NITO ENTERPRISES VS. NLRC G.R. No.
114337 September 29, 1995 Apprenticeship Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
NOVEMBER 2, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Nito Enterprises hired Capili as an apprentice machinist under an apprenticeship
agreement for six months for a daily wage, which was 75% of applicable minimum wage.
However, shortly 2 months after he started work, Capili was asked to resign for the reason
that he had been causing accidents, that he has been doing certain things beyond the scope
of his duty, and that he had even injured himself in handling one of the machines, to the
financial prejudice of the company as his medication would be shouldered by Nito
Enterprises.
Capili later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. This
decision was reversed by the NLRC, holding that Capili was a regular employee. With this,
Nito came to the Supreme Court. Nito Enterprises assails the NLRC decision on the ground
that no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement
was executed.
ISSUE:
Is Capili a regular employee or an apprentice?
RULING:
Capili is a regular employee. Apprenticeship needs DOLE’s prior approval, or apprentice
becomes regular employee.
Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship
agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance
with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has
no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the
DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a
regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code and pursuant to
the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 152894
August 17, 2007
This is a petition for review of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The Facts
On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as
“fish cleaner” at petitioner’s tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an
apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75
daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner’s
apprenticeship program.
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997,
where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or “needs improvement” since she scored only
27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance
evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner
issued a termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her
termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.
Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment
of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay Palad
her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is
hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant’s
backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other
dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decision are
AFFIRMED.
Upon denial of Palad’s motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered, to wit:
(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;
(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;
(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was
withheld from her up to the time of her reinstatement;
(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) per
cent of the monetary award herein; and
(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not
valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA
approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard
of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded due process
because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS AN APPRENTICE; and
2. WHETHER THERE WAS  A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before Hiring
of Apprentices
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in
the trade of “care maker/molder.” On the same date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However,
the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of
approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give
rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has
no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the
DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a
regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x.
Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority
over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the
TESDA. RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program as a pre-
requisite for the hiring of apprentices.
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced before the TESDA’s approval of petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is
deemed a regular employee performing the job of a “fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of a “fish
cleaner” is necessary in petitioner’s business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article
28021 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer.
Illegal Termination of Palad
To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal
must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself.
When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in
this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor
performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted
and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of
termination because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of
evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend
herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision  and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Bernardo vs NLRC
GR 122917 07/03/99
Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a
uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers.
Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as
money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank.  They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of
Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special
workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract.  Furthermore, the employer may terminate
the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause.  Unless renewed in writing by the
employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them.  In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993.  Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank.  More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions.  In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-
bodied person.  Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5.  Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access
to opportunities for suitable employment.  A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to
the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80.  Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
trade or business of the employer.  The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.  The connection can be determined
by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety.  Also if the employee has been performing the job
for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the
necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business.  Hence, the employment is
considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them.  In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993.  Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others
lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank.  More
important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions.  In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks
assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank.  With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed
these tasks for more than six months. 
Petition granted
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990
until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.  She was again
invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods,
from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. 
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary
employee where probationary period will cover 150 days.  She indicated in the portion of the
job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier.  When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy.  Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of
not accepting married women for employment.  She was dismissed from the company disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land
effective January 29, 1992.  Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 not only for order but also imperatively required.
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of
a regular employee.  Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.  It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution.  The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T.  As stated in
the labor code: 

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married,
or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right.  The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation.  Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,