on the left. Putting '-' for 'every' does
just what we want: it assures covalence and it gives us a correct equation.
(1) yes: every X is a Y = not: some X is a non-Y

+(-X+Y) = -(+X+(-Y))
Equation (1), which equates two E-form sentences, shows once again that
'every' has the character of a minus sign and should be transcribed as such.
(We continue the practice of writing 'yes' for 'it is the case that', transcribing
this expression for affirmative judgment by the '+' sign; we write 'not' for 'it
is not the case that', transcribing these and others expressions for negative
judgment by the'-' sign.)
Looking at equation ( 1) more carefully we note that the two (covalent
and equal) sides differ in three ways:
( 1) They differ in the judgment sign; one signifies affirmation the other
signifies denial.
(2) They differ in the sign of quantity; one side has 'every' the other
side has 'some'.
(3) They differ in the sign of predicate quality; one has a positive term
in predicate position, the other has a negative term.
Any two statements that differ in just these three ways are called
obverse to one another. And any two statements that are obverse to one
another are equivalent. Thus we can form the obverse equivalent of any
statement by ( 1) changing its judgment sign, (2) changing the sign of quantity
and (3) by changing the quality of its predicate term. Here are two more
examples of obverse equivalents:
(2) not every A is non-B; some A is B

-(-A+(-B)) = +(+A+B)
(3) no A is B; every A is non-B

-(+A+B) = +(-A+(-B))
Obversion further justifies our treating the formative words 'some'

and 'is' as plus signs and 'every' and 'not' as minus signs. For, as (2) and (3)
show, obversion means that we can drive an external minus sign inward
algebraically, by changing the external judgment sign from'-' to'+', by
changing the sign of'quantity' from 'some'(+) to 'every' (-),or from 'every'
to 'some' and by changing the 'quality' of the predicate term from positive to
negative or from negative to positive. More particularly, obversion shows that
'every', in the E-form transcriptions, behaves like a minus sign and we so

transcribe it. We shall formulate the Law ofObversion as:
Law ofObversion (Obv) -(+1-X+I-11 = +(-I+X-I+Y)
15. 'Isn't'
Any statement of the form 'some X is not a Y' is equivalent, by definition, to

a statement ofthe form 'some X is a nonY'. The former sentence is in turn
equivalent to 'some X isn't a Y'. We express these equivalences algebraically
by equating '+(+X+(-Y))', '+(+X+ - Y)' and '+(+X-Y)'. In effect we
contract 'is not' which transcribes as '+ -'to 'isn't' which transcribes as '- '.
The use of a minus sign for 'isn't' allows us to express familiar logical
relations in algebraic form:
some X is a Y =some X isn't a non-Y; +(+X+Y) =+(+X-(- Y))

some non-Y is an X= some X isn't a Y; +(+(- Y)+X) =+(+X- Y)
not every X is a Y =some X isn't a Y; -(-X+Y) =+(+X- Y)
Note: in logic, a binary minus sign has the meaning of'every'. But in all of the
above equations, the minus sign is unary so cancellation is allowed.
16. The General Conditions of Equivalence
Covalence does not suffice for equivalence. Thus 'some farmer isn't a citizen'
and 'some citizen isn't a farmer' are covalent statements but they are not
algebraically equal and so they are not equivalent. However, when two
covalent statements are also algebraically equal their equivalence is guaranteed
by the laws of commutation or obversion. Thus consider the pair:
some non-senator is a noncitizen; +(+(-S)+(-C))

some noncitizen is a nonsenator; +(+(-C)+(-S))
Both are positive in valence and in addition they are algebraically equal. Being
positive in valence, they both signify a positive state of affairs, possibly the
same state of affairs. But they are also algebraically equal so, by the law of
commutation, they are equivalent.

Consider the pair
every senator is a citizen; +(- S+C)

every noncitizen is a nonsenator; +(- (-C)+(- S))
They too are covalent. And they are algebraically equal. We could show they
are equivalent by appealing to obversion and to LLC. Thus
+(-S+C) = -(+S+(-C)) byObv

+(-(-C)+(-S)) = -(+(-C)+S) byObv
The two right sides are then shown to be equivalent by LLC. Since the two
right sides are equivalent so are the two left sides. More generally, whenever
two statements are covalent and equal, we can show they are equivalent by
appeal to LLC and/or Obv.
Equivalent statements are both equal and covalent.
So it is helpful that the word 'equivalent' connotes equality and covalence. We

have then an easy test for equivalence. When two statements are transcribed
in algebraic form we can see whether they are covalent and also see whether
they are algebraically equal. Suppose we find they are both equal and
covalent. Then we have determined that they are equivalent. If however we
find that they are either divalent or unequal, then we judge them to be
nonequivalent. Each condition, covalence and equality, is necessary and
together they are sufficient for equivalence. We may state this as a
fundamental general principle, called PEQ or the Principle of Equivalence:
P EQ Two statements are logically equivalent if and only if they are

covalent and equal.
Consider a pair of divalent statements that are algebraically equal:
some senators are Citizens +(+S +C)

no nonsenators are noncitizens - (+(- S)+(- C)).
The transcriptions are algebraically equal but the two statements are not
logically equivalent because they are divalent: the first statement is positive in
valence, the second is negative.
Consider whether 'no native is a noncombatant' and 'no noncombatant
is a native' are equivalent. Looking at their transcriptions we find them both
covalent and equal:
-(+N+(-C)) = -(+(-C)+N)
Since they satisfy both conditions specified by PEQ we conclude they are
equivalent. PEQ illustrates how the algebraic notation is used for logical
purposes, in this case as a test for equivalence.
As a further example ofhow we use PEQ let us consider the sentences
'(it is the case that) every noncitizen is an Asian' and '(it is the case that) every
nonAsian is a citizen'. To determine whether they are equivalent we transcribe
them algebraically and form the equation that asserts their equivalence:
+(-(-C)+A) = +(-(-A)+C)
Inspecting the first two signs of both statements we note that both statements
are negative in valence since in both cases the first two signs are different.
Thus the two statements meet the covalence condition for logical equivalence.
We note also that the two statements are algebraically equal. Since they are
equal as well as covalent, the statements are logically equivalent.
Here are two more statements logically equivalent to '+(- (-C)+A)':
- (+(-C)+(- A)) no noncitizen is a nonAsian

-(+(-A)-C) not: some nonAsian isn't a citizen
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Give four more equivalents to 'every noncitizen is an Asian'.
II. Regiment, transcribe algebraically and apply PEQ to determine which of

the following are logically equivalent pairs.
1. every truth-teller is a citizen; every noncitizen is a liar

2. only A's are B's; every B is an A
3. whales are mammals; no nonmammal is a whale
III. Give seven equivalents to 'some politicians aren't honest'.
N. Regiment and transcribe in both A-form and E-form:
1. Tom runs. (Answer: We regiment 'Tom runs' as '(some) Tom is

a runner'. The A-form and E-form transcriptions are: R+T* and +T*+R.
2. The king is speaking.

3. The Earth is not flat.
4. Some birds do not fly.
5. It is not the case that all birds fly.
********************************************************************
17. The General Form of Statements
The transcription of 'not every nonX isn't a nonY' is
-(-(-X)-(- Y))
In this transcription, all signs are minus. Note that each negative term has a
minus sign. We could also introduce a convention transcribing positive terms
in a way that gives each positive term an explicit sign to signify its positive
quality. If we prefix each positive term with a positive sign, we should
transcribe 'some X is a Y' thus:
+(+(+X)+(+Y))
Now all signs are plus. In between these extremes we have many statements
with mixed signs. Thus 'every X is a nonY' is
+(-(+X)+(- Y))
and 'some X isn't Y' is
+(+(+X)-(+Y))
In these transcriptions all plus signs are explicit. The transcription

overtly signifies the positive character of a term or a statement by prefixing it
with a plus sign. This goes quite beyond the norms of usage. Thus the normal
form is 'some X is a Y' which we could simply transcribe 'stenographically'
as '+X+Y'. But the more explicit transcription, '+(+(+X)+(+Y))', brings out
the fact that the statement is an affirmation and not a denial and it explicitly
shows the positive character of both terms.
Any fully explicit transcription has five signs. The first sign signifies
affirmation ('yes') or denial ('no', 'not'). The next sign signifies 'some' or
'every' . The next sign qualifies the first term as positive or negative. The next
sign signifies 'is' or 'isn't'. And the final sign qualifies the second term as
positive or negative. Since there are 2 possibilities for each ofthe five terms,
the total possible combinations is 2x2x2x2x2 or 32. The following omnibus
formula is the general form that shows all the possible kinds of statement:
±(±(±X)±(±Y))
yes/no some/every X/nonX is/isn't Y/nonY
In transcribing an English sentence like 'every ape is a primate' we may choose

to make all positive signs explicit, in which case
every ape is a primate ==> +(-(+A)+(+P))

Or we may choose a semi-explicit transcription that suppresses the positive
signs for terms but leaves the external judgment sign [=> +(-A+P)]. Finally
we may choose the most natural 'stenographic' style of transcription that also
suppresses the positive judgment signs [=> - A+P]. The semi-explicit style
of transcription has the advantage of making it easy to tell the valence of the
statement by looking at the first two initial signs. But after a while one
becomes adept at determining the valence of any sentence without using that
technique and then the direct mode of transcription may be used. It is after all
the most natural. For the time being however, the student is advised to
transcribe sentences in the 'semi-explicit' mode, beginning each affirmative
sentence with a positive plus sign of affirmative judgment.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Give a fully explicit transcription for the following statements.

1. every noncitizen is eligible
2. some senator is not a farmer
3. not every farmer is a golfer
4. some nongolfers are noncitizens
5. every senator is a politician
6. some sen~tor isn't a noncitizen
7. no senator is a golfer
8. no farmer is ineligible
9. not every golfer is ineligible
10. it is not the case that every politician is a citizen
IT. A semi-explicit transcription drops the positive signs for terms but keeps the
external signs of affirmation and denial. For example, the semi-explicit
transcription of 'some X is a Y' is '+(+X+Y)'. Give a semi-explicit
transcription for each of the statements in exercise I.
m. A direct or 'no frills' transcription has no plus sign for affirmation as well
as no plus signs for positive terms. For example '+X+Y' is a direct
transcription for 'some X is a Y'.
Give a direct transcription of each statement in Exercise I.
********************************************************************
In the remainder of the chapter we shall use either use direct

transcriptions or 'semi-explicit' transcriptions that give algebraic expression
to 'it is the case that'. In any case we shall omit all positive signs for positive
terms. For example we shall transcribe 'every Greek is a philosopher' as
'+(-G+P)' or as '-G+P' but not as '+(-(+G)+(+P))'. (See previous exercise
Part II.)
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Regiment where necessary, represent all sentences in semi-explicit

transcriptions and apply PEQ to determine the equivalence or lack of
equivalence of the following:
1.
every noncitizen speaks a foreign language
everyone who doesn't speak a foreign language is a citizen
2.
not every ape can hop
some that cannot hop are apes
not every ape can hop
not everything that can hop is an ape
not every nonape can hop
********************************************************************
18. The Logical Law of Commutation Applied to Compound Terms
The law of commutation that applies to converse pairs of sentences also

applies to expressions that we call compound terms. A compound term is
formed by joining two terms by means of'and' or 'or' thereby forming a third
term. For example taking the two terms 'gentleman' and 'scholar' we may
form a single compound term, the conjunction, 'gentleman and scholar', that
applies to any gentleman that is a scholar. Conjunctive compound terms obey
the law of commutation. To see this let'+ ... + ... ' stand for 'both ... and ... '.Then
the expression '<+G+S>' stands for 'both G and S' or 'G that is an S ',a term
that denotes an individual that is both a G and an S. We adopt the practice of
using angular brackets for representing compound terms. Now the law of
commutation as it applies to 'both X andY' may be stated algebraically:
<+X+Y> = <+Y+X>
According to this law compound terms of form 'X andY', 'an X that is a Y'
or 'an XY thing' denote the same thing as a term of form 'Y and X', 'a Y that
is an X' or 'a YX thing'. For example, the statement 'some farmer is both a
gentleman and a scholar' is algebraically transcribed as '+F+<+G+S>'. Note
that by the law of commutation this statement is equivalent to '+F+<+S+G>'
(read: 'some farmer is a scholar and gentleman'). Thus:
+F+<+G+S> = +F+<+S+G>
19. The Logical Law of Association
The reader may remember that the Law of Association is another fundamental
law that governs the behavior of the plus sign in arithmetic. According to the
law of association, adding y+z to x gives the same result as adding z to x+.y:
Association: x+(Y+z) = (x+y)+z
Association also governs the behavior of the plus signs in logic. Consider the
following two statements:
+F+<+G+S> some farmer is a gentleman and scholar

+<+F+G>+S some farmer and gentleman is a scholar
These statements are clearly equivalent: the existence of a farmer who is both
a gentleman and a scholar is the very same state of affairs as the existence of
a farmer and a gentleman who is a scholar. The Logical Law of Association
may be stated thus:
LLA +X+<+Y+Z> = +<+X+Y>+Z

some X is Y and Z = some X and Y is Z
For logical purposes such compound phrases as 'gentleman scholar',

'gentleman who is a scholar' and 'gentleman and scholar' are treated alike, all
being transcribed as '<+G+S>' since all denote an individual who is both a
gentleman and a scholar. For example, we transcribe the statement 'some
citizen who is a farmer is a gentleman scholar' as '+<+C+F>+<+G+S>'. The
phrase 'poor widow' denotes someone who is both a poor person and a widow.
By the law of association the statement '+<+P+W>+S' ('some poor widow is
starving') is equivalent to '+P+<+W+S>', which we read as 'some poor person
is a widow who is starving'. Adjectives like 'poor' and 'starving' are

represented by letters like 'P' and 'S', which we sometimes read as noun
phrases ('poor person', 'starving person'). Thus in the above transcriptions 'P'
is first read as the adjective 'poor' and then read as the noun phrase 'poor
person'. The sentence 'some widow is poor' transcribes as '+W+P', which is
equivalent by LLC to '+P+W' ('some poor person is a widow'). Here again the
second occurrence of 'P' is given a noun phrase reading ('poor person').
20. Derivations
Let us see how LLC and LLA may be applied to show that an argument is
valid: The argument in question is:
A1
(1) some woman who is British is a novelist +<+W+B>+N
I (2) some novelist who is British is a woman +<+N+B>+W
To justify this inference we show how the conclusion can be derived from the
premise by a series of steps called a derivation:
1. +<+W+B>+N prenuse
2. +W+<+B+N> 1,LLA
3. +<+B+N>+W 2,LLC
4. +<+N+B>+W 3,LLC
The sequence of four statements constitute a derivation (also called a

'deduction' or 'proof). The premise is the first line and needs no justification.
Each subsequent line of the derivation is a step that is justified by applying a
logical law to a previous line. The justification is stated on the right. For
example, the third statement in the derivation is justified by applying LLC to
the second statement. The expression on the right indicates that we got
statement 3 by applying LLC to the statement on line 2. The derivation ends
when we reach the desired conclusion.
Given 'some citizen who is a farmer is a gentleman and a scholar' as
premise we may want to show that 'some farmer is a scholar who is a citizen
and a gentleman' follows. Algebraically transcribed this is the argument:
A2
+<+C+F>+<+G+S> preiDise
+F+<+S+<+C+G>> conclusion
The following sequence of steps shows how we may deduce the conclusion
from the premise.
l.+<+C+F>+<+G+S> premise
2. +<+F+C>+<+G+S> l,LLC
3 +F+<+C+<+G+S>> 2,LLA
4.+F+<<+G+S>+C> 3,LLC
5.+F+<<+S+G>+C> 4,LLC
6.+F+<+S+<+G+C>> 5,LLA
7.+F+<+S+<+C+G>> 6,LLC
The derivation that follows A3 shows it is a valid argument:
A3 no poor widow is a Southern congresswoman (hence) no poor Southerner

is a widow who is a congresswoman
1. -(+<+P+W>+<+S+C>) premise
2. -(+P+<+W+<+S+C>>) l,LLA
3. -(+P+<+<+S+C>+W>) 2,LLC
4. -(+P+<+S+<+C+W>>) 3,LLA
5. -(+<+P+S>+<+C+W>) 4,LLA
6. -(+<+P+S>+<+W+C>) 5,LLC
******************************************************************
Exercises:
Provide a derivation for each of the following arguments:
1. no B is a C that is a D
/no D that is a C is a B
2. some A is a B that is both a C and a D

/some A that is a B is a C that is a D
3. some A that is a B is a C that is an D

/some D is an A that is both a B and a C
*******************************************************************
21. More on Regimenting Sentences
An English sentence like 'every whale is a mammal' transcribes directly into

algebraic notation as '- W+M'. Similarly its equivalent, 'no nonrnammals are
whales', transcribes directly as '-(+(- M)+W)'. Sentences that come ready
made for direct transcription will be called 'canonical'. In real-life reasoning,
however, canonical English sentences are the exceptions rather than the rule.
We are just as likely to come across 'the whale is a mammal' and 'only
mammals are whales' as 'every whale is a mammal' or 'no non-mammals are
whales'.
Consider the simple valid inference
nothing but a bird flies I so whatever flies is a bird
To expose the structure ofthis inference we must reformulate its two sentences,
giving each one a canonical paraphrase. This process is called 'regimentation'.
The first step in regimenting a sentence has already been discussed: one must
isolate its terms, paraphrasing where that is necessary, and then assigning a
term letter to each term. Once that is done it is often easy to reformulate it as
a canonical sentence that can immediately be transcribed. In the present
example we have expressions like 'nothing but' and 'whatever' for which we
have no direct transcriptions. So we must rephrase the sentences canonically
to make them fit for transcription. Thus we first assign
B for 'bird'
F for 'flier' or 'thing that flies'
But the premise and conclusion need to be regimented a bit more. We

paraphrase the premise as 'no non bird is a flier' [==> -(+(-B)+F)] and the
conclusion as 'every flier is a bird' [=> - F+B].
Here are two sentences taken from an example in Lewis Carroll's book
on logic that need regimentation.
(1) Nothing that isn't free from damp should be kept in a drawing room.
(2) Nothing that's encrusted with salt is ever quite dry.
From these two sentences taken as premises Carroll draws the conclusion that
nothing encrusted with salt should be kept in a drawing room. The terms of the
argument are:
thing free from damp: F

thing that may be kept in a drawing room: D
thing encrusted with salt: E
We can now regiment the sentences to allow for direct transcription:
no nonF is D => -(+(-F)+D)

no E is F => -(+E+F)
I no E is D > -(+E+D)
Using PEQ we may give an argument that is equivalent to this one:
- D+F; every thing that may be kept in a drawing room is free from damp
-F+(- E); every thing that is free from damp is not encrusted with salt
-D+(- E); /every thing that may be kept is a drawing room is not encrusted
with salt
Regimenting sentences to make them suitable for reckoning is an

indispensable tool in practical reasoning. It is essential to expose the structure
of an argument by giving each sentence its proper form. Consider for example
the following simple argument that is clearly valid.
A4 some sport cars that have no automatic transmissions are convertibles

I some convertibles that lack automatic transmissions are sports cars
Regimented and transcribed the argument looks like this:
+<+S+(- A)>+C I <+C+(- A)>+S

*******************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Give a formal derivation of the conclusion of the argument A4.
II. Regiment and transcribe the following sentences.

1. None but the brave were undaunted.
2. Female acrobats are brave women who are strong and quick.
3. All but the undaunted are men who are unwilling and unable.
*******************************************************************
22. Uniquely Denoting Terms and Singular Statements
A term that denotes no more than one thing is called a uniquely denoting term
and any statement that has a UDT in the subject position is called a singular
statement. Proper names are an important kind ofUDT, appearing in singular
statements such as 'London is foggy', 'Caruso was not a baritone' and
'Einstein is a genius'. In the singular sentence 'the Queen is gracious' the term
'Queen' may be used to uniquely denote Elizabeth II but in the general sentence
'every queen is an aristocrat' the same term is not a UDT.
A singular statement makes a claim of existence and so its valence is
positive. Thus 'Caruso is a tenor' claims that the world is characterized by the
existence of a tenor who is Caruso. The term 'Caruso' is not an ordinary term
since, by convention, it applies uniquely to a single individual: Enrico Caruso.
(Of course, even a proper name like 'Caruso' can have a use that is not UDT:
for example, praising someone's singing we might say 'He is a going to be
another Caruso'. But in that second use, 'Caruso' is, strictly speaking, no
longer a proper name.) UDTs, including proper names, have special logical
characteristics and we mark the term letters that represent them with an
asterisk. For example we use 'C*' for 'Caruso', 'E*' for Einstein' and 'Q*'
for 'Queen'(in the phrase 'the Queen'). Since the valence of'Caruso is a tenor'
is positive it is logically a particular statement and we so transcribe it:
+(+C*+T)
Literally this formula says that 'some Caruso' is a tenor. However 'Caruso'
is a proper name that applies uniquely to no more than one person; if some
Caruso is a tenor, then every Caruso is. Algebraically, '+(+C*+ n' entails '+(-
C*+T)'. Similarly '(some) Einstein is a genius'(=> +E*+G) entails 'every
Einstein is a genius' (- E+G).
In general, ifN* is a proper name conventionally used to denote some
given individual, then any statement of the form 'some N* is P' will entail
'every N* is P'. This is so because there is no more than one N* so the
difference between 'some N*' and 'every N*' is an idle difference. The fact
that 'some N* .. .' entails 'every N* .. .' explains why the words 'some' and
'every' are not actually used before proper names: normally a subject of form
'some X' differs from 'every X', but in the case ofproper name subjects this
difference makes no difference and so we do not mark it in actual discourse.
Nevertheless, for logical purposes we bear in mind that the form of 'N* is P'
is particular [--> +(+N*+P)] claiming existence and that it entails a statement
claiming nonexistence. For if 'N* is P' is true, then so is 'every N* is P' or
'NoN* is a nonP'. Thus the existentially positive statement 'N* is P' entails
'every N* is P ', which claims the nonexistence of anyone who is N and not P.
For example, 'Caruso is a tenor' claims the existence of someone who is
Caruso and who is a tenor. But since there is only one Caruso, this claim
entails the negative claim that no one who is Caruso fails to be a tenor (the
nonexistence of any nontenor who is Enrico Caruso).
The sentence 'Caruso is a tenor' is transcribed as a particular sentence,
'+C*+T'. But '+C*+T' entails '-C*+T' so we could think of 'Caruso is a
tenor' as indifferently particular or universal. In a sense its quantity is 'wild';
we are free to give it whatever quantity we wish. To indicate wild quantity for
a singular sentence, 'N* is P', we shall sometimes transcribe it with a double
sign thus:
±N*+P
some/every N* is P
The Venn diagram for a singular statement will depict two states of
affairs, one positive, the other negative. Thus 'Caruso is a tenor' signifies the
presence of a tenor who is Caruso and the absence of a non-tenor who is
Caruso:
Figure 18
T
Many singular sentences have subjects of form 'the X' or 'that X'.
These too are transcribed as particular sentences with a starred term in subject
position. For example 'that white star is a dwarf is transcribed as '+W*+D'
to indicate that the subject term is a UDT uniquely denoting the white star
under consideration. Similarly 'the moon is setting' transcribes as '+M*+S'.
Since any sentence with a UDT in subject position has 'wild' quantity we could
transcribe 'the X is Y' as '±X*+Y'. For example, where 'Queen' denotes
Elizabeth II' in 'the Queen is gracious', both 'some Queen is gracious' and
'every Queen is gracious' is true and we transcribe 'the Queen is gracious as
'±Q*+G'.
In some cases a singular statement will make only the negative claim.
I may be unsure whether Homer existed but reasonably sure that ifhe did exist,
he was blind. I should then wish to claim the nonexistence of anyone who was
Homer but who was not blind. In that case my claim is represented by
'- (+H*+(- B)' or by '- (-B)+(- H*)'. The Venn diagram for this negatively
existential claim will shade the H*(- B) segment; it won't have a sign for the
presence of a blind person who was Homer since my claim is merely negative:
Figure 19
B
A statement like 'Caruso is not a baritone' is not 'existentially'

negative; it claims the existence of a non-baritone who is Caruso. It is arguable
that existentially negative singular statements are not really singular. In the
case of a statement like 'Bigfoot does not exist', it is clear that what we are
saying is quite general: namely that nothing is Bigfoot.
To summarize: Normally, the uniquely denoting subject term of a
definite singular statement denotes some given individual. Strictly speaking
such a statement has the logical form of a particular (existential) statement.
But since it entails the corresponding universal statement, a specification of
quantity is pointless and neither sign of quantity is explicit in actual discourse.
Definite singular statements have either particular or 'wild' quantity in
transcription.
23. Identities
A singular statement whose predicate term is also singular is called an identity.

Examples of identities are 'Twain is Clemens'[--> +T*+C*] and 'The Queen
of the United Kingdom is Elizabeth II' [=> +Q*+E*] and 'Twice seven is
fourteen' [=> +T*+F*]. Any identity has the wild quantity of a singular
statement and so does its converse. This makes identity arguments special. The
logical laws governing identity statements are discussed below in section 6 of
Chapter4.
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
Transcribe the following singular statements:
1. Santa Claus is kind.

2. Homer was a poet.
3. The Loch Ness Monster is shy.
4. Charles is the Prince ofWales.
5. The moon is made of green cheese.
6. Twain is not Shakespeare.
7. Twain is no Shakespeare.
8. The Bard is Shakespeare.
9. The United States Chief Executive is the President.
10. Logic is fun.
******************************************************************
4 The Language of Logic (II)
1. Compound Statements
We have adopted the practice of representing terms by upper case letters. For
example, we represent the compound term 'gentleman and scholar' as
'<+G+S>'. By convention, we use lower case for statement letters. For
example, we may let 'a' stand for 'roses are red'. We now show how to
represent compound statements such as 'roses are red and violets are blue' in
algebraic notation.
Let 'a' represent the statement 'roses are red' and 'b' the statement
'violets are blue'. The word 'and' is used as a statement connective in forming
the compound statement 'a and b'. A compound statement formed by using the
word 'and' as the connecting expression is called a conjunction and each
statement in it is called a conjunct. Thus, if 'p' is a statement and 'q' is a
statement, then 'p and q' is a conjunction whose conjuncts are 'p' and 'q'. The
algebraic transcription of 'p and q' is
+p+q
Here too we may preface the statement by some sign of affirmation ('yes', or
'it is the case that'), which we transcribe as an external plus sign. Our
transcription then looks like this:
+(+p+q)
which reads:
it is the case that: (both) p and q
The denial of a statement is formed by prefixing it with an external

minus sign. For example if'a' represents 'some farmer is a citizen' then '-a'
(read 'not a') represents 'no farmer is a citizen'. In denying a conjunction we
77
replace 'it is the case that' by 'it is not the case that' representing this negative
phrase for statement denial by an external minus sign:
-(+p+q)
In explaining the plus/minus notation for elementary statements, we began with

the one binary sign in 'P+S' and the one unary minus sign in such forms as
'- (P+S)' and '(- P)+S'. Using the unary minus and binary plus signs as a
'primitive' base, we introduced new signs by definition. In particular, we
introduced the binary minus sign representing the term connective '(belongs to)
every' and the plus sign for the positive copulas. If we had confined ourselves
to the binary plus sign and the unary minus the range of inference of our
logical system would not have been fundamentally affected. But we would
have very limited expressive power and that would radically affect our ability
to apply our logic to actual discourse. Since we would be limited to the basic
formatives we should lack the copula and the binary minus sign for 'every'.
Thus our logical language would require us to say 'not: nonprimate some ape';
we should have no way to transcribe and to deal logically with 'every ape is
a primate'. This means we could infer 'not: A some (nonP)' from 'not:(nonP)
some A' [==> -((- P)+A) /-(A+(- P))] but we should have no way to express
the inference 'every A is P /every nonP is nonA'. The same limitation in
statement logic would confine us to 'and' and 'not'. We should then have no
access to inferences involving such statement connectives as 'if and 'or'. In
the next section we show again how to use the primitive base (binary '+',
unary '- ') to define an algebraic representation for 'if. Later we extend our
expressive power to cover the range of statement connectives that enter into the
inferences we make in ordinary discourse.
2. 'If...then'
Suppose you overhear someone saying 'there is smoke but there is no fire' and
you disagree. Your denial is amounts to affirming the old saw 'if there is
smoke then there is fire'. Statements of the form 'if p then q' are called
conditionals (sometimes: hypotheticals). Of the two component statements in
a conditional, the first is called the antecedent and the second is called the
consequent. Thus, in 'if there is smoke then there is fire','there is smoke' is
the antecedent and 'there is fire' is the consequent. Let 's' stand for the
The Language ofLogic (11) 79
antecedent and 'f for the consequent. Then '+(+s+(- t) )' transcribes the
statement you overheard and '- (+s+(- t))' transcribes your denial. The denial
is equivalent to 'if s then f but we have as yet no way to transcribe 'if...then'
algebraically. Nevertheless, we may assume that 'ifp then q' is defined as 'not
both p and not-q' and transcribe what we can:
+(ifs then t) = -(+s+(-t))
The right side defines the left. The right is negative in valence so the left must
also be negative in valence. But the left side is an affirmation implicitly
prefaced by something like 'it is the case that'. It will therefore have an
external plus sign. Thus 'if s then f will have the form of an assertion '+( )'.
Since the valence is negative the next sign must be '- '. But the next sign
represents 'if and this suggests that 'if (like 'every') is logically minus and
that 'yes: ifs then f transcribes as '+(-s+t)'. Once again we have used the
equivalence of two statements to determine the plus/minus character of an
important logical connective. We did this before when we defined 'every X
is Y' by way of 'not some X isn't Y', revealing that 'every .. .is' is to be
represented as '- ... +'. And now, by defining 'if x then y' in terms of 'not
both x and not-y', we reveal that the binary functor statement connective
'if ..then' is'- ... +'. Algebraically our definitional equivalence looks like this:
ifx then y =df. not both x and not-y

+(-x+y) =df. -(+x+(-y))
The expression '=df should be read as 'is equivalent by definition to'.
*******************************************************************
Exercises:
Transcribe the following forms:

1. if x then both y and not z
2. neither y nor x (hint: treat it as a conjunction whose conjuncts are
' -y ' and ' -z ') .
3. y if not z
4. if z then y but not x
5. if not x then ify then z
6. ifx andy then z

7. if not x, then if not y then z
*******************************************************************
3. More on Transcription
Our method of algebraic transcription has shown that the formative words,
'some', 'and' 'is' and 'then' are plus words. The formative words 'every', 'if,
'not' and 'isn't' are minus words. We have seen that 'isn't' is a contraction of
'is not'. In some languages there is a contractive word for 'and not'. If
English had the word 'andn't' we should transcribe it as '-' rendering 'p
andn't q' as '+(+p-q)'. Another possible contraction could be 'thenn't'.for
'then not'. If 'thenn 't' were English we could say things like 'if p thenn 't q',
transcribing this as '+(-p-q)'
The following formative words have a plus/minus representation:
PLUS: 'yes', 'some', 'is', 'both', 'and', 'then'

MINUS: 'not','every', 'if, 'isn't', 'andn't', 'thenn't'
This master list is much larger than it looks. Thus 'all' is logically a variant
of 'every' and it, too, is a minus word. All kinds of negative particles such as
'-less', 'un-' and 'non-' are minus signs . 'Is', 'are' 'was' and other forms of
positive copula are all transcribed as plus signs; the different forms and tenses
of negative copulas such as 'isn't', 'aren't' 'won't be' are transcribed as minus
signs. For example, 'all raindrops are colorless' transcribes'+(- R+( -C))' and
'children were shouting' transcribes as '+(+C+S)'.
We have noted that some signs have no English equivalents. Consider
'+(+p+( -q))', the transcription of 'p and not q'. This is algebraically
equivalent to '+p-q', which we should have to read as 'p andn't q'. Suppose
also that we could contract 'then not' into 'thenn't'. We could then say that
'if p then not q' is equivalent to 'if p thenn't q' and we could express the
equivalence algebraically:
-p+( -q) = -p-q
The examples of 'andn't' and 'thenn't' show that algebraic

transcription is in some respects richer than English. On the other hand, there
The Language ofLogic (II) 81
are many formative words that are not variants of any words in the above list.
These cannot be directly transcribed by a (single) plus or minus sign. 'Only'
and 'unless' are examples. In transcribing a statement containing 'only' or
'unless' we must rephrase it as a statement that contains words from the above
list or variants thereof 'Only' seems to mean something like 'no non-', or 'not:
some non-'. For example, 'only citizens are voters' may be paraphrased as 'no
non-citizens are voters' and then transcribed as '- (+(-C)+V)'. 'Unless'
amounts to 'if not' so we may paraphrase 'p, unless q' as 'if not q then p' and
transcribe it as '+{- (- q)+p)'.
No variant of'or' is on the list because 'or', like 'only' and 'unless',
cannot be transcribed as a simple plus or minus sign. Statements of the form
'p or q' are common and we now turn to the question of how we may
transcribe them.
4. 'Or'
Among the logical words that cannot be directly transcribed, 'or' is the most
important. Statements of the form 'p or q' are called disjunctions and their
component statements are called disjuncts. A disjunction is equivalent to the
denial of a conjunction. Consider the statement 'either Nellie is home or Tom
is smoking'. This statement is equivalent to the denial: 'not: both Nellie is not
home and Tom is not smoking'. More generally, since we can equate 'p or q'
to a statement containing only the primitive plus/minus words 'and' and 'not',
we may use the latter statement to define an algebraic form for 'p or q':
p or q =df. -{+(-p)+{-q))
whose right side is equivalent to '+{-(-p)-(-q))', which we could read as 'if

not p thenn't not q'. Or more simply, we could avail ourselves of the word 'or'
and simply read '-(-p)-(-q)' as 'p or q'. Algebraically the definition of'p
or q' looks like this:
+{-(-p)-(-q)) =df. -{+{-p)+(-q))
Transcribing 'either Nellie is home or Tom is smoking' as
-(-n)-(-t)
we note that it is equivalent to '- (- n)+t' which is the transcription of the

conditional: 'if Nellie is not home then Tom is smoking'. More generally:
-(-p)-(-q) = -(-p)+q
p or q = if not p then q
This equivalence could have been used to define 'p or q' as 'if not p then q'.
If English had a contraction for 'then not' we could say things like 'if not p
thenn't not q', a form of compound statement that is equivalent to 'p or q'
since it claims: ifp is false, q can't also be false. We may even think of'p or
q' as an abbreviated way of saying just that. With that understanding we are
free to transcribe 'p or q' as the formula:
+(-(-p)-(-q))
Another way of thinking about 'or' is to recognize the equivalence of

'neither p nor q' and 'not either p or q'. The former is equivalent to 'both not
p and not q' (consider: 'neither Jan is going to the party nor Peter is crashing
it', which is equivalent to 'both Jan is not going to the party and Peter is not
crashing it'). So 'not either p or q' is equivalent to 'both not p and not q'. The
latter is transcribed as '+(+(-p)+{- q) )'. The negation of this is
'-(+{ -p)+( -q))', which is equivalentto '+( -( -p)-( -q))', read: 'eitherp orq'.
Here the first '- (- ' transcribes the word 'either' and the second transcribes the
word 'or'.
We shall adopt the four minus way oftranscribing 'p or q'. More
often than not, we will drop the parentheses and transcribe 'p or q' as
'- - p- - q'. The symmetry of this formula for disjunction is like the symmetry
of '+p+q', the formula for conjunction. The transcription makes it clear that
'or' has itself no direct transcription as a plus or minus sign. In this respect,
'or' is like 'only' and unlike such logical words as 'if, 'and', and 'not', each
of which is transcribed as a plus or as a minus sign. Statements of the form
'p or q' are disjunctions and negative in valence. And of course 'p or q' is
equivalent to 'q or p'. Their equation shows this: +{-(-p)-(-q)) =
+(- (- q)- (- q)). The two sides are covalent and equal. So they are equivalent.
Note that while '+(+(+p)+{+q))' (the transcription of 'p and q') and
'+{-(-p)-(-q))' (the transcription of 'p or q') are equal they are not
equivalent since they are not covalent.
5. Representing Internal Structures
We said earlier that we can evaluate many arguments with compound

statements merely by using statement letters. But it is sometimes the case that
a transcription using only statement letters is inadequate. Consider the valid
inference:
every student is literate

if Tim is not a student then he is ineligible
I if Tim is illiterate then he is ineligible
Using statement letters the inference would be represented thus:
p
-[-q]+[-r]
/-[-s] + [-r]
But this way of representing the argument would make it impossible to show
that it is valid. On the other hand, if we represent the internal structure of its
component sentences, we should transcribe it thus:
-S+L
- [+T*-S]+(+T*+(- E)]
1- [+T*+(- L)]+[+T*+(- E)]
Now it is possible to prove the argument valid by methods that we shall learn
in Chapter 6. (Note that the conclusion is equal to the sum of the premises).
The point of this example is to illustrate that we must often transcribe
compound sentences in a way that exposes the internal structure of the
component sentences.
Consider the conjunction, 'Paris is expensive but Madrid isn't'.
Letting 'p' stand for 'Paris is expensive and 'q' for 'Madrid is expensive' we
would transcribe the conjunction as '+p+(- q)'. This however would give little
clue to the real meaning of the sentence. Here again we are interested in the
structure of the component sentences of a compound sentence. In the present
case the following transcription will give us what we want:
+[+P*+E]+[+M*- E]
Note, in this and the previous example, our use of square brackets to encase
a sentence that occurs as a component in a compound sentence. Other
examples of the use of square brackets are:
some roses are white but every violet is blue: +[+R+W]+[- V+B]
if any ape is a citizen then Ike is a citizen: -[+A+C]+[+I*+C]
all crows are black but not all are honest: +[-C+B]+[-(-C+H)]
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Transcribe the following statements algebraically. Use the underlined letters

to represent the component statements.
1. If there is no fire then there is no ~moke.

