Magno vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

147904, 390 SCRA

495, 500 [2002]

Facts:

This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the
disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija
during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days
of prision correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the
petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the
position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC cited
Section 12 of the BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months,
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after
the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.

The above provision explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after five (5) years from the service of sentence.
According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner was considered to have completed the
service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5,
2003.

It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility

between the five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code and the two-year disqualification period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985
while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in
statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 4 Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of
the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA
7160 or the Local Government Code states that:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

1
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP
881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject
matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.

In David vs. COMELEC5, we declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for
disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the
other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It
deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs
the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which
ought to prevail.

The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions
from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the law.6 The reduction of the disqualification period from five to
two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s
disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification
anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the
validity of Sonia Lorenzo’s proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the rightful
winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the
legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest.

2
National Water Resources Board vs. A. L. Ang Network, Inc., G.R. No.
186450. April 14, 2010

Facts:

In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources Board (petitioner).

A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate and maintain a
water service system in Alijis, Bacolod City.

Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondent's application on the

ground that it is the only government agency authorized to operate a water service
system within the city.1 cräläwvirtualibräry

By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondent's CPC application.

BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due
process was violated when it was not allowed to present evidence in support of its
opposition.2 c�fa

Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present

evidence,3  drawing respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
c�fa

Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and BACIWA. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to the
Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005, 4  dismissed respondent's petition for lack of
c�fa

jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . .
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . . except those
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ."

Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasi-
judicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner contends
that there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a petition for certiorari over
its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than the Court of Appeals. 8 c�fa

Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly repeal Article 89
of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067) otherwise known as the Water Code of
the Philippines.9 c�fa

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed decision of
the appellate court.

3
Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10
c�fa

Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial
agencies under Rule 4311  of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari,
c�fa

prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-judicial agencies,

like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for
procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when the law or the
Rules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. 12  The appellate court's
c�fa

construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads:

ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be
appealed to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is
situated within fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a copy
of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion; (2)
question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law (emphasis and underscoring
supplied), is such an exception, is erroneous.

Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of BP 129.
Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs,
Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:

x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court,
and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x x x. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts." 13 c�fa

In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of

the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it. 14  The
c�fa

legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and
purpose of BP 129, one of which is to provide a homogeneous procedure for the
review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.

More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the power of
review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate court gave
significant consideration to the ground of "grave abuse of discretion" to thus hold
that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioner's decisions. A reading of said
Article 89 shows, however, that it only made "grave abuse of discretion" as another
ground to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique
to the Water Code at the time of its application in 1976.

4
The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulation of the
Rules, clarified and delineated the appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court
of Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may
be invoked before the appellate court as a ground for an error of jurisdiction.

It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioner's order
via certiorari before the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In other words, it invoked such
ground not for an error of judgment.

While Section 9 (3) of BP 12915  and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of

c�fa

Court16  does not list petitioner as "among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final
c�fa

judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is

non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner's judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of
quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be
exclusive.17  The employment of the word "among" clearly instructs so.
c�fa

In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner properly

belongs to the Court of Appeals.

5
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, G.R. No. 165299, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 442

Facts:

Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the

business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed
to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on
the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner's plant located at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.3 On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation
and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner's laundry washing
activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore,
the Investigation Report4 stated that petitioner's plant was operating without LLDA
clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the
Environmental Quality Management Division of LLDA conducted wastewater
sampling of petitioner's effluent.5 The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-
compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS),
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration and Color
Units.6 Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation 7

Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and
informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water
pollution.8 On 1 March 2002, a compliance monitoring was conducted and the result
of the laboratory analysis9 still showed non-compliance with effluent standards in
terms of TSS, BOD, Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Oil/Grease
Concentration. It was reported that petitioner's wastewater treatment facility was
under construction. Subsequently, another wastewater sampling was conducted on
25 April 2002 but the results10 still failed to conform with the effluent standards in
terms of Oil/Grease Concentration.

Meanwhile, on 15 April 2002, a Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed
against petitioner before the LLDA. During the public hearing on 30 April 2002, LLDA
informed petitioner of its continuous non-compliance with the effluent standards.
Petitioner requested for another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5
June 2002. The laboratory results11 of the wastewater sampling finally showed
compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters. On 9 August 2002, another
public hearing was held to discuss the dismissal of the water pollution case and the
payment of the accumulated daily penalty. According to LLDA, the penalty should be
reckoned from 5 September 2001, the date of initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the
date LLDA received the request for re-sampling. Petitioner manifested that its
wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis. In its position paper 12 dated 25
August 2002, petitioner prayed that the Notice of Violation dated 30 October 2001
be set aside and the penalty and fine imposed be reckoned from the date of actual
hearing on 15 April 2002.

