LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

[FACTS:]

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez

Offense committed on – May 11, 1990

Complaint filed in OCP – May 30, 1990
Information filed MTC- October 2, 1990

Petitioner moved to quash information on the ground of prescription – DENIED; Appeal

to RTC - DENIED

Hence, INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW

Petitioner argued that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of
the Rule on Summary Procedure; She then invoked Act No. 3326, as amended

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided

in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prosecution contended that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Respondent
maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor
comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all
cases, without distinction.

[ISSUES:]

W/N the filing of complaint in OCP interrupted the prescription on the crime imputed to
the petitioner? NO

[HELD:]

It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only
on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.