Latin American Dictatorships and the United States

Author(s): Clarence Henry Haring

Source: Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 70 (Oct., 1950 -
May, 1953), pp. 158-170
Published by: Massachusetts Historical Society
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 Latin American Dictatorships and the
United States
Clarence Henry Haring1

Within the past few weeks a revolution in Cuba, a military

coup d'?tat, has led to the upsetting of a duly elected civilian

government a clever, resourceful military leader, who

by
once before achieved the leadership of the state?dictatorship?by
similar means. And revolution in Bolivia, but in reverse, has resulted
in the upsetting of a military government by a civilian party followed
by a
bloody civil war. These victorious civilians will doubtless rule as

arbitrarily as did the soldiers, that is, to the exclusion of every other

party or faction. And all this within the past six weeks! own gov
Our
ernment, after appropriate enquiry, has promptly recognized the new
in both Bolivia and Cuba. This action has been a matter of
r?gimes,
concern to many worthy citizens of this country: the seeming inconsist
ency of as a of in the world at on
posing champion democracy large,
the one hand, and of maintaining, on the other hand, relations with
some rather less than democratic governments inMiddle and South
America.
We fight a war?two world wars, in fact?in defense of a demo
cratic way of life, and at the same time we ally ourselves in the Pan
American Union?or the Organization of American States, or the
as it is called today?with some of the most undemocratic, ar
O.A.S.,
bitrary, if not unscrupulous and brutal governments in the western

hemisphere. We
frequently hear from the more vocal Leftists that,
with all our democratic we should not, we cannot, stand
protestations,
idly by while the democratic elements in some of the Latin American
countries are under the iron heel tyranny. We must
of military give
them our moral, if not our material support. We must do something
about it. In other words, we must intervene, on our own behalf, in the
domestic concerns of these countries.
Yet I remember that some twenty-five years ago, when we were in
tervening in the domestic politics of several Middle American States,
1This was read at the February,
paper 1952, meeting.

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 Latin American Dictatorships 159
from the Dominican Republic and Cuba to Nicaragua and Panama?
in accordance with the so-called Theodore Roosevelt "corollary" of
the Monroe Doctrine?these same liberals were just as vociferously
demanding that we desist from intervention in the internal affairs of
the Latin American This was imperialism, "dollar diplo
Republics.
macy"!
When our friends demand that wein the support of the
intervene
democratic elements in nations where one may
dictatorship prevails,
inquire what mean by "intervention." Shall we revive
properly they
the policy pursued by our government for a quarter of a century ( 1904
to 1930), sending marines to help maintain constitutional, represent
ative government? Or shall we refuse diplomatic recognition to gov
ernments set up by revolution, by unconstitutional procedure? Or shall

Washington exert its influence to deny to such governments economic

assistance, either from the United States or from Europe? Or shall we

do all these things?
Perhaps the question may be clarified by brief reference to our ex

perience in Central America and the West Indian a genera

republics
tion or two ago. In 1904?after the Spanish-American War, and our
acquisition of Puerto Rico, and the freeing of Cuba from Spanish rule
?and especially after the independence of Panama and our undertak

ing to build the Panama Canal?our interests and responsibilities in the

Caribbean area were vastly increased. It seemed important that the
very unruly little nations in that area?chronically late in making pay
ments on their foreign suffering from perennial revolution
obligations,
which oftenendangered or foreign lives and property, and
impaired
threatened to bring intervention by European governments in de
fense of their nationals?intervention which, in turn, might lead to a

permanent interest states in that area, where we believed

by European
our own interests to be paramount?it seemed important, then, that
these little states be made to behave themselves.
And President Theodore
Roosevelt, in his annual message to Con

gress in 1904 made a famous declaration?the so-called "corollary"

to the Monroe Doctrine?enunciating what came to be called the "big
stick" policy.

country whose conduct themselves well, can count upon our

Any people
hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable

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 160Massachusetts Historical Society
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its
obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States.
Chronic or an
impotence which results in a general loosening
wrong-doing,
of the ties of civilized society, may in America as elsewhere, ultimately require
intervention by some civilized nation, and in theWestern hemisphere the ad
herence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence,
to exercise an international police power.