2. Either there is smoke or there is no fire.
3. That roses are red and violets are .Qlue isn't true.
4. It isn't true that if there is smoke then there is fire.
5. It isn't true that roses are red or violets are blue.
II. Show that 'p unless q' and 'p or q' are equivalent.
(hint: treat 'unless' as 'if not'.)
III. If the internal structure of the components sentence in a compound are

made evident, we should transcribe 'if some citizen is a farmer, then some
farmer is a citizen' thus:
- [+F+C]+[+C+F]
Transcribe the following sentences using the letters underlined as term letters
(in upper case). Component sentences must now be encased in square brackets.
1. Some rose is nink and every violet is .Qlue.

2. If some farmer is a gentleman and ~cholar, then every farmer is literate.
3. If some farmer is a non£itizen and some farmer is a citizen then no scholar
is a thief.
IV. Any two statements that are equal and covalent are logically equivalent.
Using this sufficient condition, the following statements are seen to be

equivalent to '+(-p+q)', i.e., 'ifpthenq':
-(+(-q)+p) not both not q and p

+( -( -( -p))+q) either not p or q
+( -(-q)+( -p)) if not q then not p, either q or not p
Give three more equivalents to 'ifp then q'.
V. 1. Give seven algebraic equivalents to '+p+q'. For each algebraic formula,

give an English reading. If necessary, use contractions such as 'andn't' that
are not found in English.
2. Give seven algebraic equivalents and their English counterparts to
'-p+q'.
VI. Show that the following pairs of compound statements are equivalent.
1. p and (q orr); neither not q and not r nor not p.

2. p or (q and r); not both not p and (not q or not r).
VII. 'or' like 'and' is commutative and associative. Write out the laws of
commutation and association for 'or'.
********************************************************************
6. The General Form of Compound Statements
The contractive expressions 'andn't' and 'thenn't' are represented in the

General Form of Compound Statement, in which all positive signs are fully
explicit:
±(±(±p)±(±q))
yes/not; both/if; yes p/not p; and/andn't,thenlthenn't; yes q/not q
This omnibus formula contains all of the possible ways that two statements
may be joined to form a compound assertion or denial. For example,
'-(-(-p)-(-q)' is the transcription of 'not: if not p thenn't not q' and
'-(+( -p)-(+q))' is the transcription of 'not: both not p andn't q'.
In some languages, 'or' is repeated so that 'p or q' is expressed as 'or

p or q'. Suppose that in some ofthose languages we have a word 'om't' so
that 'or not p or not q' is expressed as 'om't p om't q'. This disjunction is
equivalentto 'ifp then not q', which transcribes as '+(-(+p)+(-q)'. But if we
represented 'om't' as a minus sign we could transcribe 'om't p om't q'
directly as '+(- (+p)- (+q))' (whose colloquial reading in normal English is 'not
p or not q'). Note that 'om't' hasn't been represented as a contraction of 'or
not' but as a new word in its own right that transcribes as a minus sign. (We
may think of 'om't p om't q' as defined by the denial of 'p and q' via the
equation: +(-p-q) =df. -(+p+q).)
Our discussion has shown that the possible ways of forming
compound statements goes beyond the expressive powers of a given natural
language like English or Greek, which lacks words such as 'thenn't' and
'om't'. All of the possible ways offorrning compounds implicit in the general
form of compound statement are expressed in algebraic notation but not all can
be expressed in English. We may nevertheless be content with the expressive
powers of English. For anything that could be said in a language that contained
the exotic contractions can be equivalently said in English. Even a contraction
like 'isn't P' is no more than a convenience that could be dispensed with for
all logical intents and purposes. After all 'x isn't P' [=> 'x- P'] is simply
short for 'x is nonP' [==> 'x+(- P)'].
7. Direct Transcriptions
In what follows we shall mainly stick to English words and we shall follow the
practice of directly transcribing them. The logical English words for which we
have direct transcriptions are:
PLUS MINUS
some every
and not
is isn't
then if
We shall also drop the initial plus sign of assertion as well as the signs for
positive terms. For example, we shall directly transcribe 'if p then q' as
'-p+q' and 'p and q' as '+p+q'. Similarly 'every A is B' transcribes as
'-A+B' and 'some A is B' as '+A+B'. The convenience of dispensing with
all of the extraneous plus signs is obvious. But there is a price. By dropping
the external sign of affirmation we lose the ability of mechanically determining
the valence of a statement by comparing its first two signs to see whether they
differ. For example, in determining the valence of'ifp then q' as negative, we
compare the first two signs of '+(- p+q)' and find them different. But if we
drop the initial sign of affirmation and transcribe 'if p then q' simply as
'-p+q' this test cannot be used. We could, however, look at '-p+q' and
mentally supply an initial plus sign of affirmation. We could then 'see' that the
'next' sign is different and thus determine that the statement is negative in
valence. We think you will agree that this is a small price to pay for the
convenience of omitting the eternal plus sign and going over to direct
transcription. One very quickly learns how to tell the valence of the simpler
and more natural forms.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Give direct transcriptions of the following statements and say whether their
valence is positive or negative (e.g., not p or not q: -p-q, negative).
1. not p andn't q
2. if not p then q
3. or p or q
4. orn't p orn't q
5. not: if not p thenn't q
6. if not p then both q and r
7 if both p and q then not r
8. both p and not q
9. if p then neither q nor r
10. if orn't p orn't q then not p
II. Using English* (a language supplemented by 'andn't', 'orn't' and

'thenn't') read each ofthe following sentences. Where possible give alternative
readings to a sentence.
Example: -p-q: orn't p orn't q; ifp thenn't q
1. -p-(-q)
2. +p-(-q)
3. --p--q
4. -(-p-q)-{+(-q)-s)
5. --{-p+q)--{-p+r)
6. -{--p--q)-(-r-s)
********************************************************************
8. Relational Statements
The statements we have so far considered have a subject of the form 'someS'
or 'every S' and a predicate of the form 'is P' or 'is not P'. In a statement like
'some boy envies every astronaut' we find two subject expressions, 'some boy'
and 'every astronaut' connected by the transitive verb 'envies'. A transitive
term is a two faced expression turning one (active) face to one subject and the
other (passive) face to a second subject; grammarians often call the subject
expression that follows the transitive verb the 'object' of the verb. In the
present example, the first subject term ('boy') denotes someone being
characterized as envier (one who envies), the second subject term denotes
someone being characterized as envied; the subject 'every astronaut' is the
'object' of the verb 'envies'. Although 'some boy admires every astronaut'
contains two subjects, it can be parsed as a subject/predicate statement, and
regimented as 'some boy is an envier of every astronaut' whose subject term
is 'boy' and whose predicate term is 'envier of every astronaut'. We call
'envier of every astronaut' a complex term. A complex term consists of a
relational term (in this case 'envier of') followed by a subject (in this case
'every astronaut'). The relational term 'envier (of)' is a third term that
mediates between 'boy' and 'astronaut'. Logicians call it a 'two place' term
since it pairs with two terms, 'boy' and 'astronaut'. The relational sentence
'some boy is an envier of every astronaut' thus has three terms which we may
represent as 'B ', 'E' and 'A'. In this sentence 'B' pairs with the active side of
'E' since the claim is that 'boy' denotes something that 'envier' denotes. 'A'
pairs with the passive side of 'E', the claim being that 'envied' denotes
whatever 'astronaut' denotes.
9. A Word About Pairing
In a two term sentence such as 'some boy is an astronaut' the terms 'boy' and
'astronaut' are paired for co-denoting some individual or individuals.
Similarly, in 'every boy is an astronaut' the same terms are paired and the
claim is that 'astronaut' denotes whatever 'boy' denotes. In a two term
sentence there is no possibility of misunderstanding: the two terms pair with
one another. Nevertheless, we could make the obvious explicit by supplying
a pairing index for any pair of co-denoting terms. If the index is numerical we
should transcribe 'some boy is an astronaut' as '+B 1+A1' or as '+B5+A5 ' using
any numeral we please as long as the two co-denoting terms are given the same
numeral. In practice, the terms in a two term sentences are not given pairing
indices. But in the case of relational sentences where we have more than two
terms we want a notation that keeps track of the term pairs. Using numerical
pairing indices for transcribing 'some boy envies every astronaut' indicates
how the active and passive sides of 'E' pair with 'B' and 'A' respectively:
In general, terms that pair with one another are used in a 'co-denoting'
way. Two terms that have a common numerical index form a 'proper (co-
denoting) pair'. The following (proper) pairs ofterms are implicit in 'some boy
envies every astronaut':
Bh E12 boy, envier

A2, E12 astronaut, envied
Bh (E 12, A2) 1 boy, envier of astronaut
A2, (E 12, B1)2 astronaut, envied by boy
In the following sentence, three subjects are related by a three place relational
term:
some sailor is giving every child a toy

+S 1+(G 123 -C2+T3)
Some of the proper term pairs implicit in the sailor sentence are:
sailor, giver
child, getter
T3, G123 toy, given

C2, (G 123, T3h child, getter of toy
T3, (G 123, C2h toy, given to child
T3, (G 123, S1)3 toy, given by sailor
Some sentences contain more than one relational term. Examples are
every owner of a farm is an owner of an animal

- (012+F2}1+(013+A3)1
someone who married a French woman is speaking to Tilly

+(M12+<+F2+W2>2}1+(SI3+T*3)1
A subject whose term is complex is called complex. The last two

sentences have complex subjects. In some sentences the object of a relation is
a complex subject. Here are two examples:
some boy envies every owner of a dog

+BI+(E12-(023+D3)2)1
every lobbyist is friendly with someone working for a member of the

Senate
- LI+(F12+(W23+(M34+S4)3)2)1
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Transcribe 'someone who is disdainful of everyone who believes in Voodoo

had been cursed by Otto'.
II. Give five examples of term pairs in the above transcription.
III. Transcribe and give some term pairs for each of the following.
1. Anyone that loves a teller who is stealing from a bank is anxious.

2. Any boy who owns a dog bathes it.
3. Some man who gave a rose to Edith stole a flower from Sara.
4. Every sailor who eats some fish is a man who thinks.
5. No boy who loves all animals is unkind to Fido.
********************************************************************
10. Subject/Predicate; Predicate/Subject
In a sentence like 'some girl is loved', the subject 'some girl' is to the left of
the predicate tenn 'loved'. But in a relational tenn like 'loves some girl' [=>
L 12+G:z], the subject expression '+G2' is to the right of its predicate term, 'L 12 '.
The predicate/subject fonn reminds us of sentences written in 'A-fonn': no
copula and the predicate tenn on the left. Indeed relational terms show that the
A-fonn is not altogether absent from English syntax. From a syntactical
standpoint, the presence of an A-fonn is just what distinguishes relational
sentences. The basic overall sentence structure is subject/predicate (with
implicit or explicit copula) but the relational tenns have the predicate-subject
structure of 'Aristotelian' sentences: no copula, predicate tenn on the left and
subject on the right.
In English the basic nonnal fonn is subject/predicate (SIP). Any
relational sentence could be 'nonnalized' by giving its relational tenns a
subject/predicate fonn. To get the relational tenn 'loves some girl' in line with
the basic SIP structure we could commute 'L 12+G2'. This would paraphrase
'- B 1 + (L 12+G2)' to give us:
or 'every boy is what some girl is loved by' (or 'every boy some girl doth
love'). In this paraphrase the relational tenn has the fonn of a nonnal 'Noun-
phraseNerb-phrase' (subject/predicate) English sentence whose algebraic fonn
is '+S+P'.
Let us call any expression offonn '±X±Y' a dyad. Note now that
'- B 1+(+G2+L 12)' is fully dyadic in structure. The sub-sentence '+G2+L 12 ' is
adyadofthefonn '+X+Y'. Themainsentenceisadyadofthefonn '-X+Y'.
In the next section we show how to get at and make explicit the dyadic
structure of any English statement/sentence.
11. 'Dyadic Normal Forms'
A dyad is an expression ofthe form '±X±Y'. Sentences, compound terms,

relational terms all have dyadic structure. Any sentence is a dyad in which the
first part, '±X', is the subject and the second part, '±Y', is the predicate.
Some dyads are compound terms and others are relational terms. In 'some
farmer is a gentleman and a scholar'[==> +F+<+G+S>] the whole sentence
is a subject-predicate dyad but its compound predicate term, '<+G+S>', is
also a dyad.
There are many English sentences that do not have a dyadic structure
on the surface. But all can be given a dyadic paraphrase. Consider 'some
farmer is a millionaire and a gentleman and a scholar' which we may freely
transcribe as '+F+<+M+G+S>'. The predicate term ofthis sentence is not a
dyad. But that may be remedied by rephrasing the sentence as 'some farmer
is a millionaire who is a gentleman and a scholar[-> +F+<+M+<G+S>>].
The paraphrase, and its algebraic transcription, now has a dyad predicate term
that 'nests' another dyad. In this way the whole sentence is formulated as fully
dyadic: the sentence itself is a dyad and all non-simple parts of it are dyads.
Relational sentences also need some tinkering to get them into proper
dyadic form. Thus in 'some boy is petting a dog'[=> +B 1+(P 12+D2)] the
expression 'P 12+D2 ' has the subject 'a dog' on the right. To render this
relational term as a proper dyad of form '+X+Y' we commute its material
elements, putting the subject term 'D2 ' to the left. In effect we rewrite the
sentence as '+B 1+(+D 2+P 12) 1' [read: 'some boy is what some dog is being
petted by']. By putting each subject to the left of its own predicate the sentence
has been reformulated as a dyad that nests another dyad. The whole sentence
is then said to be in dyadic norma/form (DNF).
A sentence is in DNF if every one of its terms belongs to a dyad.
To get a relational sentence into DNF we place each of its subject expressions
to the left of its own predicate expression. Let us take the sailor sentence as
another example. Its transcription is '+S 1+(G 123 -C2+T3). This sentence has
three subject expressions: 'some sailor', 'every child' and 'some toy'. The
first of these subjects, '+S ', is already to the left, but the second and third
subjects need to be relocated to the left of their own predicates. The resulting
DNF formula is
Here '+S 1' has the bracketed expression that follows it as its predicate. (The
predicate says of some sailor that he gives every child a toy.) '-C2 ' has the
bracketed expression that follows it as its predicate which says of every child
that it gets a toy. And '+T 3 ' too has its own predicate which says of a toy that
it is given. Each subject is now in its own dyad and the whole sentence is in
'dyadic normal form'. It is important to note that the numeral '1' pairs the
terms of the outermost dyad, the numeral '2' pairs the terms of a nested dyad
and the numeral '3' pairs the terms ofthe innermost nested dyad.
Finally consider how we would get
some boy who gave an old woman a flower was insincere
into DNF. Its transcription is
Its DNF transform is
Each dyad has a pair of co-denoting terms; the common numeral index keeps
track of the term pairs.
12. Commuting Relational Terms
Applying commutation to 'some A is a B that is a C' we get 'some A is a C

that is a B': +A+<+B+C> = +A+<+C+B>. Applying Commutation to the
relational term in '+A1+(R12+B 2)' gives us its DNF: '+A 1+(+B 2+Rn)'. For
example, given 'some boy is petting a dog' we get 'some boy a dog is petting'
or 'some boy is what some dog is petted by'.
The last example reminds us once again that any sentence can be
formally rewritten in a way that brings out its dyadic structure, what we are
calling its 'dyadic normal form'. When a sentence is in DNF each of its non-
elementary terms (relational or compound) will itself be a dyad of form

'±X±Y' that may in turn 'nest' other dyads so that the whole sentence is a
structure of dyads. As another example consider the difference between the
English Normal Form and the Dyadic Normal form of
some gambler who petted a dog is afraid of all black male cats
ENF: +<+G1+(P 12+D 2)>+(A23 -<+B3+M3+C3>3)

DNF: +<+G1+(+D 2+P 12)>+(-<+<+B3+M3>+C3>3+A23 )
(We begin now to suppress some of those numerical subscripts which are not
essential.) The example illustrates that it is not always possible to get
anything like a normal sounding DNF paraphrase of the original sentence. In
this case the closest we could get was
some gambler who a dog did pet is of every black male that is a cat
afraid
We do our reasoning in ordinary English and for that reason we shall

not be making routine use ofDNF formulas. Nevertheless, sentences in DNF
are theoretically important in revealing the basic two-term structure of the
sentences that enter into logical reasoning. One practical use of the DNF
formulas comes into play when we wish to detach a sub-sentence from its
context. For example, given 'some dog bit a man' we may want to infer 'a
man was bitten'. We do this by first transcribing the premise in ENF as
'+D 1+B 12+M2' and then transforming it into DNF:
We may then detach the 'sub-sentence', '+M2+B 12 '. The justification for
detachment is discussed in section 16 below.
G.W.F. Leibniz, one ofthe great logicians ofthe past five hundred
years, noted that every relational sentence consists of sub-sentences, each
containing two terms. Thus 'Paris loves Helen' is understood to say 'Paris
loves and eo ipso Helen is loved'. Leibniz's idea was that these sub-sentences
are implicit in 'Paris loves Helen'. Our DNF notation for relational sentences
represents Leibniz's analysis in perspicuous fashion. The DNF of
'P* 1+(L 12+H* 2)' is 'P* 1+(H* 2+L 12)', from which we detach the sub-sentence
'+H* 2+L 12 '. The idea that all ofthe component dyads are sub-sentences was
also proposed by A. Arnaud, a contemporary ofLeibniz, who pointed out that

'a man who is wise is honest' contains the sub-sentence 'a man is wise'. This
too is revealed in the algebraic notation '+<+M+W>+H', which contains the
phrase 'man and wise' in the form of a sentence 'some man is wise'.
DNF forms come into play when we come to compare term logic with
modern predicate logic (see the discussion of the Term Way and the Predicate
Way in Chapter 2, section 10, and Chapter 8). There DNF formulas serve as
a bridge between the two approaches to logical reckoning. Indeed, using DNF
we can show how to 'translate' any sentence of the term functor logic (TFL)
into the logical language ofModern Predicate logic (MPL).
13. Immediate Inferences from Relational Statements
Any inference in which a conclusion is deduced from a single premise is called

an immediate inference. For example, given the premise 'all children are
students' we can (immediately) infer 'no nonstudent is a child' by PEQ. We
now discuss immediate inferences where the premise is a relational statement.
In dealing with them we may need to apply laws like commutation, association
and obversion to relational terms.
Recall how the law of association enables us to infer 'some A that is
B is C' from 'some A is a B that is C'. Algebraically this inference is:
+A+<+B+C>/+<+A+B>+C
Consider now the relational statement '+A 1+(R 12+B 2)' (read: 'some A is R to
some B'). Applying association gives us '+(+A 1+R12)+B2' which may be read
'something that some A is R to is a B'. An instance of this form of argument
is:
some boy is afraid of some dog

/something that some boy is afraid of is a dog
14. Obversion
We have seen (Chapter 3, section 14) that the two sentences 'not every A is a
B' and 'some A is a nonB' are equivalent. We call either one the obverse of
the other. One sentence is the obverse of another if and only if they differ in
three ways: in external sign, in the quantity of their subjects and in the quality
of their predicates. This is easily seen if we form the equation of the two
obverses:
- (- A+B) =+{+A+(- B))
Similarly 'no A is B' and 'every A is nonB' are obverses:
-{+A+B) =+{-A+{- B))
Obverses are equivalent by PEQ. Consider now the two sentences:
some boy failed a test +B 1+({-.P) 12+T2)

some boy didn't pass every test +B 1-(P 12 - T 2)
Note that the relational terms '+((- P) 12+T2)' and '-{P 12 - T 2)' are obverses of
one another. That obversion applies to relational terms is further evidence that
relational terms are sentential in nature. Transforming a sentence into its DNF
brings this out.
+B 1+{+T2+{- P) 12) some boy some test did fail

+B 1- (- T 2+P d some boy not every test did pass
Here the two obverse 'sub-sentences' are
'-(-T+P)' and '+{+T+(-P))'
Applied to relational terms with more than two subject expressions, the same
rule applies: drive in the minus sign so as to change the sign of the relational
expression and the signs of quantity of each subject. For example from
some sailor didn't give every child a toy
we derive
some sailor failed-to-give some child every toy
The equivalence shows that the right side is the obverse of the left since all
quantities of the two subjects within the relational term have been changed:
15. The Passive Transformation
A familiar type of relational inference is the move from the active to the
passive form or from the passive to the active form of a relation. An example
IS
some boy is petting a dog I some dog is petted by a boy

+BI+(PI2+D2) I +D2+(PI2+BI)
To show the validity of this inference we give an annotated proof. In an

annotated proof, each step is justified by appeal to some relevant principle of
logic.
1. +BI+(P12+D2) premise
2. +(PI2+02)+BI 1, commutation
3. +(+D2+P 12)+B 1 2, commutation
4. +D 2+(P 12+B 1) 3, association
Line 4 is the conclusion we wanted to prove. As the annotation on the right

indicates, line 4 is got from line 3 by applying the principle of association.
In applying Commutation and Association to relational statements we
must take care to deal only with genuine dyads. A genuine dyad consists of a
pair of material elements that have a common subscript. To see the difference
between a genuine and a non-genuine dyad suppose we are given the second
step and try to move form there to 'P 12+(D 2+B 1)', justifying this move by
Association. The move is wrong since the expression 'D2+B 1' is ill-formed:
its two material elements have no common subscript.
16. Simplification
The following inference pattern exemplifies a principle called Simplification:
p and (q and r) I q and r
In propositional logic, simplification consists of detaching one of the two

conjuncts from a conjunctive premise. The detached conjunct is then asserted
as the conclusion. For example, given 'Sam is tall and (Mary is pretty and Don
is in love)' we may infer 'Mary is pretty and Don is in love' by simplification.
Algebraically the move allows us to detach '(+y+z)' from '+x+(+y+z)' to
conclude '+y+z'. More generally, simplification allows us to detach any well-
formed dyad from an expression whose terms are connected by a binary
commutative and associative functor (the'+ ... +' functor). We shall formulate
the Law of Simplification as:
Law of Simplification (LS) Any well-formed dyad may be detached from an

expression whose terms are connected by a binary commutative and
associative functor (viz., the '+ ... +'functor).
Thus from 'some farmer is a gentleman and scholar' we may infer 'some
gentleman is a scholar'; detaching '+G+S' from '+F+<+G+S>' is justified by
the law of simplification.
Simplification also applies to relational statements. Given the premise
'some boy is petting a dog'[=> +B 1+(P 12+D 2)] we may first derive its DNF,
'+B 1+(+D 2+Pd', by commutation, from which, by simplification, we may
detach '+D2+P 1/, 'some dog is petted', as the conclusion. The line of
reasoning from 'some boy petted a dog to 'a dog was petted' can be made
more explicit by giving an annotated proof.
1. +B1+(P12+D2) premise
2. +B 1+(+D2+P12) 1, commutation
3. +D 2+P 12 2, simplification
The following sequence is a derivation of 'Brutus killed' from 'Brutus

killed Caesar'.
1. +B1+(K12+C2) prenuse
2. +(+B1+K12)+C2 1, association
2, simplification
To infer 'a truck is being sold' from 'some farmer is selling a truck to
a neighbor' we first formulate the premise in DNF:
from which, by commutation and association, we derive
Next we detach 'some neighbor is buying a truck', i.e.,
Finally, we detach '+T2+S 123 ' as the conclusion.

In a sentence like 'some poor man is reading a newspaper' we may
detach two sentences 'some man is poor' and 'some newspaper is read'. The
sentences 'some man is poor' and 'some newspaper is read' are called 'sub-
sentences' of the larger sentence in which they are embedded. And generally,
any compound or relational term within a sentence has the status of a 'sub-
sentence'.
17. Pronouns and Proterms
Very often we use a term and then use that term again to denote the very same
thing as previously denoted. Consider the difference between the following
two pairs of sentences:
some men were shouting; some men were quiet

+M+S; +M+Q
In this pair, the recurring term, M, does not denote the same individuals. By
contrast, in
some men are shouting; they are alarmed

+M'+S; ±M'+A
the second occurrence ofM denotes 'the men in question'. Note the use of a
common superscript to indicate that in both sentences the subject term denotes
the same individuals. In the second sentence, the subject 'they' refers to the
men in question already referred to. So we need a pair of terms that are
designed to denote one and the same individuals in both sentences. Terms
marked by the common superscript are calledproterms. Note also that the
second sentence has 'wild quantity' since 'they' has the meaning of 'the men
in question' and all, not merely some, of the men in question are denoted by
this proterm.
A context involving a pair of proterms is called a pronominalization.
The first proterm of a pronominalization is called the antecedent; the second
is called the pronoun. (The pronoun may be prefixed with wild quantity.)
Two common forms of pronominalizations are
some A is B and it is C +[+A"+B]+[+A"+C]

if any A is a B then it is C -[+A'+B]+[+A'+C]
A third common form involves 'reflexive pronouns'. Here the antecedent and
the pronoun occur in the same sentence. Examples are:
every barber shaves himself - B' l+Sl2+B' 2

some barber shaves himself +B' l+Sl2+B' 2
In these sentences both occurrences ofB denote the same barber, but as the
numerical indices show, the first occurrence denotes the barber qua shaver, the
second denote him qua shaved. The next example is a favorite of linguists:
a boy who was fooling her kissed a girl who loved him
+<+B' I+(F12+G" 2)1>I+(K13+<+G" 3+(L34+B' 4)3>3)1
Here both occurrences of B and both occurrences of G are pronominal. But

where B 1 denotes the boy qua footer, B4 denotes him as loved and where G 2
denotes the girl who was fooled, G3 denotes her as lover.
Here are several other examples of reflexive pronominalizations:
1. some girl hates a lover of her mother

+G' 1+H12+(L23+(M34+G'4)
2. every poet understands every metaphor contained in his own work

3. no barber shaves his uncle

-(+B' t+(S12+(U23+B' 3)))
4. some barber shaves himself and no one else

+[+B' 1+S 12+B' 2]+[+B' 1-(S 12+(- B' 2))]
Note that 'else' is not a pronoun but the contrary of a pronoun.

We may apply a rule, called IPE (for Internal Pronoun Elimination)
to the transcription of an internal pronominalization that allows us to remove
the pronoun. Thus, given +B' 1+S 12+B' 2, the transcription of 'some barber
shaves himself, we can eliminate the second proterm to give us +B 1+S 11 • Note
that the elimination is accompanied by changing S 12 to S 11 . Applying IPE to
+B' 1+S 12+B' 2is analogous to changing 'some barber shaves himself to 'some
barber is a self-shaver'.
IPE IfP ',. ... P 'n is an internal pronominalization, remove P 'nand replace
any remaining occurrence ofn by,.
Applying IPE to sentence 1 above we have
1. some girl hates a lover of her mother

+G' t+(H12+(L23+(M34+G' 4)))
I 1.1 +G 1+(H12+(L23+M3t))
which is got by eliminating G' 4 and replacing 4 by 1 in M34 .
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Apply IPE to 2, 3 and 4 above to get 'pronoun-free' transcriptions.
II. Apply IPE also to 'some barber shaves himself but no one else'. (Hint:
(- B ' 2), which transcribes 'else', is not a pronoun, so should not be eliminated.)
********************************************************************
Appendix to Chapter 4
18. Bounded Denotation
The extension of a tenn comprises all the things that have the characteristic it
signifies. For example whoever has the characteristic of being a snob is in the
extension of the tenn 'snob'; thus all snobs are in the extension of 'snob' and
all critics are in the extension of 'critic'. But a tenn in use need not denote
everything in its extension. Thus in 'some critics are snobs; they admire only
one another' the tenn 'critics' is being used with restricted denotation to denote
certain critics (not necessary all who are snobs). Those who utter this sentence
may indeed have certain critics in mind whom they could identify. But in any
case they are restricting the denotation ofthe subject term to certain critics that
are, in principle, identifiable. The denotation of 'critics' in this statement is
said to be 'bounded'. A tenn that is being used with bounded denotation will
be represented by a marked letter. Thus our sentence about the critics would
be transcribed thus:
certain critics are snobs; anyone admired by some one of them is one of them.
The case of bounded denotation is an object lesson in how the
denotation of a tenn is context dependent. Consider 'critic' in 'every logician
is a critic'. Here too 'critic' signifies the characteristic of being a critic
(BEING A CRITIC) but in this use it has no denoting role at all. In 'some
critic is a logician' 'critic' does have a denoting role; it denotes some critics.
In 'every critic is unhappy', 'critic' denotes all the things that have the
characteristic of being a critic, that is, it denotes all of its extension. A
distributed tenn such as 'critic' in 'all critic like this play' denotes all of its
extension. But an undistributed tenn (e.g. 'critic' in 'some critics dislike the
play' does not denote all of its extension. [For more discussion of distribution
see section 3 in Chapter 6.] In 'the critic liked the play' the term 'critic'
uniquely denotes a particular critic whom the speaker could identify for us. In
'a critic is in the audience; the critic (in question) is taking notes' the term
'critic' is a 'protenn'. (Thus 'the critic' could be replaced by 'he' or by 'she'
in its second occurrence.) The moral of these examples is that while the
extension of a tenn is independent of context, what, if anything, it denotes can
vary from one sentence to the next.
19. Terms in their Contexts
A term in a statement is meaningful in three distinct ways: (i) it expresses a

sense, (ii) it signifies an attribute and (iii) it denotes (a) thing(s). The term
'wise person', for example, expresses the sense (description, characterization)
of BEING A WISE PERSON and it signifies the attribute (property,
characteristic) ofbeing a wise person (wisdom). What it denotes must satisfy
the description by having the characteristic signified. The expressive and
signifying meanings do not vary from context to context. But the denotation
does. In 'some wise man gave Sally excellent advice' the term 'wise man'
denotes a particular wise man. In 'every wise man is honest', the same term
denotes all wise men.
Terms are various. Some, like 'farmer', 'citizen' and 'lover(of)', are
general descriptive expressions usually denoting more than one thing. Some,
like 'Caruso' and 'forty-second president of the United States', are uniquely
denoting expressions (UDT's). Some, like 'he', and 'they', are 'proterms'
that denote a thing or things previously denoted. Others have restricted
denotation. For example, in 'Certain critics admire only one another' the term
'critics' occurs with restricted denotation, denoting persons in a restricted class
within the larger class of critics. In many cases what determines the
denotation of a term is the context of utterance. For example, in 'that ball is
new' the term 'ball' uniquely denotes the ball in question. In most contexts the
term 'moon' uniquely denotes the satellite of the Earth as contrasted with its
occurrence in 'Jupiter has more than one moon' where it is not a UDT. Proper
names by convention uniquely denote their bearers. For example, used as a
proper name 'Caruso' denotes Enrico Caruso, the famous tenor. :r.t 'Elton is
no Caruso' the term in predicate position is not a proper name but a general
term.
In evaluating arguments it is important that we know whether a term
is a proper name since sentences containing proper names have logical
properties that differ from those of sentences containing only general terms.
For example, if the subject term of '(some) Sis P' is a proper name then we
write it as '(some) S* is P' so we know that 'every S* is P' is entailed. To
indicate how a term denotes in a context, we often make use of term markers.
There are four kinds of term markers:
1. Pairing markers. This indicates how two terms are being paired for co-
denoting.
2. Pronominal markers. These indicate that a given recurrent term is a proterm,
denoting the same thing again.

3. Uniquely denoting term markers (UDT markers). These show that a term
has unique denotation in a given context. For example in 'the barber was
asleep' [=> +B*+A] the term 'barber' has unique denotation.
Proper names are UDTs in all contexts.
4. Restrictive markers. These indicate that a given term'S' is being used to
denote the members of a restricted class of S things.
1. Pairing markers
A pairing marker is a common numerical index affixed to a pair of terms to

indicate co-denotation. The numerals' 1' and '2' in
+A1+R12+B2 > some A is R to a B

-<+AI+BI>I+RI2+C2 --> every A that is a B is R to a C
are pairing markers. In 'some dog was barking at a cat' [-> +D 1+(B 12+C 2)]
the index '2' pairs 'cat' and 'bark' for denoting a cat that is being barked at.
Any two-term sentence is implicitly pair-marked. For example, 'some fanner
is a citizen' could be transcribed as '+F4+C/. In general we omit pair markers
when transcribing simple nonrelational sentences.
2. Pronominal markers
A pronominal marker is one or more prime superscripts that we affix to a

recurrent term to indicate that its denotation is focused on some one thing or
things. Super-scripted terms are protenns. Examples are:
some A is a B, that A is a C +[+A'+B]+[+A'+C]

some A is R to itself +A' I+RI2+A' 2
every A is R to itself -A'I+RI2--A'2
if any A is Bit is also C -[+A'+B]+[-A'+C]
The first subject in which the protenn occurs is the antecedent, the
subsequent subjects are pronouns. The sequence of sentences containing
antecedent and pronoun is a pronominalization. A single sentence can
constitute a pronominalization. For example, in 'some barber shaved
himself[=> +B' 1+S 12+B' 2] the common pronominal superscript indicates
that the barber being shaved (denoted by 'B' 2 ') is the same as the barber that
shaves (denoted by 'B' 1').
3. Uniquely denoting term markers
Unlike the focus of a proterm like 'man' in 'that man', which differs from
context to context depending on the antecedent, the focused denotation of some
recurrent terms is conventionally and permanently fixed. Thus, the proper
name 'Caruso' differs from 'he' in being always focused on the great Italian
tenor who sang at the 'Met' in the twenties and thirties. Also, unlike proterms,
which are usually descriptive ('an ape ...that ape'), proper names are
nondescriptive. [But some proterms are nondescriptive. Thus you say 'a man
is on the roof and I say 'it's not a man'. Here I focus on what you focused on
but I deny the description 'man'. My pronoun 'it' may be understood to refer
to 'the thing in question' i.e., that thing you took to be as man'. See F.
Sommers, The Logic ofNatural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1982, Chapter 11, where it is argued that proper names are a special kind of
nondescriptive proterms.]
Proper names are one kind of UDT. We mark UDT term letters by a
circumflex. Some UDTs are descriptive. Thus in 'the Sun is ninety-three
million miles away' and 'The present monarch is a woman' the terms 'Sun'
and 'present monarch' are descriptive UDTs. A descriptive UDT differs from
a proterm in occurring without antecedent. Consider the difference between the
above UDT occurrence of'Sun' and the occurrence of'Sun' as a proterm in
a context like 'a sun was visible on the screen; it (the sun) was a white dwarf'.
Descriptive UDTs are very much like proterms whose antecedent
background is taken for granted. For example, in 'the present monarch is a
woman' (said in 2000) the term 'present monarch' is a UDT. But we may also
view it as a proterm whose contextual background is understood. If we made
the background explicit we might have something like:
A present monarch was crowned in 1953 . She (i.e., the monarch)

was a woman.
The transcription would then be
+M'+C; +M'+W
However when the UDT occurs without background we give it a UDT

marker:
the monarch is a woman [=> +MA+W]
4. Restrictive markers
Some terms are used with restricted denotation. These are marked
by two stroke signs. For example, 'critic' may denote a special group of
critics in a context like the following:
certain critics who are snobs admire only one another
So used, the term 'critics' denotes the members of a subclass of critics and· we
should transcribe the sentence in two parts, thus:
+[+/C/+S]+[-(A 12+/C/1)+/C/2]
certain critics are snobs and anyone admired by one of them is one of them
Restricted terms are not focused. They are like general terms only
their range of denotation is bounded or restricted.
20. Rules for Using Markers
The following rules govern the use of markers:
1. Pairing markers
When a numerical (co-denoting) index has been used as a marker on an un-

distributed term, 'X', another index may be used again in repeating the
sentence. For example, we may transcribe 'some A is B' as '+A1+B 1' and then
again as '+A2+~' and so on. Moreover, if an undistributed term occurs twice
in different sentences it is generally advisable to use new numerical indices.
For example, where 'some A is R to a B' has been transcribed as
'+A1+R12+B2', weshouldnottranscribe 'some A is FtoaC' as '+A 1+F 12+C 2'
but as '+A3+F34+C/. But where one or both occurrences are universally
distributed, the same index may be used:
+A 1+R12+B 2 some A is R to a B
-(+A 1+F 12+C 2) no A is F to any C
In general, an assignment of a co-denoting index to a distributed term is

always unrestricted.
2. Pronominal markers
A similar rule holds for pronominal superscript indices. Here the antecedent
determines the indexing. In a pronominalization whose antecedent proterm is
undistributed we introduce a proterm superscript. But if we have a new
pronominaliation, we cannot index new occurrences of the proterm by the
same superscript. For example, having transcribed 'some A is P and that A is
Q' as
+[+A'+P]+[+A'+Q]
we may not transcribe 'some A is Band it is C' as
+[+A'+B]+[+A'+C]
However, where context warrants an interpretation that continues to focus on

the same A-thing we have a single pronominalization and then we should
continue to use the same superscript. For example: 'some A is B; it is C; it is
D ... ' transcribes as
+A'+B; +A'+C; +A'+D ...
There is no restriction on the assignment of superscripts to proterms

whose antecedents are distributed. For example, having transcribed 'some A
is Band it is C' with a double prime superscript, we are free to transcribe 'if
any A is D then it is E' using that same superscript: -[+A"+D]+[- A"+E].
3. Uniquely denoting term markers
Uniquely denoting terms, UDTs, are given asterisks. For example, a letter
representing a proper name in transcription is given one. There is no restriction
on the recurrent use of the same name over many different contexts. Other
UDTs occur in phrases like 'the moon', 'the President'. However it is
sometimes clear that the term 'S' in a phrase of form 'the S' is really a
proterm subject. If so, we do not mark it as a UDT but as a proterm that is
subject to the restrictions that govern how we assign pronominal superscripts.
We should, for example, normally transcribe 'the moon is full' as '+M*+S'.
On the other hand, we may be talking about one of Jupiter's moons and say
'the moon was first seen by Galileo'. Here 'the moon' is interchangeable with
'it' (that moon, the moon in question); we should then treat the expression 'the
moon' as a pronoun and give 'moon' proterm status.
4. Restrictive markers
There are no special rules for assigning the stroke markers to terms of
restricted denotation.
5 Syllogistic
1. Validity
In this chapter we study arguments that have two or more premises. Any
argument consists of n statements (a conclusion and n-1 premises). An
argument is called a syllogism if it has as many terms as it has statements,
each term appearing twice in different statements. Here are two examples of
syllogistic arguments:
A1 all baboons are apes

all apes are primates
I all baboons are primates
A2 no primate is a reptile
some reptiles are herbivores
all baboons are primates
/some herbivores are not baboons
Al is a syllogism with three recurrent terms and three statements. A2 is a

syllogism with four recurrent terms and four statements. (Syllogisms with
more than two premises are often referred to as polysyllogisms or sorites.)
Logicians are especially interested in two kinds of syllogism:
1. Those containing only universal statements. (A1 is an example.)

