Lori Jane D.

Faustorilla
Section B: HRM 200 Administrative and Office Management (5:30-6:30)
Mr. Jaysone Christopher Bancoro

i.Alba vs. Espinosa

Title of the Case: Romeo Alba v. Conrado G. Espinosa
Facts of the Case: The respondents said that on various occasions, Alba employed them as laborers for
his building projects in a number of residential villages throughout Metro Manila and the neighboring
provinces. The respondents were regular employees of Alba who received daily wages ranging from
P350.00 to P500.00 but were denied some statutorily required benefits, including their overtime pay, 13th
month pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave (SIL) pay. On various dates in 2013, some of the
respondents confronted Alba about these benefits, but this action ultimately led to their dismissal.
The other responders once more questioned Alba in 2014 about his failure to pay their benefits.
Even so, Alba became enraged and started behaving rudely toward them, yelling at them on the job site
and devising schemes to increase their workdays. The aforementioned caused these responders to request
Raffy Tulfo's (Tulfo) Radyo Singko Program assistance. Tulfo personally called Alba to urge her to
provide the respondents their full rewards as he addressed their predicament. The respondents, however,
found that the move did more harm than good since when they returned to work the following day, they
were notified that they had been fired. All of the respondents, feeling vindicated, complained to the
NLRC about their wrongful terminations and financial claims. Later, the Labor Arbiter heard a combined
version of the two complaints (LA).
Alba contended that the responders could not be considered his regular employees in order to
defend himself. He claimed to to be a mere taker of modest home improvement and repair work. He was
regarded as a mere mamamakyaw in the construction sector, who would assemble a group of skilled and
semi-skilled masons and carpenters for specialized tasks that typically lasted one to two weeks.
Depending on their level of expertise, the respondents received daily pay between P600 and P1,000. They
were also allowed to take on projects with their own clients once Alba's tasks were finished. Alba would
only hire construction workers for subsequent projects if they would be available for the duration of the
new work. The LA's conclusion that there was no employer-employee connection was rejected by the
NLRC. Alba openly declared that the respondents were a part of his workforce, which led to the
relationship between Alba and the respondents being established. Alba had the authority to choose who
would be kept on or fired from his enterprises. He also acknowledged that he daily paid the respondents'
pay.
The CA dismissed Alba's petition in its Decision on July 14, 2016. The CA stated that the four-
part test that is used to determine whether an employer and employee have a connection is satisfied. The
CA also upheld the decision that the wrongfully fired respondents were regular workers after the appeal
court considered the sort of work the respondents were expected to complete in relation to Alba's
business.
Issue/s of the Case: Alba reiterates the same arguments he used in his petition to the CA for certiorari.
The determination of an employer-employee connection and the conclusion that the respondents were
regular employees who were forcibly fired from their jobs by Alba are specifically contested. Alba also
contests the decision to make him pay the P16,125,574.61 worth of financial claims.
Ruling of the Supreme Court: The Court states up front that it will not continue to debate whether the
NLRC's and CA's decisions to, first, dismiss Conrado and Jaime, Jr.'s claims of illegal dismissal and
monetary claims, and, second, deny Nilo of his claim for SIL pay, are valid. The NLRC's conclusions on
the subject did not appear to have been contested by the aforementioned parties, making the conclusions
already definitive. Additionally, the Court's decision in this instance must only address the problems
raised in the petition. Therefore, these limitations shall apply to any later references or uses of the term
"respondents" by the Court. Upon consideration, the Court concludes that there are no compelling
grounds to overturn the CA's judgment to uphold the NLRC's conclusion.
ii.Atok vs. Gison
Title of the Case: Atok Big Wedge Company vs Gison
Facts of the Case: Respondent Jesus P. Gison was hired as a part-time consultant on a retainer basis by
petitioner Atok Big Wedge Company, Inc. sometime in February 1992 through its assistant. Rutlo A.
Torres, vice president and acting resident manager. Respondent supported petitioner's retained legal
counsel with matters relevant to the prosecution of proceedings against illegitimate surface inhabitants in
the territory covered by the company's mining claims as a consultant on a fee basis. The respondent's
specialty, he claimed, was acting as a liaison between several government entities.
Except when periodically requested by management to address topics requiring his skills as a
consultant, the petitioner did not need the respondent to visit its office on a regular basis. Respondent was
paid a retainer amount of $3,000 each month, which was delivered to him either at his home or in a
nearby restaurant, in exchange for his services. A retainer agreement was signed by the parties, but it has
since been lost and is no longer accessible. For the ensuing eleven years, the abovementioned
arrangement was maintained.
Later, as the respondent grew older, he asked the petitioner to arrange for his registration with the
Social Security System (SSS), but the petitioner declined his request. Later, he made the same request
again, but the respondent ignored him because he was simply a retainer/consultant. Respondent filed a
complaint with the SSS against Petitioner on February 4, 2003, alleging that Petitioner had refused to
facilitate his registration with the SSS.
In his capacity as resident manager of the petitioner, Mario D. Cera wrote a memo on the same
day informing the respondent that the petitioner would be terminating his retainer agreement with the
