Verba Legis

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400               October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10,
2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T.
Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the
January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision
pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the
following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and
respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all
the legal consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on
September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1)
the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which
denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared
the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him,
the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The
appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of
time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for
partial reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS

NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE
THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS

APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO.
02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF

ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES"
IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.

D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A

PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN
HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.
III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND
THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE
RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND
NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,"
is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited
Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits,
still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this
case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration
of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In
this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia
was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his
appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological
incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to
render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (remedying deficiencies)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets
a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the
index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of
the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the
Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the
mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or
for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and
promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has
made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and
strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll
the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the
CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the
same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower
court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal .14 In the recent
case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not
a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy
is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173582             January 28, 2008

YOLANDA SIGNEY, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA SERVANO, representative of
GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY, respondents.
 DECISION

TINGA, J.:

We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security benefits of a Social Security System (SSS) member
who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the 31 March
2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming the resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC),3 as well
as the 23 July 2004 Resolution4 of the same court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his member’s records, he had designated
Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6
July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS.5 She revealed in her SSS claim
that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey,
Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.6

Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001
in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha
Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.

In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the
legal wife of the deceased.7

The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001,8 denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it
recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under
the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null
and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as
confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition9 with the SSC in which she attached a waiver of rights 10 executed by Editha
whereby the latter waived "any/all claims from National Trucking Forwarding Corporation (NTFC) under the
supervision of National Development Corporation (NDC), Social Security System (SSS) and other (i)nsurance
(b)enefits due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died intestate on May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors," and
further declared that "I am legally married to Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Mr. Rodolfo P. Signey Sr."11

In a Resolution12 dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to
the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was married to
Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights. It found that
petitioner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise
controvert the confirmed marriage certificate. The SSC also found, based on the SSS field investigation report dated
6 November 2001 that even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since she herself
admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband for support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a
certain Aquilino Castillo.13

Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the death benefits, the SSC applied Section 8(e)
and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282, the SSS Law which was in force at the time of the member’s death on 21
May 2001, and held that the dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the deceased member were also
considered primary beneficiaries. The records disclosed that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. Evelyn
Signey, who predeceased him, and several illegitimate children with petitioner and with Gina. Based on their
respective certificates of live birth, the deceased SSS member’s four illegitimate children with petitioner could no
longer be considered dependents at the time of his death because all of them were over 21 years old when he died on
21 May 2001, the youngest having been born on 31 March 1978. On the other hand, the deceased SSS member’s
illegitimate children with Gina were qualified to be his primary beneficiaries for they were still minors at the time of
his death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April 2000.14

The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in an Order 15 dated 9 April 2003. This order
further elaborated on the reasons for the denial of petitioner’s claims. It held that the mere designation of petitioner
and her children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the controlling factor in the determination of
beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and 8(k) of the SSS Law, as amended, provide that dependent legal spouse entitled
by law to receive support from the member and dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children of the member shall be the primary beneficiaries of the latter.16 Based on the certification dated
25 July 2001 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the marriage of the deceased and Editha
on 29 October 1967 at the Metropolitan Cathedral, Cebu City was duly registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 on
21 November 1967. The SSS field investigation reports verified the authenticity of the said certification.17

The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha, which manifested her lack of interest in the
outcome of the case, considering that she was not entitled to the benefit anyway because of her admitted
cohabitation with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the SSC held that considering that one of the requisites of a valid
waiver is the existence of an actual right which could be renounced , petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a
right over the benefits of the deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of petitioner and her
children. The declaration by Editha that she was not married to the deceased is not only contrary to the records of
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October 1967 but also renders
nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not married to the deceased then she would have no rights that may
be waived.

Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased with Gina failed to show proof that they were
indeed dependent on the deceased for support during his lifetime. The SSC observed that Section 8(e) of the SSS
Law, as amended, provides among others that dependents include the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached 21 years of age. The provision
vested the right of the benefit to his illegitimate minor children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, irrespective of any proof that
they had been dependent on the support of the deceased.18

Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review19 under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the SSC in its 31 March 2004
Decision. Resolving the determinative question of who between petitioner and the illegitimate children of the
deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of the
latter’s death, it held that based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming death benefits as a
dependent must be the legal spouse. Petitioner’s presentation of a marriage certificate attesting to her marriage to the
deceased was futile, according to the appellate court, as said marriage is null and void in view of the previous
marriage of the deceased to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City.

The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be qualified as dependent, he must be unmarried,
not gainfully employed and must not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. And in this case,
only the illegitimate children of the deceased with Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified
beneficiaries as they were still minors at the time of the death of their father. Considering petitioner is disqualified to
be a beneficiary and the absence of any legitimate children of the deceased, it follows that the dependent illegitimate
minor children of the deceased should be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of Appeals
concluded.20

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution 21 dated 23 July 2004. It
found that there was no new matter of substance which would warrant a modification and/or reversal of the 31
March 2004 Decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been adequately resolved by the SSC and the appellate court.
The first issue is whether petitioner’s marriage with the deceased is valid. The second issue is whether petitioner has
a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased.

There is no merit in the petition.