2. Those containing exactly two particular statements one of which is the
conclusion. (A2 is an example.)
Syllogisms of type 1 are called U-regular

Syllogisms of type 2 are called P-regular
All other syllogisms are irregular. The reason for being interested in regular
109
syllogisms is simple: only regular syllogisms are valid. (A1 is U-regular; A2

is P-regular.)
Logicians speak of the mood of a syllogism. A syllogism that is of
type 1 or type 2 is said to have a regular mood. If its mood is irregular, the
syllogism is invalid. So the first question we ask when looking at a syllogism
is: What is its mood? If its mood is regular, it may be valid. If its mood is
irregular we may dismiss it forthwith as invalid. For example, looking at the
argument:
A* Some cats are tigers

some tigers are striped
/some cats are striped
we know at once that, despite its plausible appearance, it does not have a valid
form, being neither U-regular nor P-regular.
The form of A* is:
some X is Y
some Yis Z
/some X is Z
(Since the form is invalid, there will be counter-instances. After a moments

reflection we may think of a counter-instance like
some cats are mangy animals

some mangy animals are dogs
/some cats are dogs)
A second question we ask is: Do the premises add up to the conclusion? The
answer to this question is again crucial. For only those syllogism that add up
are valid.
These two conditions-being regular and adding up-are the only
conditions that a valid syllogism has to satisfy. We can state the criteria for
syllogistic validity thus:
The REGAL Principle: A syllogism is valid ifand only ifits mood is regular
and it adds up.
Syllogistic Ill
We call this the Regal Principle because the word 'regal' connotes
regular and ega/ (French for 'equal') thereby reminding us of the two
conditions to look for in a syllogism. Each condition is necessary for validity.
Taken together they are sufficient.
REGAL is a decision procedure telling us how to proceed in deciding
whether a given syllogistic inference is valid or not. In section 4 of this chapter
we shall justify REGAL, explaining why Regularity and Equality do the trick.
But for now we shall apply REGAL. In applying Regal to check the validity
of a syllogism, we first look to see whether the syllogism is regular. If it is
irregular we immediately judge the syllogism to be invalid. But if it is regular
we go on to see whether the conclusion is equal to the sum of the premises. If
it also adds up we judge the syllogism valid. Both conditions must hold; if
either one fails to hold, we judge the syllogism invalid. If both do hold, we
judge the syllogism valid.
Let us first consider a U- regular syllogism:
A3 Ul every Athenian is a Greek -A+G

U2 every Greek is mortal -G+M
(so) U3 every Athenian is mortal 1-A+M
A3 has three statements and three recurrent terms. It is U-regular and its
conclusion is equal to the sum of its premises. So it is valid. That A3 is valid
can also be seen if we represent the states of affairs signified by its premises
in a single Venn diagram:
Figure 20
The first premise is negative, signifying the nonexistence of non-Greek

Athenians. This is represented by shading the A, nonG area. The second
premise is also negative: it signifies the nonexistence of anyone who is both a
Greek and a non-mortal. This is represented by the shaded G, nonM area. We

now note that the A, nonM area is shaded. So the state of affairs signified by
the conclusion, i.e., nonexistence of anyone that is both an Athenian and
immortal is already represented in the diagram representing the states signified
by the two premises. Thus the Venn diagram shows that AI is a valid
syllogism.
Consider the following P-regular argument:
A4 U 1 every Greek is literate -G+L

P2 some philosopher isn't a non-Greek +P-(-G)
P3 /some philosopher isn't illiterate /+P-(-L)
G is the middle term (i.e., the one shared by the two premises but not the
conclusion). Notice that the second occurrence ofG is algebraically positive
since the two minus signs cancel out. Thus the conclusion results from adding
the two premises in a way that cancels out the positive occurrence of G,
replacing it by L. Since it is both regular and algebraically correct, A4 satisfies
the Regal principle.
Consider now the following syllogism, A4 *, that is equivalent to A4:
A4* U1 every Greek is literate -G+L

P2 * some philosopher is a Greek +P+G
P3* I some philosopher is literate /+P+L
Each statement in A4 * corresponds to an equivalent statement in A4. So A4 *,

like A4, is valid. We have labeled the statements of A4 and A4* according to
their quantity or valence, P for particular/positive and U for
universal/negative. This gives the valence profile, or what we will call the
mood, of the syllogism. Thus the mood of A4 and A4* is UP/P, a P-regular
syllogism. This Venn diagram graphically shows the validity of A4*:
Syllogistic 113
Figure 21
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Use the REGAL principle to check the validity of the following syllogisms.
1. no man is an island
every island is a land mass
so, no man is a land mass
2. some logicians are philosophers

some philosophers are mathematicians
so, some logicians are mathematicians
3. some noncombatants were armed

no soldiers were noncombatants
so, some soldiers were unarmed
4. every boy is a dog lover

every dog lover is kind
some kids are boys
every kind person is gentle
so, some kids are gentle
5. no cheater is honest
none who are dishonest are successful
so, so cheater is successful
6. some dogs are mean

some dogs are vicious
so, some dogs are mean and vicious
7. all lovers are poets

all poets are sentimental
no biologists are sentimental
some biologists are wise
so, every lover is wise
8. all lovers are poets

all poets are sentimental
no biologists are sentimental
some biologists are wise
so, some who are wise are not lovers
9. some pilots are brave

some cowards are not pilots
so, no coward is brave
10. some soldiers are brave and true

whoever is brave and true will be honored by all citizens
so, some soldiers will be honored by all citizens
********************************************************************
2. Inference
We have just learned a decision procedure for evaluating any syllogistic

argument for validity. Evaluating arguments is a typical kind oflogical task.
Another kind of logical task is inferential: to complete an incomplete
argument by drawing a conclusion from a given set of premises. In solving
inference problems we draw on our knowledge of the two characteristics that
every valid syllogism must have: (i) it must add up and (ii) it must either
consist entirely ofU-statements or else it must have a P-conclusion and exactly
one P-statement among the premises.
Syllogistic 115
Here is an inference problem taken from Lewis Carroll's logic book.

Carroll gives us three premises and he asks the reader to supply a fourth
statement as a conclusion to give us a complete syllogism:
(1) No terriers wander among the signs of the Zodiac

(2) Nothing that does not wander among the signs of the Zodiac is a
comet.
(3) Nothing but a terrier has a curly tail
/(4) ? ? ?
The tricky part of dealing with a problem of this kind is to sort out the terms
and to paraphrase each sentence in a way that permits us to transcribe it
algebraically (i.e., as a sentence that affirms or denies something of the form
'some/every X is/isn't Y'). This procedure is known as regimentation. [The
reader may wish to look back at the discussion of regimentation in section 10
of Chapter 2 and sections 17 and 21 of Chapter 3.] The following
transcriptions show how we may regiment the three premises of Carroll's
example.
Terms:
T =terrier
W = wanderer among the signs of the Zodiac
C =comet
S = curly tailed
Using these term letters we may regiment the argument thus:
(1) NoT is a W -(+T+W)

(2) no non-W is a C -(+(-W)+C)
(3) no non-Tis an S -(+(-T)+S)
/(4) ? ? ? I???
We are being asked to supply the conclusion. Since all of the premises are U-
statements we know by the regularity requirement that the conclusion must
also beaU-statement. So all we now need to do is add the premises. Driving
minus signs inward and adding gives us
-T-W-(-W)-C-(-T)-S = -C-S
The expression on the right is the conclusion every comet isn't curly tailed.
By PEQ, this is equivalent to '-(+C+S)' or no comet is curly tailed. This
conclusion is a U-statement and it completes the syllogism as a valid
argument. If a set of premises contains a single P-statement they should be
summed to a P-conclusion. Here is another inference problem adapted from
Lewis Carroll (we supply the transcriptions using P, N, D and W as term
letters).
(1) all puddings are nice -P+N

(2) some deserts are puddings +D+P
(3) no nice things are wholesome -(+N+W)
/(4) ? ? ? I???
Here we see a P-statement among the premises so we know that the conclusion
must be a P-statement. We know that a conclusion may be drawn by adding
up the premises and canceling the middle terms. Adding up we have
- P+N+D+P- N- W == - W+D or +D- W
Of the two algebraic alternatives for a conclusion, only +D- W will give us a
syllogism that is valid in mood. For we need a particular conclusion. So our
answer to Lewis Carroll's problem is
/(4) +D- W: some deserts aren't wholesome
We are now ready to tackle the Lewis Carroll problem we cited in

Chapter 1. Carroll asks the reader to draw a conclusion from the following
premises:
( 1) Babies are illogical

(2) Nobody is despised who can manage a crocodile
(3) Illogical person are despised
Regimenting and transcribing these algebraically we have:
1. -B+(-L)
2. -(+D+M)
3. -(-L)+D
Syllogistic 117
All three premises are universal. So any valid syllogism with these three
premises must be U-regular. This means that the conclusion must be universal.
Adding up the premises gives us '-B-M' (or, equivalently, '-(+B+M)').
Thus the conclusion is:
(4) No baby can manage a crocodile
About Carroll's next example we said earlier that it is the sort of

problem that is best approached with logical method or technique for solving
just this sort of problem. We now possess that technique.
( 1) Everything not absolutely ugly may be kept in a drawing- room.

(2) Nothing that is encrusted with salt is ever quite dry.
(3) Nothing should be kept in a drawing room unless it is free from
damp.
(4) Bathing-machines are always kept near the sea.
(5) Nothing that is made of mother-of-pearl can be absolutely ugly.
(6) Whatever is kept near the sea gets encrusted with salt.
We transcribe it thus:
1. -{-U)+K
2.-(+E+D)
3.-(+K-D)
4. -B+S
5.-(M+U)
6.-S+E
All six premises are universal. So again the conclusion must be universal.
Adding up the premises gives us '-B-M' or '-{+B+M)', which is the
transcription of
7. No bathing machine is made of mother of pearl.

********************************************************************
Exercises: (Carroll examples)
1. All cats understand French.

Some chickens are cats.
I? ? ?
2. I have been out for a walk.

I am feeling better.
I ? ? ?
3. No bride-cakes are wholesome.
What is unwholesome should be avoided.
I ? ? ?
4. All my cousins are unjust.
All judges are just.
I ? ? ?
5. Things sold in the street are of no great value.

Nothing but rubbish can be had for a song.
Eggs of the Great Auk are very valuable.
It is only what is sold in the street that is really rubbish.
I ? ? ?
********************************************************************
3. Enthymemes
Some arguments don't have all their premises. This happens very often in
conversation where the speaker may assume that a premise is so obvious that
it doesn't have to be made explicit. An argument with a missing premise is
called an enthymeme. One fairly common type of enthymeme is exemplified
by the following argument:
Syllogistic 119
all cats are furry animals

all cats are purry animals
so, some purry animals are furry animals
As it stands the argument is irregular and it does not add up. But both these
defects are repaired if we added some cats are cats to the premises. Since this
premise is obviously true (it is equivalent to some things are cats or there are
cats) we can assume it as implicit part of the original argument.
Other enthymemes omit commonly accepted truths which the
argument does not bother to state. For example, you may overhear the
following exchange between A and B:
A. Ted's not married

B. How do you know?
A. Well, I know he's a Catholic priest
As argument may be stated thus:
A5 Ted is a Catholic Priest +T*+P

I Ted is not married /+T*-M
As it stands A5 is incomplete. It has three terms but only two statements. So

a tacit premise has been omitted. Assuming that A5 is valid we can complete
it in a way that satisfies the requirements for syllogistic validity. Being valid,
A5 must have two premises that add up to the conclusion. The conclusion of
A5 is particular and so is the premise that is given us. So the missing premise
must be universal. [Why?] This gives us the first bit of information as to the
nature of the missing premise. To find out more about it we note that the term
'M' appears in the conclusion but not in the premises. So this term must be
in the missing premise. Using this information we have, we may solve for the
missing premise in As enthymeme. Let the missing premise be '-X+M'.
Then, on the assumption that A5 is valid, the following equation must be
correct.
[+T*+C]+[- X+M]=[+T*- M]
This gives us:

-X+M = [+T*-M]-[+T+C] = +T*-M-T*-C = -M-C = -(+M+C) =

-C+(-M)
A's enthymeme has now been reconstructed by making the tacit premise
(starred) explicit:
1. * all Catholic priests are unmarried -C+(-M)

2 Ted is a Catholic priest +T*+C
/3. Ted is not married /+T*-M
It is sometimes possible to reconstruct the argument of an enthymeme

that has two missing premises. Consider:
A6 every Catholic Qriest is an unmarried man

I some hachelors are £lergymen
which is formulated initially as:
-P+(-M)
/+B+C
This enthymematic argument is informally valid and it can be made formally

valid if we supply some premises that were too trivial to be expressed in
ordinary discourse. It has four terms (P, M, B and C) but only two statements.
So two premises are missing. Since the conclusion is a P- statement, one of
the premises must be a P- statement. Since no valid argument can have two
P- premises, the other premise must be a U- statement. The terms 'B' and 'C'
must appear in these missing premises. So we let one be '+X+B' and the other
be '+Y+C'. The equation ofthis syllogism is:
[- P+(- M)]+[±X+B]+[±Y +C]=+B+C
This reduces to:
±X±Y=+P+M
which, since one of the missing premises must be universal and the other
particular, gives four possible pairs of equations for our two missing premises:
Syllogistic 121
1) +X+B = +P+B;
-Y+C = -(-M)+C
2) -X+B = -(-P)+B;
+Y+C=+M+C
3) +X+B = +M+B;
-Y+C = -(-P)+C
4) -X+B = -(-M)+B;
+Y+C=+P+C
A tacit premise must be true. But only the fourth of these pairs has two true
statements. Supplemented by the fourth pair we can reconstitute the
enthymeme as a formally valid syllogism:
A6* every Catholic priest is an unmarried man

every unmarried man is a bachelor
some clergymen are priests
I some bachelors are clergymen
now formulated as:
-P+(-M)
-(-M)+B
+C+P
/+B+C
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Find the missing premise in each ofthe following:
1. some birds swim

so, some swimmers have wings
2. some birds swim

so, some swimmers are not fish
3. all monks are bachelors

some logicians are monks
so, some logicians are unmarried
4. all those who were uninvited were boys

not one boy brought a gift
every female brought a gift
so, no girl was uninvited
5. every politician is unprincipled

all philosophers are principled
so, no senator is a philosopher
********************************************************************
4. Why REGAL Works
In this section we explain why regularity and (algebraic) correctness are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of syllogistic arguments.
Anyone who asserts an argument makes a claim that its conclusion
cannot be false if its premises are true. Suppose that the argument has two
premises, S1 and S2, and a conclusion, S3. Thus the argument is S1,S2/S3.
The claim is that if S 1 and S2 are true, S3 must also be true. In effect the
claim is that anyone who asserts the premises but denies the conclusion is
inconsistent. Let us call the conjunction that consists of the premises and the
denial of the conclusion the counterclaim of the argument. Thus the
conjunction 'S1 and S2 and (-S3)' is the counterclaim of 'S1,S2/S3' and,
generally, the counterclaim of 'S1, ... Sn-l/Sn' is the conjunction 'Sl...and
Sn- 1 and (- Sn)'. The relation between any argument and its counterclaim is
very intimate. The following principle, called the Principle ofValidity (PV),
states this relation:
PV An argument, A, is valid if and only if its counterclaim, C(A), is

inconsistent.
Any conjunction can be thought of as the counterclaim of an argument.

For example, 'p&q&r' is the counterclaim of 'p,q/- r'. For suppose someone
had asserted the argument 'p,q/-r'. Then its counterclaim is 'p and q and
(-- r)' or 'p and 'q and r'. A conjunction can serve as counterclaim to several
Syllogistic 123
arguments. Thus, since 'p and q and r' is equivalent to 'p and rand q' and to
'q and rand p', it is also the counterclaim to two other arguments: 'p,r/-q' and
'q,r/-p'. A conjunction that is counterclaim to an argument will be said to
reject that argument. For example, 'p and q and r' rejects the arguments
'p,q/-r', 'p,r/-q' and 'q.r/-p'. More generally, any conjunction ofn con-
juncts can be thought of as the counterclaim of n distinct arguments each
having as conclusion the denial of one of the n conjuncts with the rest of the
conjuncts serving as premises.
Suppose now that C(A) is the counterclaim of some argument A. And
suppose that we know that C(A) is inconsistent. Then, by the principle of
validity, A is valid. From this we see that one way of finding out whether an
argument is valid is to find out whether its counterclaim conjunction is
inconsistent. If a conjunction, C, is inconsistent then all the arguments that C
rejects are valid. IfC is consistent, then all the arguments it rejects are invalid.
In what follows we shall learn how to examine a conjunction for tell- tale
signs of inconsistency.
We call any argument ofn statements and n terms a syllogism. Let
us call any conjunction that contains n conjuncts and n terms, a syllogistic
conjunction. For example, some A is Band noB is C and every A is Cis a
syllogistic conjunction with three terms and three statements. The question
that concerns us is: How can we tell whether a syllogistic conjunction is
inconsistent? In what follows conjunction will always mean syllogistic conjun-
ction.
Fortunately inconsistent conjunctions do have special tell-tale
characteristics that can be detected by the use of certain procedures called
decision procedures. Applying a decision procedure to a conjunction enables
us to decide quickly whether it is consistent or not. With such a procedure in
hand we can check the validity of any syllogistic argument, A. For suppose
we want to know whether A is valid. By denying A's conclusion and
conjoining it to the premises we form the counterclaim C(A). Now we apply
our decision procedure to determine whether C(A) is inconsistent. Suppose the
procedure delivers the verdict that C(A) is inconsistent. Then, by PV, we
know that A is valid. Suppose that it delivers the verdict that C(A) is not
inconsistent. Then, again by PV, we know that A is invalid. For if it were
valid, its counterclaim would be inconsistent.
5. Inconsistent Conjunctions: The Tell-tale Characteristics
Consider the statement 'some ape is not an ape'. It is not a conjunction but let
us call it that anyway, allowing for conjunctions that have only a single
conjunct. Here then is an example of an inconsistent conjunction. Let us
transcribe it and examine it to see what this inconsistent conjunction looks like:
cl +A-A
Here we have a syllogistic conjunction of n terms and n statements, for the
case n= 1. c 1 has two quite distinctive characteristics, called P and Z
respectively:
(P) The conjunction contains exactly one particular statement.

(Z) The algebraic value of the conjunction is zero.
Clearly, all conjunctions of form '+X- X' will be inconsistent. Let us keep
these two criteria of inconsistency in mind. Despite the extreme simplicity of
the example, we shall find that any conjunction of n statements and n recurrent
terms that satisfies conditions (P) and (Z) is inconsistent. The P/Z conditions
are necessary and sufficient conditions for the inconsistency of any syllogistic
conjunction. Thus every conjunction that satisfies P/Z is inconsistent and no
conjunction that fails to satisfy P/Z is inconsistent.
Consider a conjunction of two conjuncts:
c2 +[+X+Y]+[- X+(- Y)] (some X is Y and every X is nonY)
Here too we have a conjunction that has exactly one particular statement (the
other statement is universal) and it too adds up to zero. So, c2 is inconsistent.
More generally, any two statements that are divalent and that sum to zero must
be inconsistent. To see why, consider that two statements are equivalent if and
only if they are covalent and equal. Now two statements S 1 and S2 are
equivalent if and only ifthe conjunction, +S1+(-S2), is inconsistent. Where
S 1 and S2 are equivalent, S 1 and (- S2) will be divalent so that one will be
particular and the other universal. Also, since Sl=S2, Sl+(-S2)=0.
Generally then, any conjunction of two statements that sums to zero and that
has exactly one particular statement {the other being universal) will be incon-
sistent.
Syllogistic 125
We have now shown that P/Z holds for syllogistic conjunctions ofn
conjuncts where n= 1 and n=2. Before going on to consider cases where n>2,
we shall need to state a principle first stated by Aristotle.
The Principle ofTransitivity: If being B characterizes every A and being C

characterizes every B then being C characterizes every A.
According to the transitivity principle '+[- A+B]+[- B+C]' entails

'-A+C'. Thus any argument of the following fonn is valid:
(A1) -A+B
-B+C
1-A+C
If so, the counterclaim conjunction
C(Al) +[- A+B]+[- B+C]+[- (- A+C)]
is inconsistent. Note that the P/Z conditions for the inconsistency of a

syllogistic conjunction are again satisfied: C(Al) has exactly one P-conjunct
(the third) and its algebraic value is zero. The first conjuncts in C(Al) fonn
a transitive chain of two links. Together they entail the transitive conclusion,
'-A+C'. But the third conjunct, '- (-A+C)', contradicts that conclusion.
C(A1) is therefore inconsistent.
Let us call any conjunctive chain of universal statements whose links
areofthefonn '+[-Xi+Xj]+[-Xj+Xk]' a transitive chain. For example, the
conjunctive chain of statements
TC1 +[-A+B]+[-B+C]+[-C+D]+[-D+E]
is a transitive chain. By the principle oftransitivity, any conjunction ofn-1

universal statements that fonns a transitive chain will entail a statement of the
fonn '-X+Y' where X is the subject tenn of the first statement and Y is the
predicate tenn of the last statement in the chain. If we now add to this
transitive chain a particular nth statement ofthe fonn '- (-X+Y) ',the complet-
ed conjunction will satisfy the P/Z condition for inconsistency. For now the
whole conjunction will consist of n-1 U-statements of the transitive chain
and the nth P- statement that denies the conclusion they entail. Moreover the
whole conjunction will now sum to zero. For example, suppose we added
'- (-A+E)' to the transitive chain, TC 1. This would give us a conjunction

consisting of five statements four of which are universal and one of which is
particular, the whole summing to zero.
We call a conjunction like this one, canonically inconsistent. A
conjunction is canonically inconsistent if it has n-1 universal statements that
form a transitive chain and an nth statement that denies the transitive
conclusion they entail. It is clear that any such canonically inconsistent
conjunction will satisfy the P/Z conditions. The transitive chain can be as long
as you please. For example, by the principle of transitivity a conjunction of
26 conjuncts of the form
+[- A+B]+[- B+C]+[ -C+D] ... +[- Y+Z]+[ -(- A+Z)]
will be inconsistent since the first n-1 conjuncts form a transitive chain that
entails - A+Z but the last conjunct is a particular statement that denies - A+Z.
The whole conjunction is canonically inconsistent and it satisfies P/Z. In what
follows we will show that any inconsistent conjunction is either itself
canonically inconsistent or else is equivalent to one that is. We will also see
that any conjunction equivalent to a canonically inconsistent conjunction will
satisfy the P- Z criterion for inconsistency.
C(A1) is an example of a canonically inconsistent conjunction.
Consider the following conjunction, C(A * 1), equivalent to C(A1).
C(A*1) +[-(-B)+{- A)]+[ -{+B+(-C))]+[ -{+(-B)+A)]
Each conjunct in C(A * 1) is equivalent to a corresponding conjunct in C(A1).

Since equivalence preserves covalence C(A*1), like C(A1), has exactly one
particular conjunct. Since equivalence preserves equality, the algebraic value
ofC(A*l) will also sum to zero. And finally, since C(A*l) is equivalent to
C{Al), it too, though not canonical, is an inconsistent conjunction.
Our discussion has revealed the basic reason for the inconsistency of
any P/Z syllogistic conjunction. We have shown this for the case of
canonically inconsistent conjunctions. But what holds true for the canonical
case also holds true for any equivalent conjunction that is equivalent to a
canonically inconsistent conjunction. For suppose that a non-canonical
conjunction Cj is equivalent to a canonical conjunction Ci. Since each
conjunct of Cj is equivalent to a corresponding conjunct of Ci, the algebraic
and mood properties of the two conjunctions will be exactly the same. Since
Ci sums to zero so does Cj. Since Ci has exactly one particular statement so
Syllogistic 127
does Cj. Thus Cj too is an inconsistent conjunction that satisfies P/Z. The
P/Z criteria characterizes any conjunction, canonical or not:
PIZ A syllogistic conjunction is inconsistent if and only if it is itself

canonically inconsistent or else is equivalent to a canonically inconsistent
conjunction.
6. Equivalent Conjunctions
One way to form the equivalent of a conjunction is by reordering its conjuncts.

For example, (S1 and S2 and S3) and (S2 and S3 and Sl) are equivalent.
Another way is to form a conjunction that has equivalent conjuncts by PEQ.
For example, 'some A is Band every B is C' is equivalent to 'some B is A and
noB is nonC' because 'some A is B' and 'some B is A' are equivalent and so
are 'every B is C' and 'noB is nonC'. When a conjunction is consistent all
conjunctions equivalent to it are consistent. When a conjunction is
inconsistent, all conjunctions equivalent to it are inconsistent.
The set of equivalent conjunctions may be quite large. For example,
c(A*1) is equivalent to c(Al). But many other conjunctions are too. Since
each conjunct of a conjunction can be written in eight different equivalent
ways, and since we can order the conjuncts in six different ways, we will have
eight times eight times six conjunctions all equivalent to C(A1), all of which
are inconsistent and each of which rejects a valid argument.
Consider c(A1) and c(A*1) again:
c(A1) +[- A+B]+[- B+C]+[- (- A+C)]

c(A*1) +[-(-B)+(-A)] +[-(+B+(-C))] +[-(+(-B)+A)]
For all intents and purposes we may look upon these as the same. Both belong
to the same equivalence class of conjunctions and both are inconsistent; c(A 1)
is canonically inconsistent. But c(A * 1) is equivalent to it and it too is
inconsistent. Since c(A*1) is inconsistent, any argument formed by taking
two conjuncts from c(A* 1) as premises and the denial of the remaining
conjunct as conclusion will be valid. For example, the syllogism
- (+(- B)+A),- (- (-B)+(- A)/+B+(- C)
formed by taking the third and first conjuncts of c(A * 1) as premises and the
denial of the second conjunct as the conclusion will be valid. Moreover c(A1)
and c(A*1) are only two of8x8x6 equivalent conjunctions, any one ofwhich
is a counterclaim that may be used to generate a valid syllogism in this
manner.
7. How This is Related to REGAL
We have learned why P/Z is a necessary and sufficient condition for

inconsistency. We are now in position to say why any valid syllogism must be
regular and have a conclusion equal to the sum of its premises. That is, we
now show how the P/Z conditions for inconsistency are connected to the
REGAL principle for validity.
A syllogism is valid if and only if it has an inconsistent counterclaim.
A counterclaim to a syllogism is a syllogistic conjunction. Now any
inconsistent syllogistic conjunction ofn conjuncts satisfies the P/Z condition:
(1) U1+U2+ ... +Un-l+Pn=O
Now (1) counterclaims syllogisms that satisfy one of the following two
conditions:
(2) Ul+U2 ... +Un-1=-Pn

(3) Pn+U2 ... +Un-1=- U1
where the statements on the left are the premises of the syllogism and the state-
ment on the right is the conclusion. Equation (2) contains only U-statements
and corresponds to syllogisms that are U-regular. Equation (3) corresponds
to syllogisms that are P-regular (the conclusion,'- U1', is a P-statement). No
irregular syllogism has a counterclaim of the form (1). Now (1) is the general
form of an inconsistent conjunction. Since irregular syllogisms have no
counterclaims that have the form of ( 1), they are invalid. Thus regularity is a
necessary condition of syllogistic validity.
It is easy to see that equality is another necessary condition for
validity. For ( 1) counterclaims syllogisms that deny one of its conjuncts. Thus
(1) only counterclaims syllogisms that are formed as equations oftype (2) or
type (3). In other words, the conclusion of a valid syllogism must be equal to
the sum of the premises. Thus regularity and equality are the two conditions
that any valid syllogism must satisfy.
Syllogistic 129
We have shown that only Regal syllogisms are valid. It remains to be

shown that all Regal syllogisms are valid. That is, we now want to show that
any syllogism that does satisfy regularity and equality is valid. To show that
REGALITY is sufficient for validity we need only to reverse the reasoning:
A REGAL syllogism must satisfy either (2) or (3). However, any

syllogism that satisfies (2) or (3) equation has a counterclaim that
satisfies the P/Z criteria of inconsistency embodied in (1): Ul+U2-
... +Un-1+Pn=O. Thus the counterclaim of any REGAL syllogism is
inconsistent. It follows that every REGAL syllogism is valid.
8. Syllogisms with Singular Statements
Consider:
A7 1. Socrates is an Athenian
2. Socrates is a genius
/3. some Athenian is a genius.
A7 has two premises both of which are singular statements. And clearly A7
is a valid argument. To account for its validity we need to remind ourselves
of the special characteristics of singular statements which we call their wild
quality. A singular statement, 'S* is P', is particular ('+S*+P'). But 'S'
applies only to one individual; so '+S*+P' entails '-S*+P'. Consider
'Socrates is an Athenian'. This statement makes a positive claitp: that the
existence of an Athenian who is Socrates is a fact. Since 'Socrates' uniquely
denotes a single individual, 'Socrates is an Athenian' entails 'No Socrates is
a non- Athenian' or 'Every Socrates is an Athenian'. Thus in transcribing
'Socrates is an Athenian' we have a choice. We may transcribe it as '+S*+A'
('some Socrates is an Athenian') or as '-S*+A' ('every Socrates is an
Athenian'). Thus one way of transcribing A7 is:
-S*+A
+S*+G
/+A+G
a valid P-regular syllogism in which U+P=P.

********************************************************************
Exercises:
The following syllogisms contain one or more singular premises. Determine

their validity or invalidity.
1. All cads are untrustworthy.

Sam is a cad.
Therefore, Sam is untrustworthy.
2. Eve is tall and beautiful.

Eve is also intelligent.
So, someone tall and beautiful is intelligent.
3. Every country is aggressive.

Nothing which is aggressive really prospers.
Whatever fails to prosper will dissolve.
Italy is a country.
Hence, Italy will dissolve.
4. One who loved Sally was Max.

Max was sincere.
So, someone who was sincere loved Sally.
5. No experienced person is incompetent.

Jenkins is always blundering.
No competent person is always blundering.
So, Jenkins is inexperienced.
********************************************************************
9. The Laws ofldentity
In some singular statements both terms are singular. We have seen that such
singular statements are called 'identities'. Here are some examples of
identities:
Syllogistic 131
Two is the cube root of eight +T*+C*

Sam Clemens is Mark Twain +S*+T*
Mt. Everest is the tallest mountain +E*+T*
Let A*, B* and C* be singular terms. The following laws (called Laws of
Identity) hold:
Laws ofIdentity:
The Law ofSymmetry: A* is B * IB * is A*.
The Law ofTransitivity: A* is B* and B* is C*/ A* is C*
The Law of Reflexivity: A* is A*
10. Proofs of These Laws
An identity is a singular statement both of whose terms are singular, so its

quantity is wild. Let 'X*' and 'Y*' be two singular terms. The laws of identity
are special applications of the logical laws governing statements of the form
'some S is P' and 'every S is P'. Identity statements are special because of
their wild quantity and because both terms are UDTs. Identity statements
appear to be relational; 'twice three is six' seems like 'twice three is greater
than five'. But that too is a common illusion: 'twice three is greater than five'
is indeed relational but 'twice three is six' is an ordinary predication, no
different from 'twice three is an even number'.
Of course we can cast any predication in relational form. Aristotle's
formula for a statement of the form 'some S is P' is 'P belongs to some S'. His
formula for 'every Sis P' is 'P belongs to every S'. We may think of the
phrases 'belongs to some' and 'belongs to every' as representing relations that
tie the two terms in a predicative tie. Laws of immediate inference and
syllogistic can then be reformulated as laws that govern the predicative
relations 'belongs to some' and 'belongs to every'. These relations are then
seen to have certain formal properties. 'Belongs to some' is symmetrical.
Using A-forms, 'belongs to some' is represented by the plus sign: the
symmetry of this relation is reflected in the equivalence of 'Y*+X*' to
'X*+Y*', and more generally of 'Y+X' to 'X+Y'. 'Belongs to every' is
represented by the minus sign; its transitivity is reflected in the law that says
'Z*- X*' follows syllogistically from 'Y*- X* & Z*- Y*'. That 'belongs to
every' is reflexive can be shown by considering that '(-X)*+X*' (read:
'non- X* belongs to some X*') is self-contradictory. Thus its denial,
'- ((-X*)+X*)', is a tautology, or logical truism. But the denial is equivalent

to 'X*- X*', or '(being) X* belongs to every X*', which is the law of
reflexivity for the identity relation.
One principle of identity is known as the Principle oflndiscemibility.
It says that whenever X* and Y* are identical, any property of X* is also a
property ofY* so that there can be no discernible difference between X* and
Y*. In effect, given any identity statement 'X* is Y* ', the principle asserts that
whatever is true of X* is also true ofY*. The following syllogistic argument
justifies this:
(every) X* is Y*
(some) X* is Q
I (some) Y* is Q
This tell us that where X* is (identical with) Y* and Q-ness is a property of

X* it is also a property of Y*.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Using the identity laws, decide whether each of the following arguments are
valid or invalid.
1. Sam is Mark.
Mark is funny.
So, Sam is funny.
2. The forty-second President of the United States is Clinton.

Clinton is the husband ofHillary.
Thus, the forty-second President of the United States is the husband
of Hillary.
3. 3 is the square-root of 9.
3 is the sum of 4 and - 1.
the square-root of 9 is the sum of 2 and 1.
so, the sum of 4 and - 1 is the sum of 2 and 1.
Syllogistic 133
4. Alan is Blake.
Blake is not Cash.
So, Alan is not Cash.
5. The Queen is Elizabeth.

