951203 JIN Journal of Information TechnologySchlagwein
Commentary on Debates and Perspectives Paper
Natural sciences, philosophy
of science and the orientation
of the social sciences
Daniel Schlagwein
The debate thesis
The Debate paper (by Siponen/Klaavuniemi) is part of the
wider discourse whether or not, and with what conse-
quences, Information Systems (IS) and other social sci-
ences could be or should be ‘science’ (most recently
McBride, 2018; Nelson, 2016).
The Debate thesis rests on the position that IS research
could be, or should be, based on a model of ‘science’ as
understood and practised in the natural sciences. The cen-
tral Debate thesis, depicted in Figure 1, is the claim that IS
researchers have mis-characterised the natural sciences.
The Debate paper then itemises nine supposed mis-charac-
terisations of the natural sciences by IS researchers, con-
trasting them to either philosophy of science writings or
examples of research in the applied natural sciences. The
Debate paper concludes that correctly depicted natural sci-
ences provide an appropriate and applicable model for IS
research, including qualitative IS research, and suggests
concrete measures, such as extending the scope of IS PhD
education.
I will comment on the Debate thesis from the perspec-
tive of a qualitative IS researcher (i.e. the target audience)
and from the history of the IS field and that of the philoso-
phy of science. In particular, I am seeking to provide a bal-
anced presentation of what my IS research colleagues
actually meant and of what most scholars in the philosophy
of science and scientists in the natural sciences typically do
or argue in their works.1
First, I agree with the implication of the Debate thesis
that the natural sciences and the philosophy of science dis-
cipline (my colleague provides an excellent introduction:
Godfrey-Smith, 2003) over past decades have changed and
that they offer important and relevant insights for IS
researchers. I appreciate the thrust of the Debate thesis
encouraging my colleagues and me, as IS researchers, to
continue to engage with and read in other disciplines.
Second, I agree with the actionable conclusions of the
Debate thesis, and support the suggestions, even if I may
approach them from a different analysis. In particular, the
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broadening and extension of IS PhD training is a concrete
measure that I fully support, not the least based on my own
experience.
Third, I am, however, less than convinced by the ‘mis-
characterisations’ or ‘misunderstandings’ attributed to IS
researchers. I find the Debate thesis argument and analysis
wanting in that IS research quotes have been cherry-picked
from their textual and historical contexts and crucial distinc-
tions having been conflated. As a result, the Debate thesis
paper contributes less than what I was hoping to clarification
of the precise nature of the supposed mis-characterisations.
To be clear, in some respects, I agree with some of the ‘mis-
characterisations’, but not with the way in which they are
framed and analytically supported.2
To contribute, I will seek to add distinctions, history and
context to the Debate. In a sense, the Debate’s analysis is
weak precisely on the classical matters of much greater
concern to the humanities than to the sciences: the consid-
eration of history, context and Verstehen of meaning and
intentions.3 The meanings of statements are neither isolated
nor timeless; they need to be placed in their textual and
historical contexts.
Adding distinctions, history and
context to the debate
The Debate thesis oversimplifies the matter in a way that
unfortunately renders invisible the critical nuances. At least
two important distinctions need to be added.
First, the Debate thesis conflates the disciplines of the
natural sciences and the philosophy of science in its analysis
of these mis-characterisations. Physics, chemistry, biology
The University of Sydney, Australia
Corresponding author:
Daniel Schlagwein, Business School, The University of Sydney,
Abercrombie Building (H70), Room 4070, Darlington, Sydney, NSW
2008, Australia.
Email: schlagwein@sydney.edu.au
86 Journal of Information Technology 36(1)
Figure 1.  Original thesis: ‘IS researchers mis-characterise the
natural sciences’.
and so on are applied natural science disciplines concerned
with explaining the natural world, typically using ‘the scien-
tific method(s)’. In contrast, the philosophy of science is a
humanities discipline concerned with understanding the ide-
alised notion of ‘science’, typically using conceptual and
philosophical argumentation. The philosophy of science
discipline is a subfield of philosophy: it is not a natural sci-
ence nor is it composed of scientists. Most natural scientists
do not read philosophy of science research, form their
beliefs and pursue practices largely independent of the phi-
losophy of science (e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Okasha,
2016). This distinction is important because (a) claims about
idealtype ‘science’4 cannot be misconstrued as claims about
natural science practices and (b) a reader of the Debate
might come away with the mistaken notion that the philoso-
phy of science speaks for scientists.