We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which are supported by substantial evidence 22 and
affirmed by the SSC and the Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be reminded of the basic rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.23

It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not binding.24 The important consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard and they
availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the matter in dispute. 25 It must likewise be noted that
under Section 2, Rule 126 of the SSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of
law shall not be controlling. In the case at bar, the existence of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and
Editha is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on
the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed marriage
certificate registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to allege and prove
any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.

As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 27 is
very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention),
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.28

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxx

(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age ,
he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and

3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

xxx

(k) Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated
or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the
 share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate
children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent
parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing,
any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.

SEC. 13. Death Benefits. — Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly
contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the monthly
pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a
lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he has not paid the required
thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum
benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or
twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it
follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as
primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent, 29" the only
requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.30

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000,
respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the
SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said
legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only
qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ratio Legis

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970

IGMIDIO HIDALGO and MARTINA ROSALES, petitioners,

vs.
POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO,
BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-25327 May 29, 1970

HILARIO AGUILA and ADELA HIDALGO, petitioners,

vs.

POLICARPIO HIDALGO, SERGIO DIMAANO, MARIA ARDE, SATURNINO HIDALGO,

BERNARDINA MARQUEZ, VICENTE DIMAANO, ARCADIA DIMAANO, TEODULA DIMAANO, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF THE PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS, respondents.

Jose O. Lara for petitioners.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Two petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing petitioners' actions
as share tenants for the enforcerment of the right to redeem agricultural lands, under the provisions of section 12 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code. As the same issue of law is involved and the original landowner and vendees in
both cases are the same, the two cases are herein jointly decided.

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27,
1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square
meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, described in the
decisions under review.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of
land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the
parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities,
accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the
same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees1 in their favor.

In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses
Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for
the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.

As stated in the decisions under review, since the parties stipulated on the facts in both cases, petitioners-tenants
have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for
the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic
Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the
deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial
assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-
vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code. 2 The actions for redemption were timely
filled on March 26, 1965 by petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale,
prescribed by section 12 of the said Code.

The agrarian court rendered on July 19, 1965 two identical decisions dismissing the petitions for redemption.

It correctly focused on the sole issue of law as follows: "(T)he only issue in this case is whether or not plaintiffs,
as share tenants, are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof, where no
notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder, of the latter's intention to sell the
property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale. In other words, is the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No.
3844 applicable to share tenants?"

But proceeding from several erroneous assumptions and premises, it arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right
of redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not
to share tenants, and thus dismissed the petitions: "(S)ec 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, which comes under Chapter
I of said Act, under the heading 'Agricultural Leasehold System,' reads as follows:

'SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same
at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within
two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption.'

The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy

and leasehold tenancy. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844).
A share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and
obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22 to 41, inclusive, and Secs. 42 to 48,
inclusive, of Republic Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38, inclusive, of Republic Act No. 3844).

It is our considered view that the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of Republic Act No.
3844 is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said provision of
law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to
nobody else. In enacting the Agricultural Land Reform Code, Congress was fully aware of the
existence of share tenancy and in fact provided for the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy
system. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844.) If it were the intention of Congress to grant the right of
redemption to share tenants, it would have unmistakably and unequivocally done so. We cannot
extend said right to share tenants through judicial legislation, wherever our sympathies may lie.

The agrarian court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises in holding that agricultural share tenancy
remains recognized in this jurisdiction; that "a share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their
respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal"; and that the right of redemption granted by
section 12 of the Land Reform Code" is applicable to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants, because said
provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to the 'agricultural lessee,' and to nobody
else."

1. The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as
proclaimed in its title. Section 4 of the Code expressly outlaws agricultural share tenancy as "contrary to public
policy" and decrees its abolition. 3 Section 2 of the Code expressly declares it to be the policy of the  State, inter
alia, "to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and,
as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; to achieve a dignified existence
for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; ... and to make the small
farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of strength in our democratic
society."4 It was error, therefore, for the agrarian court to state the premise after the Land Reform Code had already
been enacted, that "the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy." A more accurate statement of the premise is that based on the transitory provision in the
first proviso of section 4 of the Code, i.e. that existing share tenancy contracts are allowed to continue temporarily
in force and effect, notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever of the following events occurs earlier:
(a) the end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the
region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expires; or (c)
the share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.

In anticipation of the expiration of share tenancy contracts — whether by contractual stipulation or the tenant's
exercise of his option to elect the leasehold system instead or by virtue of their nullity — occuring before the
proclamation of the locality as a land reform area, the same section 4 has further declared in the third proviso thereof
that in such event, the tenant shall continue in possession of the land for cultivation and "there shall be presumed to
exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of this Code."

2. The foregoing exposes the error of the agrarian court's corollary premise that "a share tenant is altogether
different from a leasehold tenant." The agrarian court's dictum that "their respective rights and obligations are not
co-extensive or co-equal "refer to their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect to the contributions
given, management, division or payment of the produce.5

But the Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer — be
a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum (bond) juris with certain vital juridical consequences,
such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works despite
the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the
farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under section 11 of the Code6 as well as the right
to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under section 12 of the Code.

This is an essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to implement the state's policy of establishing owner-
cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant existence for the small farmers that would make them a
pillar of strength of our Republic. Aside from expropriation by the Land Authority of private agricultural land for
resale in economic family-size farm units "to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers,"7 the purchase by
farmers of the lands cultivated by them, when the owner decides to sell the same — through rights of pre-emption
and redemption — are the only means prescribed by the Code to achieve the declared policy of the State.