6
1. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in
PD 984? cralawred

2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delegation of legislative powers?

Ruling:

We find the petition without merit.

Power of LLDA to Impose Fines

Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to
impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control
Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant
to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192).18

We disagree with petitioner.

Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)19 created and established the NPCC under the
Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution
Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the
powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.

Section 19 of EO 192 provides:

SEC. 19. Pollution Adjudication Board. - There is hereby created a Pollution

Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be composed
of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated by
the Secretary, the Director of Environmental Management, and three (3) others to
be designated by the Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions of the Commission/Commissioners of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases under Republic Act
3931 and Presidential Decree 984, particularly with respect to Section 6 letters e, f,
g, j, k, and p of P.D. 984. The Environmental Management Bureau shall serve as the
Secretariat of the Board. These powers and functions may be delegated to the
regional officers of the Department in accordance with rules and regulations to be
promulgated by the Board. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k), and (p) of PD 984 referred to above
states:

SEC. 6. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:

xxx

(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree
and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

7
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying
the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, the Commission, by
rules and regulations, may require subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public
buildings and other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central
sewerage system and sewage treatment works, except that no permits shall be
required of any new sewage works or changes to or extensions of existing works
that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single residential building
provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may impose
reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits herein
required.

xxx

(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the

damages and losses resulting from pollution.

(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules
and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.

xxx

(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to
carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Decree.

On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act No. 4850
(RA 4850)20 to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region, comprising of the
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan. RA 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 (PD
813),21 mandates LLDA to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region,
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 22

Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),23 LLDA is granted additional powers and
functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring,
licensing and enforcement, thus:

8
A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and
the LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution Adjudication Board and the
LLDA are empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for the prevention
and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system; and (3)
exercise such powers and perform such other functions necessary to carry out their
duties and responsibilities. The difference is that while Section 19 of EO 192 vested
the Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases
in general,24 the scope of authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to
the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA 4850, as amended.

Although the Pollution Adjudication Board assumed the powers and functions of the
NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude LLDA
from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to
impose fines as penalty.

SEC. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna
de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and
effluent quality standards or from such other wrongful act or omission of a person,
private or public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded
to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control and management.

Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such
other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court upheld the
power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not
expressly conferred by law, holding that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court
ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same
manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region.

9
 No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to impose

penalties, then LLDA will have unfettered discretion to determine for itself the
penalties it may impose, which will amount to undue delegation of legislative power.

We do not agree. Contrary to petitioner's contention, LLDA's power to impose fines

is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against
petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner's effluent. It was only
after the investigation result showing petitioner's failure to meet the established
water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner.
LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging
pollutive wastewater. The P1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount
of penalty prescribed under PD 984:

SEC. 8. Prohibitions. - No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into
any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or cause, permit,
suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any
organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall
cause pollution thereof.

Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDA's power to impose fines
which obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.

10
 Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs. Laguna Lake
Development Authority (G.R. No. 169228, September 11,
2009, 599 SCRA 452)

Facts:

Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty) developed, established, and constructed The
Alexandra Condominium Complex from 1987 to 1993. In a Deed of Conveyance dated 18 April
1988, PhilRealty transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) a parcel of
land with an area of 9,876 square meters located at 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City as well as all
the common areas of the project. The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
64355.

The condominium project consists of the following phases:

(a) Cluster A - 3 Five Storey Buildings; A-1, A-2 and A-3;

(b) Cluster B - 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; B-1 and B-2;

(c) Cluster C - 2 Seven Storey Buildings; C-1 and C-2;

(d) Cluster D - 2 Fourteen Storey Buildings; D-a and D-2; and

(e) Cluster E – 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; E-1 and E-2.

On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission issued a Development

Permit to PhilRealty to develop Cluster A of the project. In the Development Permit, PhilRealty
was required to submit its condominium plans to the Building Official of Pasig City. Architect
Walter R. Perez (Architect Perez), then Building Official of Pasig City, reviewed the Site
Development and Location Plan as well as the Sanitary/Plumbing Plans and Specifications of the
project. On 24 September 1987, Architect Perez issued a Building Permit. On 30 September
1987, Architect Perez issued a Sanitary/Plumbing Permit acknowledging the fixtures to be
installed but without indicating the System of Disposal including a Waste Water Treatment Plan.
On 15 December 1988, Architect Perez issued a Certificate of Final Inspection and a Certificate
of Occupancy for Buildings A-1 to A-3.

PhilRealty undertook the same process for Clusters B, C, D, and E. Building Permits and
Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy were issued for these clusters from 1991 to 1993.
On 31 December 1993, upon completion of Buildings E-1 and E-2, PhilRealty formally turned
over the project to TACC. However, PhilRealty did not turn over the as-built plans for the
perimeter drainage layout, the foundation, and the electrical and plumbing layout of the project.
Thereafter, TACC managed the project through Century Properties Management Corporation.

