LUIS PANAGUITON, JR. v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI

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[G.R. No. 167571. November 25, 2008.

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR. v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and


RODRIGO G. CAWILI

[FACTS:]

Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money from Luis Panaguiton.

Cawili and Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson.

Checks were dishonored. Petitioner made formal demands from Tongson and Cawili.

Only Tongson appeared with counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included
as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's
personal and business capacity.

City Prosecutor only found probable cause for Cawili and dismissed Tongson’s.

Petitioner partially appealed to DOJ - directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the NBI

TONGSON MR – DENIED

ACP Sampaga – dismissed case against Tongson on the ground of prescription under Act
No. 3326, as amended (as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings.)

Petitioner Appealed to DOJ – Denied; Petitioner MR – Granted; Tongson MR – Granted

Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari to CA – Denied on the ground of failure to attach
proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping, also noted, DOJ attached to
the petition is a mere photocopy

Hence, INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF CA.

[ISSUES:]

W/N failure to attach proper verification of non-forum shopping and attaching a


photocopy of the resolution is a ground for dismissal? NO

W/N Petitioner’s case against respondents (Cawili and Tongson) has prescribed? NO

[HELD:]

First Issue: The Court of Appeals Committed a grievous mistake.

The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that


matters which are alleged are true and correct — the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, as in the instant
case. In the case at bar, the court find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification
requirement.
A plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the
annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, a certified true copy of which was
attached. Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.

Second Issue: SC agrees that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22.
Nevertheless, the court cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

As shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the prescription
of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution
of the criminal proceedings against the accused. In People v. Parao and Parao the
first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a
judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.

Subsequently, in People v. Olarte, the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender, and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. Indeed,
to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.

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