3. The agrarian court therefore facilely let itself fall into the error of concluding that the right of redemption (as well
as necessarily the right of pre-emption) imposed by the Code is available to leasehold tenants only and
excludes share tenants for the literal reason that the Code grants said rights only to the "agricultural lessee and to
nobody else." For one, it immediately comes to mind that the Code did not mention tenants,
whether leasehold or share tenants, because it outlaws share tenancy and envisions the agricultural leasehold system
as its replacement. Thus, Chapter I of the Code, comprising sections 4 to 38, extensively deals with the
establishment of "agricultural leasehold relation," defines the parties thereto and the rights and obligations of the
"agricultural lessor" and of the "agricultural lessee" (without the slightest mention of leasehold tenants) and the
statutory consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the lessee. There is a studied omission in the Code of
the use of the term tenant in deference to the "abolition of tenancy" as proclaimed in the very title of the Code, and
the elevation of the tenant's status to that of lessee.

Then, the terms "agricultural lessor" and "agricultural lessee" are consistently used throughout the Chapter and
carried over the particular sections (11 and 12) on pre-emption and redemption. The agrarian court's literal
construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of the
State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers, who invariably were all share tenants before the
enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now uplift to the status of lessees.

A graphic instance of this fallacy would be found in section 11 providing that "In case the  agricultural
lessor decides to sell the landholding the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions." It will be seen that the term "agricultural lessor" is here used interchangeably
with the term "landowner"; which conflicts with the Code's definition of "agricultural lessor" to mean "a person
natural or juridical, who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another
the cultivation and use of his land for a price certains." 8 Obviously, the Code precisely referred to the "agricultural
lessor (who) decides to sell the landholding," when it could have more precisely referred to the "landowner," who
alone as such, rather than a civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor, could sell the landholding, but it
certainly cannot be logically contended that the imprecision should defeat the clear spirit and intent of the provision.

4. We have, here, then a case of where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal
rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

Section 11 of the Code providing for the "agricultural lessee's" preferential right to buy the land he cultivates
provides expressly that "the entire landholding offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the
landowner so desires, unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition," presumably for being beyond
their capabilities. Taken together with the provisions of Chapter III of the Code on the organization and functions of
the Land Authority and Chapter VII on the Land Project Administration and the creation and functions of the
National Land Reform Council, (in which chapters the legislature obviously was not laboring under the inhibition of
referring to the term tenants as it was in Chapter I establishing the agricultural leasehold system and decreeing the
abolition of share tenancy, 9 the Code's intent, policy and objective to give both agricultural lessees and farmers
who transitionally continue to be share tenants notwithstanding the Code's enactment, the same priority and
preferential rights over the lands under their cultivation, in the event of acquisition of the lands, by expropriation or
voluntary sale, for distribution or resale that may be initiated by the Land Authority or the National Land Reform
Council, are clearly and expressly stated.

Thus Chapter III, section 51 of the Code decrees it the responsibility of the Land Authority "(1) To initiate and
prosecute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of private agricultural lands as defined in Section one
hundred sixty-six of chapter XI of this Code for the purpose of subdivision into economic family — size farm units
and resale of said farm units to bona fide tenants, occupants and qualified farmers ... and "(2) To help bona fide
farmers without lands of agricultural owner-cultivators of uneconomic-size farms to acquire and own economic
family-size farm units ...."

Similarly, Chapter VII, section 128 of the Code, in enjoining the National Land Reform Council to formulate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the Code's provisions for selection of agricultural land to be acquired
and distributed and of the beneficiaries of the family farms, ordains the giving of the same priority "to the actual
occupants personally cultivating the land either as agricultural lessees or otherwise with respect to the area under
their cultivation."

5. It would certainly result in absurdity, contradictions and injustice if a share tenant would be denied the rights of
pre-emption and redemption which he seeks to exercise on his own resources, notwithstanding that the National
Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed that all the government machineries and agencies in the region or
locality envisioned in the Code are operating — which machineries and agencies, particularly, the Land Bank were
precisely created "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and resale to small
landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from the landowner." 10 The non-
operation in the interval of the Land Bank and the government machineries and agencies in the region which are
envisioned in the Code to assist the share tenant in shedding off the yoke of tenancy and afford him the financial
assistance to exercise his option of electing the leasehold system and his preferential right of purchasing the land
cultivated by him could not possibly have been intended by Congress to prevent the exercise of any of these vital
rights by a share tenant who is able to do so, e.g. to purchase the land, on his own and without government
assistance. It would be absurd and unjust that while the government is unable to render such assistance, the share
tenant would be deemed deprived of the very rights granted him by the Code which he is in a position to exercise
even without government assistance.

