energy security

HIGH TENSIONS OVER LOW-TIDE

program
ELEVATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
TRENDS AND INDICATORS
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

An essay for the Strategic Asia Program

by Xiaodon Liang

T
ensions were high in the South China Sea in 2015, with China’s dredging activity to expand low-tide
elevations and inhospitable rocks posing a new challenge to fellow claimants, the Philippines and
Vietnam, and proponents of maritime rights, such as the United States. Land reclamation activity,
focused on the Spratly Islands, has both military and legal implications. The construction of
runways and military facilities on the disputed islands, rocks, and reefs of the South China Sea could extend
the range of Chinese naval and aviation assets while allowing for easier resupply of outposts in the disputed
area. At the same time, the expansion of previously small outposts could obscure their status under the law
of the sea, impeding the future settlement of the maritime disputes underlying regional tensions.

CHINA’S LAND RECLAMATION PROGRAM

In May 2014 the government of the Philippines released images showing the gradual expansion of the Chinese
presence on Johnson South Reef. Reclamation activity was detected in September 2013; to date, at least seven
reefs have been expanded. Satellite images suggest China has been building military features on the reclaimed
land, including possible anti-aircraft towers on Hughes and Gaven Reefs, a helipad on Cuarteron Reef, a radar
facility on Johnson South Reef, and an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. While a spokesperson for China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs stated in November 2014 that the military improvements were intended primarily to improve
living standards and search and rescue capabilities, the United States has expressed its concern that they also
extend the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to apply coercive force in neighboring waters.

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 In June 2015, China declared that it would soon
complete land reclamation and move to constructing
structures that would facilitate a range of military and
civilian activities. The total amount of land reclaimed
by China since December 2013 equals more than 2,900
acres. Over the last 40 years, Vietnam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Taiwan have reclaimed a combined
total of 172 acres. The land reclamation programs
touch on three legal problems. First, the features on
which China and other claimants are reclaiming
land are the subject of territorial disputes, and the
reclamation activity could make future adjudication
of those disputes more difficult. Second, China has
expanded maritime features that did not previously
qualify as islands under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) into
much larger territories. Third, the Philippines has
argued that China’s land reclamation activities also
violate obligations under UNCLOS to protect the
marine environment.
UNCLOS denies a twelve-nautical-mile territorial
sea or two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) to features submerged at high tide, even if
expanded artificially into an island; uninhabited rocks
can claim a territorial sea but no EEZ. China’s land
reclamation program may have made it more difficult
to demonstrate indisputably whether the new land
bodies were previously islands, rocks, or submerged
features. Indeed, among the claims filed by the
Philippines against China in their ongoing UNCLOS
arbitration case is the request that the arbitrators
find that the Chinese outposts are not islands and
not entitled to an EEZ. The arbitral panel is still
some time away from ruling on Manila’s arguments,
having only recently issued in October a decision
affirming its jurisdiction to consider the claims.
2 the national bureau of asian research • january 2016
China has refused to participate in the arbitration,
even to argue against the panel’s jurisdiction.
Responses to China’s Activities
In August 2015, in the face of Beijing’s objections,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
called for all claimants to halt land reclamation
activities in the South China Sea. The United States
has declared its opposition to the militarization of
the land features and conducted in late October a
freedom of navigation operation around one artificial
island built on Subi Reef to emphasize its maritime
rights. Both the United States and China recognized
the destabilizing potential of incidents at sea when
they agreed on a set of relevant confidence-building
measures in November 2014 following a visit by
President Barack Obama to Beijing. In September
2015, during President Xi Jinping’s reciprocal
visit to Washington, the two leaders finalized two
new annexes covering air-to-air encounters and
crisis communications.
The animosity generated by China’s land
reclamation activities fits into a broader pattern
of Chinese activity, including the placement of an
oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam in 2014,
confrontational incidents at sea, and nonparticipation
in UNCLOS arbitration. Its commitment in the
nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea of 2002 to not complicate
or escalate disputes appears to have been sidelined.
The other claimants have responded. In July 2015,
the secretary general of the Communist Party of
Vietnam visited Washington—a first. The Vietnam
People’s Navy is taking delivery of six Russian
submarines and equipping them with supersonic
anti-ship cruise missiles, giving it a limited ability to
deter Chinese action. The Philippines for the first time in the region. The long-standing clash of principles
began operating air and naval assets out of the former underlying U.S. and Chinese interpretations of the
U.S. military base at Subic Bay, which is located closer right to freedom of navigation will also continue to
to Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands than generate occasional crises. With more freedom of
other Philippine facilities. President Benigno Aquino navigation operations on the horizon, the pattern of
proposed a 25% increase in the defense budget for Chinese responses to these perceived provocations
2016 in July. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation will be a key indicator of the capacity for restraint in
Agreement signed in 2014 between Manila and the U.S.-China relationship. Given this context, the
Washington will enable U.S. troops to begin rotating tense maritime security environment in 2015 will
deployments across the island nation’s military bases. continue to pose a significant challenge for crisis
Other regional powers have signaled a new managers over the next year. •
attentiveness to the South China Sea disputes. In
Xiaodon Liang is an Intern with the Political and Security
May, Australia’s defense minister spoke out against Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR). The views expressed are those of the author.
the militarization of the islands and affirmed his
country’s interest in defending freedom of navigation.
Japan may go further: the government of Shinzo Abe
has been weighing proposals to patrol the South
China Sea and has expanded cooperation—including
military exercises—with the Philippines, and a
Japanese warship may soon conduct drills with
Vietnamese forces. Taiwan launched a diplomatic
initiative to establish a framework for sharing
resources in the disputed areas.
Even if China terminates its land-reclamation
program as promised, the South China Sea will remain
a volatile region due to the parties’ unwillingness to
resolve their territorial and maritime disputes through
either negotiation or arbitration. In particular,
China’s nine-dash line, an ambiguous claim to most
of the sea with little basis in contemporary maritime
law, raises questions about the country’s ambitions.
As both the Philippines and Vietnam have made
progress in recent years to rationalize their South
China Sea claims with UNCLOS, the question of
whether China will move in that direction as well is
critical for understanding its long-term intentions

the national bureau of asian research • january 2016 3

 About the Strategic Asia Program
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