exter
This policy of "supervision" of the internal, and sometimes

nal, affairs of the Caribbean nations was certainly well-intentioned. Its

purpose was to exert to the utmost our power and influence in order to
insure public peace, maintain constitutional procedure in these nations,
rehabilitate their finances, and thus forestall intervention by aggrieved
governments in Europe?intervention that might our
jeopardize
control over the approaches to the Panama Canal. What was our ex

perience? Relations with the new Republic of Cuba were governed by

the celebrated Platt Amendment to its constitution, which authorized
the United States to intervene for the maintenance of public order,
limited the borrowing power of the new state, and incidentally pro
vided for the lease to the United States of certain naval and coaling
stations. The consequence was a period of American rule in Cuba from

1906 to 1909, and thereafter threats of intervention in 1912 and 1917.

The history of the Republic of Haiti had been a long story of ar
bitrary misrule, revolution, and chronic disorders, until in July, 1915,
American marines were landed to avert European intervention. The
collection of customs, and government finance generally, were placed
under American administration, and the country, although enjoying
peace and material became a dependency of the
prosperity, practically
United States.

Already in 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt first enun

ciated his famous "corollary," the government of the Dominican Re
was in a state of hopeless bankruptcy, and European intervention
public
to protect foreign lives and property seemed imminent. An arrange
ment was then made for a receivership of customs under American con
trol to insure the government's solvency. But political disturbances
and financial irregularities continued, and in April, 1916, this small
republic, too, was occupied by American marines.
I need not enter into our arrangements with the Republic of

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 Latin American Dictatorships 161

Panama, for the existence of the Panama Canal constituted them a

special case. But inNicaragua,

intervention beginning some forty years

ago, was "notorious." Nicaragua had been ruled since 1893 by a trucu
lent dictator, Jos? Santos Zelaya, who aspired to the rule of all Central
America. He was a thorn in the flesh to his neighbors. In 1909 our
government rid Nicaragua of him a revolution of the
by supporting
opposition party, and until 1924 that party (a so-called Conservative

Party) maintained itself in power with the moral and military aid of
Washington. American bankers were encouraged to make arrange
ments for the reorganization of the currency and the foreign debt, and
for the economic development of the country. In 1912 a legation guard
of iOOmarines was landed to protect the new government from revolu
tion, and they remained
there, except for a short interval in 1925?

1926, until 1933, although for several years the country was contin

ually in the throes of civil war.

By and large, American intervention made for peace, political sta

bility, and financial solvency. But that these desirable results were due

chiefly to a healthy dread of the North American Big Stick was also
true. And it caused bitter resentment, not only throughout Central
America but in Latin American countries as a whole. We were accused
of imperialism (amuch abused word), of the ambition to dominate by
strong-arm methods, military and economic, the whole Western Hem
isphere. This mounting hostility was bad for our trade as well as for
international goodwill. It culminated in the International Confer
ence of American States inHavana in 1928, when it almost destroyed
the Pan American movement. There we suffered a virtual diplomatic
defeat, and were saved only by the rivalries among the Latin Ameri
can nations themselves.
Then Washington began to see the light. We gradually liquidated
our commitments in Central America and the Caribbean and
republics,
began consciously to pursue a Good-Neighbor
Policy?really begun
by Republican President Hoover, but publicized and emphasized by
Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The legation guard was
withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933. Intervention inHaiti was gradu

ally liquidated between 1931 and 1934, when the last of the marines
left the republic. In the same year, 1934, there was signed the treaty
that freed Cuba from what it regarded as the humiliating terms of the
Platt Amendment. The full sovereignty of Panama was
recognized by

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 162Massachusetts Historical Society
a treaty ratified by theUnited States Senate in 1939. And in the Do
minican Republic, from which American forces had already been with
drawn in 1924, the American collectorship of customs was finally abol
ished in 1940. The results in our relations with Latin America were al
most immediately apparent. They at the next Pan American
appeared
Conference (International Conference of American States) at Monte
video in 1933, and in the Conference at Buenos Ayres in 1936, where
the American governments, including the United States, agreed, as a
matter of principle, to abjure all intervention in the domestic and
foreign concerns of other American states.
President Wilson, early in his first administration, had enunciated
the policy of refusing diplomatic recognition to governments coming
into power in Latin America by revolution or coup d'?tat, and this poli
cy was pursued thereafter by our State Department in Central Ameri
ca. In conformity with a series of treaties signed inWashington by all
the Central American republics in 1923, we agreed furthermore not
to recognize any new government, even if it were elected, that was
headed by a leader of a revolution or by any of his near relatives. These
efforts to maintain the forms of constitutionalism by denying recogni
tion to revolutionary governments were abandoned by the administra
tion of F. D. R. as a costly and thankless experiment.
Although this policy was confined mostly to the Central American