6. Herein lies the distinction between the present case and Basbas vs. Entena 11 where the Court upheld the agrarian
court's dismissal of the therein tenant's action to redeem the landholding sold to a third party by virtue of the tenant's
failure to tender payment or consign the purchase price of the property. There, the tenant-redemptioner was shown
by the evidence to have no funds and had merely applied for them to the Land Authority which was not yet
operating in the locality and hence, the Court held that no part of the Code "indicates or even hints that the 2-year
redemption period will not commence to run (indefinitely) until the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or
stops the tenant from securing redemption funds from some other source." 12 In the present case, the petitioners-
tenants' possession of funds and compliance with the requirements of redemption are not questioned, the case having
been submitted and decided on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share
tenants. The clear and logical implication of Basbas is where the tenant has his own resources or secures redemption
funds from sources other than the Land Bank or government agencies under the Code, the fact that the locality has
not been proclaimed a land reform area and that such government machineries and agencies are not operating therein
is of no relevance and cannot prejudice the tenant's rights under the Code to redeem the landholding.

7. Even from the landowner's practical and equitable viewpoint, the landowner is not prejudiced in the least by
recognizing the share tenant's right of redemption. The landowner, having decided to sell his land, has gotten his
price therefor from his vendees. (The same holds true in case of the tenant's exercise of the pre-emptive right by the
tenant who is called upon to pay the landowner the price, if reasonable, within ninety days from the landowner's
written notice.) As for the vendees, neither are they prejudiced for they will get back from the tenant-redemptioner
the price that they paid the vendor, if reasonable, since the Code grants the agricultural lessee or tenant the top
priority of redemption of the landholding cultivated by him and expressly decrees that the same "shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption." In the absence of any provision in the Code as to manner of and amounts
payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a suppletory character. 13 Hence, the
vendees would be entitled to receive from the redemptioners the amount of their purchase besides "(1) the expenses
of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made by reason of the sale; (and) (2) the necessary and useful
expenses made on the thing sold." 14

8. The historical background for the enactment of the Code's provisions on pre-emption and redemption further
strengthens the Court's opinion. It is noted by Dean Montemayor 15 that "(T)his is a new right which has not been
granted to tenants under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. It further bolsters the security of tenure of the agricultural
lessee and further encourages agricultural lessees to become owner-cultivators.

In the past, a landlord often ostensibly sold his land being cultivated by his tenant to another
tenant, who in turn filed a petition for ejectment against the first tenant on the ground of personal
cultivation. While many of such sales were simulated, there was a formal transfer of title in every
case, and the first tenant was invariably ordered ejected.

There is indication in this case of the same pattern of sale by the landowner to another tenant,  16 in order to effect the
ejectment of petitioners-tenants. This is further bolstered by the fact that the sales were executed by respondent-
vendor on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1954 shortly after the enactment on August 8, 1963 of the Land
Reform Code — which furnishes still another reason for upholding ... petitioners-tenants' right of redemption, for
certainly a landowner cannot be permitted to defeat the Code's clear intent by precipitately disposing of his lands,
even before the tenant has been given the time to exercise his newly granted option to elect the new agricultural
leasehold system established by the Code as a replacement for the share tenancy outlawed by it.

9. Clearly then, the Code intended, as above discussed, to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be
share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed
abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of
the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by
expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of
the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-
10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.)
By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.' (Lopez
& Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850)." 17 The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative
principles of statutory construction that, it will reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the
agrarian court, that would defeat and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and
intent. 18 Finally, under the established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor
legislation, it will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will
ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker. 19

The agrarian court's dismissal of the cases at bar should therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants' right to
redeem the landholdings recognized section 12 of the Code.

In Case L-25326, however, the deed of sale executed by respondent-vendor in favor of respondents-vendees for the
price of P4,000.00 covers three parcels of land, while what is sought to be redeemed is only the first parcel of land
of 22,876 square meters, described in the deed. Petitioners-tenants' allegation that the proportionate worth of said
parcel "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities and assessed values of the three lots,"
is P1,500.00, was traversed by respondents in their answer, with the claim that "the said land is fairly worth
P20,000.00. 20 While the vendor would be bound by, and cannot claim more than, the price stated in the deed, and
the Code precisely provides that the farmer shall have "the preferential right to buy the (landholding)
under reasonable terms and conditions" or "redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration" 21 with a
view to affording the farmer the right to seek judicial assistance and relief to fix such reasonable price and terms
when the landowner places in the notice to sell or deed an excessive or exorbitant amount in collusion with the
vendee, we note that in this case the deed of sale itself acknowledged that the selling price of P4,000.00 therein
stated was not the fair price since an additional consideration therein stated was that the vendees would support the
vendor during his lifetime and take care of him, should he fall ill, and even assumed the expenses of his burial upon
his death:

Ang halagang P4,000.00 ay hindi kaulat sa tunay na halaga ng mga lupa subalit ang mga bumili ay
may katungkulan na sostentohin ako habang ako'y nabubuhay, ipaanyo at ipagamot ako kung ako
ay may sakit, saka ipalibing ako kung ako ay mamatay sa kanilang gastos at ito ay isa sa alang-
alang o consideracion ng bilihang ito.

Under these circumstances, since the agrarian court did not rule upon conflicting claims of the parties as to what was
the proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the stated price of P4,000.00 — whether P1,500.00 as claimed by
petitioners or a little bit more, considering the proportionate values of the two other parcels, but the whole total is
not to exceed the stated price of P4,000.00, since the vendor is bound thereby — and likewise, what was the
additional proportionate worth of the expenses assumed by the vendees, assuming that petitioners are not willing to
assume the same obligation, the case should be remanded to the agrarian court solely for the purpose of determining
the reasonable price and consideration to be paid by petitioners for redeeming the landholding, in accordance with
these observations.