Elizabeth is a Windsor.
The Queen rules.
So, a Windsor rules.
********************************************************************
11. The Matrix Method for Drawing Conclusions
Given any syllogism we check to see whether it is REGAL and in that way
determine whether it is valid or invalid. But as often as not the problem is
inferential: we are given premises and we want to draw a conclusion. In what
follows we give a general technique for deriving a conclusion from two
premises. The technique is justified by a fundamental Aristotelian principle
called the 'Dictum de Omni' (or the 'Every Principle'). We shall accept
Aristotle's Dictum as our starting point:
Dictum de Omni (DDO)

Whatever characterizes every X characterizes any X
For example, suppose we have the premise that every human being is mortal
and also the premise that Socrates is a human being. According to the first
premise, being mortal characterizes every human. According to the second
premise, Socrates is a human being. Then, according to the Dictum, being
mortal will characterize Socrates.
DDO justifies drawing a conclusion from two premises both
containing a common tenn 'X'. The premise ofthe fonn '-X+Y' says that
being Y characterizes every X. In this premise, which we shall call the 'Omni'
(or 'Donor') premise, 'X' has a negative occurrence algebraically. The other
premise, called the 'Matrix' (or 'Host') premise, contains a positive
occurrence of 'X'. We may represent this premise as ' ... X .. .' where the dots
represent the matrix or environment of 'X'. Schematically the two premises
look like this:
Matrix premise ... X ...

Omni premise -X+Y
For example, the Matrix premise might be 'some X isn't aZ' [==> '+X-Z'],
in which 'X' is embedded in the matrix '+( )- Z'. The premises will then be:
+X-Z
-X+Y
where '-X+Y' is the Omni premise and '+X- Z' is the Matrix premise. The
dictum allows us to replace the positive occurrence of 'X' in the host premise
by the expression from the donor premise that characterizes every X. In effect
we may here replace 'X' by 'Y' giving us the conclusion, '+Y -Z' or 'some Y
isn't Z'.
Algebraically represented, the Dictum asserts the validity of all
syllogisms that have the following pattern:
... X...
every X is Y
I .. .Y ...
Applying the Matrix Method to the premises 'every X is Y' and 'some X isn't
Z', we have concluded 'some Y isn't Z' since this conclusion gives us a
syllogism that follows the pattern:
+X-Z
-X+Y
/+Y-Z
In effect, the Dictum tells us that any syllogism containing a matrix premise
in which the middle term has positive occurrence and an omni premise in
which the middle term has negative occurrence is valid if the conclusion is just
like the matrix premise except that the middle term has been replaced by the
term from the omni premise when the two premises have been added.
It is not hard to show that the Matrix Method (MM) sanctions only
REGAL syllogisms. Let us first consider regularity. MM requires that one
premise must be a U statement and it further requires that the conclusion must
be covalent with the matrix premise since it is exactly like the matrix premise
except that 'X' has been replaced by 'Y'. So there are only two possibilities:
Syllogistic 135
either all three statements are U and the syllogism is U-regular, or the omni
premise is U but the conclusion and matrix premise are P-statements, in which
case the syllogism is P-regular. That the conclusion will be equal to the sum
of the two premises is also guaranteed: for the middle term 'X' is algebraically
negative in the first premise and algebraically positive in the second premise,
and it cancels out by addition to give us a conclusion exactly equal to the sum
of the premises. Thus the matrix method yields only REGAL syllogisms.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Give an argument that the MM validates all three-termed Regal

Syllogisms.
(hint: Show that the matrix method will apply to validate all
syllogisms generated by inconsistent sets ofthree statements that
satisfy the P/Z conditions.)
********************************************************************
12. Venn Diagrams
[The reader may wish to review sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 before

reading this section.]
Venn diagrams have the virtue of graphically showing how two states signify
a third. Thus by jointly depicting the state of affairs signified by 'no P is M'
and the state signified by 'someS isM' in a Venn diagram we find that the
state of affairs signified by 'someS is non- P' is already depicted, thereby
showing us that this latter state characterizes any universe that is characterized
by 'noM is P and someS is P'.
Figure 22
s p
Note that 'someS is P' is not depicted. This is evidence that the syllogism 'no
M is P; some S is M /some S is P' is not valid. For if it were valid, the
conclusion would be graphically present when we depict the premises.
Though they have the merit of being graphic, Venn diagrams afe
practically limited in application to arguments with no more than three
premises. For that reason we are better off learning algebraic methods that
have no such limitations. For example, using the REGAL we can check the
validity of any n-terms argument by seeing whether it is regular and adds up.
Using P/Z we can check the validity of the argument by denying its conclusion
and seeing whether its counterclaim is consistent or not. Though they are
limited in scope, Venn Diagrams are aesthetically appealing and they give a
good idea ofthe semantic conditions of validity. For both of these reasons
they will rightly continue to be popular with students and professional
logicians.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Construct Venn diagrams to determine the validity or invalidity of the

following.
1. Every farmer is a land-owner.

Some women are farmers.
Hence, some women are land-owners.
2. Morris is a fool.
No fool ever succeeds.
Syllogistic 137
So, Morris will never succeed.
3. Some boys are good students.

Some good students are diligent.
So, some boys are diligent.
4. Some actors both sing and dance.

So, some singers are dancers.
5. No snakes are mammals.

No mammals are insects.
So, no snakes are insects.
II. Use the algebraic method for the above arguments.
********************************************************************
6 Relational Syllogisms
1. Introduction
In a statement like 'some Greek is wise' the term 'wise' is tied to the term
'Greek' in the subject 'some Greek'. In a statement like 'some Greek is wiser
than every Barbarian' we have two subjects, 'some Greek' and 'every
Barbarian'; the term 'wiser' is therefore tied to the two subject terms 'Greek'
and 'Barbarian'. A term that is tied to one subject term is called monadic.
Terms tied to two subject terms are called dyadic, or two place, terms. Dyadic
terms are 'relational'. For example, in 'Tom is taller than Nancy' and 'Nancy
is wiser than Tom' the terms 'taller (than)' and 'wiser (than)' are relational
terms. Terms that relationally tie three subject terms are called triadic. For
example, in 'some sailor is giving every child a toy' the term 'giving' is triadic,
or three place, tying three subject terms: 'sailor ', child' and toy'. Statements
containing transitive verbs like 'kisses' or 'gives' or relational terms like 'taller
than' are called relational statements. Note that the transitive verb 'kisses'
is implicitly relational: 'Tom kisses Nancy' amounts to 'Tom is a kisser of
Nancy' which contains the dyadic relational term 'kisser of. For further
discussion, including how to transcribe relational statements algebraically, the
reader is advised to review sections 8 to 15 of Chapter 4 above.
Arguments containing relational statements are called relational
arguments. Now a standard syllogism has as many terms as it has statements
but relational arguments have more terms than statements. So, strictly
speaking, relational arguments are not syllogisms. Nevertheless, in deducing
conclusions from relational premises we apply the basic syllogistic principle
first formulated by Aristotle and known as the Dictum de Omni. For this
reason we shall continue to speak of relational arguments as syllogistic
arguments, calling them relational syllogisms.
139
2. Applying the Dictum to Relational Arguments
The most important innovation in dealing with relational arguments is the

generalization of Aristotle's 'Dictum de Omni':
What is true ofevery Xis true ofwhatever is an X
We want this dictum to apply to an argument like the following:
AI
some sailor is giving every child a toy; +S 1+G123 -C 2+T3
every woman kisses some child; - W 4+K42+C 2
/every woman kisses someone some sailor is giving a toy to
The first premise contains the subject phrase 'every child', which, however, is
not the subject of the sentence. Instead, 'every child' is surrounded by another
expression. Let us call this surrounding expression E*. Now the whole
sentence could be viewed as an expression of form E*(-C) in which E*
represents 'some sailor gives a toy (to)' or '+S 1+G123+T3 ' as the environment
of 'every child', or '- C'. In effect, the statement tells us that 'some sailor is
giving a toy to' is true of every child.
'E*(- C)' will be variously referred to as the 'Omni Premise', the
'Donor Premise' or the 'E-star Premise'. In the Omni Premise the middle
term 'child' (represented by the term letter 'C') appears negatively in the
phrase 'every child', whose environment is E*, or '+S 1+G 123+T3 '. 'C' also
appears in the premise we call the 'Host' or 'Matrix Premise'. In the Host
Premise 'child' has another environment, E, representing the expression 'every
woman kisses some', or '-W4+K42+'. Thus our two premises are E*(-C) and
E(C) with the middle term 'C' having a negative occurrence in the Donor
premise and a positive occurrence in the Host premise. The conclusion is
formed by adding the Donor premise to the Host premise thereby canceling the
middle term of the Host Premise, and replacing it by the environment of the
Donor premise. In this process the Donor premise cancels into the Host
premise, and then contributes to the Host, transforming it by replacing its
canceled middle term byE*, resulting in a conclusion ofthe form 'E(E*)':
Relational Syllogisms 141
- W 4+K42+(+SI+Gm+T3h
every woman kisses someone a sailor gives a toy to
Here is the pattern of the argument:
A1
E*(-M) +S 1+G123 -C2+T3 M=C, E* = +S 1+G123+T3
E(M) -W4+K42+C 2 M=C, E = -W4+K42+
IE(E*) /- WI+KI2+(+SI+GI23+T3)2
Note that in the conclusion, 'what's true of every child', namely, that some
sailor is giving a toy to it, is now true of what every women kisses, namely, a
child. Note that numeral, '2', common to the middle term in both of its
occurrences reappears in the conclusion.
The rule of inference 'E(M),E*(- M)IE(E*)' is called 'DDO' to
remind us of the Latin phrase for Aristotle's syllogistic principle, the Dictum
de Omni (the 'every principle').
DDO: E(M), E*( -M) I E(E*)
3. Distributed Terms
The middle term of any valid syllogistic argument is positive in theE-premise

and negative in theE* premise. In 'E*(- M)', the minus sign means 'every' and
the term 'M' is there said to be universally distributed. The idea of 4istribution
is important for syllogistic reasoning and we pause to explain it further. (For
an earlier discussion see section 18 of Chapter 4.)
Syllogistic argument proceeds by canceling middles and it requires that
one of the two opposing middles be universally distributed. Negative and
positive occurrence is purely a matter of algebra. Thus 'M' has a negative
occurrence and 'P' has positive occurrence in 'not every P isM' since its
transcription is '- (- P+M)' which reduces to '+P-M'. But a term can be
negative without being distributed. If the argument is to be valid, the negative
middle term in theE* premise must be 'universally distributed'; the minus sign
must have the meaning 'every' or 'any'. For example, in '+P-M' [=>'some
P isn't M'], the minus sign does not have the meaning 'every' and '+P-M' is
not a proper E* statement. Since the application of DDO depends on our
ability to recognize when a term that occurs negatively is universally
distributed, we state the two conditions to look for in determining whether a

given term is or is not universally distributed.
A term 'M' is distributed in a sentence, S, if and only if

(1) M is negative inS
(2) Sis equivalent to a sentence ofform, 'E*(every M) '.
According to condition (2) a term that is distributed in a sentence must have

'universal occurrence' in that sentence. According to condition ( 1) it must also
be distributed in that sentence. An example where 'M' meets condition (2)
without meeting condition (1) is 'Not every M is P' [=> -(- M+P)] in which
M is positive. An example where 'M' satisfies (1) without satisfying (2) is
'Some A isn't either M or B'. This sentence transcribes as
'+A-<-(-M)-(-B)>', which, as an algebraic expression, simplifies to
A-M- B in which 'M' has a negative occurrence. However, despite being
negative, 'M' does not have universal occurrence in '+A-<-(- M)-(- B)>'
since this sentence is not equivalent to any sentence of form 'E*(every M)'.
Another example where 'M' is negative but not distributed is '+(- M)+P'
(Some non- M is P). By contrast 'M', is distributed in 'no A gave an M to
everyB', which transcribes as '-(+A 1+G 123+M2 -B 3)'. For when we drive the
external minus sign inward the result is a sentence of the form E*(every M),
in this case 'every A failed-to- give every M to some B'. The transcription
'- A 1+(- G 123)- M 2+B3 ' reveals that 'M' occurs both negatively and universally
in this statement.
Generally then, a term 'M' is universally distributed in S if and only
if S is equivalent to a sentence of the form E*(- M), with 'M' having both
negative and universal occurrence (reading'- M' as 'every M'). In any valid
syllogism the middle term is distributed in the E* premise; it is positive in the
E premise.
In the following transcription, the term 'G' is universally distributed:
+B 1- (L 12+G2); (some boy doesn't love any girl)
Here 'G' is distributed; to show it is we drive in the unary minus sign to form
a phrase 'every G' thereby disclosing that 'G' has universal occurrence. Thus
'+B 1-(L 12+G2)' is equivalent to '+B 1+((-L 12)-G2)', in which '-G' has the
meaning, 'every G'.
Consider:
K. anything that's either A or M is D
'M' is distributed in K since (1) M occurs negatively in K and (2) K is

equivalent to 'every M is either not A or D':
-<--A--M>+D = -M+<-A--D>
Of course 'M' is distributed in any sentence that begins with 'every M'. It is
also true that any sentence in which 'M' is distributed entails a sentence that
begins with the phrase 'every M'. So we could also state the condition for the
distribution of 'M' in S thus:
'M' is distributed in S if and only if S entails a sentence beginning with

'everyM'.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Transcribe algebraically and determine whether the underlined term is

universally distributed.
1. some American is neither a fool nor rich

2. Tom didn't hit any target
3. no owner of an animal is exempt
4. no snake is a mammal
5. it is not true that a sailor killed him
********************************************************************
4. Applying DDO
The terms in relational statements are normally transcribed with numerical

indices. In applying DDO to relational arguments we assign the middle term
the same numerals in both of the premises. Suppose that we are given the
English sentences of AI and that we have transcribed them thus:
1. -W6+~1+C1 every woman kisses some child

2. +S 1+G123 -C2+T3 some sailor is giving every child a toy
The second occurrence of 'C' is distributed. We have the right to assign any
numeral we please to a distributed term so we shall want to assign it a numeral
that will make it easy for us to deduce a conclusion from the two premises.
Since we want the middles to cancel out, we want 'C/ in place of 'C/; so we
replace '2' with '7' thereby rewriting the second premise as: +S 1+G173 - C 7+T 3.
We can now apply DDO to give us the conclusion
'-W6+~7+(+S 1 +G 173 +T3 )/, which reads as before: 'every women kisses
someone a sailor is giving a toy to'.
The rule for assigning numerals to universally distributed occurrem:es
of a term may be stated more formally as a Reassignment Rule:
R-A
.... -T;.. .
/. .. -1j.. .
R-A tells us that we may replace the numeral index in a universally distributed
occurrence of 'T' by any numeral we please, thereby replacing 'Ti' by 'Tj '.
The numeral represented by 'i' is a pairing index and when we change it, we
change its partners too. For example, we changed 'C/ to 'C/ but in so doing
we also had to change the 'G 123 ' to 'G 173 '.
We may avoid the use of R-A by following the procedure of
transcribing the E or 'host' premise first. Assume that the middle term in the
E premise has the index 4 so that theE premise is of form E(M4). We take
note of the numeral as we come to transcribe the E* premise. For now we
simply use the same numeral for the middle of theE* premise, writing theE*
premise as E*(- M 4).
Let us take a closer look at the form ofDDO inferences.
E(M)
E*(-M)
IE(E*)
DDO allows us to replace the middle term of the Host premise, replacing 'M'
in 'E(M)' by the expression E* taken from the Donor premise. It does not
allow any replacements in the Donor premise. Thus inferences of the form
E(M)
E*(-M)
/E*(E)
are invalid. For example, the following inference, A2, is invalid even though
the two premises add up to the conclusion:
A2
E(C) -W4+K42+C2
E*(-C) +S 1+G 123 -C2+T3
/E*(E)2 I +S1+Gm+(-W4+K42)2+T3
The conclusion of A2 says that some sailor is giving someone kissed

by every woman a toy. That is obviously unwarranted; this conclusion is the
result of canceling illegitimately into the Donor premise and replacing its
middle term by the environment of the Host premise. The opposite should be
done. To ensure validity in all cases, one must eliminate the middle from the
host replacing it by the environment of 'every M' taken from the Donor: in
other words, the conclusion must be of the form E(E*) and not of the form
E*(E).
Here is another example ofthe proper application ofDDO.
A3
E Premise: every Derby Winner is sired by a thoroughbred
E* Premise: some book lists every thoroughbred
Let 'L' stand for 'lists'. We transcribe and add E*(- T) to E(T) to get E(E*).
E(T) + E*(-T) ==> E(E*)

[-W3+S23+T2]+[+Bt+L12-T2] ==> -W3+S23+(+Bt+L12)2
The conclusion of A3 is 'every Derby Winner is sired by something that some

book lists'. Note that by Commutation, the conclusion is equivalent to
- W3+(St2+(L12+Bt))
every Derby Winner is sired by something listed in a book
A3 is an argument of the form E*(- M},E(M)/E(E*) and so it is valid by the

Dictum de Omni.
Now consider the following invalid argument:
A4
E(T} + E*(- T} I E*(E)
+[+BI+LI2-T2]+[-W3+S32+T2] I +BI+LI2+(-W3+S32)
The invalid conclusion of A4 is the obviously false statement that some book
lists something that has sired every Derby Winner. Here again the mistake is
that we have a conclusion of form E*(E) in which contribution was made to,
not by, the Donor premise.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
What conclusion can be drawn from the following pairs of premises?
1. every Pope prays for every sinner

I am a sinner
2. I pray for every sinner

every priest prays for some sinner
3. all animals are mortal

some owners of an animal are cruel
4. every lover sent a valentine to some girl

every boy is a lover
5. some dogs are owned by some fanner

every farmer sells some produce
6. some students fear all exams

every teacher scares every student
7. some dogs are timid

no cat chases any dog
8. 9 is greater than 7
7 is a prime number
9. some judges respect some barristers

all barristers are shy
10. no philosophers read all books

all books are written for some good
********************************************************************
5. Indirect Proofs for Relational Arguments
Given the premise 'some boy loves every girl' how can we show that 'every
girl is loved by some boy' follows? Here is the argument:
1. +B 1+L 12 -G2
I -G2+LI2+BI
We know that this argument is valid if and only if the conjunction of the
premise with the denial of the conclusion is a contradiction. So we can show
that the argument is valid by showing-that this counterclaim conjunction is a
contradiction. The counterclaim has two conjuncts. Let us treat them as
premises of an argument:
(1) +B 1+L 12 -G2 Premise E*=+BI+LI22

(2) - (- G2+L 12+B 1) Denial of concl. E=-( -( ... )+LI2+BI)
1+2= -(-(+BI+LI2)+LI2+BI) DDO E(E*)
The third statement, derived from the conjunction of the premise and the denial
of the conclusion, is easily transformed into the overt contradiction:
+(L 12+B 1)-(L 12+B 1) or 'someone loved by a boy isn't loved by a boy'. Thus
we have derived a contradiction from the assumption that the premise is true
and the conclusion is false. This shows that the original argument is valid.
The following famous argument is an instance of the general principle

that from 'every A is B', 'whatever is R to an A is R to a B' follows.
Premise: every horse is an animal

Conclusion: every owner of a horse is an owner of an animal
Here again we may show that this argument is valid by denying the conclusion
and applying DDO to derive a contradiction.
Counterclaim:
( 1) every horse is an animal

(2) some owner of horse doesn't own any animal
-H2+A2
+(012+H2)- (012+A2)
/+(0 12+A2)-(0 12+A2); some owner of an animal doesn't own an
animal
A direct proof of the argument may also be given by treating it as an

enthymeme (see section 3 of Chapter 5) with a missing premise that is
'tautological'.
A5
1. - H+A every horse is an animal premise
2. - (0 12+H2)+(0 12+H2) *every owner of a horse is an owner of a horse
premise
/3. -(0 12+H2)+(0 12+A2) every owner of a horse is an owner of an animal
The starred premise is a logical truism, as is any statement of the form

'-X+X'. Any logical truism (other than the conditional statement which has
the conjunction of the premises as its antecedent and the conclusion as its
consequent) may be added as a premise to an argument.
6. Transforming Arguments
A relational inference not given in DDO form can often be transformed into a
DDO inference by showing that one of the premises is equivalent to an E*
premise. For example, given the premise 'noM is P and someS isM' we may
validly conclude 'some S is nonP'. To apply DDO we first use PEQ on the
universal premise:
E*(-M) -M+(-P) = -(+M+P) noM is P

E(M) +S+M = +S+M someS isM
E(E*) +S+(- P) = +S+(- P) I someS is non- P
Consider the following inference:
Every A that is B is a C -<+A+B>+C

SomeB is aD +B+D
I something that's either not A or Cis aD I+<- A+C>+D
In this inference 'B' is the middle term. The inference is valid but it is not in
DDO form since it lacks an Omni premise in which '- B' appears. It can
however be put into the form of a DDO inference if we transform the first
premise into its equivalent '- B +<-A+C>'. Now the first premise is of the
form E*(- B). So we cancel 'B' in the Host premise, replacing it there by
'<- A+C>' to give us '+<- A+C>+D'.
Let us look at some more examples in which DDO figures.
1. every owner of a dog is kind

2. some dogs are beagles
What conclusion may be derived from these two premises? We note that the
middle term 'dog' occurs positively in (2). So (2) is the Host premise. Let us
transcribe this as '+D2+B 2 '. Now 'dog', the middle term, is distributed in (1).
But ( 1) needs to be transformed into an explicit E* premise in which we find
'every dog' surrounded by its environment E*. The following transformation
shows that ( 1) is indeed equivalent to an E*(- D) premise.
The third formula on the right shows that'D' is distributed in a statement of

the form 'E*(- D)'in whichE* = -(- K) 1+(-0 12). So we may applyDDOwith
(2) as the donor orE premise to get'+(-(- K) 1+(-0) 12)+B2 ', i.e. 'something
every unkind person fails to own is a beagle', or more colloquially as
'+(-(+(- K) 1+(0) 12)) 2+B2 ', which says 'something no unkind person owns is
a beagle'. Equivalently the conclusion is '+((-0) 12 -(-K) 1)+B2 ' (read:

'something that is unowned by everyone who is unkind is a beagle').
7. Annotating a Proof of Validity
The following argument is valid:
All Greeks are philosophers

All Athenians are rich
I All Athenian Greeks are rich philosophers
To show that it is valid we could use the indirect method of denying the
conclusion and proving inconsistency.
1. -G+P
2. -A+R
3. -(-<+A+G>+<+R+P>)
The third statement denies the conclusion and we must now show that 1, 2, and
3 are jointly inconsistent. We may do this in an annotated proof:
4.+<+A+G>-<+R+P> 3,PEQ
5.+<+R+G>-<+R+P> 4+2, DDO
6 +<+R+P-<+R+P> 5+1, DDO
Thus we have derived a contradiction from 1, 2, and 3.

We may also get the conclusion by a direct proof:
1. -G+P prermse
2. -A+R prermse
3. -<+A+G>+<+A+G> tautological premise
4. -<+A+G>+<+A+P> 3+1, DDO
5 -<+A+G>+<+R+P> 4+2, DDO
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Give indirect proofs to show that the following arguments are valid:
1. all wise men are clearheaded

some men are devious
so, some who are devious are either not wise or clearheaded
2. whoever tries to kiss every girl is rude

Jack tries to kiss every girl
so, Jack is rude
3. whoever tries to kiss every girl is rude

some girls are coy
thus, someone who tries to kiss someone who is coy is rude
4. every dog has some fleas

all fleas cause some irritation
so, all dogs have something that causes irritation
5. John loves Mary

Mary kissed Tom
Tom fooled Lois
so, John loves someone who kissed someone who fooled Lois
********************************************************************
8. Arguing with Pronominal Sentences
[The reader may wish to review sections 17 to 20 of Chapter 4 before

proceeding.] I say that a man is at the door and then add that he (the-man-in-
question, that man) wants to speak to you. The form of the sentences is
+M'+P; +M'+Q, in which the recurrent term has a common (prime)
superscript to indicate that in both occurrences the term denotes one and the
same thing: what the first 'proterm' denotes is again denoted by the second
proterm. Taken together the two sentences constitute a pronominalization.
Grammarians call the first subject in a pronominalization the 'antecedent

subject' and the second subject the 'pronominal subject', or 'pronoun'. The
antecedent and the pronoun differ in the vernacular ('some man ... the man ... ').
But logically both subjects of a pronominalization are represented in the same
way with a super-scripted protenn: +M'. The prime superscript indicates that
the same man is denoted by both occurrences of 'man' in 'a man' and 'the
man'. Usually we write 'he' for 'the man in question' but logically what we
have is a recurrent protenn focused on the same denotatum.
In 'someS is a P~ that Sis a Q' the recurrent protenn 'S' co-denotes
a 'certainS' even though the S 'in question' is not identified for us by the
speaker and may not even be known to the speaker. I may for example suspect
that some students are cheating and say:
Some students are cheating~ they will be found out

+S'+C~+S'+F
In my second statement, I denote the 'students in question' whether or not my

prediction that they will be exposed is true or false. I do not know who they
are, and may never know, yet my protenns denote 'certain students' (they
know who they are). Note that we may assign wild quantity to the pronominal
subject since S' denotes all as well as some of the students-in-question. By
assigning wild quantity to the pronoun we also mark the difference between
antecedent and pronoun. The antecedent has particular quantity, the pronoun
that 'refers back' to it is given wild quantity. Thus the pronominalization may
be transcribed as
+[+S'+C]+[±S'+F]
Suppose I add the following remark:
However, some students were prepared~ they did not cheat
Since the students now under consideration are not those previously denoted
by the protenn S ', we transcribe this second pronominalization by giving
different superscripts to the protenns:
(1) +[+S'+C)+[±S'+F]
(2) +[+S"+P]+[±S"-C]
Note that the proterms in (2) have been given double markings. In general,
once we choose a superscript for the proterms in a given pronominalization
whose antecedent is a particular subject of form 'some S ', the super-scripted
proterms denote a 'certain thing' and we may not use the same super-scripted
proterm again unless we intend to continue to denote the thing in question.
Pronominalization can often be paraphrased by sentences that are
pronoun free. Thus 'some A is a B; it is a C' can be paraphrased as 'some
A is a B that is a C', which transcribes as '+A+<+B+C>'. The more serious
pronominalizations are those that are not easily or naturally paraphrased away.
Pronominalization that takes place in the same sentence often contains
reflexive pronouns that cannot be naturally paraphrased in a pronoun free way.
An example is 'some barber shaves himself: +B' 1+S 12+B' 2 • A favorite
example of linguists is: 'a boy who was fooling her kissed a girl who loved
him'. Here we have two pronominalizations, one of which linguists call
cataphoric, or 'backward', since the pronoun 'her' appears before its
antecedent. But again, while there is this difference between pronoun and
antecedent in the vernacular, the difference is not represented in logical
transcription, since all that logically matters is the fact that a single recurrent
term is being used to denote one and the same thing. Thus the boy-fooled-girl
sentence transcribes as:
Note also that the proterms' numerals may differ: G' 2 is paired with F 12 as the
girl who is being fooled, and G' 3 is paired with K 13 and L34 as the girl who is
kissed and who loves, but the common superscript ensures that it's the same
girl. Again, B' 1 is the footer and the kisser while B' 4 is the loved one but it's
the same boy. The common superscripts signify the common focus. Similarly
'everybarbershaveshimselftranscribesas- B' 1+S 12+B' 2, where each barber-
qua-person-who-shaves is the very same person as the barber-qua-person-who-
is-shaved.
In the next few paragraphs we discuss some special rules that we need
for reckoning with sentences containing proterms.
Consider again the case of simple pronominalization. I say that a man
is P and follow this by saying that he is Q. My first sentence looks as if it
should be transcribed as +M+P and indeed ifthis sentence were not part of a
pronominalization, that would be the proper transcription. However, since we
now have a pronominalization we cannot simply transcribe the whole as
+M+P; +M+Q since there would then be no indication that the man in question
of whom it is being said that he is Q is the one that has just been said to be P.
Once the second sentence with its back reference to the first subject has
entered the picture, we must view the two subject terms in tandem as denoting
the same thing; in other words, both 'man' and 'he' now stand revealed as
'proterms' and their codenoting status must be marked by the pronominal
superscript: +M'+P, ±M'+Q.
More generally, any use of 'some X' is potentially a pronominal use
and when 'X' is followed by a pronominal back reference to 'the X in
question', it is actually so. Indeed, any sentence of form 'some X is Y' is
trivially equivalent to a pronominalization: 'something is X and it is Y'. We
may therefore introduce the following rule of inference called
Pronominalization and referred to as P 1.
P1 some X is Y I so it (the X in question) is Y

+X'+ Y I +X'+ Y
Notethattheproterm in +X'+Y shouldhavewildquantity. Given +X'+Y, we

may infer'- X'+Y' For if it is true that some students are cheating, then it is
true that 'they' are cheating, i.e, that all of the students in question are
cheating. This gives us another rule of inference:
P2 +X'+Y I -X'+Y
We will refer to P2 as the Rule of Wild Quantity (WQ).

The following equivalences are self-explanatory. In each of these
cases the formula on the right is a Pronominal Expansion ofthe formula to its
left:
some A is B = something is an A and it is a B

+A+B = +[+T'+A]+[+T'+B]
some A is B = an A exists (is a thing) and it is a B
+A+B = +[+A'+T]+[+A'+B]
every A is B = if any thing is an A, it is a B

- A+B = - [+T'+A]+[+T'+B]
every A is B = if an A exists, it is a B
-A+B = -[+A'+T]+[+A'+B]
Relational Syllogisms I55
We shall refer to the statement on the right, the pronominal expansion, as the
pronex of the statement on the left. The pronex formulas show that any
particular statement or universal statement is equivalent to a
pronominalization. Pronominal expansions may also be formulated as rules
of inference:
+X+Y I +[+T'+X]+[+T'+Y]
- X+Y I -[+T'+X]+[+T'+Y]
One pronex of+X+Y is +[+X'+T]+[+X'+Y] ('some X is a thing and

it is a Y'). Applying simplification, we may drop the first conjunct and get
Pronominalization (PI) as a derived rule:
PI some X is a Y I so that X (or it) is a Y

+X+Y /+X'+Y
PI allows us to replace +M+P by +M'+P, a sentence with a pronominal

subject, thereby justifying transcribing 'some man is P and he is Q' as
+[+M'+P]+[+M'+Q]. In effect, we understand 'some man is P and he is Q' as
saying 'a certain man is P and that man is Q'.
It is easy to see that PI allows for pronominalizing Y as well as X.
Thus from+ X+Y we move by PEQ to+Y +X and thence by PI to+Y' +X, and
again by PEQ to +X+Y' and by PI to +Y'+X'. This gives an important
derived rule of inference:
Pia +X+Y I+X'+Y'
The following simple argument shows how a pronominalization may

figure in inference: ·
some Greek are Sophists

they are philosophers
they are Athenians
/some Athenians are philosophers
To show this argument is valid we transcribe the premises algebraically thus:

1. +G'+S
2. +G'+P
3.+G'+A
The derivation proceeds:
4. -G'+A 3, WQ
5. +A+P 2+4, DDO
In using DDO we leave the Host premise intact except for the middle
term which is replaced by the environment of the Donor premise. When we
apply DDO to inferences involving pronominalization we treat the superscript
ofthe Host's middle term as part ofthe environment, E, leaving the superscript
in place when we replace the middle term by E*. The following example
illustrates this procedure:
A6 1. some barber shaves himself +B'1+S12+B'2 E(B')

2. every barber is a philosopher -B~+Pl E*(B')
I some philosopher shaves himself /+P' 1+S12+P' 2 IE(E*)
Note again that the proterm 'barber' in premise ( 1) occurs twice with different
numerical indices. In its first occurrence it denotes a barber that shaves; in its
second occurrence it denotes a barber that is shaved. The common superscript
indicates that it is the same barber. The environment E in the host expression
is+ ... '+S 12+ .. .'. Note again that the middle term, 'barber' in the Host premise
has superscripts. But these are part of its environment and they remain when
'barber' is replaced by 'philosopher'.
Finally, we restate our rule IPE (from Chapter 4, section 17). This
rule enables us to eliminate the pronouns from the transcription of any internal
pronominalization. The Rule of Internal Pronoun Elimination is:
IPE Given any internal pronominalization, ... P'm .... P'n

we may remove P'n and replace any occurrence of n by m.
For example, given +B' 1+S 12+B' 2 (the transcription of 'some barber shaves
himself) we may remove B' 2 and replace '2' by' 1' in S12 thereby giving us
a new transcription, B1+S 11 , which we might read as 'some barber is a
self- shaver'. Now we can deal with A6 as follows
1. +B' 1+S 12+B' 2 E(B)

2. -B 1+P 1 E*(-B)
3. +B 1+S 11 1, IPE
4. +P 1+S 11 2+3, DDO
Some things we talk about are impossible. Impossible things may be

more or less obvious. That square circles and married bachelors are
impossible is obvious. But it may not be so obvious that we are dealing with
an impossible situation when someone asks us to think about what happens
when an irresistible force meets up with an immovable object. It takes awhile
to realize that a world containing a force that no object can resist cannot also
be a world in which there is an object that no force can affect. One famous
case of an impossibility is the barber who shaves all persons who don't shave
themselves and refrains from shaving any that shave themselves. To prove
that no such barber can possibly exist we put down the two conditions as
premises. One condition is that the barber shaves all non-self-shavers. The
other is that he refrains from shaving all self-shavers.
1. +B\+S12-(-S22)
2. ±B' 1+(-Sd-S22
If such a barber exists, he will either be a self-shaver or a non-self-shaver.

Assume the first alternative:
3. ±B' 2+S 22 Assumption

4. ±B'2+(±B'1+(-S12)) 2+3, DDO
5. ±B'2+(-S22) 4, IPE
Now 5 contradicts 3; so assume the other alternative, i.e. that the barber in
question is a non-self-shaver:
6. ±B'2+(-S22) Assumption
7. ±B' 2+(±B'1+S12)) 1+7, DDO
8. ±B2+S 22 8, IPE
Here 8 contradicts 6. Since both possible assumptions lead to contradiction

we conclude that the barber described in the premises cannot exist--he is
impossible.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Give annotated proofs for each of the following valid inferences.
1. all politicians admire themselves

they are vain
so, some who admire themselves are vain
2. every critic is an author

every critic reads every author
so, every author reads himself
3. some philosophers are wise

they are also poor
and they are humble
thus, there are those who are wise and humble who are poor
4. all politicians vote for themselves

some senators are politicians
they are crass
so, some who are crass vote for themselves
5. some girl was kissed by a boy

he liked her
so, she was kissed by one who liked her
********************************************************************
9. Distributed Proterms
We have said that a term, T, is distributed in ' ... T .. .' if and only if T is
algebraically negative and ' ... T .. .' entails a statement of form ' ... every T .. .'.
A proterm is distributed if its antecedent is distributed. Consider 'if some A is
B then it is C' (the pronex of 'every A is Band C'). The pronex transcribes
as '-[+A'+B]+[±A'+C]', in which the proterm occurs twice as a distributed
term.
When a term is distributed we can assign to it any numeral we please.