On 24 June 1998, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its
wastewater did not meet government effluent standards provided in Sections 68 and 69 of the
1978 National Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations (NPCC) as amended by
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 34. 3 LLDA
informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent
discharge to meet government standards.

Since a sewage treatment plant would cost approximately ₱15 million to put up, TACC
experimented with a proposed solution from Larutan Resources Development Corporation, which
treated the septic vault water with biological enzymes. Still, TACC’s water discharge failed to
meet the government standards.

11
On 26 March 1999, LLDA’s Environmental Division collected samples of TACC’s wastewater. In
a report dated 6 April 1999, LLDA found two determinants in TACC’s samples: (1) Chemical
Oxygen Demand (COD) and (2) Oil/Grease (OG). LLDA found that TACC’s samples failed to
meet government standards of 150 for COD and 5 for OG.

In a Notice of Violation4 dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit corrective measures
to abate or control its water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay. LLDA likewise imposed
upon TACC a daily fine of ₱1,000 from 26 March 1999 until full cessation of pollutive wastewater
discharge.

TACC entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the STP for
₱7,550,000. The construction was completed by the second week of October 2001.

In an Order dated 19 July 1999, LLDA stated that the daily penalty was imposed upon TACC for
the pollutive wastewater discharge, and to condone the penalty would be tantamount to
tolerating the pollution of the river bodies and the Laguna de Bay which is contrary to LLDA’s
mandate.

On 1 April 2002, TACC requested LLDA to dismiss the water pollution case against it because of
the favorable analysis undertaken by the LLDA’s Pollution Control Division on 28 February 2002.
LLDA conducted a hearing on 26 April 2002. In its position paper filed on 15 May 2002, TACC
requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of ₱1,000 per day since March 1999 in
recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it undertook to comply with government
standards.

On 4 September 2003, LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay a fine of ₱1,062,000
representing the penalty from 26 March 1999 to 20 February 2002.

TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.

Ruling:

Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty

RA 4850 specifically mandates LLDA to carry out and make effective the declared national policy
of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management
and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. 19 LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas.20

Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages
resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards, thus:

Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and
its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and
from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise,
punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality
control and management.

12
In the present case, TACC does not challenge LLDA’s authority to impose the fine. However,
TACC argues that since it had already exhausted efforts and substantially spent to comply with
established effluent quality standards, the daily penalty imposed by the LLDA is an unwarranted
financial burden to its unit owners and should thus be condoned. TACC further argues that the
non-compliance with government standards was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty.

TACC’s arguments have no merit.

PhilRealty formally turned over the project to TACC on 31 December 1993. Thereafter, TACC
managed the project. It was almost five years after, or on 24 June 1998, when LLDA advised
TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. It is clear that the
responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC. If, as claimed by TACC, the
non-compliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty, TACC’s recourse is to file an
action, if warranted, against PhilRealty in a proper court. TACC cannot escape its liability to
LLDA by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not abuse its discretion in issuing
its 4 September 2003 Order.

13
Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599. September 22, 2010

Facts:

The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002 by the Pollution
Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected from herein respondent's SM City
Manila branch. The results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the said
facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with
law.4

On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, directing the same to
perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said company and
ordering the latter to pay a penalty of "One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000.00) per day of discharging
pollutive wastewater to be computed from 4 February 2002, the date of inspection, until full
cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater."5

In a letter6 dated March 23, 2002, respondent's Pollution Control Officer requested the LLDA to
conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming that they already took measures to enable their
sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLDA.

In an Order to Pay7 dated October 2, 2002, herein petitioner required respondent to pay a fine of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) which represents the accumulated daily penalty computed
from February 4, 2002 until March 25, 2002.

In two follow-up letters dated July 2, 2002 8 and November 29, 2002,9 which were treated by the
LLDA as a motion for reconsideration, respondent asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the
LLDA in its March 12, 2002 Notice of Violation and Order of October 2, 2002 on the ground that
they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the pH levels of its effluent were
already controlled even prior to their request for re-sampling leading to a minimal damage to the
environment. Respondent also contended that it is a responsible operator of malls and
department stores and that it was the first time that the wastewater discharge of SM City Manila
failed to meet the standards of law with respect to inland water.

On January 10, 2003, the LLDA issued an Order 10 denying respondent's request for a waiver of
the fine imposed on the latter.