In Case L-25327, there is no question as to the price of P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional consideration
or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326, supra, assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners therein are entitled to
redeem the landholding for the same stated price.

ACCORDINGLY, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed, and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted.

In Case L-25326, however, the case is remanded to the agrarian court solely for determining the reasonable price to
be paid by petitioners therein to respondents-vendees for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the
observations hereinabove made.

No pronouncement as to costs.
Mens Legislatoris/Mischief

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of her minor child, RAQUEL
MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, v. DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, Respondent-
Appellant.

Peregrino M. Andres for Claimants-Appellees.

H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for Respondent-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; DEPENDENTS OF

INJURED EMPLOYER. — From the express language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with
the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or
incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased, are
considered dependents.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is
true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she
was marked to him.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY THE LAW TO
FACTS AS FOUND. — Where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.
What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if
not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the
lawmakers. A paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. there can always occur to intelligence
hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-
fetched.

4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. — The Court has constantly held from the early cases of Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil.
485, a 1909 decision, in United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) that ,
assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute
and its purpose should prevail and that no construction is to be adopted that would "tend to defeat the purpose and
object of the legislator."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. — Once the policy of
purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be
entertained, therefor, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a
rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; INTERPRETATION AND

CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. — "To state the
constructions sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into
collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend
protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative body. No such suspicious ought to
be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the
constitutional objective of social justice.

7. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT IT BASED ON

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL; INSTANT CASE. — The alleged error that the
accident resulting in the death of Condrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the
course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted
by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the condensation of the Davao Stevedore
Terminal Company.

8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO

SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINTMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE,
BEYOND AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY CERTIORARI. — The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight
of conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if the
possibility that the Commission’s conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of
justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, ‘such errors would
constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part.’

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:
The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel question
raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as
well as the posthumous (born after the death of its father) child could be considered dependents within the
meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act may be gauged by the fact that we gave due course to the petition
for the review of a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission answering the question in the affirmative
and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in
behalf of her minor child, Raquel Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right of the language of the law, its
manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor, we answer the question
similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated September 27,
1966, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September
13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent
although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However. on the day
following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in
Davao City where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was facilitated
through the intercession of the general manager of the respondent company." 1 The decision likewise noted that the
claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name
Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.

As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating that the deceased was a
laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers
from his residence in Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of quarters were provided by the
respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute, and the deceased in
particular went home about three times a week. While the respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time
production manager, Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed the claimant’s declarations that the company provided a service
pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very same testimonial evidence does not
support this denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2
As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional office in Davao City and awarded to the
claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum
of P270.80 as attorney’s fees.

Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course primarily due to the question raised being one
of first impression. As announced at the opening of this opinion, we uphold the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.

1. From the express language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him
or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents. 3
Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after
the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore,
comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls
within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the
widow and the deceased had already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three months. The child
born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the posthumous daughter of the deceased.
What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems bent in ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no
uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is
attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. 4 Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to support
her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the
facts as found. 5 What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that
intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur
to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered
not too far-fetched. The employer in this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to such a
temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite obvious then why we find its stand
devoid of merit.

2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has
been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest doubts could be entertained,
therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of
the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. We have never deviated from our constant holding from Ty
Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best
conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United States v. Toribio,
8 decided the ‘next year, we made unmistakable our view that no construction is to be adopted that would bend "to
defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." We made use of an expression almost identical in Riera v. Palmaroli
9 with our warning against so narrowly interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator."
The employer in this case should have been well advised to take into consideration the teachings of the above cases
before it sought to press upon us the desirability of imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that
would render fruitless the purpose so clearly evident on the face of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of the decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission now on appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a recent case of Automotive Parts
& Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and
explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the
social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to
the legislative body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any
provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements
and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice. To quote from the Lingad case
anew: "For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a
constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what the fundamental law
requires need arise.

4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the way of the
affirmance of the decision now on appeal. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Conrado
Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too
seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on
substantial evidence argue against the contention of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had occasion to
state only last month in B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 " Nor can the conclusion reached by
respondent Commission be repudiated unless ‘on a clear showing of failure to consider the evidence on record or
failure to consider fundamental and patent logical relationships in the evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of
justice or grave abuse of discretion.’ What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating: ‘The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting
evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari.’ Even if the possibility that the
Commission’s conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of Justice Dizon in
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission.’such errors would constitute mere
errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part.’"

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission of September 27, 1966 is affirmed. With
costs against respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.
Equity of the Statute/Clean Hands Doctrine

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 130088               April 7, 2009

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., PEDRO

AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS DUPASQUIER, ELIZABETH PALMA, PILAR ONGKING, DOLLY LIM, and
RUBENCITO DEL MUNDO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 131469               April 7, 2009

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, ADD INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., PEDRO

AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS DUPASQUIER, ELIZABETH PALMA, PILAR ONGKING, DOLLY LIM, and
RUBENCITO DEL MUNDO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALICIA B. GONZALES-DECANO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch 48 and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.