business within 30 days of receiving the memo because his services were no longer required.
Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner, Mario D. Cera, and Teofilo R. Asuncion, Jr. on
February 21, 2003, with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB), Cordillera Administrative Region of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), alleging illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, vacation pay, and sick leave pay.
Issue/s of the Case: The parties are in an employment-employer relationship.
Ruling of the Supreme Court: The four-part test, i.e., (1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's
conduct, or the so-called "control test," has always been followed by jurisprudence to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. The so-called "control test" is frequently viewed as the
most important and conclusive sign of whether an employer-employee relationship exists or not.
According to the control test, there is an employer-employee connection when the person receiving the
services retains the power to control not only the end result, but also the process and tools used to get
there.
By using the aforementioned test, it appears that there is no employer-employee relationship in
the issue at hand. Among other things, respondent was not obligated to show up every day during the
petitioner's regular business hours. The respondent received his monthly retainer payments at either his
home or a nearby eatery. More crucially, the respondent was allowed the discretion to complete the tasks
using his own means and technique because the petitioner did not specify how he should carry out any of
the tasks that required his experience as a liaison officer.
 Respondent was given tasks to complete, but the petitioner had no influence over how or how
well respondent carried out these tasks. In addition, respondent explicitly acknowledged that the
petitioner hired him in a limited capacity and that there will be no employer-employee relationship
between them as a result of the absence of the element of control on the part of the petitioner and the
parties' lack of a retainership agreement. Argued in the position paper of the respondent.
Respondent cannot be regarded as the petitioner's regular employee even if the petitioner used his
services for eleven years. The lower court's application of Article 280 of the LaborCode to support its
conclusions that the respondent had become a regular employee of the petitioner was inapplicable in the
present case. The Court has ruled that this provision is not the standard for determining the existence of
an employment relationship because it only distinguishes between regular employees and casual
employees for the purposes of determining an employee's right to benefits, the right to join or form a
union, or the right to security of tenure; it does not apply in situations where the existence of an
employment relationship is disputed. Because there is no employer-employee relationship between the
parties, the petitioner's termination of the respondent's services after due notice did not constitute an
illegal dismissal, necessitating his reinstatement and the payment of his full backpay, allowances, and
other benefits. It is, therefore, incorrect on the part of the Court of Appeals to rely on Article 280 in
making this determination.
iii.Felicilda vs. Uy
Title of the Case: Mario Felicilda vs Manchesteve Uy
Facts of the Case: According to the petitioner, respondent Manchesteve H. Uy (respondent) engaged him
as a truck driver on October 29, 2010, for the latter's trucking company known as "Gold Pillars Trucking"
(GPT). As a result, the petitioner received a corporate identity card (ID), which was assigned to him in
one of GPT's branches in Manila and paid for on a commission basis.
On December 9, 2011, while waiting for his truck to be filled with cargoes—all of which were
promptly delivered to the clients of the respondent—petitioner slept off at his workstation. Respondent's
assistant informed the petitioner that his employment had already been terminated the next day, or on
December 10, 2011, because he had been caught sleeping at work.
Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent before the
NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 12-18409-11. He claimed he was fired without just reason and
due process and that his conduct of napping did not harm respondent's business.
Issue/s of the Case: The main question that needs to be answered by the Court is whether or not the CA
correctly concluded that the NLRC had acted gravely arbitrarily in concluding that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent and that the latter could not,
therefore, have unlawfully fired the former.
Ruling of the Supreme Court: The petition has merit, in my opinion. It should be noted right away that
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in cases brought before it by the CA under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is typically restricted to reviewing legal errors and does not include reassessing the sufficiency of the
evidence on which the courts a quo had based its decision. This norm is not absolute, though, and a
deviation from it may be appropriate where, as in this instance, the conclusions of fact by the CA and the
NLRC and the LA are at odds with one another. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the records to
ascertain whether the CA erred in asserting its certiorari jurisdiction when it found that the NLRC had
gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the respondent had not been unlawfully discharged.
The petitioner must convincingly demonstrate that the court or quasi-judicial authority grossly
abused the discretion granted to it in order for the unusual remedy of certiorari to be granted. Grave abuse
of discretion refers to an arbitrary and capricious application of judgment made in a despotic manner out
of emotion or personal animosity, with a nature so overt and egregious as to virtually equate to avoidance
of a positive duty or a refusal to act at all in consideration of the law.
Consequently, the petition is approved.