Issue:

5.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LLDA WAS NOT CONFERRED
BY LAW THE POWER TO IMPOSE FINES AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT COLLECT THE
SAME FROM SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC

Ruling:

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioners that respondent is already estopped from
questioning the power of the LLDA to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact that respondent
actively participated during the hearing of its water pollution case before the LLDA without
impugning such power of the said agency. In fact, respondent even asked for a reconsideration
of the Order of the LLDA which imposed a fine upon it as evidenced by its letters dated July 2,
2002 and November 29, 2002, wherein respondent, through its pollution control officer, as well

14
as its counsel, requested for a waiver of the fine(s) imposed by the LLDA. By asking for a
reconsideration of the fine imposed by the LLDA, the Court arrives at no conclusion other than
that respondent has impliedly admitted the authority of the latter to impose such penalty. Hence,
contrary to respondent's claim in its Comment and Memorandum, it is already barred from
assailing the LLDA's authority to impose fines.

In any case, this Court has categorically ruled in Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake
Development Authority,23 that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),24 except where a special law, such
as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB
assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of
pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.

In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority,25 this Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which sustained the LLDA's Order requiring
the petitioner therein to pay a fine representing penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge.
Although the petitioner in that case did not challenge the LLDA's authority to impose fine, the
Court acknowledged the power of the LLDA to impose fines holding that under Section 4-A of RA
4850,26 as amended, the LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to
meet established water and effluent standards. Section 4-A provides, thus:

Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and
its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and
from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise,
punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality
control management.

In addition, Section 4(d) of E.O. No. 927, which further defines certain functions and powers of
the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the power to "make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished." Likewise, Section 4(i) of the same E.O. states that the
LLDA is given authority to "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be
necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Executive Order." Also, Section
4(c) authorizes the LLDA to "issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions
of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and
hearing."

Indeed, how could the LLDA be expected to effectively perform the above-mentioned functions if,
for every act or violation committed against the law it is supposed to enforce, it is required to
resort to some other authority for the proper remedy or penalty. The intendment of the law, as
gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA not only with the express powers
granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or
essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions.

15
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 110120, 16 March 1994, 231 SCRA 292)

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose
off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity
to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate,
Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) for adjudication. cha

Facts:

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint  2with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring

and test sampling of the leachate 3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek
which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel
found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at
the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586, 4and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,  5as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. 6 chanrobles virtual law library

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the
complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the
leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of
the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform,
which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.  7On
December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order  8ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a
meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the
representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the
problem. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

16
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14,
1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and
issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan
from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National
Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all
garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a
dumpsite. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17,
1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as
the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the
right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary
restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final
determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers
and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.

Issue:

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the
Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted
regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series
of 1983 which provides, thus:

Ruling:

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in
this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies
implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has
the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws,
have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the
open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents
therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by
exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite? chanrobles virt

17
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy 20of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities
of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among
others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22 chanrobles virtual law library

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady
of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before
the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by
complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City
Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance
from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary
jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the
meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the
following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of
the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of
Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and
other relevant environment laws, 23cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise
by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes
the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

18
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-
parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government
of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced
in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to
draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order
in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.  26In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its
power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon
the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section
4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who
shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the
LLDA."chanrobles virtual law library

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad
powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether
by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these
projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may
not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts. c

19
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120865-71. December 7, 1995

Facts:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and
profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters
of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he
can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees
is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and
the individual personal interests of people, on the other? chanrobles virtual law library

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable

development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development
Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the
aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act
clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for
social and economic development. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended

certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid
expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de
Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial
water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the
Government and the general public over: - the environment impact of development
on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow
of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes
from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced
the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that the lake
will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in
Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic
system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily
involve the lake and its river systems, - likewise gave impetus to the creation of the
Authority.

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850,
as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective,
the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are
limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization
to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options
for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having
created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light
of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further
defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de
Bay Region". chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

20
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive
Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:

Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A.
7160 provides:

Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges

and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to
establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated
fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake
water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in
1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens
and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the
Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate

independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen
permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. c

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the
illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise, demolition shall be effected.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the
Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit:

Issue:

We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue
posed is: Which agency of the Government - the Laguna Lake Development
Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region - should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishery privileges is concerned?

21
Ruling:

Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act
No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges
to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within
a definite zone of the municipal waters. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting
the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded
that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and
expressed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a
special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute,
provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal
or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law." 3

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in
the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because
implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication.  4

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the
Local Government Code of 1991. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are
environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its
mission. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development
Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own
unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km� lake surface water, the eight (8) major

22
river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920
km� basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces,
greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces,
constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with
uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable
development. This is an exhaustible natural resource - a very limited one - which
requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and
preserve its ecological integrity and balance." chanrobles virtual law library

"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy
geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its
resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act
4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law - the special law
designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." chanrobles virtual law library

"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of

management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage
discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens
by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900
km� of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and
sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly
granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the
New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits
is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading,
"Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local
Government Units." chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively
regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2,
Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management.  6It does
partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable
and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police
power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927
provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.