G.R. No. 155171               April 7, 2009

NANCY L. TY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO E. IBABAO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33
and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 155201               April 7, 2009

TALA REALTY SERVICES, INC., PEDRO AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, DOLLY LIM,
RUBENCITO DEL MUNDO and ELIZABETH PALMA, Petitioners,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 166608               April 7, 2009

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., INC., PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIERE,

DOLLY LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO and ELIZABETH H. PALMA, Petitioners,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.

G.R. No. 130088

In the Cabanatuan City case, the RTC granted petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss4 by Order of August 20, 1996. Banco
Filipino filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied,5 drawing it to file a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus6 (a judicial writ issued as a command to an inferior court) before the Court of Appeals which docketed it
as CA-G.R. SP No. 43344.

By Resolution7 of February 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals, finding CA-G.R. SP No. 43344 sufficient in form and
substance, gave due course to it and ordered petitioners to file their Answer within ten days from notice.1avvphi1

Petitioners-TALA filed a motion to recall the appellate court’s February 14, 1997 Resolution giving due course to
the petition,8 arguing as follows:

Upon [Banco Filipino’s] own admission, x x x its instant petition is a plea for the annulment of a lower court order
granting a motion to dismiss. At the same time, [Banco Filipino] admits to have received the said order "on 17
January 1997," or, to be precise, twenty one (21) days prior to the institution of its instant petition with this
Court (assuming the same to have been filed on its given date, Febraury 2, 1997).

On the foregoing considerations alone, therefore, the mandatory, legal duty of this Court is to deny, not to grant,
due course to this special civil action. x x x

xxxx

In the case on hand, [Banco Filipino] itself alleges that it received a copy of the Order dismissing its complaint
on 23 August 1996,. Against this Order, it then filed on 7 September 1996 (the last day for perfecting an appeal
therefrom) a motion for reconsideration which herein Respondent Judge denied on 13 January 1997. Petitioner-
TALA received a copy of this Order denying its above motion 17 January 1997, Petitioner thus had only one or the
following day, 18 July 1997, to file its mandatory "notice of appeal". Thereafter, beyond 18 January 1997, the said
Order lapsed into finality. It was no longer legally appeallable.9 (Underscoring in the original)
And petitioners_TALA brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the pendency of G.R. No. 12711 before this
Court, questioning the denial of their motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 545-M-95 (the Batangas case), contending
as follows:

[Banco Filipino] tenders one and only one issue in its instant petition, to wit: Did or did not Respondent Judge
gravely abuse his discretion when he dismissed its complaint with him under Civil Case No. 2176-AF as violative of
the Supreme Court’s Administrative Circular on "forum shopping?"

The instant petition was filed with this Court on 07 February 1997. On this date, exactly the same issue above raised
was already before the Supreme Court for ruling and/or judicial determination. Two weeks earlier, on 20 July 1997
to be exact, herein Private Respondents filed with the said Tribunal under G.R. No. 12711 a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition that precisely and specifically prayed for the condemnation of [Banco Filipino’s]
complaint with the Cabanatuan RTC, Branch 86, under Civil Case No. 2176-AF, (the very complaint involved in
this petition, together with fifteen (15) other like suits, as "forum shopping." x x x10 (having their legal case heard in
the court thought most likely to provide a favorable judgement)

xxxx

[Banco Filipino] received its service copy of the above petition on 25 January 1997. On 7 February 1997 when it
filed with this Court the instant petition, said Petitioner-TALA was thus already on full and official notice of the said
petition with the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 127611. Entirely apart then from the undeniable fact that the instant
petition thus likewise breaches the Supreme Court’s circular against "forum shopping", there is the matter of [Banco
Filipino’s] criminal perjury in this case of attesting under oath that "no other action or proceeding is pending in any
other court, tribunal or agency" x x x "involving the same issues" as those tendered in the instant petition.11

The Court of Appeals denied the Motion to Recall by Resolution of June 17, 1997, declaring that its February 14,
1997 Resolution stands but the Answer should be submitted within ten days from notice. Hence, the first above-
captioned petition for certiorari, and prohibition (G.R. No. 130088)12 raising the following arguments:

Respondent Court issued its two assailed Resolutions in knowing disregard of the prior jurisdiction much earlier
assumed by this Court over the matters subject of its said Resolutions.13

xxxx

In undisguised disdain and defiance of This Court’s doctrinal instructions, Respondent Court substituted certiorari
for a lost appeal.14

xxxx

Respondent Court’s determination that [Banco Filipino’s] subject petition was "sufficient [in form] and substance"
was in fact a mere cover of its whimsical prejudgment of the said petition as meritorious.15

xxxx

Respondent Court issued its two Resolutions subject of this petition knowing that it was effectively undoing, or at
least putting to ridicule and disrepute an earlier judgment of its co-equal Division of the Court of Appeals.16

In its Comment,17 Banco Filipino argued that certiorari is not the appropriate remedy.18

G.R. No. 131469

In the Urdaneta case, the RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss by Order of March 13, 1996, finding that the
questions presented therein are not indubitable (unquestionable), hence, holding in abeyance (state of temporary
suspension) its resolution thereon until after the trial of the case.19 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.20