And if the term is a proterm, then the same rule holds for its superscripts.
When a proterm is distributed we may assign to it any superscript we please,
including superscripts already in use in other pronominalizations. For
example, given the premises 'some barber loves himself [=> +B' 1+L 12+B' 2]
and 'every barber shaves himself, we have distributed proterms in the E*
premise. This means we can assign its numerals and superscripts to line them
up with those of the Host premise, writing theE* premise as- B' 1+S 1:itB' 2 to
derive the conclusion: +B' 1+L 12+(- B' 1+S 12) 2 [read 'some barber loves
someone he shaves']. Here is the deduction:
1. +B' 1+L12+B' 2 prenuse

2. - B' 1+S 1:itB' 2 prenuse
3. +B' 1+L 12+(Sl2+B'2)'2 1+2 DDO
/4. +B' 1+L 12+(±B\+S 12)' 2 Commutation
The proterms ofpronominalizations ofthe form 'if any Tis a P then

it is a Q' are distributed. (That the 'T' in the antecedent 'any T' is distributed
is evident from the fact that the statement is equivalent to 'every Tis either not
a P or a Q. ') Consider the statement:
(9) if any students are cheating they will be found out
Here I do not commit myself to saying that some students are cheating. In a
sense the proterm does not denote at all; for there may not be any students of
whom it could be said that they are 'the students in question'. In another sense
we are inclined to say that whatever the antecedent term denotes is denoted by
the proterm in the second sentence. So we have a kind of distributed co-
denoting. 'The' students that cheat (if any there be) are the students that will
be exposed. In transcribing this pronominalization we again use superscripts:
-[+S'+C]+[ -S'+F]
Here again, since the proterms of (9) are distributed we can choose whatever
superscripts we please; we need not worry about having used the same
superscripts earlier. Thus suppose we had asserted
(8) some students are late; they must wait to be seated

+[+S"+L]+[+S"+W]
and now wish to assert (9). We need not be concerned that the double prime
has been used for (8). For (9) applies to any student, including the students
denoted by (8). It is therefore legitimate to transcribe (8)and (9) as
8. +[+S"+L]+[+S"+W]
9. -[+S"+C]+[-S"+F]
As the last two examples illustrate, whenever we are given a pronominalization

' ... Ti .. .', where 'T' is a distributed proterm, we may change the superscript
and form another pronominalization ' ... Tj .. .'. We state this as a new
Reassignment Rule:
R-A2
... 1' .. .
I ... P .. .
Another example of a pronominalization whose proterms are

distributed is
every barber shaves himself
which we transcribe as
Consider the following argument:
some barber drinks

every barber shaves his uncle
so, someone who drinks shaves his uncle
This argument is intuitively valid. To show that it is valid we shall give an

annotated proof, moving step by step to the conclusion.
1. +B 1+D 1 premtse
2. - B' l+Sl2+(U2l+B' I) premise
3. - B1+S12+U21 2, IPE
4. +D 1+B 1 1, Commutation
5. +DI+S12+U21 3+4, DDO
The next example has a pronoun whose antecedent proterm is a proper

name. It also illustrates how to handle the 'exceptive' word 'else'. Show that
'Mark Twain is Sam Clemens' follows from the following two premises:
1. Mark Twain is funnier than anyone else. +T* 1+F 12 -(-T*h

2. He's not funnier than Samuel Clemens. +T* 1+(- F 12)+C* 2
3. -(-T*h+F 12 -T* 1 passive transformation
4. +C* 2+(-F 12)+T* 1 2, passive transformation
5 +C* 2-(F 12 -T* 1) 4, obversion
6. -C* 2-(F 12-T* 1) 5, WQ
7. -(F 12 -T* 1)-C* 2 6, PEQ
8. -(-T*)2-C* 2 3+7, DDO
9. -C* 2+T* 2 8, PEQ
The last line shows that 'Clemens is Twain' can be derived from the two
premises in a series of justified steps. [For the use of passive transformation
in steps 3 and 4 the reader should review section 15 of chapter 4.]
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Give annotated proofs for the following:
1. Bill admires everyone but Ned

Ned is admired by everyone but Clint
so, Bill is Clint
2. some boy loves every girl

if someone loves every girl he is a fool
so, someone is a boy and he is a fool
3. some actors love themselves

all self-lovers are vain
hence, some who are vain are actors
4. Tom is a citizen
every citizen likes Tom
Tom was mugged by a citizen
so, a citizen was mugged by someone who likes him
5. 2 is smaller than any other prime

no other prime is even
2 is not smaller than the square root of 4
the square root of 4 is even
so, 2 is the square root of 4
********************************************************************
7 Statement Logic
1. Introduction
Arguments consist of statements. But some arguments can be seen to be valid

or invalid even if we know nothing about the internal structure or contents of
the statements involved. The logic that deals with arguments of this kind is
known as Statement or Propositional logic. In Statement Logic, we do not
make use of term letters at all since terms are internal to the statements
involved. Instead we use lower case statement letters. Each such letter
represents a whole statement.
Statement logic {also known as 'propositional logic') deals with
arguments where we can ignore contents of the statements involved. Indeed
when statement letters are used we often do know what statements they
represent. But we do not care; the validity of the argument will not depend
on the form or content of the statements involved. As an example of an
argument in statement logic consider:
If Winston Churchill is still alive then he is the oldest man alive.

Churchill is not the oldest man alive.
So Churchill is not still alive.
This argument has the following pattern:
-p+q
=lL
/-p
Any argument of this pattern is valid; e.g., this is valid and has that pattern.
If no mammals lay eggs then the platypus is not a mammal.

The platypus is a mammal.
So it is not true that no mammals lay eggs.
163
The plus and minus signs serve to operate on or to connect whole

statements. Since we are not concerned with the internal composition of the
statements we have no use for term connectives such as 'some is a' and
'every is a'. The basic connectives that figure in statement logic are the unary
connective 'not' and the binary connective 'and' which are used to define a
range of other formatives in the plus/minus notation. Here are some familiar
transcriptions.
notp -p
bothp and q +p+q
ifp then q -p+q
p orq -(-p)-(-q)
The general form of statement in statement logic is
±(±(±p)±(±q))
The external sign is the sign of judgment, plus for affirmation, minus for
denial. We determine the valence of a statement in the usual way by
comparing the external sign of judgment with the next sign: if these are the
same the valence is positive; if they differ the valence is negative. For example
ifp then q' whose fully explicittranscription is'+( -(+p)+(+q))' is negative in
valence. We shall however omit all the plus signs that signify affirmative
judgment so that 'if p then q' will transcribe as '-p+q'. Statements of
positive valence are equivalent to conjunctions. Statements ofnegative valence
are equivalent to disjunctions. An affirmative statement of negative valence is
either a conditional of form ifx then y or a disjunction of form either x or y.
Strictly speaking we ought to transcribe 'p or q' as '-(-p)-(-q)' but we shall
take the liberty of omitting the brackets thereby transcribing 'p or q' as
- -p- -q. Also we shall transcribe 'not p or q' as '-p--q' or as'--( -p)- -q'
which shows its equivalence to 'ifp then q' since the latter transcribes as the
equal and covalent statement '- p+q'.
Equality and covalence suffice for equivalence. For example, 'if p
then q' is equivalent to 'not p or q' and also to 'if not q then not p since - p+q
= - (- q)+(- p). Now this means that we can replace any compound statement
by a statement that is equal and covalent to it. However neither equality nor
covalence is necessary for equivalence. For example any statement 'p' is
equivalent to 'p or p' and also to 'p and p' but 'p' and 'p or p' are not equal
Statement Logic 165
algebraically since: p "' - -p- -p. Nor is covalence necessary. Thus

conjunctions and disjunctions are divalent. But sometimes a conjunction is
equivalent to a disjunction. Thus 'p and p' is equivalent to 'p or p'. And, as
we shall show in the next section, the conjunction '(p or p) and( q orr)' is
equivalent to the disjunction 'either p and q or p and r'.
Thus, in statement logic, the old 'principle of equivalence' serves only
as a sufficient condition for equivalence but not as a necessary one. To remind
ourselves of the difference we shall use lower case letters to represent the
principle of equivalence as it applies to logic calling it: peq.
peq Two compound statements are equivalent if (but not 'only if) they are
covalent and equal.
********************************************************************
Exercises.
Apply peq to see whether any of the following are equivalent. (Remember, if
two statements are not equivalent by peq, they may still be equivalent.)
1. if p then not- r; not both r and p

2. ifp then r; not-p orr orr
3. not-p and not-r; not: either p orr
********************************************************************
2. Contradictions
Some compound statements are contradictory others are tautological and still
others are [_contingent. For example any statement of form 'p and not p' is
a contradiction, any statement of form 'ifp then p' is a tautology, and any
statement of form 'p or q' is contingent. We shall first discuss contradictions.
It is easy to spot contradictions of form 'p and not p'. But not all
contradictions are of this simple form. The following definition of
contradiction builds up to a more general form.
1. Any statement of the form 'p & not p' is a contradiction.

2. If c is a contradiction then any statement ofform

'p & c' is a
contradiction.
3. Ifc1 and c2 are contradictions then any statement ofform 'cl or
c2 ' is a contradiction.
For example by clause 2. any statement ofthe form 'q and p and not pis a
contradiction . And by clause 3 any statement of form 'q and p and not p or
r and s and not s' is a contradiction. We shall speak of clause 3 type
contradictions as 'disjunctive contradictions'. Each disjunct of a disjunctive
contradiction is a conjunction of simple statements. And in each such
conjunction we can find two conjuncts of opposite sign. So each such
conjunction is a contradiction and, by clause 3, the whole disjunction of these
contradictions is a contradiction. A disjunctive contradiction is the most
general form of contradiction since we may consider contradictions oftype two
and type one as special cases oftype three contradictions. For example, 'q and
p and (not p)' can be considered a disjunctive contradiction consisting of a
single contradictory 'disjunct'.
3. Tautology
We use our definition of contradiction to define tautology. Any statement that

is equivalent to the negation ofa contradiction is a tautology. For example
'if p then p' is a tautology since it is equivalent to '- (+p+(- p))' which is the
negation of a contradiction.
A tautology is a logical truism and as such (as long as it is not

merely the corresponding conditional of the argument) it may be
inserted as a premise in any argument or as a step in any proof
The corresponding conditional of an argument is a conditional statement that

has the conjunction of premises as its antecedent and the conclusion as its
consequent. In an argument is valid, its corresponding conditional is a
tautology.
Statement Logic 167
4. Inconsistent Statements
Any statement that is a contradiction or equivalent to a contradiction is said to

be inconsistent. For example, '-(-p+p)' is an inconsistent statement since
it is equivalent to '+p+(-p)'. Strictly speaking only statements oftypes 1,
2 or 3 are contradictory. But since any inconsistent statement is equivalent to
a contradiction, we shall loosely characterize any inconsistent statement as a
'contradiction' and any contradiction as an inconsistency. For example, we
shall say that the inconsistent statement '- (- p+p)' is a contradiction since it
is equivalent to one. Also, since any contradictory statement is inconsistent we
shall often call it that. In effect we shall be using the terms 'inconsistent' and
'contradictory' interchangeably to characterize any statement that is equivalent
to a contradiction of type 1, 2 or 3.
The following statement is inconsistent:
if(ifp then not both q and not-q) then rand not-r
Proof:
- [-p+( -(+q+( -q)))]+[+r+( -r)]
-- [+p+(+q+( -q))]-- [+r+( -r)] peq
The second line is a type 3 contradiction.

Derivatively, a series of statements is often characterized as
inconsistent. Such a series is inconsistent if and only if the statement that is
the conjunction of all of its members is itself inconsistent.
5. Contingent Statements
A statement is 'contingent' if it is neither a contradiction nor a tautology.

Most statements are contingent. For example, all simple statements are
contingent. Compound forms such as 'p or q' and 'p and q' are contingent.
*****************************************************************
Exercises
Which of the following compound formulas is inconsistent? Tautologous?

Contingent?
1. p or (q and not-q)
2. (p and q and not-p) or (neither p nor not-p)
3. not: if(p and q) then (q orr)
[hint: not: ifx then y = x and not-y]
4. ifp and s then tors
5. neither q nor not(q and t)
6. ifp then not-p
7. if not p then (p and q)
8. ifp then p and not-p
9. (not both and not p) and (q or not-q orr)
10. ifp then (q or p)
********************************************************************
6. Direct Proofs
An argument is valid only if its premises cannot be true if its conclusion is

false. Let A be an argument. Call the conjunction of its premises with the
denial of the conclusion of A 'the counterclaim of A'. One way to prove that
A is valid is to prove that its counterclaim is inconsistent. A proof of validity
by showing the inconsistency of the counterclaim is called an indirect proof
(sometimes called a reductio). Another type of proof is direct. In a direct
proof we assert the premises and move step by justified step to the conclusion.
Such a proof is usually given in annotated form with the justifications for each
step given on the right. For example, suppose, given the premise 'p and q' we
should want to show that 'not if p then not q' follows. We could state the
proof thus:
1. +p+q /-(-p)+(-q)
2. -(-p+(-q)) 1, peq
Step 2, which is also the conclusion, is derived from step 1 by peq.

Another example of inference from a single premise is
1. +(+p+q)+r /+(+r+q)+p
Statement Logic 169
2. +p+(+q+r) 1, Association
3. +(+q+r)+p 2, Commutation
4. +(+r+q)+p 3, Commutation
The justifications for each step appear at the right. Again, the last step is the
conclusion ofthe inference whose single premise is given as step 1.
7. Rules of Statement Logic Used in Proofs
In this section we present some basic principles used in justifying the steps of
proofs in statement logic.
Modus Ponens:
Commutation and Association are familiar principles of great importance for

statement logic. Another familiar rule of inference that applies to inferences
from more than one premise is known as modus ponens. It tells us that given
'ifp then q' as one premise and 'p' as a second premise, we may infer 'q' as
the conclusion.
1. -p+q
2. p /q
Note that the conclusion is got by adding the first premise to the second
thereby using '-p' to cancel 'p' and to replace it by '+q'. We may think of
Modus Ponens as a E/E* type of rule. Think of E* as the environment of 'if
p'. Then in this case E* = +q. Think of E as the environment of 'p' in the
second premise. In this case the environment is null. Then we can see the rule
as justifying the replacing of'p' in E(p) byE*. Moreover this way oflooking
at Modus Ponens is quite general since it applies to any two premises 'E*(if
p)' and 'E(p)' where p has negative occurrence in theE* premise and positive
occurrence in theE- premise. Thus let###### be the environment of p and let
....... be the environment of 'ifp'. The rule permits us to derive'### ...... ###'
from ' .. .ifp .. .' and '###p###':
... (ifp) ... E* (-p)

###p### E(p)
I### ...... ### I E(E*)
This is our old friend, the donor host rule, in new guise. Only now the
repeated ('middle') element 'p' represents a whole statement and '-p' has the
meaning 'ifp'. In Syllogistic Logic the host/donor rule is a generalization of
Aristotle's Dictum de Omni. In Statement Logic, the host/donor rule of
inference is generalization ofthe rule popularly known as 'Modus Ponens' or
MP. MP often figures in an annotated proof that a conclusion follows from
given premises. In its most general form modus ponens may be formulated as:
MP
Given any premise ofform E(ifP) where 'p 'has negative occurrence
and another premise M(p) where p has positive occurrence the conclusion
M(E) follows.
Consider the following simple argument:
If roses are red then daisies are white

Roses are red and violets are blue
I Daisies are white and violets are blue
The argument is valid. Its annotated proof has the form:
1. ifp then q premise -p+q E*=+q

2 p and r premise +p+r E= ++r
3. q and r 1,2, MP l+q+r E(E*)
The pattern reveals nothing about the internal structure or content of 'p', 'q'
or 'r'. But that is irrelevant: any argument of this pattern is valid.
Sometimes we appeal both to MP and to peq. Consider:
If every student reads some books then the classroom is a place of

ideas
The classroom is not a place of ideas
I It is not the case that every student reads some books
Statement Logic 171
This argument has the following pattern:
-p+q
-q
I -p
Any argument of this pattern is valid. An annotated proof that - q follows

from the premises '-p+q' and'- q' is:
1. -p+q premise
2. -q premise
3. -(-q)+(-p) 1, peq
4. I -p 3,2,MP
Conjunction:
A principle called conjunction allows us to derive the conjunction of any

premises as a conclusion from those premises. For example, given any two
premises S1 and S2, 'S1 and S2' follows by the principle of conjunction
(Conj):
1. S1 prem
2. S2 prem
3. I S1 and S2 Conj.
The rule of conjunction may be shown valid by an indirect proof. FQr suppose
we denied the conclusion. This would give us
1. S1
2. S2
3. -(+Sl+S2)
We could then show that this leads to contradiction:
4. -Sl+(-S2) 3, peq
5. -S2 4,1 MP
Step 5 and step 2 are contradictory.

Conj, peq and MP are used to license the steps in many a proof.
Applying these laws we can derive several other rules that are useful in proofs.
Simplification:
One, called simplification (Simpl), allows us to infer a conjunct from a

conjunction. The general pattern is
1. p and q
I 2. p
Simplification is another 'derived' rule that can be shown valid by applying

rules already stated. We may indirectly prove that 'p and q I p' is a valid form
of argument by asserting 'p and q' together with the denial ofp and showing
that this leads to contradiction:
1. +p+q premise
2. -p negation of conclusion
3. +[+p+q] + (-p) 1, Conj
4. +(-p) + [+p+q] 3, Commutation
5. +[+(- p)+p]+q 4, Association
Thus the conjunction of 1 and 2 leads to a contradiction (line 5). The proof of
the laws of conjunction and simplification was indirect since it proceeded by
showing the absurdity of denying the laws. Such proofs are often called
'reductio ad absurdum' proofs (proofs that reduce the opposite assumption to
absurdity or contradiction).
Here are several other inference patterns and a sketch of how they can
themselves be justified by appeal to the laws already given.
Conjunctive Iteration:
Conjunctive Iteration (CI) asserts that pis equivalent to 'p and p'. We may
show this indirectly (that is, by 'reductio'). Assume p and deny 'p and p'.
1. p premise
2. -(+p+p) negation of conclusion
3. -p+(-p} 2, peq
Statement Logic 173
4. -p 1, 3 MP
5. +p+(-p) 1,4 Conj
To show the reverse we assume 'p and p' and deny 'p' and showthatthis leads
to contradiction.
1. +p+p prenuse
2. -p negation of conclusion
3. +(+p+p)+(-p) 1,2 Conj
4. +p+(+p+(-p)) 3, Association
4 is a contraction.
Disjunctive Iteration:
According to Disjunctive Iteration (DI), given 'p', 'p orp' follows. We show
this indirectly:
1. p premise
2. -(--P--p) negation of conclusion
3. +(-p)+(-p) 2, peq
4. +p+(-p)+ (-p) 3, Conj
4 is a contradiction.
To show that 'p' follows from- -p- -p, we assume the opposite and
show that '- p' and '-- p-- p' are jointly inconsistent. We first use peq to
replace'- -p- -p' by' -(-p)+p'. We then apply MP to get '+(-p)+p' which
(by peq, again) is equivalent to the overt contraction '+p+(- p)'.
Disjunctive Addition:
Disjunctive Addition (DA) allows us to derive 'p or q' from the premise 'p'.
DAis valid. For suppose that 'p' is true and 'p or q' is false:
1. p prenuse
2. -(--p--q) negation of conclusion
3. +(-p)+(-q) 2,peq
4. +p+(-p)+(-q) 1,3 Conj
The last step is the contradiction derived from the assumption that 'p or q' is
false in the case where 'p' is true.
The Law of 'And/ Or' Distribution:
We said earlier that peq gives us a sufficient condition for equivalence.

Iteration shows that two statements can be equivalent without being
algebraically equal. The Law of' And/Or' Distribution (AOD) shows that two
statements can be equivalent without being covalent. The law equates a
conjunction with a disjunction:
p or p and (q orr) = p and q or p and r

+[--p--p] + [--q--r] = --[+p+q]--[+p+r]
To prove that the right side follows from the left side we show that a
contradiction follows from the assumption that the left side is true and the right
side false (a so-called reductio argument). We should then have:
1. --p--p premise
2. --q--r premises
3. - [-- [+p+q]-- [+p+r]] premise
4. +[ -p-q]+[ -p-r] 3, peq
5. p 1, DI
6. -p-q 4, Simpl
7. -p-r 4, Simpl
8. -p+(-q) 6,peq
9. -p+(-r) 7,peq
10. -q 5, 8MP
11. -r 5, 9MP
12. +(-q)+(-r) 10, 11 Conj
13. -(+(-q)+(-r)) 2, peq
14. +[12]+[-12] 12, 13 Conj
By taking the denial of the right · side as a premise we have derived a

contradiction. A similar contradiction can be derived by assuming the right
side and denying the left. Thus the law of distribution holds. Our reductio
argument has shown that we cannot consistently assume that it does not hold.
Statement Logic 175
The And/Or distribution law shows how a conjunction may be

transformed into a disjunction whose disjuncts are conjunctions. We shall
presently give a technique for doing this to any conjunction, however long or
complicated.
The Law of 'Or/And' Distribution:
According to the Law of'Or/And' Distribution (OAD), 'p or (q and r) and '(p
or q) and (p or r)' are equivalent. This too can be shown by the indirect
method. By the laws of iteration 'p' and 'p or p' and 'p and p' are mutually
equivalent and so one may replace the other. By the laws of distribution 'p&(q
orr)' and '(p&q) or (p&r)' are equivalent (and mutually replaceable)~ also 'p
or q&r' and '(p or q)&(p orr)' are equivalent and mutually replaceable.
Thus we see that in addition to the equivalences that come under peq,
we have others that do not conform. For we have equivalences like 'p =
- -p- -p' and '+p+p =- -p- -p' whose sides are divalent or unequal or both.
In the case ofOAD and AOD both peq conditions are missing.
8. Disjunctive Normal Forms (DNF)
A statement such as 'p' or '-p' does not have two or more statements as
components. Such statements are not compound~ we call them simple. A
disjunction is said to be in 'disjunctive normal form' when each of its disjuncts
is (i) a simple statement or (ii) a conjunction of simple statements. For
example 'either rands or p and q and m' is a statement in disjunctive normal
form. On the other hand, 'either r or neither p nor q' which also has two
disjuncts is not in DNF since the second disjunct is neither simple nor a
conjunction of simple statements. Nevertheless, 'either r or neither p nor q'
may be transformed into a DNF statement by applying peq to the second
disjunct to give us the equivalent disjunction: either r or both not p and not q.
Now the second disjunct is a conjunction of two simple statements, '-p' and
'-q', and the whole disjunction is in 'normal form'.
The importance of putting a disjunction into 'normal form' is this:
When a disjunction is in normal form we can easily determine whether it is
contradictory or not by a inspecting each of its disjuncts. In a DNF each
disjunct that isn't simple is a conjunction of simple statements. We inspect
each disjunct of the DNF looking to see whether it contains a contradictory
pair of simple statements. If every disjunct has a contradictory pair, then the
whole disjunction is inconsistent since it would then be a type 3 contradiction.
But if even a single disjunct is contingent or tautological, the whole disjunction
is consistent (not a contradiction). Thus, getting a DNF equivalent to a
statement puts us in position to say whether the statement is consistent. As we
shall see, that information is logically valuable for deciding the validity of
arguments.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Transform the following statements into DNF disjunctions, then check for
inconsistency by inspecting all the disjuncts:
1. p and r and not- p OR not: if p then p OR not: either q or not- q

2. r and not- r OR not both s and not p
3. sand not s OR u and neither to nor u.
4. p and (q or not-p)
(hint: use the law of distribution)
5. sand neither q nor not q.
(hint: a disjunction may consist of a single 'disjunct'.)
*******************************************************************
9. Inconsistency and Validity
In doing logic we are often concerned with the question of deciding whether
some given argument is valid or not. Now we have just learned how to tell
whether a certain kind of disjunctive statement is inconsistent or not. It is
important to be able find inconsistency in conjunctions as well as disjunctions.
For we know that an argument is valid if and only if its counterclaim is
inconsistent. The counterclaim of any argument is the conjunction of its
premises and the denial of its conclusion. So knowing how to tell whether a
counterclaim conjunction is inconsistent or not is tantamount to knowing how
to tell whether the argument is valid or not. Thus suppose that S1, S2 ... /Sn is
an argument with n-1 premises. Assume we have a way of determining
Statement Logic 177
whether its counterclaim conjunction, Sland S2 ... and -Sn, is inconsistent.

Then we should ipso facto have a way of deciding whether 'Sl,S2 .. /Sn' is
valid. For 'Sl,S2 .. ./Sn' is valid if and only if 'Sl&S2 ... &-Sn' is inconsistent.
Now in most cases, a direct examination of a conjunction does not tell
us whether it is consistent or inconsistent. On the other hand, as we shall soon
be seeing, any conjunction is equivalent to a normal form disjunction. And we
already know how to inspect any normal form disjunction for inconsistency.
Of course, if a conjunction is inconsistent, any statement that is equivalent to
it is also inconsistent. So if we had a way of transforming any conjunction
into an equivalent DNF disjunction, we could use the method of inspection for
contradiction to decide on the consistency or inconsistency of conjunctions.
For all we should have to do is inspect their DNF equivalents.
We shall soon learn how to transform any conjunction into its
disjunctive normal form equivalent. The ability to get a disjunctive equivalent
for any conjunction will give us a tool for evaluating any argument to see
whether it is valid. The general method is this: Suppose we have an argument
A. A is valid if and only if the conjunction of its premises and the denial of its
conclusion (its conjunctive counterclaim) is a contradiction. Let C(A) be the
conjunctive counterclaim) of A. Then A is valid if and only if C(A) is
inconsistent. Let D(A) be the DNF equivalent to C(A). Then A is valid if and
only ifD(A) is a contradiction. Now by the law of distribution, each disjunct
ofD(A) is a conjunction. In that case D(A) is a contradiction if and only if
each and every disjunct contains a conjunction ofthe form 'x&-x'. So we
examine each disjunct ofD(A) to determine whether D(A) is a contradiction.
If D(A) is a contradiction then so is C(A). But if C(A) is inconsistent A is
valid. If D(A) is not a contradiction then neither is C(A). In that case A is
invalid.
One key step in this procedure has yet to be learned: how to transform
any counterclaim conjunction into its equivalent DNF disjunction. We can do
this for very simple cases by using the law of and/or distribution. But we need
to be able to apply the law of distribution to conjunctions of any length and
complexity. For that purpose we shall now learn a new way of way of
representing the law of distribution that graphically exhibits the equivalence
of any conjunction to a disjunction of conjunctions.
We have so far been using an algebraic notation to represent
compound statements like 'p and q' and 'p or q'. We have also learned, but
not used, a symbolic notation which employs the symbol '&'for 'and', 'v' for
'or' and '=>' for 'if then'. A third notation which we shall now learn is
graphic. By representing compound statements on a tree figure, it has the

advantage of revealing certain relationships that are very useful for logical
reckoning. In choosing a notation for logic we keep two desiderata in mind.
The first is brevity: in this respect 'p=>q' is better than 'if p then q'. The
second is the capacity of the notation to reveal logical relationships. For
example using the algebraic notation the equivalence relationship between 'if
not p then q' and 'q or p' is revealed as an equation of two covalent statements
which are therefore equivalent by peq:
-(-p)+q = -(-q)-(-p)
By contrast the equivalence is not perspicuously shown in symbolic notation

where it is represented as:
-p->q =qvp
We are about to learn yet a third way to represent compound statements. This
new way is graphic.
10. Graphic Representation of Compound Statements
The graphic method uses spatial relations to represent the connectives 'and'
and 'or' that join simple statements to form compound statements. Roughly,
when two statements are vertically positioned, they are conjoined. When two
statements are horizontally positioned they are disjoined. Thus when p and q
are vertically arrayed the array represents the conjunction 'p and q' or 'q and
p' depending on whether one reads it down or up.
Spatial Symbolic Algebraic

Notation Notation Notation
p andq p p&q +p+q
qandp q q&p +q+p
When 'p ' and 'q' are horizontally arrayed this represents 'p or q' or 'q or p',
depending on whether one reads the array from left to right or from right to
left.
Statement Logic 179
p orq p q pvq --p--q

q orp qvp --q--p
Notice that the spatial notation for both conjunctions is a vertical array, while
the spatial notation for both disjunctions is a horizontal array. In what follows
we shall make liberal use of all three notations.
By the principle of commutation left to right and right to left
readings are equivalent. So too are up-down and down-up readings.
p q
=
q p p&q =q&p
p q = q p pvq=qvp
p
= p&p
p
p p = pvp
p p
<=> (p v p)&(q v r) = (p&q) v (p and r)
q r
Note that the vertical reading of

p p
q r
interprets it as the conjunction '(p v p)&(q v r)' while the horizontal reading
interprets it as the disjunction '(p&q) v (p&r)'.
Since p = p v p, we write the array 'p p' simply as 'p' and so
represent 'p&(q v r)' by the array
p
I \
q r
By convention this array is usually represented as a 'tree.'
p +p+[--q--r]; p&(q v r)
I \
q r -- [+p+q]-- [+p+r]; (p&q) v (p&r)
Reading down and then left the tree represents the conjunction 'p&(q v r)'.
But the tree can also be read sideways as the disjunction '(p&q) v (p&r)'.
Thus the 'and/or' equivalence of 'p&(q or r)' and '(p&q) or (p&r)'is
represented in the two equivalent ways to read the tree: vertically or
horizontally. In effect the tree graphically depicts the equivalence of the
conjunction to the disjunction. We may state the law of distribution as an
equivalence between two trees:
p
1\ = 1\
q r p p
q r
The equivalence shows that we may drop a common term downward to the
bottom of every path that it dominates. Conversely if (as in the diagram at the
right) a common term is at the bottom of several paths we may lift it upwards
to a node that dominates the common paths. The move downward corresponds
to iterating 'p' to give us 'p or p'. Moving pup corresponds to reducing 'p or
p' to its equivalent, 'p'.
Statement Logic 181
A simple statement has no binary connectives. It is either positive (of

the form 'p'), or negative (or the form' -p'). Any conjunction or disjunction
of simple statements can be 'treed.' For example, the conjunction 'not p and
(q or not r)' is 'treed' as
-p
I \
q -r
Any simple statement can be treed. But to be treed, a compound

statement must be overtly conjunctive or disjunctive: only statements of the
form 'x&y' and 'x v y' can be treed. For example, 'not both p and q' [=>
-(+p+q)] cannot be treed as it stands since it is not of the proper form.
However it is always possible to apply peq to any compound statement that
is not a conjunction or disjunction to get an equivalent conjunction or
disjunction that is 'treeable'. For example 'not both p and q' is first
represented as '- (+p+q)' and then transformed (by peq) into
--(-p)--(-q)
which we tree as
I \
-p -q
Similarly 'ifp then q and r' is first represented as '-p+(+q+r)' and then as
'--(-p)--(+q+r)' [=> -p v q&r]:
I \
-p q
r
The tree for '+p+(-p+q)' is:
p
I \
-p q
Note again that '-p+q' istreatedasthedisjunction,'- -(-p)- -q', [==>either

not p or q], to which it is in fact equivalent.
Only conjunctions and disjunctions can be represented in tree
notation. If two statements are connected by a path that can be traversed by
going either up or down, they are conjoined. If the path connecting them
requires us to go both up and down, they are disjoined.
Henceforth we shall treat all conditional statements of the form 'ifp
then q' as ifthey are disjunctions ofthe form 'either not p or q'. In effect, we
shall look on all conditionals as 'disjunctions'.
Note that if we drop 'p' down, the tree for 'p and ifp then q' is seen
to be equivalent to
I \
p p
-p q
a disjunction of two conjunctions one of which is a contradiction. A path to

or from the top of the tree is either 'open' or 'closed'. We call a path closed
if it contains a contradictory pair of statements. A closed path represents an
inadmissible alternative. Thus the only open path on the above tree consists
ofthe disjunct 'p and q'.
To repeat: Statements that consist of a single letter with or without a
minus sign in front are called simple. Statements that contain binary
connectives such as 'and', 'or' and 'if then' are called compound.
Representing compound statements on a tree is subject to a strict limitation:
only affirmative compounds can be represented on a tree and then, only those
that have 'and' or 'or' as their binary connective. Denials of compounds must
therefore be transformed by equivalence into an affirmative disjunction or
conjunction before we can tree them. For example if we want to tree
'- (+p+q)' we must first clear the minus sign of denial by driving it inward to
get the equivalent affirmative statement, the disjunction '-p-q' which is
equivalent to '- -( -p)- -( -q)' and which trees as:
I \
-p -q
Statement Logic 183
11. Regimenting Statements for Treeing
We have noted that statements like 'ifp then q' or 'not ifp then q' cannot be
treed without first being transformed into disjunctive or conjunctive form. The
process of getting a statement into a form suitable for 'treeing' is called
regimentation. In regimenting any compound statement we first transcribe it
and then follow two rules:
1. Clear all external minus signs by driving them inward.

2. Represent the result as a statement of the form +x+y or - - x- - y.
For example, given 'not ifp then q' we first transcribe it as '-{-p+q)'. We
next drive the external minus sign inward to give us '+p-q'. We next
transform this into a statement of form '+x+y', which in this case is the
statement '+p+(-q)'. This can be treed by putting p over '-q' in vertical
juxtaposition. The statement 'ifp then not q' is first transcribed as '-p+{-q)'
which is then transformed into '-- (- p)-- (- q). This trees by putting '- p' and
'- q' in horizontal juxtaposition.
When a formula is cleared of all external minus signs it is easy to see
how it will be treed as a conjunction (vertically) or disjunction (horizontally).
For '- p+q' can be treated as 'not p or q' being equivalent to '- - (- p)- - q' .
So we tree '-p+q' as 'not p or q' putting '-p' on the left leg and 'q' on the
right leg. Similarly, '-p-q' can be read as 'not p or not q' and treed as '-p
or -q':
I \
-p -q
More complicated statements are easily handled in piecemeal fashion. Given

'not both p and not q and not if not r then not s' we first transcribe it as
'+[-(+p+{-q))]+[-(-(-r)+(-s))]'. We then use peq to get an equivalent
conjunction,+[ -p+q] + [+{ -r)+s], a formula that is clear of external minus
signs and which we tree thus:
-r
s
I \
-p q
Note that we put the simple statements on top. This makes for a smaller tree.
But we could also tree the compound thus:
I \
-p q
-r -r
s s
The above example shows how a statement that cannot be treed as it

stands can be transformed into a treeable statement. The following conditions
determine that a statement is 'treeable:
I. Any simple statement is treeable

2. Ifx andy are simple, then '+x+y' and'- -x- -y' are treeable.
3. Ifx andy are treeable then '+x+y' and'- -x- -y' are treeable.
No statement that is not of the kind specified in 1-3 can be treed. On

the other hand any compound statement has a treeable equivalent (called its
'T-form'). Consider, for example, the statement '-(p& (ifq then r&s))'.
This transcribes as
- (+p+(- q+(+r+s)))
which, by peq, is equivalent to
- -( -p)- -(+q+(- -( -r)- -( -s))).
In this form the statement is treed as
I \
-p q
I \
-r -s
Statement Logic 185
********************************************************************
Exercise:
Give the T-form equivalents ofthe following statements.
I. 'ifp then not q'

2. not both p and (r or s)
3. p and not either m or k
4. not if not p then not q
5. if p or not q then both r and not s
Tree each T-form.
********************************************************************
12. Large Trees
According to the Law of and/or Distribution, (AOD), a conjunction 'p&(q v

r)' is equivalent to the disjunction '(p&q) or (p&r)'. Stated in tree form the
equivalence holds between the two trees:
p I \
I \ p p
q r q r
Consider now a conjunction with three conjuncts:
p&(q v r)&(s v t)
Applying and/or distribution to the first two conjuncts gives us
((p&q) or (p&r))&(s or t)
Applying distribution yet again gives us
[((p&q) or (p&r))&s] or [((p&q) or (p&r))&t]

which again by distribution gives us
[(p&q&s) v (p&r&s)] v [(p&q&t) v (p&r&t)]
which is equivalent to
p&q&s v p&q& t v p&r&s v p&r & t.
The reader may agree that the process of and/or distribution for more
than two conjuncts can get fairly tedious. Fortunately, there is a much quicker
way to get the DNF equivalent of any treeable conjunction. Put the
conjunction on a tree and then read the tree disjunctively. The following trees
depict the equivalence of 'p&(q v r)&(s v t)' to '(p&q&s) v (p&q&t) v
(p&r&s) v (p&r&t)' at a glance:
p 1\
I \ = I \
q r I \ I \
I \ I \ p p p p
s t s t q q r r
s t s t
The downward reading is conjunctive, while the left- right reading gives the
disjunctive equivalent. Note again that the common term p may be dropped
to the bottom and similarly for q and r. And once again we see that this allows
the horizontal reading to give us the disjunctive equivalent to the original
conjunction. To remind ourselves that the law of distribution is the ground of
the equivalence that is depicted on the tree, we might call these trees on the
right 'distribution trees'. In effect, a distribution tree shows how a conjunction
is equivalent to a 'normal form disjunction' that is the result of applying the
law of distribution by dropping all terms down to the bottom of the tree and
then reading from left to right disjunctively.
Our ability to get a DNF equivalent to any conjunction makes it
possible to decide on the validity of any argument in statement logic. Suppose
we are given the argument:
Statement Logic 187
Al
1. both r and p
2. ifp then q
I both rand q
This argument is valid and one way of showing this is to show that the C(Al ),
the counterclaim conjunction of its premises and the denial of the conclusion,
is a contradiction. C(Al) consists of the following three conjuncts:
1. both r and p +r+p

2. ifp then q -p+q
3. not both rand q -(+r+q)
To show that C(Al) is inconsistent we will represent it on a tree and then

examine its disjunctive equivalent. This needs a bit of tinkering since the
second and third statements are not in T- form. So we replace them by their
T-equivalents to give us:
+r+p both rand p

- -(-p)--q not-p or q
--(-r)--(-q) not-r or not-q
The distribution tree for the conjunction of these three statements is:
r I \
p I \ I \
I \ r r r r
-p q p p p p
I \ I \ -p -p q
q
-r -q -r -q -r -q -r
-q
We get the right tree by dropping dominating terms to give us the DNF
equivalent to C(Al):
r&p&(-p)&(-r) v r&p&(-p)&(-q) v r&p&q&(-r) v

r&p&q&(-q)
Each path on the tree represents a disjunct. Note that each disjunct contains
a contradictory pair of conjuncts; in other words, each path is closed. Since
all paths are closed, the whole disjunction is a contradiction of type 3. Now
A1 is valid if and only ifC(A1) is inconsistent. Since C(A1) is inconsistent,
A 1 is valid. Generally then, a path that contains a contradictory pair of simple
statements is closed and when each and every path of a tree is 'closed' the tree
represents a contradiction.
We could also show that the three statements represented on the tree
are jointly inconsistent by applying Modus Ponens and peq to derive a
contradiction:
4. +r+q 1, 2 MP
5. -(-r-q) 4,peq
6. +(-r-q) +(-(-r-q) 3, 5, Conj
6 is a contradiction.
Our ability to use distribution trees for showing the equivalence of
conjunctions and disjunctions gives us a powerful tool for determining the
validity of any argument in statement logic. To evaluate an argument we
proceed as follows:
1. Form the CC of the argument.