23
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and
desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,
however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against
it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On
actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the
Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the
provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory
its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise
stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and
will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This,
the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.

ual law library

24
SR Metals, Inc., vs. The Honorable Angelo T. Reyes G.R. No. 179669,
June 04, 2014

Facts:

On March 9, 2006, each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining
Permit4 (SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte; they
were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in Sitio
Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. These permits were
granted after the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XIII of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued on March 2, 2006
Environmental Compliance Certificates5 with a validity period of one year.

The mining corporations’ ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore
they are  allowed to extract annually should not exceed 50,000 MTs pursuant to
Section 1 of PD 1899 which provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an
annual production of not more than 50,000 metric tons of ore x x x.

Subsequently, however, Agusan del Norte Governor, Erlpe John M. Amante

(Governor Amante),  questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and
shipped by the mining corporations. In reply, the mining corporations denied having
exceeded the extraction limit of 50,000 MTs.6  They explained that an extracted
mass contains only a limited amount/percentage of Ni-Co as the latter is lumped
with gangue, i.e., the unwanted rocks and minerals. And it is only after the Ni-Co is
separated from the gangue by means of a scientific process should amount of the
Ni-Co be measured and considered as ‘ore.’ Excluding the gangue, the mining
corporations pegged the volume of Ni-Co ore they had extracted from the time they
start shipping the same in August 2006 until they filed their Petition before the CA in
December 2006 at 1,699.66 MTs of Ni-Co ore only. 7 cralawred

Having reservations with the mining corporations’ interpretation of the 50,000-MT

restriction, Governor Amante sought the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
on the matter.

Meanwhile, the EMB sent the mining corporations a Notice of Violation 8 informing
them that they had exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150,000 MTs combined
production as their stockpile inventory of Nickeliferous ore had already  total
177,297 dry metric tons (DMT). This was based on the August 10, 2006 Inspection
Report9 of the MGB Monitoring Team which conducted an inspection after the DENR
received complaints of violations of small-scale mining laws and policies by the
mining corporations.  A technical conference was thereafter held to hear the side of
the mining corporations anent their alleged over-extraction.

On November 26, 2004, DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist
Order10 (CDO) against the mining corporations suspending their operations for their
operations for the following reasons:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

25
1. The excess in 1) annual production of SR Metals, Inc., 2) maximum capitalization,
and, 3) labor cost to equipment utilization of 1:1 is, by itself, a violation of existing
laws.

2. The ECCs issued in favor of San R Construction Corporation and Galeo Equipment
Corporation have no legal basis and [are] therefore considered null and void from 
the beginning.  Similarly, the small scale mining permits that were issued by reason
of such ECCs are likewise null and void. 11

A few days later or on November 30, 2006, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez replied
to Governor Amante citing DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006. 12  By comparing PD
1899 to Republic Act (RA) No. 7076, 13 a subsequent law that likewise defines small-
scale mining, the DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to have been
impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law
mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small-scale mining. 

Even assuming that the 50,000-MT ore limit in PD 1899 is still in force, the DOJ
categorically concluded that the term ‘ore’ should be confined only to Ni-Co, that is,
excluding soil and other materials that are of no economic value to the mining
corporations.  This is considering that their ECCs explicitly specified ‘50,000 MTs of
Ni-Co ore.’

The mining corporations then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in issuing the CDO.  Relying on the
rationalizations on the rationalization made by the DOJ in its November 30, 2006
Opinion, they vehemently denied having over-extracted Ni-Co.

Issue:

Two questions are posed before us. The first deals with the constitutionality of
Section 1, PD 1899 which, according to the mining corporations violates the equal
protection clause. They argue that there is no substantial distinction between the
miners covered under RA 7076, who can extract as much ore as they can, and those
covered under PD 1899 who were imposed an extraction limit.

Another issue concerns the correct interpretation of the 50,000-MT limit. The mining
corporation insist on their version of how to compute the extraction.

26
Ruling:

Petitioners are governed by the annual

production limit under PD 1899.

Two different laws governing small-scale mining co-exist: PD 1899 and RA

7076.23 The controversy lies in the apparent conflicting provisions on the definition
of small-scale mining under the two laws. Section 1 of PD 1899 defines small-scale
mining in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an annual
production of not more than 50,000 metric tons of ore and satisfying the following
requisites:

1. The working is artisanal, whether open cast or shallow underground mining,

without the use of sophisticated mining equipment;

2. Minimal investment on infrastructures and processing plant;

3. Heavy reliance on manual labor; and

4. Owned, managed or controlled by an individual or entity qualified under existing

mining laws, rules and regulations.