Second, the Debate thesis does not distinguish the rele-
vant groups, presenting IS researchers (or even all social
scientists) as if they are a homogeneous group. This glosses
over the key issue that the different groups are leading an
internal debate about the orientation of IS and social sci-
ence research. We should distinguish ‘scientistic’, ‘positiv-
ist’, ‘quantitative’ and ‘science-oriented’ IS researchers
who see themselves as working in a science tradition and
‘anti-positivist’, ‘interpretivist’, ‘qualitative’ and ‘humani-
ties-oriented’ IS researchers who see themselves as closer
to the humanities. Most quotes in the Debate paper are by
“humanities-oriented” IS researchers (e.g. Myers, Lee,
Orlikowski and Walsham) as part of a discourse that seeks
legitimisation of that form of IS research. These quotes
must be interpreted as (a) being about science-ideal-ori-
ented IS research – which is indeed often quantitative,
cause–effect seeking, and so on – not about physics, biol-
ogy and other research works and (b) critiquing this “main-
stream” IS research with the intention of legitimisation of
“humanities-oriented” IS research (and not alleging its
superiority or the general impotence of science-based
approaches for qualitative or other IS research;5 see also
Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2020; Hirschheim and Klein,
2012; Sarker et al., 2018).
Having added these distinctions, let us add historical
context to the Debate. Figure 2, a simplification, aims to
show at least the ‘relevant actors’ and to outline the com-
peting ‘schools of thought’ (and the intellectual heritage via
the arrows, unless labelled otherwise).
Academia was originally composed of just one field,
philosophy, that included all academic fields and sciences.
Over time, academia diversified into different fields due to
the increased specialisation of knowledge. The natural sci-
ences were the first to split from philosophy into stand-
alone academic disciplines mostly during the 18th century.
The social sciences split in the late 19th century. Philosophy
itself remained in the now so-called ‘humanities’ (including
arts). This led to the development of different ‘intellectual
worlds’ and different cultures: the natural sciences and the
humanities with the social sciences in between (Kagan,
2009; Snow, 1959).
By the early 20th century, philosophy itself had split into
disconnected streams. Analytical philosophy and continen-
tal philosophy are the two most commonly distinguished
streams (for brief characterizations: University of Michigan,
2020 or Plato, Stanford).6 Analytical philosophy focuses on
realism, logic and science and includes the philosophers
mentioned in the Debate paper, the logical-positivists such
as Carnap, Popper and Hempel among others. The philoso-
phy of science emerged as a major subdiscipline within
analytical philosophy, focusing on the study of an idealised
‘science’. In contrast, continental philosophy (Husserl,
Hegel, Heidegger, etc.) focuses on ‘the human condition’
and ‘the experience of being’ and, hence, often takes ideal-
ist, subjectivist, constructivist and relativist positions,
underpinning many contemporary positions in the humani-
ties (e.g. Melchert, 2014).
The long-raging orientation debate in the social sci-
ences, at its core, can be seen as being about leaning towards
one side or the other. Early social scientists, such as Comte
and Durkheim, advocated ‘positivist’, science-oriented
social sciences, in which only data through sense experi-
ence and logic count as generating valid knowledge. Comte
explicitly called for the formation of an unbiased ‘science
of sociology’ modelled on physical science to discover ‘the
laws of human behaviour’. In contrast, building on the
early ideas of Weber and Marx, ‘non/anti-positivist’ social
scientists rejected the idea that social and cultural condi-
tions could, or should, be studied via a science-oriented
model. Dithney expressed this sentiment as ‘[people] need
to be understood in the context of their connections to cul-
tural and social life’ (in Polkinghorne, 1983; see also
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hirschheim, 1985). That is, the
views of positivist social scientists often correspond to the
views of analytical philosophy (e.g. the focus on logic and
evidence) and the science fields. The ideas of non-positivist
social scientists are closer to those of humanist thinkers and
are rooted in the ideas of continental philosophy (e.g.