2. If any conjunct in the CC is not treeable, transform the statement
into its T- form equivalent.
3. Tree the CC.
4. Read the CC tree disjunctively taking each path as a disjunct.
5. Check each path to see whether it contains a contradictory pair of
simple statements. If any path is open the argument is invalid; if
all paths are closed, then the CC is inconsistent and the argument
is valid.
Example: evaluate the following argument:
A2
ifr then p and q -r+[+p+q]
not both s and if r then q -(+s+[ -r+q])
not s 1-s
Statement Logic 189
1. C(A2): +[-r+[+p+q]]+[-s+[+r+(-q)]] + (- -s)
2. We give the T-fonn equivalent ofC(A2):

+[--(-r)--[+p+q]] + [--(-s) -- [+r+(-q)]] + s
3.Tree the T-fonn:
s
I \
-r p
I q
I \ I \
-s r -s r
-q -q
Reading each path we see that it contains a contradictory pair, which shows
that C(a2) is a contradiction. This, in turn, shows that A2 is valid.
Equivalently we could show that the tree represents a contradiction by
dropping all tenns to the bottom:
I \
I \ I \
s s s s
-r -r p p
-s r q q
-q -s r
-q
Each conjunction presents a disjunction. The whole disjunction is a nonnal

form type 3 contradiction.
We could also show the validity of A2 by a direct proof:
1. -r+[+p+q] premise
2. -(+s+[ -r+q]) premise
3. -(+s+[- [+p+q]+q]] 1, 2,MP
4. -s + [+p+q+( -q)] 3, peq
5. --[+p+q+(-q)] +(-s) 4, peq
6. - [p+q+( -q)] Tautology

7. -s 6,5,MP
As this example of a proof shows, in moving toward the conclusion of an

argument we use certain rules called 'rules of inference'. Applying these rules
to the premises, we may proceed step by step to the conclusion. The sequence
of statements consisting of the premises, the intervening steps and the
conclusion is called a proof. For convenience we shall speak of every
statement in the proof as a step in the proof. Thus the premises are the first
steps of the proof and the conclusion is the last step on the proof.
We have learned several ways of evaluating a given argument.
1. check for validity by treeing the counterclaim and checking for

inconsistency.
2. check for validity by seeing whether we can derive a contradiction
from it by appealing to accepted rules of inference.
3. Check for validity by seeing whether we an derive the conclusion
from the premises by appealing to accepted rules of inference.
Methods 1 and 2 are indirect: we show validity by showing that counterclaim

is inconsistent. Methods 2 and 3 are 'derivational': we move to a conclusion
by a series of justified steps. In the case of method 2, the conclusion we seek
is a contradiction. In the case of method 3 the conclusion we seek is the
conclusion of the argument itself. In both cases we move from step to step by
appealing to rules of inference. But what ifthe argument is invalid? In that
case we might go on looking and not know when to stop. Since it cannot be
applied to tell us that an argument is invalid the derivational method does not
automatically render a decision about an argument's validity. By contrast
Method (1) tells us about invalidity as well as validity. If the argument is
invalid, Method 1 delivers a decision to that effect since the tree will show an
open path. Because Method 1 delivers a decision on invalidity as well as on
validity, logicians call this method a 'mechanical decision procedure'. It is in
fact easy enough to program a computer to apply method 1 to any argument
of statement logic and to determine whether it is valid or not. The steps it
would follow would be the steps we outlined:
1. Form the counterclaim ofthe argument

2. Get it into T-form
Statement Logic 191
3. Check the disjunction to see whether each disjunct contains a

contradictory pair of conjuncts.
4. If each disjunct is a contradiction, judge the argument valid;
otherwise judge it invalid.
Because the procedure is decisive and simple, it is deservedly popular. On the

other hand logicians have soft spots in their hearts (some would say in their
heads) for direct proofs and method 3 has its devotees. The real advantage of
the direct method is for handling incomplete arguments where we are called
upon to derive a conclusion from premises. Decision procedures are not used
in such inferential problems since they are not designed for drawing inferences
(to complete an incomplete argument) but for evaluating arguments already
complete with conclusion. We have so far learned how to use distribution
trees in decision procedures. In the next section we shall see how trees can be
used to deal with inferential problems.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Evaluate each of the following argument for validity by using Method 1:
1. if p then not q
if q then r or s
I ifp then s
2. p and q or r and not s

ifrthen s
/p
3. p
if p and q then not r
/ifqther
4. not r
p and q orr
/q
5. ifp or q then r
ifr then q and s
I p and not s
********************************************************************
13. Drawing Conclusions
Reasoning is a twofold affair. We evaluate arguments that are given to us to

see whether they are valid. But we also make arguments by inferring or
drawing conclusions from premises. In evaluating an argument we seek a
yes/no type of answer: is the argument valid? and we may apply a decision
procedure to gives us ends in the yes/no decision we seek. In drawing a
conclusion we have no complete argument to evaluate. Instead it is up to us to
produce the argument by supplying a conclusion to some given premises. Of
course the conclusion we seek is one that follows from the premises. The
process of reasoning here is direct. The question to which we seek the answer
is: Given these premises, what non-trivial conclusion can we validly infer?
In making an argument we usually want conclusions that are not
trivial. For example, given two premises 'p' and 'q' we may infer 'q' from
them, thereby giving us the complete argument: 'p, q I q'. But that argument
is trivial. Similarly, given a single premise 'p', we can draw from it any
number of conclusions of form 'p or q'. But that too is trivial. In the
discussion that follows we shall assume that the trivial and obvious
conclusions are not what we are seeking. For example suppose we are given
the premises
1. ifp then q
2. not q
and we want to know what follows. One non-trivial conclusion that may be
drawn from the premises is 'not p'. But the following may also be drawn:
i) not q
ii) either r or not q
iii) not q and if p then q
iv) either p or not p
Statement Logic 193
We call such conclusions 'trivial entailments'.

An entailment is non-trivial if and only if
a. it is not a premise (as (i) is).

b. it is not a tautology (as (iv) is).
c. it is not a disjunctive addition to a premise (as (ii) is).
d. it is not a conjunction of premises (as (iii) is ).
e. it is not an addition to any non-trivial conclusion.
Any conclusion that does not offend against any of the first four triviality
conditions is non-trivial. But if c is a non-trivial conclusion, then the fifth
condition requires us to count as trivial any conclusion offonn 'cor x'. Thus
suppose that 'not p' is a non-trivial conclusion because it does not trespass
rules a to d. Then the fifth condition for non-triviality rules out adding new
entailments such as 'not p or s', 'not p or t' and so forth which are disjunctive
additions to 'not p'.
14. Partial Disjunctions
In what follows we shall give a general procedure for getting non-trivial

entailments from any set of premises. One useful notion that we shall need is
that of 'partial disjunction'.
Given a disjunction such as 'p and q and r or s and t and u or m and
rand d' we may fonn partial disjunctions by taking conjuncts from each and
every one of its disjuncts. Thus 'q or tor d' is one partial disjunction and 'r
or s or r' is another. A disjunction entails all of its partial disjunctions.
Our problem, in its general form, is: Given a set of premises, what
(non-trivial) conclusions may we infer from them? For example, suppose we
are given the premises
1. (r and t) or (s and not q)

2. p
3. if s then (not t and not r)
What follows? It may seem that we are here limited to using the rules of
inference of statement logic to move step by step to conclusions that are,
hopefully, non- trivial. But we can do better than this. The following procedure
shows how to represent a given set of premises in a form that allows us to see
graphically what non-trivial conclusions may be drawn from them.
1. Tree the conjunction ofthe premises.

2. Mark the closed paths and ignore them.
3. Taking each open path as a disjunct, write the disjunction that is
equivalent to the conjunction of premises. Each disjunct is a con-
junction.
4. Form partial disjunctions by taking conjuncts from each disjunct.
5. From the partial disjunctions given by the fourth step, select those
that are non-trivial by not breaching any of the triviality conditions.
The selected disjunctions are non-trivial entailments.
In the above example we have the premises
1. -- [+r+t] -- [+s+( -q)]

2. p
3. -s+[+( -t)+( -r)] [=> - -( -s)-- [+( -t)+( -r)]
whose tree is
p
I \
r s
t -q
I \ I \
-s -t -s -t
-r -r
The tree shows that the conjunction of the premises is equivalent to

'p&r&t&-s v p&r&t&-t&-r v p&s&-q&-s v p&s&-q&-t&-r',
each disjunct representing a path on the tree. However, two paths are closed,
which means that we may ignore them (steps 1 and 2). This leaves
p&r&t&-s v p&s&-q&-t&-r
This disjunction is equivalent to the conjunction of the treed premises and so

is entailed by them.
Statement Logic 195
We may now (step 4) form partial disjunctions by taking a conjunct from each
ofthese disjunctions. Among these are
pvp
pv -q
tv -t
-s v s
Each partial disjunction in the above list is entailed. But they are all trivial
entailments. However, the following partial disjunctions are non-trivial:
t or not r (if r then t)

r or not t (ift then r)
not s or not q (if q then not s)
That these partial disjunctions are entailed can easily be verified. For suppose
we denied any one of them and added the denial to the tree. In each case the
tree will 'close' entirely and show contradiction. Since the consequence of
denying any partial disjunction is inconsistency, all of the partial disjunctions
are entailed by the original disjunction that is equivalent to the conjunction of
the premises.
Thus the answer to the question 'what follows from these premises'
can be given by treeing the premises and looking at the possibilities for
forming partial disjunctions that cover all of the open paths. The non-trivial
entailments can be picked off the tree directly, care being taken to choose a
partial disjunction that exhausts all open paths. Consider for example the
following tree representing the two premises 'if s then (rand not p)' and 'tor
not r or (sand p)':
I \
-s \
I I \ r
t -r s -p
p I I \
t -r s
p
The first, second and fourth paths are open. Two of the open paths are
dominated by '- s'; the remaining path has a 't' on it. Thus '- s v t' is a partial
disjunction that covers all open paths. Another exhaustive disjunction is 't v
-r'. Both of these are non-trivial. Another is 'r v tv -r', but that is
tautologically trivial. Yet another is '-p v -r v t'. But that only adds to the
previous entailment, 't v - r', and so does not give us more information than
we already have. Thus we may complete the argument in two non- trivial
ways:
1. if s then r and not p

2. tor not r or (sand p)
3. /not s or p
3*. /not r or t
Since --(-s)+p = -s+p and --(-r)--t = -r+p, our two alternative

conclusions could be stated as 'if s then p' and 'if r then t'.
Of course real premises come in English sentences and not in neat
symbols. We might want, for example, to know what the following premises
entail:
1. If you marry a rich girl you'll be wealthy but unenterprising

2. If you marry a poor girl you'll be enterprising but not wealthy
3. You will marry, but only once.
Let r transcribe 'you'll marry a rich girl', p transcribe 'you'll marry a poor
girl', e transcribe 'you'll be enterprising', and w transcribe 'you'll be wealthy'.
In algebraic notation, then:
1. -r+[+w+(-e)]
2. -p+[+e+(-w)]
3. --[+r+(-p)]--[+p+(-r)]
The third premise states that you'll either marry a rich girl and wont marry a
poor girl or else you'll marry a poor girl and won't marry a rich girl. The tree
for these conjoint premises is
Statement Logic 197
I \
I \
-r w
I \ -e
-p e I \
I \ -w -p e
I \ I \ I \ -w
p r p r p r I \
-r -p -r -p -r -p p r
-r -p
This tree has two open paths representing
-r&e&-w&p or w&-e&-p&r
from which the following non-trivial entailment may be extracted:
-w v -e; e v w
The first of these is equivalent to 'if w then not e', the second to 'if not e then
w'. Thus we may conclude that you'll be wealthy if and only ifyou won't be
enterprising. Other non-trivial entailments include :
-e v -r; w v p; -w v -p
or their conditional equivalents 'if e then not r;' 'if not w then p' ; 'if w then
not p'.
In the process of constructing a tree for a set of statements we will
often close a path without further ado because that path has a contradictory
pair of statements on it. For example, in constructing the tree for the premises
1. ifp then q
2. p orr
3. not r
-r
I \
p r
I \
-p q
we close the third path without going farther because we know that all paths
below it will close. This tree contains a single disjunct '-r&p&q' and three
non-trivial entailments: 'p', 'q', 'p&q'. Entailments that include '-r' are
trivial since that is given as a premise. 'p or q' is trivial since it is an
'addition' to a non-trivial entailment.
****************************************************************!**
Exercises:
I. Tree the premises given and draw two non-trivial conclusions from them by
inspecting the tree and exhausting the open paths.
1. p&s v p&q
-(-q->r)vt
p -> (r v q)
I??
2. not (p or q)
ifr or s then q
I??
II. For each example in (I) provide a conventional annotated proof for one of
the two conclusions you got.
********************************************************************
Statement Logic 199
15. Using the Tree Method for Annotated Proofs
The tree method for deriving conclusion can be used in annotated proofs. The
following rules are needed.
1. When first given a set of premises we use peq as needed to transform them
into a conjunction of disjunctions of simple statements. We call this process
'treeing the premises'.
2. The tree read downwards represents the conjunction of the (transformed)

premises. Read across the bottom the same tree represents an equivalent
disjunction since the tree pictures the operation of the law of distribution
according to which any conjunction of disjunctions is equivalent to a dis-
junction of conjunctions. This licenses us to restate the conjunction of premises
as a disjunction. In stating the equivalent disjunction, we appeal to the law of
distribution, putting 'tree distribution' (TD) as our justification. In applying
TD to get a disjunction, we throw out all disjuncts that are contradictory
taking all and only those that are at the bottom of open paths. Call this
disjunction D 1.
3. By the law of disjunctive entailment, any disjunction D 1 entails a partial

disjunction 02 consisting of disjuncts containing statements taken from each
disjunct of D 1. Thus from D 1 we may move to 02, annotating this step as
justified by 'disjunctive entailment' (DE).
4. The last step consists of eliminating those disjunctive entailments that are
trivial--premises, 'additions' to premises, tautologies as well as any addition
to a non-trivial entailment. See above section.
The following is an example of an annotated proof that uses the tree method
of derivation:
l.p p premise
2. q -> r -q+r premise
3. p -> s -p+s premise
4. (s&t) -> q -[+s+t]+q premise
5. -q v r --(-q)--r 2,peq
6. -p v s --(-p)--s 3,peq
7. -(s&t) v q -[+s+t]- -q 4,peq

8. (-s v -t) v q --[--(-s)--(-t)]--q 7,peq
Steps 5-8 are needed to render all of the premises 'treeable'.
p
I \
-q r
9. Tree of I \ I \
1,5,6,8 -p s -p s
I I \ I I \
-s -t q -s -t q
10. -- [+p+( -q)+s+( -t)] -- [+p+r+s+( -t)] -- [+p+r+s+q] TD

11. --(-t) -- (-t) -- r 10, DE
12. -t--r 11, DI
13. s 10, DE
14. -t--q lO,DE
The last three lines are the non-trivial entailments.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Use the four step method above to derive at least two non-trivial conclusions:
1. p ::> q
t => -r
(t&s)&-p
s=>-w
I??
2. -(pvq)
(q&-r) v (r&-s)
I??
********************************************************************
Statement Logic 201
16. Statement Logic as a Special Branch of Syllogistic Logic
The section that follows is optional, being of historical interest and of special
concern to the student who may be interested in some of the reasons that have
led logicians to choose different approaches to their subject. On one approach,
the logic of statements is looked upon as a special branch of the logic of terms.
On another approach the logic of statements is fundamental and the logic of
terms is treated as grounded in the logic of statement. Our approach in this
book has not taken a stand on this question. We have however shown that
term and statement logic have the same basic syntax so that an elementary
sentence of form 'some A is B' and an propositional sentence of the form
'p&q' can both be transcribed as sentences of form '+x+y'. More generally,
we have shown that all statements are built out of dyads of this form. We have
already shown that such dyads occur as sub-sentences in sentences that contain
compound or relational terms. In what follows we shall show that the dyads
representing compound sentences can also be construed as subject-predicate
sentences with a subject of form 'some/every x' and a predicate of form
'is/isn't y'. By showing this we shall have carried out a program of reducing
propositional logic to term logic. This terminist program has been announced
by many logicians who hold that term logic is the basic logic and that
propositional logic is simply a special branch ofterm logic.
The question ofwhether term logic or statement logic is primary is our
topic and we introduce it by citing two remarks of the great eighteenth century
logician Gottfried Leibniz. Leibniz was a 'terminist'.
1. Thomas Hobbes rightly stated that everything done by the mind is a

computation by which is understood either the addition of a sum or the
subtraction of a difference. So just as there are two primary signs in
algebra,'+' and'-' in the same way there are as it were two copulas.
2. If, as I hope, I can conceive all propositions as terms, and

hypotheticals as categoricals, and if I can treat all propositions
universally, this promises a wonderful ease in my symbolism and
analysis of concepts, and will be a discovery of the greatest
importance.
The first remark of Leibniz has been developed by us in the plus/minus

notation for the logical 'functors' that join terms and statements. Thus we
represented 'being P characterizes (some) S' as 'P+S' and 'being P

characterizes every S' as 'P-S' with the plus and minus signs that connect the
terms serving as 'logical copulas' in place of the predicative formulas 'being
(a so and so) characterizes a/every (such and such)'. The same signs are used
in forming compound propositions: 'q+p' for 'q and p' and 'q-p' for 'q ifp'.
We later introduced the more natural mode of representing English sentences,
e.g., transcribing 'every Sis Pas '-S+P' and 'ifp then q' as '-p+q'.
Leibniz' s second remark alludes to the fact that a compound statement
like 'p and q' logically behaves like an elementary statement 'some Pis Q'
and that a hypothetical compound 'if p then q' logically behaves like the
categorical universal form 'every p is q'. This led Leibniz to look for a way
to 'read' propositional statements categorically, construing for example 'ifp
then q' as a statement of form 'every xis a y; he hoped thereby to treat
statement logic as a special branch of the logic of terms. We call this
approach 'terminism'. The terminist logician holds that term logic is primary
logic. It should be said that Leibniz's belief that term logic was more basic
than statement logic was traditional. Historically, term logic came first with
Aristotle's epochal study of the syllogism; the study of statement logic was
developed by the Stoics quite a bit later. Before the twentieth century, the
teaching oflogic followed the historical order: term logic including syllogistic
was taught first and statement logic second. In recent years, however, the
historical order was judged to be misleading or irrelevant and today the vast
majority of logicians think of statement logic as primary logic. Thus the
contemporary doctrine reverses Leibniz's priorities by giving 'every A is B'
a hypothetical reading, construing it to say something like 'for any thing x,
if x is an S then x is a P'. If this is the right way to construe 'every A is B',
then one cannot learn the logical behavior of this and other universal sentences
before one learns how the sentential connective expression 'if then' behaves.
And indeed, today, the students oflogic almost always begins with statement
logic where they study the logical behavior of the sentential connectives 'if
then', 'and', 'or' etc. After mastering the logic ofthe sentential connectives
students go on to study how to construe 'every A is B', 'some A is B' and the
other forms of'elementary' sentences that enter into syllogistic arguments that
were once the starting point of logical study. The present book rejects the
modem thesis ofthe priority of statement logic. We have in fact shown that
the two logics may be taken on equal terms. But if priorities are to be
assigned, we would favor Leibniz's idea of treating statements as terms. We
will now show how this may be done and examine the implications of doing it.
Statement Logic 203
In the plus-minus notation the elementary and compound forms are

isomorphic. In this section we shall construe '-p+q' as a statement of form
'every x is a y'. The idea is to treat statements as terms and compound
statements as if they were ordinary categorical statements. To implement this
idea we shall exploit the doctrine presented in Chapter 1 that a statement is just
like a term in signifying a characteristic and denoting what has the
characteristic signified. We shall show that a statement may be construed as
a term that signifies a world characteristic and denotes the world that has that
characteristic. And we shall then show how this makes it possible to construe
compound forms such as 'p and q' (or 'ifp then q') as statements of the form
'some x is y' or ('every xis y').
In using the algebraic mode of transcription we see that an elementary
statement like 'some A is B' and a compound statement like 'p and q' have the
same formal structure: +X+Y. Similarly, 'every A is B' and 'ifp then q'
have the structure '-X+Y'. But even if we did not represent the statements the
same way the similarities would be brought home to us in other ways. Logici-
ans have long ago noted that an argument of form 'if p then q, if q then r/ if p
then r' exhibits the same kind of transitivity as a syllogism like 'every A is B,
every B is C/ every A is C'. It was facts like this that led Leibniz and others
to speculate that 'ifp then q' might somehow be construed 'categorically', as
making a claim of form 'every X is Y'. The problem is that we do not seem
to have a natural way oftreating 'ifp then q' as a categorical statement. Or
to put the difficulty another way: we have no way of construing whole
statements as if they were terms within a statement. Similarly we should like
to give a categorical reading to '+p+q', reading it as saying something of the
form 'some X is a Y' but, again, we do not know how to construe·the terms
of such a statement. A further difficulty presents itself: Leibniz believed that
by treating statements as terms and reading propositional statements
categorically we could subsume the laws of statement logic under the laws of
term logic. But treating statements as terms would be pointless unless it could
also be shown that the categorical reading of compound statements preserved
such familiar laws of statement logic as modus ponens, iteration, distribution
and so on. It is not at all clear that this can be done; we have, for example,
noted that some of the formal constraints of term logic such as the covalence
and the equality conditions for equivalence, do not hold for statement logic.
Any attempt to show that statement logic is like a branch of term logic must
account for some crucial differences as well as for the formal similarities of
term and statement logic.
We are about to take the step that Leibniz recommended but before we
show how to interpret propositional statements categorically by treating
statements as terms we will remind ourselves of the ways that terms and
statements are alike.
Consider a woman who makes the following two statements:
1. p (=there are elks)

2. q (=there are no elves)
Assume that she has in mind the real world. As it happens, (1) and (2) are
both true of the real world. Let us call a world a 'p-world' if the statement
'p' is true of it. If 'p' is nottrue of the world, we call it a 'not-p world'. For
example if p =there are elks in Canada and q =there are elves in Canada, then
W (the real world) is a world characterized by the existence of Canadian·elks
and the nonexistence of Canadian elves. In other words, the world is a p
world and a not-q world.
The question that Leibniz has set us is how to rephrase propositional
statements such as 'p and q' as saying something like 'some pis q' and 'ifp
then q' as saying something like 'every p is q'. And the answer we argue for
is: to understand 'p and q' to say 'some pis q' by reading this as 'some p-
world is a q-world' and to understand 'ifp then q' as 'every pis q' by reading
'every p is q' as 'every p-world is a q-world'.
In reconstruing propositional statements as categorical statements we
bear in mind the following facts:
1. Propositional statements and ordinary statements have the same basic

structure. Singular and general statements have the same basic structure.
These facts are perspicuous in algebraic transcription where the basic
structure is represented as a dyad of form '#+@'.
2 Ordinary statements are about things in a domain of things (a universe of

discourse); when the terms of an ordinary statement denotes, it denotes one or
more things in that world.
3. Propositional statements are about one thing only, the world they all claim
to characterize; when a propositional statement denotes, it denotes that world.
These points suggest that if we are to give categorical readings to

Statement Logic 205
propositional statements, then we must understand them all as making claims

about one and the same thing: the world.
To see the significance of this, let us imagine that some domain, D,
has a as its sole member. Suppose that a is a p-thing, au-thing , an r-thing but
not an s-thing. Now suppose that an outside observer, Molly, is characterizing
the objects in D. Unbeknownst to Molly, whenever she describes any object
in D, it is always the same object. Molly makes the following true assertions
I.
1. some u is r true
2. something is p true
3. nothing iss true
Having satisfied herself that these are true Molly now wonders whether any of
the following are true:
II.
4. every p is r
5. every non-q IS u
6. everything is p
7. every q is r
8. every sIS p
9. no r is p and s
10. every p and sis r
11. every u is p
12. everything is u
13. some r 1s p
14. some r is not s
15. every sis r
Had Molly known that D contains no more than one thing, she would have
seen that the truth of every statement in II is entailed by some statement in I.
For example, (6) 'everything is p' follows form (2) 'something is p', there
being only one thing and that thing being p. Moreover since everything is p,
it follows that (11) every u is p and (8) every sis p since nothing in Dis au-
thing or an s-thing without being a p-thing. Also, since (1) some u is r it
follows that both that something is u and that something is r. But from
'something is u', 'everything is u' follows, which, in turn, entails (5) 'every
non-q is u'. Similarly from 'some thing is r' 'everything is r' follows. But if
'everything is r, then (4) every pis r, (7) every q is rand (8) whatever is p and
sis r. Finally, from 'nothing iss', Molly would infer (11) 'nor is p and s'.
In a universe of discourse containing only one thing 'everything is X'
and 'some thing is X' are equivalent. Now this fact about singular domains
has an important logical application. For while ordinary statements are claims
about the things of a domain that contains many things, propositional
statements may be understood to make categorical claims about the domain
itself.
We are now in a position to say how we may construe propositional
statements terministically as categorical. The idea is to construe all
propositional statements as being about the one world. We now read 'p and
q' as saying something like 'some pis q' and 'ifp then q' as saying something
like 'every p is q'. Let 'p' be any sentence and let '<p>' be the state of affairs
in which p (i.e., the state signified by 'p') and let the term 'p' denote any
domain or world characterized by <p> (i.e., any p-world).
By convention, lower case letters are statement letters. But in our new
way of construing these letters they are a special type of term that apply to the
members of a domain of worlds, 'p' applying top-worlds, 'q' to q-worlds and
so forth. But in this case, the domain of worlds, which is the domain of the
claim of any propositional statement, contains only one world as its member
(by hypothesis the actual world). In effect, all propositional statements are
now construed as singular statements about the one actual world. Since in
any context of discourse only one domain is under consideration, all
propositional statements are semantically singular. It is as if all propositional
(lower case) letters were starred as uniquely denoting terms.
We are saying that all propositional statements are about one and only
one thing: the world itself. We may read 'p' categorically as the statement:
'the world is a p-world'; moreover 'p' is true if and only ifthe world is a p-
world. We now read our formulas '+p+q', '- p+q', etc., as 'some p-world is
a q-world. 'every p-world is a q-world', etc. Since the categorical version of
a propositional statement is a statement of the form 'some/every xis a y', the
bare assertion 'p' may be understood as the categorical assertion 'some world
is a p-world'. However, since all statements are about the one world, 'some
p-world is a q-world' entails 'every p-world is a q-world'. We rewrite
propositional statements in categorical form in accordance with the following
rules:
Statement Logic 207
1. p&q some pis a q +p+q

2. p ::> q every pis a q -p+q
3. p some thing is a p (some pis a p) +p+p
4. -p no thing is a p (no p is a p) -(+p+p)
Because of their singularity, propositional assertions are subject to

special laws that distinguish them from ordinary categorical statements. The
latter are about many things. But propositional assertions are all about one
and the same thing: the world itself. In particular, the following two
propositional laws are especially important:
1. some world is p-world = every world is a p-world

2. some pis q =every pis q.
According to the first law any statement 'p' claims that 'some world is a p-
world'. But since only one world is under consideration, this claim is
tantamount to the claim that every world is a p-world. The truth of the second
law is also obvious; there being only one world, if that world is both a p-world
and a q-world, then every world is a q-world and in particular every p-world
is a q-world.
By construing every propositional statement as a categorical statement
about worlds, we carry out Leibniz's terminist program. Leibniz correctly
believed that statement logic could be understood as a special branch of the
logic of terms. This terminist doctrine is encouraged when we note (a) that
compound statements have the same formal structure as categorical statements
whose elements are terms and (b) that many of the laws of statement logic
(e.g., the law that denying a conjunction is equivalent to affirming the
disjunction of denials) are the same as the laws of term logic (e.g., that denying
that some A is B is equivalent to affirming that every A is not B since both
laws have the structure: -(+x+y) = +(-x-y)).
We noted, however, that terminism seemed wrong when we consider
that the categorical versions of propositional statements led us to a branch of
term logic that differs in fundamental ways from the rest ofterm logic. For
example, we know that in the ordinary logic of terms covalence and equality
are necessary conditions for logical equivalence. But covalence and equality
are not necessary conditions for the equivalence of propositional statements.
Other discrepancies are equally serious. For example, we noted that 'some A
is B /every A is B' is not valid in ordinary term logic, but its analogue, 'p and
q /p::::~q', is valid in statement logic. We note also that the pair of statements
'some A is A; some nonA is nonA' can both be true in ordinary term logic but
their propositional analogue in statement logic is the pair 'p and p' and 'not
p and not p', which can't be jointly true. But we now see that all differences
between term and statement logic can be explained once we recognize that
propositional statements are unique in having a singleton domain as their
universe of discourse so that all propositional terms denote one and the same
world. A logic of terms for a singleton domain has just the properties that
distinguish statement logic from ordinary term logic.
In a context where all statements apply to only one thing, 'every A is
B' does follow from 'some A is B' and 'some A is A' is incompatible with
'some nonA is nonA'. Interpreting the propositional statements of statement
logic by treating the statement letters in the formulas '+p+q' and '-p+q' as
propositional term letters does not violate any of the laws of a term logic
whose statements have a universe of discourse that has exactly one member.
Thus, while the move from 'some A is B' to 'every A is B' is prohibited, this
isn't the case where the terms are UDTs. Thus from 'some pis q' to 'every p
is q' is permitted. For if it is true that something (viz., The World) is both p
and q then it is true that everything is both p and q. And if every thing is both
p and q then everything is either not p or q. This explains why '+p+q' entails
'-p+q'. For, where there is only one world to consider, 'some p-word is a
q-world' does entail 'every p-world is a q world'.
The singularity of propositional statements also accounts for their
divergence from the law of equivalence governing general statements.
According to that law two statements are logically equivalent if and only if
they are covalent and equal. But in propositional logic, when two statements
are both covalent and equal, that suffices for their equivalence. However,
neither of these conditions is necessary.
One of the divergent cases is the law equating 'p&p' to 'p v p ',
which in categorical form is the equivalence of 'some pis p' to 'every non-p
isn't non-p' . For ordinary terms this equivalence between divalent statements
is invalid: 'some P is P' is not equivalent to 'every nonP isn't nonP'. The
right hand side is equivalent to 'no nonP is nonP'. (Consider 'some ape is an
ape', which is true and 'no non-ape is a non-ape' or 'every non-ape is an ape',
which are false.) But in propositional logic the divalent equivalence holds.
Here again the validity of the propositional equivalence is due to the
circumstance that only one thing is being talked about. In a singleton domain
of worlds 'some p-world is a p-world' = 'no p-world is a non-p-world', since
Statement Logic 209
where something (the actual world ) is a p-world it follows that nothing fails
to be a p-world. Thus the crucial difference between ordinary term logic and
propositional 'term' logic is that the latter makes claims about a singular
domain and in a singular domain 'something is X' is equivalent to 'everything
is X'. This crucial difference gives statement logic its special character. And,
once this is understood, we are free to understand statement logic as a special
branch of the logic of terms that we have all along been studying.
We have shown that the logic of propositional statements can be
construed as a special branch of the logic of terms. But having shown this, it
still remains true, as a practical matter, that the techniques we have learned for
dealing with arguments in statement logic are especially suited to it. In any
case, even though '+p+q' has the same form as a statement '+P+Q', which we
read 'some P is Q', it would be pointless to change our way of expressing
ourselves, by reading, say, 'roses are red and violets are blue' as 'some world
in which roses are red is a world in which violets are blue'. We therefore
continue to read '+p+q' as 'p and q' and '-p+q' as 'if p then q'. For all
intents and purposes, we continue to treat statement logic as an independent
logic even as we bear in mind the terminist interpretation that Leibniz
adumbrated.
17. Venn Diagrams for the Singleton Universe of Propositional Logic
Consider the Venn diagram for 'someS is P' where 'S' and 'P' are ordinary
terms:
Figure 23
s p
The cross mark inside the SP segment indicates the presence of an SP thing.
But what about the other segments? Since no information is given we leave
this empty~ nothing may or may not be in any one of them. Now consider the
Venn diagram for 'some p-world is a q-world' where it is understood that no
more than one world is under consideration.
Figure 24
Note that we have shaded everything except the pq area. Note now that an
unshaded area represents the presence of a pq-thing (in this case a pq-world).
The difference between a regular Venn diagram and a Venn diagram
for a singleton universe is this: on a regular diagram we have three possibilities
for any given area:
1. it has nothing in it (marked by a cross)

2. it is definitely empty (shaded)
3. it may be empty or not (unmarked and unshaded)
In a Venn diagram for a singleton universe we have only two possibilities:

1. it has something in it (unshaded)
2. it is empty (shaded)
There is no third possibility.