On the other hand, under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to
'mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.’ Significantly, this
definition does not provide for annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.

DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006 concluded that as nothing from RA 7076 speaks
of an annual production limit, Section 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly
repealed by RA 7076, the later law. However, while these two laws tackle the
definition of what small-scale mining is, both have different objects upon which the
laws shall be applied to.  PD 1899 applies to individuals, partnerships and
corporations while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives. 24 There are other differences
between the two laws, but we cannot hastily conclude that there is an implied repeal
because of the omission. Both laws may stand.

Petitioners then construe the omission of the annual production limit in the later law
in the that sense that small-scale miners granted mining contracts under RA 7076
can now conduct mineral extraction as much as they can while the benefit of
unlimited extraction is denied to those granted permits under PD 1899.  According
to them, such situation creates an invalid classification of small-scale miners under
the two laws, hence the attack on Section 1 of PD 1899 as being violative of the
equal protection clause.

We do not, however, subscribe to the mining corporations’ averment that the

50,000-MTs production limit does not apply to small-scale miners under RA 7076. 
Recognizing the DENR’s mandate to regulate the country’s natural resources under
EO 192,25 both PD 1899 and RA 7076 delegated to the DENR, thru its Secretary, the
power to promulgate the necessary IRRs to give effect to the said laws. 26 cralawred

27
Significantly, the DENR in the exercise of such power had just recently resolved the
question on the production limit in small-scale mining. On July 5, 2007, it issued
DMC 2007-07 or “Clarificatory Guidelines in the Implementation of the Small-Scale
Mining Laws”. By imposing the annual production limit of 50,000 DMT to both SSMPs
issued under PD 1899 and Small-Scale Mining Contracts (SSMCs) under RA 7076,
the DENR harmonized the two laws, viz: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

V. Maximum Annual Production

For metallic minerals, the maximum annual production under an SSMP/SSMC

shall be 50,000 dry metric tons (DMT[s]) of ore, while for nonmetallic minerals, the
maximum annual production shall be 50,000 DMT[s] of the material itself, e.g.,
50,000 DMT[s] of limestone, 50,000 DMT[s] of silica, or 50,000 DMT[s] of perlite.

The maximum annual production above shall include low-grade and/or marginal ore,
and/or minerals or rocks that are intended for sampling and/or metallurgical testing
purpose/s."

With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA 7076,
the issue raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot.  The fact is,
the DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all
of them. There is therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not
recognize and comply with the said limitation.  It must be stressed that the DENR is
the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the
country’s resources; it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations for the implementation of mining laws.

The DENR, being the agency mandated

to protect the environment and the country's
natural resources, is authoritative on
interpreting the 50,000- MT limit.

MAO No. MRD-41 specifies measuring the ‘run-of-mine ore,’ meaning the ore as it
emerges from the mine, i.e., before treatment.27 As explained by the DENR-MGB
Director, the ore is weighed only in DMT, excluding the water or moisture content.
Simply stated, included in the measurement are other materials lumped with the
sought-after mineral.

This definition is congruent with RA 7942 or The Philippine Mining Act of 1995.  Said
law defines “ore” as “naturally occurring substance or material from which a mineral
or element can be mined and/or processed for profit.” 28  Clearly, the law refers to
ore in its unprocessed form, i.e., before the valuable mineral is separate from the
ore itself.

Also in Section V of the earlier mentioned DMC-2007-07, the DENR clarified the
50,000-MT limit by differentiating the measurement of metallic minerals from
nonmetallic ones.  Noticeably, the metallic minerals are conservatively measured
compared to nonmetallic or industrial minerals for a reason. Compared to metallic
minerals, nonmetals are easily available when mined in their raw/natural state, like
limestone.  As nonmetallics are produced from natural aggregates, the production
limit of 50,000 DMTs will be easily met.  On the other hand, metallic minerals, like

28
Ni-Co are not easily available in their pure form since they are sourced from ores
which are mined.  To extract these metals of economic value, the gangue lumped
with them have to be removed by metallurgy.  And in order to produce a ton of a
metallic mineral sought for, big volumes of gangue will have to be removed.  As
indicated by the mining corporations' Summary of Shipments, 29 it took 151,612
DMTs of ore to extract only 1,699. DMTs of Ni-Co.  Thus, 149,912.34 DMTs of ore
are considered waste.  This means that if we are to subscribe to the mining
corporations’ interpretation of how to measure mined ore by measuring only the Ni-
Co and excluding the gangue, small-scale miners are virtually given the license to
continuously collect large volumes of ore until the 50,000 DMTs of Ni-Co limit is
met.  It must be emphasized that mining, whether small or large-scale, raises
environmental concerns.  To allow such a scenario will further cause damage to the
environment such as erosion and sedimentation, landslides, deforestation, acid rock
drainage, etc.30  As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, extracting millions of
DMTs of run-of-mine ore will mean irreversible degradation of the natural resources
and possible landslides and flashfloods.