Husserl’s phenomenology or Hegel’s dialectics).7
Most quotes in the Debate thesis are from the IS disci-
pline’s part in this wider ‘social science orientation debate’,
yet little consideration is given to this fact in the analysis.
For example, the Debate paper appears to take the 1999
quote ‘while the conventions for evaluating information
systems case studies conducted according to the natural sci-
ence model of social science are now widely accepted, this
Schlagwein 87
Figure 2.  Broader debate: the orientation of the social sciences.
is not the case for interpretive field studies’ (Klein and
Myers, 1999: 67) to mean that science could not be a foun-
dation for qualitative IS research. This is not at all in line
with my reading of the quote. The full textual and historical
context makes it clear that the authors were calling for
humanities-oriented (interpretivist) qualitative research to
be (a) generally accepted in IS and (b) evaluated on its own
quality criteria, not those of positivist-scientistic IS
research. This is neither a statement about the natural sci-
ences nor does it mean that a science-oriented approach is
not also conducive to qualitative research, an idea that had
already been introduced years earlier (Benbasat et al.,
1987). That is, the supposed misunderstanding does not
exist if the quote is properly placed in its context.
Figure 2 is hopefully useful to place into context the
alleged ‘mis-characterisations’ of the natural sciences by IS
researchers. Let us analyse two of these mis-characterisations,
one where I agree with the Debate’s analysis and one where I
disagree.
I agree that at least some IS researchers may wrongly
believe that ‘science’ implies a quantitative or mathemat-
ical approach must be taken or that it is preferable (mis-
characterisation [2]). As per Figure 1 (the Debate thesis),
this may be a misunderstanding of the natural sciences by
IS researchers. Through Figure 2, it is now possible to see
that the misunderstanding, if there is one, is by some sci-
ence-oriented IS researchers relative to the philosophy of
science’s contemporary understandings of ‘science’.8 For
example, the preference for ‘systematic literature
reviews’ (over narrative reviews in IS research; analysed
in Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2015) or the claim that
‘experimental research, often considered to be the “gold
standard” in research designs, is one of the most rigorous
of all research designs’ (relative to other social science
methods; Bhattacherjee, 2012: 62) may then probably be
an indication of the misunderstanding at which the Debate
is pointing. In any case, I agree with the authors – and
earlier arguments (Dube and Pare, 2003; Lee and Hubona,
2009) – that science can equally support (some forms of)
qualitative research.
The one mis-understanding where I disagree is the belief
that Klein and Myers would mis-characterise science by
attributing hermeneutics to the humanist Gadamer and not to
science (Klein and Myers, 1999; mis-characterisation [6]).
The first problem is that it seems quite undisputed that her-
meneutics historically, and as an applied method, must be
attributed to humanities, not the natural sciences. As the
Debate paper states, hermeneutics originated in theology and
then moved to fields such as history. But theology and his-
tory are not natural sciences! Therefore, Klein and Myers
(1999) placed hermeneutics rather appropriately. The second
problem is that, while the authors and some individual phi-
losophers (e.g. Heelan and Bernstein) may believe that the
sciences are hermeneutic at their core, this is not shown to be
88 Journal of Information Technology 36(1)
the majority view nor the typical view of either natural scien-
tists or philosophers in the philosophy of science. The infa-
mous ‘Sokal Hoax’ during the ‘Science Wars’ precisely
ridiculed this idea of hermeneutics in science (Godfrey-
Smith, 2003; Sokal, 1996). Unless an unreported general
mind-shift has occurred, the characterisation of the natural
sciences as fundamentally being, methodologically using or
understanding themselves as hermeneutic would be inaccu-
rate (again, a characterisation should refer to the ‘typical’
case or view; more on hermeneutics: Zimmermann, 2015).