Consider the Venn diagram for 'p :;:~ q' in its categorical form 'every
pis aq':
Figure 25
Statement Logic 211
Looking at Figure 24 we note that Figure 25 is already depicted: the p(not q)

area is shaded. This graphically shows that 'some pis q' entails 'every pis
q' in the singleton universe of discourse of propositional logic.
*****************************************************************
Exercises:
Construct Venn diagrams for each of the following, showing that the
conclusion follows from the premises.
l.p=>q
-s
q=>s
I -p&-s
2. p&q
I P => q
3. not p
I ifp then q
4. not (p and not q)

not q
lnotp
5. ifp then q
ifq then r
I ifp then r
*******************************************************************
8 Modem Predicate Logic
1. Syntax
The logical system that we have studied in this book is known as Term Logic
or Term/Functor Logic (TFL). TFL parses sentences as 'dyads' made up of
two terms and a functor that connects them. Not only sentences, but relational
terms, compound terms and compound sentences are given dyadic parsings.
Term Logic goes back to Aristotle. In this chapter we shall acquaint ourselves
with another logical grammar and another system oflogic known as Predicate
Logic or Modern Predicate Logic (MPL). For discussion of the differences
between TFL and MPL, the reader may wish to look again at Chapter 2
section 11, where we distinguished two approaches to logical syntax: 'the
Term Way' and 'the Predicate Way'. We have so far followed the Term Way.
In this chapter we follow the Predicate Way.
The grammar of a logical language is called logical syntax. Looking
at a sentence, the logician distinguishes between its material elements, which
carry its meaningful content, and its formative elements, which determine its
form. For example, looking at 'some apes are omnivores' the logician who
follows the term way distinguishes between the two material elements 'apes'
and 'omnivores', on the one hand, and the functor expression 'some are' that
joins these terms to give us a sentence of the form 'some X are Y', on the
other. The material elements ofTFL are nouns or noun phrases. By contrast,
the material elements of Predicate Logic are verbs or verb phrases that serve
as predicates.
Let us recapitulate the parsing style of the Term Way. Consider the
fact that 'some bird sings' entails 'some singer (singing thing) is a bird'. The
terminist represents this inference as '+B+S I +S+B'. In so representing it one
first paraphrases 'some birds sing' as 'some bird is a singer'. In so
'regimenting' the sentence, we treat the verb 'sing' in the premise as if it were
the predicate verb phrase 'is a singer'. We then use 'singer' as a term that
could take either subject or predicate position. In effect, TFL splits the verb
213
'sing' into a copula, 'is (a)', and a term, the noun or noun phrase 'singer' or
'one who sings'; this term then reappears in the subject position of the
conclusion. We similarly regiment 'all birds sing' as 'all birds are singers',
again analyzing it as a two term sentence, '- B+S'. In TFL each sentence has
two terms and a functor that connects them. The same two term parsing is
given to a singular sentence like 'Caruso sings'. Here the (singular) term
'Caruso' and the general term 'singer' are connected by the commutative
functor 'some is a' and the sentence transcribes as '+C*+S'. In TFL a
singular sentence such as 'Caruso sings' has 'wild' quantity; it is particular,
but because its subject term, 'Caruso', denotes uniquely, 'some Caruso sings'
entails its corresponding universal, 'every Caruso sings'.
2. MPL: The Predicate Way
An alternative to the two term way of construing sentences follows the

linguist's familiar parsing of sentences into Noun Phrase and Verb Phrase.
Consider 'Caruso sings'. The linguist parses this as 'Caruso/sings' with
'Caruso as subject-name and 'sings' as predicate-verb. This style of parsing
is adopted by MPL for all singular sentences. Note that in dividing the
sentence into the two material parts consisting of 'Caruso' and 'sings', MPL
does not further analyze the verb 'sings' as 'is a singer'. Thus in 'Caruso
sings' there is no 'connective' expression that ties the verb to the noun.
Indeed, that is one very important difference between TFL and MPL; in TFL
we always have a formative element, a 'connective' that ties the two material
elements. But in MPL the verb 'sings' follows the noun 'Caruso' without
benefit of a connective joining one to the other.
In the relational sentence 'Paris loves Helen', MPL recognizes the
verb 'loves' as a two place predicate. Both 'Paris' and 'Helen' are subject-
names. By contrast, TFL parses 'Paris loves Helen' as consisting of two 'sub-
sentences': 'Paris loves' [+P* 1+L 12] and 'Helen is loved' [+H*2+L 12], both
implicit in 'P 1+L 12+H* 2'. Note that 'P* 1+(L 12+H* 2)' transforms into
'+P* 1+(+H2+L 12+)' [read 'Paris is what Helen is loved by'], a dyad whose
second term is itself a dyad: the sub-sentence '+H* 2+L 12 '.
Modern Predicate Logic 215
3. General Sentences in MPL
Predicate Logic treats a general sentence like 'some birds sing' as a two verb
sentence. The contrast between TFL and MPL can be better appreciated when
we look at the different way they approach a simple inference like
some birds sing I some singers are bird
In representing this little inference the logician must identify two 'material'
(nonformal, 'extra-logical') expressions that appear in converse order in the
two sentences. As we said, TFL chooses nouns; MPL chooses verbs. In line
with its terminist parsing policy, TFL regiments 'some birds sing' as 'some
birds are singers'; the two expressions that convert are the nouns 'singers' and
'bird. MPL takes verbs (predicates) as the interchangeable expressions. A
verb may be simple like 'ran' or 'sings' or it may be formed by taking a noun
and putting a copula in front of it.' For example, 'is a singer' is a verb formed
in this manner. Thus any predicate of the form 'is an X' is a verb. Using
verbs as the basic material elements, MPL regiments 'some bird sings' as a
sentence containing the two verbs or predicates, 'is a bird' and 'sings'. So
analyzed, the inference looks like this:
something is such that it is a bird and it sings

I so something is such that it sings and it is a bird.
Note that the sentence, as parsed in MPL, is now understood to contain

pronouns as well as predicates; the word 'something' behaves as the
antecedent to the pronoun 'it', which appears as the subject in the two
component (singular) sentences 'it is a bird' and 'it sings'.
Because the MPL construal of 'some bird sings' is a bit cumbersome,
practitioners ofMPL have introduced certain symbols to make it tidier. (MPL
is often popularly called 'symbolic logic'.) Let '(Ex)' abbreviate the phrase
'something, x, is such that', let 'Bx' stand for 'xis a bird' and let 'Sx' stand
for 'x sings'. Then MPL represents the inference thus:
(Ex)(Bx&Sx)
I (Ex)(Sx&Bx)
In words:
something x is such that x is a bird and x sings

I something x is such that x sings and x is a bird
The expression '(Ex)' is sometimes read as 'there exists an x such that'.

Grammatically, this expression serves as the antecedent to the pronoun, 'x',
that comes after it in 'x is a bird' and 'x sings'. Logicians call '(Ex)' 'the
existential quantifier'. It serves to introduce the pronoun variable 'x', which
is said to be 'bound' by the quantifier antecedent. Thus, in MPL pronouns are
'bound variables' and antecedents are 'quantifiers;' in the logical language of
MPL, the relation of binding is the relation that an antecedent expression (e.g.,
the quantifier 'something') has to its pronouns (the variables it binds). That
'(Ex)' is related to the variables it binds in the way that an antecedent is
related to its pronouns is evident if we reads '(Ex)(Bx&Sx)' thus:
there exists a thing [antecedent] such that it (that thing) [pronoun] is

a bird and it [pronoun] sings
Note (again) that the letter 'B' in 'Bx' does not stand for the noun 'bird'; it is
not a term letter but a predicate letter representing the verb 'is a bird'. By
contrast, in the terminist formula '+B+S' the letter 'B' is a term letter
representing the noun 'bird'.
4. The Logical Language of MPL
Compare '+S+P' as a way of representing 'some Spaniard is a painter' to

'(Ex)(Sx&Px)'. The TFL formula is a straightforward transcription ofthe
English sentence. The MPL formula is more complicated. And indeed, the
language of MPL is not easy to master. To help us in learning it we shall
make use ofthe more natural and familiar (to us) formulas ofTFL. Thus in
'translating' a sentence like 'some boy loves a girl' into MPL we shall first
transcribe it as 'B 1+L 12+G2 ' and then use the transcribed formula as a bridge
to get to '(Ex)(Bx&(Ey)(Gy&Lxy))', treating the TFL formulas as a bridge
to the corresponding formulas of MPL.
Before learning how to reckon arguments in MPL, we must learn the
logical language ofMPL. The symbolic formulas ofMPL are not algebraic:
they contain no plus or minus signs. Thus 'p and q' is not represented as
'+p+q' and 'ifp then q is not represented as '-p+q'. Instead, the symbolic
ways of representing compound sentences is exclusively used:
English form Algebraic Form Symbolic Form
pandq +p+q p&q

ifp then q -p+q p=>q
p orq -(-p)-(-q) pvq
p if and only if q +[- p+q]+[- q+p] p-q
notp -p -p
The following symbolic expressions are used in forming elementary sentences:
English Form Algebraic Form Symbolic Form
X is P +X*+P Px
SomeS is P +S+P (Ex)(Sx&Px)
Every Sis P -S+P (x)(Sx => Px)
We use the TFL algebraic formulas as bridges to MPL formulas. The

rules for translating any sentence of TFL into a sentence of MPL are called
'TR' (for 'translation rules').
The first of these rules, TRI, tells how to translate particular TFL
sentences into MPL. The TR rule for particular sentences is TRI:
TRJ:
English TFL MPL
some A is B ==> +A 1 +B1 ==> (Ex)(Ax&Bx)
For example, applying TRI to 'some American is a banker' we use the TFL
bridge, '+A1+B 1', to get to '(Ex)(Ax&Bx)' as the MPL formula. Note the use
of numerical pairing indices in the TFL formula. These are usually omitted in
transcribing non-relational sentences since it is obvious in such simple
sentences that the two terms of the sentence are the only terms being paired.
Nevertheless, in using a TFL sentence as a bridge for translating into MPL, we
shall give each term pair (arbitrarily chosen) numerals; these indices are then
replaced by bound variables in the corresponding MPL formulas.
The expression that follows a quantifier is called the 'matrix'. For
example the matrix of the formula '(Ex)(Ax&Bx)' is '(Ax&Bx)'. In
translating '+A 1+B 1' as '(Ex)(Ax&Bx)' we treat the numeral as the bound
variable pronoun 'x' and we treat '+A 1+B 1' as a conjunction of form '+p+q'.
This gives us the matrix formula 'Ax&Bx' or 'it is A and it is B', which needs
a quantifier antecedent to the pronoun, 'x'. MPL prefixes the conjunctive

formula (the matrix) with the quantifier antecedent '(Ex)' or 'something, x,
is such that'.
There is a corresponding TR for universal sentences in MPL.
Consider the universal form 'every A is B', which the terminist transcribes as
'- A+B'. MPL gives ita conditional reading, treating it as 'Ax-::JBx'. But now
the quantifier antecedent that 'binds' the pronouns is universal. The MPL way
of expressing 'every A is a B' is
every thing is such that if it is an A then it is a B
Using the bound variable 'x' in place of 'it' we have the formula:
every thing x is such that: if x is an A then x is a B
As we will see quite shortly, a translation rule applied to the 'matrix' gives us
(Ax-::JBx). The symbolic abbreviation for 'every thing xis such that' is '(x)'.
Thus the MPL formula corresponding to '- A+B' is
(x)(Ax -::J Bx)
The expression 'every thing xis such that', which is symbolically abbreviated
as '(x)' is called 'the universal quantifier'. The universal quantifier in '(x)(Ax
-::J Bx)' binds the variables of the component sentences 'Ax' and 'Bx' in the
matrix, 'Ax -::J Bx'. The TR for translating 'every A is B' into MPL is:
TR2: every A is B ==> -A 1+B1 ==> (x)(Ax ~Ex)
For example, to translate 'every American is a banker' we use the bridge

'-A 1+B 1'. Applying TR2, yields '(x)(Ax->Bx)' as the MPL formula.
There are three TR rules for translating compound forms. Wherever
'p' and 'q' are sentences, the formula '+p+q' translates as 'p&q'. The rule
that takes us from '+p+q' to 'p&q' is 'TR/and', the And rule:
TR!and: p and q ==> +p+q ==> p&q
A second rule, called, 'TR/if, or the If rule, is used to translate conditional

forms. Thus, given 'ifr then s', we first transcribe it as '-r+s' and then, by
TR/if, translate it as 'r -::J s' :
TR!if ifp then q ==> -p+q ==> p:::xJ
A third rule, called 'TRior', tells us how to render 'p or q' into MPL:
TRior: p or q ==> --p--q ==> pvq
In applying TRI to a compound form like 'some roses are pink and
some are white' we first transcribe it in the usual way
+[+R+P]+[+R+W]
which, byTR/and, becomes '[+R+P]&[+R+W]'. WenextapplyTRl to each

conjunct. However, in applying TRI we must treat each conjunct separately
giving each conjunct its own quantifier; we may not bind all the pronoun
variables by a single antecedent quantifier. The correct MPL translation is
(Ex)(Rx&Px)&(Ex)(Rx&Wx)
Although 'x' is used throughout, it has different antecedent quantifiers in the

two conjuncts. Another (easier to read) MPL version would use 'y' for the
second conjunct:
(Ex)(Rx&Px)&(Ey)(Ry&Wy)
These two versions are equivalent. But the following formula which binds 'x'
by only a single quantifier is not a correct translation:
(Ex)((Rx&Px)&(Rx&Wx))
TR/and and TRior apply to compound terms as well as to compound

sentences. In translating a sentence like 'some A is either B or C', we first
apply TRI to give us '(Ex)(Ax&(B or C)x)' and then apply TRior to the
disjunctive expression. The result is '(Ex)(Ax&(B v C)x)'. A later rule {TR4)
allows us to represent '(B v C)x' as 'Bx v Cx'.
******************************************************************
Exercises:
Translate into MPL:
Example:
if every A is B then some C is D
1. - [- A+B)+[+C+D] Algebraic Transcription
2. [- A1+BJ1 => [+C2+D2] TR/if
3. (x)(Ax=>Bx) => (Ey)(Cy&Dy) TR2, TRl
i) if any A is B then every C is D

ii) no C is D but some C is K
iii) only A is B
iv) every J is K unless some J is M
(hint: If 'ifu't' were a word, 'unless' would be its synonym.)
v) some rose is pink and it is white
********************************************************************
5. Singular Sentences in MPL
In TFL singular and general sentences are syntactically alike. In MPL

singular sentences are treated as being radically different in form from general
sentences. The TFL manner of transcribing sentences whose subjects are
proper names or other singular subjects does not differ from the manner in
which general sentences are transcribed. Thus 'Caruso is a tenor' transcribes
as '+C* 1+T 1' and 'Caruso admired Puccini' as '+C* 1+A 12+P* 2 '. By contrast,
where the MPL form of the general sentence 'some Italian is a tenor' is
'(Ex)(lx&Tx)', the MPL form for 'Caruso is a tenor' is 'Tc', in which the
lower case letter 'c' represents the subject 'Caruso' and the upper case letter
represents the predicate 'is a tenor'.
Singular sentences that have two singular subjects are given similar
treatment. The MPL form for the relational singular sentence 'Caruso admired
Puccini' is 'Acp'. This formula has two lower case letters in subject position,
respectively representing the singular nouns 'Caruso' and 'Puccini'. The
predicate letter 'A' represents the transitive verb 'admires', or the relational
predicate expression 'is an admirer of. Predicates like these take two subjects;
we call them 'two place predicates'.
Translating sentences containing singular terms into the notation of
MPL is straightforward and we do not need to use a TFL formula as a bridge.
The translation rule is
TR3
S*isP ==> Ps
S* is R toP* ==> Rsp
xis P ==> Px
xis R toy ==> Rxy
Applying TR3 to 'Tom loves Ella' [T* 1+L 12+E*21 we get 'Lte'. (Note that we
simply replace the numerals of the TFL formula, 'L 12 ' by the names of the
lover and the beloved.
Sentences with three subjects have a three place predicate. For
example, the MPL formula for 'Italy ceded Fiume to Yugoslavia' is 'Cify', in
which 'C' is a three place predicate relating Italy as the country that ceded,
Fiume as the city that was ceded and Yugoslavia as the country to whom
Fiume was ceded by Italy.
A fmal translation rule takes compound terms into MPL formulas.
The MPL formula for 'some gentleman and scholar is a farmer' is
'(Ex)((Gx&Sx)&Fx)'. Its TFL formula is '+<+G+S> 1+F 1'. In getting from
the TFL formula to the MPL translation, we first apply TR1 and then apply
TR/and to '<+G+S>' to get '(G&S)'. This gives us '(Ex)(<G&S>x&Fx)'.
A new rule, TR4, allows us to distribute a variable inward, treating a form like
'<G&S>x' as '(Gx&Sx)'.
TR4:
<+A+B>x ==> <A&B>x ==> Ax&Bx
<--A--B>x ==> <AvB>x ==> AxvBx
We get the MPL translation of 'some gentleman and scholar is a farmer' by

the following steps:
1. +<+G+S>I+FI TFL
2. (Ex)(<+G+S>x+Fx) 1, TR1
3. (Ex)(<G&S>x&Fx) 2, TR/and
4. (Ex)((Gx&Sx)&Fx) 3, TR4
6. How the Logical Syntax of MPL is 'Ontologically Explicit'
The logical grammar ofMPL is the standard logical grammar taught today.
One reason for this is that formulas written in the language of MPL are
explicit about what makes them true; each MPL formula tells us exactly what
sort of things have to be present in the world or absent from it for the formula
to be true. Consider again the TFL and MPL renditions of a sentence like
'some Spaniards are painters'. According to TFL this is to be rendered as
'+S+P'. According to MPL this is to be rendered as '(Ex)(Sx&Px)'. The TFL
formula is simpler and closer to the original English. However, MPL has a
special virtue that has recommended it to most contemporary logicians. In the
words of one the foremost exponents of MPL in this century:
The grammar that we logicians tendentiously call standard is. a

grammar designed with no other thought than to facilitate the tracing
of truth conditions. And a very good thought this is. 0'-/.V.O. Quine,
Philosophy ofLogic, Prentice Hall, 1970, pp.35- 36)
That '(Ex)(Sx&Px)' has very explicit truth conditions is evident when

we consider that for 'some Spaniard is a painter' to be true the following
conditions must hold: a Spaniard must exist, a painter must exist, the Spaniard
in question must be the painter in question. All these conditions for the truth
of 'some Spaniard is a painter' are expressly present in the MPL formula,
which says 'there exists a thing such that it is a Spaniard and it is {also) a
painter'. The condition that a Spaniard exists is there. The condition that a
painter exists is there. And the condition that the Spaniard in question is the
painter in question is explicit in the use of a single pronominal subject for the
two predicates 'is a Spaniard' and 'is a painter', both of these predicates being
said to hold of that subject.
More generally, an MPL formula is always explicit about what things
in the world must exist or fail to exist in order for the statement to be true.
This is even more clearly seen in more complicated sentences like 'some boy
loves no girl', whose MPL form is '(Ex)(Bx& -(Ey)(Gy&Lxy))' which says
'there exists an individual, x, such that x is a boy and there exists no in-
dividual, y, such that y is a girl and x loves y'. Here the existence of a boy and
the nonexistence of any girl that is loved by that boy are the truth conditions
of the sentence, and both ofthese truth conditions are explicitly expressed in
the MPL formula. Quine is right in suggesting that one of the main reasons
for the deserved popularity ofMPL lies in the 'ontological' explicitness of its
logical grammar: any MPL statement as much as says what in the world there
must be or fail to be in order for the statement to be true.
Nevertheless, the virtue of explicitness is more than offset by the
artificial complexity of the MPL formulas and by their 'distance' from the
sentences of an ordinary language. The complexity is evident in the way it
treats even the simplest sentences. Consider 'every horse is an animal', which
TFL transcribes as '-H+A' but which MPL translates as '(x)(Hx =>Ax)'.
The TFL formula is akin to a stenographic transcription (letters for terms, '- '
for 'every', '+'for 'is'). But the MPL formula paraphrases 'every A is B' as
something like 'any individual is such that if it is a horse then it is an animal'.
Such a paraphrase is aptly termed a 'translation' because it introduces novel
syntactical elements not found in the original English sentence 'every horse is
an animal'. In the first place, it treats 'every horse is an animal' as a
pronominalization in which the quantifier expression 'any individual' serves
as antecedent to the pronoun 'it'. The original sentence, of course, has no
pronouns. In the second place, MPL introduces the sentential connective form
'if ... then' which connects two component 'sub-sentences', 'it is a horse' and
'it is an animal'. Again, the original sentence looks to be simple and not
compound. The distance between the vernacular English sentence and the
MPL formula is even greater for a relational sentence like 'some sailor is
giving every child a toy'. TFL transcribes this in a stenographic way as
'+S 1+G 123 -C2+T3 '. By contrast, MPL creatively paraphrases it, or
'translates' it, as 'there exists an individual, x, such that x is sailor and for any
individual, y, ify is a child then there exists an individual, z, such that z is a
toy and xis giving y to z'. The symbolic formula for this is
(Ex)(Sx&((y)(Cy => (Ez)(Tz&Gxyz)))
Another example of an MPL rendering of a relational sentence is
every owner of a cow owns a barn
which MPL understands to say 'for every x if something, y, is such that y is

a cow and x owns y then something, z, is such that z is a barn and x owns z'.
Symbolically:
(x)((Ey)(Cy&Oxy) => ((Ez)(Bz&Oxz)))

Formulas like these are examples of 'multiple quantification'; which

is to say, they are sentences with more than one quantifier expression, each of
which binds a different pronominal variable. It is often not easy to see how to
give MPL renderings of English relational sentences that involve multiple
quantification. How, for example, is one to translate 'some boy envies every
owner of a dog'? Or 'some one who owns a barn does not own any animal'?
The language of MPL is the standard language of modern logic. But it is an
artificial language, so it is not easy to learn. However, anyone who has
mastered the language of TFL can easily learn how to translate any TFL
sentence into MPL. Translation from English into MPL may be made simple
by using TFL transcriptions as bridging formulas. With the aid of the TFL
bridging formulas, and using the TR rules we have just learned, the translation
of multiply quantified relational sentences can be done in a fairly straight-
forward mechanical way. The TR rules that get us from 'some/every A is B'
to the corresponding MPL formulas apply to dyads ofthe form '+X+Y'. But
any sentence of TFL can be written as a sentence that is either itself a dyad or
analyzable into dyads.
7. Dyadic Normal Forms
The formulas of TFL that are especially useful for translating into MPL are
what we call 'Dyadic Normal Forms' (DNF). The DNF of a sentence is a
normal form in which compound and relational terms are dyads. We here
review the method of transforming any standard TFL sentence into DNF first
introduced in section 11 of Chapter 4.
A dyad is an expression of the form '±X±Y'. For example, a
compound term such as 'gentleman and scholar', which transcribes as an
expression ofthe form '<+X+Y>', is a dyad. Any sentence is a dyad in which
the first part '±X' is the subject and the second part '±Y' is the predicate. A
sentence is in DNF when its structure is fully dyadic, so that every expression
in it other than its terms is a dyad ofthe form '±X±Y'. As often as not, a
given sentence is not initially given to us in dyadic form. Thus in 'some boy
is teaching some girl'[==> '+B 1+(T 12+G2) 1' ], the expression 'T12+G2 ' has the
subject 'a girl' on the right. To rewrite it as a proper dyad we commute the
phrase 'T 12+G2 ', putting the subject term, 'G2 ', to the left. In effect, we
rewrite the sentence as '+B 1+(+G2+T 12) 1'. In this formula each subject phrase
has its predicate to the right and the whole formula is said to be in dyadic
normal form. The expression '+G2+T 12 ' is a 'sub-sentence' that may be
understood to say 'some girl is taught (by)'. Generally, when we put a

relational sentence into DNF, we place each subject phrase to the left of its
own predicate.
Let us take the sailor sentence, 'some sailor is giving every child a
toy', as another example. Its transcription is '+S 1+(G 123 -C2+T3)'. This has
three subject expressions: 'some sailor', 'every child' and 'some toy'. The
first of these subjects, '+S 1', is already to the left, but the second and third
subjects need to be relocated to the left of their own predicates. The resulting
DNF formula is '+S 1+(-C 2+(+T3+G 123))'. Here the expression that follows
the subject '+S 1' is a predicate that says of some sailor that he gives every
child a toy. '-C2 ' has its predicate; this says of every child that it gets a toy.
And '+T3' too has its own predicate, which says of a toy that it is given. Each
subject is now in its own dyad and the whole sentence is in 'dyadic normal
form'. The subject-predicate pairings may be made more explicit by giving
each term pair its own numerical co- indexing:
The rules of translation that take us from TFL forms to MPL forms
apply to dyads. In applying these rules to relational statements, we first
reformulate the TFL transcriptions in DNF and then apply each rule in a step-
wise fashion to the dyadic forms of the TFL formula. Consider how we should
use the DNF of the sailor sentence to get to the MPL formula:
l.+St+( -C2+(+T3+G 123)) DNF

2.(Ex)(Sx& (-C 2+(+T3+Gx23 )) TRl
Note that we began with the outermost dyad that includes all the other dyads.
In it we replaced the numerical index that pairs the terms 'sailor' and 'giver'
by the pronoun 'x', which now serv~s as common subject to the predicates 'is
a sailor' and 'gives' in the formula 'he is a sailor and he gives'. Moving
inward, we proceed by applying rule TR2 to the next dyad,
'- C2+( +T 3+Gx23 ) ', this time replacing '2' by the bound variable pronoun 'y':
3. (Ex)(Sx&((y)(Cy => (+T3+Gxy3)) TR2
Finally, we again apply TRl to the remaining (innermost) dyad, '+T3+Gxy3'.

4. (Ex)((y)(Cy => (Ez)(Tz&Gxyz))) TRI
The MPL translation is now complete.

Let us see how the rules can be applied to give us the MPL translation
of 'every owner of cow is an owner of a bam'. This first transcribes as
'-(0 12+C 2)+(0 13+B3)', but we need it in DNF so we put each subject to the
left of its predicate:
1. -(+C2+0 12)+(+B3+0 13) DNF

2. (x)((+C 2+0x2) => (+B3+0x3)) TR2
3. (x)((Ey)((Cy&Oxy) => ((Ez)(Bz&Oxz)) TRI (twice)
Sometimes one relational phrase is embedded in another. An example

is 'some adolescent is a cousin of a murderer of a painter' which transcribes
as '+A 1+(C1 2+(M23+P3))'.
1. +AI+(+(+P3+M23)+C12)) DNF
2. (Ex)(Ax&(Ey)((Ez)Pz&Myz&Cxy) TRI (thrice)
Some sentences have one singular subject and one general subject. An
example is 'Tom is memorizing every poem', whose TFL transcription is
'+T*1+(M12- P2)'.
1. +T*1+(-P2+M12) DNF
2. (-P 2+M~) TR3
(Note that in applying TR3 we eliminate 'T* 1' and elsewhere replace the
codenoting numerical index '1' by the name 't' .) We next apply TR2 to the
formula that remains:
3. (y)(Py => Mty) TR2
The MPL formula, 3, may be read thus:
anything, y, is such that if y is a poem then Tom is memorizing y
or, alternatively as
for anything, y, if y is a poem then Tom is memorizing y

and, more colloquially, as
if anything is a poem, Tom is memorizing it
Consider 'some boy envies everyone who owns a dog', whose TFL
transcription is '+B 1+(E 12- (0 23+03))'.
1. +Bt+(-(+D3+023)+Et2)) DNF
2. (Ex)(Bx&(y)((Ez)(Dz&Oyz) => Exy))) l,TRl, TR2, TRl
(After a while, one gets to collapsing several steps into one.)
8. Translating Pronominalizations
The general form of a pronominalization is ' ... some s ...the s'. In the natural
languages, words such as 'it', 'him(self)', 'she', stand in for a pronominal
subject 'the S (in question)'. Thus we do not normally say 'some barber
shaves the barber in question' but 'some barber shaves himself. Most
pronominalizations are paraphrases of sentences that contain no pronouns. A
pronominalization such as 'some A is a B; it is also C' is merely a loquacious
way of saying 'some A and B is a C'. Similarly, 'if any A is a B then it is a
C' is reducible to 'every A and B (thing, person) is a C', which again is not a
pronominalization. (See the rules for pronominal expansions in section 8 of
Chapter 6 above.)
The style ofMPL is to pronominalize. A sentence like 'some ape is
hungry' is not naturally construed as a pronominalization. But the logical
syntax of MPL construes any general sentence, i.e., any sentence containing
'some' or 'every', as a pronominalization. Thus 'some ape is hungry'
becomes 'something is such that it is an ape and it is hungry'. And while
'every boy loves some girl' is not a pronominalization in natural language, its
MPL rendering has two pronouns: 'everything is such that if it is a boy then
there exists someone such that it is a girl and the boy (he) loves the girl (her)'.
By contrast, TFL transcribes a natural language sentence of the form 'some
A is B' or 'every A is R to some B' without treating it as pronominalizations.
For example, '- B1+L 12+G2' is a pronoun-free formula. The bridging rules
that take us from TFL to MPL are thus designed to take us from a
nonpronominal formula like 'some A and B is C' [ > '+<+A+B>+C'] to the
corresponding quantified pronominalization formula '(Ex)(Ax&Bx&Cx)' of

MPL.
Some sentences are natural pronominalizations and TFL transcribes
them with proterms. Oddly enough, when a TFL formula is itself a
pronominalization, it is not really suitable as a bridge to MPL. For example,
the transcription of'some A is a Band it is a C' is '+[+A' 1+BJJ+[+A\ +C 1]'.
But this formula is not as good a bridge to the MPL formula as
'+<+A+B>+C' which is pronoun- free. For that reason, in using the formulas
of TFL as bridges to MPL, it is best to confine oneself to pronoun-free
formulas wherever possible.
We noted earlier that a pronominalizaion like 'some A is B; it is C'
can be understood as a paraphrase of a pronoun-free formula 'some A and B
is a C'. But certain English pronominalizations are not merely stylistic
paraphrases ofnonpronominal sentences. Examples are 'some barber shaves
himself' and 'some student eloped with his aunt'. These sentences contain
'reflexive pronouns' and they cannot be naturally rephrased in a way that
eliminates the pronouns. In transcribing such pronominalizations, TFL uses
super-scripted proterms. (See Chapter 4, section 8.) Thus, '+B' 1+S 12 +B' 2'
transcribes 'some barber shaves himself' and '+S' 1+E 12+(A23 + S ' 3)'
transcribes 'some student eloped with his aunt'. Note that in these formulas
the common superscript signifies the common reference to the same barber
again, the same student again. But the numerical indices of the proterms differ
and we cannot automatically apply TRl and TR2 to the formulas by replacing
the numbers by bound variables.
The MPL version of'some barber shaves himself' is 'someone is such
that it is a barber and it shaves it(self)'. Symbolically this is '(Ex)(Bx&Sxx)'.
Suppose we tried to get this MPL formula by applying TRl to
'+B' 1+S 12+B' 2', the transcription of 'some barber shaves himself.
1. +B' I+{+B' 2+S12) DNF

2. (Ex)(B'x & (+B' 2 +Sx2)) TRl
3. (Ex)(B'x&((Ey)(B'y & Sxy) TRl
Arriving at 3 we can go no further. The reason is clear: the TFL formula has
two numerical indices, which renders it unsuitable as a bridge to the MPL
formula which has only one. If we are to apply our bridging rules to formulas
that contain proterms, we shall need to modify the formulas in a way that
renders them suitable as bridges to the MPL translation. As it stands, a
formula like '+B' 1+{S 12+B' 2)' cannot serve as a bridge formula for purpose of
translation to MPL. So we must modify it in a systematic way to serve that

purpose.
9. Preparing the TFL Bridge
We modify a TFL pronominalization such as +B' 1+(+B' 2+S 12) (the DNF form
of 'some barber shaves himself) by applying to it our rule for internal
pronoun elimination (IPE) [see section 17, chapter 4, and section 8, chapter 6].
Recall that this rule allows us to remove subsequent proterms and, in so doing,
eliminate superscripts. Thus, our DNF formula for 'some barber shaves
himself, viz., '+B' 1+(+B' 2+S 12)' becomes, by IPE, '+B 1+S 11 '. Applying TR1
to this formula we get '(Ex)Bx&Sxx)'.
To translate 'some student eloped with his aunt' we begin with its
transcription '+S' 1+(E 12+(A23 +S' 3))', and put that formula into DNF.
1. +S' 1+(+(+S\+A23 )+E 12) DNF

2. +SI+(+A21+E12) IPE
3. (Ex)(Sx&(Ey)(Ayx&Exy)) TR1 (twice)
which we read as 'there is an x such that x is a student and there is a y such

that y is an aunt ofx and x eloped withy'
********************************************************************
Exercises:
Translate the following sentences into MPL.

1. every A is Band C
2. everyone who kidnaps a son of a millionaire is a criminal
3. no mother hates her baby
4. some A or B is D but not E
5. every father of a bride mistrusts her groom
********************************************************************
10. Identity in MPL
Consider how MPL treats 'some author is a Missourian' as opposed to a

singular sentence like 'Twain is a Missourian'. In MPL 'Twain is a
Missourian' is translated as 'Mt'. By contrast, 'some author is Missourian'
is a general sentence that translates as '(Ex)(Ax&Mx)'. TFL marks the
proper name, but gives both the same treatment:
Twain is a Missourian -> +T*+M

some author is a Missourian => +A+M
An identity sentence in English is like any other singular sentence

except for having singular terms in both subject and predicate positions (see
section 23 of Chapter 3). And again, sentences affirming identity are not given
special treatment in TFL. Consider 'Twain is Clemens', which TFL
transcribes as '+T*+C*', in which 'T*' is the subject term and 'C*' is the
predicate term. Apart from the fact that the proper names are starred to
indicate that they are uniquely denoting terms, there is nothing special about
this transcription. The form of 'Twain is Clemens' [=> '+T*+C*'] is the
same as the form of 'some humorist is a Missourian' [=> '+H+M'].
By contrast, MPL treats all proper names as subject terms and so it
represents 'Twain' and 'Clemens' by lower case letters. But if both 't' and
'c' are subjects, they must both be attached to a two place predicate. What is
the predicate? The answer given by MPL is that 'Twain is Clemens' should
really read 'Twain is identical with Clemens'. More generally, in a statement
of identity one would read 'is' as 'is identical with'. In translating 'Twain is
Clemens' we first read it as 'Twain is identical with Clemens'. Letting 'I'
represent the two place predicate 'is identical with', our translation is 'Itc'. It
is also customary to use '=' for the identity predicate, in which case the
translation is 't=c'. Thus, given an English sentence like 'Twain is Clemens',
MPL treats it as a dyadic sentence ofthe form 'X*= Y*'. By contrast, TFL
does not introduce a relation of identity. For TFL an identity sentence is
simply one that has uniquely denoting terms in both subject and predicate
positions. Thus 'Twain is Clemens' is 'monadic'. But since it is singular it
has wild quantity. To put it bluntly; TFL does not recognize identity as any
kind of relation. Even a sentence like '2 3 = 8' is read monadically as a
particular sentence '(some) 23 is 8'. MPL, however, sees a sign of relation in
'Twain is Clemens'.
Suppose A affirms that Twain is Clemens and B denies it. MPL

represents their respective statements thus:
A: Itc
B: -ltc
The denial of identity comes up when I say 'Twain is funnier than everyone
else'. Anyone who asserts this is saying in effect that Twain is funnier than
everyone who is not (identical with) Twain. MPL translates this as
(x)(- Ixt => Ftx)
i.e., 'for anyone x, ifx is not identical with Twain, then Twain is funnier than
'
X.
To translate a sentence affirming identity or difference into MPL we
need first to rephrase it in a way that explicitly brings in a two place predicate
'is identical with', 'is the same as' or 'is not identical with' or 'is other than'.
Only then can we proceed to apply the rules of translation. Thus, given the
sentence 'Twain is funnier than anyone else', we should first render it as
'Twain is funnier than everyone not identical with Twain'.
1. +T* 1+F 12 -((-I23)+T*3)

2. +T* 1+( -(+T*3+(- I23))+F12) DNF
Eliminating 'T*' and replacing all subscripts pairing with 'T*' by 't' we get:
3. -(-12t)+F2t
4. (x)(- Ixt => Fxt) TR2
This example also illustrates the general point that the bridge between TFL
and MPL is more useful for sentences containing general terms than it is for
sentences containing proper names or other uniquely denoting terms. The
syntactical distance between the formulas of TFL and MPL is greatest when
the sentences involved have proper names or other uniquely denoting subjects
expressions (e.g., 'the King of France', Smith's eldest daughter'). In many
cases it simply does not pay to use TFL as a bridge for translating singular
statements (including identities) into MPL. Thus, given a simple singular
sentence like 'Twain is an author', we should directly move to 'At'. (Why
bother to get to it via '+T*+A'?)
Sometimes the identity predicate comes between two pronouns or

between a pronoun and a proper name. An example is
there is only one divine being
We understand this to say that some being is divine and no being other than
that being is divine. TFL renders this as
+[+B'+D]+[- (+(- B')+D)]
There is no natural way to eliminate the pronouns. So we don't bother to use

the formula as a bridge. MPL renders the sentence as
(Ex)(Dx&(y)(- lyx :J - Dy))
i.e., 'some being is divine and every being not identical with it isn't divine'.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
1. Translate 'nothing differs from itself into the language ofMPL.

2. Translate 'only Crick understands' into the language of MPL.
(Hint: construe the sentence as 'Crick understands and no one else
understands'.)
3. Translate into MPL: none except Teddy is loyal to Sally (Hint: no
one not identical to Teddy)
********************************************************************
11. Logical Reckoning in MPL
Having learned how to translate into MPL language we will now learn some
MPL techniques for evaluating arguments and drawing conclusions from
premises. Consider the valid syllogistic argument 'every ape is hairy; some
denizens of Madagascar are apes; so some denizens of Madagascar are hairy'.
To show that it is valid in TFL we could transcribe it, deny its conclusion and
derive a contradiction:
1. -A+H premise
2. +D+A premise
3. -(+D+H) negation of conclusion
4. -D+(-H) 3,PEQ
5. +A-H 4,2, DDO
6. +H-H 5,1, DDO
This evaluates the argument as valid. For we have shown that denying the
conclusion leads to contradiction. (Another method could be used: show that
1, 2, and 3 give you a P/Z conjunction (see section 5 of Chapter 5).)
A similar technique may be used in MPL. First we should represent
the premises and the denied conclusion in MPL thus:
1. (x)(Ax :::> Hx) premise

2. (Ex)(Dx&Ax) premise
3. - (Ex)(Dx&Hx) negation of conclusion
But now we stop: we lack MPL rules analogous to the TFL rules such as PEQ
and DDO that would enable us to proceed to derive a contradiction. In the
next two sections we present the MPL rules that are used in evaluating
arguments like the above.
12. Transformation Rules
Rules of one important type are called Rules of Transformation (also called
Rules of Substitution). A rule of transformation permits us to transform a
formula into an equivalent formula thereby permitting us to replace the former
by the latter. One such rule allows us to change a formula that has an initial
sign of negation into one that has no such sign. For example, given the TFL
formula '-(+T+A)' [read: nothing is an A], we clear the negation sign by
driving it inward algebraically by 'obversion' to give us '-T+(-A)'
[everything is a nonA]. The analogous move for MPL is
- (Ex)(Ax) = (x)- (Ax)
Note that this transformation involves three changes:
1. we change the outermost sign

2. we change the quantifier

3. we change the sign of the Matrix
In MPL, the law that corresponds to TFL obversion is called 'The Law of
Quantifier Interchange' (QI). The following transformations are justified by
the law:
Law of Quantifier Interchange (QI):

-(x)( .. x...) = (Ex) -( .. x .. .)
-(Ex)( .. x... ) = (x) -( .. x.. .)
(x)( .. x.. .) = -(Ex) -( .. x ... )
(Ex)( .. x.. .) = -(x) -( .. x.. .)
Applying QI we may make the following simple inferences:
not everything is created I something is un-created

-(x)(Cx) I (Ex)-Cx
nothing is created I everything is not created

- (Ex)Cx I (x)- Cx
everything is created I not: something is not created

(x)Cx I -(Ex)-Cx
something is created I not: everything is not created.