It may be significant to state at this point that while the annual production limit by
measuring only the material itself may apply in small-scale nonmetallic mining, the
same cannot be true to metal mining for the reasons above stated.  Hence, the
DENR saw it proper to conservatively measure the production of metallic minerals
apparently bearing in mind the more intense of such kind of mining to the
environment.

Anent the mining corporations’ contention that their ECCs specified that they were
allowed to extract 50,000 MTs of Ni-Co, such should not be taken literally in the
sense that the measurement should only be based on the Ni-Co in their purest
form.  Their that they are to mine Ni-Co and not any other minerals.  This
construction likewise applies to the respective SSMPs given them.

29
League of Provinces vs. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013, 696
SCRA 190

Facts:

On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with
the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares
situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.2

On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the
Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III. 3

On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April
29, 1998.4

On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for
Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon's Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement. 5

On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and
affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated April 29, 1998.

On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO
of Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area
covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement. 6

On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director
Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that
the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004, fifteen
(15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order, per the Certification dated October 8,
2004 issued by the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta, Rizal. 7

Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the
MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its
(AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former area of
Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated
October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.8

On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the
Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of
denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal – April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 − is to be
considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the purpose
of determining when the land subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be considered
open for application.

On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating
that the Order dated July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the
Order dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be the
reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden Falcon.

30
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid
Applications for Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its
Application for Exploration Permit.9

On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the
PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the
aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for
Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and
Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).10

On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor
Dela Cruz the approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit. 11

On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits
in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez. 12

Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-
Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2) The areas
covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior
Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were illegally converted
to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos' ruling
that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was controlling;
(5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered areas that were
never declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as one of the quarry
resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects
of an Application for Quarry Permit.13

On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision 14 in favor of AMTC. The
DENR Secretary agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining
location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27,
2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied
Golden Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the
letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the
Regional Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office.
He stated that the Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area
was still closed to mining location; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB
and the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that
AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining
applicants; thus, AMTC’s Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR
Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to
Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never proclaimed to be under the People's
Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not
considered among the quarry resources.

31
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND

CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL,
NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL
PROVINCES.

Ruling:

Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the

Constitution31 provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."

Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress
may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."

Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale
Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned
government agencies.

The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to
mining activities, which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implement and methods and
do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 32

It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is,
subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate,
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the
enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government
agencies.

Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of
the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the
Local Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no
more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the
law.34

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art.
X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. 35 It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State.36 Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of
powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, 37 and those
provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the
allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units
and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress 38 under Section
3, Article X of the Constitution.

32
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units."

In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of
the Local Government Code provides:

DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on
August 15, 1995, provides under Section 12344 thereof that small-scale mining applications
should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding permits shall be issued by the Provincial
Governor, except small-scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.

Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, adopted on December 19, 1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining
Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through the concerned
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the
Director though the Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations. 46 Moreover, it provides that
Local Government Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and subject to
valid and existing mining rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel,
quarry x x x and gravel permits not exceeding five (5) hectares." 47

Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR
Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory
power of control, but did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power
to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-
scale mining contracts entered into by the Board.

The contention does not persuade.

The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in Section
24 of R.A. No. 7076, thus:

33
 Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc.
(MISSMA) vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., G.R.
No. 149638, December 10, 2014

Facts:

On July 1, 1985, the Bureau of Forest Development issued to Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) a
prospecting permit (Permit to Prospect No. 755-123185) covering 4,941 hectares within the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve. This forest reserve was instituted by Proclamation No. 369 issued by then Governor
General Dwight F. Davis on February 27, 1931.

On March 10, 1986, the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences issued to Marcopper a permit to explore (EP 133)
covering the same area.

On February 16, 1994, Marcopper assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SMGMC).

On December 19, 1995, the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau director ordered the publication of SMGMC’s
application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA No. 128) for the 4,941 hectares covered by EP
133.

JB Management Mining Corporation, Davao United Miners Cooperative, Balite Integrated Small Scale Miners
Cooperative, MISSMA, PICOP, Rosendo Villaflor, et al., Antonio G. Dacudao, Puting Bato Gold Miners
[8]
Cooperative, and Romeo Altamera, et al. filed adverse claims against MPSA No. 128.

[9]
The adverse claims were anchored on DENR Administrative Order No. 66  (DAO No. 66) issued on December
27, 1991, declaring 729 hectares of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as forest land open for small-
scale mining purposes, subject to existing and valid private rights.