This space does not allow discussion of all the supposed
‘mis-characterisations’ of the natural sciences by IS
researchers. However, I believe that considering context,
history and the above distinctions help to better clarify
whether they are, in fact, mis-characterisations at all (or
simply value differences) and, if so, precisely of what and
by whom.9 The Debate thesis authors need to be careful
here not to add their own set of mis-characterisations
through simplistic analysis. I thank the authors of the
Debate thesis and those of another debate (McBride, 2018
and responses) for reigniting the fundamental question
about IS research: What kind of field of inquiry is it or
what kind should it be?
Declaration of conflicting interests networks of auxiliary assumptions, the example referring to
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Daniel Schlagwein https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1591-4660
Notes
1. The quotes selected in the Debate thesis are in relation
to idealtype ‘science’ – the idealised typical case (Weber,
1904). These characterisations can only be fairly labelled
‘mis-characterisations’ if the typical case is different at
the relevant time. Arguing a mis-characterisation based on
expectational cases, minority opinions or later changes cer-
tainly sets the bar too low. Categories are useful for argu-
ments even if they do not capture all borderline cases (van
Fraassen, 1980). (The same holds for ‘qualitative vs quanti-
tative’ IS research: it is certainly not a perfect, but is a prag-
matically useful, distinction.)
2. I also note the focus on methodological/epistemologi-
cal issues at the expense of ontological and value/ethical
considerations.
3. Critical reflection would also be expected in interpretivist
research (Klein and Myers, 1999) such as a discussion how
the fact that there is a Debate co-author with a science back-
ground but no co-author with a humanities background may
have predisposed the analysis. I will set this aside.
4. The philosophy of science itself debates the precise bound-
ary of ‘science’ across the spectrum of academic fields. The
natural sciences are ‘in’ while the arts and humanities are
‘out’. It is unclear if the philosophy of science would aspire
to include all social sciences in its explanations (let alone
normatively guide those fields; for example, Godfrey-Smith,
2003; Okasha, 2016).
5. To drive the point home with an analogy, the 2020 politi-
cal slogan ‘Black Lives Matter’ could only be legitimately
understood as ‘only Black lives matter’ without a contextual
understanding. In the actual historical context, the meaning is
clearly ‘Black lives should matter equally’. Context matters.
6. I acknowledge but set aside pragmatism and Eastern
philosophies.
7. This is to say that the humanities have their distinct
approaches and intellectual foundations, not that they never
use science-type research methods or analytical ideas.
8. For one example, the philosophy of science’s increased
acknowledgement of fundamental disciplinary differences
between fields led to the emergence of the philosophy of the
special sciences. For instance, it was recognised that even the
other natural sciences, such as biology, should not be treated
like physics, thus leading to the philosophy of biology (see
for more Mayr, 1961; Okasha, 2019).
9. Two brief notes: By ‘theory-ladenness of data’, the philoso-
phy of science refers to scientists in different paradigms or
‘a layperson versus a scientist’ is rather off the point (in mis-
characterisation [8]). The quote by Mannheim (1936) now
might be considered wrong but, to me, it seemed to be rather
correct at the time. Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientific
Revolution had not yet been published and, in 1936, the views
in the natural sciences and the philosophy of science aligned
with those of Mannheim (in mis-characterisation [9]).
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Author biography
Daniel Schlagwein is associate professor of Business Information
Systems at The University of Sydney. He is co-editor-in-chief of
the leading Journal of Information Technology (JIT). At The
University of Sydney, he co-directs the Digital Disruption Research
Group (DDRG). He is the leading chief investigator on the
Australian Research Council’s (ARC) Discovery Project on
Digital Nomadism (2019–2022). His research interests are new
forms of digital working and organising (e.g. crowdsourcing, digi-
tal nomadism and IT-enabled openness) as well as the epistemo-
logical and philosophical foundations of Information Systems (IS)
research. Daniel’s research is published in leading journals such as
the Information Systems Journal, the Journal of Information
Technology, the Journal of the Association for Information
Systems (AIS) and The Journal of Strategic Information Systems.
The AIS Research Ranking 2018 puts him in the top 100 of IS
researchers worldwide, while the Financial Times Ranking 2019
puts him in the top 100 of German business researchers. Daniel’s
research is featured in, for example, Sky News, The Sydney
Morning Herald and the McKinsey Quarterly. He frequently
speaks at both industry and academic conferences.