(Ex)Cx I - (x)- Cx
A number of transformation laws of Statement Logic that deal with

negation and the connectives ' & ', 'v', and '::J' figure prominently in reckoning
with the formulas ofMPL. The following rules of transformation are known
as DeMorgan's Laws:
DeMorgan 'sLaws (DML):

Symbolic form Algebraic Form
-(p&q) = ( -p) v ( -q) -(+p+q) = -p-q
-(p v q) = (-p)&(-q) -(--p--q) = +(-p)+(-q)
p&q = -((-p) v (-q)) +p+q = -(-p-q)
p v q = -((-p)&(-q)) --p--q = -(+(-p)+(-q))
Any conditional formula may be replaced by a disjunction. We call this the

Conditional/Disjunction equivalence.
Conditional/Disjunction (C/D):
p ~ q = -p v q -p+q = - -( -p)- -q
Another important rule oftransformation is the Law of Double Negation:
Double Negation (DN):

p = --p
The following transformation laws are called Iteration
Iteration (IT):
p= p&p
p= pvp
13. Rules of Inference
Rules oflnference license the steps in a derivation leading to a conclusion from

given premises. The following rules of inference are much used in justifying
steps in a derivation.
Modus Ponens (MP):

p ~q
p
lq
Example:
if there is smoke, there is fire
there is smoke
so, there is fire
Modus To/lens (MT):

p ~ q
-q
I -p
Example:
if there is smoke, there is fire
there's no fire
hence there's no smoke
Simplification (SIMPL):
p&q
lp
Example:
roses are red and violets are blue
hence roses are red
Conjunction (Conj):
p
q
lp&q
Example:
roses are red
violets are blue
hence roses are red and violets are blue
Addition (Add):
p
lpvq
Example:
Tony is home
hence Tony is home or roses are red
Some times an inference may be justified by simply appealing to a

transformation rule. The transformation laws are then treated as rules of
inference. For example, suppose we wished to show that 'not every A is B'
entails 'some A is not B'. The MPL translation of 'not every A is B' is the
premise of the following example.
1. - (x)(Ax => Bx) prenuse

2. (Ex)- (Ax ::l Bx) 1, QI

3. (Ex)-(-Ax v Bx) 2, C/D
4. (Ex)((- (-Ax))&(- Bx)) 3,DML
5. (Ex)(Ax&(-Bx)) 4,DN
The last line is MPL for 'some A is not B'.
14. Literal Formulas
Literal formulas are simple sentences consisting ofa predicate and one or more
singular subjects. The following sentences are examples ofliteral formulas:
Caruso sings Sc
Plato admired Socrates Aps
x loves y Lxy
xisnnullng Rx
Sally gave Tommy a cookie Gstc
If a sentence is literal, so is its negation. For example, since 'Gstc' is a literal

sentences, so is '- Gstc'. (Literal sentences that are positive are sometimes
called 'atomic' sentences. Negative literals are not atomic.)
We shall need four more rules before we get down to reckoning with
the formulas ofMPL. The rules in question are called Rules ofInstantiation.
A rule of instantiation permits us to replace a pronoun by an arbitrary name.
For example, given the sentence 'someone is such that he is a Spani.ard and he
is proud' we may decide to call that 'someone' 'Abe' and then say: 'Abe is a
Spaniard and Abe is proud'. The formal rule justifying this in MPL is called
'existential instantiation' and looks like this:
Existential Instantiation (El):

(Ex)( .. x.. .)
/ ... a...
EI tells us that if we are given any step in a derivation that is existentially

quantified we may remove its quantifier and substitute a name for the variables
that it binds. Thus we may be given the premise 'some student is Pakistani',
whose MPL form is '(Ex)(Sx&Px)'. If this sentence is true there must exist
something (someone)--call it (he or she) 'a' --that is S and P. If so, 'Sa&Pa'
is true. Again, this move eliminates the quantifier '(Ex)' and replaces the
bound variable by an arbitrary name, giving us a formula that is free of
quantifiers and variables. EI may be performed only once. For we have no
right to assume that more than one student is Pakistani. Thus we cannot arbi-
trarily choose a second name, say 'Bob' and also infer 'Bob is a student and
Bob is Pakistani'. Moreover, once 'a' has been introduced as a name via EI,
it cannot be used in an another existential instantiation. Thus suppose we are
now told that 'some student is a billionaire'. This translates as
'(Ex)(Sx&Bx)'. Applying EI, we can derive 'Sb&Bb' by deciding to call the
student in question 'b'. But we cannot instantiate '(Ex)(Sx&Bx)' by again
using 'a' as the name for the billionaire student since that name has already
been used for the student who is Pakistani. We have no grounds for assuming
that they are the same person.
A second rule, called 'universal instantiation', enables us to eliminate
the universal quantifier by instantiation.
Universal Instantiation (UI):

(x)(. .. x ...)
/ ... a...
UI says that, given a universally quantified step in a derivation, we may

remove its quantifier and replace the variables it binds by any name we choose.
Thus, given the formula '(x)(Sx : : > Px)' as the translation of 'every Spaniard
is proud', we may instantiate to 'Sa::::> Pa', since ifthe premise is true for any
x, it is true for any arbitrary person, 'a'. For example, if it is true that every
Spaniard is proud, then it is true that if Abe is a Spaniard, then Abe is proud.
Universal instantiation is unrestricted; we can instantiate as many times as we
please. For if it is true that every Spaniard is proud then it is true that if Bob
is a Spaniard, then Bob is proud, and also true that if Zelda is a Spaniard then
Zelda is proud, and so on for any name one cares to put in for the universally
bound variable.
The reverse of EI also holds. Given the premise 'Abe is a Spaniard
and Abe is proud' we may deduce the conclusion 'someone is such that he is
a Spaniard and he is proud', thereby replacing the name 'Abe' by pronouns.
Because we move from a singular to a general sentence, the rule permitting
this is called 'existential generalization':
Existential Generalization (EG):

... a...
I (Ex)( .. x .. .)
Applying EG to the premise' Adam was created' we may conclude 'something

was created'. Thus:
Ca
I (Ex)(Cx)
Finally, if we have a formula ' ... a .. .' in which 'a' appears as an

arbitrary name so that ' ... b ... ' would also be true and ' ... c .. .' would also be
true, etc., then we may 'generalize universally' to '(x)( ... x ... )':
Universal Generalization (UG):

... a...
I (x)(. .. x .. .)
For example, suppose we chose 'Jupiter' as an arbitrary name to fill the gap
in' ... was created'. Assume we could just as well have chosen any other name
to fill that gap and that the resulting sentence would be taken as true. In that
case we could have series of sentences of the form ' ... was created', all of
which are assumed to be true, and we have the right to generalize to
'everything was created'. Thus, by applying UG, we have the inference 'Cj
I (x)(Cx)'.
As an example ofhow instantiation and generalization may figure in
logical reckoning in MPL, consider how we may derive a conclusion from
'every A is B' and 'something is an A':
1. (x)(Ax => Bx) prenuse

2. (Ex)(Ax) premise
3. Aa 2, EI
4. Aa => Ba 1, UI
5. Ba 3,4,MP
6. (Ex)(Bx) 5,EG
We have derived the conclusion 'Something is aB'. Using 'T' for 'thing', the
same conclusion may be quickly derived in TFL:
1. -A+B prenuse
2. +T+A prenuse
3.+T+B 1+2, DDO
We offer now a summary of important rules for reckoning in MPL:
1. Rules dealing with negation:

DN: p= --p
DML: -(p&q) = -p v -q
-(p v q) = (-p)&(-q)
C/D: -(p&-q)=p=>q=-pvq
2. Rules of iteration:
CI: p =p&p
DI: p = p vp
3. Rules dealing with quantifiers:

QI: -(Ex) = (x)-
-(x) =(Ex)-
(Ex) = -(x)-
(x) =-(Ex)-
4. Rules of instantiation:
EI: (Ex)( ... x ... ) / ... a .. .
UI: (x)( ... x ... ) / ... a .. .
5. Rules of generalization:
EG: ... a ... I (Ex)( ... x ... )
UG: ... a ... I (x) ( ... x ... )
15. Reckoning in MPL
Consider the valid argument 'every Ape is furry, some denizens of

Madagascar are apes, so, some denizens of Madagascar are furry'. To prove
it is valid in TFL we might use a reductio proof, denying the conclusion and
showing that conjoining the denial with the premises is inconsistent by P/Z.
But a direct proof could also be given:
1. -A+F premise
2. +D+A premise
3. +D+F 1+2, DDO
We now show how to do a direct proof in MPL:
1. (x)(Ax => Fx) premise

2. (Ex)(Dx&Ax) premise
3. Da&Aa 2, EI
4. Aa=> Fa 1, UI
5.Aa 3, SIMPL
6.Fa 4,5,MP
7.Da 3, SIMPL
8. Da&Fa 6, 7, Conj
9. (Ex)(Dx&Fx) 8,EG
Step 9 is the conclusion 'some denizen ofMadagascar is furry'.
16. Canonical Normal Forms (CNF)
It is often useful to transform the sentences we are reckoning with into a

'standard' or 'normal' form. Any sentence ofMPL can, by transformation,
be reduced to an equivalent sentence that has the following two characteristics:
1. Except for quantifiers, predicate letters and bound variables, the

formula contains no signs other than '- ',' & ' and 'v'.
2. '-'appears only in literal sentences.
Any sentence that has these two characteristics is said to be in 'Canonical

Normal Form' (CNF). If a sentence is not in CNF it is always possible to
transform it into one that is. We want to learn how to transform sentences into
CNF because CNF sentences are especially suited for logical reckoning in
MPL. As an example of a CNF transformation we use QI, C/D, DML, and
DN to tum '- (x)(Ax => Bx)' into the CNF formula '(Ex)(Ax&(- Bx)' by the
following series of steps.
1. - (x)(Ax => Bx) Given

2. (Ex)- (Ax => Bx) 1, Ql
3. (Ex)-(-Ax v Bx) 2,CD

4. (Ex)(--Ax&-Bx) 3,DML
5. (Ex)(Ax&- Bx) 4,DN
Line 5 is a CNF formula.

One technique for getting a CNF formula for an English sentence is
to transcribe into a TFL 'bridge' formula and then to clear the minus signs
from the bridge formula before translating it into MPL. Consider, for
example, 'no boy hates every girl', whose TFL formula is '-(+B 1+H 12 -G2)'.
If we applied TRI and TR2 to the DNF of this formula the result would be
'-(Ex)(Bx&(y)(Gy => Hxy))'. To get this into CNF we should have to apply
QI and DML. But suppose we had first cleared the external minus sign from
the bridging formula. We should then have'- B 1-(H12 -G2)', from which we
would again clear an external minus sign, giving us '- B 1+((- H 12)+G2)'. The
DNF ofthis formula is '-B 1+(+G2+(-H 12))', which we use as a bridge and
which translates into '(x)(Bx => (Ey)(Gy&- Hxy))'. Now this formula contains
only literal components, but it just falls short of being in CNF since it contains
the conditional sign'=>'. However, we may apply C/D to give us the CNF:
(x)(- Bx v (Ey)(Gy&- Hxy))
The moral of this example is that the more we can simplify in TFL before we
translate into MPL, the better off we are when it comes to doing logic in MPL.
17. Indirect Proofs in MPL
Indirect proofs tell us whether a given argument is valid or not. But for that
we need to be given a complete argument. In using an indirect method to
evaluate an argument for validity, we (1) deny its conclusion, conjoining the
denial to the premises, (2) get all conjuncts into CNF, (3) instantiate each
conjunct, using EI or UI or both and (4) tree the instantiations and test the tree
for inconsistency. An inconsistent result shows that the original argument is
valid. Thus, the general method consists of denying the conclusion and then
instantiating the counterclaim. This gives us a conjunction that has no
quantifiers. We are then able to examine this conjunction in the usual way: by
treeing it to see whether we have got a contradiction. Consider again the
argument 'every A is F, some Dis A I some Dis F'. Denying the conclusion
gives us the following counterclaim of three conjuncts:
1. (x)(Ax ::1 Fx) premise

2. (Ex)(Dx&Ax) prenuse
3. -(Ex)(Dx&Fx) negation of conclusion
We now proceed by applying the rules of reckoning:
4. (x)-(Dx&Fx) 3, QI
5. (x)((-Dx) v (-Fx)) 4,DML
6. (x)(- Ax v Fx) 1, C/D
Lines 2, 5 and 6 are all in CNF. We now instantiate them:
7. Da&Aa 2, EI
8. -Da v -Fa 5, UI
9.-AavFa 6, UI
The conjunction of 7, 8 and 9 can be treed:
Da
Aa
I \
-Da -Fa
I \
-Aa Fa
The tree has all of its paths 'closed', revealing that 7, 8 and 9 are jointly
contradictory. Since 7, 8 and 9 follow from the counterclaim, this shows that
the counterclaim of the original argument is inconsistent. The argument itself
is therefore valid.
We could save ourselves several steps if we clear the minus from our
TFL formulas before using them as the bridge to MPL.
1. -A+F => (x)(Ax ::1 Fx)

2. +D+A => (Ex)(Dx&Ax)
3. -(+D+F) (== -0+(-F)) => (x)(Dx ::1 - Fx)
Applying C/D to 1 and 3 gives us three CNF formulas ready for instantiation
and treeing:
1.* (x)(-Ax v Fx)

2. (Ex)(Dx&Ax)
3.* (x)(-Dx v -Fx)
A word of advice is in order. It is better (and is often necessary) to

use EI before using UI. This is due to the restriction that applies to EI but not
to UI. Instantiating in the order 2, 1*, 3* gives us the same closed tree as
before.
The general technique for indirectly proving the validity of an
argument in MPL is this:
1. Form the counterclaim of the argument in TFL. Clear all external

minus signs from the formulas and translate into MPL.
2. Transform all sentences to CNF.
3. Instantiate--beginning with EI and then going on to UI.
4. Tree the resulting sentences.
5. Now check to see whether the tree closes. If it does close, the
argument is valid. An invalid argument will not give a closed tree.
18. Relational MPL Arguments
We now apply the technique to some more complicated arguments. Consider

how we could show that the following argument is valid.
every colt is a horse

I every owner of a colt is an owner of a horse
Denying the conclusion we have
1. -C2+H2 prenuse
2. - (- (0 12+C2)+(012+H2)) negation of conclusion
1 and 2 jointly form the counterclaim of the argument. Before proceeding to

translate into MPL clear the external minus sign of 2:
2, peq
A further simplification of 3 is available:
3,PEQ
We now put 4 into DNF:
4,DNF
We now translate 5 and 1.
6. (Ex)(+C 2+0x2)&(- H 2+0x2) 5, TR1

7. (Ex)((Ey)(Cy&Oxy)&(y)(Hy => (-Oxy))) 6, TR1, TR2
8. (y)(Cy => Hy) 1, TR2
Using C/D we get 8 and 7 into CNF:
9. (y)(-Cy v Hy) 8, C/D

10. (Ex)((Ey)(Cy&Oxy)&(y)(-Hyv -Oxy)) 7,C/D
Instantiating 10 gives us
11. Cb&Oab&(-Hb v -Oab) 10, EI,Ul
Instantiating 9 gives us
12. -Cb vHb 9, UI
Treeing 11 and 12 we get:
Cb
Oab
I \
-Hb -Oab
I \
-Cb Hb
The tree for the instantiations closes; we have a contradiction.

To show that 'every girl is loved by some boy' follows from 'some
boy loves every girl' we counterclaim and get:
1. +B 1+(L 12 -G2) pretruse

2. - (- G 2+(L 12+B 1) negation of conclusion
We then simplify 2 by driving in the minus signs:
3. +G2+((- L 12 - B 1)) 2,PEQ

4. +B 1+(-G2+Ln)) 1,DNF
5. +G2+(- B 1+(- L 12)) 3,DNF
4 and 5 are our bridging formulas. We now translate into MPL:
6. (Ex)(Bx&(y)(Gy;:, Lxy) 4, TR1, TR2

7. (Ey)(Gy&(x)(Bx;:, - Lxy) 5, TR1, TR2
8. (Ex)(Bx&(y)(-Gy v Lxy)) 6, C/D
9. (Ey)(Gy)&(x)(- Bx v - Lxy)) 7, C/D
8 and 9 are now in CNF so we instantiate them:
10. Ba&Gb&(-Gb v Lab) 8, EI, UI

11. Gb&(- Ba v -Lab) 9, EI, UI
We now tree 10 and 11:
Ba
Gb
I \
-Gb Lab
I \
-Ba -Lab
All paths close so we have derived a contradiction from the counterclaim.

Here is a more complicated argument:
anyone who ~nvies anyone who Qwns a §.lave is immoral

every (captured) Akkadian was a slave
I no Akkadian is owned by anyone that any moral person envies
We will use a direct TFL proof to derive the conclusion and then follow this
by an indirect MPL proof of validity.
1. - (E 12+(0 23 +S 3))+(- M 1) prenuse

2. -A3+S3 premise
I -(+A3+(0 23+(+M 1+E12))) conclusion
3. - M~-(E 12+(023+S3)) 1, peq
4. - M 1+(- E 12)- (0 23 +S3) 3, peq
5. -(023 +S 3)+(-E 12)-M 1 4, LLC (twice), LLA
6. -(-((-E 12)-M 1)))+(-023 )-S3 5, peq
7. -S 3+(-0 23 )-(EI2+MI) 6, LLC (twice), LLA
8. - A3+(- (0 23 )- (E 12+M1) 2+7, DDO
9. -(+A3+0 23 +(E 12+M 1) 8, peq
Line 9 is the conclusion we sought to derive.

In the indirect MPL proof we shall use steps 1 and 2 and the denial of
the conclusion as bridges to the MPL formulas.
1* -(+(+S 3+0 23 )+E 12))+(-M 1) 1, DNF

1** (x)((Ey)((Ez)(Mx&Exy)&Oyz))) 1*, TR2, TR1
2* (z)(Az -> Sz) 2, TR2
3* +A3+(0 23 +(+M 1+Ed negation of conclusion
3** +A3+(+(+M 1+Ed+023 )) 3*, DNF
3*** (Ez)(Az&(Ex)((Ey)(Mx&Exy)&(Oyz))) 3**, TR1 (thrice)
We now tree instantiations of3***, 1**and 2*.
4* Ac 3***, EI
Ma
Eab
Obc
I I \ \
- Sc - Obc - Eab - Ma 1**, UI
I \
-Ac Sc 2*, UI
The tree closes, which shows that denying the conclusion entails a
contradiction.
To show that 'some Greek shaves himself follows from 'every barber
shaves himself and 'some barber is a Greek' we deny the conclusion and
conjoin it with the premises:
1. no Greek shaves himself negation of conclusion

2. every barber shaves himself premise
3. some barber is a Greek prenuse
To show that these three statements are jointly inconsistent we transcribe them,
simplify, translate them, get them into CNF and then instantiate. Having
simplified the transcriptions we arrive at:
1. -G'1+(-S12)-G'2 negation of conclusion

2. - B' I+SI2+B' 2 premise
3. +BI+GI premise
As a first step we apply IPE to 1 and 2:
4. -GI+(-SII) 1, IPE
5. - BI+SII 2, IPE
After transformation, instantiation and treeing, we have:
Ga
Ba
I \
-Ba Saa
I \
-Ga -saa
It is instructive to compare how one could do this example in TFL:
1. - B\+S 12 - B' 2 prenuse

2. +BI+GI prenuse
3. - BI+SII 1, IPE
4. +GI+S11 2+3, DDO
[Note that an English language sentence like 'some boy envies every owner of
a dog' has no pronouns in it. MPL 'translates' it with three pronouns
[(Ex)(Bx&(y)((Ez)Dz&Oxy => Exy))], but TFL transcribes it as a proterm free
formula [- B+(E-(O+D)]. More often than not, even when a sentence
explicitly contains pronouns, it can be rephrased and transcribed in a

pronoun-free way. For example, 'if any A is B, then it is C' can be rephrased
as 'any A that is B is C' and transcribed without proterms as '-<+A+B>+C'.
Indeed, most logical reckoning can be done without the pronouns (bound
variables) that are an indispensable feature of MPL. This gives TFL a
decided advantage over MPL in naturalness and ease of reckoning. Having
said this, it should be pointed out that reflexive pronouns are special; in
transcribing a sentence like 'some barber shaves himself TFL needs proterms
(prior to application of IPE). Though we prefer TFL to MPL, it must be
conceded that in the area oflogical reckoning that involves reflexive pronouns,
TFL has no special advantage over MPL.]
********************************************************************
Exercises:
I. Show that 'Aristotle is not wiser than himself follows from 'no one is wiser
than Aristotle'. (hint: use UI).
2. Using MPL, derive 'every senator admires a fool' from 'every senator
admires himself and 'if any(one) is a senator, then he is a fool'.
*******************************************************************
19. Identity Arguments in MPL
As we have seen above (section 10 of this Chapter), statements such as 'Mark

Twain is Sam Clemens' and 'the square root of twenty-five is five' are often
called identities. An identity statement in TFL is simply a statement both of
whose terms are uniquely denoting terms. Again, an identity is a statement
of the form 'some X* is Y*'. Arguments that contain an identity premise or
conclusion require special treatment in MPL. The reason for this is that in
MPL a sentence like 'Twain is Clemens' is construed as a dyadic statement
whose 'is' is understood to mean 'is identical with'- -a two place relational
term that ties 'Twain' and 'Clemens' as two subjects in the way 'loves' ties
'Paris' and 'Helen' in 'Paris loves Helen'. Having introduced identity as a
relation, MPL must also introduce special laws governing it. The following
'Laws of Identity' are often used when dealing with identity arguments.
Laws ofldentity:
LI.l ifx=y, theny=x (I'he law ofsymmetry)
LI.2 ifx=y and y=z, then x=z (I'he law oftransitivity)
Ll.3 x=x (I'he law ofrejlexivity)
Ll. 4 ifPx and x=y, then Py (Leibniz's Law)
LI.l asserts that identity is a symmetrical relation. According to LI.l, if

Twain is Clemens, then Clemens is Twain. LI.2 asserts that identity is a
transitive relation, so that if Clemens is Twain and Twain is the author ofLife
on the Mississippi, then Clemens is the author of Life on the Mississippi. The
third law asserts that identity is reflexive. According to LI.3, we can always
assert that 'Twain is Twain', 'Socrates is Socrates' and so on. LI.4 allows us
to replace 'x' by 'y' once we know that x=y. Thus, given that Twain is a
humorist, and given that Twain is Clemens, we can conclude that Clemens· is
a humorist. This law is often called Leibniz's Law. Thus, in MPL one or
more special laws governing the identity relation must be added as 'axioms of
identity'.
In TFL identity statements are not relational and the analogous laws
can be proved by ordinary means. For example, according to Leibniz's Law,
'Y* is P' follows from 'X* is P' and 'X* is Y*'. Since identities are singular
statements, they have wild quantity. By assigning universal quantity to 'X*
is P' and particular quantity to 'X* is Y' we can prove the fourth law
syllogistically. Thus, an argument like the Twain example comes out as a
valid syllogism:
+T*+C* Twain is Clemens

-T*+H Twain is a humorist
/+C*+H I Clemens is a humorist
We now offer a pair of identity arguments to illustrate the way that

MPL deals with them by applying the laws of identity.
(i) Show that 'Mark is an author' follows from the premises 'Clemens
is Twain', 'Twain is an author' and 'Clemens is Mark'.
1. c=t premise
2. At premtse
3. c=m premise
4. m=c 3, symmetry
5. m=t 4, 1, transitivity
6. t=m 5, symmetry
7. Am 2, 6, L.L. (Leibniz's Law)
(ii) Show that 'Twain is Clemens' follows from 'Twain is funnier

than anyone else' and 'Twain isn't funnier than Clemens'. One way
is to deny the conclusion and show that this gives us a contradiction:
1. (x)(-(x=t) :::> Ftx) premise

2. -Ftc prenuse
3. -(t=c) negation of conclusion
4. (x)(x=t) v Ftx) 1, C/D,DN
5. c=t v Ftc 4, U.I.
6. t=c v Ftc 5, symmetry
The tree for 2,3, and 6 is:
-Ftc
-(t=c)
I \
t=c Ftc
The tree closes. Denying the conclusion leads to contradiction so the argument
is valid.
********************************************************************
Exercises:
1. Show that 'the Evening Star is Hesperus' follows from 'Hesperus is

Phosphorus', 'Phosphorus is the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star is the
Morning Star'. (in MPL and then TFL)
2. Given the premises 'only Clemens knows' and 'Twain knows', prove that
Twain is Clemens (in MPL and then TFL).
*******************************************************************
Rules, Laws and Principles
TFL
Logical Law of Commutation (LLC): +(+X+Y) = +(+Y+X)

Law ofObversion (Obv): -(+/-X+/- Y) = +(-/+X-/+Y)
Principle of Equivalence (PEQ): Two statements are logically equivalent if

and only if they are covalent and equal.
Logical Law of Association (LLA): +X+<+Y+Z> = +<+X+Y>+Z
Law of Simplification (LS): Any well-formed dyad may be detached from an

expression whose terms are connected by a binary commutative and
associative functor (viz., the'+ ... +' functor).
Internal Pronoun Elimination (IPE): If P' m... P' n is an internal

pronominalization, remove P 'n and replace any remaining occurrence
of n by m·
The REGAL Principle (REGAL): A syllogism is valid if and only if its mood
is regular and it 'adds up'.
Principle of Validity (PV): An argument, A, is valid if and only if its

counterclaim, C(A), is inconsistent.
Principle of Transitivity: If being B characterizes every A and being C

characterizes every B, then being C characterizes every A.
P/Z Criteria: A syllogistic conjunction is inconsistent if and only if it is itself

canonically inconsistent or else is equivalent to a canonically
inconsistent conjunction.
253
Laws of Identity:
Law of Symmetry: A* is B* I B* is A*
Law of Transitivity: A* is B* and B* is C* I A* is C*
Law ofReflexivity: A* is A*
Dictum de Omni (DDO):

(Aristotelian version): Whatever characterizes every X characterizes
any X.
(Generalized version): What is true of every X is true of whatever is
an X.
(Host/Donor version): E(M), E*(- M) I E(E*)
Reassignment Rule (R- A): The numerical index on a universally distributed

occurrence of a term may be replaced by any other numeral.
... -Ti··· I ... -Ti···
(R- A2): The superscript of any distributed proterm may be
changed to form another pronominalization .
... Ti ... I ... Ti ...
Pronominalization (Pl): some X is Y I so it (the X in question) is Y

+X'+Y I +X'+Y
(Pla): +X+Y I +X'+Y'
Rule ofWild Quantity (WQ), (P2): +X'+Y I- X'+Y
Pronominal Expansions:
some A is B = something is an A and it is a B
+A+B = +[+T'+A]+[+T'+B]
some A is B = an A exists (is a thing) and it is a B
+A+B = +[+A'+T]+[+A'+B]
every A is B = if any thing is an A, it is a B
-A+B = -[+T'+A]+[+T'+B]
every A is B = if an A exists, it is a B
-A+B = -[+A'+T]+[+A'+B]
STATEMENT LOGIC
principle of equivalence (peq): Two compound statements are equivalent if

(but not 'only if) they are covalent and equal.
Modus Ponens (MP): Given any premise ofthe form E(ifp), where p has
negative occurrence, and another premise M(p ), where p has positive
occurrence, the conclusion M(E) follows.
Conjunction (Conj): From any two premises the conjunction ofthose premises
follows.
Simplification (Simpl): From any conjunction either conjunct follows.
Conjunctive Iteration (CI): Any statement is equivalent to its conjunction with

itself.
Disjunctive Iteration (DI): Any statement is equivalent to its disjunction with

itself.
Disjunctive Addition (DA): From any premise the disjunction of that premise
and any other statement follows.
Law of 'And/Or' Distribution (AOD): (p or p) and (q orr)= (p and q) or (p

and r)
+[- -p- -p]+[- -q-- r] = -- [+p+q]-- [+p+r]
Law of 'Or/And' Distribution (OAD): (p and p) or (q and r) = (p or q) and (p

orr)
--[+p+p]--[+q+r] = +[--p--q]+[--p--r]
MPL
Translation Rules (TFL => MPL):

TRI: some A is B -> +A1+B 1 => (Ex)(Ax&Bx)
TR2: every A is B > - A1+B 1 => (x)(Ax ;:, Bx)
TR/and: p and q => +p+q -> p&q
TR/if: ifp then q > -p+q > p;:, q
TRior: porq > --p--q > pvq
TR3: S* is P > Ps
S* is R toP* > Rsp
xis P > Px
x is R to y --> Rxy
TR4: <+A+B>x > <A&B>x => Ax&Bx
<--A--B> ><A vB>x >Ax vBx
Law of Quantifier Interchange (QI):

-(x)( ... x ... ) = (Ex)-( ... x ... )
-(Ex)(... x ... ) = (x)-( ... x ... )
(x)( ... x ... ) = -(Ex)-(... x ... )
(Ex)( ... x ... ) = -(x)-( ... x ... )
DeMorgan's Laws (DML):

-(p&q) = -p v -q -(+p+q) = -p-q
-(p v q) = -p&-q -(--p--q) = +(-p)+(-q)
p&q = -(-p v -q) +p+q = -(-p-q)
p v q = -(-p&-q) --p--q = -(+(-p)+(-q))
Conditional/Disjunction (C/D): p;:, q = -p v q -p+q = --(-p)--q
Double Negation (DN): p = - - p
Modus Ponens (MP): p ;:, q, p I q
Modus Tolens (MT): p;:, q, -q I -p
Simplification (Simpl): p&q I p
Conjunction (Conj): p, q I p&q

Addition (Add): p I p v q
Existential Instantiation (EI): (Ex)( ... x ... ) I ...a ...
Universal Instantiation (UI): (x)( ... x ... ) I ... a ...
Existential Generalization (EG): ... a ... I (Ex)( ... x ... )
Universal Generalization (UG): given that 'a' is an arbitrary name so that

' ... b .. .', ' ... c .. .', etc. would also be true: ... a ... I (x)( ... x ... )
Laws of !~entity:
Law of Symmetry (LI.l ): if x=y then y=x
Law ofTransitivity (L1.2): ifx=y and y=z, the x=z
Law of Reflexivity (LI.3): x=x
Leibniz's Law (L1.4): ifPx and x=y, then Py
ANote on Further Reading
Having mastered An Invitation to Formal Reasoning, the reader may wish to

pursue one or more of the topics discussed or alluded to here. Term Functor
Logic (TFL) was given its present formulation by Fred Sommers in a series of
articles published in philosophical journals. You might want to look at 'The
Calculus of Terms', reprinted in The New Syllogistic, George Englebretsen,
editor, New York, Peter Lang Publ., 1987. Sommers provided an extensive
introduction to and philosophical foundation for TFL in his The Logic of
Natura/Language, Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1982. David Kelley's textbook,
The Art ofReasoning, 2nd expanded edition, New York, W.W. Norton & Co.,
1994, includes a chapter presenting the main elements ofTFL. Englebretsen' s
Something to Reckon With, Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1996, offers
a summary account of term logic as well as an extensive survey of the
historical antecedents of Sommers' logic.
The history of all logic, not just TFL, begins of course with Aristotle.
The bold reader may wish to consult one of the many editions and translations
of his Prior Analytics, the book in which Aristotle invented syllogistic logic.
A very comprehensive history of logic is William and Martha Kneale's The
Development ofLogic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962. The reader interested
in exploring further Leibniz's contributions to logic might examine some ofhis
essays in Leibniz: Logical Papers, G.H.R. Parkinson, editor and translator,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. While Aristotle was the first logician, and
Leibniz was perhaps the greatest traditional logician, Lewis Carroll (pen name
of the mathematician Charles L. Dodgson) was almost the last- but certainly
the most entertaining-traditional logician. His books, Symbolic Logic and
The Game of Logic, first published a hundred years ago, have served as a
source of delightful but challenging logic problems for generations of teachers
and writers, including ourselves. Both books have been printed in a single
volume by Dover Publ., Inc., New York, 1958.
Modem Predicate Logic (MPL) has had a very brief (just over a
century), but very rich and eventful, history. There are a very large number
259
of textbooks available now presenting the standard version of that logic. I.

Copi's Introduction to Logic, 9th edition, New York, Macmillian, 1994, and
S. Barker's Elements ofLogic, 5th edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1989,
are two of the more popular of these. W.V.O. Quine's Philosophy ofLogic,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1970, is an excellent, brief account of
the philosophy behind MPL.
The system of diagrams used here was invented by the mathematician
John Venn in the nineteenth century. An interesting survey of systems of logic
diagrams is found in Martin Gardner's Logic Machines and Diagrams,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. A system of diagrams quite
different from Venn's, but built with Sommers' version ofTFL in mind, has
been developed by Englebretsen. A full presentation of it is found in his Line
Diagrams for Logic: Drawing Conclusion, Lewiston, N.Y., Mellen, 1998.

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An Invitation to Formal Reasoning

The logic of terms

Ashgate Publishing Company

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Control Number: 00-132808

ISBN 0 7546 1366 6

Printed and bound by Athenaeum Press, Ltd ..

Chapter 2 Picturing Propositions

11. Term Way vs. Predicate Way

Chapter 3 The Language of Logic (I)

Chapter 4 The Language of Logic (II)

Chapter 6 Relational Syllogisms

9. Distributed Proterms 158

Chapter 7 Statement Logic

Chapter 8 Modem Predicate Logic

16. Canonical Normal Forms (CNF) 241

Rules, Laws and Principles 253

A Note on Further Reading 259

It seems to be a fairly widely held belief among contemporary teachers of logic

inferences involving unanalyzed statements. The second challenge was to offer

(1) Socrates is wise

Symbolically, predicates are symbolized by uppercase letters, proper names

educational backgrounds and abilities, more of them are enrolled in

Note for Instructors:

A normal adult possesses information stored in memory in the form of

(S 1) Some Prime Minister was a woman.

Applying your reasoning capability you will take S 1 as a premise and

(S2) Some woman was a Prime Minister.

Let us call your argument 'A 1':

AI: S 1. Some Prime Minister was a woman.

(1) Babies are illogical.

(4) No baby can manage a crocodile.

The whole sequence of four statements is an argument. The first three

(1) Everything not absolutely ugly, may be kept in a drawing-room.

(7) No bathing-machine is made of mother of pearl.

(This too is Carroll's conclusion; he arrives at it by using a method quite

that S2 is true is indirectly: by way of inferring S2 from S 1. And in fact that

2. The Form of an Argument

A2: S3 Some member of the Armed Services Committee is a Southerner.

A3 some farmer is a noncitizen

3. A Word About the Form of Statements

Every argument consists of two or more statements (a conclusion and one or

every cat is a feline

Another instance of an argument of this form is

every Greek is a philosopher

4. The Form of Singular Statements

singular statement. Statements with general terms in subject position

i) Garbo was laughing.

I. What is the form of the following arguments? (use X,Y Z)

6. Only Garbo is laughing. (hint: Only X is Y can be construed as 'no

5. Terms and Statements

Every statement consists of two kinds of components. Elementary statements

statement of form 'every X is Y' was represented as 'YaX' while 'some X is

A4: some roses are red and no violets are yellow

A6: if there is smoke then there is fire

A6 is an instance of the general form:

F2: ifx then y

6. Symbolizing Compound Statements

11. if neither p nor q then not r

7. A Word About Validity

F3: some X is not a Y

Now it might seem to us that F3 is a valid argument form. But if it