republics, countries of South America feared that this form of interven

tion would be extended to them also, as itwas, once, in the case of Ecua
dor. This was one of the circumstances in the crisis in inter-American
relations at the Havana Conference in 1928. But in 1930?that year of
South American revolutions, when
governments were overthrown by
force in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil?we fairly promptly in
each case accorded diplomatic recognition to the new r?gime.
One of the chief aims of our Caribbean policy had been to insure con
stitutional government and popular control through honest elections.
In that we had signally failed. The implications of this policy and the
responsibilities put upon the Department of State, were too vast. They
forced the department to serve as interpreter of the constitutions of
these countries. Rival political leaders turned toWashington to inquire
whether they were eligible for election for the presidency, or which of
the political parties in the dispute was constitutional, when in reality
neither, perhaps, had much claim to that distinction. If we supported a

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 Latin American Dictatorships 16 3

government as being constitutional, it generally meant merely ena

bling that government to perpetuate itself in power by rigging the elec

tions?in other words, supporting what became, to all intents and pur
poses, a as in for more than a decade.
dictatorship, happened Nicaragua
If we refused recognition to a government as being unconstitutional,
we encouraged the opposition to attempt to overthrow it by violence?
in short, we were encouraging revolution. In any case, the party in
power, because it was associated with foreign intervention, came
just
generally to be opposed by a majority of the people. Thus the govern
ment was really a minority to be no way out of
r?gime. There seemed
this morass of contradictions.
So we liquidated our Caribbean engagements, and joined
slowly
with all the other American governments formally to repudiate the
in the domestic concerns and foreign relations of
right of intervention
other American states. This principle found its ultimate expression at
the Pan American conference at Bogota in 1948, where the problem
was discussed of the recognition of de facto governments; whether a
new government of revolution?not a or constitu
arising by way legal
tional or de jure government?should be accorded immediate recogni
tion regardless of its origin. The discussion centred about the so
called Estrada Doctrine of the continuity of diplomatic relations. This
doctrine was not formally adopted by the Conference; the question
was referred to the Inter-American Council of Jurists. But our State

Department, in spite of some popular criticism, has since acted more or

less in accord therewith. The Bogota Conference met in March of

1948. Before the end of that same year, two popularly elected gov
ernments in South America had been overturned by an army revolt?
that of Peru in October and that of Venezuela in November. In each
case the State Department, after
appropriate inquiry, recognized the
new military r?gime. We had done the same, more recently, in Cuba
and Bolivia. That is where we stand today.
The past five or six years have seemed rather discouraging for
friends of democracy in Latin America. We see Argentina a constitu
tion closely patterned after that of the United States, prostituted by
a demogogic Per?n; we find military dictatorship inVenezuela, Peru,
Haiti, and Cuba?in all of which countries government by popular
election had only recently emerged for the first time in their history;
we see Colombia, remarkable during nearly fifty years for its adher

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 164Massachusetts Historical Society
ence to democratic rule, driven by factional into the dictator
passions
ship of a single party.
There is, however, a brighter side to the picture. Brazil within the
same period repudiated dictatorship and returned to popular elections
in 1945. And although Brazil recently re?lected its former dictator,
Getulio Vargas, to the presidency, that election was in reality the
greatest expression of popular suffrage in its history. Ecuador, classic
land of revolutions, few of whose presidents in recent years have been

permitted to complete their term of office, seems under President Galo

Plaza to have attained to some degree of equilibrium. Chile and Uru
guay, too, both of which have lived under dictators at one time or an
other during the past quarter century, have retained their democratic
institutions intact.
Even in the Middle American area?Central America and the
Caribbean?the hopes for democracy are glimmering, in spite of a
Somoza in Nicaragua and a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. The
of Panama have very recently and very an
people forcibly rejected
aspiring semi-fascist demagogue; Costa Rica and Salvador, during the