In the meantime, as the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, effective July 1, 1997, petitioners filed a
motion21 urging the RTC to resolve the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss, citing Rule 16, Section 3 of 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that "The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason
that the ground relied upon is not indubitable." The RTC denied the motion, the orders denying the Motion to
Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration having already become final and, in any event, petitioners had already
filed their Answers.22 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration, contending that as the orders were interlocutory (a legal term which can refer to
an order, sentence, decree, or judgment, given in an intermediate stage between the commencement and conclusion
of a cause of action), they could not have gained finality. The motion was denied.23 Hence, the second above-
captioned petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (G.R. No. 131469), contending that:

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS AS
THEY ARE FOUNDED ON RESPONDENT COURT’S AVOIDANCE OR EVASION OF A MANDATORY
OBLIGATION FRESHLY LEGISLATED BY NO LESS THAN THIS COURT, AND ARE THEREFORE,
VOID[;]

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION ON THE GROUND THAT INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS ATTAIN FINALITY.24

G.R. No. 166608

In the Lucena case, the RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss as well as their Motion to Resolve Pending
Motions with Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.25 Petitioners’ subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
prompting them to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 73558.26

In the meantime or on November 22, 2002, this Court, in Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank originating from an ejectment case filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino
concerning properties in Malolos, Bulacan, found that the trust agreement between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty
is contrary to law, and as both parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief should be given to one against the
other.27

By Decision28 of June 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA G.R. SP No. 73558 on the ground that there was
no forum shopping. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, they filed the fifth petition for
review (G.R. No. 166608),29 alleging that the Court of Appeals erred when it

A.

x x x FAILED TO APPLY THE CATEGORICAL AND BINDING PRONOUNCEMENT BY THIS

HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. No. 137533, ARTICULATED IN ITS EN BANC DECISION DATED 22
NOVEMBER 2002, TO THE CASE AT BENCH, IN WANTON DISREGARD OF THE SECOND ASPECT OF
RES JUDICATA, I.E., CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT.

B.

x x x VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF ADHERENCE TO JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS WHEN IT FAILED TO

APPLY TO THE CASE AT BENCH THE DEFINITIVE AND BINDING DECISION BY NO LESS THAN THIS
HONORABLE COURT, SITTING EN BANC, IN G.R. NO. 137533.
 C.

x x x WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING AND SPLITTING

A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION RESULTING EITHER TO RES JUDICATA OR LITIS PENDENTIA AS THEY
FIND APPLICABLE AGAINST THE RECONVEYANCE COMPLAINT SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT
PETITION VIS A VIS THE SIXTEEN [16] OTHER RECONVEYANCE COMPLAINTS OF RESPONDENT
BANCO FILIPINO.30

G.R. Nos. 155201 and 155171

By Resolution31 of June 6, 1996, the RTC in the Davao City case disposed of petitioners’ motion to dismiss, as well
as other motions, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby:

1. GRANTS the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Nancy L. Ty and the other defendants, namely:
Pedro B. Aguirre, Remedios A. Dupasquier, Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim,
Rubencito M. Del Mundo, and Add International Services, Inc., and accordingly, the complaint as against
them is ordered DISMISSED;

2. DENIES the motion to dismiss as far as defendant Tala Realty is concerned. Accordingly, defendant
Tala Realty is directed to file its responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order;
and

3. DENIES the motion for reconsideration of the Order dropping defendant Cynthia Mesina as party
defendant. (Underscoring supplied)

SO ORDERED.32

Both Banco Filipino and Tala Realty filed Motions for Partial Reconsideration. Tala Realty raised the issue of forum
shopping as a result of a derivative suit filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by Banco
Filipino’s minority stockholders "to recover its properties/branches, also proceeds of sales of some properties, funds
and receivables which have been ‘warehoused’ and all put under trust in the name of defendant Tala, as well as for
damages against all defendants xxx who criminally, unlawfully, and immorally covet ownership of properties and
misappropriate funds/receivables pertaining and belonging to and owned by Banco Filipino."33 (Underscoring in the
original)

Subsequently, in an October 4, 1996 Resolution,34 the RTC set aside its June 6, 1996 Resolution and dismissed the
Davao City case.

Banco Filipino thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-GR SP No. 42301. Nancy filed her own Comment thereto in addition to that of herein petitioners.35

By Decision36 of March 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC October 4, 1996 Resolution,
reinstated the Davao case, and ordered the RTC to proceed with the case to its conclusion.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, with Nancy filing her own in addition thereto.37 Their Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied,38 petitioners, except Nancy, filed the fourth above-captioned petition,39 faulting
the Court of Appeals

I
x x x IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THIS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
WHEN THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE FILED AN ORDINARY APPEAL UNDER RULE 45 OF THE
SAME RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II

x x x IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY DID NOT
CONSTITUTE ULTIMATE FACTS.

III

x x x IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN THE CASE AT
BAR.

IV

x x x IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF SPLITTING ITS CAUSE OF ACTION
WHEN IT INSTITUTED THE VARIOUS COMPLAINTS FOR RECOVERY IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE
COUNTRY WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION IS PREDICATED UPON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A
SINGLE TRUST/WAREHOUSING AGREEMENT.

x x x IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT DID NOT ENGAGE IN FORUM-SHOPPING IN FILING THE
SEVENTEEN (17) COMPLAINTS FOR RECOVERY AND MORESO SINCE THE SEC CASE FOR
RECOVERY WAS STILL PENDING RECONSIDERATION AT THE TIME.40

Nancy filed her own petition before this Court, the third-above captioned petition (G.R. No. 155171),41 assigning the
following errors:

THE ORIGINAL ACTION OF CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO
QUESTION AN ORDER DISMISSING A COMPLAINT.