The DENR constituted a panel of arbitrators pursuant to Section 77 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 tasked to
resolve the adverse claims against MPSA No. 128.

The panel of arbitrators, in its decision dated June 13, 1997, reiterated the validity of EP 133 and dismissed all
adverse claims against MPSA No. 128. The adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board.

[10]
The Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), in its decision  dated January 6, 1998, vacated the decision of the panel
of arbitrators:

Issue:

I.
Whether the DENR Secretary’s decision went beyond the PMRB’s decision, otherwise, whether the
DENR Secretary can modify the PMRB’s decision; and

II. Whether the DENR Secretary’s modification to divide the 729 hectares into two areas contravened the
mandate of the MAB decision and the purpose of Republic Act No. 7076.

Ruling:

Authority and functions

in mining activities

In any case, we discuss the powers of the different agencies in relation to mining activities as laid down by the
relevant laws.

Mines Adjudication Board

34
Chapter XIII (Settlement of Conflicts) of Republic Act No. 7942 known as the Mining Act of 1995 provides for the
powers of the panel of arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Section 77 states that “the panel
shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:

a. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

b. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
c. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/ concessionaires; and
d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.”[91]

Section 78 provides for the MAB’s appellate jurisdiction over the decision or order of the panel of arbitrators.
[92]
 Section 79 enumerates the MAB’s powers and functions, including the power “to conduct hearings on all
[93]
matters within its jurisdiction.”

Provincial Mining Regulatory Board

While the MAB’s jurisdiction covers the settlement of conflicts over mining claims, the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) — created under Republic Act No. 7076 known as the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 — granted powers that include functions more executive in nature such as declaring and segregating
[94]
areas for small-scale mining.

Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7076 provides for the PMRB’s power to “declare and segregate existing gold-rich
areas for small-scale mining” but “under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary”:

Section 24. Provincial/ City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the
implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review
by the Secretary:

(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rich areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-
scale mining area, an area that is declared a small mining area; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.[95]
Section 22 of DAO No. 34–92, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 7076, similarly states
that the “Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under RA 7076 shall exercise the following powers and
[96]
functions, subject to review by the Secretary[.]”

Section 6 of DAO No. 34–92 also provides that “[t]he Board created under RA 7076 shall have the authority to
declare and set aside People’s Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for small-scale mining
[97]
operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary thru the Director[.]”

DENR Secretary

Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076 reiterates the DENR Secretary’s power of control over “the program and the
activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s small-scale mining area”:

Section 26. Administrative Supervision over the People’s Small-scale Mining Program. The Secretary through his
representative shall exercise direct supervision and control over the program and activities of the small-scale
miners within the people’s small-scale mining area.

35
The Secretary shall within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act promulgate rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of the same. Priority shall be given to such rules and regulations that will
ensure the least disruption in the operations of the small-scale miners.[98]

Section 21.1 of DAO No. 34–92, the implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act No. 7076, states that the
DENR Secretary has “direct supervision and control over the program and the activities of the small-scale miners
[99]
within the people’s small-scale mining area.”

This court has distinguished the power of control and the power of supervision as follows:

. . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done  in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. [100] (Emphasis
supplied)

[101]
League of Provinces v. DENR  discussed that “the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying
out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
[102]
country’s natural resources.”

Since the DENR Secretary has power of control as opposed to power of supervision, he had the power to affirm
with modification the PMRB’s decision.

Executive Department

The Constitution provides that “[t]he State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
[103]
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens[.]”

Moreover, “[t]he President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
[104]
economic growth and general welfare of the country[.]”

Chapter II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7942 known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 also provides as
follows:

SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. – Mineral resources are owned by the State and the exploration,
development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The state may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors.

The State shall recognize and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands as
provided for by the Constitution.[105]

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 on mineral reservations provides that “[m]ining operations in existing mineral
reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the
[106]
Department or through a contractor[.]”

Apex Mining v. SMGMC discussed that "Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 is a special provision, as it
specifically treats of the establishment of mineral reservations only. Said provision grants the President the power
to proclaim a mineral land as a mineral reservation, regardless of whether such land is also an existing forest
[107]
reservation.”

In the 2002 case of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining
[108]
Cooperative  involving the same Diwalwal gold rush area, this court discussed that “the State may not be
precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the
[109]
gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.”

36
 [110]
Incidentally, we acknowledge that PICOP raised the validity of Proclamation No. 297 in its memorandum.  It
argues that Proclamation No. 297 by then President Macapagal-Arroyo was without congressional concurrence
[111]
as required by Republic Act No. 3092, thus, revocable.  The validity of Proclamation No. 297, however, is not
an issue in these cases. This subsequent development was not litigated, and this is not the proper case to assail
its validity.

37