past few years, have both fought for free elections; Guatemala five
years ago overthrew a heavy-handed dictatorship to restore the demo
cratic process, although a process that comes close to putting Commu
nist elements in control. Even Honduras recently chose a president by
peaceful election.
All this, however, does not make the problem of our relations with
dictators or democrats any simpler. During the recent World War, of
course, the contradiction of our fighting for democracy in Europe and
consorting with dictators in America was obvious, although it was no
more contradictory than our alliance with Communist Russia. For both
situations the answer is the same ; in a time of grave national peril (and
after Pearl Harbor it was very grave, for we were on the brink of dis

aster) we had to seek help, and economic where we

especially help,
could find it, regardless, if you will, of political principle.
But there are other
considerations, less transitory, more permanent,
involved. I believethat it is very important that the Pan American

Union, or Organization of American States, be preserved, for strategic,

military reasons and for the peace of the world?preserved as a region

al organization within the United Nations. That regional organization
is based upon the principle of the absolute political equality o,f states,

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 Latin American Dictatorships 165
large and small ; a unique principle, for no other international political
body, neither the League of Nations, nor the United Nations, has been
able to achieve this political equality of states. Indeed only by adher
ence to such a among nations so varied in language, race,
principle,
culture, and economic power, has the Pan American concept achieved
such notable our former policy of intervention,
success. On which was
really a denial
of that the Pan American movement was al
principle,
most wrecked twenty-five years ago.
Even under an unpopular dictatorship, interference by a foreign
power has frequently stirred the patriotic majority of the nation to

rally behind their own government. A liberal opposition to dictator

ship which welcomed foreign intervention has generally been a mi

nority in the nation, not too popular with their In

fellow-countrymen.
fact, it is a common phenomenon in Latin American history that dic
tators or governments have up the
unpopular deliberately conjured
spectre of foreign interference in order to rally the nation behind them
and divert attention from the shortcomings of the government at home.

Argentina is a case in point, both when Spruille Braden was our

ambassador in Buenos Ayres, and today. Mr. Braden never attacked
the government to which he was accredited, but he did state publicly
that he and his fellow-countrymen believed in democracy and hoped
for the ultimate victory of democratic principles in America. That
could doubtless be interpreted as "moral support" for the democratic
elements in Argentina?moral support for which these
elements had
been anxiously hoping. But
it just as certainly did not weaken General
Per?n 's likelihood of election to the presidency. On the contrary, many
believe that popular support for Per?n was increased by what he loudly
proclaimed to be gross intervention in the domestic politics of Argen
tina. And President Per?n has ever
since, to this day, used Ambassador
Braden as a to rally the nation to his support. The issue
whipping-boy
of the famous Blue Book by our Department of State just before Pe
r?n's first election, intended to discredit the existing r?gime in Argen
tina, was also, and for the same reasons, as the Spaniards say, contra

producente.
I am not sure, therefore, that even moral support by our government
for the democratic elements suffering under dictatorship in Latin
America can be relied on for success. Political either
interference, by
landing marines or by denial of recognition, we have tried,
diplomatic

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 166Massachusetts Historical Society
and found wanting. The currents of a jealous nationalism in these coun
tries are running too strong. Pressure of any kind is immediately seized
upon by press and politicians as foreign intervention, and intervention
of any kind, the American states have agreed, contravenes the basic

principle of the political equality of states.

There are, moreover, other considerations of a collateral nature.
There runs throughout Latin America?and our own is rarely
public
aware of it?another sentiment parallel with Pan Americanism, and

quite as strong, if not, at times, stronger; and that is Latin American

ism. The American nations with a common Hispanic background?and
this includes Portuguese Brazil?possess a feeling of solidarity that
often transcends the Pan American idea. Indeed, in the minds
of many
Latin Americans the two are often confused, and when they talk of
Pan Americanism they are really thinking in terms of Latin American
ism. This was true even of the great South American liberators, Simon

Bolivar, called, if inaccurately, the "Father of Pan Americanism."