II

NO WAREHOUSING AGREEMENT BETWEEN BANCO FILIPINO AND TALA WAS REFLECTED OR

COULD BE DEDUCED FROM THE 17 APRIL 1979 MINUTES OF THE BOARD MEETING. MOREOVER,
THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ALLEGED WAREHOUSING AGREEMENT WAS DISPUTED BY PETITIONER.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REINSTATING THE COMPLAINT WHICH FAILED TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING OUT THE CHALLENGE ON BANCO FILIPINO’S FORUM
SHOPPING AND OF ITS SPLITTING OF ITS CAUSE OF ACTION CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. THE ALLEGATIONS IN ALL ITS SEVENTEEN (17) COMPLAINTS PLEAD A VIOLATION OF
THE SAME SINGLE TRUST AGREEMENT AND CONSTITUTE ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION.

B. THE EXECUTION OF VARIOUS DEEDS OF CONVEYANCE DID NOT GIVE RISE TO VARIOUS
TRUST AGREEMENTS BUT WAS, AS ALLEGED IN ALL THE SEVENTEEN (17) COMPLAINTS
OF BANCO FILIPINO, MERELY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE TRUST AGREEMENT.

C. ALL SEVENTEEN (17) COMPLAINTS FILED BY BANCO FILIPINO REQUIRE THE

PRESENTATION OF ESSENTIALLY THE SAME, IF NOT IDENTICAL, EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE PURPORTED TRUST RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANCO
FILIPINO AND TALA UPON WHICH THE FORMER RELIES ON RECONVEYANCE OF THE
PROPERTIES.

D. BY SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION, BANCO FILIPINO HAS VIOLATED THE RULE

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.

BANCO FILIPINO WAS LIKEWISE GUILTY OF DELIBERATE AND WILLFUL FORUM SHOPPING IN
HAVING FILED THIS CIVIL CASE BEFORE THE COURT A QUO DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
DERIVATIVE SUIT FILED BY ITS MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS BEFORE THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND EXPRESSLY SUPPORTED BY IT.

VI

BANCO FILIPINO’S CLAIM HAS CLEARLY PRESCRIBED.

VII

THE PETTION BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO ATTACH
PROOF THAT THE PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE OF BANCO FILIPINO HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO
EXECUTE THE AFFIDAVIT AND CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED THERETO.
FOR THE SAME REASON, EQUALLY DEFECTIVE IS THE COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.42

By Resolution of June 18, 2008, this Court consolidated the five petitions.43

Respecting G.R. No. 130088, the Court finds that certiorari is not the appropriate remedy. One of the conditions
for certiorari to lie is that "there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law."44 Petitioners in G.R. No. 130088 could have filed their answer in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 43344 after the Court of
Appeals ordered them to file the same within ten days from notice.

Likewise, certiorari does not lie in G.R. No. 131469, as petitioners had the remedy of proceeding with the trial of the
case on the merits.

NEVERTHELESS, in view of the merits of petitioners’ Motions to Dismiss filed before the respective trial courts,
the Court relaxes the application of procedural rules and passes upon their merits.45

In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,46 this Court, by Decision dated
November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino arising
from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions, held that the trust
agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. The relevant portion of the Court’s ruling in said case reads:
The Bank alleges that the sale and twenty-year lease of the disputed property were part of a larger implied trust
"warehousing agreement." Concomitant (naturally accompanying or associated) with this Court’s factual finding
that the 20-year contract governs the relations between the parties, we find the Bank’s allegation of circumstances
surrounding its execution worthy of credence; the Bank and Tala entered into contracts of sale and lease back of the
disputed property and created an implied trust "warehousing agreement" for the reconveyance of the property. In the
eyes of the law, however, this implied trust is inexistent and void for being contrary to law.471avvphi1.zw+

xxxx

An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this Court has held that "where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud."48

xxxx

x x x [T]he bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its
purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it
to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same
time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had
already reached. x x x

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and
that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent (avoid, evade or bypass) the limitation.
Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to
reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price." This
agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while we find the sale and lease of
the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, we cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the
parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the payor in
achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‘clean hands’
doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship
with Tala.49

xxxx

The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto ( in equal fault), thus, no affirmative relief should be given to one against the
other. The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further
collect rent from the Bank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation nor the use of a juridical relation
such as a trust to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. Neither the Bank nor Tala came to court with clean hands;
neither will obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands.
x x x50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.51 This
Court’s ruling quoted in the immediately preceding paragraph on the nullity of the trust agreement which Banco
Filipino seeks to enforce thus applies to the present petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated February 14, 1997 and June
17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43344 are SET ASIDE. The March 13, 1996 Order of Branch 48 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta is SET ASIDE. The June 29, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. SP GR No. 73558
is SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2176-AF before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Civil
Case No. U-6026 before Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Civil Case No. 95-127 before Branch
No. 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena, and Civil Case No. 23, 821-95 before Branch 33 of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.