This is quite natural, not only on cultural grounds, but because of the

glaring contrast between the "Colossus of the North," with its extraor

dinary economic and power, and their own meagre re

political
sources. This Latin Americanism, although largely sentimental, is
sometimes into political
translated terms. The insistence of the Latin
American delegates to the tepee Conference inMexico in 1945
Chapul
and at the San Francisco Conference that created the United Nations
later same year,
in the that Argentina in spite of its "misbehavior"

during the Second World War, be restored to good standing within

the Pan American Union and be admitted to the United Nations, is a
case in point. It iswithin the orbit of these ideas that the Organization
of American States must function, and it is the more important that
the solidarity of the United States with the other American Republics
be maintained.
There are, however, still other circumstances of amore fundamental
sort. It may be questioned whether many of the Latin American nations
are prepared, as yet, for democracy as we understand it in this country.
In many of them, especially the Andean countries, the rate of illiteracy
is high, and land still remains the possession of a relatively few who,
fearful of losing their privileged position, are distrustful of democratic
institutions, and at times in the past have been frankly fascist. In many
of them the mass of the population, Indian or near Indian, or Negro

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 Latin American Dictatorships 167
or Mulatto, remain an ignorant, impoverished, dependent class, out
side the body politic. A small educated white minority monopolizes
political and economic
power. In other countries a middle class has

emerged and advanced

in numbers, wealth, and education, and has ob
tained political and social recognition. But here, too, very often, due
to lack of experience, political education has lagged behind cultural
and economic progress. The consequence is the political crises inArgen
tina and in Colombia today.
The rise to power of the Per?n r?gime in Argentina represents
nothing more or less than the bankruptcy of democracy there as a

going concern?the moral and political bankruptcy of what was once

the majority, middle-class party, the so-called Radical Civic Union,
and this in a country that prided itself on being somewhat superior to
all other Latin American nations?not as other people are?and in
culturaland political progress far beyond the stage of alternate revolu
tion and dictatorship. And Colombia, which we fondly regarded as

having definitely emerged with Uruguay and Chile, as one

together
of the few truly democratic states of South America, which has enjoyed
almost a half century of unbroken political peace, where Liberals and
Conservatives cooperated loyally in maintaining the constitutional
process, often collaborating in the government?in Colombia today
party passions have risen to fever heat, with the result that some of the

provinces are in a state of civil war.

These shortcomings, as has been said elsewhere, are due to historic
circumstances that go back to the days before independence. One hun
dred and twenty-five years ago these Latin American communities,
like the thirteen English colonies, had attained a that
development
made them strong enough to achieve independence from the mother
country. Unlike the English however,
colonies, they lacked most of
essentials of self-government. the absolutism
Under of Spanish and
Portuguese kings, they never had been given opportunities to learn the
rules of democratic action, or the of
simplest elementary principles
government, nor were they permitted to acquire experience
popular
inmatters so axiomatic to us that we are scarcely conscious of them.
Motives of public service, which are the result of in
long experience
and without which no democracy can survive; the
self-government,
of willingness of the minority to submit to a ma
spirit compromise,
jority's decisions, or of a majority to respect the rights of the minority

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 168Massachusetts Historical Society
?all these were notable for their absence. And again, when independ
ence was achieved in South America, it involved a revo
only political
lution. The old social order remained: a small land-owning aristocracy
or Negro
supported by a great mass of servile Indian workers. A mid
dle class did not exist.
The South American patriots held high resolves for the future of
their countries and aimed to give them
ideally perfect governments
based on the of democracy and equality. But in actual practice
priciples
they fell far short of these ideals. They were theorists, without practi
cal experience in politics. They drew up constitutions that embodied
the ideals of liberalism fashionable in that day, but inmost cases incom
with the actual social and economic conditions prevailing in
patible
their countries. In this aristocratic society, moreover, the only respect
a or the
able job was professional job?in the army, the government,
church ; and all the more so because, with the lack of industrial devel

opment and of a middle class there was little economic opportunity

for the ambitious young man in any other sphere of life.

Politics, therefore, in these new republics soon resolved itself into

a
struggle between rival groups in the small ruling minority for con
trol of the government and of the patronage that went with it.When
a faction or group got into power, it could not easily be dislodged, for
once in office, it tried to remain there, by hook or crook, by fraud or
force. In short, it became a kind of dictatorship, which could be pried
loose only by violence, by resort to revolution. The written constitution
was in substance ignored, and revolution became the accepted extra-con
stitutional method of changing the government. Something of this in
herited situation still survives today. Given the handicaps with which
these republics to contend, handicaps
have had social, economic, racial,
and political, the vagaries of their history in the past may easily be ac
counted for, and the vagaries of their politics in some of them today.
No nation can be made to achieve democracy by government fiat,
either at home or from abroad. A functioning democracy is the fruit of
a long, hard period of experiment, of trial and error. This is nowhere
better exemplified than in the history of the United States. In some

countries, therefore, generally the more Indian countries, government

at best and of necessity remains in the hands of an educated minority?
at worst, in the control of a military dictator. In some of the more ad
vanced either a self-appointed oligarchy of land-owners and
republics,

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 Latin American Dictatorships 169
leaders in industry and commerce manipulates the political machinery
set up the government, or a
by the constitution and monopolizes

demogogic Per?n exploits the ignorant proletariat and an inexperi

enced middle-class electorate, to set up a semi-fascist dictatorship.
Even inMexico, which has made extraordinary progress in the past

quarter-century, where the national government in general probably

represents the will of the majority, candid Mexicans freely admit that
elections are not, and cannot be, "free and uncontrolled."
What, then, is the answer to this problem of the relations of the
United States with dictatorship in Latin America? If we cannot, and
should not, intervene or covertly in the domestic of
openly politics
other American countries, we can at least openly, in our periodical press
and elsewhere, condemn injustice and denial of personal and political
rights in the more unfortunate republics. Witness the universal con
demnation abroad of the rape of La Prensa of Buenos Ayres by the Pe
r?n r?gime last year. We can also assist even undemocratic govern
ments to raise the standard of living of the under-privileged masses,
improve health
and vigor by programs of public sanitation, and provide
enlarged educational facilities?a major item in Point Four?and so
create a broader basis for the emergence of an
help intelligent, popular
electorate. We can also an of how a democracy should
provide example
function by trying to keep our own house in order?which we have not
done too successfully of late, as shown by the disclosures of corrupt

practices in both national and local administration.

Our should
government try to avoid even the appearance of con
doning or the violation of and
dictatorship personal political rights
in other American republics. This will be difficult, while we are carry
ing out the Point Four program. As Professor Stuart Hughes has put it
in a recent book in regard to Italy and Japan,

The United States does not need to support conservative political parties in any
overt fashion ; these their to understand that en
parties simply give people they
joy the blessing of the American government, and their people, far more accus
tomed than the Americans to think in terms of economic influence on politics,
are to believe them. American influence can come without ef
ready practically
fort or intuition.2

The same remarks to our relations with undemocratic govern

apply

2 our Times
Stuart Hughes, An Essay for (New York, 1950).

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 170Massachusetts Historical Society
ments inLatin America. The daily press reported last fall that the
World Bank had recently granted a credit of a half million dollars to
the Republic of Nicaragua for constructing a grain storage and drying

plant. Does this assistance imply moral and economic support for the

dictatorship of Somoza, or is it merely aid in raising the living stand

ards of the Nicaraguan people? The loan of one hundred and twenty
five million dollars to Argentina over a year ago, was really intended
to bail out American business
interests, and perhaps to avert an eco
nomic crisis that would
bear heavily upon the rank and file of Argen
tine people, but it created a very unhappy impression among liberals in

Argentina and in other South American countries, notably in Brazil,

our best friend in that part of the world. It was not so much that we
seemed to be aiding a near-fascist r?gime, but rather because we were
not being so generous to other Latin American countries. And there
is no evidence that this "soft touch" approach has even earned us the
good will of the Per?n r?gime. The government-controlled Argentine
press continues to attack the United States and certain of its respected
citizens outrageously. An Argentine inclination to cooperate effectively
with the United States and other American republics, either in the
O.A.S. or in the seems to be as remote
policies of the United Nations,
as ever.

Given then, the present critical state of affairs in the world at large,
and the O.A.S. as at present constituted, intervention by the United
States in the countries of Latin America in the interest of democracy,
the exertion of diplomatic or economic pressures, is out of the question.
The charter of the O.A.S. everywhere stresses as fundamental the

principles of popular government 5yet within the Union there exists an

unfortunate division between governments that are narrow oligarch
ies, or and governments that are honestly democratic.
dictatorships,
Any policy of intervention by the United States, even "moral" inter

vention, would merely tend to make this schism wider, and might be
resented by all Latin American governments, good and bad. By hold

ing the Union together, however, we

are really working in the ultimate
interests of liberalism throughout the Americas, and helping to

strengthen that larger world order represented by the United Nations.

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